Journal of Political Affairs 2019 - Concordia University Undergraduate

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JOURNALÂ POLITICAL AFFAIRS

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The Journal of Political Affairs is comprised of undergraduate papers (in French and in English) relating to scholarship in political science. The Journal encompasses essays in public policy, political theory and philosophy, international politics, comparative politics, Canadian politics, and international political economy – and papers from other disciplines that address issues of political importance.

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Copyright â’¸ Journal of Political Affairs 2019 The Journal of Political Affairs retains First North American Serial rights The JPA is a yearly publication produced by the Political Science Department at Concordia University, Montreal Except for brief passages quoted in newspapers, magazines, radio or television reviews, no part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, inducing photocopying or recording, or by an information storage and retrieval system, without written permission from the author of the essays.

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Printed at Rubiks Rubiks Downtown West 2148 Mackay H3G 2J1 514.845.8444 production@rubiks.ca Journal of Political Affairs Concordia University 1445 De Maisonneuve Blvd. W., Montreal Quebec, Canada H3G 1M8 http://www.facebook.com/jpajournal political.affairs.concordia@gmail.com

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Editors Letter

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Climate Change Induced Migration in India and Marshall Islands

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One Step at a Time: A Democratic Approach to Canada's Turnout Problem

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R2P Post Libya: Invalidated Idea or Worthy of Reform

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A Friendly Dictator: Neorealism to explain U.S. and IMF Support of the Pinochet Regime

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Pourquoi l'Allemagne a-t-elle une politique d'asile plus gĂŠnĂŠreuse que la France?

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Dying With Dignity Canada and their Efforts to Shape Bill C-14

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SPVM: A Case of Bureaucratic Representative Theory

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Violence Against the LGBT+ Community in Latin America

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Meet The Team & The Authors

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New Levels of Climate Urgency

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Migration Induced by Climate Change India and the Marshall Islands

by Zulema Dath

Introduction Climate change has introduced a new level of urgency for many developing countries. The occurrence of sudden natural disasters has increased by 60% over the last 40 years, along with an average of 25.4 million people being displaced every year due to these natural disasters (Bedarff 2017, 6). There is much discourse in regard to the impact of environmental changes on these countries, in addition to increasing policy measures to prevent future climateinduced emigration and domestic migration. This paper seeks to identify the effects of climate change on the environmental and socioeconomic factors for migration, as well as the policies being implemented in response to climate change and climate-induced migration. I contend that climate change exacerbates environmental and socioeconomic factors in the form of a catalyst for migration.

These factors demonstrate the manifestation of climate change consequences, which can create further vulnerability if not addressed properly. Therefore, issues within the environmental, socioeconomic and political realms should serve as policy targets for governments to effectively handle and prevent climate-induced migration. This paper will begin with a literature review discussing implications of climate change for vulnerable human populations, factors for migration and policy options. The case studies of The Marshall Islands (RMI) and India will be observed through the following themes while addressing the extent of international migration: the relative role of environmental stresses and the

!15 socioeconomic factors that cause climate change and migration. As policy implementation is crucial for the successful fight against climate-induced migration, this paper will also compare and contrast the policy responses and political influences surrounding the two countries. The paper will conclude by expanding on the effects of climate change and policy implementation to demonstrate the urgency for governments to strengthen their environmental and socioeconomic policies in order to reduce climate change vulnerability and negative consequences that catalyst migration.

Literature Review Before delving into the case studies of The Marshall Islands and India, the discourse and theories surrounding climate-induced migration must first be established. This literature review will demonstrate some of the factors that may influence climate-induced migration, as well as the resulting vulnerability of communities. As previously stated, policy can either promote the vulnerability of populations or instill climate resilience.

Factors for Migration The effects of climate change on migration depend on the vulnerability of a community (Brown 2008, 9). One can measure vulnerability by considering the amount of exposure to climate conditions, as well as the adaptive capacity of a community. This vulnerability is influenced by both climate change and nonclimate change related factors. Climate change-related factors include climate processes (i.e., levels rising and water scarcity) and climate events (i.e., flooding and storms), which act as “push” factors for migration. Non-climate change factors can act as “pull” factors, but are most influential on the resilience of a community through government policy (Brown 2008, 9). Consequently, all of the above play an important role in climate-induced migration, not simply on climate change itself.

Implications of Climate Change for Vulnerable Human Populations Brown argues on behalf of the International Organization for Migration that climate change will cause less habitable areas around the world.

!16 Consequently, there will be an increase in population movements due to the destruction of livelihoods and the lack of access to food and water supplies (Brown 2008, 16). The effects of climate change forecasted for the future are looking grim: The world is expected to increase between 1.8 degrees Celsius to 4 degrees Celsius above current global temperatures by 2099 (Brown 2008, 16).

Extreme weather events are also expected to increase in frequency as well as in severity, which can potentially harm vulnerable communities. The number of people who are expected to be affected by floods by the 2050s are between 10 to 25 million per year (Brown 2008, 16). Clearly, although climate-induced migration may be a recent phenomenon, it may grow exponentially in the decades to come.

Policy Options and Challenges In regard to policy, it is in the interest of policymakers to create policy that targets climate change and the alleviation of climate-induced migration (Chirico 2017, 138). There are complex and interrelated links between the effects of climate change and non-climate change related aspects such as the environment, socioeconomic and political factors. As a result, policy targeted towards the development and improvement of these aspects will reduce vulnerability to climate change. This approach is effective because it tackles the root of the environmental migrant dilemma. For instance, Chirico emphasizes the importance of effective international collaboration in order to reach the objectives of the Paris Agreement, as well as the Sustainable Development Goals. In this regard, longterm solutions to combat climate change with mutually agreed upon goals can be addressed (Chirico 2017).

However, the task of effectively handling environmental migrants can be complex due to the variety and unpredictability of migration (Martin 2010, 400).

Factors such as planned versus spontaneous migration, small-scale versus largescale migration, domestic versus international migration and temporary versus permanent settlement all require very different policy approaches (Martin 2010).

This can be problematic when applying uniform and overly simplistic approaches that do not take into consideration the aforementioned aspects interrelated with the impact of climate change and how it affects migration. As a result, both climate change and non-climate change factors must be addressed in order to

!17 effectively implement policy that reduces vulnerability to climate change and prevents further migration.

Case Studies: The Marshall Islands and India Introduction These particular countries were selected as case studies due to their differences in geographic size, impacts from climate change, and most importantly, their policy initiatives towards climate change and climate-induced migration. Each case study will seek to identify the effects of climate change upon environmental and socioeconomic factors for migration.

As the case studies will demonstrate, the role of climate change on socioeconomic and environmental factors seems to act as a catalyst for migration.

When climate change affects environmental factors, such as flooding, it is more obvious and visible to policymakers for policy implementation. In India, for example, sustainable development is a clear and straightforward objective because improvements are often more noticeable and easily measurable.

Socioeconomic factors are more complex. Climate change seems to further entrench all kinds of existing inequalities when it is not being properly addressed through effective policy implementation. In India, for example, the vulnerability of women to climate change is so deeply rooted due to socioeconomic and gender inequalities, as well as a lack of concern from policymakers. More importantly, vulnerable women are often without the means to migrate to a better location and are forced to experience the negative consequences of climate change in their daily lives. This is contrasted with the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI), in which policy directed towards socioeconomic and gender equality are perceived as advantageous to the general development of their country, while increasing the resilience of the people.

Furthermore, the strong relationship between land and identity serves in both the Sundarbans of India and The Marshall Islands as impediments to the “push� socioeconomic factor that is enforced through climate change. This sets it apart from environmental factors that are affected by climate change.

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The Marshall Islands Environmental Factors Due to rising sea levels and the increasing intensity of environmental disasters caused by climate change, such as typhoons, the coral reefs and islands of the Marshall Islands, also known as atolls, are under the threat of becoming uninhabitable (Weir et al 2016, 1022). The frequency of saltwater flooding in the Marshall Islands has declined dramatically as a result of climate change. The ‘lens’ of freshwater supplies takes about 12 months to recover. However, if the prevalence of saltwater flooding continues to decrease, RMI’s freshwater will not be able to recover quickly enough to combat saltwater inundation. At current rates, this may be experienced as early as 2040 (Weir et al 2016, 1022). If this were to occur, entire populations could be completely decimated and may have to seek asylum elsewhere. However, not all scholars are convinced that the inundation of the Marshall Islands is inevitable. Ford and Kench (2014) argue that there is no evidence that the islands are being “washed away” despite the fact that local sea levels are rising. Their research has found that the islands have persisted by continually adjusting to the environment while experiencing different levels of erosion and accretion (Ford and Kench 2014). This is demonstrated in the few but powerful typhoons experienced by the RMI that have caused widespread destruction across the islands, while still accumulating sediments for both the formation and the recovery of the islands (Ford and Kench 2015, 22). Whether the loss of habitable land can be avoided depends on how well atoll communities can adapt to climate change.

Socioeconomic Factors The influence of climate change on socioeconomic components functions as both “push” and “pull” factors. The “push” factor of climate change is demonstrated through the increased levels of urban migration away from vulnerable areas, such as low-lying atolls, caused by climate change (Campbell and Warrick 2014). On the other hand, the “pull” factor is migration in hopes of livelihood security and job opportunity. Consequently, the urban centers of Majuro and Ebeye contain over two-thirds of the total population and is facing issues of overcrowding, unemployment and pressure on resources (Republic of

!19 the Marshall Islands 2014, 11). Social tensions such as competition for land, space and money cause land disputes and discourage potential investors. Furthermore, 40% of the Marshallese population is 15 years or younger, causing negative impacts on health, education and youth policy, as well as employment policies (Republic of the Marshall Islands 2014, 11).

The Marshallese have a strong social and cultural attachment to their land that creates an intertwined concept of land and culture (Weir et al., 2017).

Although there continues to be strong societal and political support for traditional values and social structures as part of Marshallese culture and identity, the urban migration of the dominant younger population from the outer islands, coupled with the threat of climate-induced migration, challenges the survival of Marshallese traditional identity and culture (Weir et al., 2017). In this context, the “push” and “pull” socioeconomic factors for migration that are impacted by climate change must be powerful enough to overcome the desire to stay and maintain cultural roots.

India Environmental Factors India is part of the BRICS countries, comprised of Brazil, Russia, India, China and now South Africa, who are expected to become the dominant suppliers of manufactured goods and services by 2050 (Investopedia). However, India’s rapid development has enhanced pollution and man-made contributions to the increasing effects of climate change (Ananthapadmanabhan, 2007).

According to Panda, climate change is expected to affect migration in several ways. Firstly, atmospheric warming in certain regions will cause reduced agricultural potential, which can undermine fertile soil and water (Panda 2010, 77-78). Secondly, extreme weather events will destroy homes and communities, thus creating mass displacement. Lastly, rising sea levels will continue to destroy low-lying coastal areas. As Panda (2010) argues, the diverse geography of India makes it susceptible to climate change effects such as drought, desertification, rising sea levels in coastal regions, water scarcity and low food productivity.

These represent environmental “push” factors that force migration within India.

For example, a rise in sea level of only one meter is expected to displace 7.1

!20 million people in India, with 32% of the country’s coastal area at risk of inundation in the future (Panda 2010, 77-78). Furthermore, with an increase in temperature of 2 degrees Celsius, combined with an 8% increase in precipitation, there is an estimated loss of 12% of agricultural net revenue for India (Singh et al.

2018).

Socioeconomic Factors The Sundarbans forest of India has been experiencing forced migration due to flooding that has been exacerbated by climate change. It is a cluster of lowlying islands located across India and Bangladesh, covering nearly 4,000 square miles. On the island of Ghoramara, only 3,000 of the 40,000 original inhabitants remain (Shapiro 2016). A survey conducted by Roy and Guha in 2013 found that over the past ten to fifteen years, there has been an increased trend of migration from the Sundarbans to other cities in India. Out of 41 households, one to two male members per household migrated for reasons including loss of assets due to flooding, infertile land, and a lack of alternative job opportunities, among other reasons. This trend has reflected the people’s need to migrate in order to maintain a livelihood as a result of the effects of climate change (Roy and Guha 2013, 78).

When there is high socioeconomic and gender inequality, vulnerability to climate change will also be high, due to a lack of means necessary to build resilience. In India, climate change has accentuated the existing inequalities and reduced the likelihood of achieving gender equality. Women tend to be the first to experience environmental degradation and are the most disturbed by it (Yadav and Rattan 2017, 9). Yadav and Rattan argue that climate change has impacted extreme poverty, the destruction of livelihood, and the loss of productive assets.

This has caused the increased emigration of men in search of employment opportunities, and the “feminization of responsibilities” (Yadav and Rattan 2017).

They argue that climate change has also created the opportunity for increased human trafficking, which can increase by 20% to 30% during disasters (Yadav and Rattan 2017, 10). Disasters make women more vulnerable to trafficking due to the disruption of social structure and protective patterns in families.

Furthermore, Yadav and Rattan note that girls who come from very poor families are more susceptible to be forced into labor and the sex trade as a consequence of extreme climate change that destroys productive assets and increases poverty. Any

!21 formal laws that could potentially benefit women are not helpful in practice due to social and cultural factors that favor men. For example, less than 10% of privately held land is under the name of a woman in India (Yadav and Rattan 2017, 10).

However, instead of observing increased migration patterns of Indian women, Yadav and Rattan have found that women have been demonstrating climate change adaptation and mitigation (Yadav and Rattan 2017, 11-12). In the deserts of Rajasthan, women are growing crop varieties that are suited to the region, planting fruit trees for nutrition and income, as well as constructing embankments for capturing rainfall and prevent runoff or soil erosion (Yadav and Rattan 2017, 11-12). In order to build resilience in poor communities, it is crucial to establish programs that not only increase one’s ability to recover from a climate-related shock, but also accumulate assets. This includes the protection of public goods from climate change impact so that vulnerable populations are assured access to public goods for future resilience (Godfrey-Wood and Flower 2017).

Policy Implications This section seeks to identify the policies that are being implemented in response to climate change and climate-induced migration in both countries, as well as evaluate their effectiveness and implementation.

The Marshall Islands The National Development Themes of the RMI serves the purpose of mitigating the impacts of climate change and increasing awareness (Republic of the Marshall Islands, 2014). Another prominent climate change policy is The Joint National Action Plan for Climate Change Adaptation and Disaster Risk Management (JNAP), which was created in 2010. Furthermore, The RMI National Climate Change Policy of 2011 functions to “climate-proof” all development activities (Republic of the Marshall Islands, 2014).

Some of the challenges that the RMI faces are rapid urbanization and urban unemployment, which have been intensified due to climate change.

Therefore, the RMI’s objective is to reduce urban migration by improving the quality of life of the inhabitants of the outer islands in order to eliminate the

!22 appeal of migrating to the cities. To achieve this, the policy addressed in both Vision 2018 in 2001, and more recently in the National Strategic Plan (NSP), contains objectives for sustainability of the economy and infrastructure (Republic of the Marshall Islands 2002; Republic of the Marshall Islands 2014).

It is important to note that both Vision 2018 and the NSP address the importance of gender equality and aim to reduce socioeconomic inequality (Republic of the Marshall Islands 2002; Republic of the Marshall Islands 2014).

In the Marshall Islands, land ownership is traditionally decided through matrilineal land rights. The RMI exhibits a strong desire to support these customary matrilineal land rights as further protection of women’s rights and opportunity. The RMI also seeks to reach an “acceptable level” of equity in income distribution through collaboration with NGOs to design policies and programs for those affected by poverty and who need assistance (Republic of the Marshall Islands 2002; Republic of the Marshall Islands 2014). The reduction of socioeconomic and gender inequalities through policy, in addition to lowering poverty levels, is an effective approach for preventing further urban migration. As stated in the literature review, the vulnerability of a community is partially contingent upon their adaptive capacity. The adaptive capacity is increased when socioeconomic inequalities and poverty levels are decreased. This policy also serves to improve the livelihoods of non-urban communities, thus removing the “pull” factor of urban migration.

To reduce excessive labor force and reduce the pressure on resources that has been exemplified by urban migration, the RMI encourages international migration (Republic of the Marshall Islands 2002). However, the RMI does not have policy regarding the potential consequence of mass, forceful emigration as a result of climate change in the future.

India India has historically argued that developed countries should start by reducing their per capita emissions before India is forced to do the same, in order to prevent detrimental effects on their development (Saryal 2018). However, with the creation of the National Action Plan on Climate Change (NAPCC) in 2008, climate change mitigation for sustainable technology has reflected India’s desire

!23 to combine sustainable development with economic growth (Isaksen and Stokke 2014, 116).

In regard to climate migration, India’s policy is lacking. Unlike the Marshall Islands, India does not perceive climate-induced migration policy as a priority or as being compatible with development (Boas 2012, chapter 7).

According to Boas (2012), the NAPCC does not mention the issue of climate migration or displacement. In 2011, the joint project director of the Sundarban Development Board stated that there are no policies in place for the Sundarbans that address climate migration on a structural basis (Boas 2012, chapter 7). Boas states that the Indian governments contends that climate migration is not a present or prioritized issue, unlike poverty or sustainable development, for example.

However, Boas cites that an indirectly beneficial policy for climate migration is the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act. This act ensures that every rural household gets one hundred days of work per year, through labour programs, and serves to improve the livelihood security of communities, as well as reducing the pressure of migration due to environmental stresses (Boas 2012, chapter 7).

The policies of the RMI over the past few decades have focused on sustainable development that would alleviate the factors that makes The Marshall Islands more vulnerable to climate change, such as socioeconomic inequality and the treatment of the environment. Overall, the RMI has acknowledged the importance of policy that addresses environmental sustainability and the need for a stable and equitable society. They have also implemented policy that will increase the resilience of the Marshallese to combat climate change and prevent losing the land that is strongly tied to their identity and culture.

The policies of India differ greatly from those of the RMI. The policies of India have only recently given attention to the possibility of sustainable development, much less the growing existence of environmental migrants. Instead, India prioritizes policy towards the interests of the economy and development, thus neglecting the need for more and improved social and environmental policy.

Conclusion To conclude, this paper seeks to identify the effects of climate change on environmental and socioeconomic factors for migration in RMI and India. It also

!24 aims to identify and understand the policy responses from both governments.

Whereas the Marshall Islands faces the most pressure to create effective policy due to the high stakes of climate change, India is a much larger country that has been experiencing internal migration patterns for centuries and does not fear for the complete inundation of its land. As I argue, the vulnerabilities produced by environmental and socioeconomic factors become compounded by climate change. Consequently, climate change often serves as the final straw that forces vulnerable communities and individuals to migrate.

This brings attention to the second element of my argument, which is that policy should target environmental concerns and socioeconomic inequalities that can promote resilience among these communities. Not only could this create a widespread reduction in vulnerability, but also empower traditionally marginalized groups, such as women in India. As demonstrated in the case study, Indian women and girls become more vulnerable to trafficking due to climate change, but are capable of practicing sustainable methods for resilience. It is important to value the potential that humans have to increase their resilience and adapt to obstacles of climate change. Therefore, it is crucial that environmental protection and reform programs are implemented and maintained alongside social policy that can promote the rights of women and vulnerable communities. If this is properly implemented, climate-induced migration is likely to decrease, and engender positive consequences such as reduced strain on resources and lower socioeconomic inequality in urban areas.

If more countries became as strongly committed to climate change resilience through development and socioeconomic equality as The Marshall Islands, climate change could become much more manageable. This paper aims to fill the gap in current literature that links climate change and socioeconomic policy. However, more research in this relatively new area of study could help create more holistic approaches to strategic policy making and implementation for governments to combat contemporary issues of climate change.

!25 References Ananthapadmanabhan, K. Srinivas and Vinuta Gopal. 2007. “Hiding behind the poor.” Greenpeace India Society, 1-14. Accessed March 15, 2018. http://www.greenpeace.org/india/en/ Bedarff, Hildegard. 2017. “Climate Change, Migration, and Displacement: The Underestimated Disaster.” Greenpeace Germany: 3-34. Accessed April 17, 2018. https:// www.greenpeace.de/sites/www.greenpeace.de/files/20170524-greenpeace-studie-climatechange-migration-displacement-engl.pdf Berchin, Issa Ibrahim, Isabela Blasi Valduga, Jéssica Garcia and José Baltazar Salgueirinho de Andrade Guerra. 2017. “Climate change and forced migration: An effort towards recognizing climate refugees.” Geoforum no.84. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.

2017.06.022 Boas, Ingrid. 2012. “Climate change migration (India).” The Encyclopaedia of Sustainability: China, India, and East and Southeast Asia: Assessing Sustainability, 61-63, in Great Barrington, MA: Berkshire Publishing Group. Accessed March 22, 2018. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/268632572_Climate_change_migration_India Brown, Oli. 2008. “Migration and Climate Change.” International Organization for Migration no.

31: 5-54. Accessed April 17. https://0-www-deslibris-ca.mercury.concordia.ca/ID/213042 Campbell, John and Olivia Warrick. 2014. “Climate Change and Migration Issues in the Pacific.”

United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific Office: 2-42.

Accessed on 7 March 2018. http://www.ilo.org/dyn/migpractice/docs/261/Pacific.pdf Chirico, Francesco. 2017. “The challenges of climate change, migration and conflict in pursuit of the Sustainable Development Goals: A call to responsible and responsive policy makers.”

Journal of Health and Social Sciences 2 no. 2: 137-142. Accessed April 17, 2018. http:// journalhss.com/wp-content/uploads/jhhs22_137-142.pdf Dreher, Tanja and Michelle Voyer. 2014. "Climate Refugees or Migrants? Contesting Media Frames on Climate Justice in the Pacific." Environmental Communication 9 no.1: 58-76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17524032.2014.932818 Ford, Murray R. and Paul S. Kench. 2015. “Multi-decadal shoreline changes in response to sea level rise in the Marshall Islands.” Anthropocene 11: 14-24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/ j.ancene.2015.11.002 Godfrey-Wood, Rachel and Benjamin C. R. Flower. 2017. “Does Guaranteed employment promote resilience to climate change? The case of India’s Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA).” Development Policy Review 36 no. 1. https://0-doi-org.mercury.concordia.ca/10.1111/dpr.12309 Hingley, Rebecca. 2017. “Climate Refugees: An Oceanic Perspective.” Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies 4, no.1: 158-165. DOI: 10.1002/app5.163 Investopedia. Nd. “Brazil, Russia, India and China- BRIC.” Investopedia.com. Accessed March 20, 2018. https://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/bric.asp Isaksen, Kari-Anne and Kristian Stokke. 2014. “Changing climate discourse and politics in India.

Climate change as challenge and opportunity for diplomacy and development.”

Geoforum, 57: 110-119. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2014.08.019

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Martin, Susan. 2010. “Climate Change, Migration, and Governance.” Global Governance 16: 397-414. Accessed April 17, 2018. https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/29764954.pdf? refreqid=excelsior%3A5f27d770219fa20a4c9814e2351159cc McNamara, Karen Elizabeth and Chris Gibson. 2009. “We do not want to leave our land: Pacific ambassadors at the United Nations resist the category of ‘climate refugees’. Geoforum 40: 475-483. doi: 10.1016/j.geoforum.2009.03.006 Panda, Architesh. 2010. “Climate Refugees: implications for India.” Economic and Political Weekly 45 no. 20: 76-79. Accessed March 14, 2018. http://environmentportal.in/files/ Climate%20Refugees_1.pdf Republic of the Marshall Islands. 2002. “National Report to the World Summit on Sustainable Development.”: 1-67. Accessed March 15, 2018. http://www.un.org/esa/agenda21/ natlinfo/wssd/marshallIslands.pdf Republic of the Marshall Islands. 2014. “National Strategic Plan 2015-2017.” Economic Policy, Planning and Statistics Office (EPPSO): 1-147. Accessed March 15, 2018. https:// www.adb.org/sites/default/files/linked-documents/cobp-rmi-2017-2019-ld-01.pdf Roy, Chandan and Indrila Guha. 2013. “Climate Change Induced Migration: A Case Study from Indian Sundarbans.” International Journal of Theoretical and Applied Sciences 5: 72-93.

Accessed March 22, 2018.

Saryal, Rajnish. 2018. “Climate Change Policy of India: Modifying the Environment.” South Asia Research, 38 no. 1: 1-19. doi: 10.1177/0262728017745385 Shapiro, Ari. 2016. “The Vanishing Islands of India’s Sundarbans.” National Public Radio, Inc. (U.S.). Accessed on March 10, 2018. https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/ 2016/05/23/478393443/the-vanishing-islands-of-indias-sundarbans Singh, Naveen P., Bhawna Anand and Mohd Arshad Khan. “Micro-level perception to climate change and adaptation issues: A prelude to mainstreaming climate adaptation into developmental landscape in India.” Nat Hazards: 1-18. https://doi.org/10.1007/ s11069-018-3250-y Weir, Tony, Liz Dovey and Dan Orcherton. 2017. “Social and cultural issues raised by climate change in Pacific Island countries: an overview.” Regional Environmental Change 17: 1017-1028. Doi: 10.1007/s10113-016-1012-5 Yadav, S.S. and Rattan Lal. 2017. “Vulnerability of women to climate change in arid and semi-arid regions: The case of India and South Asia.” Journal of Arid Environments 149: 4-17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jaridenv.2017.08.001

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One Step at a Time A Democratic Approach to Canada’s Turnout Problem

by Nicolas Gertler

Introduction Canadian democracy is in a sorry state. Following the 2015 federal election, the Liberal Party of Canada held a strong 184 seat majority in the House of Commons, despite only having garnered 39.5 percent of the vote (Elections Canada 2015a, 2015b). This is not an anomaly. Disparities of this sort are part of the fundamental design of Canada’s single-member plurality electoral system, whereby candidates only need more votes than any individual competitor to be elected in a district (Blais and Massicotte 2002).

While this particular democratic deficit is intentional and, perhaps, justified, trends in voter turnout are harder to ignore. In the most recent election, overall turnout was 68.5 percent (Elections Canada 2015c). This number is relatively low in global context—New Zealand’s most recent elections had 79.8 percent turnout, Norway’s had 78.2 percent, and Belgium’s had 89.37 percent (International IDEA 2018)—but it is exceptionally high compared to other recent Canadian elections. In the 2008 and 2011 elections, turnout was 58.8 percent and 61.1 percent, respectively, and the average turnout for Canadian federal elections since 2000 is 62.55 percent (Elections Canada 2015c). Over this same time period the average turnout for parliamentary elections in European countries with Freedom House scores equivalent to Canada’s was 71.5 percent (International IDEA 2018).

Recent turnout figures are exceptionally concerning, but this issue is not a new one. In the report of the Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party

!29 Financing, published in 1991, Jerome H. Black noted that “a disturbingly large number of Canadians are not involved in the performance of an act that lies so clearly at the heart of democratic theory and practice” (Black 1991, 62). Black went on to suggest several measures to address “the turnout problem in Canada” (Ibid., 88). It must be noted that Black was already sounding the alarm at a time when turnout was 10–20 percent higher than it is presently.

Twenty-five years later, in a report of the House Special Committee on Electoral Reform, the issue of voter turnout in Canadian federal elections was highlighted once again. In addition to concerns over turnout in general, the report placed particular emphasis on the outsized number of people from historically disenfranchised and underrepresented groups in the pool of non-voters (Special Committee on Electoral Reform 2016).

Given the persistence of the issue of voter turnout in Canadian federal elections, it is logical that recommendations to improve Canadian electoral democracy start from this point. This paper will begin by discussing why voter turnout is so fundamentally important in the first place. It will then consider compulsory voting as a means of increasing voter turnout. From that point, various alternative methods for increasing voter turnout in Canadian federal elections will be considered. These include: proportional representation for Canadian federal elections, bundled elections, and various measures to reduce barriers to voting, such as voting on weekends. Ultimately it is concluded that while mandatory voting may be the most effective single means of increasing voter turnout, its drawbacks in terms of fundamental democratic principles are too great. Instead, this paper recommends that a series of more indirect reforms be implemented so as to increase turnout in Canadian federal elections and generally improve the state of democracy in Canada.

The Case for High Voter Turnout Voting is far from the only means of democratic participation, but it is the most fundamental. It is the prerequisite for all other democratic activity, including protests, strikes, and electoral campaigning. It is also the most universally accessible form of democratic participation. As Lijphart (1997, 1) contends, even for all the problems of voter turnout, voting remains the least-unequal form of democratic participation, and the one with the lowest barrier to entry. Some forms

!30 of participation have barriers that will always be high because they require time, money, or both. But at the very least it is possible to at least make voting accessible to all, and by extension to include all (or nearly all) citizens in some form of democratic participation.

Moreover, voting in elections is one of the forms of democratic participation that is most directly associated with political influence. It is worth stating the obvious here: that those who vote are those who decide who is in office. Low turnout inherently means that a small portion of people are having an outsized influence on the choice of government and, by extension, on public policy. This might be less of an issue if that small portion of people were representative of the population as a whole, but as Lijphart puts it “low voter turnout means unequal and socioeconomically biased turnout” (Ibid., 2). This assertion works the other way as well. When turnout is higher, the link between socioeconomic status and voting is much less significant (Ibid., 3).

Even if this disparity did not exist, high turnout would still have intrinsic value. As Hill puts it, there is value in complete information. If the choice to abstain is considered democratic participation in and of itself, then how low can turnout go while still being considered legitimate? A government elected in a near-zero turnout election would clearly not have legitimacy. Hill contends that the question is not whether or not higher turnout changes policy outcomes, but quite simply that legitimacy derives from being the expressed choice of the people. Higher turnout confers more complete information about that choice (Brennan and Hill 2014, 130–137).

The Case for Compulsory Voting In light of this, several scholars have made compelling cases in favour of making voting compulsory. The common premise through their arguments is straightforward: that low turnout consistently has a socioeconomic skew, and that compulsory voting is the most best method for addressing this disparity.

In his 1996 address to the American Political Science Association, Lijphart referred to compulsory voting as “the strongest of all institutional measures” to address low voter turnout (1997, 8). He went on to demonstrate that compulsory voting significantly raises turnout even when penalties are low and minimally enforced (Ibid., 9). In Compulsory Voting: For and Against, Hill puts the

!31 argument in even less equivocal terms. Hill argues that compulsory voting has certain benefits that make it unique compared to other measures to address this issue, because compulsory voting can change the norms around voting. Without compulsory voting, voting is only the norm among those with higher socioeconomic status. Among those in lower socioeconomic status groups, not voting is the norm. Conflicting with this norm can be irrational due to the fact that if not enough people in the same situation make the same choice the vote will not matter. The costs will always outweigh the benefits if the probability of one’s preferred outcome occurring are zero. Hill argues that compulsion is not as much coercion as it is enforced coordination among groups (Brennan and Hill 2014, 148–51).

Both Lijphart and Hill ultimately put their arguments in utilitarian terms.

They argue that while compelling people to vote might not be an ideal solution, the good it provides in terms of ironing out socioeconomic disparities in voter turnout outweigh the downsides. As the next section of this paper contends, however, the ends to not necessarily justify this means.

Issues with Compulsory Voting While compulsory voting would undoubtedly raise turnout more than any other single method, it has two primary issues which make it an unappealing solution.

Both come down to the basic principle that the conditions under which one participates in democracy matter.

The first issue with compulsory voting has to do with the means by which it achieves higher turnout. Proponents of compulsory voting argue that it serves to increase democratic legitimacy. As this paper contended in an earlier section, this increase in democratic legitimacy mostly comes from the high voter turnout which occurs as a result of compulsory voting. Considered in isolation however, compulsory voting is an inherently undemocratic policy tool.

Schneider and Ingram (1990) provide a framework for classifying policy tools based on their assumptions regarding human behaviour. Schneider and Ingram’s five categories are: authority tools, incentive tools, capacity tools, symbolic and hortatory tools, and learning tools. Compulsory voting could be construed as either an authority tool or an incentive tool. Authority tools are those which “assume their targets are motivated by a commitment to obey laws and

!32 regulations without the aid of tangible incentives� (Ibid., 514). They function through the imposition of hierarchy. Incentive tools, on the other hand, assume that people are rational actors with free will. They function by increasing costs or benefits to encourage the desired policy outcome (Ibid., 515–16).

Compulsory voting is theoretically based in an incentive structure. It creates a cost to not voting by fining or otherwise punishing those who do not vote. But as Lijphart argues, enforcement of compulsory voting in practice is relatively lax, and the fines associated with not voting are low (Lijphart 1997, 2).

If the compulsion to vote is not achieved through fines or fear of incarceration, then it stands to reason that compulsory voting should not be categorized as an incentive tool.

Under these conditions, compulsory voting must be understood as an authority tool. It relies on the legitimacy of the state to dictate necessary actions to its subordinates. This may be an acceptable means for motivating action within a public service organization, or even among the broader public during a national emergency, but it is not a means to achieve legitimate, democratically elected government. Legitimate democracy is, by definition, bottom-up. Authority tools are top-down. An authoritarian democracy is inherently contradictory, and compulsory voting trends dangerously in that direction.

The second issue with compulsory voting was put forth by Singh (2016), who demonstrated that the boost in turnout from compulsory voting does not resolve the underlying issues of voter apathy and disillusionment with a given political system. Singh found that voters in compulsory systems were more likely to cast haphazard votes that do not align with their political preferences. As Singh demonstrated empirically, and other critics of compulsory voting have pointed out (see Brennan and Hill 2014, 83–107), compulsory voting does not necessarily lead to more democratic engagement.

Given that turnout in and of itself has merit for democracy, this is not a fatal flaw. But in combination with concerns over the authoritarian basis for democracy under compulsory voting it does suggest that a more democratic approach would be to address the underlying issues causing lower turnout, rather than bandaging over them with a method that is fundamentally undemocratic. The following sections, then, will propose several methods Canada might employ for doing exactly that.

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Alternative Methods for Increasing Voter Turnout If higher turnout is a democratic good, but the most reliable method for achieving higher turnout—compulsory voting—is fundamentally flawed, the next step is to consider alternative methods for increasing voter turnout in Canada. To do so, we must first consider what factors lead to voting or abstention in the first place.

The debate over why people vote or abstain is long and fraught. Rational choice models of the voting calculus, beginning with Downs (1957) and notably expanded on by Riker and Ordeshook (1968), generally contend that choosing to vote is an irrational act. The differential benefits of one’s desired outcome occurring as opposed to the opposite occurring (B), multiplied by the probability that one’s vote is the decisive factor in swaying an election (P), will never be enough to overcome the costs of voting (C). This is due to the fact that P is virtually always minuscule, making voting irrational if it entails any costs at all.

This purely rational approach would expect voter turnout to be near zero (Ibid.).

Given that turnout in elections is empirically higher than rational choice would initially expect, rational choice theorists, beginning with Downs, have proposed amendments to the theory to overcome this “paradox of voting.” For his part, Downs (1957) proposed that voters still vote out of a desire to maintain democracy. Riker and Ordeshook (1968) proposed that people still vote out of a sense of duty (D). Green and Shapiro (1994) and Blais (2000) have identified an additional five attempts to amend the rational choice model to account voter turnout. However they also all identify significant issues with each amendment to the model. As Blais argues, Down’s amendment is ultimately irrational as it moves beyond individual considerations. As for Riker and Ordeshook, Blais argues that their D variable raises issues of tautology, as any irrational behaviour could be explained away by a sense of duty (Ibid., 3–4).

These issues lead Green and Shapiro to disregard the rational choice approach to voter turnout altogether. For his part Blais is highly critical, but he ultimately concludes that rational choice maintains some explanatory power, if only at the margins. Blais contends that about half of eligible voters have a strong sense of duty. These voters will always turnout, and rational choice considerations do not apply to them. This places a floor on turnout at about fifty percent. For the remaining potential voters who lack this strong sense of duty, Blais contends that

!34 rational choice still has a small effect. Blais reformulates the P variable, arguing that voters’ consideration is not whether their vote will be decisive but rather if the election is seen as a foregone conclusion. He also argues that the B and P variables should be added rather than multiplied (Ibid., 137–9).

The remainder of this paper follows Blais’ premise. Given that the question of increasing voter turnout has to do with turning out marginal voters who, as Hill contends, are the most likely to lack a sense of duty with regards to voting, Blais’ work suggests that increasing P and B, along with decreasing C, should lead to increased voter turnout among marginal voters.

Proportional Representation: Increasing Probability Broadly speaking, electoral systems can be sorted into four categories: plurality, majority, proportional, and mixed (Blais and Massicotte 2002). Plurality (otherwise known as first-past-the-post, or FPTP) is fundamentally the simplest electoral system. To be elected in an FPTP election, a candidate need simply garner more votes than any other candidate (Ibid., 42–3).

Proportional systems (otherwise known as proportional representation, or PR) take many forms, but the general premise is that they distribute seats proportionally within a multimember district according to the portion of votes a party obtains. The most common method for then selecting members to fill the apportioned seats is through list systems, in which parties provide a list of candidates to occupy the seats they are elected to. Whether voters have input on the order of this list (open list) or not (closed list) is one of several variables that must be decided when designing a proportional system. Other variables include district magnitude, the electoral formula, where there will be one or many tiers of candidates, and what the minimum threshold of votes is to be allocated any seats at all (Ibid., 45–53).

Finally, mixed systems employ multiple electoral formula in a single election. Mixed systems are most frequently used either in tiered systems, where one chamber is elected proportionally and the other by plurality or majority, or in corrective systems such as mixed-member proportional (MMP), in which proportional distribution is used to fix distortions caused by FPTP elections (Ibid., 54–5).

!35 The different means by which these systems translate votes into seats— what Blais and Massicotte refer to as mechanical effects—result in psychological effects on voters and politicians. Psychological effects can include whether politicians are likely to form new parties, and whether voters are likely to vote strategically against their preferences (Ibid., 56–8). Due to the varying psychological effects of electoral systems, different systems can have different effects on turnout. The question, then, is which system fosters the highest turnout among voters?

Most research on the topic concludes that countries with PR systems and large districts (allowing for more proportional distribution of votes) have significantly higher turnout (Blais 2007, 625). Blais and Aarts (2006) have questioned the causal mechanisms of this relationship, especially in light of data from Latin America which runs counter to this hypothesis, but the relationship still holds in industrialized nations with proportional electoral systems.

Proportional representation generally increases turnout by an average of 7 or 8 percent (Ibid., 186).

Understood through Blais’ interpretation of the P variable, this association seems logical. Blais (2000, 138) proposes that P is determined by whether or not the election is seen as a foregone conclusion—whether their vote might count.

Proportional representation is specifically designed to ensure that few votes are wasted.

Moreover, other effects of PR systems can have a positive impact on efficacy—the sense that one’s participation matters. As Karp and Banducci (2008) have demonstrated, citizens who support smaller parties are more efficacious in more proportional systems. They have also demonstrated that those with strong partisan preferences are also more likely to feel efficacious, and that PR tends to make these partisan preferences stronger. Further, Karp and Banducci found that this increased sense of efficacy, as seen in PR systems, does translate into higher political participation (Ibid., 324–7).

Not all elements of PR systems have a positive effect on voter turnout, however. Karp and Banducci also found that the formation of coalition governments, which is more common under PR systems where single parties are much less likely to hold a majority of seats, discourages voter turnout (Ibid., 332).

!36 A higher number of parties may also increase the amount of information voters need to cast a ballot, depressing turnout in its own right (Blais 2007, 628).

Proportional representation does tend to increase the number of parties in the running. PR systems have about nine parties on average, while FPTP systems have six on average (Blais and Massicotte 2002, 56). But this effect is not inevitable. Increasing the threshold for a party’s inclusion in the legislature reduces the number of parties. This might suggest that PR with a high threshold would resolve the issues of more parties reducing turnout. But one must also consider that higher thresholds lead to higher disproportionality (Powell and Vanderberg 2000), and that higher disproportionality depresses voter turnout. This is in addition to Karp and Banducci’s (2008) finding, stated earlier, that much of the increase in political efficacy and participation under proportional representation is itself due to the higher number of parties. Thus these conflicting considerations must be balanced when recommending an electoral system.

The best electoral system for Canada from the perspective of raising voter turnout, then, is likely a proportional representation system with party lists, large district magnitude, and a moderate threshold. For all the ambiguity regarding the effects of proportional representation on turnout, the results in modern industrialized nations such as Canada are fairly clear cut and positive (Blais and Aarts 2007). The use of party lists would reduce information costs for voters compared to other methods, as voters need only be aware of the parties to cast an informed ballot (Blais and Massicotte 2007, 53–54).

What exactly the best district magnitude would be in the Canadian context is beyond the scope of this paper, but some tentative recommendations can be made. The best option from the point of view of disproportionality and turnout would be a single, nation-wide district, but given regional divides in Canada this seems unlikely. Moving to the next largest subnational units, then, provincial boundaries could be used as districts. Alternatively, the regional divisions already employed in the Canadian Senate could be used.

Finally, there is the question of thresholds. As Blais and Massicotte (2007, 51–3) point out, all thresholds are somewhat arbitrary and subject to challenges after implementation. Given that an arbitrary number must be proposed at some point, however, a four percent threshold seems appropriate. This is significantly lower than the highest thresholds currently in use (Ibid.), and as such it should not

!37 create too high a level of disproportionally. But four percent is also significant enough that it should limit the smallest, most extreme parties from entering Parliament and increasing information costs for voters.

Bundled Elections: Lower Costs, Higher Benefits Two variables from the rational choice turnout equation remain to be addressed.

These are B, the benefit a voter gains from their desired result coming to fruition as opposed to the opposite occurring, and C, the costs a voter incurs in casting their ballot (Riker and Ordeshook 1968). Approaches that addresses these factors should aim to increase the benefits accrued, decrease the cost of voting, or both.

Bundling elections—holding multiple elections for different levels of government at the same time—would address both these factors.

The general expectation of the political science literature is that turnout for lower-order elections—such as elections for provincial legislatures—should be lower than for higher-order elections—such as elections for the Canadian House of Commons. In many Canadian provinces, however, this is not the case. As Thorlakson (2015) demonstrates, Ontario and Alberta are the only provinces in which turnout for federal elections is significantly higher than in provincial elections. In Saskatchewan, Prince Edward Island, and Newfoundland and Labrador the reverse is true: turnout in provincial elections is significantly higher than in federal elections.

As Blais (2007) puts it, however, turnout should be expected to be higher when the body being elected has more political power. The greater the consequence of the election, the higher the turnout. Canadian provinces have substantial power and near exclusive domain over healthcare, education, and other policy areas which have direct consequences for voters. That there is some ambiguity as to which level of government in Canada has more power may help explain the unusually high relative turnout in many provincial elections (Thorlakson 171–2).

Bundling provincial and federal elections, then, would compound the benefits of a given federal and provincial party or candidate being elected. A voter’s calculation of the benefits of voting would have to take into consideration the differential benefits at both the provincial and federal levels. In cases where

!38 provincial turnout is lower than federal turnout, provincial turnout would be expected to rise. This is the standard expectation, as voiced by Lijphart (1997, 10), in cases where lower-order elections have lower turnout than higher-order elections. In an exceptional case like in Canada, however, it stands to reason that the reverse would hold, and that concurrent elections would also raise federal turnout in cases where provincial turnout is typically higher.

Given that bundling elections would reduce the frequency of elections, holding provincial and federal elections concurrently could also aid in decreasing the costs of voting. Fewer elections would produce less voter fatigue, which has a measurable negative effect on voter turnout (Rallings, Thrasher, and Borisyuk 2003). As Lijphart puts it, with concurrent elections “the benefit of voting now increases while the cost remains almost the same� (1997, 8).

As Lijphart references, concurrent elections can bring turnout rates in the traditionally lower-turnout election in-line with standard turnout rates for the traditionally higher-turnout election (Ibid.). As such, the expected increase in voter turnout if provincial and federal elections were held concurrently would vary significantly by province. Based on Thorlakson’s (2015) calculation of the difference in turnout between federal and provincial elections, turnout for federal elections could reasonably be expected to rise by approximately 5.5 percent in Saskatchewan, 6 percent in Quebec, and 16 percent in Newfoundland and Labrador. In provinces such as Ontario, where turnout in federal elections is typically higher than in provincial elections, federal turnout would not be expected to rise, but provincial turnout would likely rise to the same level as federal turnout.

In spite of these potential benefits to voter turnout, however, the secondary effects of bundling federal and provincial elections must also be considered.

Doing so would create a closer link between provincial and federal political cycles. Voters would have fewer opportunities to voice their political opinions, amplifying the impact of any given political sentiment at the time of a bundled election.

Moreover, bundling elections may also be incompatible with the Canadian parliamentary system. Strict fixed-date elections are conflict with a system where a minority government can fall at any time. This is especially a concern given that

!39 the first recommendation—proportional representation—would likely lead to more, not less, minority governments.

As such, it cannot be recommended that Canadian federal and provincial elections be held at the same time. While this would undoubtedly have a significant impact on federal voter turnout in some provinces, its secondary effects are too great. What is recommended, however, is to hold municipal elections concurrent with provincial elections. While this would not have as large an impact on voter turnout, any reduction in the frequency of elections would be expected to have some effect.

Reducing The Costs of Voting While bundling elections would have an overall effect on the cost of voting over many elections, it does not change the costs in any given election. Even with multiple elections on the ballot, voters must still be registered, informed, and at their polling place to vote.

There is no single solution that can address all of these issues and bring costs to zero. Compulsory voting might be considered one means of doing so, but it addresses the costs of voting by adding costs to not voting. Nothing is necessarily done to address the barriers that already exist. Even without a single overall solution, however, there are multiple smaller solutions which can have impacts on turnout in the aggregate.

As Blais (2007) notes, there is limited evidence for the impact of specific measures, but that overall, making voting less difficult should increase turnout. As such, facilitating voter registration, increasing the number of polling days, the use of mail-in ballots, and holding elections on weekends rather than weekdays would all lower the barriers to voting and likely increase turnout (Lijphart 1997).

Given that voter registration and mail-in ballots are already fairly widespread in Canada these recommendations need not be considered further.

Expanding advanced polling and holding elections on weekends, however, are both recommended, as each would be expected to produce a modest increase in voter turnout for Canadian federal elections.

Compulsory Voting in Comparative Perspective This paper has already argued that compulsory voting is not an ideal approach for increasing voter turnout based on the means by which it achieves said increase.

!40 The general wisdom among supporters of compulsory voting, however, is that for all its problems it would raise voter turnout more than any other method. The overall increase in turnout from compulsory voting is generally estimated to be between 10 and 15 percent (Blais 2007, 625).

Individually, no recommendation made in this paper can be expected to achieve the same increase in turnout across the board. The expected increase from proportional representation is approximately 7 or 8 percent (Blais and Aarts 2006, 186). As has been argued above, the increase in voter turnout from bundling federal and provincial elections would likely vary greatly by province, ranging from no increase in Ontario to potentially 16 percent in Newfoundland and Labrador. If the recommendation to simply bundle municipal and provincial elections were followed the expected increase would still be positive, but significantly lower than 16 percent. Numerical estimates for the change in voter turnout likely to result from expanding early voting and holding elections on weekends are not readily available, but the consensus is that they would be modest and positive.

Assuming that the estimated increase in turnout from all the recommendations above would compound, then, the overall increase in voter turnout would likely be in the range of the expected increase from implementing compulsory voting alone. Compulsory voting may be the most straightforward means of raising voter turnout, but it is not impossible to raise turnout to similar levels without compulsory voting. Given all the other problems that compulsory voting introduces this seems to be yet another argument against compulsory voting in Canadian federal elections.

Conclusion This paper has given several recommendations for increasing voter turnout in Canadian federal elections without the use of compulsory voting. These recommendations are: (1) that Canada adopt a proportional representation system with party lists, large district magnitude, and a moderate threshold; (2) that provincial and municipal elections be held concurrently; (3) that advanced polling expanded; and (4) that elections be held on weekends.

While the available evidence indicates that each of these methods would be effective to some degree, not all of these recommendations are of equal

!41 importance. Indeed, these recommendations are presented in decreasing order of impact. Any earnest attempt to increase voter turnout in Canadian federal elections should begin with implementing proportional representation and then move on to further changes. To achieve an increase in voter turnout that is comparable to the expected increase from compulsory voting, however, all of these recommendations would need to be implemented.

Unfortunately, it would seem that these recommendations are also presented in descending order of political resistance. As demonstrated by the Canadian Government’s reaction to the recommendations of the House Special Committee on Electoral Reform (see Gould 2016), recommendations with the least impact are much more likely to be taken up than those which would bring more substantial change. Future work, then, should focus on the means by which the political will for implementing significant electoral reform can be built.

References Black, Jerome H. 1991. “Reforming the Context of the Voting Process in Canada: Lessons from Other Democracies.” In Voter Turnout in Canada, edited by Herman Bakvis, 61–176.

Research Studies, v. 15. Toronto: Dundurn Press.

Blais, André. 2000. To Vote or Not to Vote? The Merits and Limits of Rational Choice Theory.

Pittsburgh, Pa: University of Pittsburgh Press.

———. 2007. “Turnout in Elections.” In Oxford Handbook of Political Behavior, edited by Russell J. Dalton and Hans-Dieter Klingemann, 621–35. Oxford Handbooks of Political Science. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press.

Blais, André, and Kees Aarts. 2006. “Electoral Systems and Turnout.” Acta Politica 41 (2): 180– 96.

Blais, André, and Louis Massicotte. 2002. “Electoral Systems.” In Comparing Democracies 2: New Challenges in the Study of Elections and Voting, edited by Lawrence LeDuc, Richard G. Niemi, and Pippa Norris, 2nd ed., 40–69. London ; Thousand Oaks: Sage.

Brennan, Jason, and Lisa Hill. 2014. Compulsory Voting: For and Against. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Downs, A. 1957. “The Causes and Effects of Rational Abstention.” In An Economic Theory of Democracy, 260–76. Harper and Row. Elections Canada. 2015a. “Official Voting Results: Forty-Second General Election.” http:// www.elections.ca/res/rep/off/ovr2015app/home.html.

!42 ———. 2015b. “Report on the 42nd General Election of October 19, 2015.” Canada. h t t p : / / w w w. e l e c t i o n s . c a / c o n t e n t . a s p x ? s e c t i o n = r e s & d i r = r e p / o ff / sta_2015&document=index&lang=e.

———. 2015c. “Voter Turnout at Federal Elections and Referendums.” Elections Canada. http:// www.elections.ca/content.aspx?section=ele&dir=turn&document=index&lang=e.

Gould, Karina. 2016. “Government Response: Strengthening Democracy in Canada: Principles, Process and Public Engagement for Electoral Reform.” Canadian House of Commons. h t t p : / / w w w. o u r c o m m o n s . c a / D o c u m e n t Vi e w e r / e n / 4 2 - 1 / E R R E / r e p o r t - 3 / response-8512-421-122.

Green, Donald P., and Ian Shapiro. 1994. “Chapter 4.” In Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A Critique of Applications in Political Science, 47–71. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ.

Press.

International IDEA. 2018. “Voter Turnout Database.” International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. https://www.idea.int/data-tools/data/voter-turnout.

Karp, Jeffrey A, and Susan A Banducci. 2008. “Political Efficacy and Participation in TwentySeven Democracies: How Electoral Systems Shape Political Behaviour.” British Journal of Political Science 38 (02).

Lijphart, A. 1997. “Unequal Participation: Democracy’s Unresolved Dilemma - Presidential Address, American Political Science Association, 1996.” American Political Science Review 91 (1): 1–14.

Powell, G. Bingham, and Georg S. Vanderberg. 2000. “Election Laws, Disproportionality and Median Correspondence: Implications for Two Visions of Democracy.” British Journal of Political Science 30: 383–411.

Rallings, C., M. Thrasher, and G. Borisyuk. 2003. “Seasonal Factors, Voter Fatigue and the Costs of Voting.” Electoral Studies 22 (1): 65–79.

Riker, William H., and Peter C. Ordeshook. 1968. “A Theory of the Calculus of Voting.” American Political Science Review 62 (01): 25–42.

Schneider, Anne, and Helen Ingram. 1990. “Behavioral Assumptions of Policy Tools.” The Journal of Politics 52 (2): 510–29.

Special Committee on Electoral Reform. 2016. “Strengthening Democracy in Canada: Principles, Process and Public Engagement for Electoral Reform.” Canadian House of Commons. http://www.ourcommons.ca/Content/Committee/421/ERRE/Reports/RP8655791/errerp03/ errerp03-e.pdf.

Thorlakson, Lori. 2015. “Explaining the Federal-Provincial Turnout Gap in the CanadianProvinces.” Canadian Political Science Review 9 (1): 164–76.

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R2p

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R2P Post Libya Invalidated Idea or Worthy of Reform?

by Patrick Groeneveld-Meijer

Introduction The 2011 NATO intervention in Libya has led to extensive scholarly debate on the merits of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). Some have argued that the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) has been discredited as a practical solution for the protection of civilians against mass atrocities (Bukar 2016, 93).

Others have advocated for reforming the concept in order to avoid past mistakes and restore faith in its use (Stewart 2011). This paper will build on the latter argument; that the international community should reform R2P in order to build on progress made within the realm of international law, and ensure that the mistakes made in Libya are not repeated. These mistakes include; NATO overstepping the bounds of its mandate and failing to provide adequate support in rebuilding Libya. The paper will begin by outlining the historical origins of R2P, defining the concept and, examining why it went wrong in Libya. It will differ from the current literature by presenting a typology of reform proposals that focuses on implementation, judicial, and structural reforms.

Origins of R2P The concept of R2P stems from calls for a new framework to prevent mass atrocities against civilians (Genser 2012, XXV). This concern arose due to the failures of the international community in conducting traditional humanitarian intervention throughout the 1990’s, in countries such as Rwanda and Bosnia

!45 (Ibid). Traditionally, humanitarian intervention has consisted of using military force to intervene within the borders of sovereign states in an effort to prevent human rights violations (Tufekc 2018, 1217). This has proved contentious as it tends to impede on state sovereignty, which is the idea that states have supreme authority over their own territory (Evans and Sahnoun 2001, VII). Humanitarian intervention challenges sovereignty by suggesting that states have the “right” to intervene in the internal affairs for other states in defense of civilians (Ibid).

Countries such as Russia and China have opposed humanitarian intervention on the grounds that the international community should not involve itself in the internal affairs of sovereign states. Moreover, humanitarian interventions have been controversial when they have happened in cases such as Bosnia and when they have failed to occur in cases such as Rwanda (Ibid, VII). The next section will explain the logic behind the creation of R2P, and trace changes in international norms from the “right of humanitarian intervention” towards a “responsibility to protect.”

Creation of R2P The international community’s failure to intervene effectively in Rwanda and Bosnia led to new debates about how best to balance humanitarian intervention and state sovereignty. In an effort to reconcile these two ideas, UN general secretary Kofi Annan published Two Concepts of Sovereignty (Annan 1999). When describing the tension between intervention and sovereignty, Annan claimed that, “Just as we have learnt that the world cannot stand aside when gross and systematic violations of human rights are taking place, we have also learnt that, if it is to enjoy the sustained support of the world’s peoples, intervention must be based on legitimate and universal principles” (Ibid). He then went on to describe a new concept of individual sovereignty: that the fundamental human rights enshrined in the charter of the United Nations imply that that the idea of sovereignty should be extended to individuals (Ibid). Thus, Annan called upon the international community to develop new frameworks that recognize the need to protect both individual and state sovereignty. In response to this call, the Canadian government sponsored the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) and suggested a move away from a “right of intervention,”

!46 as seen in Kosovo, towards a “Responsibility to Protect” (Gholiagha, 1077). The next section will provide a detailed explanation of the mechanisms of R2P, and explain what sets it apart from traditional humanitarian interventions.

Defining R2P In order to illustrate their proposal, the ICSS employed the concept of “human security,” an approach that gives priority to human beings rather than states (Hehrir 2012, 41). The commission built on this concept by arguing that, “military intervention could only be legitimate when major harm to civilians is occurring or imminently apprehended, and the state in question is unable or unwilling to end the harm, or is itself the perpetrator” (Ibid, 41). The shift towards human security represents the starting point of R2P’s three core principles. First, the primary responsibility of the state is the protection of its people (Evans and Sahnoun, XI). Second, if the state lacks the capacity to protect its civilians, the international community has a responsibility to help it do so (Ibid, XI). Third, if the state is unable or unwilling to help its citizens, the principle of nonintervention is supplanted by the international responsibility to protect (Ibid, XI).

Thus, R2P departs considerably from traditional humanitarian intervention ina number of areas. R2P creates a dialogue of “responsibility” that implies that states must ensure the protection of their civilians from atrocities. This differentiates it from humanitarian intervention, which focuses on states having the “right” to intervene in order to prevent large scale suffering. R2P is also much narrower in approach and focuses on the prevention of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity (Adams 2012, 11). Another key difference is that humanitarian intervention is focused on the use of military force against a state without consent, whereas R2P prioritizes a broad range of preventative measures before intervention can occur. These measures include both negotiated and noncoercive action, such as mediation and criminal justice (Junk 2016, 54).

Humanitarian intervention is predicated on the idea that states have the “right to intervene,” which assumes that they can impede on the sovereignty of others without the support of international law (Adams 11). In contrast, R2P creates a legal framework rooted in international law. The differences between humanitarian intervention and R2P are often overlooked (Evans and Sahnoun,

!47 XII). This section has shown that R2P marks a significant change from traditional humanitarian intervention. These misconceptions have caused a great deal of harm to the credibility of R2P. In an effort to clear up some of these misconceptions, the next section will use Libya as a case study, to explain where the use of R2P has deviated from its intended purpose.

Case Study: Libya In 2011, R2P faced its first test. Spurred by the Arab Spring and an ensuing wave of pro-democracy movements across the Arab world, Libyan citizens began protesting against the brutal rule and dictatorship of Muammar Gaddafi. The protests quickly turned into a fully-fledged uprising that threatened to topple Gaddafi’s 40-year regime (Bellamy, 9). Gaddafi responded by unleashing his security forces on the opposition, and began issuing threats reminiscent of previous genocides in Rwanda and former Yugoslavia. When addressing the people of Benghazi, the birthplace of the Libyan Arab Spring, Gaddafi stated, “We are coming tonight […] We will find you in your closets […]

We will show no mercy” (Aidan, 13). Threats such as these, coupled with Gaddafi’s heavy handed response to opposition, caused the UN to use all of its possible mitigation options. Resolution 1970 was adopted unanimously by the Security Council, and was the first resolution to specifically refer to R2P (Bellamy, 9). The resolution demanded an immediate end to violence, worked towards finding a negotiated settlement, imposed financial sanctions on the regime, and implemented an arms embargo. However, the regime failed to comply, and when it was on the verge of capturing Benghazi, the Security Council used R2P to authorize the use of force for the protection of civilians, implemented a no-fly zone and enforced the arms embargo (Ibid). The action heavily cited R2P and received broad support from the United Nations and the Arab League. The operation was led by NATO and consisted of two phases: Phase one successfully prevented the fall of Benghazi and protected its civilians. Rather than stopping there, NATO began phase two, and continued the intervention by supporting rebels with airstrikes against the regime. This ultimately led to the overthrow and death of Gaddafi. Phase two provoked high levels of controversy as many states, particularly Russia and China, claimed that by conducting regime change, NATO

!48 had overstepped the bounds of resolution 1973 (Ibid). The next section will look into the criticisms made towards the intervention, and draw a distinction between critiques of R2P as an idea and critiques of its implementation.

Critique of the R2P Intervention in Libya Much of the criticism leveraged against R2P has criticized the long-term consequences of intervention in Libya, rather than the structure of R2P itself.

This section will go through some of these criticisms in order to illustrate the negative effects it has had on the legitimacy of R2P. The Libyan intervention was successful on many counts. Mass atrocities were prevented, NATO suffered very low casualties and Gaddafi was deposed.

However, seven years on, one would be hard pressed to find any long-term benefits to the intervention. After the fall of Gaddafi, the tribal militias that had contributed to his downfall began infighting, and the state began to disintegrate.

Libya has become a failed state, characterized by terrorism, two rival governments, economic mismanagement, and a migrant crisis (Abdessadok 2017). While the intervention itself was a success, one of the crucial aspects of R2P, the responsibility to rebuild, was ignored by the international community.

The rebuild pillar originally entailed providing security in post-intervention states, and promoting reconciliation between former enemies (Keranen 2016, 11).

The idea was to ensure that the need to intervene would not arise again, by rebuilding local capacity to assume the role of protecting civilians. However, most of the countries that were part of the intervention failed to participate in rebuilding the country. It is therefore crucial that the responsibility to rebuild be re-emphasized in any reforms to R2P. Perhaps the strongest critique of R2P comes from countries and academics who claim that NATO overstepped the bounds of its mandate (Chivvies 2014, 90-91). Security Council resolution 1973 authorized an R2P based intervention to protect the civilians of Benghazi from regime forces (Ibid). However, it did not authorize NATO and other outside powers to provide air support for subsequent actions against Gaddafi. It is doubtful that the rebels would have claimed victory without this support, as NATO’s help was critical in ending the reign of Gaddafi.

This led to widespread criticism from Russia and China who claimed that R2P

!49 had become a tool for Western countries to intervene within sovereign countries.

It is therefore crucial that the military aspects of R2P be re-visited, in order to ensure that intervening countries do not overstep their mandates. Thus, rebuilding trust in the idea of R2P could require implementing more stringent monitoring and accountability measures. While far from perfect, R2P still represents the best chance in our time to work towards an international community that stands against mass atrocities (Bellamy, 1). It is therefore imperative that the international community learns from its mistakes in Libya, and reforms accordingly. The next section will present a typology of reform proposals that can act as a starting point for this endeavor.

Typology of Reform The next section of this paper will explore various avenues for reform that would avoid the mistakes observed in the Libya case, by ensuring that the ideas of R2P are implemented as intended. Potential reform proposals will be categorized as follows; implementation of existing R2P elements, monitoring and accountability, and UN structural reform.

Implementation of R2P elements Aside from its core pillars, R2P also consists of three elements that often receive less attention; the responsibility to prevent, the responsibility to react, and the responsibility to rebuild (Evans and Sahnoun, XI). While crucial to the general framework of R2P, the Libyan intervention did not sufficiently address these principles. The responsibility to rebuild would have included providing full assistance with recovery, reconstruction, reconciliation, and addressing the causes that led to the intervention in the first place (Ibid, XI). The responsibility to prevent would have been more difficult to implement, given the speed with which the Arab spring took hold. However, the UN could have focused more on addressing root causes of conflict, such as corruption and poverty, which were apparent in the years leading up to the Arab Spring. The UN could also have put more effort into promoting dialogue between the regime and rebel groups, in an effort to reach a peaceful settlement that did not require intervention. The

!50 international community’s failure on these points highlight potential avenues for reform which will be presented in the following section.

In “Libyan Lessons: Bring Back the Responsibility to Rebuild,” Keranen claims that the responsibility to rebuild did not receive enough attention due to a 2009 reformulation of R2P which failed to include its core principles (Kerenen).

He claims that the lack of attention given to specific rebuilding measures in this recalibration led to less emphasis being placed on it. He argues that re-integrating provisions on post-intervention security within the core pillars of R2P would go a long way in holding states accountable for post-intervention realities (Ibid). This could include adding measures that address the short-term issues faced by societies in the wake of military interventions (Ibid). While this suggestion is a step in the right direction, it suffers from a lack of clarity on what these measures would actually be and how they would impact state willingness to participate in intervention to begin with. More emphasis on post-conflict reconstruction would increase costs and commitment on the part of states conducting intervention.

However, in light of current realities in Libya surrounding the migrant crisis and ISIS, it has become clear that failing to incur short term costs can have serious implications for intervening countries further down the line.

As previously mentioned, another element of R2P is the “responsibility to prevent.” In “Responsibility while Protecting: Reforming R2P Implementation,” Tourinho et al. propose a renewed emphasis on prevention and non-coercive measures to ensure that atrocities do not occur in the first place (Tourinho et al 2016, 144). They claim that following the Libyan intervention, the UN secretariat attempted to renew this aspect. However, they quickly found that states were skeptical of being singled out as possible future perpetrators of mass atrocities (Ibid, 144). This reality makes it more difficult to conduct prevention through the lens of mass atrocity crimes. As a way of addressing this concern, Tourinho et al. suggest that the UN should widen its approach to prevention away from the direct prevention of mass atrocity crimes, towards symptoms such as poverty and health.

In order to do so, they advocate for collaboration with other institutions and NGOs that are already on the ground (Ibid, 144). Such an approach could have prevented the effects of the Syrian civil war by disassociating the term of mass atrocities from R2P, and by extension, made the Assad regime more receptive to talks. However, such an approach also runs the risk of softening the international

!51 community’s condemnation of mass atrocities and lead to complacency , something that R2P was originally created to avoid. It is therefore imperative that R2P reforms do not water down the language of R2P in an effort to make the perpetrators of atrocities more receptive to their prevention. Having identified some avenues for reform concerning the implementation of existing R2P elements, the next section will focus on improving the monitoring and accountability of R2P interventions through judicial reform.

Judicial Reform: Monitoring and Accountability Another avenue for the reform of R2P lies in improving monitoring and accountability measures for intervention. Aidan Hehir argues for the creation of a judicial body that holds the power to judge how to respond to intra-state humanitarian crises (Hehir, 12). This judicial body would act separately from the Security Council and act as an alternative in cases where it is paralyzed (Ibid, 232). Thus, if a crisis was to erupt that divided the Security Council the judicial body would be mandated to make a judgement on intervention.

It is important to note that had this reform existed during the intervention in Libya, it would not have been used, because the intervention was sanctioned by the Security Council. However, the idea has the potential to strengthen the legal validity of future interventions. It also has the potential to break deadlocks in the Security Council by analyzing evidence of atrocities and releasing verdicts on intervention. For example, had a judicial body existed in the lead up to the Syrian conflict, it could have broken deadlock in the Security Council and ruled in favor of international intervention due to wide-ranging proof of war crimes being committed by the Assad regime.

Lea-Henry presents another judicial reform by advocating for the creation of an international court that could offer authoritative interpretations of international law in real time (Lea-Henry 2018, 110). Lea-Henry claims that such a body is currently lacking from the international system and would consist of independent judges charged with delivering verdicts on issues affected by UN power structures (Ibid, 110). This would include passing resolutions on intervention that are blocked by the Security Council. While this proposal is similar to Hehrir’s, it adds a monitoring aspect that would ensure that states

!52 conducting intervention abide by their mandates. It also recognizes the speed with which developments occur by emphasizing the court's’ ability to make decisions in real time.

If implemented, the combination of Hehrir and Henry’s proposals would make it easier to conduct interventions and make states more accountable for their actions. Such reforms would most likely come under significant attack from states such as China or Russia who could see the creation of judiciary bodies as an attempt to legitimize breaches of sovereignty. While it is true that both authors go to great lengths to ensure the impartiality of such courts, the problem is that their very existence challenges the power of the veto. Still, including Henry’s proposal for a monitoring function could potentially convince these countries to accept such reforms, by ensuring that intervening powers stick to their original missions.

This would alleviate concerns from countries that disapproved of the second phase of the NATO intervention in Libya. The next section of this paper will discuss how wider reform of the Security Council could positively impact the implementation of R2P. UN structural reforms The third avenue for reform revolves around changing the structure of the United Nations in order to make R2P interventions more feasible. There have been a wide range of proposals on reform of the Security Council more generally, but few are directly linked to R2P intervention. Reforming the Security Council could improve consensus building, which would also affect deadlock on R2P. Some of these proposed changes include establishing a UN constitution, expanding General Assembly powers, expanding UNSC membership and limiting the veto power or abolishing it altogether (Henry, 109). Such proposals would undoubtedly democratize the implementation of R2P considerably, but are unlikely to pass given their lack of subtlety in challenging the power of the P-5 (Ibid). However, two other somewhat radical proposals could improve the implementation of R2P considerably; the creation of a UN army and a P-5 code of conduct. The following section will explain these proposals and illustrate why they may not be as difficult to achieve as one may imagine.

!53 Many of the criticisms surrounding the Libya intervention address the perception that the operation itself was NATO-ized. This is problematic: it raises questions about the intent of the countries involved, from states that are not part of the alliance. The problem is that NATO is usually the only force that is strong enough to effectively conduct such operations on short notice (Tourinho et al., 136). In an effort to address this problem, Hehir proposes the creation of an independent UN army that could be used to conduct R2P interventions (Hehir, 234-235). He claims that such an army would act as both a deterrent and rapid response force that could be deployed by an independent judiciary to ensure that it does not represent the interests of independent states.

The creation of an independent UN army has some merit, particularly if coupled with an independent judicial system that could deploy it in cases where the Security Council is in deadlock. Such an army would act as a deterrent against the perpetrators of atrocities, and intervene solely for the protection of civilians.

Aidan explains that heavy machinery such as tanks and major offensive weapons would be unnecessary, because such an army would not be used to defeat opposing armies but to halt atrocities (Ibid, 235). However, the problem is that deterrence only works if it is backed by significant force. Thus, while Aidan’s proposal represents a potentially effective solution to the Nato-ization of the UN, it would require enormous contributions from states and an independent judicial system in order to avoid current Security Council deadlock. If the resources could be gathered, it might be easier than expected to convince states that are skeptical of R2P to sign on. The key to incentivizing states to agree to its creation would be a truly independent judicial system, with the power to make non-biased judgments on its use. This would make the army accountable to international law, rather than the self-seeking whims of independent states.

Halil et al argue for the creation of a code of conduct for the Security Council (Halil and Bektas 2017, 192). The code of conduct would consist of guidelines for how the council should react to cases of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes (Ibid). The idea would be to minimize the effects of P-5 veto powers by recommending that they be restricted in the cases stated above and by requesting that states who have the veto pledge not to use them. Thus, creating a norm against using the veto in cases of mass atrocities.

!54 A Code of Conduct as a solution to Security Council deadlock on intervention could represent a plausible solution to inaction. However, it is difficult to see why states would wish to sign on to such a code. The veto power holds immense power and the states that wield them are unlikely to relinquish them even in cases of mass atrocities. For example, there have been blatant cases of atrocities being committed by the Syrian regime, and Russia has blocked multiple resolutions that aimed to stop them. This inaction suggests that Russia would be unwilling to give up their veto power. Moreover, even if states agree to a change in norms, there is nothing to stop them from deciding to use the veto should they change their minds. This avenue is therefore unlikely to make much headway unless it found a unique way of incentivizing its adoption.

Conclusion This paper has argued that while R2P has come under fire following the Libyan intervention, it still represents the international community’s best tool for addressing mass atrocities. However, in order to renew faith in its framework, significant reforms are necessary to ensure that interventions follow through with R2P’s guidelines. This was accomplished by explaining the historical origins of R2P, defining the concept, examining its effects in Libya, and outlining a typology on proposals for reform. While this paper did not come to any distinct conclusions on which reforms are best, it is the author’s hope that it may act as a preliminary typology of possible solutions. Future research could synthesize the various proposals put forward in this paper and work towards addressing the criticisms leveled against them. Another avenue for research could be to work on potential incentives that could help them be adopted. Without these incentives, it will be very difficult to implement the ideas put forward in this paper. Regardless of the difficulties, it is imperative that the international community view R2P as a work in progress, rather than an end in and of itself. One only needs to compare past atrocities in Rwanda, Bosnia and Kosovo with their modern counterparts in Syria, South Sudan and the DRC to understand the need for continued work in the prevention of mass atrocities.

!55 References Adams, Simons. “Libya and the Responsibility to Protect,” Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, Occasional Paper Series, (2012): 11.

Bellamy, Alex. The Responsibility to Protect: A Defense. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.

Brown, Chris. “On Gareth Evans, The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and for All.” Global Responsibility to Protect 2, no.

3 (June 2010): 310–14.

Bukar Mohammad Ibrahim. “The Litmus Test of R2P: An Analysis of the Legality and Legitimacy of Military Intervention in Libya.” Journal of Law, Policy and Globalization, 2016.

Chivvis, S. Christopher. Toppling Qaddafi: Libya and the Limits of Liberal Intervention. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014.

Gareth Evans, and Mohamed Sahnoun. The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty Canada: International Development Research Centre, 2001.

Genser Jared, and Irwin Cotler. The Responsibility to Protect. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2012.

Gholiagha, S. “‘To Prevent Future Kosovo’s and Future Rwanda’s, A Critical Constructivist View of the Responsibility to Protect.” International Journal of Human Rights 19, no. 8 (2015): 1074–97.

Hyena Valmir. “International Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo.” Academic Journal of Business, Administration, Law and Social Sciences 2, no. 1 (2016): 170-174.

John J. Davenport. “In Defense of the Responsibility to Protect: A Response to Weissman” Criminal Justice Ethics 35, no. 1 (April 2016): 39–67.

!56 Julian, Junk. “Bringing the Non-Coercive Dimensions of R2P to the Fore: The Case of Kenya” Global Society 30, no. 1 (2016): 54-66.

Kofi, Annan. “Two Concepts of Sovereignty.” The Economist, Sept 16, 1999. https://www.economist.com/international/1999/09/16/two-concepts-ofsovereignty.

Lea-Henry, J. “A Poggean Reform Agenda for Improving Political Will in Response to Mass Atrocities.” Politics in Central Europe 14, no. 1 (2018): 93–116.

Mehmet Halil and Mustafa Bektas. “Code of Conduct as an Alternative to Reformation of the UN Security Council.” Alternative Politics 9, no. 2 (May 2017): 192–213.

Outi, Keranen. “Libyan Lessons: Bring Back the Responsibility to Rebuild.”

Oxford ResearchGroup, November 11, 2016. https:// www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/blog/libyan-lessons-bring-back-theresponsibility-to-rebuild. Özgür, TÜFEKÇİ. “Can War Ever Be Ethical? Perspectives on Just War Theory and the Humanitarian Intervention Concept.” Ataturk University Journal of Economics & Administrative Sciences 32, no. 4 (October 2018): 1217– 29.

Stewart, Patrick. “Libya and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention.” Foreign Affairs 26 (2011). https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/libya/ 2011-08-26/libya-and-future-humanitarian-intervention.

Tourinho, M, Stuenkel O, and Brockmeier S. “Responsibility While Protecting: Reforming R2P Implementation.” Global Society 30, no. 1 (2016): 134– 50.

Zineb, Abdessadok. “Libya Today: From Arab Spring to Failed State.” Al Jazeera, May 30, 2017. https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/04/ happening-libya-today- 170418083223563.html.

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!58

A Friendly Dictator Neorealism to Explain US and IMF support of the Pinochet Regime in Chile, 1970-1989

by Sophie Hough-Martin

Introduction General Augusto Pinochet ruled Chile via military dictatorship from 1973 to 1990, after he led a military coup against the democratically-elected Leftist president, Salvador Allende (Huneeus 2007, 138). Despite international public outcry surrounding the Pinochet regime’s use of violence and coercion, the US supported Pinochet from the very day he came to power. Similarly, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) provided financial aid to the regime during the debt crisis in the 1980s (Huneeus 1998, 364). This paper uses Chile from 1970 to 1989 as a case study in critiquing the IMF as an international organization for overlooking and supporting political authoritarianism when economically liberal policies were the result.

Despite Pinochet’s publicly violent and authoritarian practices, the IMF and the US continued to support his regime. This paper seeks to determine the extent to which US interests affected IMF policy-decision making with regards to the Pinochet Regime, and argues that the IMF acted as a legitimizer of the US. This support of the US included, by extension, support of the US capitalist position of the Western bloc within the Cold War balance of power. By financially aiding Chile, they attempted to avoid the spread of communism in Latin America.

This was of crucial interest to the US, since keeping Chile capitalist was integral to US success relative to the Soviet Union in the ongoing Cold War. The first

!59 section of this paper will outline the Chilean case through careful consideration of the relevant literature. The second section will deal with a theoretical overview of neorealism, followed by an analysis of the Chilean case which reviews the reaction from the US and the IMF under a neorealist framework. It will ultimately show how, under a neorealist framework, the US and the IMF had political interest in supporting Pinochet’s violent, authoritarian regime.

The Chilean Case Salvador Allende, La Vía Chilena & the 1973 Military Coup To understand the Pinochet regime, it is crucial to understand a few issues in the background: the democratic government that Augusto Pinochet ousted in his 1973 coup d’état, and the political climate and social unrest that enabled a military coup to be carried out successfully. Here, I will discuss Salvador Allende and his socialist policies, as well as the economic crisis that preceded the military coup, which ended Allende’s government and started the military government under Augusto Pinochet. Finally, I will delve into US involvement in Chile.

In 1970, Salvador Allende was democratically elected as the head of a Popular Unity minority government in Chile (Huneeus 2007, 240). Salvador Allende was an unapologetic Marxist, with a “profound anti-US bias” who envisioned a peaceful path to socialism through legal routes in Chile. La Vía Chilena was Allende’s vision of a different kind of socialist revolution than those seen in Russia and Cuba (Dietrich 2018, 240). Allende wanted to avoid a civil war at all costs. For that reason, la vía Chilena and Allende’s policies were decidedly peaceful, even in the face of counter-revolutionary armed forces (Dietrich 2018, 244). Allende sought broad-based support for his socialist policies, which was a difficult goal given his minority government (Huneeus 2007, 33). In his first year of government, Allende’s peaceful approach to socialist revolution truly seemed to be successful. “The socialization of large-scale private property by congressional expropriation, market purchase, or executive decree had been so

!60 successful that in the November 4, 1971 speech celebrating the first year of his inauguration Allende could proclaim: ‘[…] the fundamental bases of heavy industry today belong to Chile and to the Chileans.’” (Winn 2010, 241) It was this success that made the Nixon Administration nervous.

Before Allende was elected, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in the US had supported three separate groups to try and oust Allende from office “before […] the Chilean Congress reaffirmed his victory.” (CIA 2000) The CIA provided tear gas, submachine-guns, and ammunition to one group, who had been plotting a military coup in 1970. (CIA 2000) Despite these efforts, no coup was successful in 1970, and Allende was confirmed as president of Chile. Upon Allende’s confirmation as president, the Nixon administration immediately undertook pressure tactics designed to increase public dissatisfaction with the Allende government. These came in the form of “economic and psychological warfare,” through cutting economic aid from $260 million in 1967 to less than $8 million in 1972 (Dietrich 2018, 138-139). While there was no direct link between the CIA, the US, and the 1973 military coup, the Nixon administration provided military aid and weaponry. (CIA 2000) They also kept in close contact with the Chilean military, in the hopes that the military would have a central role in any coup that would get rid of Allende (Dietrich 2018, 139-140).

Allende’s socialization plan included the nationalization of many key industries, which put $1 billion in US investments at risk (Dietrich 2018, 138).

While the first year of Allende’s socialization plan had been successful, an economic crisis emerged over his three years in power. This crisis “united capitalists, landowners, the middle classes, and their political party allies against labor, peasants, and leftist parties.” (Silvia 1993, 535) Combined with the steep decline in US economic aid, the economic crisis destroyed a policy coalition of interested parties that “had supported import-substitution industrialization in Chile.”(Dietrich 2018, 535). As a result, economic debates in 1973 centered around two economic approaches: gradualist economic development models that allowed high levels of industry protections to stabilize the economy over time, or

!61 dismantling of barriers and stabilizing the economy quickly through market liberalization (Silvia 1993, 535).

Discontent and conflict emerged between classes: the laborers, peasants and leftist parties vs. capitalists, landowners, the middle classes, and their political allies. General Pinochet faced a climate wherein a military coup could easily be justified and executed on anti-Marxist terms. On September 11, 1973, General Pinochet and the Chilean military seized power in a coup d’état. The following day, Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon discussed the coup in Chile on the phone. During this call, Kissinger claimed, with regards to US involvement, that “our hand doesn’t show this time.” (CIA 2000) This phone call asserts claims that while the US was not directly involved in the planning and execution of Pinochet’s military coup, US military officials had communicated to the Chilean military that they would support a coup against Allende with any means necessary (Dietrich 2018, 139-140).

The Pinochet Regime: A Violent Police State with Neoliberal Economics General Augusto Pinochet ruled for seventeen years following the 1973 coup, (Huneeus 2007, xxi) and three main factors characterized his regime: the use of coercion and violence in constructing a police state, economic reforms that transformed production and dismantled labor organizations, and a cult of personality surrounding Pinochet himself (Huneeus 2007, 3).This section will explore these tactics used by the Pinochet regime to secure and maintain power.

Latin America faced several military dictatorships during the mid-1970s, but none as violent as the Pinochet regime. Similarly, the regime’s complete alteration of the economic landscape completely changed the way Chileans interacted with their government(Huneeus 2007, 3). Immediately after Allende’s overthrow, the military disbanded Congress, declared Allende’s Popular Unity party outside of the law, and announced that any citizen with a “belligerent attitude” against the military junta would be executed (Dietrich 2018, 44).

!62 Military arrests began, “aimed at the top leaders of the overthrown government, mid-level leaders that had worked in agrarian reform or the Ministries of Health and Housing, leaders of labor unions, local civil society organizations, and members of the media.” By the new year, the Pinochet regime had arrested 45,000 Chileans (Dietrich 2018, 142).

The military was “convinced that Popular Unity was a movement that included armed groups and was planning an action like the Prague coup in Czechoslovakia in 1949.”(Huneeus 2007, 46) As such, the Pinochet regime used violence as its central mechanism in thwarting challenges to its authority (Dietrich 2018, 141). Conversely, Allende’s Popular Unity government was decidedly peaceful. Even during the coup, Allende did not call for counter-violence, martyring himself instead (Winn 2010, 243). The military regime justified themselves by claiming that the revolutionary actions taken by Allende had “created a climate of violence.” (Winn 2010, 245) The Pinochet regime also institutionalized a secret police force, the National Intelligence Directorate (DINA), to gather information and intelligence on the people who threatened them most: Marxists, and those aligned with the Popular Unity party (Huneeus 2007, 50). DINA did more than simply consolidate power; the brutality and violent use of force associated with the secret police force was cause for international outcry (Huneeus 2007, 50). Despite public outcry and the US government's active knowledge of the violence, they continued to support Pinochet’s authoritarian regime (Dietrich 2018, 141).

The dictatorial nature of Pinochet’s government was a marked departure from Chile’s history of democratic elections, for the better part of the twentieth century. “The coup marked a dramatic departure, not only from Chile’s history of democratic rule in the twentieth century, but also from prevailing economic policies and political economy interactions.” (Gilson and Milhaupt 2011, 251) These prevailing economic policies gave way to neoliberal economic reforms, such as market liberalization, deregulation, mass layoffs of public service employees, and privatization of public companies (Huneeus 2007, 163). These

!63 economic reforms served as a means of prioritizing poverty alleviation, and ensuring the economic stability Allende had been unable to achieve (Huneeus 2007, 162). In 1973, Pinochet suspended all existing labor contracts, outlawed unions, and banned collective bargaining (Berg 2006, 36). Every industry in the public sphere had private competition added to it, as a means of liberalizing the market (Huneeus 2007, 163). These regulations had a profound effect on Chilean labourers, as noted by Munck: “Workers have generally been the main bearers of the social debt of […] restructured labor market and the deregulation of labor relations.” (Munk 1994, 91) In addition to Nixon’s public support of the regime, the US played another key role in relation to Chilean economic reforms through the Chicago Boys (Silvia 1993, 541-542). These were a set of specialized technocrats, trained at the University of Chicago Department of Economics, (Huneeus 2007, 233) who’s economic model strictly prioritized privatisation, “with the dual purpose of eliminating the state’s entrepreneurial role and strengthening the position of private businesses.” (Huneeus 2007,164) Initially, the economic model instituted by the Chicago Boys saw quick and positive results, due to the grave economic crisis that had preceded them. (Huneeus 2007, 165) Pinochet and the Chicago Boys were closely intertwined: the neoliberal economic policies that were implemented would not have been possible without the level of centralization the regime had acquired (Silvia 1993, 547) While these economic reforms did see initial success, the amount of debt acquired through international loans overwhelmed the long-term impact. The long-term results did not provide consistent results; the economic reforms’ results “were modest in terms of growth, employment, and inflation compared with the achievements of democratic governments in the 1960s and 1990s.” (Huneeus 2007, 275) The reforms themselves were not “coordinated with exchange rate and capital account policies, and disregarded the challenge of completing underdeveloped factor markets.” (Ffrench-Davis 2002, 75) Additionally, the accumulation of foreign debt placed the economy in risky territory. One month

!64 into the Pinochet regime, the Nixon administration gave Chile a $24 million loan.

(Schoultz 1998, 360) By 1981, “borrowing was principally by private Chilean firms from foreign private banks, without any guarantee from the Chilean government.” (Ffrench-Davis 2002, 110) Before the abolition of the gold standard in the early-1970s, international capital movements mostly occurred between nonfinancial firms and governments. However, by 1973, loans had become the primary financial instruments in the market. (Devlin 1989, 59) Due to the high amount of external borrowing and excessive domestic spending in the private sector, a debt crisis in 1982 rocked the Pinochet regime and led to the renegotiation of foreign debt with bank creditors, the IMF and the US government. (Ffrench-Davis 2002, 19-20) While the Pinochet regime was arresting political dissidents and ‘disappearing’ them, the IMF had given Chile “explicit and strong support” that reaffirmed the economic reforms undertaken by the dictatorship. (Dietrich 2018, 364)

The IMF and the USA The IMF is a central actor in securing loans for developing countries, through securing foreign aid to those countries. This section will address the IMF, its governance structure, and the role of the US within the IMF as an international organization.

The IMF was created with the “primary purpose […] to ensure the stability of the international monetary system – the system of exchange rates and international payments that enables countries (and their citizens) to transact with each other. (IMF 2018) It is a financial body which acquires its financial resources from member states subscriptions, known as “quotas.” (Broz & Hawes 2006, 80) The governance structure of the IMF consists of two representative bodies, with weighted voting: each member state has 250 ‘basic’ votes, plus an additional vote for each part of its quota equal to SDR 100,000. (Brosz & Hawes 2006, 81) The US is the largest member of the IMF, with a quota of SDR 37.1 billion and

!65 371,743 votes. (Broz & Hawes 2006, 81) While the board of governors is supposed to have ultimate authority, it has delegated its powers to the executive board. (Broz & Hawes 2006, 81) This board does not take formal votes, making it difficult to ascertain which individual actors have the most influence. However, the chair of the executive board decides on a “sense of the meeting” based on whether a position is supported by members with significant votes. IMF decisionmaking can thus be understood through the positions of member states with a higher number of votes. (Broz & Hawes 2006, 81-82) As mentioned, the end of the gold standard between 1968 and 1973 signalled a new era for the IMF from the fixed standards that had existed out of the Bretton Woods agreement. (IMF 2018) International capital movements before this point were “effected mostly by non-financial firms and by governments.” (Devlin 1989, 59) However, by 1973, loans had become the primary financial instruments in the market, as international capital flows became decidedly privatized. (Devlin 1989, 59) In the 1980s, the IMF led structural adjustment programs that offered financial loans to developing countries in exchange for fundamental changes to their economies and governments. (Corbo & Fischer 1996, 2847) Their lending patterns have been linked to US banks’ level of exposure in a region: the likelihood of a country receiving IMF loans increases by 3.4% if US banks have high levels of financial exposure in that area. (Broz & Hawes 2006, 98) Neorealism Throughout the Cold War, realism was the dominant theory in international relations. (Walt 1998, 31) Realism assumes that the international system exists in a state of anarchy, that states are the principal, rational actors, that they act out of self-interest, and that the survival of the state is their most basic goal. (Walt 1998, 31) Neorealism emerged after changes in the global political landscape in the 1970s, when “East-West concerns [supplanted] North-South issues at the top of foreign policy agendas.” (Nye 1988, 237) According to neorealism, states “seek self-preservation” and to maximize opportunities above

!66 all else, through material power. (Telbami 2002, 160) The framework focuses on the structure of the international system to a higher extent than traditional realism: “States in an anarchic order must provide for their own security, and threats or seeming threats to their security abound.” (Waltz 1988, 617) Neorealism also focuses on global powers and their spheres of influence. This brief section will explain how US policy and IMF behaviour during the Pinochet regime supported violence in order to secure influence and victory over the Soviet Union, displaying clear neorealist patterns of governance.

The structure of the Cold War saw the international political landscape in a state of bipolarity: a constant struggle between the Soviet bloc and the Western bloc for the upper hand. “In a two-power competition, a loss for one is easily taken to be a gain for the other.” (Waltz 1988, 622) Neorealist theory argues that bipolar international systems ensure global powers are subject to a greater likelihood of internal engagement over external engagement, limiting the likelihood of war. (Mastanduno 1997, 52) Neorealist theoreticians like Kenneth Waltz claim that “to let one’s side down risks one’s own destruction.” (Waltz 1988, 621) Neorealism accounts for the structural reality of the great powers and their blocs during the Cold War, and while it does not explicitly deal with foreign policy, it provides a framework for understanding the importance of assessing US domestic interests when addressing the Chilean situation. (Waltz 1988, 619) In other words, neorealism as a theoretical framework allows us to understand the key role played by the US in financially and politically supporting the IMF decision to engage with the Pinochet regime, regardless of the blatant human rights violations the regime committed.

The US had a central role in shaping post-coup Chile. Before Salvador Allende was inaugurated as president, the US had CIA operatives working with opposition groups to prevent Allende from taking power. (CIA 2000) Once Allende had become president, the Nixon administration’s cuts to foreign aid debilitated the Chilean economy. (Dietrich 1973, 138-139) When discussing the 1973 coup, Nixon alluded that he and Kissinger would have been heroes for their

!67 efforts in destabilizing a democratically-elected Marxist during the era of McCarthyism as the major foreign policy framework. (Dietrich 1973, 140) While US involvement in Chile clearly falls within the framework of neorealism during the Cold War, IMF reasoning for supporting Chile is less clear.

As mentioned, the lack of transparency in IMF decision-making practices, specifically their lack of roll-call voting, makes it difficult to discern degrees of influence from specific actors. Specifically, it makes it difficult to “directly observe US positions and motivations.” (Broz & Hawes 2006, 86) However, there are a number of factors which point toward a high level of US influence over IMF decision making and policy. First, as mentioned, there is a direct correlation between US bank exposure in a given area, and the likelihood of that area receiving an IMF loan. (Broz & Hawes 2006, 84-85) Second, the fact that US Congress has the ability to direct the positions the US takes at the IMF. (Broz & Hawes 2006, 84-85) Finally, the US has a staggeringly high amount of contribution toward the IMF. (Broz & Hawes 2006, 84-85) These three factors show an undeniable tipping of the IMF scales in favour of US influence.

The fact that the IMF and the US both explicitly supported the Pinochet regime throughout the 1970s, at the same time the international community began to learn about the executions and human rights abuses occurring in Chile, should be inexplicable for two democratic organizations. (Ffrench-Davis 2002, 19-20) Neorealist insight with regards to the two-power competition between the USSR and the US, in conjunction with the competing economic ideologies of capitalism and communism during the Cold War, serves to explain the US’ high level of involvement and commitment to a dictatorial regime. (Huneeus 2007, 162-163) Similarly, the IMF support of the Pinochet regime serves to demonstrate the power the US held over IMF policy making, while reinforcing neorealist ideas of actors being more likely to engage through internal mechanisms, and avoid external warfare. (Broz & Hawes 2006, 86 & Mastundando 1997, 52) Preserving capitalism and preventing the spread of the Soviet sphere of influence were central priorities in the IMF and US support of neoliberal

!68 economic reforms in Chile, despite the regime’s use of coercion and violence against political opponents and civilians. That is, US self-preservation and prevention of a Soviet victory were of higher importance than Chilean democracy; (Berg, 1973, 36) instead of promoting democracy, a principle capitalism and the free market are supposed to encourage, the IMF and the US supported a dictatorial regime to protect Western interests against the expansion of Soviet influence in Latin America. Pinochet’s regime was better for US interests than Allende’s government had been. While the US would eventually pressure the regime to halt atrocities against Chileans, they would always acknowledge this. (Dietrich 1973, 148) IMF alignment with US’ interests matches the neorealist understanding of states and great powers as the key rational actors in the international political sphere, by mitigating the sovereignty of international structures. (Waltz 1988, 619 & Ffrench-Davis 1982, 19-20) Conclusion Chile’s political and economic structure saw a complete overhaul between 1970 and 1989. From Allende to Pinochet, IMF attitudes were traceably influenced by US interests. Rather than respecting Chilean democratic traditions, the Chicago Boys aided Pinochet in implementing a liberalized economy which superseded the will of the people, in order to prevent the Soviet sphere of influence, and Marxist ideology, from establishing itself in Latin America.

(Dietrich 1973, 138) As neorealism suggests, the importance of keeping the Soviet Union in balance with the US to ensure the American sphere of influence did not shrink, supplanted any normative harms-reduction goal in terms of human rights abuses. (Waltz 1988, 621) As the Pinochet regime was friendly to the anticommunist interests of the US during the Cold War, providing financial aid to Pinochet was intrinsically linked to the US’ self-interest. (Dietrich 1973, 148)

!69 References Berg, Janine. 2006. “Working in Chile: Reform, Repression, and Flexibility since 1973.”

In Miracle for Whom?: Chilean Workers under Free Trade, edited by Richard McIntyre, 27-60. New York: Routledge.

Broz, J. Lawrence and Michael Brewster Hawes. 2006. “US Domestic Politics and International Monetary Fund Policy.” In Delegation and Agency in International Organizations edited by Darren G. Hawkins et al., 77-106. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Central Intelligence Agency. General Report: September 18, 2000. “CIA Activitis in Chile.” Accessed July 20, 2018. https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/generalreports-1/chile/ Corbo, Vittorio and Stanley Fischer. 1995. “Structural Adjustment, Stabilization and Policy Reform: Domestic and International Finance.” Handbook of development economics 3: 2845-2924.

Devlin, Robert. 1989. Debt and Crisis in Latin America: The Supply Side of the Story.

Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Dietrich, Christopher. 2018. “’Our Hand Doesn’t Show’: The United States and the Consolidation of the Pinochet Regime in Chile (1973-1977).” In Dirty Hands and Vicious Deeds: The US Government’s Complicity in Crimes Against Humanity and Genocide, edited by Samuel Totten. North York, ON: University of Toronto Press.

Ffrench-Davis, Richardo. 2002. “f” In Economic Reforms in Chile: From Dictatorship to Democracy. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Gilson, Ronald J. and Curtis J. Milhaupt. 2011. “Economically Benevolent Dictators: Lessons for Developing Democracies.” The American Journal of Comparative Law 50, no. 1: 227-288.

Huneeus, Carlos. 2007. The Pinochet Regime. Translated by Lake Sagaris. Boulder, CO: Lynne Reiner Publishers, Inc. International Monetary Fund. “The IMF At-a-Glance.” Accessed July 20, 2018. https:// www.imf.org/en/About

!70 Mastanduno, Michael. 1997. “Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy after the Cold War.” International Security 21, no. 4: 49-88.

Munck, Ronaldo. 1994. “Workers, Structural Adjustment, and Concertacion Social in Latin America.” Latin American Perspectives 21, no. 3: 90-103.

Nye Jr., Joseph S. 1988. “Neorealism and Neoliberalism.” World Politics 40, no. 2: 235-251.

Schoultz, Lars. 1998. Beneath the United States: A History of U.S. Policy Toward Latin America. Cambridge, US: Harvard University Press.

Silva, Eduardo. 1993. “Capitalist Coalitions, the State, and Neoliberal Economic Restructuring: Chile, 1973-88.” World Politics 45: 526-559.

Telbami, Shibley. 2002. “Kenneth Waltz, Neorealism, and Foreign Policy.” Security Studies 11, no. 3: 158-170.

Walt, Stephen M. 1998. “International Relations: One World, Many Theories.” Foreign Policy 110: 29-46.

Waltz, Kenneth N. 1988. “The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory.” The Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18, no. 4: 615-628.

Winn, Peter. 2010. “The Furies of the Andes: Violence and Terror in the Chilean Revolution and Counterrevolution.” In A Century of Revolution: Insurgent and Counterinsurgent Violence During Latin America’s Long Cold War, edited by Greg Grandin and Gilbert M. Joseph. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Nicolas, Philippe. European Migrant Crisis. 2017. www.philippe-nicolas.com

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!72

Étude comparative Pourquoi l’Allemagne a-t-elle adopté une politique d’asile plus généreuse que la France ? par Célia Philippe

Contexte La crise des réfugiés a pris l’Europe de court il y a trois ans, et de nombreux pays ont dû s’adapter à cette crise qui perdure encore aujourd’hui. Jusqu’à décembre 2018, c’est au total 109,922 personnes qui ont risqué leur vie dans la traversée de la Méditerranée, et 2,216 personnes qui ont péri dans cette même traversée. La plupart des arrivées se font en Grèce, Italie et Espagne, et c’est en 2015 que le pic d’arrivées a été enregistré avec 1,015,877 personnes abordant les côtes de l’Europe (UNHCR 2018). Nombreuses sont les personnes fuyant leurs pays pour l’Europe dans l’espoir d’une vie meilleure, et risquent leur vie dans une traversée dangereuse. Suite à cela, les pays membres de l’Union Européenne ont dû mettre en place une série d’arrangements pour répondre à l’urgence de la situation. La Commission Européenne a tenté en vain d'implémenter un quota obligatoire de 160,000 réfugiés, répartis parmi les pays membres (Le Monde 2015). Néanmoins, cela n’a pas empêché certains pays comme l’Allemagne d’adopter leur propre politique migratoire, en décalage avec le reste de l’Europe.

Ainsi, le pays a décidé d’ouvrir ses portes aux réfugiés, suite à la suspension du règlement Dublin dans le cas des réfugiés Syriens, qui « stipulait que le premier État membre d’entrée était responsable des demandeurs d’asile » (Constant et Zimmerman 2017, 200). Cependant, la France a pris une toute autre approche au problème et s’est fermée sur elle-même, refusant d’offrir un traitement spécial aux réfugiés Syriens.

!73 Conséquences de la recherche Il est important d’étudier ce sujet, car cette crise des réfugiés est l’un des challenges les plus importants pour l’Europe depuis le tournant du 21ème siècle.

En effet, le flux accablant de réfugiés a exercé une pression incommensurable sur les différents gouvernements européens. Ce fut d’ailleurs un des arguments majeurs des pro-Brexit lors de la campagne pour quitter l’Union Européenne. De surcroît, ce mouvement eurosceptique pourrait bien s’étendre à d’autres pays si la situation présente n’est pas correctement prise en charge (Constant et Zimmerman 2017). Le lourd fardeau d’accueil des réfugiés n’est partagé que par une poignée de pays, pendant que le reste n’accepte que très peu de réfugiés. Cela crée un déséquilibre entre des pays comme l’Allemagne qui a enregistré en 2015 587 demandes d’asile pour 100,000 habitants, soit le double de la moyenne européenne qui est de 260, tandis que la France en a seulement enregistré 114 (Benedikter et Karolewski 2017). En observant la politique d’asile allemande, sa manière de fonctionner ou bien ses motivations, cela pourrait permettre d’identifier d’autres pays pouvant se calquer sur le modèle allemand comme une stratégie pour gérer la crise. Dans le cas de la France, il est aussi utile d’identifier les facteurs qui justifient l’adoption d’une politique d’asile moins hospitalière.

Introduction de l’étude comparative L’Allemagne et la France ont toutes deux un riche passé en termes d’immigration, notamment dans le but de satisfaire les besoins économiques du 20ème siècle et de l’industrialisation. Ces grandes vagues migratoires ont occasionné des dépenses significatives, mais répondaient à une pénurie de main d’œuvre. La France accueillis majoritairement des migrants francophones d'anciennes colonies, et qui par conséquent avaient moins de difficulté à s'intégrer que ceux migrant en Allemagne. Cette tendance fut telle que dans les années 30, la France était le deuxième pays d’immigration derrière les États-Unis en terme d’arrivées enregistrées. Aujourd’hui cette tendance s'est inversée, puisque c’est maintenant l’Allemagne qui est le deuxième pays d'immigration, toujours après les États-Unis (Lammert 2017). Nous allons donc explorer les raisons de ce revers de situation, et en quoi la politique d’immigration diffère en France et en Allemagne. Cette étude est placée dans le contexte plus précis de la crise des réfugiés de 2015, nous allons donc nous concentrer sur les plus récents

!74 avancements de ces trois dernières années de cette politique d’immigration.

L’attitude divergente entre la France et l’Allemagne peut être justifiée par trois facteurs : la culture, l’économie et la démographie. Premièrement, la culture de l'Allemagne est généralement plus inclusive pour les étrangers, tandis que la culture française est plus fermée. Deuxièmement, l’économie allemande est plus productive et se porte mieux que l’économie française. Dernièrement, la population allemande est projetée de diminuer dans les années qui suivent, alors que celle française devrait maintenir une lente croissance.

Différence culturelle Tout d’abord, la différence culturelle entre les deux pays est un facteur de la divergence de la politique d’asile. Un aspect fondamental de la culture allemande est la «Willkommenskultur» – ou culture de l'accueil – et elle a évolué après à la crise de 2015. Cette culture de l'accueil est décrite par l’auteur qui cite Klaus Bade comme « une réaction à la tardive révision de la propre image nationale allemande comme un pays d’immigration » (Braun 2017, 40). Suite à l’arrivée en masse de réfugiés, le pays a vu une hausse dans le volontariat et les organisations caritatives pour répondre aux besoins de ses nouveaux arrivants. La crise a pris de court l’État, et a saturé le système en place laissant les réfugiés à leur sort. C’est alors que les allemands se sont mobilisés, offrant des repas chauds ou bien un logement temporaire aux réfugiés, qui étaient forcés de vivre dans la rue dû au manque de prise en charge. Cette récente apparition de la «culture de l’aide» a restructuré les communautés locales du pays d’une manière non-négligeable.

Bien que cette culture soit prônée par le gouvernement fédéral, ce sont les volontaires et associations qui jouent un rôle central et actif au quotidien. Ce contact en face-à-face que certains allemands ont avec ces réfugiés permet de mieux les sensibiliser à la cause et d’ouvrir leur champ d’horizon concernant les épreuves vécues par ces migrants. Dans le futur, cela pourrait permettre de remplacer le traditionnel paradigme d'intégration qui demande des migrants de s’assimiler à la culture du pays, par un modèle de multiculturalisme prévalant avec une cohabitation de diverses cultures. Cependant, une des critiques de cette culture d’accueil est qu’elle est majoritairement alimentée par une petite partie de la population. Ce sont les personnes âgées, les personnes éduquées et les femmes de la bourgeoisie qui participent le plus dans ce mouvement, bien que de plus en

!75 plus de jeunes eux-mêmes fils ou filles d’immigrants commencent eux aussi à participer (Braun 2017).

Pour ce qui est de la culture française c’est une autre histoire. L’élément marquant ici est la notion très controversée de laïcité qui est centrale dans la culture française et indissociable de la République française. La laïcité est définie par le fait que l’État français ne reconnaît aucune religion, et que cette dernière peut être pratiquée dans le domaine privé mais ne doit pas relever du domaine public. Le port de signes religieux ostentatoires dans les écoles, mairies ou autres lieux d’État est donc rejeté. La religion musulmane tout particulièrement est vue comme en désaccord avec le refus laïc de tous signes religieux dans l’espace publique. Le port du voile dans les écoles publiques fut interdit en 2004, car considéré comme un obstacle à l'émancipation des femmes musulmanes, et il fut de même en 2010 pour le port de la burqa. C’est dans ce contexte d’hostilité déjà présente envers les musulmans que se sont ajoutés les attentats de Charlie Hebdo, Paris ou encore Nice, et qui n’ont fait qu'attiser le feu du débat sur la religion.

Depuis, l’opinion publique est fortement divisée sur la question d’immigration et la laïcité demeure un sujet sensible (Bauzon 2017).

Aujourd’hui, nombreuses sont les personnes qui font l’amalgame entre l’Islam et le terrorisme en France, et sont donc réticentes à accueillir ces réfugiés qui pour beaucoup sont vus comme un affront, car provenant de pays majoritairement musulmans. Par conséquent, il est compréhensible que l’État ait décidé de s'aligner sur l’opinion publique afin de ne pas raviver la controverse. La France est à ce jour difficilement prête à assimiler une vague de réfugiés qui, en tant que réfugiés, sont en décalage avec la société française qui leur demandera d’abandonner leur culture en faveur d’une assimilation totale.

Décalage de leur modèle économique et social D’autre part, une des raisons pour laquelle la politique d'asile de la France et l’Allemagne diffère tant est due au décalage de leur modèle économique et social.

En effet, au niveau européen, l’Allemagne est souvent célébrée pour son succès économique et son bas taux de chômage inégalé dans la région. En octobre 2018, le taux de chômage en Allemagne était de 3,3 pour cent tandis que celui de la France était de 8,9 pour cent (Eurostat 2018). De plus, le marché français est largement dominé par le secteur tertiaire, qui en 2016 représentait 22,7 pour cent.

!76 Par conséquent, le gouvernement a plus d'intérêt à donner la priorité aux migrants hautement qualifiés. Le marché allemand contraste avec celui de son voisin français, et demeure à ce jour majoritairement industriel à 25,6 pour cent, et requiert donc une main d’œuvre en plus grand nombre et pas nécessairement qualifiée (Europa 2016).

On peut aussi comparer le rendement des entreprises de France et d’Allemagne présentes dans l’autre pays. Le chiffre d’affaire des entreprises françaises en Allemagne est de 137 milliards d’euros, et inversement, celui des entreprises allemandes en France est de 141 milliards d’euros (France Diplomatie 2017). Malgré le fait que les entreprises allemandes en France sont moins nombreuses par rapport aux entreprises françaises situées en Allemagne, elles sont visiblement plus efficaces en termes de chiffre d’affaire. D’après Trouille (2013), cela est attribuable en partie aux différences structurelles dans le monde du travail, avec des salaires moins élevés et un marché du travail plus flexible en Allemagne. En 2016, le coût horaire moyen de la main-d'œuvre en Allemagne était de 33 euros, alors que celui de son homologue français était de 35,6 euros, plus élevé et donc moins compétitif . Ce coût horaire par salarié est tiré de ceux à temps plein notamment dans les domaines de l'industrie et des services (INSEE 2018). Un coût horaire plus bas signifie qu’un salarié représente une dépense moins importante pour les employeurs et le gouvernement. Cela explique donc pourquoi l'Allemagne a besoin de plus de main d’œuvre, qu’elle peut notamment se procurer par le biais de l’immigration de masse, par opposition à la France qui a besoin de moins de main d’œuvre.

De surcroît, les organisations syndicales et les nombreuses régulations du travail mettent un frein à l’immigration en France. Le marché du travail français est renommé pour sa considérable complexité, et bien qu’il ne s’oppose pas directement à l’immigration, avoir recours à des migrants n’est pas pour autant encouragé lorsqu’il s’agit du secteur primaire ou secondaire. En effet, la France fait plus souvent recours aux migrants hautement qualifiés, dont la présence est infime parmi les réfugiés venant de Syrie ou autres pays en conflit. Pour ce qui est des organisations syndicales, elles sont historiquement sceptiques envers l’immigration, mais cela a changé dans les récentes années, et elles participent maintenant activement à combattre la discrimination. Cependant, dans le marché

!77 du travail, ce n’est pas pour autant que les syndicats promeuvent l’arrivée de travailleurs migrants à grande échelle (Menz 2008).

Alors qu’il y a peu de place pour le lobbying dans le marché du travail en France, l’héritage néo corporatiste du modèle allemand permet à plus d’acteurs de s’engager dans les négociations. En effet, le néo corporatisme est un système qui “envisage le tripartisme (les régulations entre l’État, le patronat et les syndicats) comme un moyen de régulation par lequel l’État intervient dans les rapports entre le capital et le travail” (Arcq et Marques-Pereira 1991, 160). De ce fait, il est facile pour ces syndicats de présenter leurs intérêts tirés d’un consensus social à l’État en se conformant au système mis en place par ce dernier (Arcq et MarquesPereira 1991). Le marché du travail allemand est traditionnellement guidé par une politique de migration axée sur la demande, et est donc favorable à la participation de migrants dans les entreprises locales afin d’augmenter les effectifs et d’augmenter la productivité. De plus, les organisations syndicales allemandes sont depuis longtemps favorables à l’intégration des migrants dans le marché du travail. La Confédération allemande des syndicats (DGB) a notamment publié une étude démontrant la rentabilité à long-terme de la migration, surtout accompagnée de mesures d’intégration comme des cours d’apprentissage de l'allemand (Menz 2008).

Différence d’évolution de leurs populations Pour finir, le vieillissement des populations est un autre problème dans beaucoup de pays développés. C’est notamment le cas de l’Allemagne, qui avec un peu plus de 80 millions d’habitants est le pays le plus peuplé de l’Union Européenne, tandis que la France en compte seulement 66 millions (INSEE 2017). Cependant, le taux de fertilité en France est de 1,92 enfants par femme ce qui en fait le plus élevé de l’Union Européenne, alors que celui de l’Allemagne est de 1,60 enfants par femme (Eurostat 2018). Evidemment, il faut au minimum 2,1 enfants par femme pour que la croissance de la population soit viable et ne dépérisse point. Les projections montrent que d’ici 2080, la population de l’Allemagne devrait diminuer à 77,79 millions d’habitants et celle de la France devrait atteindre 78,69 millions. De plus, la population française sera relativement plus jeune comparée à la population allemande, et éprouvera donc moins de difficulté à soutenir la partie de la population plus âgée (INSEE 2017).

!78 Le taux de dépendance vieillesse est souvent utilisé pour définir la durabilité du modèle social dans les pays. Il correspond au pourcentage de la population âgée de 65 ans et plus, relative au total de la population active de 15 à 64 ans.

Ainsi en 2006, il y avait respectivement 25 et 28 personnes âgées pour 100 personnes de la population active en France et en Allemagne (Muszyńska et Rau 2012). Dans leur recherche, Muszyńska et Rau (2012) examinent le taux de dépendance vieillesse dans plusieurs pays européens dont la France et l’Allemagne, selon plusieurs scénarios. En effet, ils prennent en compte la différence du taux de vieillesse si les personnes âgées sont en bonne santé ou non, mais aussi à un taux de migration zéro ou avec flux de migration.

En premier lieu, ils projettent le taux de dépendance vieillesse dans l’éventualité d’une migration nulle. Avec ce scénario, le taux de dépendance vieillesse pour la France sera de 47 et celui de l’Allemagne est de 67 en 2050.

L’écart entre les deux pays a donc drastiquement augmenté, en partant d’un taux de dépendance vieillesse dans les deux pays qui était dans la moyenne européenne. En effet, en 2050 la France aura le taux le plus bas avec le Danemark, tandis que l’Allemagne se rapprochera de la moyenne européenne de 61. En second lieu, ils procèdent à projeter le taux de dépendance vieillesse en partant du principe que les pays maintiendront une balance de migration positive.

Dans ce cas, tous les pays verront leur taux de dépendance vieillesse diminuer et la France descendra à un score de 45 tandis que l’Allemagne verra une baisse plus significative à un score de 58. Bien que d’ici 2050, ces mêmes migrants seront pour la plupart retraités, la tendance est qu’ils seront toujours plus jeunes parmi la catégorie des personnes âgées. Muszyńska et Rau finissent par conclure que même si une balance positive de migration, et qu’une population âgée en meilleure santé ne puisse pas mettre fin au vieillissement de la population, ces deux facteurs sont déterminants dans le façonnement du marché du travail dans les décennies à venir.

Cette recherche souligne l’importance de la migration pour atténuer le vieillissement des populations. Cela explique en partie donc pourquoi l’Allemagne et la France ont deux différentes politiques d’asile. En effet, comme démontré par les projections, le taux de dépendance vieillesse en France ne subit presque aucun changement en présence ou en absence de migration. Par contre, le taux de dépendance vieillesse en Allemagne chute avec la présence de migration,

!79 ce qui explique pourquoi le pays a opté pour une politique d’asile plus hospitalière que la France (Belanger et Lutz 2017).

Conclusion et approfondissement En conclusion, l’approche différente de l’Allemagne et la France vis-à-vis de leur politique d’asile peut donc être expliquée par les facteurs suivants.

L’économie allemande se porte mieux et à un modèle social plus avantageux, avec des organisations syndicales impliquées dans le processus décisionnel, qui ont le pouvoir d'influencer et voient une politique d’immigration inclusive d’un bon œil.

De plus, la culture française est plus réticente à l’ouverture aux étrangers que la culture allemande. Les notions de laïcité et culture de l'accueil peuvent donc entrer en opposition, surtout dans le contexte présent de tensions liées au terrorisme et à la crise des réfugiés. Enfin, la population allemande est projetée de subir un fort déclin dans les décennies à venir, ce qui explique qu’elle cherche à exploiter l’opportunité d’un flux de migrants pour remédier au problème, alors que la population française devrait au contraire augmenter et n’a donc pas nécessairement besoin d’un point de vue purement démographique d'accueillir des migrants. Ces facteurs ne sont cependant pas exclusifs, et indépendamment l’un de l’autre sont une faible motivation pour un pays de changer leur politique d’asile, mais c’est combiné qu’ils deviennent déterminants. Ainsi, même si la France parvient à modifier son économie ou bien sa culture d'accueil, le fait qu’elle n’ait pas besoin d’un apport en population extérieur empêchera un changement.

Pour approfondir le sujet, il est intéressant de noter que malgré le fait que l’Allemagne ait en apparence adoptée une politique d’asile plus généreuse que la France, ceci est aujourd’hui remis en cause et le système mis en place par l'Allemagne s'essouffle peu à peu. En effet, les deux pays ont une chose en commun : ils mettent tous deux délibérément de côté les réfugiés à travers leur politique en dissuadant l'intégration des demandeurs d’asile, une discrimination qui est entretenue constamment. Comme Bank (2000) l’explique dans son article, il y a un décalage dans la façon dont les réfugiés sont traités sur le papier et en réalité, autant avant qu’après leur accueil en Europe. Un parfait exemple de cela est l’accord que l’Europe a signé avec la Turquie, qui vise à empêcher le plus

!80 d’arrivées de migrants possible aux portes de l’Europe. De ce fait, il est attendu que la Turquie renforce les contrôles aux frontières et “récupère” les réfugiés dont la demande d'asile a été rejetée, tout cela contre une allocation financière de 3 milliards d’euros (BBC 2016). Pour les réfugiés qui auront la chance de voir leur demande d’asile accepté, ils seront exclus de participer dans la vie quotidienne du pays d'accueil et tenus à distance afin de les décourager de planter leurs racines, dans l’éventualité où cela mènerait à encore plus d’arrivées par les liens sociaux de ceux déjà présents en Europe (Bank 2000).

Ces éléments d’approfondissements pourront être développés dans un futur essai. En attendant, les développements de la crise des réfugiés sont à observer de près. Le dénouement de cette crise est fondamental dans l’histoire de l’Europe, ainsi que la manière avec laquelle elle est abordée. Certains pays comme la France ou l’Allemagne ont déjà rétabli, au moins temporairement, le contrôle aux frontières qui est traditionnellement non-existant dans la zone Schengen. Avec la sortie du Royaume-Uni, la responsabilité des réfugiés pourrait bien s’alourdir pour le reste des pays membres de l’Union Européenne. En janvier 2018, le gouvernement français d’Edouard Philippe a présenté un projet de loi asileimmigration visant à diminuer les délais dans lesquels un demandeur d'asile peut déposer son dossier ou encore son recours. Cela a créé des inquiétudes de la part d’associations qui aident les migrants et demandeurs d’asiles, car ils voient en ce projet de loi la possibilité d’effectuer d’avantages de renvois, ainsi qu’un doublement de la durée maximale des séjours en rétention administrative (Le Monde 2018). Du côté allemand, le paysage politique est en plein réforme avec Merkel passant le flambeau de la tête du parti à Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, qui pourrait potentiellement devenir la prochaine chancelière. Cependant même en tant que protégée de Merkel, ses vues sur les dossiers de la sécurité du pays et de l’immigration sont des points divergents. De ce fait, si Annegret KrampKarrenbauer est faite chancelière dans le futur, ils est probable que le pays adopte une politique d’immigration plus conservatrice qu’à ce jour (BBC 2018).

!81 Bibliographie Arcq, Etienne et Bérengère Marques-Pereira. 1991. « Néo-corporatisme et concertation sociale en Belgique » Persée 9(3): 159–179 Bank, Roland. 2000. « Reception Conditions for Asylum Seekers in Europe: An Analysis of Provisions in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany and the United Kingdom » Nordic Journal of International Law 69: 257–288 Bauzon, Stéphane. 2017. « Le symbole républicain de la laïcité en France » Persona y Derecho 77: 177-194 BBC. 2016. « Migrant crisis: EU-Turkey deal comes into effect » <http://www.bbc.com/news/worldeurope-35854413> (Accédé le 12 avril 2018) BBC. 2018. « Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer: Merkel choice elected CDU leader » <https:// www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-46487246> (Accédé le 19 décembre 2018) Belanger, Alain et Wolfgang Lutz. 2017. « Demographic change and the drivers of future migration into Europe. Approach, methodology and work plan of the JRC/IIASA Centre of Expertise on Population and Migration » International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) March 2017 Report: 1–29 Benedikter, Roland et Ireneusz Pawel Karolewski. 2017. « Europe’s Refugee and Migrant Crisis: Economic and Political Ambivalences » Challenge 60(3): 294–320 Braun, Katherine. 2017. « Decolonial Perspectives on Charitable Spaces of “Welcome Culture” in Germany » Social Inclusion 5(3): 38–48 Constant, Amelie F. et Klaus F. Zimmerman. 2017. « Le défi des migrations: quelles options pour l’Europe » Revue d'Économie Financière 125: 195–207 Europa. « Germany Overview » <https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/countries/membercountries/germany_en> (Accédé le 10 avril 2018) Europa. « France Overview » <https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/countries/member-countries/ france_en> (Accédé le 10 avril 2018) Eurostat. 2018. « Taux de chômage harmonisé par sexe » <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do? tab=table&init=1&language=fr&pcode=teilm020&plugin=1> (Accédé le 15 décembre 2018) Eurostat. 2017. « Structure et vieillissement de la population » <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statisticsexplained/index.php?title=Population_structure_and_ageing/fr> (Accédé le 11 avril 2018)

!82 Eurostat. 2018. « Total fertility rate, 1960–2016 (live births per woman) » <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php? title=File:Total_fertility_rate,_1960%E2%80%932016_(live_births_per_woman).png> (Accédé le 16 décembre 2018) France Diplomatie. 2017. « Présentation: Relations économiques et commerciales » <https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/dossiers-pays/allemagne/relations-bilaterales/ presentation-21140/> (Accédé le 10 avril 2018) INSEE. 2017. « Comparer les pyramides des âges de 29 pays d'Europe» <https://www.insee.fr/fr/ statistiques/2418102?p1=de&p2=fr&annee=2080> (Accédé le 16 décembre 2018) INSEE. 2018. « Salaire minimum - Coût du travail » <https://www.insee.fr/fr/statistiques/3303424? sommaire=3353488&q=smic+europe > (Accédé le 10 avril 2018) Lammert, Norbert. 2017. « Migration et intégration : L’Allemagne et la France face aux défis européens du 21e siècle » Allemagne d'aujourd'hui 1(219): 21–25.

Le Monde. 2015. « La Commission européenne détaille les quotas de réfugiés par pays » <http://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2015/09/09/la-commission-europeenne-va-presenterdes-quotas-de-refugies-par-pays_4749591_3214.html> (Accédé le 11 avril 2018) Le Monde. 2018. « Que contient le projet de loi asile-immigration ? » <https://www.lemonde.fr/immigration-et-diversite/article/2018/01/11/que-contient-le-projetde-loi-asile-immigration_5240339_1654200.html> (Accédé le 19 décembre 2018) Menz, Georg. 2008. « Political Battles at Home and in Brussels: Labor Migration and Asylum Policy in Established Countries of Immigration: France, the United Kingdom, and Germany » p.1–69 dans The Political Economy of Managed Migration: Nonstate Actors, Europeanization, and the Politics of Designing Migration Policies. Oxford: Oxford University Press Muszyńska, Magdalena M. et Roland Rau. 2012. « The Old-Age Healthy Dependency Ratio in Europe Population Ageing » 5: 151–162 Trouille, Jean-Marc. 2013. « Economic and Industrial Cooperation Between France and Germany: Assessment and Future Prospects » German Politics and Society 31(106): 1–23 UNHCR. 2018. « Mediterranean situation » <http://data2.unhcr.org/fr/situations/mediterranean> (Accédé le 14 décembre 2018) Vollmer, Bastian A.. 2017 « The Continuing Shame of Europe: Discourses on migration policy in Germany and the UK » Migration Studies 5(1): 49–64

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!84

Dying with Dignity Canada and Their Efforts To Shape Bill C-14

by Hannah Rogers

The matter of medical assistance in dying has been, and continues to be, an issue of immense debate. Medically assisted dying has been regarded by advocacy groups and individuals as necessary end of life care for people suffering from terminal, and unbearable illness. However, as the matter of medically assisted dying is centred around the ethics of the service, there are polarizing views. The implementation of policies surrounding medically assisted dying in Canada has been a complicated process, that has included a variety of actors.

Advocacy groups, policy-makers, medical professional associations, and various interest groups are some of these actors who offer differing perspectives and contribute to the debate. This is an issue of contention, as some believe this care is necessary, while others deem it unethical and synonymous to murder. With the goal of policy implementation in order to get individuals the medical care they need, advocacy groups have become heavily involved in the policy process. This paper will thoroughly investigate the involvement of Dying with Dignity Canada (DWDC), an advocacy group representing individuals seeking the right to die. In this paper, I will investigate Dying with Dignity Canadaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s prominent influence on Bill C-14, specifically the ways in which they were successful in influencing the bill, despite challenges they, among other advocacy groups, frequently encountered. The ways in which they failed to shape the policy, as well as their contribution to the conversation, will also be touched upon. This paper will prove that Dying with Dignity Canada effectively influenced the policy issue by highlighting their member representation and interest, lobbying approach, framing strategies and resource mobilization. The very fact of Bill C-14 being passed by the government of Canada demonstrates the effective nature of the lobbying that

!85 took place on behalf of Dying with Dignity. Bill C-14 is an act to amend the criminal code which create exemptions in order for medical professionals to administer medication to end a patientâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s life (Bill C-14 2016). With specific attention paid to Bill C-14, and by drawing on academic works regarding advocacy group strategy and resources, lobbying tactics, and social and health movement literature, I will identify the groupâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s challenges and successes with regard to effectively influencing Bill C-14, as well as acting as an avenue for individuals to push their individual policy agenda through an institutionalized group.

The following sections will be organized by noteworthy literature regarding advocacy group strategy and resources, lobbying tactics, and social movement organization and health movements. Analyzing these factors will contribute to further understanding of Dying with Dignityâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s challenges and situating their specific case. As each division of literature pertains to the challenges or assets of the group, it will create a framework for the following case study of Dying with Dignity Canada in their specific endeavours. As mentioned, this paper will discuss the specific case study of Dying with Dignity Canada, which outlines the details of the group and their work, challenges, accomplishments, involvement with the policy issue and their relation to the literature previously discussed. Lastly, a discussion will be presented of the key themes identified in discussed literature and their relation to the specific case of Dying with Dignity and Bill C-14.

Challenges and Strategies of Advocacy Groups and Social Movement Organizations Categorization of Advocacy Groups The literature on advocacy group categorization and strategy, social movement organizations, and health movements, all highlight and explain the challenges and strategies of groups seeking to make a policy or social change.

First, advocacy group categorization and strategy discusses in what ways they represent their members and the challenges and effectiveness of resources and strategies they use. Advocacy groups work to influence public policy without assuming control in government and are responsible for representing and

!86 educating citizens on an issue, while providing an avenue for them to hold their government accountable (Young and Everitt 2004, 21). An advocacy group can be issue-oriented or institutionalized, therefore determining their policy goals and likelihood of survival if they are successful in implementing policy change. As the persuasion of an advocacy group depends on their ability to organize and mobilize, and institutionalized group, which characteristically has strong organization, has an advantage (Pross 1986, 3-5). Institutionalized groups possess advantages such as communication with bureaucrats who have a sense of how the political system works, have permanent offices with professional staff, and have stable memberships (Pross 1986, 15-16). According to Pross, it is these groups that are institutionalized who have a higher probability of reaching their policy goals and being successful in their advocacy. Depending on if a group serves public or self-interest determines the challenges it faces. A group serving selfinterest has a higher volume of membership with frequent donors acting in their own best interest, while public interest groups do not receive such support. An advocacy groupâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s ability to provide information regarding the issue they represent is also an indicator of their success or failure.

Strategies of Advocacy Groups Advocacy group strategies are central in understanding this work, because the strategies used by different groups represent their resources, and influence their level of effectiveness in implementing policy. As explained by Walker, advocacy groups adopt inside and outside strategies, where each offers a different explanation to the tactics a group uses (Walker 1991, 103). Insider strategies entail close ties with key policy-makers and actors while maintaining an inconspicuous presence, as to draw as little attention and opposition as possible (Beyers and De Bruycker 2018, 57-58). Insider strategy also lends itself to direct lobbying due to the direct ties to key players. Administrative and legislative lobbying are important, and with an insider strategy, advocacy groups can use their knowledge of government processes and personal ties to important officials to their advantage (Walker 1991, 166-168). This is beneficial to a group as little opposition allows them to further advance their policy agenda with the alliance of policy makers. Lobbying is an organized attempt to influence government and policy, and a central strategy of advocacy and interest groups to advance their

!87 agenda. Through lobbying, advocacy groups have the ability to involve themselves in the agenda-setting process and get a policy issue on the government agenda. An advocacy groupâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s targets vary, as some lobby directly to the government, while others manipulate corporations, ethical arguments as well as constitutional angles to achieve their policy goals (Dyck 2017, 365-379). While lobbying has come under scrutiny due to the lack of transparency, it has been regulated in order to keep it as fair as possible and to accurately represent the publicâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s interests. By possessing the resources and knowledge to lobby, a group can further advance their agenda more effectively. Groups also rely on venue tactics, meaning they lobby and appeal to different levels of government, courts and associations in order to create ties with aligning groups, to advance their policy agenda (Cairney 2013).

Social movement organization literature Literature regarding social movement organizations touches upon the strategies and challenges groups face, specifically regarding resource mobilization, framing strategies and the political opportunity structure. As suggested by Rochan and Mazmanian, gaining access to the policy process is the most effective strategy for a social movement organization to hold influence because authorities are more likely to be inclusive in this process, than to accept demands made by outside pressures for policy change (Rochan and Mazmanian 1993,75). In regard to the advantages or challenges of social movement organizations, resource mobilization theory emphasizes resources, organization, and political structure, which shape the effectiveness of an advocacy group (Jenkins 1983, 527). By possessing these factors, an advocacy group becomes a professional organization. By having outside financial support and professional organization strategies, groups are better able to mobilize, become knowledgeable in their area of interest, as well as entice members with their organized and rational actions, therefore demonstrating to said members their ability to effectively shape thought and policy (Gamson and Meyer 1996, 222-227).

Framing strategies are crucial aspects of social movement and advocacy group literature. Diagnostic framing specifically addresses the way a group simply frames an issue to recruit support and clearly outline their stance on an issue (Snow and Bedford 2000, 615). Political opportunity structure contributes to the

!88 understanding further by emphasising the involvement of elites, stability of elite involvement and support as well as openness of the government structure (Tarrow 2011, 22-28).

The broader category advocating for the equality of health rights, health movement literature, contributes to this work. Health care is described as a human right according to the Canadian Senate in chapter five of the Health Care Guarantee, and medically assisted death is identified as necessary care for individuals suffering at the end of life (Canadian Senate 2016). The issue of the right to medically assisted death is closely associated with health access movements, pushing to extend care to individuals who need it (Zavestowski and Brown 2004).

As an advocacy group seeking to change policy, Dying with Dignity Canada faced issues regarding capturing the attention of authorities to advance their policy agenda and setbacks put in place by the opposition. These advocacy group categorizations and strategies, social movement organization theories and health movement literature, position the specific case of Dying with Dignity Canada and provide an understanding of strategies available to them as an advocacy group. By using these works to understand their inner workings and actions, the justification behind their ultimate success in implementing policy regarding access to medical assistance in dying will become apparent.

Case Study: Dying with Dignity Canada and their Policy Interest Since the 1970â&#x20AC;&#x2122;s, medically assisted dying and the right to die have been conversations Canadians have been engaged in politically. With the decriminalization of attempted suicide and the right to refuse medical treatment both emerging around 1972, the conversation has escalated to a debate regarding the right to medical assistance in dying. In a 2014 poll conducted by Dying with Dignity Canada, eighty-four percent of Canadians said they supported medically assisted death for competent individuals with a terminal illness and unbearable suffering repeatedly asking for assistance in dying (CBC News 2015).

Provincially, the nation has been making progress at differing paces, but a federal push was necessary in bringing the right to die to patients who desperately needed the care. Dying with Dignity Canada (DWDC) is an advocacy group and not-for-

!89 profit organization dedicated to advocating for individuals seeking a medically assisted death or the decision to die on their own terms, which is respected by the Canadian Constitution and Charter of Rights and Freedoms. DWDC also provides support to patients struggling with end of life decisions, as well as support to healthcare practitioners who provide medical assistance in dying. Dying with Dignity Canada was founded in 1982, and represents members varying from patients seeking advocacy, former Canadian senators, lawyers and philanthropists (DWDC 2018). DWDC frequently acknowledges their donors and recognizes their reliance on donations, as these donations are their sole source of funding. In early 2015 before the election of the Liberal government, DWDC faced opposition from the Conservative government who pushed for an audit of the group, later resulting in them being stripped of their charitable tax status, hindering their funding (Cheadle 2015).

The group provides services ranging from personal representation and advocacy for patients, to supplying the public with information on the right to die, and dissecting Bill C-14, the policy which outlines citizensâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; right to an assisted suicide, making it more accessible to the public (DWDC 2018). While making the policy more acceptable to the public, DWDC also provides people with an easily digestible outline of the Carter vs. Canada ruling in which the legalization of medically assisted dying is explained. The group also supplies members and citizens with personal stories of individuals affected by, or involved with assisted dying. DWDC also gives representation and support to medical practitioners who provide medical assistance in dying (MAiD). By providing the public with such a vast array of information, DWDC proves their credibility and reliability as legitimate representation and informants regarding this specific policy issue.

Dying with Dignity Canadaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s policy position is self-evident. The organization clearly emphasizes the right of individuals to decide the measures they want to take at the end of their life. The groupâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s lobbying goal in the implementation of policy was first to decriminalize medical assistance in dying to protect medical practitioners who are willing to provide such a service (DWDC 2018). This was accomplished with the Supreme Court ruling in Carter vs.

Canada. However, to further the accessibility of such medical attention, policy implementation at the legislative level was necessary. DWDC was firm with their position on basic access to medically assisted death for individuals with serious

!90 and/or incurable diseases or disabilities with a foreseeable natural death.

However, they extend their advocacy to individuals with predicted degenerative diseases such as Alzheimerâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s and Huntingtonâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s disease, giving them the opportunity for advanced consent for a medically assisted death (DWDC 2018).

This still requires implementation into the legislation, and is something the group is still striving for. However, the exclusion of these individuals ultimately signals one of the failures in the original implementation of this policy. Along with the groupâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s desire to include advanced consent for medically assisted death, they also voice the right to an assisted death for mature minors and those seeking a medically assisted death due to mental illness (Global News 2016). This recommendation does not seem to be a concern of the government, therefore highlighting another failure of DWDC in implementing specific legislative content.

DWDC was one of the key witnesses in committees leading up to the passing of Bill C-14, and provided recommendations for the bill, one example of this being for the bill to be more inclusive in its language which will be addressed later. Although Bill C-14 has passed, they continue to advocate for patients and integrate medically assisted dying a norm in Canadian society. While the group respects the boundaries of medical practitioners, they push against practitioners refusing to refer patients to a health care professional who could administer such care (Fine 2018). Since the passing of Bill C-14, DWDC has continued their involvement in the matter of dying with dignity. The group continues to advocate for patients seeking a medically assisted death by challenging religious hospitals opposed to providing this care in courts in Ontario (Fraser 2017). DWDC is an institutionalized group which has shown that their work is not limited to merely the implementation of Bill C-14 as they constantly continue other works. Using resources such as committee documents, media sources, official publications of the group and transcripts, the ways in which DWDC was involved in policy implementation and in shaping the discussion surrounding medically assisted dying, is apparent.

!91

Dying with Dignity and Influence on Bill C-14 and Medically Assisted Death The key themes which outline the challenges and successes of Dying with Dignity Canada and how the organization was effective in influencing such policy will now be explored. This section will demonstrate ways in which they used strategies and tactics to advance their agenda in the context of the literature previously discussed. As mentioned, DWDC positively contributed to Bill C-14 and the conversation surrounding medically assisted death by maintaining a strong member representation and interest, having a tactful lobbying approach, effective framing strategies and strong resource mobilization. This section will position their successes along the themes of framing strategy, lobbying strategies, resource mobilization and political opportunity structure. The literature will directly apply to the specific case of DWDC and demonstrate how they were successful in bypassing challenges.

The first way in which DWDC was successful was in their use of framing strategies. The framing strategies used by DWDC regarding the issue of medically assisted death was diagnostic, meaning they defined the issue in such a way that the public would view it as one of basic human rights for individuals to receive the care they needed. By framing it as a health and rights issue, minimizing the focus on the ethical debate, it was easier for them to gain support and align their interests with potential members. Framing strategies do however go beyond diagnostic framing. Prognostic framing offers a solution to the issue, which can be done through policy, as seen in the case of DWDC. Their strategic framing of the issue is visible in their language and approach to introducing and discussing medically assisted death. On their website, they clearly emphasize that to die with medical assistance is a right, not a privilege or something up for ethical debate.

This is apparent when visiting their page, with sections reading, â&#x20AC;&#x153;defend your right to assisted dying, voice your choiceâ&#x20AC;? (DWDC 2018). By framing medically assisted dying as both a right and a choice, the issue ultimately becomes open to various interpretations. By allowing various interpretations, excessive opposition is mitigated.

Dying with Dignity Canada, as with most advocacy groups, used lobbying as their main tactic to influence the government to produce the policy change they

!92 wanted. DWDC has a variety of lobbying tactics and resources to effectively lobby the government. One case of this is the groupâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s use of a professional lobbying group, Fleishman- Hillard Canada firm, who were responsible for arranging meetings with federal stakeholders to discuss their legislative proposal on the matter of assisted dying (Office of the Commissioner of Lobbying of Canada 2017). This direct communication with key stakeholders and policy makers demonstrates the groupâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s use of Walkerâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s inside lobbying strategy to effectively communicate their agenda. Dying with Dignity was also present at committee meeting throughout the policy process, therefore present to make recommendations on what they believed to be material to strengthen the bill. This inside lobbying approach proved to be successful, as their recommendations to the House Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights Bill of C-14 were observed. DWDC recommended the language in line 241.2 of Bill C-14 should be adapted to include individuals who do not deem available treatment as acceptable to be eligible for a medically assisted death, which was originally omitted (Dying with Dignity Canada 2016). The language of Bill C-14 clearly demonstrates this suggestion to include those who do not deem available treatment as acceptable as eligible candidates for a medically assisted death was implemented (Bill C-14 2016). This demonstrates their policy position and their effective lobbying strategies to implement aspects of representation that otherwise would have been neglected without proper advocacy.

Resources available to an advocacy group are a contributing factor in their effectiveness to advance their agenda and implement their desired policy. As explained by Gamson and Meyer, resource mobilization involves internal group resources such as money, organization, allies and expertise, all resources that DWDC possesses (Gamson and Meyer 1996, 222-227). The influence of these resources is apparent, as they have strong membership support to fund them, no longer receive subsidies or possess a charitable tax status, showing they are dependent on these donations. They are capable of hiring proper representation and lobbyists to advance their agenda, and are an institutionalized group with strong organization. One main resource that is relatively new to advocacy groups is social media. Dying with Dignity Canada has a very active online presence, both on their website, uploading new stories and information, and their twitter page where they vocalize their goals and plans to represent Canadians. DWDC

!93 also has a strong relationship with certain media outlets such as The Huffington Post. The Huffington Post has a page dedicated to the issue of the right to die, where DWDC and their works are frequently mentioned (HuffPost 2018). This positive media attention is an advantage to the group, as it acts as a platform for them to further vocalize their cause and goals.

The political opportunity structure introduced by Tarrow lends itself to the justification of the successes of DWDC. Although the Canadian policy making processes is not relatively open, DWDC’s close relations with stakeholders and the fact that it is an institutionalized group has opened the political system in a way that makes it more accessible for them to convey their interest. DWDC also has the advantage of allied elites, as seen with their members, such as Canadian senators and various distinguished Canadians. By having this elite investment, they have an advantage in expressing and implementing their goals.

The literature discussed clearly aligns with the specific case of Dying with Dignity Canada and demonstrates in what ways their successes were able to offset their challenges. By analyzing the framing strategy, lobbying strategies, resource mobilization and political opportunity structure, this paper demonstrated the applications of these conceptual literary works to explain the successes of Dying with Dignity Canada and how these advantages ultimately led to their success in influencing Bill C-14 and the conversation surrounding a medically assisted death.

Conclusion The question that was under investigation in this paper was how the advocacy group Dying with Dignity Canada influenced Bill C-14 and the conversation surrounding medically assisted death. By drawing on literature addressing advocacy groups, lobbying strategies, social movement organizations and health movements, this work demonstrates how DWDC was ultimately successful in influencing the bill, despite challenges associated with the policy process. It is apparent DWDC’s success is due to their strong member representation and interest, tactful lobbying approach, framing strategies and resource mobilization. DWDC’s members include elites, who possess the power to strengthen the group’s work as justified by the political opportunity structure

!94 literature explored in this work. Their strong member interest also boosted their financing, giving them the resources needed to effectively lobby and mobilize. By adopting Walkerâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s inside lobbying strategy and the resources to hire professional lobbyists, they were able to successfully communicate with stakeholders in the policy process, therefore effectively voicing their agenda to create their desired policy outcome. DWDC used framing strategies to outline their issue as a rights issue, not an ethical issue. This successfully created less opposition by appealing to the idea of rights, and aligning their interest with those of potential members.

Lastly, DWDC had an array of resources that allowed them to act effectively in influencing the policy. By having stable funding from donations, a positive relationship with the media, an inside connection to key stakeholders in Bill C-14, DWDC was able to successfully influence the policy process. After analyzing all these factors of DWDCâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s involvement with Bill C-14, it is clear that despite challenges, they were ultimately successful in influencing the creation and context of Bill C-14.

The specific case of Dying with Dignity Canada contributes to the understanding of advocacy groups and public policy. Dying with Dignity Canada exhibits the characteristics and strategies a group must possess to be effective in influencing policy, acting as an example for other advocacy groups aiming to advance their policy agenda.

!95 References Anonymous. 2015. “Timeline: Assisted Suicide in Canada.” CBC News, February 5th, 2015. http://www.cbc.ca/news/health/timeline-assisted-suicide-incanada-1.2946485 Beyers, Jan, and Isklander De Bruycker. 2019. "Lobbying Strategies and Success: Inside and Outside Lobbying In European Union Legislative Process." European Political Science Review 11 (1): 57-74.

Bill C-14, An Act to amend the Criminal Code and to make related amendments to other Acts (medical assistance in dying), 1st sess., 42nd Parliament, 2016. www.parl.ca/ DocumentViewer/en/42-1/bill/C-14/royal-assent.

Cairney, Paul. 2013. “Politics and Public Policy.” Last modified October 29, 2013. https://paulcairney.wordpress.com/tag/venue-shopping/ Canada. Senate. “The Health of Canadians- Federal Role Final Report Part III.” 2016.

Cheadle, Bruce. “Dying with Dignity Canada Stripped of Charitable Tax Status.” The Huffington Post, January 20th, 2015. https://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2015/01/20/ dying-with-dignity-charitable-tax-status_n_6508300.html?utm_hp_ref=ca-dyingwith-dignity Dyck, Perry. 2017. “Canadian Politics” Advocacy Groups and Lobbying. ITP Nelson.

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Dying with Dignity Canada. 2016. “Dying with Dignity Canada’s Submission to the House Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights- Brief on Bill C-14.”

May 2nd, 2016. http://www.ourcommons.ca/Content/Committee/421/JUST/Brief/ BR8300568/br-external/DyingWithDignityCanada-e.pdf Epstein, Steven. 2016. “The politics of health mobilization in the United States: The promise and pitfalls of disease constituencies.” Social Science and Medicine Vol. 165.

Fine, Sean. 2018. “Ontario court rules doctors who oppose assisted death must refer patients.” The Globe and Mail, January 31, 2018. https:// www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/ontario-court-rules-doctors-whooppose-assisted-death-must-refer-patients/article37802558/ Fraser, Laura. 2017. “Dying with Dignity may challenge Ontario law exempting religious hospitals from offering assisted death” CBC News, August 14th, 2017. http:// www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/assisted-dying-religion-ethicsaccessibility-1.4244328 Gamson, William, David Meyer. 1996. Comparative Perspectives on Social Movement: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framing.

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!96 Government of Canada. “Medical assistance in dying.” Health services. Last modified January 8th, 2018. https://www.canada.ca/en/health-canada/services/medicalassistance-dying.html Harris, Kathleen. 2016. “Doctor-assisted dying bill restricted to adults facing ‘foreseeable’ death.” CBC News, April 14th, 2016. http://www.cbc.ca/news/ politics/canada-physician-assisted-death-law-1.3535193 Huffington Post. 2018. “Dying with Dignity.” Accessed April 10th, 2018. https://www.huffingtonpost.ca/news/dying-with-dignity/ Jenkins, J. Craig. 1983. “Resource Mobilization Theory and the Study of Social Movements.” Annual Review of Sociology Vol. 9: 527-553.

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!98

Increasing Minority Representation in the Service de Police de la Ville de Montreal A Case of Bureaucratic Representative Theory

by Taran Singh

In recent decades, Canada’s population demographics have shifted considerably, especially in urban centres. Canada is an open country that welcomes immigration. It has legislatively recognized its diversity with the introduction of the Multiculturalism Act in 1988. Many even maintain that diversity is its strength. This Act goes hand in hand with the representative bureaucracy theory, which proposes that government institutions should mirror the make-up of their constituents. Good democratic governance requires citizens’ trust and participation; as such, public institutions must reflect the population make-up and be responsive to its needs. Police officers are street-level government agents with coercive powers. Therefore, to maintain high levels of public confidence, the make-up of urban police forces should represent the diversity of their local communities. The failure to adequately represent its communities can lead to exacerbated consequences in the aftermath of a critical event. This paper argues that increased diversity within the Service de Police de la Ville de Montréal (SPVM), aligned with representative bureaucracy theory, will improve public trust, decrease crime-rates, and improve citizen participation in state-society – all of which will improve state-citizen relations as pre-conditions for successful democracy. This argument is drawn after an assessment of the state

!99 of the Montréal police service (SPVM), with regards to its approach to diversity.

First, this paper will explore theoretical approaches to the management of diversity in Western liberal democracies. Second, it will consider the SPVM’s fatal encounter with Freddy Villanueva and compare it with similar events in the U.K. and the U.S.. Third, it will compare the make-up of the SPVM with other Canadian police forces. Fourth, it will consider some of the mechanisms of affirmative action used in other multicultural states, specifically India. Finally, this paper will provide clear, implementable proposals to improve the SPVM’s relations with minority communities.

The first section explores some of the theoretical approaches to managing diversity in Western Liberal democracies, and discusses the consequences of diversity mismanagement on civic engagement. Maintaining citizens’ trust in public institutions, such as police forces, is a major concern for liberal democracies like Canada. Governments go to great lengths to protect this trust, as even the appearance of impropriety can be as bad as impropriety itself. This often involves the establishment of public inquiries, such as the Commission of Inquiry into the Sponsorship Program and Advertising Activities, led by John Gomery from 2004-2006, which investigated the misuse of funds in the Canadian government’s Sponsorship Program (Bathe 2016). Paradoxically, Gomery notes such public inquiries can actually erode public trust, such that the “cost of pursuing corruption may outweigh its benefits” (BBC Politics 97 1997).

According to Patti Lenard (2017), these challenges are not unique to Canada; in fact, she states that public trust is on the decline in Western democracies. As Western societies teeter on the edge between trust and distrust, the foundations of our political systems can become fragile. In the context of diversity, trust – defined for the purpose of this paper as a combined measure of attitudes and behaviours – is central to the functioning of our societies (CBC News 2010). This highlights challenges for policy-makers on how to bring about change. Moreover, the erosion of public trust has a strong and extended effect on public democratic participation, leading to a decrease in voting rates.

!100 According to Bhikhu Parekh, member of the British House of Lords, current patterns of participation in liberal democracies – where periodic voting is the extent of citizens’ political engagement – is insufficient and is a factor leading the rise in populism today (CBC News 2013). To counter the deleterious effects of distrust, Parekh maintains that governments must be more responsive to the needs and interests of local communities and should increase the channels of participation at the community level (CBC News 2013). This is particularly important for communities that have experienced ‘ghettoization,’ the phenomenon of minorities living in proximity to their identity group. Though caused by many factors, such as “a fear of white hostility” and wanting “proximity to community temples”, ghettoization exacerbates the decline in public democratic participation when those communities are not sufficiently represented in public institutions (CBC News 2013). Consequently, the lack of diversity among the police, especially in such neighborhoods, increases tensions between minorities and government institutions, and further hinders trust, resulting in a cycle of decreased participation.

Influential Canadian political actors have recognized the importance of minority participation. For example, Beverley McLachlin, former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada, has stated that her long-term objective is to see greater diversity on the Supreme Court of Canada (CBC News 2016). This type of representation – a mix between symbolic representation and actual power – reiterates the Canadian ideal of minority belonging, which is essential to an improved democracy in the immediate future. Significantly, if these adjustments are not made in a timely manner, social cohesion suffers, and relations can deteriorate past a point of facile reconciliation. As shown here, many politicians and academics emphasize minority representation in public institutions to increase public trust and participation.

To further understand the relation between incorporating minorities in public institutions and liberal democracy, the second section examines three cases from Montréal (Canada), London (U.K.) and Los Angeles (U.S.). The failure to incorporate minorities in public institutions can exacerbate community tensions,

!101 which can become apparent in the aftermath of a critical event. The following comparative examples in Montréal (Canada), London (U.K.), and Los Angeles (U.S.) illustrate that in an environment of public mistrust, a negative perception of police forces can lead to widespread rioting. In 2008, Freddy Villanueva – an 18year-old Hispanic Montréaler – was shot by an SPVM officer in what was later determined to be an act of self-defence (Chiang 2016). This incident led to a riot in Montreal-North – a multi-ethnic borough (Chiang 2016). The ensuing coroner’s report criticized police tactics and recommended that the police should “receive training for dealing with members of ethnocultural groups and understanding their perceptions of police” (Edmonton Sun 2013). Significantly, the report did not include any recommendations to diversify the SPVM – a leading cause of the agency’s inability to understand and relate to perceptions of the minority communities in its jurisdiction.

The two incidents that occurred in London and Los Angeles, discussed below, were followed by political inquiries with implemented recommendations and academic studies examining the impact of minority representation in police forces. In the United Kingdom (U.K.), the failure to obtain convictions for the racially motivated murder of Stephen Lawrence in 1993 – an eighteen-year-old black British man from southeastern London – led to a public inquiry, headed by Sir William Macpherson, that examined London’s Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) (Express News Service 2015). The subsequent Macpherson Inquiry Report, published in February 1999, concluded that “institutional racism” caused a “collective failure to provide appropriate public service to the Lawrence family because of their color, culture, and ethnic origin” (Gianni 2017). Jack Straw, then Home Secretary, accepted the report and launched an action plan which aimed to “improve relations with ethnic minorities” (Gianni 2017).

In Los Angeles, the filmed beating of Rodney King, a black man, by the police led to an inquiry into the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD), headed by attorney Warren Christopher. The ensuing Christopher Commission Report found that LAPD officers repeatedly used “excessive force”; and that “minority [LAPD] officers are […] subjected to racist slurs”(Gianni 2017). The key

!102 recommendations were to provide “minority and female officers [an] equal opportunity for leadership positions”; and that “a new position of Community Relations Officer” should be implemented (Gianni 2017).

In Sounman Hong’s analysis of policing in the U.K, he concludes that representative bureaucracy in police forces decreases crime rates, improves organizational integrity, and increases community participation with police officers (Gianni 2017). Using statistical methods – the OLS and the 2SLS models – Hong measures that, during the ten-year period between 2000-2010, in the U.K., a “10 percent increase in the share of ethnic minority police officers was associated with a 1.4 to 3.8 percent decrease in the number of crime incidents” (Gianni 2017, 30). Moreover, Hong argues that increased diversity in traditionally homogenous “public organizations improves ‘organizational integrity’” – as greater diversity may lead to the ability to “challenge unfair, unjust, or corrupt practices […] previously tolerated or unnoticed by the majority” Ibid14

. While diversity causes internal tensions, it “fosters a positive ethical climate”

– such as police officers changing their assumptions that minorities are “inherently more unlawful than whites” (Gianni 2017, 14). Finally, this change in attitudes and behaviours increases trust and “minority citizens […] cooperate more willingly with the public organization”; this leads to the “‘coproduction’ of public values” – which means that there is “considerable bureaucrat-citizen interaction in which communities contribute to public service delivery” (Gianni 2017, 14). Hong’s examination of the U.K. police force supports representative bureaucracy theory.

In a similar study led by James R. Lasley on the long-term effects of race in policing, researchers conducted interviews with police officers of minority backgrounds at two intervals – in 1992 and in 2007 (Gomery 2017). The researchers found that between these periods, police officers “significantly increased their desire to engage in active representation or ‘partnerships’ with the community” (Gomery 2017). Building on representative bureaucracy theory, the researchers measured the link between ‘passive representation’ – increased parity between an organization’s make-up and the community it serves – and ‘active

!103 representation’ – an increase in the interests of the clients who share demographic backgrounds with those minority workers (Gomery 2017). The key finding of the longitudinal, interview-based study is that “minority officers hold a more favourable outlook towards increased officer involvement with citizens” – minority officers build key relationships with community members which establish and intensify public trust (Gomery 2017). These studies show that increasing diversity representation has significant positive impacts on the internal culture and external community relations of police forces in diverse, urban neighborhoods.

After comparatively examining cases in three different cities, all of which are located in Western liberal democracies, the third section compares the makeup of the SPVM in Québec with other Canadian police forces. With rapidly changing demographics – primarily marked by increasing diversity in urban areas – many Canadian cities have made efforts to modify the make-up of their police forces in order to better represent their communities. When compared to their Canadian counterparts, cities in Québec have a significantly lower rate of proportional representation. The following examples of Canadian police forces demonstrate the principle measures police forces have implemented in order to diversify their staff, namely i) modified hiring policies – with important recruiting drives among minority groups; ii) expedited training programs; and iii) key symbolic decisions to outwardly demonstrate this changing make-up and culture of police forces. These initiatives promote police work as a viable employment opportunity among racialized youth, who tend to distrust police departments.

Toronto and Vancouver are the most diverse cities in Canada; a reality that is increasingly reflected in the personnel make-up of their police departments. In 2000, less than 10 percent of Toronto’s officers belonged to a ‘visible minority’ group; in 2016, that percentage had climbed to 24% (Gray 2017). Despite this significant improvement, the Toronto Police Department (TPD) still does not proportionately represent its citizens, nearly half of whom are ‘non-white.’ (Gray 2017). Consequently, the city has launched the Transformational Task Force which has called for a “multi-year plan to achieve a police service that mirrors the

!104 broad diversity of Toronto” (Grewal 2017). Symbolic change is also part of the TPD’s strategy, as demonstrated by the appointment of the city’s first black police chief – Mark Saunders (Sounman 2016). In part, Saunders has been tasked with bringing “real change” to the TPD, which is suffering from “soured community relations” (Sounamn 2016).

In Vancouver, the police “run recruiting fairs and events” and the diversity among the force, measured by a CBC survey in 2016, is 22 percent – however visible minority groups make up 54 percent of the city’s citizens (Kumar 1992). In the aftermath of this survey, the Vancouver Police Department (VPD) launched “the largest police recruiting drive in almost a decade,” with an emphasis on diversity (LA TImes 1991). While the city does not have a hiring quota, according to the VPD police union president Tom Stamatakis, “most police forces across Canada are actively trying to recruit people who reflect the diversity of their community” (James, LArson, Kelso and Brown 2011). With regards to symbolic diversity, the VPD also sends a positive message to aspiring minority youth: the VPD’s Deputy Chief Constable is Steve Rai – an Indo-Canadian born in Punjab (VPD).

Both the TPD and the VPD have significantly increased minority representation within their ranks: they hold regular recruitment drives aimed at minority groups; they have minorities in high-ranking positions; and they both have minority-representative officers in media positions. While these efforts are noteworthy, both police departments acknowledge that they fall short of mirror representation – which is an equal proportion of representation in an institution relative to its proportion in society. In fact, only two Canadian cities – Halifax, Nova Scotia, and Hamilton, Ontario – have achieved mirror proportional diversity in their respective police force (Leavitt 2017).

This raises an important question: how far-reaching should policy measures go in order to increase representation in public institutions? In North America, policies for strategic advancement of minorities or historically marginalised peoples are popularly known as ‘affirmative action’ policies; they

!105 are best understood through the experience of blacks in the U.S. (these are also used for gender advancement). Globally, one of the most aggressive examples of diversity-based affirmative action policies can be found in India’s policies of ‘reservation’, known as aarakshan. These policies enable a better understanding of the spectrum of political mechanisms available to achieve desired results regarding diversity advancement.

The fourth section considers the political path of India’s affirmative action policies of ‘reservation’. Since India’s Independence in 1947, a quota system to advance historically marginalized castes – a Hindu religious classification upholding social segregation based on ritual purity – has been heavily debated and contested. To encourage the social, economic, and political advancement of ‘scheduled castes’ (SC), ‘scheduled tribes’ (ST) and ‘other backward castes’ (OBC), a parliamentary commission was launched in 1979. Headed by B.P. Mandal, this commission was tasked with understanding the conditions of these groups as well as the merits of a vast ‘reservation’ system, a quota system, where a proportion of seats would be reserved for members of the specified communities – including, for example, in higher education institutions. Tabled in 1980, the Mandal Commission Report (Mandal) “recommended 27% reservation for OBC candidates at all levels of its services”, in addition to some advancement policies that were already in place (Lenard 2017). The report’s proposals were finally discussed at the Lok Sabha – the Indian House of Commons – in 1990, and meaningful implementation occurred in the 2000s. However, the tensions in the public realm were palpable, even leading to occasional violent protests (McLachlin 2017). The primary takeaway from the implementation of Mandal is that while aggressive quota systems are possible in plural democracies, their implementation is politically challenging and can create significant social upheaval between different social groups.

Thus far, this paper has reviewed the theoretical benefits of bureaucratic representative theory; it has examined specific benefits for police forces; it has compared the make-up of the SPVM with the other Canadian metropolises; and it has provided the potential scope of affirmative action policies. The final section

!106 examines the province of Québec, and its metropolis Montréal, and provides implementable proposals to improve conditions. With regards to police forces in Québec, there are specific obstacles for minorities. These include the linguistic requirement – because candidates must be proficient in French, the province’s only official language; the training facility – located in Nicolet, a rural, isolated town on the south-shore of Trois-Rivières; and the organization culture – which is disproportionately dominated by ‘white’ individuals. These are the primary hurdles that candidates from minority communities must overcome to become police officers in the province – including the Sûreté du Québec (SQ), all local police forces, and the metropolis of Montréal.

Any meaningful change should begin with its metropolis’s police force – the Service de Police de la Ville de Montréal (SPVM). Comparative figures from smaller cities in the province of Québec show that they are significantly behind the rest of the country. Montréal is the most diverse city in Québec: 33% of residents are ‘non-white’; however, diversity in the SPVM is measured at a paltry 7% (SPVM 2017). Between 2011 and 2015, there was only a 0.5% increase in the diversity of the SPVM, reinforcing that the rate of diversity is stagnant. The SPVM should adopt significant measures to correct this clear discrepancy. A three-prong strategy is being proposed here: i) increase symbolic representation; ii) institute active, systemic recruitment drives among minorities; and iii) add a complementary training facility in Montérégie, near the diverse cities of Montréal and Sherbrooke.

While institutions can take years to change, their image can be remedied more rapidly. Even though the proportion of visible minorities in the SPVM cannot change overnight, symbolic changes could send important signals to Montréal residents. Two such changes can be implemented quickly: i) increase minority representation for media relations officers; ii) promote minority individuals to high-ranking positions, like Chief Deputy. First, by increasing diversity in media relations, the SPVM will immediately appear to be more diverse than it currently is. At the moment, the SPVM’s ‘permanent media’ relations team, as well as the ‘replacement team’, are all white francophones – the

!107 latest member was added as recently as January 2016 (Parekh 2017). This indicates that the SPVM has not considered diversifying their media presence – a thought that should worry proponents of mirror representation. An improvement to the media relations team could have an immediate impact, potentially even increasing the SPVM’s appeal to minority youth. Second, having more highranking officers, especially those in positions of power who may obtain media attention, would be part of the symbolic change required. Between 2011 and 2015, the percentage of high-ranking minority officers within the SPVM increased by 2%, from a measly 3% to 5% (Sabbagh 2011). While these figures show some improvement, they suggest a strong resistance to change from the SPVM. The second change is for the SPVM to pursue an ongoing, active recruitment strategy, especially aimed at adolescents and young adults from minority communities. Occasional, localized drives promoting some job opportunities – which is what the SPVM has been doing – is insufficient to attract these potential candidates (Schingler 2016). Appointed Montréal’s police chief in 2015, Philippe Pichet said that he “wants a police force which reflects the population”, and he insisted that the SPVM are “working on it” (Slattery 2016).

His predecessor, Marc Parent acknowledged that “trust” could be a major challenge to recruit non-white officers who may also not consider police work as a “respectable profession” (Takeuchi 2016). Changing these attitudes requires more than just a few CEGEP visits a year. Following the example set by the VPD, the SPVM should implement a continuous recruitment strategy.

The final change addresses the location of the training facility. Currently, all candidates for police forces in Québec train at the police academy in Nicolet – a town on the south-shore of Trois-Rivières. The location of the facility might be a significant deterrent for many applicants – Nicolet is a very rural, isolated town which would struggle to attract multilingual, diverse young adults. By opening a new academy in a friendlier, more diverse and linguistically plural environment – like in the Montérégie, between Montréal and Sherbrooke – Québec police forces could attract a greater number of minorities to their academy. Graduates from this

!108 training facility can go on to join any police force in Québec, including the Sûreté du Québec (SQ). The representation in other police forces in the province of Québec is even worse than in the SPVM. In the last nine years, out of 735 new hires by the SQ, only five came from ‘cultural communities’ (VPD 2017). This additional location could have a meaningful impact beyond Montréal’s SPVM, and eventually reverberate in police forces across the province.

Having considered how the lack of diversity representation can negatively affect minority trust in public institutions, this paper has highlighted the importance of addressing diversity management within the police force following violent encounters between minorities and the police, such as the fatal encounter involving Freddy Villanueva. Comparing the efforts of other Canadian police forces to increase diversity representation to those of the SPVM, this paper found that Québec’s police forces are not sufficiently diverse to restore minority trust.

Even more worrisome, the SPVM does not appear to be implementing any significant policies to change course. After exploring some of the more aggressive mechanisms employed by multicultural states to increase diversity representation, such as the policies adopted in India, this paper has suggested three policy changes – i) increasing symbolic representation; ii) yearlong recruitment campaigns; iii) and adding a more suitable training location – that are sustainable, can be implemented quickly, and could achieve the long-term goal to diversify Québec police forces so that they mirror the make-up of the communities they serve.

Even after achieving greater levels of representation, many Canadian cities continue to face challenges of public trust. As stated earlier, only two cities have achieved mirror representation. Other major cities, especially Vancouver and Toronto are struggling to reach mirror representation. In addition to this critique, a human rights tribunal ruled as recently as in April 2017, that race-based discrimination occurred in the hiring and promoting practices in Ontario’s Peel district. The Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario ruled that Peel police discriminated against Sgt. Baljiwan Sandhu – a 28-year veteran of the police force – when he “sought a promotion to inspector in 2013” (Warnica 2017). Moreover,

!109 despite being significantly more diverse than the SPVM, a 2016 poll found that nearly 40% of Vancouverites did not trust that the VPD would treat them fairly (Wilton 2015). These pan-Canadian comparisons show that significant challenges remain beyond the implementation of the suggested proposals which could continue to affect the public trust of police forces.

Since the 1990s, there have been numerous inquiries following policing incidents â&#x20AC;&#x201C; some have led to changes, others have not. Where the recommendations rely on principles of representational bureaucracy, studies have emerged which have shown that better representation is beneficial: it promotes public trust, decreases crime rates, and increases community involvement.

Therefore, diverse cities must adopt policies that align with representative bureaucracy theory. A diverse, representative police force can challenge the internal hegemony, maintained by homogenous groups, and promote an ethical climate â&#x20AC;&#x201C; which is better for minorities and women internally, and is better perceived externally. By developing community relations, a diverse police force can count on greater community involvement, which can, in turn, reduce crime

!110

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!111 Gomery, John. “Avoiding Corruption and Scandal in the Future: Lessons to Learn from Gomery.” Lecture presented at the Workshops on Social Science Research, Concordia University, Montréal, QC, March 2017.

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THE POLITICS OF VIOLENCE

!114

Violence Against the LGBT+ Community in Latin America

by Pim Stroomer

Introduction Across the globe, a generalized theme of violence has coincided with and terrorized the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender, or LGBT+ community.

The Latin American and Caribbean region is no exception to this general trend.

Many types of violence occur daily against members of the LGBT+ community; structural discrimination, societal prejudices, and hate crimes, among others.

Despite expectations of tangible change there is a “paradoxical trend of rising anti-gay violence in the midst of a gay-rights boom” (Encarnación 2011, 106).

There has been an uneven expansion of LGBT+ rights across the region, and arguably a lack of attention for the politics of sexuality (Corrales 2015, 53). These factors have produced significant gaps in the knowledge available, which has negatively impacted the probability of these violent conditions to improve. So, how has an increase in political visibility and legal rights for members of the LGBT+ community in Latin America from the 1980s until the present affected their exposure to violence? This essay will argue that these factors should have improved the situation, but pervasive structural violence and heteronormative culture continue to plague Latin American LGBT+ communities. First, this paper will assess the literature available on the subject. It will then analyse Latin American societal norms under a theoretical framework of structural violence and heteronormativity in mainstream culture. Finally, it will explore a variety of cases of LGBT+ targeted violence in the region. Generally, the essay will focus

!115 on the disparity in legal and judicial rights that should protect this vulnerable community, but in practice do not. This, in juxtaposition with the societal expectations that make up the reality that LGBT+ individuals endure, will show that violence does not confine itself exclusively to aggression.

Literature Review To better understand the issue discussed in this essay, it is necessary to assess the available literature . Throughout the literature, there is a general consensus on the relative lack of academic research done, both on LGBT+ targeted violence and on LGBT+ groups as a whole. There are many reasons for this: In the case of Latin America, it is primarily due to the variety of problems that the region has undergone throughout its very turbulent history. This turbulence has forced the politics of identity to take a back seat in Latin American political arenas. There is an understanding that there is a lack of information on marginalized groups not only in Latin America and the Caribbean but in most places around the globe. Similarly, most of the literature agrees that there remains significant progress to be made for LGBT+ rights, despite the progress that has been achieved so far.

Omar G. Encarnación’s 2011 “Latin America’s Gay Rights Revolution”assesses the gay rights revolution in Latin America through the lens of Argentina’s 2010 legalization of same-sex marriage. It examines the use of human rights rhetoric to end anti-gay discrimination, the importance of the internet to mainstream gay culture, the creation of a gay market to leverage clout for the gay community, and critical alliances with the political establishment of Argentina.

Encarnación notes that the Latin American gay rights revolution is rooted in political strategizing rather than in social change, as there is a paradoxical trend of rising anti-gay violence in the midst of a gay rights boom (Encarnación 2011, 106). The author explains this by reminding the reader that the progress of gay rights in Latin America has predominantly depended on innovative politics and strategic alliances, rather than on a genuine and widespread acceptance of homosexuality (ibid, 114). This indicates that cultural norms do not necessarily change with the law, and that the LGBT+ community must continue fighting for social acceptance. The government cannot force people to adopt a certain

!116 ideology, it can only implement laws. Encarnación argues that, in order to effectively create and maintain change, NGOs, advocacy groups, and governmental organizations must come together to design programmes specifically for the various pockets of the LGBT+ community spread around the region (ibid, 116-117). This is a necessary prerequisite to the advancement of LGBT+ rights, which must be changed both from the bottom up and the top down.

We now turn to Javier Corrales’ 2015 publication“Politics of LGBT Rights in Latin America and the Caribbean.” Corrales begins by declaring that there has been an uneven expansion of LGBT rights across the region, and a demonstrable lack of attention for the politics of sexuality. He aims to identify some gaps in the research, showing that both new and old questions remain unaddressed (Corrales 2015, 53). Corrales remarks that there has been notable progress in the rights of the LGBT+ community in certain Latin American countries, but that this does not necessarily correlate to increased safety for the community. The author refers to the case of Brazil, which has tremendous protections of rights for LGBT+ individuals but is simultaneously “one of the world’s murder capitals of LGBT individuals” (ibid, 54). Some explanations for this discrepancy between judicial rights and practical reality are provided: On one hand, Corrales argues that the economic state of a city or area can somewhat determine what the level of tolerance toward marginalised groups will be. On another hand, he describes how 1LGBT+ movements must convince the majority of the population to support their cause, and create strong ties with political parties in order to situate themselves in their national and societal frameworks.

The author also discusses the influence of faith-based organizations in countries with a higher proportion of religious citizens, and a strong bond between church and state as contributing factors (ibid, 54-55). According to this article, laws were amended in favour of LGBT+ individuals prior to effective social change (ibid, 56). The author ends this article by reiterating his earlier point that more research is needed to understand which factors are aiding, and which are preventing progress for Latin American LGBT+ communities (ibid, 60). The fact that the article is opened and closed on this note shows the urgency of the lack of research done on the matter.

!117 Mark B. Padilla, Ernesto Vásquez del Aguila, and Richard G. Parker, together, wrote Chapter 9, “The Health of Sexual Minorities”, in a book titled “Globalization, Structural Violence, and LGBT Health: A Cross-Cultural Perspective,” which was published in 2007. This chapter, much like academic articles previously mentioned, states there is incomplete scholarly literature on the topic of violence against LGBT+ individuals, further verifying and affirming the claims of the previous readings (Padilla et al. 2007, 209). This chapter discusses, another type of structural violence against LGBT+ individuals, namely the lack of proper access to healthcare. This is especially relevant when keeping in mind the AIDS epidemic during the late 20th century, which is likely to reemerge if limited and lacking governmental efforts continue, as the situation is already precarious (ibid, 224). There is a particular difficulty in the analysis of health in LGBT+ persons. Not only do the authors of this chapter argue that the literature on the health of LGBT+ individuals is lacking, but that the intersection of this with cultural variations worldwide may influence the amount of available literature on the topic (ibid, 210). The authors argue that policies and programmes aimed at the health of LGBT+ individuals must not only focus on health services, but on effectively changing the cycle; this requires acknowledgement of abusive state policies, and strategy to apply political pressure (ibid, 217). The chapter ends on the consideration that there are larger social forces at play when considering LGBT+ health. Thus, advocating for approaches that address the social inequalities and an uncovering of the link between structural violence sexual marginality is necessary (ibid, 232).

Lastly we consider a report written by Annie Wilkinson in 2014 for the North American Congress on Latin America, or NACLA. The report is titled “Who the Rainbow Tide Leaves Out,” and assesses the actual limitations and realities of the kinds of practical rights LGBT+ communities have across the region . It describes how poor, Indigenous, Afro-descendent, gender nonconforming, and trans people have an especially limited access to state services.

Wilkinson’s report argues that progress been made since the military and authoritarian dictatorships of the 1980s, but that policy changes have not been universally affirmative across the region. The author refers to an opposition in policy change in the region to clarify this idea: in Argentina, the first openly gay advocacy organization launched in 1969, which aided in the increase of political

!118 visibility for LGBT+ individuals (Wilkinson 2014, 31). Through this, and the LGBT+ tolerant ideology spreading throughout Latin America, openly gay politicians have been able to take office in countries such as Ecuador, Mexico, and Peru, to name a few. However, simultaneously, countries such as the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, and Honduras have constitutionally outlawed same-sex marriage by defining marriage as something that can happen only between a man and a woman (ibid, 31). Although Wilkinson’s report does not touch on the academic literature, or lack thereof, it demonstrates the repeated argument by other authors that although significant progress has been made for the rights of LGBT+ individuals, there are nonetheless many political, economic, and legal barriers this group must face.

Theoretical Framework In his 2000 publication “State Violence and Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (lgbt) Rights,” Mark Ungar sets the scene for a cultural and theoretical framework which may help explain why there is such a lack of literature on violence against the LGBT+ community. His explanation rests on an examination of the legal, historical, and cultural perception of homosexuality, and how these intertwine. In Latin America, anti-gay violence traces back to the days of the Aztecs (Ungar 2000, 64). In many cases, Western colonial rule implemented some form of religion of the state. Post-colonial authoritarian regimes reinforced these deeply entrenched religious attitudes. Though in present day, accepting homosexuality can be seen as an imposed Western behaviour, their real legacy is one of cultural homophobia (ibid, 65). This homophobia can still be seen through the machismo that is prevalent in the region, calling for heteronormativity and condemnations of non-normative sexualities in mainstream cultural values. This is backed up by René Boivin, who claims that hate crimes against sexual minorities are rooted in homophobia in the context of social and cultural norms, and are protected by silence, indifference, and impunity (René Boivin 2015, 162).

When discussing violence, one must first address the very concept. There are many different forms of violence: structural inequalities, physical aggression, societal prejudice, and judicial oppression, among others. Arguably, one of the

!119 most pertinent causes of these types of violence is structural violence, defined as “violence exerted systematically—that is, indirectly— by everyone who belongs to a certain social order” (Farmer 2004, 307). Alongside these forms of violence comes the intersectional identity of every individual that is subject to them. This is to say that everybody in a certain social order already lives within a system that predisposes them to, often unwillingly, exert violence upon others. This often disproportionately affects marginalized and disenfranchised population groups such as sexual minorities, putting them in a position in which they are particularly vulnerable to structural inequalities and violence (Padilla et al. 2007, 212).

Factors such as race, gender, age, physical ability, and sexuality can all be causes for a different experience in the context of an individual’s exposure to violence.

This means that certain individuals or groups of people are more likely to face the effects of violent behaviours from either the state, different forms of groups or organizations, or other members of civil society in their surroundings than their more culturally and socially accepted counterparts. This is not to say that a heterosexual white man in Brazil, for example, will not face any form of violence, but that this would less likely be dependent on any of the adjectives used to describe this person. In contrast, a transgender Indigenous woman in Brazil is more likely to face violence related to the way she physically presents. Some examples of structural violence are poor legal aid, arbitrary detention, unequal access to health care, and biased courts (Ungar 2000, 63).

We move on now to discuss the aspect of physical aggression. This type of violence is more tangible and thus easier to record, as it can be seen in intimate partner violence, torture, murder, and other homophobic hate crimes. However, this form of violence is not always reported due to stigmatization. LGBT+ individuals know they are at risk for further consequences upon revealing their identity to authority figures, which leads to violence being underreported (Padilla et al. 2007, 216). This violence can take place in very private settings such as in one’s own home, as well as in extremely public ones such as on a square or in the street. This form of violence is often socially accepted and thus overlooked, due to the structural issues described earlier. Physical violence targeted at LGBT+ individuals is not always given attention, as the system is often rigged against people of these backgrounds. An example of how institutional and structural the violence against the LGBT+ community is can be seen through the case of

!120 Mexico. In this example, we see that 29% of the perpetrators of violence against LGBT+ persons were committed by governmental justice, public safety institutions and figures of authority such as police officers (René Boivin 2015, 163).

This further demonstrates the severe legal negligence and judicial discrimination by the state against sexual minorities. It is necessary to change the judicial system in order to adequately protect LGBT+ individuals against crimes committed out of prejudice and intolerance (ibid, 166).

Another example of the type of prejudice and discrimination that takes place against the LGBT+ community can be seen in the 2007 Gay Pride Parade in Santiago de Chile. Chile only abolished article 354 of its penal code, which rendered “sodomy” punishable by law, in 1997 (Barrientos 2011, 113). This was a law instituted, in part, to criminalize homosexuality and all same-sex acts of a sexual nature. Barrientos wrote his article and published it in 2011, but laws to protect people from discrimination in its various forms were yet to be written. In 2001, 45.2% of interviewees of the segunda encuesta de tolerancia y no discriminación, or second survey of tolerance and non-discrimination, were of the opinion that homosexuality should be prohibited and goes against human nature (ibid, 116). Furthermore, on Table 2: “Situation of discrimination in LGBT population (% of people who have lived each situation)”, we can see the experience of the LGBT+ individuals and in what way they have been impacted negatively by their gender identity or sexual orientation from aspects of their life with low discrimination, increasing gradually (ibid, 123-124). These statistics show the intrinsically systemic and structural disregard for LGBT+ rights, as they depict discrimination and exclusion from education, health care, and employment, as well as mistreatment by investigative police. All of these aspects of life should be regulated by the government, but it is clear that LGBT+ individuals are being neglected in this regard. Collectively, this demonstrates that there is culturally a relatively homogenous opinion that negatively affects the LGBT+ community in Latin America. The preconceptions and dismissive cultural norms work in favour of the structural inequality that is already in place and enables it to foster and grow increasingly over time.

Social prejudice can act as a strong factor in the creation and maintenance of violence against LGBT+ persons. The fostering of negative connotations and bias towards a certain social group within your surroundings or in society as a

!121 whole, can prolong and reinforce potential violence against these individuals.

Although it is not a direct or explicit form of violence, it is arguably the most important aspect to consider. Chile, well-known for its progressive legislation on LGBT+ rights, is a country where, between 1990 and 2009, the percentage of people who described homosexuality as never justifiable decreased from 76.9% to a mere 11.9% (Barrientos and Bozon 2014, 324). The fact of the matter is nevertheless that the cultural homophobia in Chile persists (Barrientos et al. 2010, 761-762). Although the technical increase in rights is present, countries with strong church presence in public discourse, such as Chile, struggle to find societal acceptance of LGBT+ individuals. This is due to the fact that this institution overwhelmingly shapes opinions but does so to “sustain the hegemonic heteropatriarchal model, linking non-heterosexuality to ‘abnormality’ and, therefore, giving heterosexual men a place of privilege and moral supremacy…” (ibid, 770). The state and church may officially be separated, but a large shift in the public perception of LGBT+ individuals is necessary before this becomes evident in the way LGBT+ individuals are treated. Without a shift, the legislative amendments that have been undertaken to aid the LGBT+ community will practically be rendered futile.

Exploration of the Case Both the partaking in sexual action of homosexual nature and, more generally speaking, simply being a queer person was illegal in most parts of the world until recently. In Latin America, the first openly gay advocacy organization launched in Argentina in 1969. Since then, many countries have decriminalized same-sex relations; Panama and Nicaragua being the last Spanish-speaking countries in the region to do so in 2008 (Wilkinson 2014, 31). This is clear proof of improvement in access to legal rights and maintenance of the rule of law across the region. This is the type of progress needed to reduce violence against LGBT+ persons in the grand scale, but it is not enough. For example, regardless of the progress made in Latin America, same-sex marriage is only legal in 5 countries in the region. There are yet many steps to be taken in order to adequately protect LGBT+ persons in the legal framework across the region. This is an especially pressing matter for the poor, Indigenous peoples, Afro-descendants, gender non-

!122 conforming folk, and trans bodies, as these are commonly the most marginalized and disenfranchised voices when speaking about political and social visibility (ibid, 31). A brief history of the legalization of homosexuality will be provided, as well as an overview of the current situation LGBT+ individuals find themselves in today in Latin America. This will include a variety of countries across the region in order to provide a broader understanding.

The legalization of homosexuality has been taking place in Latin America mostly since the wave of democratization that hit the region during the 1980s, removing authoritarian regimes from power (Ungar 2000, 61). It is even now the case, however, that LGBT+ persons are seen as “a health hazard, a threat to public morality, and a cultural imposition from decadent Western society” (ibid, 61).

This, in turn, takes on the form of institutional state violence. This can be seen in the deeply embedded homophobia that is present in most legal infrastructures across the region. This is not a feat exclusive to Latin America, but rather a form of repression that is part of the histories of nearly every part of the world (ibid, 64). It may not necessarily outwardly discriminate against the already vulnerable community, but can be seen through the many loopholes in the law, which exposes LGBT+ persons to “legal”- and “semi-legal” violence. Examples are issues such as poor legal aid, arbitrary detention, unequal access to health care, and biased courts (ibid, 63). In the present day, the “semi-legal” violence is arguably more prevalent, as being outwardly homophobic has started to become increasingly negatively stigmatized. Thus, police officers that exert violence against LGBT+ individuals often rely on vaguely worded laws, regulations, and practices in order to protect themselves from any form of persecution (ibid, 66).

This behaviour is excused by society, because LGBT+ individuals are often seen as “undesirable” populations, being associated frequently with AIDS, prostitution, and the breakdown of morality. This is especially the case for transgender people (ibid, 66-67). Although these issues are not exclusive to this subgroup of society, the structural, systematic, and judicial discrimination and persecution of these people is more prevalent and extremely recurrent, as the lack of protection from the police encourages and, to some, justifies violent behaviour against LGBT+ individuals (ibid, 70).

In more recent years, the gay rights revolutions across the region have taken many conservative governments somewhat by surprise. This means that the

!123 LGBT+ community has been able to make itself more politically active and visible, which has aided its social progress. However, it must be kept in mind that the rights of LGBT+ communities can vary depending on what country is being discussed, and occasionally even what area of said country (Corrales 2015, 54).

The Brazilian state, for example, is known to have a decent framework for the legal protection for LGBT+ persons, but is also one of the places with highest rates of LGBT+ murder. As is often the case, it is mostly the conservative parties of any given state that lead the charge against LGBT+ rights, working together with faith-based organizations. Although many states have a conservative history, only 11 out of 40 states in the Latin American and Caribbean region have not yet legalized same-sex activity. All of these states are English-speaking and can be found in the Caribbean (ibid, 59).

Gay rights activists in Mexico used the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, commonly referred to as UDHR, as a platform to argue in favour of sexual rights, too. Many groups in Mexico argued that this was not the case, as LGBT+ individuals were seen as perverted and degrading to Mexican culture and ethics (Grinnell 2016, 75). The use of the narrative of the UDHR in order to fight for sexual rights was not uncommon during this period. The question was often whether or not a state would recognize this to be true, seeing as even the United Nations has yet to acknowledge these rights to be human rights (ibid, 74). The activists used international leftist rhetoric and political strategies within Mexico to obtain equal rights, condemn repression, and reclaim the lack of democracy they experienced. The relentless activism of these early pioneers of LGBT+ rights and their continued efforts to find a space for their cause with politicians, in the cultural setting, and in collaboration with academics, has contributed to the advancement of this marginalized groupâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s human rights and political visibility.

This helped lead to the eventual legalization of homosexuality in Mexico, and even same-sex marriage in some states in the country today (ibid, 87).

The variety of acceptance and tolerance across the region can be crosscompared, which is what Chaux and LeĂłn have done with their 2016 article for the Journal of Homosexuality. This paper compares Chile, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Mexico, and Paraguay. On an individual level, this paper found multiple positively correlative factors for determining levels of tolerance for homosexuality, namely: levels of education, attendance of religious

!124 services, degree of religious belief, GDP per capita, gender, and age. Additionally, socio-emotional competencies, positive beliefs about the use of aggression, the level of urbanization, and the level of development of a country can all impact tolerance (Chaux and Leรณn 2016, 1254-1257). Chaux and Leรณn performed a secondary analysis of data from the Latin American component of the 2009 International Civic and Citizenship Education Study. This study was composed by the International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement, which is an international cooperative of national research institutions and governmental research agencies. The purpose of the initial study was to understand the ways in which countries prepare their young people to undertake their roles as citizens (Schultz et al. 2010, 15).

The collected data presents a wide array of information across a variety of cultural and social contexts. It was found that around 30% of adolescent participants believe that homosexuals should not be allowed in their schools, 34% agree that homosexuality should be considered and treated as a mental disease, and 40% would dislike having homosexual neighbours. A conflicting statistic is presented, however, when assessing certain statements. Around 80% of participants believe homosexuals should have equal rights, but only 52% are of the opinion that homosexuals should have the right to marry (Chaux and Leรณn 2016, 1261). As mentioned above, the level of development can be seen in correlation with tolerance of homosexuality. Participants from Guatemala and the Dominican Republic, which are less developed than other participating states, indicated more negative attitudes towards homosexuality than participants from Mexico (ibid, 1261). The level of development can depend on the level of urbanization, educational achievement results, and the size of the GDP per capita, which are higher in Mexico than in Guatemala and the Dominican Republic (ibid, 1270). It must also be kept in mind that Mexico has a longer history of formal democracy, whereas other states that participated more commonly fall under dictatorships (ibid, 1257). Another significant indicator of tolerance of homosexuality was the attendance of religious services and the importance of the consideration of religion, which showed a 16% increase in homophobic attitudes.

Even within religious communities, however, a difference in tolerance can be seen when comparing Catholic and non-Catholic Christians (ibid, 1264). It was also found that across all six countries that participated, adolescent males were more

!125 likely to agree with homophobic statements and attitudes than their female counterparts. Naturally, this was to different extents. In Chile, the difference in tolerance between males and females was much larger than in Guatemala, for example (ibid, 1268).

There were certainly limitations to this study, which the authors admit and recognize. These are issues such as the scale of the study, which may have been to large too adequately analyze certain factors. One of these factors is peer group dynamics, which may form a complacent adolescent’s view of homosexuality before they make up their own opinion. Furthermore, the data comes from students’ anonymous self-reports, which risks the possibility of some students misunderstanding questions. Simultaneously, the students must keep in mind the social desirability of their responses (ibid, 1271). Regardless of the limitations of this study, it does affirm and give a better insight on the level of tolerance of homosexuality and the homophobic attitudes of adolescents across a multitude of countries in Latin America. The study shows a positive trend in the increase of tolerance of homosexuality, which gives hope that the adults of the future and their children will be able to further the social acceptance and legal rights of LGBT+ individuals in the next century.

The current political, cultural, and social sphere depict an image of increased tolerance. With that said, being an LGBT+ individual in Latin America puts people in a position of heightened risk of exposure to violence. This is especially the case in Brazil, which is, as mentioned in the literature provided by Corrales, one of the murder capitals of the world for LGBT+ individuals (Corrales 2015, 54). Advocacy groups such as Brasil Sem Homofobia, or Brazil Without Homophobia, and the Grupo Gay da Bahia, or Gay Group of Bahia are working on the predicament the Brazilian LGBT+ community , by designing programmes in cooperation with NGOs and governments (Encarnación 2011, 116-117). As Encarnación states: “Gay rights on the books, gay activists contend, will mean nothing if gay people are being killed in the streets simply for being gay,” (ibid, 117). It is thus essential that the way in which the general public perceives the LGBT+ community change, which can be done through initiatives by NGOs and governmental programmes, as well as continuous lobbying and advocacy. This process will take many more years, but it is the only option for LGBT+ individuals in order to survive.

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Conclusion How has an increase in political visibility and legal rights for members of the LGBT+ community in Latin America and the Caribbean from the 1980s until the present affected their exposure to violence? This paper has argued that the increase of political visibility and legal rights of LGBT+ individuals should have improved the situation, but structural violence and heteronormative culture continue to plague the community. It is evident that the legal rights the LGBT+ community has theoretical access to have increased tremendously. This is especially evident in the fact that multiple countries in the region have legalized same-sex marriage. In addition to this, same-sex relations have been decriminalized in almost all countries, with the exception of the English-speaking Caribbean (Corrales 2015, 59). However, the societal, structural, and institutional prejudices and inequalities that LGBT+ persons face on a daily basis have not yet ceased to exist. General tolerance of LGBT+ persons has increased, but this does not mean that these groups of people have been accepted into mainstream society.

Thus, although the legal framework in which LGBT+ individuals now find themselves has, in most Latin American countries, improved, there is nevertheless a tremendous struggle for LGBT+ activists and individuals to find a space to exist within a fragile social web that does not fully tolerate nor accept them. Structural violence and a narrative of heteronormative culture in Latin American society feed off of one another, creating a negative feedback loop and maintaining this as the status quo. LGBT+ activists and their activism, lobbying, protests, and advocacy for rights and tolerance have, and will continue to disturb, this social fabric and cause positive change in order to decrease, and ideally end, disproportionate violence against the community.

!127 References

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Thank You For Reading.

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