The Counter Terrorist Magazine - February/March 2009 by Solomon

AIR FRANCE 8969 • GANGS, ORGANIZED CRIME & TERRORISTS • HEROS OR VIGILANTES?

Counter The

Oﬃcial Journal of the Homeland Security Professional FEBRUARY/MARCH 2009

VOLUME 2 • NUMBER 1

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CONTENTS

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BUILDING MODERN TERRORISM INVESTIGATORS by Clint Watts

Case Study: AIR FRANCE HIJACK: FLIGHT 8969 Flight 8969

by Chuck Pfarrer

Strategic View: LAWFARE: PART 1 How Islamist Lawfare Tactics Are Targeting Free Speech

by Brooke Goldstein and Aaron Eitan Meyer

GANGS, ORGANIZED CRIME & TERRORIST GROUPS

A Threat Assessment at the Crossroads

by Jennifer L. Hesterman

Homeland Security Abroad: LEARNING FROM ISRAEL’S EXPERIENCE by Barry Glover, Saint Leo University

Heroes or Vigilantes? CITIZENS WHO FOIL TERROR by Jonathan Keiler

DEPARTMENTS: 4

From the Publisher

Book Review

Training Review

Made in the USA

Cover Illustration: Scott Morrison

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Counter The

FROM THE PUBLISHER:

Continuing Vigilance

Oﬃcial Journal of the Homeland Security Professional

By Henry Morgenstern

VOLUME 2 • NUMBER 1

FEBRUARY/ MARCH 2009 Editor Chris Graham

e wish all our readers a safe, successful, and happy New Year as we begin

our second year of publication. At the end of last year, the events in

Mumbai reminded us how the world is still subject to destructive attacks against civilian populations by fanatic groups. We are constantly reminded that being vigilant is a duty for all First Responders who are dedicated to protecting our country. Defining “vigilance” is equally important. Does it mean keeping up-to-date on the events of the “Global War on Terror”? Learning about the constantly evolving terror threat? Is it about training, training, and training? Is it about informing our citizenry of what vigilance means? It is all these things and much more. We have sought to make a modest contribution to this effort by providing you with a forum for sharing your know-how and experience with other Homeland Security professionals. Judging by the response from First Responders, we are succeeding in providing that forum. In this issue, a very important article on Lawfare by Brooke Goldstein and Aaron Eitan Meyer takes us all to a different battle front in the War on Terror. Goldstein is a talented film maker (Winner of the United Nations Documentary Film Festival 2006 for “The Making of a Martyr,” about a fifteen-year-old child, Hussam Abu, who was used as a suicide bomber) and is also the legal director of the prestigious Middle East Legal forum. In their article about Lawfare, she brings to light a subject that SSI takes very seriously: the actions of quasi-legal terror groups, within the U.S.A., that cynically use our own hard-won freedoms and our laws against us under the guise of challenging the infringement of their civil liberties. These groups pose a real threat: journalists, academics, and our own efforts have come under their attempts to disinform and weaken our state of vigilance. Being vigilant means exposing the legal wing of the Global Jihad and looking for ways to define this threat and deal with it. We hope the discussion that begins in this magazine will be echoed in your own communities throughout the coming year.

•

Henry Morgenstern President - SSI P.S.

Director of Operations Sol Bradman Director of Advertizing Carmen Arnaes

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Contributing Editors Barry Glover Brooke Goldstein Jennifer Hesterman Jonathan Keiler Aaron Eiten Meyer Chuck Pfarrer Clint Watts

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Copy Editor Laura Town

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Oﬃce Manager Lily Valdes Publisher: Security Solutions International Suite 204 14300 SW 129th Street Miami, Florida 33186 ISSN 1941-8639 The Counter Terrorist Magazine, The Oﬃcial Journal of the Homeland Security Professional, is published by Security Solutions International LLC, as a service to the nation’s First Responders and Homeland Security Professionals with the aim of deepening understanding of issues related to Terrorism. No part of the publication can be reproduced without permission from the publisher. The opinions expressed herein are the opinions of the authors represented and not necessarily the opinions of the publisher. Please direct all Editorial correspondence related to the magazine to: Security Solutions International SSI, 14300 SW 129th Street, Suite 204, Miami, Florida. 33186 or info@thecounterterroristmag.com The subscription price for 6 issues is $34.99 and the price of the magazine is $5.99. (1-866-573-3999) Fax: 1-786-573-2090.

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Case Study:

AIR FRANCE FLIGHT 8969 HIJACK By Chuck Pfarrer On Christmas Eve, 1994, Air France Flight 8969 prepared to depart Houari Boumedienne Airport, Algiers, for a two hour and thirty minute flight to Paris. Aboard the Airbus 300 were more than 180 passengers: 100 Algerians, 70 French, five citizens of Photo: iStock the UK, about a dozen Europeans, and five Americans. As the 12 crew members prepared for departure, four men boarded through the aft doorway.

hey wore the uniform of Air Algerie pilots, and openly carried assault rifles. They ordered the passengers to lower their window shades, and collected passports and identification documents, placing them in black plastic garbage bags. When challenged by Air France crewmembers, the terrorists quickly sealed the passenger doors and announced their intention to hijack the aircraft. Their plan went awry almost at once. The hijackers were members of the GIA (Groupe Islamique Armé), a fundamentalist Algerian Jihad organization. The hijack team was led by a 25 year old petty criminal turned terrorist named Abdul Abdullah Yahia. Unstable, and possibly psychotic, Yahia was the leader of a GIA cell named “Those Who Sign Their Names in Blood.” During Algeria’s sectarian civil war, Yahia had made himself famous for murdering and beheading Algerian police officers. Yahia got on the PA system and announced that they would soon be airborne, en route to Paris, and that he and the other hijackers were members of the GIA’s “Soldiers of Mercy.” They would prove anything but merciful. Yahia ordered the pilot to take off. The tower refused to grant clearance. Though Yahia and his three accomplices had sealed themselves aboard, the aircraft’s wheels were chocked, and passenger and service ladders remained attached.

Within minutes, the tarmac was teeming with black-clad, balaclava-wearing Algerian counter-terrorist troops. They paraded thoughtlessly around the aircraft in broad daylight, casing entrance routes and aiming weapons at the windows. Within 90 minutes, while still on the ground, Yahia discovered and executed an Algerian policeman among the passengers. The policeman’s body was dumped onto a baggage cart. Yahia again demanded that the wheel chocks be removed; again the tower refused. Three hours after boarding the plane, Yahia executed a second hostage, Bui Giang Tu, a 48-year-old Vietnamese diplomat. His body joined the corpse of the police oﬃcer on the runway. As the passengers watched in horror, the hijackers now placed explosive charges in the passenger cabin and cockpit. Yahia threatened to blow up the plane on the runway if he was not allowed to depart. Ominously, the hijackers made no other demands. They had no manifesto to read, and they asked for the release of no comrades in jail; their only demand was to be allowed to depart for Paris. By 2:30pm, the security director for Air France, Philippe Legorjus, was on the phone with the commander of the Algerian Army. Legorjus was himself a former counter-terrorist operator; he knew the Algerian counter-terrorism force, called “The Ninjas,” was unequal to the task of retaking a hostage-ﬁlled airliner.

As the passengers watched in horror, the hijackers now placed explosive charges in the passenger cabin and cockpit.

©istockphoto.com/name

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©istockphoto.com/name

The commandos atop the ladder shouted down to the ramp operator. After twenty desperate seconds, Favier and his team clawed open the hatch. The delay would prove costly.

To stall for time, negotiators in the tower offered Yahia a deal. They would release several members of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), political allies of the GIA, if Yahia allowed the women and children to deplane. Yahia eventually agreed, and soon after nightfall, 63 Algerian women and children were let go. Yahia again demanded to take off; the Algerians continued to stall. In France, a crisis team had assembled. Foreign Minister Alain Juppe tried to persuade the Algerians to allow the French Groupe d’Intervention de la Gendarmerie National (GIGN) to assist in resolving the crisis. Founded in 1974, GIGN is the French Gendarmerie’s elite counter-terrorism and hostage rescue unit. Despite the name, GIGN is part of the French military, not the police. At 8pm, 40 GIGN operators, led by Major Denis Favier, took off from Neuilly, a military airfield outside Paris. They flew across the Mediterranean toward Algiers, prepared to retake the aircraft.

By 9pm, Algerian military intelligence had identified Abdul Abdullah Yahia as the lead hijacker. Again, the Algerians proved singularly inept. They forced Yahia’s mother to take up a microphone in the control tower and plead with her son to release the remaining hostages. Within minutes, Yahia selected a French national, Yannick Beugnet, from among the passengers. Yahia keyed the microphone, forced Beugnet to beg for his life, and then shot him in the back of the head. Yahia now stated that he would kill a hostage every thirty minutes until the plane was allowed to depart. The GIGN rescuers were now approaching Algiers, but were denied permission to land. After circling for two hours, the aircraft carrying the French commandos was diverted to Spain to refuel. French Prime Minister Eduard Balladur was furious. He informed Algerian Prime Minister Mokdad Sifi that France held Algerian authorities responsible for the security of the French nationals in the plane. Incredibly, at this moment, the Algerians attempted a horse trade. France had suspended arms shipments to Algeria at the start of the civil war in 1991. According to numerous sources,1 the Algerian government’s response was to propose a deal—it would allow the GIGN to land and retake the plane if the French resumed arms shipments to Algeria. Prime Mister Balladur flatly refused. He demanded that the plane be allowed to depart immediately for France. The French would resolve the issue on French soil. The Algerians washed their hands of the matter— the tower communicated that the plane was cleared to depart. Now the colonel commanding the Ninjas refused orders to remove the wheel chocks and stairways. The hijack was in its twelfth hour, three passengers were dead

and Algerian command and control was breaking down. Shortly after midnight on Christmas morning, the Ninjas finally obeyed orders and removed the boarding stairs. The A300 took off and headed out over the Mediterranean. Aboard Air France 8969 things went from bad to worse. The terrorists had a sadistic knack for tormenting their captives, especially the French nationals. One hijacker was nicknamed Le Fou (“The Nut Job”) by the passengers. He spent the flight across the Mediterranean fiddling with the demolition charges, reading aloud from the Koran, and telling male passengers that he would be rewarded for his martyrdom with 70 virgins. Finally airborne, Yahia told the pilot to fly directly to Paris. Captain Bernard Dehemme had secretly communicated with French authorities, apprising them of the situation. The decision had been made that the airliner would not be allowed to approach the French capital. Captain Dehemme convinced Yahia that twelve hours of sitting on the runway had burned nearly half the airliner’s fuel. Insisting that the airbus would not make it to Paris, Captain Dehemme persuaded Yahia to allow the plane to land in Marseilles. The captain and first officer knew, if Yahia did not, that GIGN would be waiting. What Captain Dehemme did not know was that Yahia planned to crash the plane into the city of Paris. This information had come from French Intelligence sources via the consulate in Oran, Algeria. A GIA informant stated that the plane was “a flying bomb that will explode over Paris.” A debrief of hostages released in Algiers confirmed that the plane was wired with 20 sticks of TNT. The French now knew that Yahia was bent on suicide. His plan was to use the airliner as a flying bomb. French fighter jets were scrambled and

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shadowed the Airbus as it crossed the Mediterranean. At 3:33am, Air France 8969 touched down at Marseilles. Only minutes earlier, Favier and a GIGN assault element had arrived from their holding pattern at Mallorca, Spain. The airbus was taxied to a remote portion of the airport. As the tower in Marseilles attempted to contact Yahia, GIGN blocked the runway and deployed snipers. Two hours of tense radio silence followed. At 6am Christmas morning, the hijackers put Captain Dehemme on the radio to demand 27 tons of fuel and a direct route to Paris. Yahia had asked for nearly three times the amount of fuel necessary for the trip. French officials were now convinced that Yahia intended to crash the plane into the city. The tower at Marseilles said it was arranging for fuel trucks, and offered to supply food and water and empty the airplane’s backed up toilets. Yahia agreed. Ironically, these aircraft services were provided by GIGN operators dressed in Air France uniforms—the same ruse Yahia had used in Algiers. As the plane was serviced, GIGN teams were able to count the hijackers, ascertain that the hatches were not booby trapped, and slip several listening devices aboard the plane. During the morning and early afternoon, GIGN planned and rehearsed the takedown operation on an identical Airbus 300 parked behind a hangar. They waited for a go code from Paris. None came. As GIGN waited for the green light, Yahia lost patience. Whether he suspected a trap, or discovered a listening device, is unknown. At 4:45pm, he jammed a gun behind Captain Dehemme’s ear and ordered him to taxi the airplane within 100 feet of the main terminal. As the big A300 lumbered forward, Yahia opened fire on the control tower, raining

plate glass on negotiators and air traffic controllers. At 5:17pm, GIGN executed an immediate assault.2 GIGN troopers approached the aircraft using mobile loading ramps and on foot. Favier led the initial attack group, which assaulted the forward righthand cabin door. This hatch accessed the area aft of the flight deck. As the mobile stairs touched the aircraft, GIGN surged forward. But the mobile ramp had been raised too high, and jammed the hatch. The commandos atop the ladder shouted down to the ramp operator. After twenty desperate seconds, Favier and his team clawed open the main cabin door. The delay would prove costly. Seven GIGN operators flooded into the first-class cabin. They were met by a pelting hail of fire. As the gun battle raged, two other teams entered through the rear doors, quickly actuated the escape slides, and herded passengers off the plane. In the first-class cabin, GIGN troopers and hijackers battled at close quarters. The difference in their weapons quickly became a factor. The lead GIGN shooting pair carried 9mm MP5 machine pistols. The remainder of the lead assault group carried Manurhin MR-73 .357 revolvers. Yahia and the hijackers were armed with fragmentation grenades, 7.62mm AK47 assault rifles, and a 9mm Uzi. What Yahia lacked in accuracy he made up for in volume of fire. Four GIGN operators were wounded in the first seconds of the assault. One hijacker was killed by a .357 round fired into his head; as he tumbled backward into the cockpit, a second hijacker was shot down as he opened fire on the passengers. The remaining terrorists returned highly accurate fire. Within seconds, six more GIGN operators were wounded. In the cockpit, Captain Dehemme was

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shielded by the body of a slain hijacker. First Officer Jean-Paul Borderie was not so lucky. Pinned in the crossfire, he managed to open a cockpit escape window and jump 16 feet to the tarmac. He suffered a broken leg and wrist, but, miraculously, was untouched by gunfire. As a second wave of GIGN commandoes advanced, a surviving terrorist fired down at the mobile boarding ramp. The lead GIGN operator had his weapon struck by a bullet, detonating the rounds in the revolver’s cylinder. The resulting explosion knocked him backwards and down the stairs. Badly wounded, he was dragged to safety. The fight in first class raged back and forth for more than ten minutes. Hundreds of rounds were exchanged. Flash crashes and eventually fragmentation grenades were thrown at the remaining terrorists. The GIGN were superbly trained and resolute. Despite the immense fire superiority of the terrorists, Major Favier’s team soon secured the cockpit and first-class areas. Yahia and his terrorists were dead, and with them their hope of detonating a flying bomb over Paris. The French tactic of arming assaulters with revolvers had taken a toll. French casualties amounted to almost 25% of the assaulting force. Ten GIGN commandos were wounded, five seriously. Their Manurhin MR-73 .357s fired aluminum hollow point ammunition. These rounds had considerable stopping power, but did not pass through cabin partitions . The AK-47 ball ammunition fired by the terrorists was of sufficient velocity to pass through cabin bulkheads, aircraft fuselage sections, hatchways, and GIGN body armor. Ten GIGN operators were wounded, as were 13 passengers and three crew members. No passengers were killed, and at 5:35pm, a wounded Favier radioed,

“The operation is terminated. Damage limited.” The 54-hour nightmare of Air France 8969 was over. GIGN had executed a textbook counter-terrorist operation; their bold, courageous assault had saved 200 lives aboard the aircraft and countless hundreds of lives on the ground. Yahia had succeeded in his goal of martyrdom, but failed in his attempt to visit destruction on a French city. Following 9-11, two myths have persisted: the first is that the airline suicide attacks were an Al Qaeda innovation. The controlled flight of civilian aircraft into ground targets had been attempted multiple times before, twice against Washington, D.C. One attack nearly succeeded—the second did, In 1974, Samuel Joseph Byck attempted to hijack Delta flight 523, bound for Atlanta. Byck’s intent was to

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crash the gas laden, passenger crammed DC-9 into the White House. He very nearly succeeded. Rushing a passenger gate at Baltimore Washington Airport, Byck gunned down a policeman and two Delta crew members. Prior to the hijacking, Byck had made tape recordings explaining his plan and had sent them to the media— he intended to deliberately crash the aircraft, killing himself, all aboard and cause maximum destruction on the ground. Byck was shot and killed by police before he could force the aircraft to take off. In 1986, Pan Am Flight 73 was hijacked by the Abu Nidal Organization. The hijacking was ended by direct action resulting in a firefight that produced many casualties. Subsequent information indicated that the goal of the hijacking was to use the aircraft to fly into a selected target.3

The second plan to crash civilian aircraft into the White House was successful. On the night of September 11, 1994, Frank Eugene Corder stole a Cessna 150 from Aldino Airport in Maryland. Over the White House, Corder switched off his engine, conducted a “dead stick” approach and smashed his airplane into the front of the executive mansion. The first family was not in the White House at the time, and Corder’s light plane did little damage: but he had succeeded. Byck and Corder were disturbed loners, not politically motivated terrorists. But their plans were practicable. In hindsight, the operational demonstration of America’s vulnerabilities, in itself, should have been sufficient warning. The second fiction perpetuated after 9-11 was that suicide hijacking could not have been prevented because no

The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2009 11

one perceived that such a threat existed. This, too, is nonsense. There was no failure to anticipate the 9-11 attacks. A report, prepared by the National Intelligence Council in 1999, stated explicitly: “Suicide bombers belonging to al-Qaeda’s Martyrdom Battalion [sic] could crash-land an aircraft packed with

high explosives into the Pentagon, the headquarters of the Central Intelligence Agency or the White House.” 4 5 Five years before 9-11, the National Intelligence Council had not only named the attackers, but correctly predicted the targets and means of attack. That global transportation systems

and airline passengers remained open to terrorist exploitation was a failure of policy makers and senior bureaucrats who ignored, disregarded, or failed to grasp the deadly serious nature of the threat. On Christmas Morning. 1996, a GIGN assault element foiled the hijack of Air France 8969. The attacks of 9-11 were ﬁve years in the future— but they were certain to be duplicated. Abdul Yahia had shown terrorists the way to paradise.

•

ABOUT THE AUTHOR Mr. Pfarrer is a former naval special warfare oﬃcer and was an assault element commander at SEAL Team Six. During the years 2003– 2007, Pfarrer served as a senior planner for terrorist weapons, methodology, and operations for the National Counter Terrorism Exercises TOPOFF 1, 2, and 3. Pfarrer has written broadly on terrorism and counterterrorism, and was the principal author of the weapons of mass destruction annex to the national counterterrorism plan. He is presently director for military and national security aﬀairs at Trillacorpe, LLC.

NOTES 1

Sancton, Thomas. Time Magazine, 24

June, 2001. 19 November, 2008. http://www. time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1101 941226-163487,00.html 2

Recontre avec Thierry P. L’assault de

Marignane Reconté par Thierry P. GIGN,org. Le site du GIGN. 19 November 2008. http:// web.archive.org/web/20071015204050/ http://gign.org/temoignages/thierry-p.php 3

Niza, Abu. Counter Terrorism Magazine,

Winter, 2006. Volume 12, Number 4. 4

Report of the National Commission on

Terrorist Attacks on the United States. [The 911 Reports] June, 2004. 19 November 2008. http://www.9-11commission.gov/archive/ hearing12/9-11Commission_Hearing_200406-16.htm 5

The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism.

Library of Congress – Federal Research 12 The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2009

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Division. September 1999. Circle 181 on Reader Service Card

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Strategic View:

LAWFARE

PART 1

How Islamist Lawfare Tactics Are Targeting Free Speech By Brooke Goldstein and Aaron Eitan Meyer

Are American authors who write about terrorism and its sources of ﬁnancing safe? Are counter-terrorist advisors to the New York City Police department safe? Are U.S. congressmen safe when they report terroristfront groups to the FBI and CIA? Are cartoonists who parody Mohammad safe from arrest?

14 The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2009

©istockphoto.com/name

ust a Dutch politician who produced a documentary film quoting the Koran stand trial for blasphemy of Islam in Jordan? Is anyone who speaks publicly on the threat of radical Islam safe from frivolous and malicious lawsuits designed to bankrupt, punish, and silence them? These days, the answer is no. Lawfare is usually defined as the use of the law as a weapon of war1, or the pursuit of strategic aims through aggressive legal maneuvers.2 Traditionally, lawfare tactics have been used to obtain moral advantages over the enemy in the court of public opinion,3 and to intimidate heads of state from acting out of fear of prosecution for war crimes.4 Al-Qaeda training manuals instruct its captured militants to file claims of

torture or other forms of abuse so as to reposition themselves as victims against their captors.5 The 2004 decision by the United Nation’s International Court of Justice declaring Israel’s security fence a crime against humanity, which pointedly ignored the fact that the fence contributed to a sharp decline in terror attacks, is another example of lawfare aimed at public opinion.6 Yet, lawfare has moved beyond gaining mere moral advantages over nation-states and is now winning lawsuits against government actors. Over the past ten years, we have seen a steady increase in Islamist lawfare tactics directly targeting the human rights of North American and European civilians in order to constrain the free ﬂow of public information about radical Islam.

Over the past ten years, we have seen a steady increase in Islamist lawfare tactics directly targeting the human rights of North American and European civilians in order to constrain the free ﬂow of public information about radical Islam.

The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2009 15

The lawsuits are often predatory, ﬁled without a serious expectation of winning, and undertaken as a means to intimidate, demoralize, and bankrupt defendants.

THE ISLAMIST MOVEMENT The Islamist movement is that which seeks to impose tenets of Islam, and speciﬁcally Shari’a law, as a legal, political, religious, and judicial authority both in Muslim states and in the West. It is generally composed of two wings—that which operates violently, propagating suicide-homicide bombing and other terrorist activities; and that which operates lawfully, conducting a “soft jihad” within our media, government, and court systems; through Shari’a banking;7 and within our school systems.8 Yet Islamism, the drive to promulgate Islamic values as they are deﬁned by various Imams and Muslim leaders, is the ideology that powers not only Hamas and Al-Qaeda, but motivates organizations such as the Canadian Islamic Congress, the Islamic Circle of North America, and the Council on American Islamic Relations.9 Both the violent and the lawful arms of the Islamist movement can and do work apart, but often, their work reinforces each other’s. For example,

one tenet of Shari’a law is to punish those who criticize Islam and to silence speech considered blasphemous of its prophet Mohammad. While the violent arm of the Islamist movement attempts to silence speech by burning cars when Danish cartoons of Mohammed are published, by murdering ﬁlm directors such as Theo Van Gogh, and by forcing thinkers such as Wafa Sultan into hiding out of fear for her life, the lawful arm is skillfully maneuvering within Western court systems, hiring lawyers and suing to silence its critics.

LEGAL JIHAD Islamist states, organizations, and individuals with financial means have launched a “legal jihad,” filing a series of malicious lawsuits in American courts and abroad, designed to punish and silence those who engage in public discourse about radical Islam. Such lawsuits are being used as a weapon of war against counter-terrorism experts, law enforcement personnel, politicians, and anyone working to disseminate information on Islamist terrorism and its sources of financing. The lawsuits are often predatory, filed without a serious expectation of winning, and undertaken as a means to intimidate, demoralize, and bankrupt defendants. Claims are often based on frivolous charges ranging from defamation to workplace harassment, from “hate speech” to “Islamophobia,” and have resulted in books being banned and pulped, thousands of dollars worth of fines, and publishing houses and newspapers rejecting important works on counter-terrorism out of fear of being the next target. By suing to impose penalties and gag orders on counter-terrorism experts, government officials, authors, and the media, noncombatants who engage in Islamist lawfare are assuming critical support roles, whether intentionally or

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not, for violent operations that seek to establish principles of Shari’a law in the West. The following cases represent a small percentage of Islamist lawfare in the U.S. but are illustrative. In 2003, the Washington-based Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR), sued former U.S. Congressman Cass Ballenger after an interview with the congressman revealed that he had reported the group to the CIA and FBI as a “fundraising arm for Hezbollah.”10 Fortunately, the judge in Ballenger’s case ruled the congressman’s statements were made in the scope of his public duties and were therefore constitutionally protected speech in the interest of public concern. The following year, CAIR instituted a 1.3 million dollar lawsuit against Andrew Whitehead, an American activist and blogger, for maintaining the website Anti-CAIR-net.org, on which CAIR is described as an Islamist organization with ties to terrorist groups. After refusing Whitehead’s discovery requests, seemingly afraid of what internal documents the legal process it had initiated would reveal, CAIR withdrew its claims against Whitehead, a settlement was reached, and the case was dismissed by the court with prejudice.11 In 2005, the Islamic Society of Boston (ISB) ﬁled a lawsuit charging defamation against a dozen defendants including the Boston Herald, FOX 25 News, counterterrorism expert Steven Emerson, and several others. The defendants were targeted by ISB for publicly speaking about the Islamic Society’s connections to radical Islam and for raising questions about the construction of its Saudifunded mosque in Boston. A full two years after it had initiated the lawsuit, and just a few months after the discovery process was initiated into ISB’s ﬁnancial records, ISB dropped its case and abandoned all of its claims against all of

the defendants, without receiving any form of payment.12 Bruce Tefft, a former CIA official and counter-terrorism consultant for the NYPD, was sued by a Muslim police officer for “workplace harassment” after Tefft sent out emails to a voluntary recipient list of police officers containing information about radical Islamic terrorism.13 Tefft’s suit is ongoing. Sometimes American authors and publishers wrongfully targeted are able to take advantage of Anti-SLAPP statutes, the acronym being Anti-Strategic Litigation Against Public Participation. Anti-SLAPP statutes have been enacted in several, but not all, U.S. states and are aimed at preventing lawsuits designed to hinder legitimate public dialogue. The problem, however, with Anti-SLAPP statutes is threefold—not all states have enacted them, there is no federal equivalent, and one must wait to be sued in order to take advantage of them. Such was the case when American author Matthew Levitt and his publisher, Yale Press, were sued by KinderUSA for Levitt’s book Hamas, in which Levitt describes KinderUSA as a charitable front for terror financing. In response to the lawsuit, Levitt and Yale Press instituted a counter-claim based on California’s AntiSLAPP statute arguing that KinderUSA’s suit was a disguised attempt at wrongfully intimidating them into silence. Shortly after the counter-claim was filed, KinderUSA mysteriously dropped its lawsuit, claiming only that it found the suit too costly to pursue.14 Most disturbing, however, are the examples of parties sued for reporting on official U.S. government investigations into terrorist activities, or for formally appealing to government authorities to conduct investigations into suspected illegal activity. Parties targeted in this vein include the New York Times, which, in 2001, reported on the U.S.

government’s investigation of the Global Relief Foundation and was subsequently sued15; The Wall Street Journal, which, in 2002, reported on the monitoring of Saudi bank accounts and was also sued16; and the Anti-Defamation League, which, in 2002, called for the investigation of a public school superintendent named Khadja Ghafur, based on indications that schools under his supervision were teaching religion in violation of the establishment clause. Ghafur predictably sued ADL for libel and lost, but only after much time and money was spent by ADL defending itself.17 The cumulative effect of these lawsuits, combined with the looming threat of future lawsuits, is creating a detrimental chilling effect on the exercise of free speech within this country, and raising the cost of public debate about the war on terrorism. Islamist lawfare has also sparked a wave of self-censorship, with publishing houses going as far as hiring security experts to assess the potential for violent reactions in the Muslim community to printed words. The strategy of silencing Western material “blasphemous” of Islam began not with objections to truth, cartoons, politicians, or political articles. After the 1988 publication of Salman Rushdie’s famous work of fiction, The Satanic Verses, Iran’s Ayatollah Khomeini issued his infamous fatwa against Rushdie, a British citizen at the time.18 The fatwa marked the beginning of the end of open discourse—fictional or otherwise—on Islam. Only six months ago, the deputy head of the Khomeini Archives proudly stated on Iranian television that “Imam Khomeini’s fatwa on Salman Rushdie has historic significance for Islam. It was not just a fatwa; it was a verdict that still holds today.”19 From this epochal attack, Islamists have moved on to silencing public discourse on issues of national security directly, even as they still seek to

quash creative works of fiction to which they object. Though Salman Rushdie published The Satanic Verses in 1988, he remains in hiding a full 20 years later. Most recently, Random House Publishing Group pulled a fictional novel entitled “The Jewel of Medina” by journalist Sherry Jones about the Prophet Mohammad’s child bride. The publishing house feared it would prove offensive to some in the Muslim community and “incite acts of violence.”20 Prior to making its decision public, Thomas Perry, deputy publisher at Random House, consulted with security experts and scholars on Islam and received “from credible and unrelated sources”21 cautionary advice not to publish the work. Denise Spellberg, an associate professor of Islamic history at the University of Texas, made what was described as a “frantic” appeal to drop a “very ugly, stupid piece of work,” that she said “made fun of Muslims and their history.”22 Despite the commercial success of fictional pieces about the war on radical Islam, such as the New York Times’ bestseller The Last Patriot,23 written by Brad Thor and published by Atria Books, and Daniel Silva’s Secret Servant, published by Putnam, Random House seems to be leaving its business decisions up to articulate professors of Islamic studies. Although the publication of the book was officially postponed for “safety reasons,” it is certainly open to question whether the hysterical response of an associate professor constitutes a credible danger. Chastising Random House further, the Islamic Community in Serbia released a statement claiming it was not satisfied with the mere withdrawal of the novel and the organization’s leader, Muamer Zukorlic, demanded all of the published copies be handed in.24 The cases listed above reflect a few of the same battles going on now:

The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2009 17

free speech of Americans and other Westerners being placed under siege by Islamists. Those targeted run the range from government officials actively engaged in battling Islamist terrorism to novelists who dare to use Islamic themes or history in their writing. What must be appreciated is the fact that this problem is by no means limited to lawsuits within the United States, or even lawsuits involving U.S. citizens. As we will demonstrate in Part II of this article, lawfare as an Islamist strategy has made significant inroads in Europe, Canada, and international organizations. And as lawfare continues to be increasingly utilized the world over, the stakes for Western democracies, including the United States, continue to be raised significantly.

•

ABOUT THE AUTHORS Brooke Goldstein is a practicing attorney, an award-winning ﬁlmmaker, and the director of the Legal Project at the Middle East Forum. The Legal Project is dedicated to providing pro-bono legal representation to authors, activists, and publishers who work on the topics of radical Islam, terrorism, and their sources of ﬁnancing. Aaron Eitan Meyer recently received his Juris Doctor degree from Touro Law Center, and is currently Assistant to the Director at the Legal Project of the Middle East Forum and Legal Correspondent to the Terror Finance Blog.

THE NEXT ISSUE WILL CONTAIN PART II, THE CONCLUSION, OF HOW ISLAMIST LAWFARE TACTICS ARE TARGETING FREE SPEECH.

NOTES Dunlap, Law and Military Interventions: Preserving Humanitarian Values in 21st Century Conﬂicts (29 Nov 2001), 1

and David Rivkin, The Wall Street Journal Op Ed at http://online.wsj.com/ article/SB117220137149816987.html (commentary at: http://www.prospect.org/cs/ articles?article=the_lawfare_scare) 2 http://www.opinionjournal.com/forms/ printThis.html?id=110005366 3 http://online.wsj.com/article/ SB117220137149816987.html 4 Israeli Minister Avi Dichter canceled a trip to Britain after being threatened with arrest over a 2002 incident, (See http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/ article3012503.ece) Also, current Israeli Deputy Prime Minister and former Israel Defense Forces Chief of Staff Shaul Mofaz cut short a trip to Britain after “the director of public prosecutions in England asked police in London to investigate war crimes allegations.” (See http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2002/11 /01/1036027036796.html) 5 “Lawfare” By David B. Rivkin & Lee A. Casey, The Wall Street Journal (Feb 26, 2007) at http://prasad.aem.cornell.edu/doc/media/ PrasadRajan.WSJAFeb07.pdf 6 For the text of the decision see: http:// www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2= 4&k=5a&case=131&code=mwp&p3=4 7 For more information on Shari’a compliant financing see David Yerushalmi, “Sharia’s Black Box: Civil Liability and Criminal Exposure Surrounding ShariaCompliant Finance,” Utah Law Review (Sept 2008 forthcoming), see also www. stopsharianow.org 8 Much has been said about the Saudi effort to produce school textbooks for American grade schools, and the establishment of Islamic-language public schools such as the Khalil Gibran Academy in New York, raising issues of Establishment Clause violations and contravening separation of church and state, or more accurately, Mosque and state. “Islam in America’s public schools: Education or indoctrination?” http://www.sfgate. com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/g/a/2008/06/11/ cstillwell.DTL On New York’s “Khalil Gibran International Academy” http://www. danielpipes.org/blog/2007/03/on-new-yorkskhalil-gibran-international.html 9 ISNA: “In addition to building bridges

18 The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2009

of understanding and cooperation within the diversity that is Islam in America, ISNA is now playing a pivotal role in extending those bridges to include all people of faith within North America.” http://www.isna.net/ ISNAHQ/pages/About-Us.aspx CAIR: “CAIR believes the active practice of Islam strengthens the social and religious fabric of our nation.” http://www.cair. com/AboutUs/VisionMissionCorePrinciples. aspx. CAIR also oﬀers a ‘guide’ which oﬀers “…background information about Islam and Muslims, best practices on reporting on the Muslim community and a list of accurate terminology to use when covering issues relating to Islam.” Also, they have a campaign to ‘Explore the Quran’ with the following description of their aim: “In today’s climate of heightened religious sensitivities and apparent cultural clashes, now is the time for people of all faiths to better acquaint themselves with Islam’s sacred text, the Holy Quran.” http://www.explorethequran.org/ This is to be accomplished by distributing copies of the Quran. There is a similar campaign regarding Muhammad. http://www.exploremuhammad. org/ ISNA: Imam Sirraj Wahhaj, listed as Member, ISNA Majlis Ashura: “In time, this so-called democracy will crumble, and there will be nothing. And the only thing that will remain will be Islam,” Wahhaj was quoted as saying in one of his sermons. as cited in “Radical Imam Promotes ProIslamic Ad Campaign to Run on New York Subways” http://www.foxnews.com/ story/0,2933,387701,00.html CAIR: Omar M. Ahmad, then-director of CAIR: “If you choose to live here (in America) ... you have a responsibility to deliver the message of Islam...” in “American Muslim leader urges faithful to spread Islam’s message” and “The Koran, the Muslim book of scripture, should be the highest authority in America, and Islam the only accepted religion on earth...” Article by Lisa Gardiner Available online at http://www.danielpipes.org/394.pdf NOTE: There are other quotes that might be useful. Plus, DP publicly dealt with these statements by Ahmad, which Ahmad later

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claimed he never said. The WorldNetDaily article has more: http://www.worldnetdaily. com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=53303 10 Ballenger made the comment in a phone conversation to journalist Tim Funk of the Charlotte Observer on October 1, 2003. As cited by the Court in Council of American Islamic Relations, v. Cass Ballenger, 444 F.3d 659 (D.C. Cir. 2006) http://pacer.cadc.uscourts.gov/docs/common/ opinions/200604/05-5161a.pdf 11 Despite CAIR’s failed eﬀort at intimidation, Whitehead’s Anti-CAIR website is still up and running along with the text that was at issue and is available at www.anti-cairnet.org 12 In line with the old adage that actions speak louder than words, the fact that both ISB and CAIR abandoned their claims right before they would have been required, by court order, to turn over internal documents speaks volumes about whether the two Plaintiﬀs had ever intended to pursue their legal claims on their merit or had instead, intended to use the court system to intimidate the Defendants as well as other journalists, into not reporting on

their activities. 13 http://frontpagemagazine.com/Articles/ Read.aspx?GUID=AF613BFA-8E34-4A078DB4-20D89DE3D84B 14 KinderUSA claimed that its resources were better spent on charity. http://www. libraryjournal.com/info/CA6470780.html 15 In aﬃrming the decision, the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals reiterated that “Truth is an absolute bar to recovery for defamation.” 390 F.3d 973 (7th Cir. 2004) http://cases.justia.com/us-court-of-appeals/ F3/390/973/506579/ 16 The bank dropped the suit in 2005, but the WSJ published a ‘clariﬁcation’ that it had not in fact reported any allegation that linked the bank to terrorism. http://online.wsj.com/ article/SB118530038250476405.html 17 “Court throws out Muslim educator’s suit against ADL” http://www.jewishsf. com/content/2-0-/module/displaystory/ story_id/20626/edition_id/422/format/html/ displaystory.html 18 For an excellent synopsis and explanation of these events, see “The Ayatollah, the Novelist, and the West” by Daniel Pipes,

available online at http://www.danielpipes. org/article/186 19 http://www.danielpipes.org/ blog/2004/06/is-salman-rushdie-now-safe. html 20 “Random House Pulls Novel on Islam, Fears Violent,” by Edith Honan, (Aug 7, 2008) at: http://www.reuters.com/article/ newsOne/idUSN0736008820080807 21 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ uknews/2524540/Random-Housescraps-publication-of-novel-on-ProphetMohammeds-child-bride.html 22 http://dick-meom.blogspot. com/2008/08/random-house-randomlydecides-not-to.html 23 The book is available at: amazon.com: http://www.amazon.com/Last-PatriotThriller-Brad-Thor/dp/141654383X/ref=pd_ bbs_sr_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1218036 222&sr=8-1 24 http://www.adnkronos.com/AKI/ English/Religion /?id=1.0. 2419224932 25

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B Building Modern

TERRORISM INVESTIGATORS By Clint Watts

©istockphoto.com/name

Seven years after 9/11, determining the necessary skills investigators need to disrupt, deter, and defeat terrorist networks remains largely a mystery. Law enforcement, a profession that originally followed a linear set of reactive criminal investigative steps, has mutated into a dynamic, intelligence-driven effort to preempt both crime and terrorism. Efforts to rapidly adapt training to this new paradigm struggle to meet the needs of the modern day counter-terrorism (CT) investigator.

22 The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2009

eginning in 2002, investigators were thrown into a plethora of training and told to know in depth a vast array of disparate topics including, but not limited to, medieval Middle Eastern history, social networking, foreign languages, cultural awareness, and complex Internet analysis. Today, uncertainty as to what are essential CT training topics results in wasted resources and confusion for trainees. Most training formats use passive auditorium presentations, leaving investigators wondering, “Why am I here? What information is important for me?” CT investigator skill development should complement the natural investigative process rather than stand apart from investigator duties. Courses should empower investigators to identify terrorist indicators through investigative techniques such as ﬁeld interviews, search warrants, surveillance, and open source data collection. Additionally, skill development must include an application phase in which investigators utilize new counterterrorism techniques with the assistance of subject matter experts. Critical throughout this development process is creating training appropriate for the local jurisdiction, thus placing renewed emphasis on properly designing training before conducting it.

COUNTERTERRORISM THREAT TRIAGE: “What Am I Seeing? What Am I Looking For?” Globalization has created an asymmetric threat environment in which investigators encounter hundreds of

cultures and networks within any given jurisdiction. The complex human terrain terrorism investigators must navigate requires a base level of knowledge on a vast number of threats. The three most critical terror threats from this array are al Qaeda, Hamas, and Hizballah. Immediately following 9/11, investigators pursued thousands of terrorism leads with a natural bias towards al Qaeda. Unable to distinguish among these three groups, investigators mistook indicators of Hizballah or Hamas activity for that of al Qaeda. Investigators must recognize the differences among these groups, as mistakes result in lost intelligence or flawed investigations in which only part of a terrorist network, rather than the whole, is identified and disrupted. “Threat triage” centers on five variables: geographic focus, religious ideology, state sponsorship, political goals, and organizational structure. Looking at these threats, CT training should provide tangible indicators to distinguish among organizations. The table below provides a rough outline of how threat triage training can be built for investigators to rapidly distinguish among organizations. Although it is true that all of these terror groups are known to collaborate at times, in general these threats can be distinguished through broad categories and specific indicators. Many current training programs have taken CT investigators to unnecessary extremes in depth. Academic professors, an essential part of any good CT instructional program, will often preach to investigators about understanding centuries of ideological knowledge and hundreds of religious figures. Although

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Globalization has created an asymmetric threat environment in which investigators encounter hundreds of cultures and networks within any given jurisdiction.

The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2009 23

Although the Internet remains the lifeblood for all sorts of terror groups, it has also provided a valuable window by which CT investigators can gain valuable insight into terrorist motivations, plans, and techniques. TERROR THREAT

GEOGRAPHIC FOCUS

RELIGIOUS IDEOLOGY

STATE SPONSORSHIP

GOALS

HIERARCHICAL STRUCTURE

HAMAS

PALESTINE

SUNNI EXTREMIST

NATIONALISTIC

YES

HIZBALLAH

LEBANON

SHIITE EXTREMIST

YES (IRAN)

NATIONALISTIC

YES

AL QAEDA

GLOBAL

SUNNI EXTREMIST

PAN-ISLAMIC

knowing the justiﬁcations and sources for “oﬀensive jihad” can be useful for investigators, in-depth study of every Al Qaeda ideologue provides little value to investigators. Essentially, investigators need to be able to identify and assess terror threats, not lecture on their historical roots. The best law enforcement trainer I have witnessed is Dr. William McCants. As the editor of the best online blog for understanding al Qaeda ideology, Jihadica, Dr. McCants uses his academic expertise to empower investigators with informed methods for analyzing ideological threats of Middle Eastern origin. His research compendium, entitled Militant Ideology Atlas, provides law enforcement with an informed analysis of Al Qaeda’s propaganda citing those publications most read and distributed by terrorists.

24 The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2009

The practicality of Dr. McCants’ calculations is evident in the comparison of his ﬁndings with the perpetrators of the Madrid Bombing. The ten most popular Al Qaeda ideological texts identiﬁed by Dr. McCants exactly matched those documents found in the rubble of the Madrid bombers’ apartment. Today, he translates and publishes daily analysis of jihadi forums providing law enforcement a constant stream of material for detecting terrorist motivations. International terrorism remains the focus for training but CT investigator programs must retain a solid base of training on domestic terror threats as well. Even today, the majority of terrorist acts committed domestically are executed by United States citizens. The same circumstances that created global

terror threats such as Al Qaeda have also empowered domestic groups in the U.S., such as the Animal Liberation Front, Earth Liberation Front, and the Aryan Nations. These groups remain active and although the focus on international terrorism will likely continue for some time, investigators can use the lessons learned from international terrorism training for application domestically. Two particularly critical areas with signiﬁcant international and domestic overlap are terrorist use of the Internet and terrorist ﬁnancing.

TERRORIST USE OF THE INTERNET: A Supporting Rather Than Main Investigative Eﬀort The Internet has become one of the trademarks of 21st century terrorism. Al Qaeda and like-minded groups use the Internet extensively to inspire, train, and operate a cellular, global network. Although the Internet remains the lifeblood for all sorts of terror groups, it has also provided a valuable window by which CT investigators can gain valuable insight into terrorist motivations, plans, and techniques. Training CT investigators to mine this trove of data remains a challenge for most training programs. Today, most “Terrorist Use of the Internet” classes lack any tangible skill development that CT investigators can use to gain an investigative edge. CT investigators need training to distinguish violent websites from political propaganda and to understand how forums and blogs provide open source investigative clues. The best law enforcement trainer of these skills is Mr. Aaron Weisburd of the Society for Internet Research. His personal research has tracked down dozens of terrorists around the globe and revealed how terror organizations truly use the Internet

to their advantage. Using open source techniques, Mr. Weisburd provides investigators via his website and training modules with established methods for analyzing Internet data and gaining valuable information on terrorist threats.

FINANCIAL TRACKING: Financial expertise remains a hallmark of all investigative training. CT investigators must be able to analyze financial data and recognize indicators of illicit funding. Thankfully, law enforcement maintains a long history of financial investigative successes. Those individuals who have conducted financial investigations of organized crime and narcotics networks still hold an essential investigative role in counterterrorism. Although veteran forensic accountants remain the anchor for investigating finance, modern CT investigators must also build upon this base of experience with an accompanying understanding of Hawala money exchange systems. The Hawala system, an informal money exchange system used in the Middle East and South Asia, provides international terror organizations a natural cover for exchanging illicit funds. Thus, CT financial training should include a robust discussion of the operation and tracking of Hawala finance networks coupled with the lessons learned from decades of financial investigations.

FIGHT TERRORISM ON THE STREETS NOT THE NET: Unfortunately, increased information technology has resulted in excessive desk investigation despite the greatest CT successes coming from successful human source development and ﬁeld interviews. Investigators, as opposed to analysts, provide the most critical counterterrorism function: human intelligence. Only human intelligence provides the

qualitative investigative depth needed to penetrate terrorist networks. Developing advanced interviewing abilities requires cross-cultural communication skills to avoid cultural gaffes and insults, rapportbuilding techniques rooted in history, geography, and religion, and relationship maintenance methods that are foreign to Western culture. Training for these skills requires a program utilizing language and culture experts, as well as law enforcement and intelligence veterans with significant overseas experience. This combination of experience and expertise will yield interviewing techniques that allow investigators to distinguish friend from foe. The need and use of language skills remains a topic of hot debate within CT communities. Although having personnel fluent in foreign languages such as Arabic, Pashtun, and Urdu is a must for CT operations collectively, training expenditure beyond familiarization may not be worthwhile unless students can achieve fluency in the language. The gap between language familiarization and fluency is deep, costly, and not necessarily productive, so organizations should spend their resources wisely.

AVOID PASSIVE TRAINING METHODSEven though counter-terrorism investigations by nature are dynamic, rapid, and complex, most CT instruction since 9/11 remains passive, theoretical, and unrealistic. Much CT training utilizes an academic, university style of presentation consisting of classroom lectures with few question and answer sessions between attendees and instructors. Good CT training will be designed such that students receive academic knowledge through simulated exercises demonstrating advanced CT skills. For example, an academic

The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2009 25

discussion of terror group propaganda should then be demonstrated through a drill in which investigators analyze propaganda documents discovered during a search warrant search. The subject matter expert instructor can then provide the student real-time feedback. CT training should always be tied to real world case studies. Recent years have produced a robust set of CT investigative successes and failures. Once curriculum designers identify the skills their investigators need, they should always build those lessons learned from international and domestic investigations into their courses. Many British investigative services predominately use the case study method of training. Their students always leave instruction with a ﬁrm set of counterterrorism do’s and don’ts devised from countless investigations including Operation Crevice, the 7/7 Bombings, and the Glasgow Bombings. Lastly, case studies are an invaluable tool in demonstrating the collaborative, networked counterterrorism architecture needed to penetrate modern terrorist networks.

PRINCIPLES FOR DESIGNING COUNTERTERRORISM TRAINING: No one CT curriculum meets the needs of all counter-terrorism investigators. As a new discipline, a relative standard for instruction and counterterrorism skill development remains many years away. However, there are many principles I believe investigative organizations can adhere to when developing counterterrorism programs. 1. Identify those CT skills most applicable to your jurisdiction before selecting any training. For example, investigative organizations routinely book training on Hamas

only to later find out that there has never been a Hamas investigative lead in their jurisdictions or even populations that might have sympathy towards the terror group. Meanwhile, those same jurisdictions might have large Aryan Nations threats that remain unaddressed by any training. 2. Develop and/or buy training formats designed to enhance investigative abilities. When selecting trainers or developing instruction, investigative organizations should ensure that no more than twothirds of the instruction is classroom lecture. More than two-thirds will likely result in wasting scarce training resources on courses that reap little to no benefit for students. 3. Maintain a diverse instructional team. Counterterrorism requires teams of investigators and analysts with diverse backgrounds and skill sets. Consequently, a good CT instructional team will also maintain an equally diverse set of presenters. Cultural and experiential diversity will help remove biases in instruction and provide trainees a richer set of perspectives. 4. More instructors teaching many topics is always better than one instructor teaching many topics. Should you encounter a CT instructor who claims to be able to teach singlehandedly courses on al Qaeda, Hamas, Hizballah, cultural interviewing, terrorist use of the Internet, and terrorist financing, you can be certain that the training you are getting will be average at best and most likely substandard in no less than 80% of its delivery. CT is an interdisciplinary field that requires specialized expertise from a variety of experts. Let seasoned investigators teach investigative techniques, academics teach history and ideology, computer techs teach the Internet, and forensic

accountants teach financial tracking. 5. $2000 of good training is ten times better than $1000 of awful training. In CT training, you get what you pay for. Although all training has cost limitations, those responsible for its design should conserve resources in areas in which their organizations have experience and invest in those disciplines in which they lack internal expertise. 6. Recognize instructional chameleons. Terrorism and counterterrorism have been a boom industry for many. Techniques utilized during Internet and finance investigations are extremely useful crossovers for investigating terrorism. Meanwhile, legions of instructors now proclaim expertise in counterterrorism— expertise largely gained by reading books and articles written by real experts on terrorism and the Middle East. Be wary of the instructional chameleons who lack the language, work experience, and on-the-ground experience of true terrorism experts. Chameleons’ résumés often reveal a previous specialty in Soviet studies and Russian language. Their knowledge of terrorism will be largely superficial, can provide little practical application for investigators, and is repetitive of arguments made by real terrorism experts. If you are going to spend resources on instruction, make sure to buy true experts rather than instructional chameleons with flashy presentation skills.

•

ABOUT THE AUTHOR Mr. Watts is a former US Army Infantry Oﬃcer, FBI Special Agent and Executive Oﬃcer of the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. He is currently a Partner

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Gangs, Organized Crime & Terrorist Groups:

A THREAT ASSESSMENT AT

THE CROSSROADS By Jennifer L. Hesterman

“Future war will not be waged by armies but by groups whom today we call terrorists, guerillas, bandits, and robbers, but who will undoubtedly hit upon more formal titles to describe themselves.”1 — Martin van Creveld (1991)

28 The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2009

artin van Creveld’s future has arrived, and his shadowy groups are not only thriving and spreading terror abroad and in our communities—they now share the same operational space, fundraising methods, and resources. Some “formal titles” they’ve assumed are al Qaeda, Hezbollah, MS-13, and FARC. Gangs and criminal enterprises are a direct and growing threat to our national security and the fabric of society. With blatant disregard, and even pure contempt, for the law and its enforcement officers, these offenders operate in a realm that is dangerous and increasingly impenetrable. By leveraging globalization and telecommunication advances, and in some cases, preying on anarchy resulting from the end of the Cold War, gang and criminal activity now transcends national borders. These groups have not only gone global, they possess an increasing level of sophistication and corresponding flexibility to change tactics and persistently evade law enforcement. Factor terrorists into the mix and the security threat is greatly amplified. The potential convergence of these three “armies” of non-state actors should be of great concern to law enforcement and those engaged in securing the homeland.

FOURTH-GENERATION WARFARE Perhaps we’ve entered the era of fourth-generation warfare (4GW), which retired Marine Corps Colonel G.I. Wilson describes as “a gray area phenom-

enon where war, crime, and peace blur manifesting themselves as threats to the stability of nation states by non-state actors (gangs, terrorists, militias, cartels, clans, tribes, pirates, criminal enterprises) and non-governmental organizations.”2 According to Wilson, in 4GW, nationstate militaries find themselves fighting non-state opponents (or “strategic criminals”), pulling them apart at the moral crosshairs of the U.S. government. In fact, FBI director Robert Mueller has declared MS-13 the highest priority in his criminal enterprise branch. • History: Following a bloody 12 year civil war in El Salvador that took more than 100,000 lives, many citizens fled to the U.S. for sanctuary and to start new lives. Along with law-abiding citizens came those with criminal intentions, having been exposed to extreme violence in their homeland. Several were members of government-trained death squads, with extensive training in explosives, military tactics, and firearms. Others had served as guerrillas with the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front, known as “Salvatruchas.” Some were members of a street gang known as “La Maras.” The convergence of these groups in immigrant communities led to what is now known as the MS-13 gang. • Structure: MS-13 has a pyramidshaped operation. Loosely affiliated groups labeled “cliques” operate at the local level. However, there is now some regional connectivity with leadership meetings, and an emerging national command structure. • Operational Modus Operandi: Gun

running, drugs, kidnapping, human trafficking, rape, extortion. Brutal murders, with victims including pregnant women and children. The crime is often perpetrated with machetes. Vicious initiation rites, starting as early as grade school. Membership is a lifelong contract; many members have tried to leave the gang, only to be killed. • Adaptable and morphing: MS-13 recently began changing its outward image to the public. Leadership is encouraging members to hide their highly-recognizable, prolific tattoos. Members are also making significant clothing changes: for instance, not wearing the gang’s blue and white colors, or wearing mainstream clothing, so as to avoid law enforcement interest. • Sophistication: MS-13 members and leadership have been known to leverage technology to recruit, spread their ideology, and communicate through chat rooms, text messaging, and web sites. • Internationalization: MS-13 in the U.S. has direct ties with members in other countries. According to the FBI, gang members in a prison in El Salvador have been able to reach out and kill gang members in Los Angeles.3 Deportees return to their countries with newfound knowledge and maintain their connections in the U.S. MS-13 has also spread to Europe. • Rival Gang: Mara 18 (M18), or the 18th Street Gang, is the adversary group to MS-13. With an estimated 30-50,000 members, M18 is larger than MS-13 and has rapidly expanded into 32 states. With international connections, organizational

The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2009 29

MULTINATIONAL CORPORATE SOPHISTICATION

©istockphoto.com/name

structure, and sophistication, law enforcement is concerned that the MS-13/M18 rivalry may push gang warfare into a new realm. The FBI’s MS-13 National Gang Task Force (MGTF) was created in 2004 to help coordinate and focus the eﬀorts of federal, state and local law enforcement agencies. With the ability to position and engage internationally, the FBI also works diligently with other countries similarly impacted by the MS-13 gang and their violent tactics.

COMPLEXITIES OF MODERN ORGANIZED CRIME Equally as pressing, and another direct threat to our national security, is the challenge of modern Organized Crime (OC). By leveraging globalization and ever-advancing communications technology, OC has morphed from centralized, homogenous criminal enterprises into a complex, transnational threat. The global nature of OC activities increases the diﬃculty of identifying and impeding activity, and requires the dedication of additional resources from already strapped federal agencies.

The U.S. is now the unwilling host to criminal enterprises from Russia, as well as African, Asian, and Baltic nations, which operate across national borders. As such, federal law enforcement agencies must now dedicate resources abroad in the targeted regions, engaging at the source, in the hopes of stemming crime and corruption here at home. Often the rule of law in the region is weak and the government either corrupt, or unable to deal with the problem alone. Organized crime rings in the U.S. are now engaged in all illegal activities: drug trafficking, prostitution and human trafficking, racketeering, financial scams, extortion, kidnapping, intellectual property and identity theft, and murder. The Organized Crime Section at FBI Headquarters is divided into three units which focus on La Cosa Nostra and Italian organized crime and racketeering, Eurasian/Middle Eastern organized crime, and Asian and African criminal enterprises. Worthy of note: the FBI believes that Eurasian organized crime poses some of the greatest threats because of its size, wealth, and global reach.4

30 The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2009

Although routinely underestimated in relation to sophistication, transnational criminal organizations act as networks and pursue the same types of joint ventures and strategic alliances as legitimate multinational corporations. A multinational corporation is often defined as one that operates on a worldwide scale and without ties to any specific nation or region. The global business environment is unique and multifaceted, which requires extra considerations. Because of the complexity of international operations, the right people (e.g., lawyers, accountants, and subject-area experts) must be on the payroll. Analysis of the international customer base, product demand, and proper positioning of the product is necessary to maximize profit. The company must assess the cost of doing business and streamline staff and operational activities to cut overhead and maximize profit. Any business must have good supply-chain management, from procurement to storage to product delivery. This process requires extra planning and sophistication when applied to a global market. Understanding international commerce laws and issues related to the operation of offshore businesses is a necessity. Cultural knowledge of the countries involved in the transactions is necessary, including languages, currencies, and business practices. All savvy business ventures are low-risk or high-return, and most are able to extract profits throughout the process. A good international business is able to leverage rapidly changing communication and transportation technology to stay viable. Surprisingly, the above describes the Cali Cartel drug syndicate at its operational peak in late 1980s. Successful

international criminal enterprises follow the same business plan and often work in parallel with unsuspecting legitimate corporations by using their business practices as a model. They have many resources. Many organizations own and operate a variety of aircraft and boats, with skilled operators at the helm. Sophisticated satellite phones and use of Global Positioning System equipment keep the criminals on the run and investigators in the dark. Bottom line: modern organized crime groups operate with parallel methods to many legitimate global corporations. Unfortunately for governments battling this issue, not only are transnational criminal networks harder to detect and infiltrate than ever, but, despite the governments’ best efforts, business is booming. The economic impact alone is staggering: it is estimated that global organized crime reaps illegal profits of approximately $1 trillion per year.5 Commonalities of Gangs, OC, and Terrorist Groups. These non-state actors have several shared characteristics, making their liaison more likely. • Flexible, able to change tactics and morph strategies to avoid attention, can work around legal and other roadblocks • Loosely organized, decentralized, fractured, franchises; decimation of top leadership won’t kill the organization • Ideological extremism, and in some cases, apocalyptic intentions • Able to leverage technology for recruiting and secure communication • Transnational in nature; diplomatic, military, and legal engagement all necessary to address problem • Curb appeal to disaffected, poor, those seeking affiliation, angry at “the system” • Excessive violence, lack of respect for human life/dignity, and disregard or contempt for the law and its enforcement agents

• Conscious, voluntary decision made by participants to join the organization, but tremendous pressure to stay; leaving could mean death Would Terrorists and Organized Crime Partner? Even though many terrorist groups already engage in criminal activity prior to execution of their attacks, will they increasingly seek criminals’ assistance and form greater alliances with OC groups? I posed this question in several oﬀ-the-record interviews with federal agents involved in organized crime and/ or tracking terrorist ﬁnancing and their answers provide excellent context for the continued study of this phenomena.

• The seductiveness of the amount of resources and unlimited supply (particularly in drugs and humans) is hard to resist. With ideology distorted, terrorists themselves may even become users of the commodity they market. • As we eﬀectively close the door on terrorist fundraising methods such as illicit charities and hawala, they may soon have no alternative and must turn to organized crime.

WHY TERRORISTS AND ORGANIZED CRIME PARTNER: • Money talks. Criminals do not care what you are moving or the reason—if you can pay, they will do the job for you. • No method of earning, moving, or storing assets is off the table because of ideology. Conflicting ideologies will not prevent them from such an alliance. al Qaeda has already liaised with the Naples-based Camorra mafia to move and hide terrorists.6 • Manpower—OC has it and terrorists need it. The shift to human capital is an important point. “Many of these (terrorist) cells don’t appear to be very well-funded, but what is more important than money is human capital. And human capital doesn’t seem to be in short supply.”7 • Established networks and routes are tough to crack, especially in the narcotics realm. This connection makes continued alliance in drug trafficking likely and drugs yield the highest profit. • Organized crime has established infrastructure, which provides low overhead that conserves money for the terrorist’s operation.

©istockphoto.com/name

Many organizations own and operate a variety of aircraft and boats, with skilled operators at the helm. Sophisticated satellite phones and use of Global Positioning System equipment keep the criminals on the run and investigators in the dark.

The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2009 31

WHY TERRORISTS AND ORGANIZED CRIME MAY NOT PARTNER: • Too many people involved in transactions; terrorists prefer anonymity. The fewer people involved, the less chance of mission failure. • Organized crime does not want to knowingly “get in bed” with terrorists for business reasons. It brings unwanted attention. Why become involved with groups that the U.S. government is using extensive resources to pursue…and possibly destroy your successful business? • Some organized crime members see themselves as patriotic. They do not want to be responsible or culpable for terrorist attacks. • Organized crime does not need the terrorist’s business. The criminals are doing quite well alone. Organized crime does not want to share business. • These criminals are not natural allies because their motivations differ. • Organized crime is in the profit-taking and profit-making business; after paying people and debts, proceeds are recycled into the operation, and the criminal activity continues. For terrorists, especially local cells, the crime is a means to an end. They are only in business until the attack is successfully executed, then they are out.

WHAT ABOUT GANGS AND TERRORISTS? Although it is more likely that terrorist groups would liaise with OC factions, it is not inconceivable they would outwardly seek alliance with a 3G2 gang, such as MS-13. Also, connections via the prison system could facilitate the spread of a radical ideology to gang members. Or perhaps the liaison between the two would occur unwittingly, through an OC connection. Regardless of how it might happen, it is an important consideration

for those in the strategic and tactical level ﬁght against these activities.

ACTIVITY IN CENTRAL AMERICA. Terrorists may have already conducted business south of the U.S. border. In August 2007, the Washington Times ran a story regarding a closely-held DEA report which discussed a connection between Middle Eastern drug-trafficking and terrorist cells operating in the U.S. that were raising funds via Mexican cartels and their trafficking routes.8 Although the report was never publicly released, a member of Congress confirmed that the DEA document substantiated information given to his House terrorism subcommittee. The report also confirmed rumors of Texas residents applying to change their Islamic surnames to Hispanic-sounding names on identification documents such as driver’s licenses. Perhaps innocuous, but maybe a trend that bears scrutiny. Additionally, in 2004, U.S. intelligence authorities indicated that al Qaeda operatives may have been in Tegucigalpa, Honduras planning attacks against British, Spanish, and U.S. embassies. Much has also been written about a possible meeting in Tegucigalpa between suspected al Qaeda operative Adnan al Shukrijumah and MS-13 members in 2004.9 Al Shukrijumah is an elusive and highly wanted man: the U.S. government has posted a $5 million reward for his capture. Also known as “Jafer the Pilot,” he completed commercial flight school and received an associate’s degree in the U.S. Khalid Sheik Mohammed fingered him as an associate, and possibly an accomplice when planning the attacks of 9/11. Al Shukrijumah is still practicing his trade; he attempted to obtain material in Canada to build a dirty bomb and may be complicit in assisting with planning last year’s thwarted attack on fuel tanks and pipelines at JFK Airport.

MS-13 groups have been detected at the U.S. border with Mexico, potentially engaged in human gun and drug-smuggling operations. Established routes will be of interest to terrorists trying to penetrate our borders. The prospect of a liaison between al Qaeda and MS-13 shouldn’t be marginalized and must be factored into the analysis of intelligence gathered on each group.

THE BATTLE AHEAD The convergence of organized crime, drug trafficking and terrorism requires a new paradigm of strategic thinking. It cannot be seen through a diplomacy, military, law enforcement, financial or intelligence lens alone. Rather, it demands a prism of all of these to offer a comprehensive and coordinated approach.10 Frank J. Cilluffo When devising our strategy to fight this threat, we must stay cognizant and open to how the nexus could threaten our government in new, provocative ways. For instance, according to the NGIC, members from most major U.S. gangs, including MS-13, have been documented on and around military installations at home and abroad.11 Some belonged to the gang prior to joining, but others were recruited after taking the oath to protect and defend their country against all enemies… foreign and domestic. Or perhaps domestic terror groups such as the Earth Liberation Front, also increasingly violent in action and growing in scope and size, may be sources of manpower, intelligence, and infiltration for terrorists. As the debate continues as to whether these non-state actors have or would ally, one fact remains: gangs, modern transnational criminals, and terrorists are constantly seeking new ways to obtain resources to fuel their operations. And their continued and expanded liaison appears inevitable.

•

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32 The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2009

The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2009 33

ABOUT THE AUTHOR Jenni Hesterman is a retired Air Force colonel. She is a senior analyst for The MASY Group, a Global Intelligence and Risk Management ﬁrm, and is a professor at American Military University, teaching courses in homeland security and intelligence studies. Her book Transnational Crime and the Criminal-Terrorist Nexus, was published in 2005 Martin van Creveld, The Transformation of War, New York: The Free Press, 1991 2 www.d-n-i.net/fcs/pdf/wilson_sullivan_ gangs_terrorism.pdf 3 http://www.wnd.com/news/article. asp?ARTICLE_ID=55419 4 http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress03/ ashley103003.htm 5 http://www.fbi.gov/hq/cid/orgcrime/ocshome.htm 6 http://news.newamericamedia.org/news/ view_article.html?article_id=f38d897f8f88184 12fb11cc2c68b7912 7 Farah, Douglas “Terrorism Inc.; al Qaeda Franchises Brand of Violence to Groups across World.” 8 http://www.washingtontimes.com/ news/2007/aug/08/terrorists32teamingwith32drug-cartels/ 9 http://www.washtimes.com/news/2004/ sep/28/20040928-123346-3928r/ 10 https://research.maxwell.af.mil/papers/ ay2004/aﬀellows/Hesterman.pdf 11 militarytimes.com/static/projects/pages/ 1

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OTHER SOURCES: https://research.maxwell.af.mil/papers/ ay2004/aﬀellows/Hesterman.pdf http://www.gangsorus.com/marasalvatrucha13.html http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/11240718/ www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/ MR1382/MR1382.ch4.pdf http://www.nationalgangcenter.gov/default. cfm http://www.canadafreepress.com/2007/ judi060607.htm http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/12/ 01/60minutes/main1090941_page3.shtml www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34233.pdf

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Homeland Security Abroad:

LEARNING FROM

ISRAEL’S EXPERIENCE By Barry Glover Associate Professor, —Saint Leo University

We determined that there was no substitute for seeing what 50 or more years of conﬂict with terrorism has produced. Photo: iStock Added to this was the extraordinarily successful record of Israel’s defenses against terrorism over the past six years.

aint Leo University’s criminal

six years. Since 2002, when in one particular

justice program oﬀers an under-

month there were 14 successful suicide bomb-

graduate specialization in homeland security

ing attacks against Israel, Israel has defended

which was originally developed for the U.S.

itself against many more terrorist attacks, and

Navy at the direction of the university presi-

reﬁned its techniques, such that last year there

dent, Dr. Arthur F. Kirk. In addition, several

was only one.

courses on this topic are oﬀered at the gradu-

In reviewing diﬀerent programs, we decided

ate level. The homeland security program is

on Security Solutions International (SSI) to

comprised of many of our full-time students

host our homeland security educational mis-

from our main campus in Florida, centers

sions in Israel. The company was well-known

throughout the country, military personnel,

to us from our involvement with the Sarasota,

and on-line program oﬀerings. Students who

Florida, sheriﬀ’s annual Gulf Coast Terror-

are not seeking a college degree at this time

ism Prevention program and from having had

may take six established courses on homeland

SSI conduct a memorable one-week program

security, earning 18 credit hours and a Certi-

for our undergraduate and graduate students

ﬁcation in Homeland Security. For students

at our Saint Leo campus. The SSI program

with an interest in foreign policy and social

promised the most practical approach to the

justice, the university oﬀers certiﬁcation and

educational opportunities for our students.

credit hour courses in international studies.

Unlike other programs, the SSI program

In our pursuit to optimize the program, we

was custom-developed based upon inter-

decided several years ago to provide students

views company personnel conducted with its

with a hands-on learning experience that

wide-ranging contacts in homeland security in

would demonstrate how homeland security

Israel. The daily and evening agenda consisted

is conducted in a society that is democratic

of tours and lectures concerning Israel’s ap-

and shares similar values, if not our legal and

proach to ﬁghting terrorism on a daily basis.

policing policies.

The tour sites and lectures covered everything

After examining many potential destina-

that students of U.S. homeland security

tions, we decided upon Israel because of the

needed to know. Unlike other programs that

constant nature of the threat there, and the

oﬀer a number of irrelevant options, the SSI

fact that homeland security is practiced there

program was focused on homeland security.

in a civilian setting, unlike the U.S. experi-

The fact that SSI had taken homeland security

ence in Iraq or in other countries. As a retired

professionals from over 200 diﬀerent agencies

police captain, I was aware that operational

on past missions to Israel, and their worldwide

procedures would vary among diﬀerent

reputation as a leader in the ﬁeld, meant that

countries due to the usual variables: the legal

they were the logical choice for our university.

framework, use of force policies, and community policing standards. We determined that there was no substitute

Photo: SSI

Unlike other programs, the SSI program was customdeveloped based upon interviews company personnel conducted with its wide-ranging contacts in homeland security in Israel.

Throughout the program, the access that my students and I had was unprecedented. We also had the beneﬁt of learning from over

for seeing what 50 or more years of conﬂict

20 members of diﬀerent homeland security

with terrorism has produced. Added to this

agencies who were members of the mission.

was the extraordinarily successful record of

Our choice of SSI was, in fact, completely

Israel’s defenses against terrorism over the past

validated. The helpfulness of SSI staﬀ both in

Photo: SSI 36 The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2009

The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2009 37

is mentioned in the Bible and today has its

assassination. Surprisingly, the presenter on

because at some point all the personnel served

largely Turkish-era architecture considerably

this topic was extremely candid on what went

in the military, many in the same units.

restored. Our hotel was located two blocks

wrong and how Israel changed its protection

from the U.S. embassy and one block from Tel

policies to avoid a similar tragic act in the

into eﬀect to beneﬁt the citizen’s ability to

Aviv’s beachfront. After a short period of time,

future.

cope with terror. In particular, we noted the

our observations conﬁrmed that the people of

accented by interesting and highly relevant

scene once the forensic examination of the

degree of freedom and their enjoyment of life

lectures. The last day was spent on a memo-

scene has been completed. This policy was

were evident.

rable visit to the separation fence between

designed to enable citizens to return to the

Israel and the Palestinian Authority, where

area of the attack and resume their normal life

with a vital lecture on the culture we were

we learned about border security systems and

style as soon as possible. This policy undoubt-

about to encounter and seven tips on how to

techniques. There was time for a few visits to

edly creates a great deal of pressure on the

make the most of our encounters. This ses-

the incredible sites of Christian interest—the

members of Israel’s forensic teams. However,

sion, presented by an internationally-known

Church of the Holy Sepulchre, the sea of

they understand the psychological beneﬁts

cross-cultural instructor, prepared us to better

Galilee, and Nazareth—as well as to the amaz-

to the public and they perform admirably in

understand the people and the country we

ing countryside. More importantly, we were

their assigned function.

were about to explore. On Sunday (the ﬁrst

able to enjoy the warm and friendly spirit of

day of the week in Israel) the program began

the Israeli people.

in earnest, always intense and packed with visits and lectures by some of the very best Israeli security experts, who were dynamic presenters. Visits included the Ruttenberg Power station on the border with Gaza, which is constantly threatened by incursions and by improvised mortar ﬁre. From there we went on to visit the port of Ashdod, the railway station, the Azrielly shopping mall, and the sites of many bombings including Mike’s Place— one of the only al Qaeda attacks perpetrated by British citizens. We learned about suicide bombing from Samuel Bashan, the former the pre-trip planning stage and in Israel was remarkable, and everyone we dealt with was equally professional, pleasant, and attentive, and went well beyond what could be expected.

ARRIVING IN ISRAEL— LEARNING THE MINDSET OF ISRAELIS CONSTANTLY FACING A TERROR THREAT Upon our arrival in Tel Aviv, after a long

bomb trainer for the Israel Security Agency and an expert on Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIED). Colonel Moti Francis, also of the ISA, delivered memorable lectures on aviation security and VIP protection. We also had brieﬁngs (always from the active head of security of the place we were visiting) at the Hebrew University, the Knesset, the Ministry of Tourism, and the old city of Jerusalem, which was as memorable as you would expect. Before visiting the Old City, we were briefed by the police about their policies

ﬂight from Newark, we made a pleasant stop

and technologies. We also had visits to the

for coﬀee on the way to our hotel in the

scene of mass sporting events and even the

ancient city of Jaﬀa, which hosts a port that

site of Israeli prime minister Itzhak Rabin’s

38 The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2009

immediate restoration of a terrorist attack

Israel have a very Western lifestyle in that their

The program started on Saturday evening,

Photo: SSI

Every visit was a unique learning experience

There are also public policies that are put

WHAT DID WE LEARN? LESSON 1 The very ﬁrst lesson we learned was how

LESSON 2 The Israeli security concept involves perimeters but not as we know them. They have perimeters around a target that begin with an “intelligence” perimeter. For instance, this

the Israeli people react to the security situ-

could be plainclothes personnel who patrol

ation. They accept and honor the eﬀorts of

the streets around a potential target (for exam-

their national police, Shin Bet (Israel Security

ple, the U.S. embassy) and report information

Agency) counterterrorism units, and the Israel

to security personnel closer to the center.

Defense Forces (IDF) in helping to keep them

These perimeters are designed to eﬀectively

safe as they steadfastly go about their daily

contain the threat in areas far from the center

lives in deﬁance of the constant threat. There

(or target). This is best illustrated at Ben Guri-

was no chaﬃng at the constant presence of se-

on National Airport. In order to approach the

curity and no conﬂict with the security forces

airport, all traﬃc goes through a checkpoint

responsible for implementing the Homeland

which visually and verbally checks all arriving

Security policy.

traﬃc, well before cars or buses reach the

We also found out how the cooperation between the people and the homeland security agencies was mirrored by the cooperation be-

terminal. This avoids a case in which a VBIED could reach the crowded terminals. As you arrive at the terminal, there is

tween agencies and the interface between these

another perimeter. This involves security per-

agencies and the intelligence eﬀort. Of course,

sonnel stationed outside who observe people

Israel has the beneﬁt of compulsory military

arriving before they go into the terminal.

service which gives many the backgrounds

These security personnel may ask where you

to successfully perform security functions. It

are traveling today or other questions in order

also gives the security services a cadre of well-

to see reactions and behavior.

trained personnel to recruit from, whether in

In particular, we noted the immediate restoration of a terrorist attack scene once the forensic examination of the scene has been completed. This policy was designed to enable citizens to return to the area of the attack and resume their normal life style as soon as possible.

Inside the terminal, there are highly-

the national police or in the Israel Security

trained security screeners who are extremely

Agency. This service makes connections

well-versed on detecting behavioral anomalies.

between diﬀerent branches much stronger

They ask relevant questions in a pleasant but

The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2009 39

persistent way. For example, they might ask

inadvertently having left something in his

TSA tends to invest more in technology such

what your reason was for being in Israel and

bag, and realized, surprised, that a knife or

as facial recognition, rather than advanced

where you stayed during your visit. They may

large bottle of liquid had passed through the

training on human behavior analysis.

follow up by checking the location given to

screeners.

verify you are telling the truth. Finally, after you clear the security screeners

Would Israel’s methods of proﬁling pas-

As most of us have experienced, there is hardly any face-to-face contact with TSA

sengers be illegal here in the United States?

security screeners in this country. The Israelis

you arrive at what we would recognize as a

I would suggest that they are not. They are

believe that technology serves to enhance

TSA checkpoint. However, here the checks

sound practices based upon experience and re-

their human intelligence procedures. Actually

are more expedient and surprisingly, do not

search by some of the best experts in the ﬁeld.

talking with people and evaluating their threat

include removing your shoes. Bomb sniﬃng

In fact, it is illegal for Israeli security forces to

level as determined by their responses is a

dogs and other advanced technology are uti-

intensify security checks based upon race or

practice that has proven eﬀective throughout

lized for the detection of explosive materials.

religion, just as it is in the United States. This

the years. Israel security forces are constantly

As an Israeli security professional pointed out

was veriﬁed when the Israel Supreme Court

developing their skills in the area of identify-

to us, “When you have only one perimeter,

ruled in March of 2008 that security screeners

ing suspicious behavior of individuals.

you have no security.” In other words, by

may not detain Arab passengers for additional

screening everyone at one security checkpoint,

checks and searches without having probable

success of Israel’s highly regarded intelligence

you accomplish nothing more than oﬀering

cause to believe they are a threat. Therefore,

network. Some were prevented even after the

a false sense of security which is doomed for

so long as the TSA uses behavioral techniques,

terrorist had left the “safe house” and was en

failure.

as the Israelis have mastered, we should not

route to execute the terrorist act. Stopping a

encounter any legal problems in this country.

bomber or vehicle already launched is a little

As we also learned, it is an unwise coun-

like intercepting a launched missile—very un-

LESSON 3

Several attacks have been halted due to the

“Look for the bomber and you will ﬁnd

terterrorism practice to engage in this type of

likely. Remarkably, it has been accomplished

the bomb,” was a constant refrain from the

proﬁling because terrorists are using diﬀerent

in Israel through the incredible training and

many security experts. The corollary of this

proﬁles to accomplish their acts. Past bomb-

experience of their counterterror and intel-

concept is that searching everyone eﬀectively

ers have included a pregnant Irish woman, a

ligence units.

produces no results because it is very diﬃcult

Belgian woman, and children. Looking for the

to determine what modus operandi the ter-

bomber means just that: the person with the

rorists may be using. For example, contrary to

most likelihood of carrying out an act of terror

Israeli security procedures, TSA checkpoints

either purposefully or unwittingly.

LESSON 5 Although we learned a great deal about very technical aspects of security, the greatest

in the U.S. require that all passengers’ shoes be

Keep in mind that many experts have

lesson learned was one of cooperation. Terror-

removed and scanned, despite the fact that the

pointed out the carrier of the bomb may be

ists only have to get it right once. Homeland

next attempt will most likely be conducted in

an unsuspecting mule who might have been

security has to be right 100% of the time if

another way. The TSA is a reactive system that

duped into carrying out a terror attack with-

they are to protect our country.

has failed numerous controlled tests at major

out his knowledge.

airports throughout the country whereby ﬁrearms and other deadly weapons went un-

LESSON 4

noticed and passed through the established

Israeli security forces consider human intel-

Watching the terrifying events in Mumbai, India, as this article was written underlined this. It is imperative that there is cooperation and sharing of intelligence among First

screening system. Obviously, more emphasis

ligence, or HUMINT, their most important

Responders, the armed forces, Homeland

needs to be placed on watching the screening

priority. As such, they invest an enormous

Security and all states and other government

monitors. More importantly, there is a need

amount of time and money in training their

agencies responsible for the protection of our

for advanced training on non-verbal com-

personnel in this area of expertise. They

citizens. Additionally, international coopera-

munications to identify those who may be po-

also employ state-of-the-art technology that

tion among nations is absolutely required

tential threats before they reach the crowded

has proven to be eﬀective. According to the

in order to curtail terrorism throughout the

screening area. I think it is safe to say that we

experts we spoke with, nothing surpasses the

world.

all know of someone, perhaps ourselves, who

human-to-human interface as a method of

has been passed through a TSA checkpoint,

identifying potential terrorists. In contrast,

40 The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2009

The degree of cooperation we felt, as Americans frequently entering into very sensi-

The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2009 41

2009 CALENDAR OF EVENTS SPONSORED BY: tive areas of Israeli security and yet having our many questions answered, and the incredible willingness of the Israelis to share the knowledge they have learned from being victims of horrifying and senseless attacks, were phenomenal. This sharing of information, inclusive of the mistakes made in the past, is a prime example of international cooperation. In conclusion, there is a great deal to learn from Israel’s experience and expertise, and I am confident that our Department of Homeland Security has thoroughly examined their techniques and procedures on counterterrorism. U.S. Homeland Security should be commended for doing its part in protecting our great country, as verified by the fact that there have been no major attacks since the 9/11 tragedy. We must never let our guard down and most of all, never forget the victims of this cowardly attack. We left Israel and the many new friends that we met there. We met officials in the Circle 243 on Reader Service Card

Israeli defense establishment whom we can contact and consult with in the future. With the continuous support of President Kirk and his staﬀ, Saint Leo University will continue to participate in learning missions in Israel in conjunction with SSI. Our criminal justice program is designed for students who want to enter the law enforcement profession and for those who are already in the arena, whether law enforcement or military, risking their lives to protect all of us.

•

ABOUT THE AUTHOR Professor Glover is a retired detective captain from the Clearwater, Florida, Police Department. He is an Associate Professor of Criminal Justice at Saint Leo University. Professor Glover teaches in both the undergraduate and graduate programs and currently coordinates all special programs in the Criminal Justice department, including Saint Leo’s Command Oﬃcer Management School. He may be contacted at barry. glover@saintleo.edu.

42 The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2009

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CounterTerrorad(AU7183)829FA.qxd

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BOOK REVIEW

Tactics of the Crescent Moon: Militant Muslim Combat Methods by H. John Poole

n the past, I served in an organization that maintained a required reading list. This list contained gems such as Sun Tzu’s Art of War. The list also contained ridiculous works (from a professional education perspective) such as Orson Card’s novel, Ender’s Game. This demonstrated to me that an individual who strives for expertise must take responsibility for his own education and identify eﬀective supplemental study. At that time, my contemporaries were supplementing their education with John Poole’s The Last Hundred Yards: The NCO’s Contribution to Warfare. Not abiding by the maxim of not judging a book by its cover, I never opened that book due to my impression of the amateurish cover art. Years later I opened my ﬁrst John Poole book and was rewarded with tremendous tactical insight and a distinct thought path divergent from that of modern American bureaucracies. In 2004, Poole published Tactics of the Crescent Moon: Militant Muslim Combat Methods (Posterity Press). This work is among his most appropriate for counter-terrorism personnel. In “Part One: A Heritage of

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Reviewed by: Chris Graham

Unconventional Warfare,” Poole tackles three topics. He discusses the divergence of Turkish tactics from Allied tactics that enabled Turkish success in combat at Gallipoli in 1915. He illustrates several

lessons from the Iran-Iraq war, and discusses Israel’s expulsion from Southern Lebanon. In “Part Two: Islamic Guerrilla Tactics,” Poole studies ﬁve groups.

He examines Palestinian fighters and Chechen rebels. The author looks at the Afghan mujahideen that defeated the Soviets, and the current Afghan resistance that opposes allied forces. Finally, Poole examines the Iraqi opposition. In “Part Three: Bringing Peace to the Region,” the author concludes with four valuable chapters. Chapter 9 discusses how Islamic guerrillas are trained, and chapter 10 follows the operational pattern set by Muslim militants. Chapter 11 asserts that, “the response must be unconventional,” and chapter 12 discusses the tactics that the author advocates which support that “unconventional response.” Poole’s books can easily be overlooked based on the quality of cover art. This is a shame. The entire Poole series, beginning with The Last Hundred Yards: The NCO’s Contribution to Warfare, through his most recent, Tequila Junction: 4th-Generation Counterinsurgency provide unique insight into terrorists, insurgents, and guerrillas that is underappreciated within defense and security hierarchies. Whether you are a security officer in Washington, D.C., a first responder in London, or a soldier in Kabul, Tactics of the Crescent Moon provides valuable knowledge.

•

The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2009 45

Heroes or Vigilantes?

CITIZENS WHO FOIL TERROR

By Jonathan Keiler

srael has been struck by several recent terror attacks that should be significant to American policy-makers and law enforcement officials. In these incidents—the shooting of a private security guard, a massacre of yeshiva students, and two attacks by Palestinian bulldozer drivers—the terrorist acted independently or with only loose ties to terror organizations. In each instance the terrorist was killed, not by law enforcement officers or on-duty military personnel, but by private citizens (including off-duty soldiers). The United States too is victimized by lone-wolf terrorists. These attacks are typically downplayed by government and law enforcement officials who often “discover” non-ideological motivations for such attacks. But as Daniel Pipes has persuasively argued, incidents such as the murder of the Coptic Christian Armanious family in New Jersey (2005), the Beltway snipers (2002), the Jewish Federation shootings in Seattle (2006), and the LAX shootings (2002), among a multitude of others, are best explained as home-grown acts of Islamic terrorism. The way in which these American cases differ from recent Israeli ones is how the terrorists were stopped. With the exception of the 2002 shootings at LAX, in which the perpetrator was gunned down by an Israeli El Al airlines security officer, American terrorists have either killed themselves, or been killed or captured by law enforcement officials. As this kind of attack continues, or increases in frequency, it is likely that an American civilian will, at some point or another,

step into harm’s way and kill, injure, or apprehend a terrorist. This will raise difficult issues, including the desirability of such action and criminal and civil liabilities. It is something that local, state, and federal officials must anticipate. An American civilian is less likely to find himself in a position to stop a terror attack than an Israeli. With military service common (though no longer universal) in modern Israel, the chance a terrorist might run into an off-duty soldier or reservist is relatively high. And Israeli soldiers tend to keep their personal weapons with them when off duty. But in the Israeli incidents described above, the scenario was not that simple. In the first incident an armed private security guard shot the terrorist. In the yeshiva attack, the terrorist was first shot by a student, and finished off by a furloughed army officer using his service weapon. In one bulldozer case, the off-duty soldier who shot the terrorist was unarmed, and took a pistol from a private security guard to shoot the terrorist. In the second an armed off-duty reservist shot the driver (who was finished off by a border policeman). Such attacks and circumstances are not inconceivable in America. In two of the Israeli cases, Israeli police were at the scene, but failed to act aggressively to halt the attacks. A policeman who responded to the yeshiva shootings chose not to confront the terrorist and awaited backup. In the first bulldozer incident a police officer and private security guard were wrestling with the driver when the off-duty soldier

As this kind of attack continues, or increases in frequency, it is likely that an American civilian will, at some point or another, step into harm’s way and kill, injure, or apprehend a terrorist.

Photo: Scott Morrison 46 The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2009

The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2009 47

shot him. The soldiers’ willingness to ignore the police was likely both a function of their military training and the general rambunctious nature of Israeli society, in which many citizens exhibit little open respect for authority. Fortunately, the soldiers acted correctly. On the other hand, the intervention of armed locals (as occurred during the Beslan school massacre in Russia) can be disastrous. In America, it’s likely that citizens on the scene will accept the judgment of law enforcement officers, even if that judgment is mistaken, as it was at Columbine. It remains to be seen what the reaction of American law enforcement officials would be in the event a citizen took matters into his own hands in the presence of the police, but it is not likely that they would be very accepting. This leads to the main issue—will the civilian who stops a terrorist attack be treated by prosecutors and police as a hero or as a criminal vigilante? The answer is hardly obvious. Because law enforcement officials tend to downplay acts of terror, particularly when committed by the lone-wolf terrorist, the citizen who foils a terror attack might find the incident characterized very differently later. A civilian who ignores the instructions of police at the scene of a terror event, even if he acts to save

Hypothetically, what would have happened if a civilian, instead of just blocking the entrance, had approached the gunmen and shot them in their sleep, to make sure that they could not escape?

the lives of others, would likely confront some criminal liability. Finally, whether and at what level a civilian would face criminal and civil liabilities would vary wildly from state to state.

THE CASTLE DOCTRINE States regulate the use of force in home defense (sometimes called the Castle Doctrine) very diﬀerently. It is instructive to consider how Maryland and Texas, two states with very dissimilar use of force laws, disposed of two recent cases. The Maryland case involved a police oﬃcer, Corporal Keith Washington, who shot two unarmed deliverymen, who he claimed attacked him. He killed one, wounding the other. Washington’s wife and minor daughter were in the house. The deliverymen were much bigger than Washington. One of them had a criminal record, including a conviction for burglary. Washington had a reputation as a hot-head, and a checkered police record, but this information was largely kept from the jury. Washington was convicted of involuntary manslaughter, assault, and weapons charges, and sentenced to 45 years in prison. In the Texas case, Joe Horn shot and killed two men who burglarized his neighbor’s house. Ignoring the 911 operator, Horn gunned down the men on his front lawn. Horn alternately claimed he had a right under Texas law to go after the burglars, or that he felt threatened by them (although their wounds suggested this was unlikely). Horn was cleared by a grand jury on June 30, 2008, despite a vigorous campaign by minority groups to see him tried for murder. It is hard to believe that Washington would have been convicted in Texas, much less imprisoned for 45 years; had Horn acted in Maryland, he almost certainly would have been jailed. A civilian who takes the law into his own hands against terrorists would likely face a

48 The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2009

similar disparity depending on where the incident occurred.

THE BELTWAY SNIPERS John Allen Muhammad and Lee Boyd Malvo, the so-called Beltway Snipers, attacked ten times in Maryland, and five in Virginia. Virginia has more liberal gun laws than Maryland, and a more gunfriendly culture, but it doesn’t appear that either fact affected the sniper’s actions. After first concentrating on Maryland, the gunmen moved to Virginia, as police, military, and civilian vigilance increased. The most critical civilian involvement was the tip that led to their capture. Ron Lantz, a truck driver from Kentucky, discovered the gunmen at a Maryland rest stop. Lantz, at the request of police, blocked the exit with his truck until authorities arrived. Muhammad and Malvo, asleep, made no attempt to drive away. Hypothetically, what would have happened if a civilian, instead of just blocking the entrance, had approached the gunmen and shot them in their sleep, to make sure that they could not escape? Purely in terms of ensuring public safety, had a citizen killed the snoozing gunmen, a deadly threat to the community would have been neatly eliminated. But it’s unlikely that any state would sanction the killing of sleeping terrorists. As a matter of public policy, such deliberate action against temporarily vulnerable criminals ought not be encouraged so long as there are effective law enforcement assets available. Certainly, law enforcement personnel would have to attempt an arrest in such a situation, lest their conduct be deemed an extra-judicial execution. But suppose it did happen? Regardless of public policy, would such a deliberate killing by a private citizen be legally defensible, absent a case of jury nullification? Perhaps such an incident

will never occur, but considering the possibility sheds light on the issues involved. Terrorism by definition is an attack on the body politic. Arguably, any person within the targeted population is a victim of the terrorist and under threat. Even people who have not been directly exposed to terrorist acts exhibit symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorders. Indeed, if this were not true, terrorists would not terrorize. Therefore, wouldn’t deadly force applied by a victimized citizen against a known terrorist-murderer, even if that citizen is not under immediate physical threat, be an arguable act of self-defense? And if the killing of sleeping terrorists can be legally justified, wouldn’t almost any action by a civilian against terrorists in the act be legally justified as well? Police and soldiers may be bound by their own orders and regulations, but what about a civilian “victim” who acts against terrorists? Courts may eventually have to come to grips with this issue.

“RIGHT TO CARRY” LAWS AND THE VIRGINIA TECH SHOOTINGS Another key difference between states is “right to carry” laws. Again, Maryland serves as a useful example of a state with a highly restrictive carry law, while Virginia offers its citizens much broader gun rights. As we have seen, the Beltway snipers were not deterred by Virginia law, and Virginia was the scene of the worst criminal shooting in American history at Virginia Tech in 2007. So in deterring committed killers, “right to carry” laws don’t appear to make much difference. Still, the shootings at Virginia Tech raised the issue of citizen action in a terror scenario. Although mass murderer Wen Ho Lee was not an ideologically motivated terrorist, his rampage raised questions about civilian use of force. Despite Virginia’s right to carry laws,

Virginia Tech enforced a local ban. Police, following the general reform in procedures that occurred after the Columbine killings, attempted to confront Lee immediately, but Lee chained the building doors, frustrating police. After the killings some argued that had the school not banned firearms a student or teacher might have ended the murder spree. A more interesting hypothetical is what prosecutors would have done had a student carried a gun illegally and used it against Lee. What if the evidence showed that the student accidentally shot another student before hitting Lee, but that he ultimately saved many more? What would prosecutors have done? Few officials seem to have considered these questions. Perhaps the odds of American civilians confronting such situations are relatively small, at least compared to the odds facing Israeli citizens. But it happened on Flight 93, in which a small group of passengers failed in an attempt to retake a hijacked plane, causing the terrorists to crash the plane, killing all aboard. We know that the plane was destined for Washington, D.C., and that had the passengers not acted, the loss and damage would have been incalculably greater. After the event, aircrew on other flights actively encouraged passengers to defend the planes themselves, and this occurred in the case of the so-called shoe bomber, Richard Reid. The government agreed to allow pilots to arm themselves in order to defend their aircraft. Aircraft are arguably sui generis in that they are fragile conveyances that offer no escape, and legally captains and crew have always had enforcement and arrest powers on board. But schools are not so different, with administrators also possessing limited enforcement and arrest powers. If escape from a school is largely barred, as at Virginia Tech, it’s fairly impossible to distinguish the situation from that of an

aircraft. Columbine was an example of police acting at a school with insuﬃcient aggressiveness, resulting in loss of life. The 1974 massacre at Ma’alot high school in Israel, by Palestinian terrorists, occurred during an aggressive, but ﬂawed, rescue attempt. In both those cases, and at Virginia Tech, an armed civilian could hardly have done worse than the authorities.

CONCLUSION So is the citizen who guns down a terrorist a hero or a vigilante? It’s probable that law enforcement personnel and prosecutors will have to confront this question in legal and moral circumstances more complex than Flight 93 or the shoe bomber incident. The substantial differences in state laws and policies could lead to wildly differing outcomes with significant social, moral, and political implications. There are several things we should consider and do ahead of this inevitable problem. We should recognize terrorist attacks for what they are when the evidence points in that direction, instead of making every effort to find nonideological motivations. It is a myth that Islamic terrorists are mostly poor members of the underclass but this doesn’t mean that terrorists don’t act out of complex motivations, both ideological and personal. Placing excessive focus on the individual terrorist’s psychology, as opposed to a common sense evaluation of the purpose and result of the act, doesn’t serve the interests of justice or truth. It would be wrong to confront a citizen, who acted reasonably, and in the good faith belief that he was thwarting a terror attack, with a prosecution based upon teasing out details that argue against terrorism. Law enforcement personnel should be trained to cooperate and take advantage

The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2009 49

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of civilian volunteers (particularly in the area of gathering intelligence) while discouraging vigilantism. Asking civilians to come forward with information before or after a terror act can be the critical factor in preventing or solving the crime. Civilian vigilance, not vigilantism, should be strongly encouraged, but authorities should be prepared to deal with civilians who, in good faith, don’t understand the diﬀerence. If and when civilian involvement moves beyond passing on information to active attempts to foil terrorists, law enforcement personnel should be prepared to discriminate between what’s potentially helpful and what is not. They should not regard the intervening civilian as the legal or moral equivalent of the terrorist. In action, this might mean, in rare circumstances, forgoing the almost automatic policy that everybody but police drop weapons. Legally, even though there is a strong interest in discouraging vigilantism, prosecutors and politicians must avoid the pitfalls of moral and legal equivalency. Before the fact, prosecutors at the federal and state level ought to war-game such situations, even though each will have to be handled on a case-by-case basis and will diﬀer according to state laws. After the fact, and after the judicial process has taken its course, executives at the state and federal level may have to consider cases of citizen involvement, in which convictions of the citizen result, in terms of pardon or clemency reviews. Ultimately, it may be governors or presidents who decide who is a vigilante and who is a hero.

•

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

50 The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2009

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Mr. Keiler is a former army Judge Advocate General oﬃcer and a litigation attorney. He is a National Board Certiﬁed history teacher and author whose work has appeared in numerous publications dealing with national security, law, education, and military history.

The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2009 51

I Photo: SSI

Training Review:

Security Solutions International SWAT

COUNTER-TERRORISM OPERATIONS COURSE By Chris Graham SWAT units possess a range of equipment appropriate for use on counterterrorism (CT) operations. Existing SWAT elements typically are held to higher standards for tactical proﬁciency, physical ﬁtness, and personnel screening than are other agency personnel.

52 The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2009

deally, a SWAT officer possesses a high degree of tactical proficiency and serves on a team that has been forged into a proficient unit through high quality training, operational experience, and competent leadership. Unfortunately, that officer’s experience and training, which focused on the criminal threat that he typically faces, may get him killed when confronting terrorists. Tactics that have been designed to address specific criminal challenges are vulnerable to exploitation by terrorists. In October of 2008, Security Solutions International (SSI) conducted its first open enrollment SWAT CounterTerrorism Operations Course near Jacksonville, Florida. It had conducted this course for teams from California to Florida, but this was the first iteration that individual SWAT officers were provided the opportunity to attend. The course’s lead instructor was a veteran of both Israeli military special operations and the Israeli national police’s counterterrorism team. With a wealth of real world CT experience, he provided much insight and answered questions drawing upon personal operational experience. Additionally, he provided the unique and critically important perspective of successful

CT operations conducted by a law enforcement (as opposed to military) unit faced with the most complex terrorism scenarios and within highly disciplined rules-of-engagement. The first day of training began in the classroom. Students were shown videos recounting some nuances peculiar to terrorism, received PowerPoint lectures, and discussed case studies. Instructors stated that the following days would be spent familiarizing students with tactics, techniques, and procedures that have been used successfully to defeat terrorists. The majority of training would be conducted using practical application exercises. Student equipment was checked, safety inspections were conducted, and the training moved into the field. Students were introduced to a method of room clearing referred to as “secure searches.” This clearing technique was developed in response to terrorists hiding themselves in walls, floors, and ceilings, and engaging entry team personnel with automatic weapons or explosives. The technique minimized team members’ exposure to these threats which would have been catastrophic if approached with some of the commonly used room clearing techniques.

Although all SWAT officers present had previous experience assaulting buses, this was the first time many officers converged on all sides simultaneously utilizing simple but effective control measures to eliminate fratricide risks.

Photo: SSI

The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2009 53

Students practiced isolating the structure that terrorist suspects occupied. By subtly positioning personnel or using speed and quickly moving in, students cut the terror suspects off from escape and assistance. Meticulous planning and control measures were utilized to mitigate the threat of fratricide from friendly fire. Due to the availability of a bus to be used as a training aid on the second day, hostage rescue bus assaults were practiced on day two. Although all SWAT officers present had previous experience assaulting buses, this was the first time many officers converged on all sides simultaneously utilizing simple but effective control measures to eliminate fratricide risks. As always, training began as a dry walk through and progressed to a full speed force-on-force scenario utilizing Simunitions and role players. Students were presented some ideas for hostage rescue operations and drilled them repeatedly. Again, most students had the opportunity to pick up some pieces of knowledge relevant to terrorism operations that wasn’t previously addressed by their existing SOP’s (standard operating procedures). Students were instructed in some military-based tactics such as ambushes. SWAT officers practiced interdicting hypothetical terrorist bombers enroute

to attacks. There was a discussion about the benefits of apprehending terrorist cell members without the knowledge of other cell members. Techniques for accomplishing this were practiced. On the final day of training students were provided information regarding two separate terrorist suspects who needed to be apprehended simultaneously. Utilizing techniques practiced, one terrorist was apprehended and the other was “killed” in a flurry of Simunitions, having forced the team to use (hypothetically) lethal force. Based upon information obtained from the apprehended terrorist, an immediate operation was launched to isolate a terrorist safe house. Calling out the suspects, a man and his son, apparently uninvolved, complied with instructions and exited the house. Team members utilizing secure search techniques cleared the structure and engaged terrorist suspects. A large improvised explosive device (IED) was recovered in addition to the terrorist’s personal weapons and a laptop computer. Based upon the hypothetical (quick) exploitation of the laptop computer, the location of a terrorist cell holding at least one hostage was discovered. A rescue was hastily planned and authorized. Multiple elements simultaneously entered the

apartment complex in which hostages were believed to be held. Resisting terrorist cell members were engaged. With rooms thick with smoke from flash bangs and detonated booby traps, team members emerged with hostages safely in hand. The exercise completed, debriefing was conducted and a series of scenarios designed to force students to employ all techniques practiced was concluded. Patrol officers, security personnel, and the general public may be the most likely to experience a chance encounter with terrorists. SWAT elements might be the unit of choice for deliberate contact with terrorist suspects. Although police officers are not unfamiliar with suspects willing to fight to the death, SWAT elements must understand the necessity for terrorism-specific operational capabilities. The frequent presence of explosive devices and the demonstrated terrorist tactic of attempting to ambush and kill responders rather than attempting escape (at times), combined with the likelihood of heavily armed tactically proficient small enemy teams, require the use of appropriate counterterrorism tactics. SSI’s SWAT Counter-Terrorism Operations Course is a valuable starting point for the development of your team’s SOP for CT operations. •

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