The Counter Terrorist Magazine - June/July 2010 by Solomon

RADIOACTIVE IED • UNDERCOVER IN NABLUS • FARC • SUICIDE BOMB TECHNOLOGY

Counter The

Official Journal of the Homeland Security Professional JUNE/JULY 2010

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VOLUME 3 • NUMBER 3

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Counter The

JUNE/JULY 2010

VOLUME 3 • NUMBER 3

Official Journal of the Homeland Security Professional

COVER STORY:

IRAN’S GLOBAL REACH By Steve Young

CONTENTS

FEATURES: 28

Firsthand: UNDERCOVER IN NABLUS By Aaron Cohen

Case Study: RADIOACTIVE IED IN MOSCOW By Lina Kolesnikova

FARC: LATIN AMERICA’S LARGEST NARCO-INSURGENCY By Michael Mylrea

CONCEALED SUICIDE BOMB TECHNOLOGY: THREE RECENT DEVICES By Rick Hahn

DEPARTMENTS: 6 26

69 72 Cover:

From the Editor

Challenges at Home and Abroad

Book Review

An Explanatory Memorandum on the General Strategic Goal for the Group in North America

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Training Review

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Challenges at Home and Abroad

Counter The

FROM THE EDITOR: By Chris Graham

Official Journal of the Homeland Security Professional

VOLUME 3 • NUMBER 3

iolent Jihadist movements around the world have not abated. Terrorist groups continue to strive for new bases of operations and to expand their influence. More violent plans have been undertaken and more American citizens have been discovered to have volunteered to serve various factions of our adversaries. Over a year ago, U.S. DOD reports warning of the possibility of the sudden collapse of the Mexican government were made public. In the past year, Mexico’s struggle to resist internal criminal domination of communities has intensified. Unfortunately, the violent undertakings of these criminal groups continue to kill scores of Mexicans and Americans. Their operations continue to pour across the U.S./Mexico border occupying the lions’ share of American law enforcement resources in border states and posing a significant challenge throughout all the Americas. International piracy continues to be profitable. Commercial shipping companies are hesitant to employ adequate security measures due to cost and liability concerns. Insurance agencies continue to pay ransoms. Multinational naval forces, designed primarily for a diﬀerent type of naval warfare, patrolling nearly limitless areas of the ocean and constrained by largely ineﬀective rules of engagement, are unable to prevent these acts of piracy. The Islamic Republic of Iran apparently perseveres in its pursuit of nuclear weapons development and use of terrorist groups to support foreign policy objectives. Cyber attacks originating in the People’s Republic of China target groups that seem to have adversarial relationships with the Chinese government. Many other international challenges continue to contribute to the creation of friction and conflict. The Counter Terrorist will continue to cover these and other security challenges. We will continue to provide information that assists professionals in making intelligent choices, and to do so, we will continue to depend on you. When the experience of your duties provides insight that will benefit our brothers and sisters facing these challenges, share your knowledge here.

Semper Fidelis,

Chris Graham Editor of The Counter Terrorist

JUNE /JULY 2010

Editor Chris Graham Director of Operations Sol Bradman Director of Advertizing Carmen Arnaes Director of Production Kelli Richardson Contributing Editors John Andrews Jennifer Hesterman Richard Marquise Steve Young Graphic Design Morrison Creative Company Copy Editor Laura Town Office Manager Lily Valdes Publisher: Security Solutions International 13155 SW 134th St. • STE 204 Miami, Florida 33186

ISSN 1941-8639 The Counter Terrorist Magazine, The Official Journal of the Homeland Security Professional, is published by Security Solutions International LLC, as a service to the nation’s First Responders and Homeland Security Professionals with the aim of deepening understanding of issues related to Terrorism. No part of the publication can be reproduced without permission from the publisher. The opinions expressed herein are the opinions of the authors represented and not necessarily the opinions of the publisher. Please direct all Editorial correspondence related to the magazine to: Security Solutions International SSI, 13155 SW 134th Street, Suite 204, Miami, Florida. 33186 or info@thecounterterroristmag.com The subscription price for 6 issues is $34.99 and the price of the magazine is $5.99. (1-866-573-3999) Fax: 1-786-573-2090. For article reprints, e-prints, posters and plaques please contact: PARS International Corp. Web: www.magreprints.com/quickquote.asp Email: reprints@parsintl.com Phone: 212-221-9595 • Fax: 212-221-9195 Please visit the magazine web site where you can also contact the editorial staﬀ:

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Firsthand:

DUVDEVAN Undercover in Nablus

By Aaron Cohen One morning in Tel Aviv, as I was trying to sleep off a Gold Star hangover, my pager sounded. I was being called in for a Level Four meeting, meaning all the Duvdevan teams (Israeli undercover military special operations teams) needed to be back at the base immediately. It would turn out to be the final major mission of my Duvdevan career.

Counter The

Photo: SSI

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Aaron Cohen. Photo courtesy of the author.

our hours later, the operations room was crowded, swirling with cigarette smoke. Zoar was sitting at the head of the table, next to Ilan, staring at the details of the terrorist warrant and breaking down the Ops plan. “Tonight we’ve got a shot to take down Abu Jihad,” he said. I glanced around the room—we all recognized the nom-deguerre, meaning “father of the Holy War,” of the Hamas mastermind behind the Dizengoff Mall bombing. “Shabak’s been working this on the inside for months. We’ve seen several chances come and go. This guy moves around from safe house to safe house constantly. We understand Abu Jihad’s going to be at a wedding in Mishraim, just outside of Nablus. We’re going to insert a small team undercover in the wedding party. We’ll take him down right after the ceremony, at the reception hall.” I would be working Mista’aravim (undercover as an Arab), but I wouldn’t

be going inside the wedding reception. I was going to pose as a Palestinian sweet-corn vendor, acting as one of the eyes-on-target. The mission was so high priority that command had requested multiple and simultaneous eyes-on-target confirmation. It was a huge operation, probably the most complex and well planned of my time with Duvdevan. Close to forty warriors on the mission were divided into four teams. Twenty men were going in undercover, two inside the wedding reception hall, posing as friends of the groom, and the rest walking around outside to confirm the target’s arrival. Rooftop snipers would surround the target location. We would have a dozen undercover cars with heavy weaponry on the perimeter, circling the streets of Nablus. We spent hours in the operations room, going over the logistics. We had guys on the inside who had been to the

Our undercover guys would have about 60 seconds to walk inside, shake some hands, offer congratulations, and then snatch Abu Jihad.

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If a firefight were to break out, I had my SIG tucked at the small of my back and the bottom of the cart was custom lined with Kevlar.

target locations a few days earlier. They had taken photos of the area, mapping the streets. We even had the floor plan of the community hall where the party was going to be held. We knew which door Abu Jihad was most likely to enter. The most unpredictable element was the street outside. Streams of people would constantly be coming in and out, and cars would be double-parked, blocking our lines of vision and possible escape routes. It was a tight-knit neighborhood, staunchly loyal to Hamas, virtually impossible to infiltrate for any long period of time. The informal and unstructured nature of the wedding receptionâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;more of a communal celebration for the neighborhood than a formal gathering with place cards and an RSVP listâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;gave us our window of opportunity. This section of Nablus was such a hotbed of Hamas leadership and

recruitment that it felt completely secure. Who would have the audacity to try to crash this wedding party? By seven p.m. I approached the wedding hall wearing a thin-striped dress shirt, dark-grey slacks, and a fake moustache attached with mustard glue, pushing my sweet-corn cart down the block. Our undercover guys would have about 60 seconds to walk inside, shake some hands, offer congratulations, and then snatch Abu Jihad. My primary role as one of the eyeson-target would be to confirm that Abu Jihad actually showed up at the reception. We had to make certain that it was him, not some look-alike double or cousin with a close resemblance. We had a series of surveillance photos taken with extremely high-powered, long-lens cameras and enlarged into razor-sharp close-ups. Back at the base, I had studied

Duvdevan team. Photo courtesy of the author. 10 The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2010

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the photographs for hours, and I knew Abu Jihad’s distinguishing features, right down to the mole above one eyebrow. I wheeled my vending cart into position, with a clear line of sight on the entrance to the reception hall. My undercover disguise was not designed to withstand deep scrutiny. The reason playing a sweet-corn vendor was a good role was that the actual vendors change a lot, providing one of the few excuses for new faces in the neighborhood. For the same reason, we also had several undercover operators driving taxis because there are lots of unofficial gypsy cabs in the territories. I saw one of the passing cabs. The driver was a Duvdevan operator and the passengers in back were also our operators. For the next 15 minutes, our cab drivers dropped off their passengers and picked up new passengers, adding another layer of eyes-on-the-target as they circled the neighborhood. My cart had a handwritten sign in Arabic listing my prices: sweet corn for 50 agurote, juices for 1 shekel each. The cart also had a live-action camera feed, meaning I had to position it carefully to capture images of the front entrance. If a firefight were to break out, I had my SIG tucked at the small of my back and the bottom of the cart was custom lined with Kevlar. Flipped on its side, the cart would provide cover as a bulletproof barricade. “A’salaam.” I looked up to see a guy about my age handing me a 50-agurote coin. I handed him one ear of corn. I didn’t want to risk making conversation, so I looked away. Luckily, it was the only sale I made during theMission: mission. August 21-29, 2009 August November November My earbudMission: was in place. As soon6-14, as 2009 we had confirmation that Abu Jihad was on the scene, our instructions were to double-click. I could hear transmissions from one of the circling white Savannahs

in which the officers were receiving camera feed from my sweet-corn cart as well as other video images coming from several undercovers carrying briefcases and backpacks with cameras. Every one of the eyes-on-target—there were more than a dozen in the immediate vicinity—were instructed to doubleclick upon confirmation of sighting Abu Jihad so there would be no chance of false identification. Zoar and Ilan were adamant: We needed double-clicks from everybody working eyes-on-target before initiating the takedown. If any of us decided to call it off, we each had a squelch button transmitting a highpitched tone to everyone on the team, letting them know that the mission had been aborted. My team was designated as the second cordon. The first cordon was responsible for the security of the two operators entering the reception hall as wedding guests. The second cordon was responsible for the takedown vehicles— SUVs from the Duvdevan base to be used when Abu Jihad and any accomplices were apprehended—while the third cordon, still about a kilometer out, consisted of bulletproof green military vehicles equipped with heavy machine guns for use in the event of a violent riot or massive neighborhood shoot-out. An older model Mercedes sedan pulled up in front of the reception hall, doubleparking. Three men exited, all wearing open-necked dress shirts. All were in their late 20s or early 30s with darkcomplexions, moustaches, and trimmed beards. As they approached the entrance to the reception hall, I recognized the face of Abu Jihad. I gave the double-click. Zoar’s voice came on my earbud, shouting. “Are you sure? Is everyone sure?” One by one, all the other eyes-ontarget double-clicked. If anyone clicked a third time, or if

Zoar’s voice came on my earbud, shouting. “Are you sure? Is everyone sure?” One by one, all the other eyeson-target doubleclicked.

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Abu Jihad got spooked and started to run, we had orders to break cover and transition immediately from Mista’aravim into takedown mode. The two officers assigned to infiltrate the wedding were legends in the unit, with hundreds of missions under their belts. Seasoned and cool headed, they didn’t hesitate, and they didn’t panic. They walked directly into the reception hall and we could hear the casual exchanges as they shook a few hands, offering congratulations, saying, “A salaam alaykum.” Boom—it all transpired within six seconds. The two operators grabbed Abu Jihad, without drawing their weapons, and pulled him outside the wedding hall by his elbows and shoulders. He was struggling, his face a mask of confusion, but he barely had time to shout. The moment our operators yanked him outside, an unlicensed taxi with three

more of our operators inside lurched to a screeching stop. The back door flew open. Abu Jihad was bundled inside. The taxi made a clean getaway. It was all over so fast that everyone inside the hall was stunned. Abu Jihad had no formal bodyguards, but one of the wedding guests now rushed outside, enraged, and drew a pistol from his waistband. He brandished the black handgun, but before he could get off a shot there was the crack of rifle fire. Three whistling reports. He fell to the pavement dead. Three of our rooftop snipers hit him with nearly simultaneous telescopic shots. The wedding guests were streaming out into the street, shouting, pointing. “Allah u akbar! Allah u akbar!” It was a scene of pure mayhem. People were shrieking, women were falling to the ground, and still no one knew which direction the gunshots came from, how

Abu Jihad was kidnapped from the reception so quickly, or how this other guest ended up bleeding to death in the street. I reached behind me and felt for my SIG at the small of my back. But there was no need to pull it now. The mission was completed. I could see the taillights of the getaway taxi, carrying Abu Jihad, rounding the corner. As casually as possible, I ditched my sweet-corn cart and walked in the direction of the predetermined rendezvous spot a block away. When I got there, another undercover taxi was pulling over to the curb. Ilan was at the wheel, smoking a cigarette, radio in his lap. Enon was in the backseat, grabbing me by the elbow as I opened the door to pull me inside the moving cab. Now Ilan’s radio began to crackle with more fast-breaking news. Two other wanted Hamas terrorists were spotted as

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guests inside the reception hall. There was no more element of surprise. Duvdevan’s job was done. The order was given for the third cordon to go to work. The uniformed brigades from Golani and Givati were ordered to snatch up the other two wanted men. The stealth Mista’aravim mission was over; it had now turned into a massive display of military might. As Ilan wheeled the undercover taxi around the corner, I watched the scene unfolding outside my window: more than 100 IDF soldiers were taking up positions and the bulletproof, armored vehicles were beginning to roll, surrounding the reception hall. Leaving Nablus, the entire neighborhood looked like it was under siege. I chose to share this excerpt from my book Brotherhood of Warriors because I believe that it demonstrates some very important operational lessons. A skilled operator who can infiltrate his adversaries’ neighborhoods may be the most valuable counter terrorism weapon. All soldiers must strive for a mastery of local language, an intimate understanding of local culture and customs, and to develop an advanced sense for reading the environment. An individual who cannot communicate with the people he encounters, has only a rudimentary understanding of the local culture, and has not honed his level of awareness is an operational liability to counter terrorism and counter insurgency efforts. He is a hazard to operational success and to (his teammate’s / a bystander’s / and his own) safety. Finally, I would add that armor, technology, and standoff from the population cannot replace operational skill. These deceptively appealing traps provide neither the operational effectiveness nor the safety that they might provide in a conventional war.

The counter terrorist must have the skill and confidence to work within the population, face to face with adversaries and friends.

•

About the Author Mr. Cohen is a veteran of Israel’s special operations unit, Duvdevan. This unit dispatched operatives disguised as Arabs

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into the Palestinian-controlled West Bank to apprehend terrorist leaders. Upon returning to California, he founded IMS Security (www.imssecurity.net). The author’s book, Brotherhood of Warriors: Behind Enemy Lines with a Commando in one of the World’s Most Elite Counterterrorism Units, was coauthored with Douglas Century (Ecco / HarperCollins, 2008).

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Case Study:

A RADIOACTIVE IN MOSCOW

I.E.D.

By Lina Kolesnikova

During the summer and autumn of 1995, Shamil Basayev, one of the most notorious Chechen guerrilla commanders, repeatedly threatened the government of the Russian Federation with new terrorist acts if various military operations of the federal forces continued. He also claimed that he had possession of seven containers of bacteriological weapons, and five artillery shells containing binary munitions and radioactive materials. He stated the intent to use them against the civil population of Russia.1

Counter The

Red Square, Moscow, Russia. Photo: Bart Slingerland

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n October 14, 1995, during a press conference in Shali (Chechnya), he displayed a container that allegedly held radioactive materials (he did not specify what exactly was in it). He claimed that four identical containers were secretly placed in different parts of Russia.2 George Kaurov, the press secretary of the Ministry of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation, made a subsequent statement that Basayev probably possessed some Cobalt-60, Caesium-137, or Strontium-90 (low- grade) materials.3 On November 21, 1995, a journalist from the Russian independent television channel (NTV), Elena Masyuk, interviewed Basayev in Chechnya. During the interview, Basayev showed Masyuk a map of Izmaylovsky Park in Moscow and the exact location of an alleged explosive device containing radiological materials. On November 22 the journalist and her supporting TV crew were reportedly unable to leave the territory of Chechnya, but on November 23 they returned to Moscow. Masyuk informed the chief

A Chechen fighter stands near the government palace building in Grozny, Chechnya. Photo: Mikhail Evstafiev producer of NTV about Basayevâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s claim and the journalists decided to conduct their own investigation. Using the map Masyuk reported receiving4 and a dosimeter, she recovered a yellow package from a snowdrift in Izmaylovsky Park. Journalists proclaimed it a radioactive device belonging to Basayev. At about 4 p.m. the same day, NTV informed the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (FSB) about the find.5 According to the press offices of EMERCOM (Ministry for Civil Defence, Emergencies and Elimination of Consequences of Natural Disasters) of Russia, the radioactivity of the

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On December 22, during another press conference, Basayev displayed another container and threatened that he could “explode it in the water or in the air for (maximum) contamination.”

found container was 2 roentgen/hour at a distance of 1 centimeter, and 600 microroentgen/hour at a distance of 1 meter. The container weighed about 15 kilograms and measured 400 x 300 x 250 millimeters.6 At 11 p.m. the same day, the container was sent to a chemical laboratory of the Scientific Research Institute of the FSB for additional research. EMERCOM insisted in a press release that there was no contamination in the park and surrounding areas.7 The next day, Friday, November 24, a senior official of the FSB stated that it did not constitute a lethal threat to Moscovites. He insisted that the content was very low grade. He said that it was absolutely harmless even for someone within a 5-meter distance. He claimed that it contained a “radioactive element, which is used for the calibrating of radioactive equipment.” Journalists, referring to unnamed sources, believed that it was Caesium-137, which is used

in cancer treatment as well as for many industrial applications.8 However, at the same time, some Western media claimed that it was potentially lethal.9 On December 22, during another press conference, Basayev displayed another container and threatened that he could “explode it in the water or in the air for (maximum) contamination.”10 Basayev could have obtained radioactive materials in three ways: from existing facilities in Chechnya; stealing or buying them from other facilities in Russia; or acquiring them from foreign facilities and sponsors (stealing, buying, receiving them from an accomplice). However, the majority of Russian experts believe the first scenario—that Basayev obtained radioactive materials by stealing them from facilities in the Chechen Republic. By the time of the war for independence in 1991, there were several facilities in the Chechen Republic that contained sources of ionising radiation.

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But the most accessible for Chechen separatists may have been buried radioactive waste from the so-called special plant named Radon in Grozny (the capital of the Chechen Republic). This plant was built in 1964 and was one of 16 regional subsidiaries of radioactive waste disposal in the Soviet Union. It received radioactive waste from 72 enterprises in Dagestan, North Ossetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Ingooshetiya, and Chechnya (North Caucasian area). Radon was located close to the Karakh Mountains in the northeast part of the Grozny district and 30 kilometers from Grozny, the capital. A designated sanitary-hygienic zone around the plant was about 410 hectares. In addition to Radon, there were more than 20 facilities where one could find radioactive materials, including hospitals, research laboratories, and some factories. From the beginning of military operations in 1991, effective control of each of these places was not maintained by federal agencies. Absent security and a lack of qualified personnel left them open for guerrilla access. Since 1999 security has reportedly been improved. The Chechen government reportedly controls all accesses to such facilities with federal security services. In July 2006 Basayev, who also was responsible for hostage takings in Moscow and in Beslan, was killed in an FSB operation. Modern terrorist perspectives change. Previously, “killing was an outcome of an operation, now killing is an operation itself.”11 As RAND (a well known research organization) defined it in 1999, we witness the paradigm of terrorismwar.12 More and more terrorists adopt tactics that allow them to achieve the highest possible number of victims. Such a perspective, no doubt, inspires them to obtain weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In modern use, the term “WMD” includes biological, nuclear, chemical, and radiological weapons. In reality, biological and nuclear weapons have the potential for mass killing and causing

large-scale damage. Chemical and radiological weapons, however, have somewhat limited potential from this point of view. For example, in many scenarios, neither of the two latter types of weapons can cause the same dramatic damage to the infrastructure or biosphere. On the other hand, use of conventional weapons (e.g., explosives) against specific targets might cause significant damage.

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An improvised explosive device in Iraq. Photo: U.S. Army

Therefore, WMD has the potential of being misleading when used in general discussion. Widely overused and sometimes confusing, WMD in the context of terrorism, however, reflects the possibility of massive destruction to civil society. Not only the actual use of WMD, but the threat of use and claims of possession by terrorists cause anxiety among the population and could provoke civil disturbances. Development of nuclear technologies, especially for peaceful purposes, unfortunately multiplies the number of locations or access vectors that terrorists can use to take possession of WMD or their components. Even in countries with stable political situations and advanced security controls, there are incidents of loss of control and disappearance of some components that can be used by criminal or terrorist groups for threatening or even killing on a large scale. But countries experiencing political or civil unrest or insurgency movements, or countries where

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ing the threat

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U.s. and policymakers, first israeli experiences and detailed interv responders, and threat of suicide students of home iews with frontline personnel, terro Suicide Terror enab land security to understand and for future attacks. r. it analyzes recent suicide attac deal with the grow les ks as well as our following the expe current vulnerabili Moreover, they learn ing rt authors’ advic ties e, readers learn how to prepa re possible measures and likely scenarios and losses in the event of an attac for and implement an effective and quick response to prevent an attack. k. following an overv to minimize casua iew and historical lties review of suicide terror, the book cover • Global jihad s: • Israel’s confron tation with suicide te rrorism • America’s expe rience with suicide b ombi ngs • Internationalizat ion of suicide terroris m • High-risk scena rios and future trends • Methods for co nfronting suicide terror • Medical manag ement of suicide terro rism Using eye-witnes s accounts, the text recreates the studies help reade look and feel of rs actua these very dangerousget into the minds of suicide terro rists in order to unde l terrorism incidents. Detailed threats. case rstand how to best This book is a defin prevent and confr itive study of suicide ont experts who have terro r, syn thesizing the experie dealt with it firsth nce of well-known Is devastating threa and. anyone respo t should read this book and consider nsible for understanding, preventing raeli and American its , and confronting recommendation OPHIR FALK, LLB, this s with all seriousne MBA ss. , is a Part institute for Coun ter terrorism, wher ner at the Naveh, Kantor Even-Har of experience in e he has published law firm and a Rese vario numerous articles carried out risk asses us security capacities and serve in the field. Mr. falk arch Fellow at the d as a sments for olympic has over a decade venues and critic consultant for the 2004 olympic HENRY MORGEN al games, where he natio nal infrastructure. STERN is the Presi than 500 federal, dent of security state solutions internation first responders to Is , and local agencies to effectively al, a comp any that of suicide terror. He rael to study Homeland Security. Mr. confront the threat of terror and regul has trained more has o arly Morg takes groups of ffered expert comme enste radio stations, and ntary on terror-relatern is a widely published author on the Web broadcasts. d issues for NBC subje , ABC, CBS, Fox, num ct erous

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civil institutions cannot fulfill their roles, the risk of clandestine groups accessing WMD components becomes higher. In addition to the acquisition of components for the creation of improvised WMD, terrorists will likely continue to attempt to acquire manufactured WMD. Both NATO and Warsaw Pact forces fielded special atomic demolition munitions (SADMs). These man-portable nuclear weapons were designed to be employed by infiltrating special operations personnel. Though rumors regarding missing Russian devices that have circulated are unproven and denied by the Russian government, one can imagine the terrible consequences of these types of devices falling into terrorist hands or similar devices being provided by emergent nuclear powers. Fortunately, the actual creation and effective use of many WMD requires advanced skills. The majority of terrorist groups do not possess and cannot easily gain access to these skills. The followers of

www.SuicideTerror.com • 866-573-3999 22 The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2010

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the Japanese sect Aum Shinrikyo attacked the Tokyo metro with Sarin gas in 1995. Russian troops experienced two “lowscale” chemical attacks in Chechnya in 1999. Neither of these attacks caused a high toll of casualties or serious damage to infrastructure and the environment. However, it is not only the actual use, but rather the perceived capability of a terrorist group to access real WMD components, create WMD, and then use them that may profoundly change society. Terrorists understand that well and seem eager to obtain WMD capabilities (even groups that may not intend to use the weapons). Possession of a “dirty bomb” employing radiological components seems to be a popular claim and a popular fear. A dirty bomb can create contamination and, subsequently, the disruption and anxiety that terrorists desire to pressure authorities and to realize their objectives. Not surprisingly, dirty bombs are often referred to as

“weapons of mass disruption.” While downplayed by governments and having had no dramatic impact on an already anxious society, the Izmaylovsky Park case of 1995 illustrates the viability of these threats.

•

About the Author Ms. Kolesnikova is a Russian, Brusselsbased homeland security consultant. She is a Member of the Advisory Board of the Crisis Response Journal and holds a MSc in Risk, Crisis and Disaster Management (Leicester University), MA in History (Novosibirsk State University) and PgD in International and European Relations (Amsterdam University).

endnotes Basayev Shamil Salmanovich. Retrieved on 28 January 2010 http://www.flb.ru/ persprint/6.html 2 Basayev demonstrates container with radioactive materials. Interfax 15 October 1995. 1

Basayev container. Retrieved on 11 February 2010 http://www. zn.ua/1000/1550/4531/ 4 Interview of Elena Masyuk on radio station Echo of Moscow. Retrieved on 28 January 2010 http://www.echo.msk.ru/ programs/korzun/51820/ 5 Basayev container. Retrieved on 11 February 2010 http://www. zn.ua/1000/1550/4531/ 6 Ibid 7 Ibid 8 Ibid 9 “Moscow tries to play down radioactive Chechen Feat” The Irish Times, 25 November 1995; Nuke Package Raises fears of Chechen attack – but how real are they? Agence France Press, 24 November 1995 10 NTV Today 22 December 1995 issue at 10 p.m. 11 “Homeland Security and Terrorism” J.R. White 2005 12 “Countering the New Terrorism” Ian O. Lesser et al RAND 1999 3

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BOOK REVIEW

An Explanatory Memorandum on the General Strategic Goal for the Group in North America By: Mohamed Akram

n August 2004, Maryland police officers stopped a suspicious SUV after observing a passenger videotaping the cables and upper supports of the Chesapeake Bay Bridge. The driver, Ismail Elbarasse, was wanted on a federal warrant in a Chicago terrorism trial.

The local Joint Terrorism Task Force was notified and authorities obtained a search warrant for Elbarasse’s home in Virginia. Documents seized from Elbarasse’s home describe the origins, structure, and operations of the Muslim Brotherhood apparatus in the United States, including a plan for conquering America.1 Among the items seized from Elbarasse’s home was a document written in May 1991 that outlines goals and strategies for Islamists operating in the United States. The document, “An Explanatory Memorandum on the General Strategic Goal for the Group in North America” was written by Mohamed Akram. In it Akram referenced a “long-term plan . . . approved and adopted” by the “Shura Council” in 1987 and proposed the memo as a supplement to that plan. The most revealing statement in the document is:

Reviewed by: Dean T. Olson

The process . . . is a ‘Civilization-Jihadist Process’ with all the word means. The Ikhwan must understand that their work in America is a kind of grand Jihad in eliminating and destroying the Western civilization from within and ‘sabotaging’ its miserable house by their hands and the hands of the believers so that it is eliminated and God’s religion is made victorious over all other religions. It is a Muslim’s destiny to perform Jihad and work wherever he is and wherever he lands until the final hour comes . . .2 The document also contained a list of twenty-nine “organizations of our friends” in North America. Included are some of the most influential and high-profile Islamic organizations in the United States, including: • International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT) • Islamic Association for Palestine (a parent group of the Council on American-Islamic Relations [CAIR]. CAIR was not created until 1994.) • Islamic Circle of North America (ICNA) • Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) • Muslim Arab Youth Association (MAYA) • Muslim Students Association (MSA) • North American Islamic Trust (NAIT) • Occupied Land Fund (later known as the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development) Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin, Arabic for Muslim Brotherhood, was established in Egypt by Hassan al-Banna in 1928. AlBanna believed that Islam’s decline and

the societal ills that plagued the Islamic world stemmed from secularism. He formed the Ikhwan to return Muslims to the origins of the faith by imitating its founders. He hoped to re-create the “Golden Age” when Islam experienced unrivaled glory and influence by reestablishing the global Islamic empire called the “Caliphate.” Since its founding the Ikhwan has grown into one of the largest and most influential Islamist organizations in existence with followers throughout the Middle East, Europe, Australia, Canada, and the United States. More significantly, it has spawned the vast majority of Islamist terrorist groups active today, including HAMAS, acronym for the Islamic Resistance Movement (or Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya, in Arabic), operating in the Palestinian territories, and al-Qaeda. The Ikhwan’s infiltration of American society is a shrewd, multifaceted effort that includes manipulation of academic institutions via large donations, the establishment of secret communities and training camps, and the radicalization of prisons and mosques.3 The plan is a flexible, multiphased, long-term approach for a “civilizational jihad” in America. It calls for various tactics, including immigration, infiltration, surveillance, propaganda, protest, deception, political legitimacy, and terrorism. The year 2050 is the Muslim Brotherhood’s target date for transforming the United States into a Muslim country.4 The Ikhwan works through a sophisticated financial network that connects the operations of more than 70 branches around the world. In America, Ikhwan members have formed

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numerous religious, charitable, and social organizations, including the Muslim Students’ Association, the North American Islamic Trust, the Islamic Society of North America, the American Muslim Council, and the International Institute of Islamic Thought.5 The Ikhwan is a highly influential movement that employs various forms of deception to gain a foothold on power. While it professes nonviolence in favor of political solutions, it influences and supports terrorist organizations.6 On its website the group advocates “establishing the Islamic government” worldwide by “building the Muslim state . . . building the Khilafa (Caliphate) . . . mastering the world with Islam.” The group’s readiness to use violence was demonstrated in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing in New York City and the disrupted “Day of Terror” plot to blow up the United Nations Headquarters, the Lincoln and Holland tunnels, the George Washington Bridge, and the FBI’s headquarters in the city. Brotherhood member Sheikh Omar Abdel-Rahman and nine others were convicted of conspiracy in 1995 and sentenced to prison terms up to life in prison. Prior to the U.S.-led attack on the Taliban, the Ikhwan had training camps in Afghanistan where it worked with Kashmiri militants and sought to

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expand its influence in Central Asian states7. Ikhwan machinations include an ingenious process to desensitize America to the incursion of Islam into the fabric of society.8 This “soft jihad” is perhaps the most insidious, and potentially the most effective, assault on democratic freedoms. Some terrorists have attacked the United States for supporting Israel. Some have attempted to force the withdrawal of Western influence from the regions of the world that contain Muslim holy sites. Others have set their sights on nothing less than global conquest. Akram’s document seems to demonstrate that the Muslim Brotherhood’s goals are the latter.

•

ABOUT THE AUTHOR Mr. Olson is a retired sheriff’s department bureau commander. A graduate of the FBI National Academy, he also earned an MA in Security Studies from the Center for Homeland Defense and Security at the Naval Postgraduate School. Akram’s document appears in the author’s book, Perfect Enemy: The Law Enforcement Manual of Islamist Terrorism Charles C. Thomas Publishing, 2009.

ENDNOTES Devroude, Shawn (FBI special agent), 2004. Search warrant affidavit to the U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Virginia, August 20, 2004. 1

Olson, Dean, 2009. Perfect Enemy: The Law Enforcement Manual of Islamist Terrorism, Charles C. Thomas, Springfield, IL. 3 Dahoah-Halevi, Jonathan, 2007. The Muslim Brotherhood: A Moderate Islamic Alternative to al-Qaeda or a Partner in Global Jihad? Jerusalem Viewpoints, No. 558, Institute for Contemporary Affairs. 4 Ehrenfeld, Rachel and Alyssa Lappen, 2006. The Truth about the Muslim Brotherhood: Part I, FrontPage Magazine. 5 Lefkowitz, Josh, 2007. The 1993 Philadelphia Meeting: A Roadmap for Future Muslim Brotherhood Actions in the U.S. NEFA Foundation, New York. 6 Ehrenfeld, Rachel and Alyssa Lappen, 2006. The Truth about the Muslim Brotherhood: Part II, FrontPage Magazine. 7 Dahoah-Halevi, Jonathan, 2007. The Muslim Brotherhood: A Moderate Islamic Alternative to al-Qaeda or a Partner in Global Jihad? Jerusalem Viewpoints, No. 558, Institute for Contemporary Affairs. 8 Baran, Zeyno, 2008. The Roots of Violent Islamist Extremism and Efforts to Counter It, Testimony, U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, July 10. 2

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By Steve Young In 1979, then U.S. President Jimmy Carter failed to understand the depth of dissatisfaction and anger against the United States by the Iranian populace when the shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, was overthrown and allowed to receive cancer treatment in New York. Following the United Statesâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; refusal to extradite the shah back to Iran, this anger eventually translated into the November 4, 1979, takeover of the U.S. embassy in Tehran by Iranian students resulting in a hostage situation lasting for the next 444 days.

Counter The

Mahmoud Ahmedinajad meeting supporters on May 9, 2009. Photo: Kamyar Adl

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he hostages were not released until the day of President Ronald Reagan’s inauguration. However, the Iranian people’s distrust of the United States did not originate with the shah’s overthrow, but with the 1953 coup that brought him to power. At that time, with assistance from the CIA and British intelligence, Pahlavi’s supporters overthrew then Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq, installing Pahlavi as the new Iranian monarch.1 The United States became a strong supporter of the shah’s effort to modernize the country— an effort that included the United States’ involvement in establishing Iran’s first nuclear capability. In 1957 the United States and Iran signed a civil nuclear cooperation agreement as part of the U.S. Atoms for Peace program. Ten years later, the United States supplied 5.545 kg of enriched uranium—5.165 kg of which contained fissile isotopes—to Iran for fuel in a research reactor. The United States also supplied 112 kg of plutonium—104 kg of which were fissile isotopes—for use as “start-up sources for research reactor.”2 At the time, the United States encouraged further development of Iranian nuclear power. Fast forward to 2010 and the political situation is entirely different. With the establishment of a clerical theocracy in Iran, the United States became the Great Satan; Iranian assets have been frozen as a result of the 1979 U.S. Embassy takeover; and U.S. sanctions have been placed on Iranian imports, exports to Iran, and various Iranian-owned banks.3 More importantly for U.S. and regional Middle East security, Iran has embarked on a program of uranium enrichment for its nuclear program. Currently, Iran has nuclear production-related facilities in the following Iranian cities: Arak (heavy water plant); Isfahan (uranium conversion plant); Bushehr (nuclear

power station); Natanz (uranium enrichment plant); and Qom (uranium enrichment plant).4 The Natanz plant has come under International Atomic Energy Agency scrutiny and is the most concern to the United States because it has the capability of producing 220 pounds of enriched uranium monthly.5 Iran only revealed the Qom facility in September 2009 after it was discovered by unnamed foreign intelligence sources. This second uranium enrichment facility is scheduled to become operational in 2011.6 Although Iran has repeatedly stated that its nuclear activities are for peaceful purposes, the United States and its allies, China and Russia’s tepid support notwithstanding, believe otherwise. In late 2009 the United States proposed that Iran ship a large quantity of lowenriched uranium to France and Russia for processing into higher-enriched, but not weapons grade, material suitable for a research reactor. Iran’s president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, has since rejected the deal leading to the decision by the United States and the other five countries involved in Iranian nuclear negotiations—Britain, France, Germany, Russia, and China—to decide whether to impose harsher sanctions or to resort to military force to halt further enrichment progress. There are proponents of both courses of action, but additional sanctions appear to be the only pragmatic choice. However, the outcome of additional sanctions is uncertain and may affect only the Iranian general population, not the government it is intended to influence.7 Alternatively, Israel, the country considered to be most susceptible to potential Iranian nuclear aggression, is trying to decide whether an air strike against Iranian nuclear facilities is feasible. Iran has made numerous threats to wipe out the Jewish state, most recently in late January 2010.8 Disconcertingly, Israel lies

Fast forward to 2010 and the political situation is entirely different.

Recently freed Americans held hostage in Iran disembark Freedom One, January 27, 1981. Photo: DOD via pingnews.

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Not since the 1979 revolution have so many Iranian citizens become involved in protesting the results of an election whose results were regarded to be highly questionable.

within Iranian missile range and within rocket range of Hezbollah from the north and Hamas from Gaza.9 With the most to lose in a region with a nuclear-armed Iran, the Israelis have the hardest decision to make, but currently have opted for diplomatic initiatives to play out. In the latest development to dissuade the Iranians from further nuclear development, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Kuwait recently accepted delivery of U.S. antimissile defense systems. In addition, Aegis cruisers are on permanent patrol in the Persian Gulf. These cruisers contain shipto-air capabilities that could intercept Iranian incoming missiles.10

The June 2009 Election Protests

Enmeshed within the Iranian nuclear situation is the Iranian opposition’s reaction to Ahmadinejad’s June 12, 2009,

reelection. Not since the 1979 revolution have so many Iranian citizens become involved in protesting the results of an election whose results were regarded to be highly questionable. On multiple occasions since the election, Iranian students and ordinary citizens have taken to the streets to protest the election’s results. The government’s crackdown on the protesters began quickly after protests started and one of the first casualties was 26-year-old Neda AghaSoltan, whose death by gunshot was documented quickly on the Internet.11 Iranian government sources were quick to claim Western influence over the protests and accused the CIA or British intelligence for Agha-Soltan’s death or stated that her death was initially faked and she was shot on the way to the hospital.12 Protests in December 2009 resulted in additional deaths, including a nephew of Mir Hosein Mousavi, the

Protesters in Tehran, 2009. Photo: [Protected] from Tehran, IRAN 30 The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2010

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A picture of a Hezbollah sign over the highway in South Lebanon. Photo: Eternalsleeper former prime minister widely believed to have legitimately won the June election.13 The violence against protesters was particularly noticeable because it occurred on the holy day of Ashura, a day of mourning for the Shi’a martyr Hosein, the Prophet Muhammad’s grandson. More alarming to the regime, though, may be the number of clerics who have become critical of the way protesters have been treated by the baseej, hired thugs of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), to handle crowd control. Chief among the critics had been Grand Ayatollah Hosein Ali Montazeri until

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his death on December 20, 2009. To minimize the number of possible reformist protesters at his funeral, the Iranian government saturated crowds with baseej, significantly reducing any protester’s impact. And on January 28, 2010, two men were hanged for alleged crimes against the state, while the Iranian government depicted them as among the persons arrested during the late December protests.14 Whether or not their involvement in the protests is true, their hangings are intimidating to future protesters who believe their pursuit of free speech will be dealt with harshly. Most

. INTE G

recently, former Iranian vice president, Hossein Marashi, began serving a one year sentence for spreading propaganda against the ruling clerics.15 Protests of the June 2009 election present multiple problems for the regime. First, the world’s first theocracy has now been exposed for the oppressive government it has become. The protesters may have set off a domino effect within the country that may eventually topple the regime from within. This creates political problems for countries such as China and Russia who have long supported a kid-glove approach for dealing with Iran in light of their economic interests there. Moreover, the United States and others anxious to do a nuclear deal with Iran must wait until the Iranian government has a sense that it can control its own population. Harsher sanctions may be coming soon if the Iranians cannot appear to be compliant with the peace offerings now on the table. Meanwhile, during all the turmoil surrounding election protests and nuclear standoffs, the Islamic Republic of Iran, through its official government institutions such as the IRGC and its proxy, Hezbollah, has been quietly extending its influence in areas such as Africa and South America.

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Exporting the Revolution: The IRGC and Al-Quds

Formed in 1979 shortly after the shah’s overthrow, the IRGC, or Pasdaran (meaning “guard” in Farsi), was initially established to augment the Iranian army and to act as the primary protector and guarantor of the Iranian regime. Today, the IRGC has evolved into a military, political, and economic powerhouse. Current military forces consist of naval, air, and ground components, and total roughly 125,000 fighters. Moreover, the guard controls the country’s strategic missile forces and conducts foreign and domestic intelligence operations. As part of its responsibility for protecting the regime, the guard has sole jurisdiction of securing Tehran.16 In addition, the IRGC founded and controls the volunteer militia group, the baseej, aka basij, who gained worldwide notoriety for its role in subverting, beating, and allegedly killing anti-regime protesters and reformists following the disputed June 2009 election. In recent years, the IRGC has solidified its political and economic clout within Iran. Although most often presented as a unifying and uniform force, as in most bureaucracies, there exists within the IRGC a degree of political infighting. In fact, rival IRGC

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members have stood against each other in recent elections. Nevertheless, during Ahmadinejad’s first term, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei appointed IRGC members as various ambassadors, mayors, undersecretaries, and provincial governors. At the time, 14 of the country’s 21 cabinet members were formerly affiliated with IRGC.17 The economic influence of the IRGC began shortly after the end of the Iran-Iraq war in 1989. What began as modest investments in agriculture, road building, and mining eventually allowed the IRGC to expand into military industrial contracts. In fact, it has been estimated that the value of IRGC businesses could approach $12 billion.18 Today, the Khatam al-Anbia company, controlled by the IRGC, is Iran’s chief engineering arm and is analogous to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.19 It has also been identified by the U.S. government as a contributor to Iran’s proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and recently its assets were frozen in line with newly imposed U.S. sanctions.20 As a primary component of Iranian hegemony plans, the IRGC created the al-Quds Force, the Iranian version of the U.S. Special Operations Forces. The al-Quds Force’s mission is simply to provide resources to export the Iranian revolution overseas. Its traditional area of responsibility has been Lebanon,

Since its inception, Hezbollah has received armament and financial support from Iran. Iraq, and Gaza. In Lebanon, the al-Quds Force, as part of the IRGC, was instrumental in the creation of the Hezbollah terrorist group. It has provided Hezbollah financial resources, weapons, and training in Iran as well as in south Lebanon and Hezbollah’s traditional stronghold in Lebanon’s Beqa’a Valley. The result of their efforts has been the creation of a military infrastructure that fought Israel to a stalemate in the summer of 2006. According to the Asymmetric Operations Working Group Newsletter, the al-Quds Force corps include Corps Five, Turkey; Corps Six, Persian Gulf Region (allegedly responsible for the Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia); Corps Seven, Lebanon; Corps Eight, Africa (principally focused on Algeria, Tunisia, Sudan, and Egypt); Corps Nine, Europe, North America, and East Asia; Corps Ten, Bosnia (considered the springboard for Europe); and one independent unit, Malek Ashtar Brigade, with two of its battalions currently deployed in Lebanon.21

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Following military clashes in December 2009 between Houthi rebels in Saada province and Saudi border forces, the Yemen government claimed to have stopped shipments of Iranian arms via sea from Eritrea. However, to avoid a Saudi naval blockade of that smuggling route, it has been alleged that Iran now smuggles weapons to the Houthis via land.23

Hezbollah Extends Iranian Influence

Anti-US mural, Tehran, Iran, 2004. Photo: Bertil Videt Al-Quds forces are believed to support anti-U.S. militia in Iraq such as the Mahdi Army of the anti-U.S. cleric, Muqtada al-Sadr, and elements of the Badr Brigade, which is linked to the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, a Shi’a political party. In addition to firearms, al-Quds operatives were allegedly supplying radical Shi’a groups advanced improvised explosive devices such as explosively formed projectiles and possibly more than 100 Austrian Steyr HS50 .50 caliber sniper rifles.22 In the Middle East, theological differences between Sunni and Shi’a Muslims sometimes devolve into open conflict. Nowhere is that more evident than in Iraq where the Shi’a-dominant government of Iraq is subjected almost daily to attacks by either Sunnidominated al-Qaeda or Sunni extremists. Recently, long-standing skirmishes between Shi’a Houthi rebels in Yemen and the Sunni-dominated Yemeni government have developed into a proxy conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran.

The founding of Hezbollah by the IRGC in approximately 1982 and subsequent support from the al-Quds Force as a counterweight to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon is well known. Because of Hezbollah’s involvement in the deaths of numerous Americans, including 242 U.S. Marines in 1983, Hezbollah was designated by the U.S. State Department as an international terrorist group in 1995.24 In addition, Hezbollah’s media outlets, al-Manar television and al-Nour radio station, are specially designated global terrorist entities.25 The consequences of designation involves freezing of assets by the U.S. Treasury Department. Since its inception, Hezbollah has received armament and financial support from Iran. This armament and Hezbollah’s fighting capabilities were on display during the summer 2006 war with Israel when up to 4,000 Kaytusha rockets were fired at Israel and the AT-14 E Kornet missile, an advanced Russian-made anti-tank weapon, was used effectively against Israeli tanks. The Kornet was allegedly purchased from Syria by Hezbollah using Iranian funds.26 Iran has also recently smuggled weapons to Hamas in the Gaza strip, which borders Israel on the south.27 In Gaza, Hamas would likely not be in control today of that desert strip of land were it not for the support of elements of al-Quds and Hezbollah operatives.28 Recently, Hamas military commander Mahmoud Mabhuh was killed in Dubai for his long-time role in smuggling

weapons to both Hezbollah and Hamas from Iran.29 The Iranians have not limited their activities to the Middle East. By exploiting Lebanese businessmen, Iran and Hezbollah have extended their reach into such places as South America and Africa.

Iran and Hezbollah in South America

During the 1970s Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay founded three border cities along their common border in central South America and established a free trade zone there. During the Lebanese civil war that began in 1975, many Lebanese immigrated to the tri-border area (TBA) and established a vibrant business community. Seen as a potential funding source, Hezbollah began sending operatives to the TBA to recruit and acquire resources during the late 1980s. Eventually, from its TBA base, Hezbollah launched attacks in March 1992 against the Israeli embassy and a Jewish community center in July 1994, both located in Buenos Aires. By mid-2000 U.S. intelligence estimated there were 460 Hezbollah operatives in the TBA.30 In addition, the TBA reportedly hosts terrorist operatives from Egypt’s Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group) and Al-Jihad (Islamic Jihad), al-Qaeda, Hamas, and al-Muqawamah (the Resistance), another pro-Iran wing of Hezbollah.31 Most disturbing to U.S. national security though are reports from Argentine intelligence services that al-Qaeda and Hezbollah were linking up with local drug dealers to use existing smuggling routes through Mexico into the United States.32 During a visit to Venezuela in 2007, Ahmadinejad pledged to invest $1 billion in Bolivia over a five-year period.33 As a result of Ahmadinejad’s overtures, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez has backed Iran’s continuing development of its nuclear program. Ahmadinejad has also recently visited Ecuador and Nicaragua, and has received

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pledges of support from their respective governments. Iran is also expecting a visit from Brazil’s President Lula da Silva this year. The question remains as to what Iran expects in return for these overtures. Analysts such as Ely Karmon suggest three objectives: first, Iran is seeking support from ““revolutionary” South American countries for Iran’s nuclear policy as a diplomatic counterweight to U.S. and European pressure; second, Iran seeks to destabilize moderate or Westernleaning governments; and lastly, Iran wants to show the home front that it is a player on the international stage.34 It is evident that Ahmadinejad’s presence in South America has led to an increased Hezbollah presence. In June 2008 the U.S. Treasury Department designated Ghazi Nasr al Din, a Venezuela-based Hezbollah supporter born in Lebanon, as an individual that facilitated financial support to Hezbollah in Lebanon. A Treasury Department press release stated that Nasr al Din

counseled Hezbollah donors on fundraising efforts and specific deposit information related directly to Hezbollah. Similarly, Treasury designated Fawzi Kan’an, a Venezuela-based Hezbollah supporter born in Ba’albeck, Lebanon, a financial supporter of the terrorist group.35

Iranian Influence in Africa

In addition to the previously mentioned visits to South America, Ahmadinejad has been active in Africa for principally the same reasons: diplomatic support for the Iranian nuclear program, destabilization of pro-West governments, and home front appeal. With promises of cheap oil and business cooperation, Iran has made diplomatic inroads into countries such as Senegal, Gambia, Mauritania, Nigeria, and others such as South Africa and Sudan. As a result, Senegal and South Africa have endorsed

During a visit to Venezuela in 2007, Ahmadinejad pledged to invest $1 billion in Bolivia over a five-year period. Iran’s right to nuclear power; Sudan has signed a military cooperation pact; and the South African cell phone company, MTN, now covers more than 40 percent of Iranians.36 Somalia has been a nation in turmoil since the overthrow in 1991 of then President Mohammad Siad Barre. Finally, in February 2009 Sheik Sharif Sheik Ahmed became president and now represents a modicum of hope

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for stability in the country. That potential stability is regularly threatened by elements of Harakat Al-Shabab Al-Mujahideen (the Warrior Youth Movement in Arabic) also known as al-Shabab, a military wing of the former Islamic Courts Union, whose extremist brand of Wahhabi Islam is patterned after that of al-Qaeda.37 The goal of al-Shabab is the overthrow of Sheik Ahmed’s government and the establishment of a strict Wahhabi-based form of Shari’a law. The source of al-Shabab’s weaponry is murky, but a recent STRATFOR (a global information company) report has Iran supplying arms to the group.38 U.S. security officials are worried about successful attempts by al-Shabab to recruit American citizens of Somali ethnicity as suicide bombers. That this effort has been partially successful was first seen in October 2008 when a Somali American male from Minneapolis, Minnesota, blew himself up in Somalia.39 What causes U.S. officials even greater concern is the potential for these recruits to return to the United States with their U.S. passports and blow themselves up in the United States. Other Iranian activities in Africa include exploitation of the illicit diamond trade in West Africa by Hezbollah to raise significant funds. This illicit trade has been primarily carried out in Sierra Leone, Liberia, the Cote d’Ivoire (Ivory Coast), and the Democratic Republic of Congo.40 In May 2003 Belgian police arrested Antwerp-based Kassim Tajideen for fraud, money laundering, and conflict diamond smuggling involving

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a number of businesses in Lebanon and Africa. Tajideen passed proceeds of these activities to his brother, a Hezbollah commander in Lebanon, amounting to tens of millions of dollars.41 Because of these illicit activities, in May 2009 the U.S. Department of the Treasury designated Tajideen a terrorism supporter resulting in the freezing of Tajideen’s personal as well as his companies’ assets. Abd al Menhem Qubaysi, a Cote d’Ivoire-based Hezbollah supporter, has also had his assets frozen for facilitating Hezbollah fund-raising events there.42

Conclusion

By continuing to protest against the legitimacy of its government, the Iranian people are involved in a long-term struggle to replace the current theocracy with a government more concerned with righting a decrepit economy and rejoining the world community than in maintaining ultimate power. Thus far, Iran gives every impression that it will do everything it can to become a nuclear power. Iran’s success could result in an arms race that extends far beyond the Middle East. While these two issues dominate media headlines, Iran has expanded its influence to the Gaza strip, Iraq, and selected countries in Africa and South America by increasing its diplomatic presence and through its proxy Hezbollah and the al-Quds Force. At home, the IRGC and the baseej keep the regime in power. Countering Iran requires numerous approaches and requires the United States to act in concert with other concerned

parties. Unilaterally, though, there are obvious actions the United States can take. For example, securing its borders becomes more important to dissuade would-be attackers. Diplomatically, it will be important to keep countries already friendly to the West within that sphere. In addition, focused sanctions against Iran must be in place to convince the world that the United States is doing all it can to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear power before military action can realistically be contemplated. Militarily, it appears that every effort should be made to establish the United States African Command on the continent and expand effective special operations forces activities wherever possible. Although President Barack Obama extended an olive branch to Iran, it appears that with Iran’s rejection of that overture, the relationship of these two governments will grow increasingly adversarial.

•

About the Author Dr. Young is a retired CIA operations officer with tours in the Middle East, South Asia, and Europe. A former Marine, Dr. Young also served in Iraq and Afghanistan during conflict operations and with the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force in Houston. He currently teaches at Sam Houston State University in Huntsville, Texas.

endnotes Mark J. Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne. Mohammad Mossadeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran. (Syracuse University Press, 2004). Available at: http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/ NSAEBB/NSAEBB126/index.htm. Accessed January 22, 2010. 2 Dr. Farhang Jahanpour, Oxford Research Group. “Chronology of Iran’s Nuclear Programme 1957-2007.” Available at: http://oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/oxford_ research_group_chronology_irans_nuclear_ programme_1957_2007. Accessed January 22, 2010. 3 “An Overview of O.F.A.C. Regulations Involving Sanctions Against Iran.” US Treasury Department, Office of Foreign Assets 1

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Control. January 22, 2009. Available at: http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/enforcement/ ofac/programs/iran/iran.pdf. Accessed January 19, 2010. 4 “Iran’s Key Nuclear Sites.” BBC News. September 25, 2009. Available at: http:// • REACT® (Rapid Engage And Close-quarters Tactics) news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4617398. • Terrorist negotiations and training stm. Accessed January 19, 2010. • School security and survival 5 • Multiple terrorist-mass hostage siege training “U.N. Nuclear Agency: Iran will • New SWAT & small unit tactics for law enforcement start up Qom nuclear facility in 2011.” November 16, 2009. Available at: http:// www.myfoxphoenix.com/dpp/news/world/ UN_Nuclear_Agency_Iran_Will_Start_Up_ Qom_Nuclear_Facility_in_2011_70744348. The BattleSling® was initially designed to provide ® Accessed January 28, 2010. U.S. law enforcement and military operators with 6 the capability to cross open ground under heavy Ibid. ICAL RESCUE 7 T fire, while keeping hands free for weapons. The C “Iran: Time for Tougher Sanctions.” The A T BattleSling® provides, the large, looping weightEconomist, January 9–15, 2010. pp. 14–15. bearing straps that allow those wounded in military 8 “Iran’s leader predicts Israel’s destruction” combat operations to be moved for long distances Associated Press, January 27, 2010. Available supported by the large muscles of the backs and at: http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20100127/ legs of the carriers, rather than the fatiguing ap_on_re_mi_ea/ml_iran_israel. Accessed effect to hands, forearms and shoulders caused by January 30, 2010. conventional hand-carried stretchers and litters. 9 “Israel and Iran: The Gathering Storm.” The Economist, January 9–15, 2010, pp. 28–29. 10 David E. Sanger and Eric Schmitt. “U.S. Circle 12 on Reader Service Card speeding up missile defenses in Persian Gulf.” New York Times, January 30, 2010. Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/31/ world/middleeast/31missile.html?hp. I�� P�� S�� Accessed January 31, 2010. at The Center for Rural Development 11 “Who was Neda? Slain woman an I�� P�� S�� unlikely martyr.” CNN.com/world. June at The Center for Rural Development 24, 2009. Available at: http://www.cnn. com/2009/WORLD/meast/06/23/iran.neda. profile/index.html#cnnSTCText. Accessed January 28, 2010. 12 “Neda Soltan’s death was faked, says Courses for Public Safety Practitioners documentary on Iran state TV.” News. Courses include: com.au. January 8, 2010. Available at: http://www.news.com.au/world/nedas Law Enforcement Professionals Available Now! death-was-faked-says-iran-state-tv/storye6frfkyi-1225817268398. Accessed January  Fire Service Professionals 28, 2010. Coming Soon! 13 “Iran’s Turmoil: Growing Signs of  Emergency Management Desperation.” The Economist, January 2–8, Professionals 2010. pp. 34–35. Coming Soon! 14 Nasser Karimi. “Iran hangs 2 for allegedly aiming to topple state.” Associated Press. January 28, 2010. http://news.yahoo.com/s/ Enroll in a course today. ap/20100128/ap_on_re_mi_ea/ml_iran/print. No fees! No cost! Accessed January 28, 2010. DISCLAIMER: This project was supported by Cooperative Agreement Number 2006-GD-T6-K001 administered by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security/FEMA, Training and Exercises Integration 15 Nasser Karimi. “Iran jails former vice Secretariat. Points of view or opinions in this document are those of the author and do not represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. president, reform activist.” ABC news/

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international. March 19, 2010. Available at: http://abcnews.go.com/International/ wireStory?id=10144865. Accessed March 19, 2010. 16 Greg Bruno. “Iran’s Revolutionary Guards.” Council on Foreign Relations. June 22, 2009. Available at: http://www.cfr.org/ publication/14324/irans_revolutionary_ guards.html. Accessed February 1, 2010. 17 Ibid. 18 Kim Murphy. “Iran’s $12 billion enforcers.” Los Angeles Times, August 26, 2007. Available at: http://articles.latimes. com/2007/aug/26/world/fg-guards26. Accessed February 1, 2010. 19 “Frederic Wehrey, Jerrold D. Green, Brian Nichiporuk, Alireza Nader, Lydia Hansell, Rasool Nafisi, and S. R. Bohandy. “The Rise of the Pasdaran.” RAND Corporation, National Defense Research Institute. 2009. ISBN 978-0-8330-4620-8. 20 Matthew Lee. “U.S. slaps new sanctions on Iran’s Revolutionary Guard.” Houston Chronicle print edition, February 11, 2010. pp. A-9. 21 AOWG Strategem Newsletter, Vol. 2, 1, May 2008.

22 “Experts: Iran’s Quds force deeply enmeshed in Iraq.” Foxnews.com. February 16, 2007. Available at: http://www.foxnews. com/story/0,2933,252212,00.html. Accessed February 4, 2010. 23 Jonathan Spyer. “Analysis: Suddenly, the Arab world wakes up to Yemen’s rebellion.” Global Research in International Affairs, December 20, 2009. Available at: http://www. gloria-center.org/Gloria/2009/12/arab-worldwakes-up. Accessed January 30, 2010. 24 “U.S. Designates Al-Manar as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist Entity Television Station is Arm of Hizballah Terrorist Network.” U.S. Department of the Treasury Press Release, March 23, 2006. Available at: http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/js4134. htm. Accessed February 20, 2010. 25 Ibid. 26 Jonathan Spyer. “Lebanon 2006: Unfinished War.” The Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 12, No. 1, March 2008. Available at: http://meria.idc.ac.il/ journal/2008/issue1/jv12no1a1.asp. Accessed January 28, 2010. 27 “Hamas’ weapons smuggling.” Britain Israel Communications and Research Center,

December 24, 2009. Available at: http:// www.bicom.org.uk/context/research-andanalysis/israeli-palestinian-arena/bicom-focus-hamas-s-weapons-smuggling. Accessed January 19, 2010. 28 Gregory R. Copley. “Gaza conflict has everything to do with the power struggle in Iran.” World Tribune.com, January 5, 2009. http://www.worldtribune.com/worldtribune/ WTARC/2009/me_iran0003_01_05.asp. Accessed January 19, 2010. 29 Edmund Sanders. “Slain Hamas commander smuggled missiles, Israelis say.” Los Angeles Times via Houston Chronicle print edition, February 1, 2010. pp. A-6. 30 Ron Chepesiuk. “Global Terrorism-The Latin American connection persists.” New Criminologist, November 1, 2008. Available at: http://www.newcriminologist.com/ article.asp?nid=2103. Accessed November 2, 2008. 31 Rex Hudson. “Terrorist and Organized Crime Groups in the Tri-Border Area (TBA) of South America.” Library of Congress, Federal Research Division, July 2003. Available at: http://www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/frd0703. pdf. Accessed January 21, 2010.

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32 Ron Chepesiuk. â&#x20AC;&#x153;Global Terrorism-The Latin American connection persists.â&#x20AC;? New Criminologist, November 1, 2008. Available at: http://www.newcriminologist.com/ article.asp?nid=2103. Accessed November 2, 2008.33 â&#x20AC;&#x153;Iran leader visits Venezuela, Bolivia.â&#x20AC;? USA Today, September 28, 2007. Available at: http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/200709-27-iran-south-america_N.htm. Accessed January 21, 2010. 33 Ely Karmon. â&#x20AC;&#x153;Iran challenges the United States in its backyard, in Latin Americaâ&#x20AC;? from â&#x20AC;&#x153;Iran and its Proxy Hezbollah: Strategic Penetration in Latin America.â&#x20AC;? Elcano Royal Institute, Madrid, Spain. January 2010. 34 â&#x20AC;&#x153;Treasury targets Hizballah in Venezuela.â&#x20AC;? U.S. Department of the Treasury Press Release, June 18, 2008. Available at: http:// www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp1036.htm. Accessed January 19, 2010. 35 â&#x20AC;&#x153;Iran and Israel in Africa: A search for allies in a hostile world.â&#x20AC;? The Economist, February 6-12, pp. 49-50. 36 Jeffrey Gettleman. â&#x20AC;&#x153;Somalia.â&#x20AC;? New York Times, September 17, 2009. Available at: http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/ international/countriesandterritories/somalia/ index.html. Accessed February 2, 2010. 37 Scott Stewart. â&#x20AC;&#x153;Iranian proxies: An intricate and active web.â&#x20AC;? STRATFOR Global Intelligence, February 3, 2010. Available at: http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100203_ iranian_proxies_intricate_and_active_web. Accessed February 4, 2010. 38 Randy James.â&#x20AC;&#x153;Recruiting Americans for Somaliaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s jihad.â&#x20AC;? Time.com, December 7, 2009. http://www.time.com/time/world/ article/0,8599,1945855,00.html. Accessed February 4, 2010. 39 â&#x20AC;&#x153;Illicit diamond trade used by Hizballah and others.â&#x20AC;? Dreams of Africa.org, January 19, 2009. Available at: http://www. dreamsofafrica.org/blog/2009/01/19/illicitdiamond-trade-used-by-hizballah-and-others/. Accessed January 19, 2010. 40 Chaim Evan-Zohar. â&#x20AC;&#x153;Hizballah diamond smugglers put on U.S. terrorists list.â&#x20AC;? Diamond Intelligence Briefs online, May 28, 2009. Available at: http://www. diamondintelligence.com/magazine/magazine. aspx?id=7894. Accessed January 19, 2010. 41 â&#x20AC;&#x153; Treasury Targets Hizballah Network in Africa.â&#x20AC;? U.S. Department of the Treasury Press Release, May 27, 2009. Available at: http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/tg149. htm. Accessed January 19, 2010.

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By Michael Mylrea

The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) is recognized as a terrorist group by the Colombian government, the United States, Canada, and the European Union. The group was established in the 1960s as a guerrilla movement for the Colombian Communist Party with the goal of overthrowing the Colombian government.

he Marxist-Leninist insurgency evolved into a fight involving communist guerrilla groups FARC and the National Liberation Army (ELN), the government, and right-wing paramilitary groups. In addition to members of the Colombian government and its allies, FARC also targets citizens, especially wealthy landowners. To protect themselves from guerrilla armies, paramilitary organizations were formed by landowners and drug cartels in the 1980s. Paramilitaries, FARC, and ELN are known for kidnapping, extortion, use of violence, and cocaine trafficking. The Colombian government formed alliances with the paramilitaries against the guerrillas until declaring them illegal in 1997—some assert that there is still an informal relationship. FARC is the largest insurgent group in the Americas with an estimated 11,000 members in 2009 (apparently down from 16,000 in 2001). Other estimates by Colombian government officials suggest that military successes against FARC have encouraged as many as 11,200

members to desert, reducing their current numbers to about 8,000.1 FARC’s decline is attributed to joint U.S.-Colombian operations and the efforts of President Álvaro Uribe (Uribe’s father was killed by FARC). The president has aggressively pursued FARC since he took office in 2002.2 Colombian Vice President Francisco Santos Calderón boasted that these operations were successfully “. . . reducing [FARC’s] income and promoting reinsertion of most of their members, they look like a paper tiger.3” Despite FARC’s reduced numbers, it still conducts effective attacks. FARC has a vast international presence in the drug trade. Most of its guerrillas are located throughout the southeastern parts of Colombia at the base of the Andean mountains.4 These guerrillas have had a sporadic physical presence in Venezuela, Peru, Brazil, Panama, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Argentina, and Bolivia. FARC fields a formidable paramilitary fighting force, divided into seven main operational regions, each led by a military command. These commands are supported by “military intelligence

Raul Reyes. Photo: US Department of State

Acting on information received, the Colombian aircraft attacked, killing Raul Reyes, FARC’s secondin-command, and 24 guerrillas and activists in the camp.

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Nine tons of captured cocaine in Key West, Fla. (2007. U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Timothy Cox.

Long denying it has any connection to drug trafficking, FARC has bolstered its status as a drug cartel by eliminating middlemen to dominate approximately 70 percent of the cocaine produced in Colombia, according to Colombia’s Ministry of Defense.

units” and specialist mobile units that are under the direct control of the FARC’s high command. FARC members attend military training camps, where, at various times, other terrorist groups have exchanged military tactics, techniques and procedures. For example, the Spanish terror group ETA has been involved in training Colombian militants in cell phone activated explosive devices and anti-aerial equipment since 2003.5 FARC has struggled to maintain a web presence to reach supporters and to spread its propaganda. One of its main pages was disabled in 2009 after its previous website was shut down in 2006—a notification says “the website is banned and currently not available” in German.6 Recently, a number of pro-FARC videos and even a short, professionally made documentary have

appeared on various video-sharing websites, including YouTube.7 In one video, a FARC representative argues the benefits of marijuana. In another, which appears to be aimed at recruitment, a traditional Colombian folk dance is being performed by its women members under a jungle canopy. FARC drug operations consist of different units that specialize in production and trafficking of cocaine. Increased pressure from joint U.S.Colombian efforts, known as Plan Colombia, may have forced FARC to shift some of its efforts to Central America and make increased efforts to reach the European market by establishing alliances with narcotraffickers in Peru, Panama, and Mexico. The network shift has been met with internal dissent. For example, orders

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given by FARC leaders to send weekly payments of $1.5 million to “support their political links in Canada, Australia, and neighboring friends,” were reportedly disobeyed8. FARC seems to have been weakened by its inability to reliably communicate internally due to fear of communication intercepts. Colombian counter narcotics and intelligence operations

have weakened FARC by infiltrating its command and control, and communications, and by killing some leaders. Opponents of these initiatives, however, argue that eradicating production nodes and eliminating traffickers just shifts the drug supply chain to another location or organization without diminishing demand—the root of the problem. But drug skirmishes continue. On March 1, 2008, under the cover of darkness, Colombian aircraft flew toward Putumayo where FARC guerrillas were entrenched in a dense jungle encampment situated near Santa Rosa de Sucumbíos, just inside the Ecuadorian border. Acting on information received, the Colombian aircraft attacked, killing Raul Reyes, FARC’s second-in-command, and 24 guerrillas and activists in the camp. Colombian troops transported by helicopters quickly followed, recovering bodies and information contained in hard disks, flash drives, and three laptop computers. The U.S.-backed Colombian efforts have apparently weakened the operational capacity of FARC. Intelligence from the Reyes attack, popularly called the FARC files, revealed intimate details about FARC, its organization, key personnel and allies—including alleged sponsors, such as neighboring Ecuador and Venezuela—and an extensive global network of drug and arms trafficking. State sponsors apparently helped FARC obtain arms from foreign suppliers through the use of a Venezuelan seaport and to hide senior leadership like Germán Briceño Suárez.9 State assistance may have also influenced FARC’s move away from guerrilla activities to drug trafficking. Long denying it has any connection to drug trafficking, FARC has bolstered its status as a drug cartel by eliminating middlemen to dominate approximately 70 percent of the cocaine produced in Colombia, according to Colombia’s Ministry of Defense.10 The introduction

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Protesters gather to march against the FARC. Photo: Germán Cabrejo, for equinoXio of a new coca leaf that grows well in Colombia also has led to a significant increase in FARC’s cocaine production.11 FARC files documented an interest in acquiring or making a weapon of mass destruction. A couple of weeks later, Colombian officials reported recovering 66 pounds of depleted uranium that was originally in the possession of FARC. Even though it wasn’t weapons grade, the threat of FARC wielding a “dirty bomb” existed.12 However, FARC researcher Douglas Farah notes, “the type and grade of uranium in question indicate that FARC had been the victim of a scam or was planning on perpetrating a scam on an unsuspecting third party.”13 Moreover, a FARC files letter from Raul Reyes, translated by Farah, suggests that its goal for acquiring uranium was profit driven:

“Another item is uranium. There is someone who supplies me with materials for making explosives, his name is Belisario and he lives in Bogotá he sent me a sample and the specifications and proposes selling it at $2.5 million per kilogram. They will deliver it and we will see who we can sell it to. It would [be] best to sell to a government so we can sell a lot. They have 50 kilos ready and can sell much more as they have a direct contact with those that produce it.”14 While some have dismissed the possibility of FARC using a weapon of mass destruction, the same networks FARC uses to transport cocaine into the United States might potentially be used to transfer a weapon of mass destruction to a group that would use it.15 Even more troubling is the growing reports of a possible nexus in Latin America between FARC, Islamic terror organizations—

Determining a measure of success in countering narcotics has always been challenging. Colombia is one of the largest recipients of American military assistance.

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“I fear greatly that the connectivity between narcoterrorism and Islamic radical terrorism could be disastrous in this region. What I worry about in this region with outside actors coming into it is the potential for those streams to cross, if you will, for the fuel of narcoterrorism to become engaged in Islamic radicalism here in the Americas, here in our home. ”16 Adm. Stavridis emphasized the threat of Iranian and other state-backed terror groups infiltrating the U.S.’s southern border. Pointing to a photograph of the Iranian president, he said, “This gentleman is Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, president of Iran, a state that sponsors terrorism. He is a very dangerous man and he is in this area of the world,” adding that Iran has opened 10 embassies in Latin America and has plans to open others in the near future.17

COUNTERING FARC

In 2003 the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), working with Colombian officials, intercepted a phone call from Nancy Conde in Miami. She was seeking to buy satellite telephones for FARC insurgents. In exchange for a lighter sentence, the FBI had Conde provide FARC contacts with phones that allowed thousands of calls to be traced and monitored over the next five years, leading to a number of successful attacks against FARC. This apparently included killing Reyes in 2008 and the rescue of Ingrid Betancourt, a former Colombian presidential candidate kidnapped in 2002, and three American contractors, held since February 2003.18

Government agents heard Conde and her co-conspirators negotiate shipments of everything from assault rifles to condoms for distribution to about a third of the FARC’s estimated 9,000 fighters, including the 1st Front that held the hostages. “We’re not talking just about finances, communications equipment, food and weapons—but also medical supplies, medicines and people who cared directly for the wounded,” said Luis Ernesto Tamayo, the security official who reportedly ran the Colombian side of the operation.19 Determining a measure of success in countering narcotics has always been challenging. Colombia is one of the largest recipients of American military assistance. A large part of this aid package is dedicated to equipping the Colombian military for counter-narcotics operations. But FARC’s involvement in the drug trade has blurred the lines between the counter narcotics and counter insurgency components of U.S. aid.20 Since the United States launched Plan Colombia’s $1.2 billion aid package in 2000, production of cocaine in Colombia and consumption in the United States has not decreased. In fact, when production of cocaine decreases in one area, it may temporarily increase the price and then simply move production centers. A comprehensive solution should reduce demand for the drug and the willingness to produce it. A study by RAND, a prominent thinktank, concluded that “ . . . treatment of heavy users may be a more cost-effective way of dealing with drug interventions.”21 This may require expanding treatment programs for the U.S. addict population. According to RAND’s estimates, one dollar spent on treatment would reduce cocaine consumption just as effectively as ten dollars spent on border interdiction; and twenty-three dollars spent on eradication. Moreover, eradication may punish farmers and populations by poisoning other crops, the environment, and water supplies.22 In recent years,

U.S.-led counter narcotics efforts have made a strategic shift from eradication to intervention, but a comprehensive treatment program is still lacking. Another challenge is that military and counter narcotics aid to Colombia may be “diverted to empower non-state armed actors, increasing both extra-legal violence and electoral manipulation, with no apparent reduction in drug production23.” In fact, “when U.S. military aid increases, attacks by paramilitaries, who are known to work with the [Colombian] military, increase more in municipalities with bases24.” The current U.S. administration’s proposed budget cuts to Colombia for military spending in 2011 might be reflective of the limited proven benefits of military and counter narcotics aid. In fact, despite the counter narcotics focus of U.S. military aid to Colombia, “. . . the aid shock is found to reduce the number of anti-narcotics operations undertaken by the Colombian military, and has no significant effect on the cultivation of coca, the crop used to manufacture cocaine.”25 Synergizing the one-time separate U.S. counter-narcotics and counter insurgency aid may be more effective. Today, Plan Colombia combines military, counter narcotics, and social development efforts. The best practices used to weaken FARC may include: seizure of key corridors and supply chain routes; military reconstruction backed by increased civilian leadership dedicated to the problem; and infiltration of communications and integration of intelligence-enforcing branches of government, including different branches of military and national police.26 But this success is not the same as a comprehensive solution. As FARC becomes increasingly active across borders a comprehensive solution is imperative. This will require fighting the problem at its roots by reducing users’ demand and increasing drug producer’s opportunity

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like Hezbollah—and anti-American state sponsors, such as Venezuela and Iran. Adm. James G. Stavridis, former commander of U.S. Southern Command, recently testified before the House Armed Services Committee that there “is a growing threat” that terrorist groups are using the same “routes, profits, and corruptive influence” as drug traffickers.

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cost. A three-pronged strategy that prioritizes interdiction, social economic development, such as promoting alternative crops, and drug treatment may be most effective. Until then, FARC’s violent narco-insurgency will continue to threaten Colombia and may reach through America’s southern border.

•

About the Author

endnotes

Helen Murphy and Bernard Lo. “FARC Is a `Paper Tiger’ After Offensive, Desertions” Oct. 29 2008(Bloomberg)accessed at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid= 20601086&sid=aCsN3xsYNI0M&refer=lat in_america 2 Jeremy McDermott . “Colombia’s rebels: A fading force?” BBC. February 1, 2008. 3 Helen Murphy and Bernard Lo.”FARC Is a `Paper Tiger’ After Offensive, Desertions”(Bloomberg. Oct. 29 2008 accessed at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/ news?pid=20601086&sid=aCsN3xsYNI0M& refer=latin_america 4 Leonard, Thomas M. (October 2005). Encyclopedia of The Developing World. Routledge. p.1362. ISBN 1-57958388-1. 5 Benedetta Berti. “Colombia’s FARC and the Basque ETA: Exploring the Tactical and Economic Partnership.” Terrorism Monitor Volume: 7 Issue: 2 January 23, 2009. 6 Adriaan Alsema. “FARC website taken offline.” Colombia Reports. August 21, 2009. Accessed at http://colombiareports.com/ colombia-news/news/5524-farc-website-takenoff-air.html 7 Juliana Rincón Parra. “Colombia: FARC’s controversial online presence”GlobalVoices. January 6, 2010, accessed at http:// globalvoicesonline.org/2010/01/06/colombiafarcs-controversial-online-presence/ 8 Brett Borkan. “FARC becoming drug cartel: Police.” Colombia Reports. February 18, 2010. Accessed at: http://colombiareports. com/colombia-news/news/8296-farcbecoming-drug-cartel-police.html 9 Colombian governor: FARC leader is hiding in Venezuela. El Universal. Accessed at : http://english.eluniversal. com/2010/02/19/en_pol_esp_colombiangovernor:_19A3456015.shtml 10 Brett Borkan. “FARC becoming drug cartel: Police” Colombia Reports. February 18, 2010. Accessed at: http:// www.colombiareports.com/colombia-news/ news/8296-farc-becoming-drug-cartel-police. html. 11 Douglas Farah. “What the FARC Papers Show Us about Latin American Terrorism.” April 1, 2008. 12 Ray Walser. “The FARC Files, Colombia, and International Terrorism.” Heritage Foundation. March 28, 2008

Mr. Mylrea is a security consultant that has worked, lived, and traveled extensively in the Andean region of South America and the Golden Triangle in Southeast Asia. During this time, the author’s research focused on narcoinsurgencies and the best practices to counter them.

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13 Douglas Farah. “What the FARC Papers Show Us about Latin American Terrorism.” April 1, 2008.. 14 Ibid. 15 Peter Walker. “Venezuelan troops mobilize as Farc dispute nears boiling point.” Guardian, March 4, 2008. Accessed at http:// www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/mar/04/ colombia.venezuela 16 Michael Mylrea. “Winning the War on Drugs in Mexico: Sí, se puede!” April 16, 2009. Accessed at: http://www. foreignpolicyjournal.com/2009/04/16/ winning-the-war-on-drugs-in-mexico-si-sepuede/ 17 Speech by Adm. James G. Stavridis at the Center for Strategic and International Studies on January 16, 2008. 18 Douglas Farah. “Lessons Learned from the Campaign Against the FARC in Colombia.” November 16, 2008 NEFA Accessd at: http://www.nefafoundation. org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/ nefafarclessonslearned1108.pdf 19 Frank Bajak. “U.S.-tapped phones aided Colombia rescue” Associated Press. July 13, 2008. 20 Oeindrila Dube and Suresh Naidu. 2010. “Bases, Bullets, and Ballots: The Effect of U.S. Military Aid on Political Conflict in Colombia.” CGD Working Paper 197. Washington, D.C.: Center for Global Development. http://www.cgdev.org/content/publications/ detail/1423498. 21 C. Peter Rydell, Susan S. Everingham. “Controlling Cocaine: Supply Versus Demand Programs” RAND. 1994 Accessed at: http:// www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/ MR331/ 22 Ibid 23 Oeindrila Dube and Suresh Naidu. 2010. “Bases, Bullets, and Ballots: The Effect of U.S. Military Aid on Political Conflict in Colombia.” CGD Working Paper 197. Washington, D.C.: Center for Global Development. http://www.cgdev.org/content/publications/ detail/1423498 24 Ibid 25 Ibid 26 Douglas Farah. Lessons Learned from the Campaign Against the FARC in Colombia November 16, 2008 NEFA Accessed at: http://www.nefafoundation. org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/ nefafarclessonslearned1108.pdf

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by Rick Hahn For years, bombs aboard aircraft were, like most improvised explosive devices, comprised of an explosive main charge, a detonator (usually commercially manufactured) and an improvised electrical fuzing system that included wires, batteries, and switches. The bomb that brought down Pan Am 103 over Lockerbie in December 1988 was such a bomb.

o too were bombs designed by Palestinian terrorist Mohammed Rashid that exploded onboard an aircraft on approach to Honolulu in 1983 and over Rome a few years later. But as airport security grew more sophisticated, hiding the batteries, wires, and other components became more and more difficult. This was particularly true because many of the fuzing mechanisms were specifically designed to be just that, fuzing mechanisms, and would not readily be confused with a cell phone or an iPod going through security screening. Hence, the race for new technology began. Apparently, the goal was to build a bomb

One of the explosive shoes of the 2001 “shoe bomber”, Richard Reid. Photo: FBI Laboratory that a person could carry on board, but which had no electrical components. It seems the terrorists turned to history for answers. For many years before batteries were the common things they are today, miners and quarry operators used burning fuses to initiate explosives. This seems to be where the terrorists first turned. The December 2001case of Richard Reid, the famous airline passenger “shoe bomber,” represented this tactical adaptation. Reid, a resident of Britain and self-proclaimed al-Qaeda member, had a device constructed of pentaerythritol tetranitrate (PETN) and triacetone triperoxide (TATP) hidden in his shoes. The PETN was the intended

The advantage of Reid’s shoe bomb was that it had no moving parts, no batteries, no wires, none of the things that security screeners have traditionally been trained to look for.

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In short, without a dog trained to detect such materials, the likelihood of detecting them may be minimal.

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main charge and the TATP was meant to serve as the detonator. PETN is a “high”, or high-yield, explosive, releasing a large quantity of energy per weight. But PETN requires a sustained shock wave to initiate; it cannot be detonated with a burning fuse or electrical “hot wire” as low explosives can. The believed answer for the terrorists was TATP. TATP is a high explosive that is very sensitive to heat, shock, and friction. A mere spark is enough to initiate not just burning, but detonation, which in turn can initiate other, less sensitive explosives such as PETN. There was no commercial detonator, battery, or wire in the device contained in Reid’s shoes. Rather, Reid’s device was designed to be detonated with a burning fuse. The fire of a burning fuse would initiate the TATP, which in turn would detonate the PETN. Reports at the time indicate that Reid repeatedly struck matches while sitting aboard the aircraft in an apparent effort to light the fuse. His efforts failed and before he could detonate his device, his actions drew attention and resulted in his being overpowered and subdued by fellow passengers (after several attempts at lighting). The advantage of Reid’s shoe bomb was that it had no moving parts, no batteries, no wires, none of the things that security screeners have traditionally been trained to look for. Excepting detection by a dog or a “sniffing” technology, the device would likely not be detected by screening. Even at that, unless the dog was specifically trained to search for PETN or TATP, or could have detected the small amount of black powder

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contained in most burning fuses, (which presumably this was), it is unlikely that even a dog would alert on Reid. Indeed, despite secondary screening by French officials on the first day he tried to board a commercial aircraft, on December 21, none of the components of the device were detected. It is a direct result of the design of Reid’s device that in the United States (and many other places around the world) passengers are required to pass their shoes through the screening device as part of the security regimen. Still, Reid’s device failed to meet the objective: to bring down a commercial aircraft in an act of martyrdom. Evidently, other terrorists evolved another adaptation for concealed suicide bomb technology. In December 2009 Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, a Nigerian man allegedly linked to al-Qaeda, also tried to initiate an explosive device onboard a commercial jet. Like Reid’s shoe bomb, there were no wires or batteries in Abdulmutallab’s improvised explosive device. But unlike Reid’s bomb, hidden in his shoes and reliant on lighting a fuse to initiate it, Abdulmutallab’s bomb was contained in separate chemical components hidden in his clothing and relied on spontaneous combustion to function. The indictment against Abdulmutallab provides a description of the device. The document states: “The bomb consisted of a device containing . . . PETN . . . TATP . . . and other ingredients. The bomb was concealed inside defendant[’s] . . . clothing. The bomb was designed to allow defendant . . . to detonate it at the time of his choosing.”1 Prior reports indicated that the device, or components of it, was sewn into Abdulmutallab’s underwear, a place where even technical screening and pat-down searches would be less likely to detect the materials. So while Reid’s device and Abdulmutallab’s device may have similarities, the difference lies in the method of initiation. In the case of

Abdulmutallab, there are no reports of matches or lighters, but rather a report of a syringe with a liquid. While the technique of using a syringe with a liquid had already been demonstrated by demolitions’ experts, this was an innovation over Reid’s attempt at initiating a bomb. There are a variety of chemicals known to react when combined, bursting into flames within seconds of contact with each other. Hence, the chancy matter of lighting a burning fuse, as Reid attempted, would not be required for Abdulmutallab’s device. Rather, Abdulmutallab could merely remove the components from his clothing, arrange them, and then using the syringe inject the reactive material that would start spontaneous combustion. The combustion, like the burning fuse in Reid’s shoe, would initiate the TATP, and fractions of a second later, the PETN. Again, there is no way to easily detect these components. They are powders or liquids, required in relatively small quantities, and devoid of metals that are generally the key in security screening. In short, without a dog trained to detect such materials, the likelihood of detecting them may be minimal. Because Abdulmutallab’s device components appear to have been sewn into his underwear, there is a significant call to deploy millimeter wave body scanners that provide a virtual image of the scanned person’s body separate from articles of clothing. Indeed, this is a technology that, perhaps, may have detected the components carried by Abdulmutallab. But deployment of these devices would be both expensive and likely take years to implement. Additionally, many will object to this intrusion into private areas, possibly preventing deployment of this technology. However, even if deployed, it would not be a final solution. These devices may not probe the interior of the body, and there is already a report of

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a bomber carrying an explosive device hidden internally.2 In August 2009 an al-Qaeda fugitive from the Saudi justice system offered to give himself up, provided he could do so personally to Prince Muhammad bin Nayef, the Deputy Interior Minister of Saudi Arabia. This was arranged and the fugitive, Abdullah al-Asiri, was picked up by the prince’s security detail in Yemen and flown to a meeting with the prince. In the meeting, an explosive device purportedly hidden inside al-Asiri’s rectum detonated, causing minor injuries to the prince. It is believed that the device may have been triggered by a cell phone. In the wake of the Abdulmutallab bombing attempt, the story was revised, as “national security sources” reportedly told ABC news that the bomb carried by al-Asiri was an underwear bomb not unlike that worn by Abdulmutallab.3 My own review of photos from the scene where al-Asiri’s device detonated leads me to question this. The damage to his body4 leads me to believe that the device was, indeed, secreted inside his body as opposed to his underwear.5 We have another option being explored by terrorists—concealment of IED components in body cavities. This opens the door to several possibilities, the details of which I will leave to the reader’s imagination. It is sufficient to say that reasonable screening procedures will likely not detect all bomb components, particularly those designed to be chemically initiated and carried inside the body. On February 18, 2010, the Italian news agency Adnkronos ran a story from Sanaa, Yemen, in which it stated that al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (apparently responsible for training Abdulmutallab) said, “We have dozens of sophisticated explosive devices which are similar to that used by the Nigerian, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab on the Christmas Day flight . . . .” We are facing a challenging future

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in commercial air travel. It may soon become apparent that the most intrusive of security screening remains incapable of detecting a committed suicide bomber’s explosives. The goal of downing a commercial aircraft seems to be a continuing objective of the terrorists. Therefore, it is necessary to be watchful of fellow passengers. Whatever they may look like or where they come from, male, female, young, old, black, white, Asian, etc, you should pay attention. If you find them or their actions suspicious, go to the back of the plane and discreetly advise a crew member of any misgivings. Preemption may be the optimum goal, but yet again, we see that the final line of defense is reliant upon the individual citizen’s awareness and actions.

•

ABOUT THE AUTHOR Mr. Hahn is a retired FBI agent. The author’s experience includes fourteen years as an investigator in terrorism cases and seven years in the FBI Laboratory Explosives Unit as an examiner of explosive and hazardous devices.

ENDNOTES U.S. v Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, 2: 10-cr-20005, Indictment, January 6, 2010. 2 Gardner, Frank, Fears Over ‘Internal’ Terror Bomb, BBC News, September 26, 2009 3 Tapper, Jake, The August Attempt on Prince Mohammed, and the Link to Flight 253, ABC News, January 3, 2010, http://blogs.abcnews.com/ politicalpunch/2010/01/the-augustattempt-on-saudi-prince-mohammed---and-the-link-to-flight-253.html 4 Europol report; The concealment of Improvised Explosive Devices in rectal cavities, The Hague, September18, 2008. 5 It’s worth noting that both the attack against Prince bin Nayef and the Abdulmutallab attack were orchestrated out of Yemen and credit in both cases was claimed by al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. 1

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ATAC 360 The Advanced Thermal Acquisition Camera available from P&R Infrared (a division of P&R Technologies, Inc) was designed to detect man-sized objects from over 1500 feet away in complete darkness and through adverse atmospheric conditions without any form of natural or artificial illumination. Designed for land and sea vehicle employment, it can be operated by either wired or wireless remote control. It provides 370 degree horizontal rotation and 135 degree vertical tilt with fingertip controls. The ATAC 360 has a built

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Counter

advertiser index

The

JUNE/JULY 2010

Volume 3 • Number 3

Official Journal of the Homeland Security Professional To request detailed product information, circle the appropriate reader service number (RSN) on the attached Reader Service Card. The card is self-addressed and includes postage. For more information on all of our advertisers and advertising opportunities, please visit our website at: www.thecounterterroristmag.com/advertising.asp Individual advertisers’ websites are also provided below for your convenience.

RSN

Ad/Company • website and/or email....................................................................................................... Page Number

32 8 35 27 35 10 35 95 95 59 59 6 12 25 67 67 123 123 57 57 163 163 16 77 18 85 85 83 83 19 77 81 81 53 53 20 77 51 51 39 39 13 341 49 49 22 79 141 141 9 77 34 167 24 28 153 153 7 77 75 75 169 169 63 63 3 109 191 191 73 315 315 4 77 1 41 14 45 30 171 171 131 131 37 37 117 117 179 143 143 99 99 29 29 26 77 69 69 71 71

27 11th Annual USNSTA Tactical Training Seminar • www.usnsta.com............................................................................... 15 5.11 Tactical • www.quanticotactical.com/511....................................................................................................................... 19 5th Annual Homeland Security Professional Conference • www.thecounterterroristmag.com/conference................ 55 Adams Industries • www.adamsindustries.com.......................................................................................................... 49 19 2 Ahura Scientific • www.ahurascientific.com/ct........................................................................................................... 19 ALS Technologies Inc • www.lesslethal.com.............................................................................................................. 52 54 American Public University • www.amuonline.com................................................................................................. 45 41 59 American Security Challenge • www.americansecuritychallenge.com.................................................................................. 41 Archangel Group • www.battlesling.com.............................................................................................................................. 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70 The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2010

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TRAINING REVIEW

Advanced Neutralization of Locks

By Chris Graham

n a hot Iraqi day, I crouched behind a dried mud wall. Our breacher banged away with a ram on a steel door. That door stood between us and the compound we were attempting to raid. Recent ROE (rules-of-engagement) changes had pushed us away from the use of explosive breaches and forced a wider use

While a number of us had long felt that we needed to acquire skills for subtly gaining entry, in the military, only an insufficient few possessed these skills. Since then I have had the opportunity to attend the National Intelligence Academy’s (NIA) Basic and Advanced Neutralization of Locks courses. NIA has been training law enforcement

a retired SWAT officer and A.L.O.A. certified master locksmith, and possesses a full career’s experience in interagency covert entry operations. One of the most experienced men in the country with these skills, he regularly took phone calls throughout the course from various agency personnel in the field seeking his insight into particularly challenging locks,

of mechanical breaching. Unfortunately for us, we encountered a locked steel door that stood between us and our objective. As our tenacious breacher banged away in futility, the mission commander and I hastily debated the merits of crashing a vehicle through a mud wall. Each loud clang increased the likelihood that we would suddenly eat enemy fire.

and other government personnel since 1971. The NIA instructors are seasoned law enforcement veterans with comprehensive experience in the unique skill sets represented in the many courses offered. Bob Duman was the instructor for both courses that I attended at NIA’s South Florida classroom. Duman is

alarms, and safes. Further distinguishing NIA’s training is the comprehensive array of locks, tools, and training aids provided for each student’s use. On the first day of the advanced course, we began practicing basic picking skills, this time with mini-picks for small locks such as those that might be found on a computer or lighting timer. We

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discussed the value of decoding a lock and making a key if a lock is difficult to pick, and of confirming that a lock functions before investing time attempting to pick it. We spent the remainder of the morning picking locks with pick guns. In the afternoon, we discussed how to defeat handcuffs, shimmed open padlocks, and began a discussion about car locks. The next day we continued the study of vehicle locks, which came with the admonishment that this topic could easily support an additional week of training. We finished the day impressioning keys. Day three included viewing a video by former Royal Marines Commando, John Falle, and practicing combing brass padlocks, defeating tubular locks, and defeating tough door locks with a deformed ice pick. Finally, we discussed drilling shear lines to open locks.

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On the fourth day, we discussed Abloy, Primus, Medeco, and Mul-T-Locks. We watched a video on the use of an underthe-door entry tool and discussed ways to improvise this gear. We ended the day discussing defeating electric locks that fail-safe (open) and those that fail-secure. We played with a door handle-removing device, opened push-button locks, and discussed making master keys. On the final day of training, we worked with interchangeable core locks, resolved some final questions, and wrapped up early enough for students (government personnel from five countries) to catch flights. The Iraq raid described above ended with the resident (apparently sick of the noise) opening the steel door before any vehicles crashed through the wall. The raid resulted in the seizure of 50 electric

blasting caps and about 20 rockets (marked “made in Brazil”), and the capture of one well-mannered insurgent. One of the wisest men I have worked for used to regularly say, “Hope is not a course of action.” If you agree with this insight, you may choose to ensure that your personnel are appropriately trained. Lock neutralization skills are necessary for some special investigations and are valuable for escape and evasion skills. These skills should be mandatory for breachers and they are becoming increasingly necessary for EOD (explosive ordinance disposal) operations. The National Intelligence Academy and instructor Bob Duman provide this training with a level of quality that would be extremely difficult to duplicate. www.nationalintelligenceacademy.com

•

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