TALIBAN SHADOW GOVERNMENT • PSEUDO OPERATIONS • LeT • AL-MANAR PROPAGANDA
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The Journal for Law Enforcement, Intelligence & Special Operations Professionals OCTOBER/NOVEMBER 2011
VOLUME 4 • NUMBER 5
COVER STORY:
30
THE IRANIAN ART OF WAR By Tom Nypaver
CONTENTS
FEATURES: 8
20
30
8
Firsthand: PSEUDO OPERATIONS By Eeben Barlow
20
Case Study: SHADOW GOVERNMENT: THE TALIBAN TAKES A VILLAGE By Mark Sexton
46 58
AL-MANAR: SATELLITE PROPAGANDA NETWORK By M. Zuhdi Jasser
LASHKAR-E-TAIBA: A THREAT BEYOND THE INDIA-PAKISTAN EQUATION By A. S. Sekhon
DEPARTMENTS: 6
From the Editor
44
Book Review
69
Innovative Products
72
Training Review
Land of the Free Global Warrior
Modular Battering Ram, M4S1 Handguns, Gladiator Carbine Master Covert Neutralization of Locks
Cover: Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Illustration: Scott Morrison
58
The Counter Terrorist ~ October/November 2011 5
Counter The
FROM THE EDITOR:
Land of the Free By Chris Graham
O
Journal for Law Enforcement, Intelligence & Special Operations Professionals
VOLUME 4 • NUMBER 5
n August 30, 2006, Omeed Aziz Popal reportedly ran down 18 pedestrians in a black Honda Pilot in San Francisco. He is said to have referred to himself as a “terrorist” when being taken into custody. On January 8, 2011, Jared Lee Loughner reportedly shot congresswoman Gabrielle Giffords and 18 others in Tucson. Loughner has been described as a fan of the books Mein Kampf and The Communist Manifesto. Between February 11 and 12, 2011, Maksim Gelman reportedly went on a stabbing spree killing four and wounding five more in New York City. Gelman had multiple previous arrests on drug related charges. These incidents, and countless others, bear many commonalities. These attacks illustrate the fact that it is impossible for any policing agency to prevent occurrences of violent crime. Individual citizens are both the first and last line of defense in their own security. Those of us who have sworn to “support and defend the constitution of the United States” are painfully aware that we rarely have any privileges that civilians do not have regarding the carriage of weapons or the use of force for personal security. Our ability to protect ourselves and our families is generally no different than that of any citizen. Those of us who “protect and serve” are granted special privileges and responsibilities pertaining to the carriage of weapons and use of force. Even members of policing agencies, however, face the reality that family members are vulnerable. Parents, spouses, siblings and adult children can only protect themselves in the same ways that all citizens are permitted to. Crime and terrorism are present around the world. American citizens, however, are guaranteed the right to bear arms for defense by the Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and are traditionally expected to actively defend themselves. One must therefore wonder if a single victim or bystander in the above attacks had been armed and in possession of the most basic level of fighting proficiency, how many lives might have been saved? While Mexican gang wars are cited as justification to contravene the Constitution, the undisputable fact remains that the vast majority of weapons used by narco-insurgents in Mexico are obtained from international arms dealers, corrupt government personnel and apparently, the Department of Justice. (See OP Fast and Furious link below.1) If American firearms being illegally transported to Mexico are cause for concern, perhaps gaining control of the border is a better solution than harassing law abiding American citizens. We are fortunate to live in a nation that has historically exercised restraint when it comes to concentrating trust and responsibility in the hands of government agents. Whether you live in the Wild West on the Mexican border, in al-Qaeda’s favored target—New York City—or anywhere in between, uninhibited application of the Second Amendment to the Constitution is as necessary today as it was in 1791. Semper Fidelis, Chris Graham Editor, The Counter Terrorist
1 Sharyl Atkisson. 2011. “ATF Manager Says He Shared Fast and Furious Info with White House.” CBS News. Aug 17. http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-31727_162-20083772-10391695.html
OCTOBER/NOVEMBER 2011 Editor Chris Graham Director of Operations Sol Bradman Director of Advertizing Carmen Arnaes Director of Production Kelli Richardson Contributing Editors Eeben Barlow Jennifer Hesterman Richard Marquise Tom Nypaver Steve Young Graphic Design Morrison Creative Company Copy Editor Laura Town Office Manager Lily Valdes Publisher: Security Solutions International 13155 SW 134th St. • STE 204 Miami, Florida 33186
ISSN 1941-8639 The Counter Terrorist Magazine, Journal for Law Enforcement, Intelligence & Special Operations Professionals is published by Security Solutions International LLC, as a service to the nation’s First Responders and Homeland Security Professionals with the aim of deepening understanding of issues related to Terrorism. No part of the publication can be reproduced without permission from the publisher. The opinions expressed herein are the opinions of the authors represented and not necessarily the opinions of the publisher. Please direct all Editorial correspondence related to the magazine to: Security Solutions International SSI, 13155 SW 134th Street, Suite 204, Miami, Florida. 33186 or info@thecounterterroristmag.com The subscription price for 6 issues is $34.99 and the price of the magazine is $5.99. (1-866-573-3999) Fax: 1-786-573-2090. For article reprints, e-prints, posters and plaques please contact: PARS International Corp. Web: www.magreprints.com/quickquote.asp Email: reprints@parsintl.com Phone: 212-221-9595 • Fax: 212-221-9195 Please visit the magazine web site where you can also contact the editorial staff:
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The Counter Terrorist ~ October/November 2011 7
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Firsthand:
PSEUDO OPERATIONS Counter The
An Executive Outcomes pseudo team prior to deployment, Angola, 1994. Photo: Author.
8 The Counter Terrorist ~ October/November 2011
In 1982 the war between South Africa and Angola was bloody and brutal. The socialist South West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO) along with Cuba, East Germany, and Russia allied with Angola.1
By Eeben Barlow
T
he South African Defence Force’s (SADF) 32 Battalion had been deployed into Angola to conduct combat operations. The battalion’s small Reconnaissance Wing was asked to conduct offensive reconnaissance tasks for the battalion as well as raids, ambushes, and snatch operations. Many of these tasks were executed as pseudo tasks aimed at deceiving and misleading the enemy and the local population. I commanded one such simple mission: locate a small, well-hidden dirt track being used by the communist Forças Armadas Populares de Libertação de Angola (FAPLA)2 to resupply the Angolan garrison at Cahama. The battalion was especially concerned that part of this resupply would include Soviet SA-7 man portable surface-to-air missiles, a very real threat to our aircraft and helicopters that were already in short supply. Once located, the battalion would use all means possible to cut off this supply route and keep it under pressure.
Campaign vehicle of the SWAPO party of Namibia. Photo: Pgallert Lacking both decent maps and aerial photographs, the only way we could locate the road was to traverse the dense bush and hope we stumbled across it. After 5 days, we finally found it. Whilst still at the road, we heard a vehicle approaching and a decision was taken to attack it. The hasty ambush led to several enemy killed and six SA-7 missiles being found in the vehicle. Being unable to carry the missiles with us, we damaged them sufficiently to render them useless.
Lacking both decent maps and aerial photographs, the only way we could locate the road was to traverse the dense bush and hope we stumbled across it.
The Counter Terrorist ~ October/November 2011 9
As men who had been in combat for several years, we were not lacking in aggressiveness.
During our exfiltration, the local population informed us of a “large SWAPO base� directly on our exfiltration route. This base was located on the opposite side of a wide, dry river bed that lay directly in our path and that we had to cross. The locals guided us to the edge of the river bed and pointed out the base location. For several minutes, we watched a group of SWAPO terrorists washing on the edge of the river bed. As a pseudo team, we knew we had surprise on our side. Wearing a mixture of FAPLA and SWAPO uniforms, carrying Soviet-bloc weapons and with faces and hands blackened to make us appear to be indigenous (at least from a distance), we formed up into an extended line and began our advance to contact on them. As men who had been in combat for several years, we were not lacking in aggressiveness. They noticed us as we broke cover on the opposite river bank and began our long walk across the open river bed toward them. Believing we were either part of their group or allied FAPLA troops, they waved a greeting at us. When
SWAPO billboard 2004. we got to within a few meters from them, they realized their mistake, but it was too late. We opened fire. Deception and surprise by our 8-man pseudo team was complete. We overran the 120-man enemy camp, killed and wounded numerous SWAPO, and destroyed weapons, ammunition, and a recent supply of equipment and medical supplies they had received from Norway. Those who did not fall during the hail of fire fled as fast as they could.
10 The Counter Terrorist ~ October/November 2011
There is nothing novel about insurgencies, terrorism, or pseudo operations. What is new is the absolute determination of modern-day terrorists, as well as criminal and political insurgents, to apply extreme violence against civilians with no apparent fear of consequence. Their actions are aimed at threatening, intimidating, or using violence against innocent civilians to demoralize and coerce support—with the goal of undermining or manipulating
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The former South African Defence Force base in Outapi, Omusati, Namibia. Photo: Rtevels governments. Indeed, in their violent attempts to smother freedom, they commonly resort to twisting the law to make their wrongs appear right. The strategy employed by these groups has resulted in a shift in the nature of conflict, resulting in governments having to consider new methods of safeguarding their interests and protecting their monopoly on the use of violence. Modern attempts to counter these threats do not always yield the results planners hope for. The armed forces and law enforcement agencies are required to operate according to the laws of war and abide by rules of engagement and use-of-force policies, guidelines that often favor the insurgents
and terrorists. The resultant effect is similar to trying to fight an agile enemy with both hands tied. An often overlooked covert weapon in the arsenal against terrorism and insurgencies is the conduct of pseudo operations—operations aimed at deceiving the enemy (just as terrorists rely upon deception) and exploiting opportunities. These operations can serve as a force multiplier and assist in wresting initiative from the enemy. Numerous misconceptions exist regarding pseudo teams and their deployment and operation. These misconceptions are because the typical pseudo team is small—usually between
There is nothing novel about insurgencies, terrorism, or pseudo operations.
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CLEAR S EC U R E TRAIN
Bridge destroyed during civil war in Angola. Photo: Paulo César Santos four to six men—wears the uniform of the enemy, is highly mobile, carries the weapons of the enemy, and applies enemy tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). They can either include or exclude captured enemy troops that have been “turned.” Making use of turned troops in a pseudo team holds several advantages. Not only do they know the “lay of the land”, but they speak the local languages and dialects, understand the customs and traditions of the local population, and when necessary, can make direct contact with the local population for intelligencegathering purposes whilst posing as the enemy. Pseudo teams need not be used exclusively for intelligence gathering. In conventional, semi-conventional, and unconventional warfare, they can add to a commander’s operational and tactical options. Adding to the misconception of pseudo operations is the misguided belief that these teams must act as “insurgents” or “terrorists” when encountering the local population. Although they apply enemy TTPs—and whatever works to ensure
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14 The Counter Terrorist ~ October/November 2011
mission success—their operations are aimed at maximizing avoidance of the local population but if picked up, to give the appearance of being the enemy. (They should avoid the local population at all costs, and when contact with the locals is forced, they must be able to carry off their deception.) Pseudo teams, despite their ability to conduct reconnaissance of enemy positions and gather intelligence, are highly aggressive, heavily armed, small fighting teams or sticks that are able to take offensive action when it is needed. The aim of pseudo operations is to: 1. Deceive the enemy and the local population 2. Allow own forces to operate undetected in enemy territory 3. Conduct reconnaissance of enemy positions and movements 4. Gather intelligence 5. Conduct follow-up operations 6. Act as forward air controllers/ artillery forward observers/naval gunfire spotters 7. Conduct other offensive actions against the enemy such as raids, ambushes, etc.
Despite the small size of the pseudo teams, success is based on knowing the enemy and his TTPs, deception, stealth, surprise, aggressiveness, and firepower. A well-trained pseudo team is able to successfully attack a numerically superior force and devastate it. However, if the teams are not correctly trained, equipped, and supported, any potential pseudo operation can become a disaster in the making. There are numerous factors that influence the role and effectiveness of pseudo teams. These include, inter alia, the following: 1. Selection criteria of those willing to operate in pseudo teams 2. The enemy 3. The terrain 4. The local population 5. Climatic conditions 6. Intelligence 7. Preparation of the pseudo teams 8. Own forces deployments and support The successful conduct of any pseudo operation is reliant on the following: 1. Intelligence 2. Training, equipping, and preparing the teams 3. Insertion and exfiltration 4. Support As strategy is driven by intelligence, a lack of this vital prerequisite will lead to failure and compromise of the pseudo teams. Intelligence is therefore the lifeblood of any pseudo operation. The requisite intelligence needed to train and deploy pseudo teams can be gained from numerous sources such as: 1. Agents and informers 2. Radio intercepts 3. Air photography 4. Real-time air reconnaissance 5. Ground reconnaissance 6. Prisoners and deserters 7. The local population and
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e er st d av gi ter 2nd s ve Regifsorer 2nr to s0a00e RBe eifsotrmeeb2enrd£to1,s0a0v0 ge e e , RBeepftoermepbtor £to1 000 S ept u beto 1, B Se temup to £ p Se up
BRINGING BRINGING BRINGING TOGETHER TOGETHER TOGETHER THE THE THE WORLWIDE WORLWIDE WORLWIDE GEO GEO GEO COMMUNITY COMMUNITY COMMUNITY Geospatial Geospatial Geospatial Insight Insight Insight forforDefence forDefence Defence & &Intelligence &Intelligence Intelligence
23 23 - 26 23 - 26 January - 26 January January 2012 2012 2012 QEIIQEII Conference QEII Conference Conference Centre, Centre, Centre, London London London
KEY KEY KEY FOCUS FOCUS FOCUS AREAS AREAS AREAS FOR FOR FOR 2012 2012 2012 MAPS MAPS TO MAPS APPS TO TO APPS - APPS Focused - Focused - Focused on delivering on on delivering delivering online online on online demand on on demand demand and and onand time on on time data, time data, information data, information information and and analysis and analysis analysis to each to each to each useruser in-theatre user in-theatre in-theatre and and in HQ. and in HQ. in HQ. GIS ARCHITECTURE GISGIS ARCHITECTURE ARCHITECTURE & MISSION & MISSION & MISSION MANAGEMENT MANAGEMENT MANAGEMENT - Focus - Focus - on Focus the on challenges on thethe challenges challenges GIS GIS professionals GIS professionals professionals havehave when have when designing when designing designing and and modifying and modifying modifying theirtheir systems their systems systems and and discussing and discussing discussing the practical thethe practical practical realities realities realities of providing of providing of providing information information information and and managing and managing managing datadata data on aon day-to-day on a day-to-day a day-to-day basis. basis. basis. INTELLIGENCE INTELLIGENCE INTELLIGENCE EXPANSION EXPANSION EXPANSION - Focusing - Focusing - Focusing on the on current on thethe current current GIS GIS strategies GIS strategies strategies and and operational and operational operational successes successes successes in preparation in preparation in preparation for for for the Olympic thethe Olympic Olympic Games Games Games in London, in London, in London, London London London Transport Transport Transport GIS,GIS, anti-terrorism GIS, anti-terrorism anti-terrorism workwork around work around around the major thethe major worldwide major worldwide worldwide cities, cities, cities, use use of imagery use of imagery of imagery and and data and data in data border in border in border control control control and and crime and crime prevention crime prevention prevention and and many and many others. many others. others. OPERATIONAL OPERATIONAL OPERATIONAL FOCUS FOCUS FOCUS - DGI - DGI is- moving DGI is moving is moving awayaway from away from theory from theory into theory into practical into practical practical operational operational operational casecase studies, case studies, studies, that that willthat focus willwill focus on focus on on current current current and and latest and latest GIS latest GIS strategies GIS strategies strategies fromfrom war from war theatres war theatres theatres around around around the globe. thethe globe. globe. HUMAN HUMAN HUMAN GEOGRAPHY GEOGRAPHY GEOGRAPHY - Using - Using -not Using only notnot only military only military military force, force, but force, intelligence butbut intelligence intelligence about about the about local thethe local people local people people has has proven has proven proven to betoone be to be oneone of the of most the of the most effective most effective effective newnew strategies new strategies strategies in Afghanistan, in Afghanistan, in Afghanistan, Lybia Lybia and Lybia and many and many other many other in-theatre other in-theatre in-theatre operations. operations. operations. GIS IN GISC4ISR GIS IN C4ISR IN -C4ISR For- the For - For fithe rstthe fitime rstfirst time ever time ever DGI ever DGI is aiming DGI is aiming is aiming to cover to cover tothe cover GIS thethe GIS strategies GIS strategies strategies and and tools and tools used tools used within used within C4ISR within C4ISR -C4ISR The- The - The big strategic bigbig strategic strategic capabilities capabilities capabilities based based on based GIS on on GIS or involving GIS or involving or involving GIS.GIS. GIS.
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Created Created Created byby the bythe the community community community forfor the forthe the community community community TheThe DGI The DGI 2012 DGI 2012 2012 Advisory Advisory Advisory Board Board Board & Speakers & Speakers & Speakers Already Already Already Include: Include: Include: Col. John Col.Col. Kedar, JohnJohn Kedar, Chief Kedar, Chief of Staff Chief of Staff of Staff Headquarters Headquarters Headquarters Engineer Engineer in Engineer Chief in Chief in Chief (Army), (Army), UK (Army), MOD UK MOD UK MOD
Vanessa Lawrence, CB Director Vanessa Lawrence, Vanessa Lawrence, CB Director CB Director General and and Chief Executive, General and General Chief Executive, Chief Executive, Ordnance Survey Ordnance Ordnance Survey Survey
Susanne Yoakum-Stover, Executive Susanne Yoakum-Stover, Susanne Yoakum-Stover, Executive Executive Director, Institute For For Modern Director, Institute Director, Institute For Modern Modern Intelligence Intelligence Intelligence
Ric Diaz, GEOINT Team Leader, Ric Diaz, GEOINT Ric Diaz, Team GEOINT Leader, Team Leader, Intelligence Fusion Centre, RAFRAF Intelligence Intelligence Fusion Centre, Fusion RAF Centre, Molesworth, UK MOD Molesworth, Molesworth, UK MOD UK MOD
Michael W. Michael Powers, W.Technical Powers, Technical Michael W. Powers, Technical Director Geospatial Director Geospatial Research Research and and and Director Geospatial Research Engineering, Engineering, US Army US Army Engineering, US Army
ElizaEliza Manningham-Buller, Former Eliza Manningham-Buller, Manningham-Buller, Former Former MI5MI5 Head,Head, MI5Head,
BrigHockenhull, Jim Jim Hockenhull, D ISTAR, Brig Jim Brig Hockenhull, D ISTAR, D ISTAR, UK MOD UK MOD UK MOD
Andy Andy Marles, Andy Marles, Chief Marles, Chief Fire Chief Offi Fire cer, Fire Officer, Officer, SouthSouth Wales South Wales Fire Wales &Fire Rescue Fire & Rescue & Rescue
John Teufert, JohnJohn Teufert, NC3A Teufert, NC3A Geo-Offi NC3A Geo-Offi cer, Geo-Offi cer, cer, NATONATO C3NATO Agency C3 Agency C3 Agency
Ramage Executive Director, StevenSteven Ramage Steven Executive Ramage Executive Director, Director, Marketing and and Communications, Marketing Marketing and Communications, Communications, Geospatial Consortium OpenOpen Geospatial Open Geospatial Consortium Consortium (OGC)(OGC) (OGC)
Vice Admiral ViceVice Admiral Robert Admiral Robert B. Robert Murrett, B. Murrett, B. Murrett, Dept. Dept. Director, Dept. Director, Institute Director, Institute Institute for National for National for National Security Security Security and andand Counterterrorism Counterterrorism Counterterrorism (INSCT) (INSCT) (INSCT)
Kenneth Pugh, Head of Navy, Geo, Navy,Navy, Kenneth Pugh, Kenneth Head Pugh, of Geo, Head of Geo, Chile MOD MOD Chile MOD Chile
Leendert Leendert Bal, Leendert Director, Bal, Bal, Director, European Director, European European Maritime Maritime Maritime Safety Safety Agency Safety Agency Agency
Colley, Ast. Ast. Secretary Frank Frank Colley, Frank Ast. Colley, Secretary Secretary Defence GEOINT, Defence Imagery Defence GEOINT, Defence Defence GEOINT, Imagery Defence Imagery & Geospatial Organisation (DIGO), & Geospatial & Geospatial Organisation Organisation (DIGO), (DIGO), DoDDoD Aust.Aust. DoDAust.
Brig.Brig. General (ret)(ret) Amnon Sofrin, Brig. General (ret) General Amnon Sofrin, Amnon Sofrin, ofIntelligence The Intelligence Directorate Head Head of The Head of The Intelligence Directorate Directorate Israeli Intelligence Service Israeli Intelligence Israeli Intelligence Service Service (ISIS)(ISIS) (ISIS)
Col Pat ColFryer, Col Pat Fryer, Pat Section Fryer, Section Head Section HeadHead Geospatial Geospatial Geospatial PolicyPolicy & Operations, Policy & Operations, & Operations, SHAPE, SHAPE, NATO SHAPE, NATO NATO
Marlene Meyer, Marlene Head Meyer, of Defence, Head of Defence, Marlene Meyer, Head of Defence, Geospatial Geospatial Organisation, Organisation, Denmark Denmark Geospatial Organisation, Denmark
Lt. Col. Lt.Neil Col. Lt. Marks, Col. NeilNeil Marks, National Marks, National Expert, National Expert, Expert, Col. Babis Col.Col. Babis Paraschou, Babis Paraschou, Paraschou, Chief ChiefChief Council Council of Council theofEuropean the of the European European UnionUnion Union Geospatial Geospatial Geospatial Officer, OffiNATO cer, Officer, NATO NATO Col.Col. Mark Burrows, Commander, Deployment Deployment Deployment Corps, Corps, Greece Corps, Greece Greece Col. Mark Burrows, Mark Commander, Burrows, Commander, UK MOD JAGO,JAGO, UKJAGO, MOD UK MOD Pyatt, Director, GEOINT Policy SteveSteve Pyatt, Steve Director, Pyatt, GEOINT Director, Policy GEOINT Policy and and Plans, New Zealand MoDMoD KjetilKjetil Utne,Utne, Director, Military and Plans, New Plans, Zealand New MoD Zealand CaptainCaptain Kjetil Captain Utne, Director, Military Director, Military Geographic Service, Norwegian Geographic Geographic Service, Norwegian Service, Norwegian MOD MODMOD
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so forth The intelligence thus gained is required to: 1. Determine the enemy’s primary and secondary areas of operations, assembly areas, safe areas, logistical supply, reaction times, and deployments 2. Determine the pseudo team’s TTPs 3. Determine the dress and actions of the pseudo teams 4. Determine resupply points and helicopter landing zones 5. Determine cache areas, especially during long-term pseudo operations 6. Confirm terrain in terms of uniforms, footwear, and other equipment 7. Confirm maps, mapping requirements, and so forth However, intelligence without welltrained, correctly equipped troops to exploit it is worthless. Likewise, a strategy based on a lack of intelligence is worthless. The training of the troops must include specialist training and needs to emphasize: 1. Daring 2. Initiative 3. Teamwork 4. Improvisation 5. Aggressiveness 6. Fire discipline 7. Leadership 8. Fieldcraft and environmental tactics 9. Quick thinking 10. Surprise 11. Confidence The deployment of a pseudo team can be achieved by numerous means of infiltration. These include, inter alia, the following: 1. By foot 2. By vehicle 3. Aircraft (fixed wing parachute
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The Counter Terrorist ~ October/November 2011 17
drops) 4. Helicopter (rappelling or fast roping) 5. Small boats such as canoes Successful employment of pseudo teams depends on: 1. Outstanding command and control 2. Close air support (on call) 3. A quick reaction force to follow up on successes or need for assistance—on standby for duration of the operation 4. Medevac and casevac assets on call 5. Standby operators to replace casualties 6. Outstanding communications The deployment of pseudo teams must always be: 1. Conducted in secret 2. Into a restricted area or “frozen” area—an area where no friendly
forces or allied troops are active. Own forces or allied troops can be used to reinforce the outer boundaries of the area the pseudo teams are deployed in, but are not authorized to enter it when active. Successful pseudo operations do not “just happen.” They are well planned and controlled to ensure maximum success at all levels. As a weapon in the commander’s arsenal, pseudo teams can play an invaluable role in deceiving the enemy and creating confusion, an aspect that can be exploited in operations against terrorist and insurgent alike. The essence of success lies with intelligence, training, equipping, deployment, and support.
•
ABOUT THE AUTHOR Mr. Barlow is a former special operations officer and intelligence
officer of the South African Defence Force. The author was also the founder of the private military company, Executive Outcomes, author of the book “Executive Outcomes” (Galago Publishing, 2007) and eebenbarlowsmilitaryandsecurityblog. blogspot.com
ENDNOTES South West African People’s Organisation. 2 Angolan Ground Forces. 3 Only those of us of European extraction blackened-up. Our black African troops didn’t need to. 4 A more detailed account can be found in the book They Live by the Sword (Breytenbach, J. Galago, 1990). 5 Turned enemy troops are those that have chosen to switch sides and fight against their erstwhile friends. 6 A stick is an element consisting of four men. 1
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Counter Terrorist ~ October/November 2011 19
Case Study:
SHADOW GOVERNMENT: The Taliban Takes a Village
Key villagers meet with U.S. forces in Afghanistan. U.S. Navy photo by Lt. Cmdr. Steven Parks
Counter The
20 The Counter Terrorist ~ October/November 2011
A common method used by Taliban tribal members in eastern and southern Afghanistan to gain control of an area deemed of strategic interest to the Taliban leadership operating from safe havens in Pakistan or within Afghanistan is to identify and target villages to subvert. The Taliban has recognized the necessity to operate with the compliance of the local population.
By Mark Sexton
T
he modus operandi has been to gain its cooperation through indoctrination (preferred) or coercion (when necessary). The control of villages is tactically needed to allow the Taliban to stage fighters and equipment to be used in attacks against Afghan security forces and US and coalition troops, and strategically to operate an effective and parallel “shadow government” that supplants the Afghan central government. The Taliban utilize existing tribal networks and alliances to further its own organizational growth in areas whenever possible. This “piggybacking” on Pashtun tribal structure facilitates the ability of the Taliban to rapidly spread into areas and to withstand network targeting as US and coalition forces disrupt old and established Pashtun tribal agreements. The Taliban destabilize and alienate the population from Afghan government and US policies and efforts in a targeted
This photo is caught from a video film that has been filmed by RAWA in Kabul using a hidden camera. It shows two Taliban from department of Amro bil mahroof (Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice, Taliban religious police) beating a woman in public because she has dared to remove her burqa in public. Photo: RAWA
area. One must understand Pashtun tribal structure and apply lethal and non-lethal operations appropriately to interdict our adversaries’ ability to exploit traditional Pashtun tribal networks.
VILLAGE NODES OF INFLUENCE For a non-Afghan or foreigner to understand how the Taliban can subvert a village, we can use a simple social structure model to identify the key nodes of influence within a typical Afghan village. A village can be divided into three areas that most affect how daily life is lived. These areas generally fall under political and administrative, religious, and security. These three areas can be considered key nodes of influence in every Afghan village. The node that is the most visible to outsiders is that of the malik and village elders. The malik
and village elders represent the political aspects of the village. A second key node is the imam. The imam represents the religious node of influence within a village. A third local node of influence is the system of security found within a village. Security is traditionally conducted by the men of each individual village, which is a village-based militia (lashkar). When one or more of the parts or nodes of influence is controlled by either the Taliban or Afghan government in a village, then the side having taken or controlling the village nodes will have the most influence. This victory can be temporal in nature.
TALIBAN CONTROL OF VILLAGE NODES The Taliban looks for villages and areas that it can operate within and use as a base against US and Afghan
The Counter Terrorist ~ October/November 2011 21
forces. Areas with little US presence or Afghan police or army are prime areas the Taliban will initially seek to subvert and hold. The Taliban builds networks by getting a fighter, religious leader, or village elder to support them. Whichever one or more are initially used will be exploited by tribal and familial ties. The village politics administered by the elders and represented by an appointed leader (malik) are the most identifiable node of influence of any particular village. The Taliban will attempt to sway those village leaders who are not supportive by discussion and if necessary, threats, violence, or death. In villages where the locals say there is no malik, it is usually described as a convenience to the village as “no one wants the position” or sometimes “the elders cannot agree on a malik so it is better that there is none.” In these cases, it is likely that the Taliban has intimidated, driven out, or killed that village representative. When locals are pressed for a representative they will give you a name of a person who has come to represent the village. This individual
will most likely be in support of and supported by the Taliban. The Taliban will use coercion or force, if necessary, to install a malik or “representative of the village.” A “sub-commander” will be established in the village to keep those in line who would resist the Taliban or the malik, and will be supported by limited funding. The sub-commander may have several fighters under his control with the ability to augment with other sub-commanders and fighters as needed. The fighters will often be armed only with small arms and rocket-propelled grenades. They may or may not have an IED capability, and if not will coordinate IED activities for defense and when possible offense against US and Afghan forces. These fighters may stay in the village but preferably are not from the village. Currently, many fighters are recruited from the Punjab and in Pakistani religious schools (madrassas). Locals can sometimes be pressed into service to fight when needed, but the Taliban tend to use fighters from different villages so
Nad e Ali Central School in Helmand, Afghanistan. Photo: ISAF Headquarters Public Affairs Office 22 The Counter Terrorist ~ October/November 2011
that when threats or physical violence is utilized it won’t be kinsman against kinsman. Blood-relative males from Pashtun villages may fight and it may be revenge against Afghan and coalition forces due to what they feel are egregious acts committed against themselves and their village, which is exploited by the Taliban. The imam and local mosques of villages are often visited by the Taliban. This is not generally opposed by villagers as it is expected that even the Taliban must be allowed to perform and express their Islamic duties. These mosque visits afford the Taliban opportunities to gauge village sentiment and to build and establish contacts within localities. Village religious leaders also serve to educate children in villages where the Taliban have either closed or destroyed the local school. The mosque and imam serve as an education center for the Taliban while still presenting an opportunity for village children to be “educated.” This presents a solution to the unpopular notion of schools being closed. A constant and recognized complaint from the Afghan people is the lack of opportunity because of poor education. The Taliban will supplant the local imam if needed by supplying its own to a village. A village with no imam will receive one and the Taliban will establish a mosque. This mosque will serve as a meeting place for Taliban, a storage facility/cache, and an indoctrination center. Sympathetic locals are used as auxiliaries to provide food and shelter. One way to do this is for known supporters to place food and blankets outside their living quarters or in guest quarters to be used by Taliban in transit or operating within a village. This gives the resident supporter some cover of deniability. When US or Afghan forces arrive, all that is found are the blanket,
possibly clothing, footprints, and other signs of the Taliban’s visit. The Taliban has blended into the surrounding village.
TALIBAN CAN CONTROL WITH FEW FIGHTERS The Taliban method requires relatively few of its own personnel. Its strength is in the local subversion of the most basic levels of village organization and life. It is also a decentralized approach. Guidance is given and then carried out with commanders applying their own interpretation of how to proceed. The goal is to control the village, and at the local level the only effective method, which must be used by all commanders, is to control what we have termed the “nodes of influence.” Form fits function—an Afghan village can only work one way to enable its members to survive a subsistence agrarian lifestyle, and the Taliban know it well. To control an area, the Taliban will identify villages that can be most easily subverted. They will then spread to other villages in the area one at a time, focusing efforts on whichever node of influence seems most likely to support their effort first. Using this model, the Taliban could influence and dominate or control a valley or an area with relatively few active fighters and fighting leaders. The actual numbers may be more population and fewer fighters. Recently, one figure reported in the news from a Canadian general’s assessment held that active Taliban members had gone from 15 percent to 1 percent to 2 percent in villages in the districts of Zari and Panjway in southern Afghanistan. One to two percent of a population involved with an insurgency enables the Taliban to maintain resistance and control of a populated area. Most likely, the remaining Taliban members in these villages are cadre or leaders who can
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“Soldiers from Charlie Company 2nd Battalion, 87th Infantry Regiment set fire to a Taliban safehouse. Photo: U.S. Army
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reconstitute fighters and staging areas as needed when government forces depart that area. The Taliban will have an elaborate network to support their fighters in areas they control or dominate. They will have safe houses, medical clinics, supply sites, weapons caches, transportation agents, and early warning networks to observe and report. The US and Afghan forces, heavily laden with body armor and excessive equipment, are reluctant to leave their vehicles, sometimes by command design. They are blown up on the same predictable roads and paths that they entered the area on. The Taliban will use feints and lures to draw our forces away from caches and leaders in an attempt to buy them time to relocate, or draw friendly forces into a lethal ambush. After the attack, the Taliban disperse and blend into the village. The village will usually sustain civilian casualties and propaganda will be spread of US and Afghan forces using excessive force. The US and Afghan forces will leave or set up an outpost nearby, but the Taliban attacks will continue because the forces are not in the village, do not truly know “who’s who in the zoo,” and aren’t able to effectively interface with the village nodes of influence to their benefit. Locals are reluctant to help because to be seen talking with the Americans and Afghan security forces will result in a visit from a Taliban member to determine what they talked about and to whom. The local villagers know the government has no effective plan that can counter the Taliban in their village and will typically only give information on Taliban or criminal elements to settle a blood feud. The Pashtu people are patient to obtain justice and will use what they have to pay back “blood for blood,” even against the Taliban, through a complex code known as Pashtunwali of which badal (revenge),
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24 The Counter Terrorist ~ October/November 2011
nanwatai (asylum), and melmastia (hospitality) are examples that can help or hinder US and coalition efforts at pacifying a Pashtun tribe or area.
COUNTERING THE TALIBAN IN THE VILLAGE Countering Taliban subversion of the populace is not done effectively with just more troops located at outposts. The troops must coordinate their activities with the local population and establish security through and within the village. When US and Afghan forces do this the fight will typically take on a particularly violent aspect, and involve the population as the Taliban attempt to maintain control. The US and Afghan forces and government will need to identify individuals to use lethal and nonlethal targeting. This requires in-depth knowledge of tribal structure, alliances, and feuds. Viable alternatives or choices need to be available to village leaders and villagers. Just placing US and Afghan soldiers at an outpost and conducting token presence patrols and occasionally bantering with locals and organizing a meeting (shura) once a month have not worked. Afghan identity is not primarily national, i.e., belonging within a geographic boundary with a centralized national government. Afghan identity is tribal in nature. Americans view identity as a national government; in the villages, Afghans do not. The tribe is most important. The country “Afghanistan” running things from Kabul does not mean very much to the Afghan people in the villages under duress from the Taliban. US and Afghan forces must be able to infiltrate and shape the village nodes of influence and then target individuals.
.OGISTICS
241%74'/'06
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Terrorist ~ October/November 2011 25
Right now our military embraces a centralized, top-down driven approach that prevents our military and UStrained Afghan counterparts from doing so. Current US procedures and tactics attempt to identify the Taliban without regard to their influence or social role at a village level. Instead, we attempt to link individuals to attacks and incomplete network structures through often questionable intelligence. The individuals in nodes of influence must be identified as neutral, pro, or anti-Afghan government and then dealt with. To target any other way is haphazard at best and does not gain us the initiative. US and Afghan forces must also devise and utilize tactics to fight outside and inside the village. Proactive tactical pursuit operations based on basic military doctrine should be emphasized. Combat and reconnaissance patrols must be practiced and mastered. Afghan troops must be incorporated in operations as they grew up in similar village settings and can instantly recognize normal and abnormal patterns and understand the nuances of village life and mores. Counterinsurgency (COIN) and infantry tactics need to be tailored to the specific area and insurgents. Best are lightly equipped and fast-moving COIN forces
conducting tactical pursuit operations that go into villages and know how to properly interact with locals and identify Taliban insurgents. They must have the ability to take their time and stay in areas they have identified at the local level as worth trying to take back. Being moved from place to place in armored vehicles while barely engaging local leadership does not work. A light infantry force conducting specialized reconnaissance in villages, utilizing observation posts, and using proven tactics like trained visual trackers to follow insurgents into and out of villages while conducting ambushes, foot patrols outside the village, and knowing the local village situation are the key. Infantry tactics should also use vertical envelopment of Taliban fighters by helicopter and parachute to cut off avenues of escape and to insert troops to conduct sweeps and set blocking positions. Helicopters can be used to quickly reposition troops for greater effectiveness during operations and used for command and control. Gunships can be used to drive insurgents to ground (fix) while troops close upon and capture/ kill those they encounter. Troops should foot patrol into villages at night, talk with and document compounds and
26 The Counter Terrorist ~ October/November 2011
inhabitants for later analysis, and have a secure patrol base locally from which to operate. Mega bases or FOBs should only be used for support. Units and tactics must be decentralized.
EXTERNAL SUPPORT FOR TALIBAN AND END GAME The Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence agency has been implicated in supporting Taliban activities and movement within Pakistan and into Afghanistan. The Iranian government and Revolutionary Guards have also been implicated in helping the Taliban with the provision of arms, equipment, and expertise. With external sanctuary and a long, poorly controlled border and focus currently on al–Qaeda-only strikes in Pakistan, the Taliban has increased potential for survival. If the United States won’t or can’t go after the Taliban in its Pakistani sanctuary and stop the flow of arms and equipment from Iran, it is not surprising that the Taliban has been asked to come to the table and play a part in the governance of Afghanistan because it will not be eliminated by military and police operations as they are currently being conducted. The future of Afghanistan is going
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The Counter Terrorist ~ October/November 2011 27
and harbored and covered for al-Qaeda training camps and the perpetrators of 9/11, will be legitimized. Is this the success and win America wants? Should we build a failed state with US tax dollars and blood only to install elements of the Taliban back in power?
•
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter over Zabul province of Afghanistan, Oct. 15, 2009. Photo: Spc. Tia P. Sokimson to have Taliban as a political entity in the government if tactics are not appropriately evolved to the mission. The very same Taliban that forces women to
wear complete covering form head to toe in public, limits education of girls, imposes radical interpretations of Islamic justice, has killed hundreds of Americans,
Ophir Falk and Henr y Morgenstern have serious about winn compiled a book that should be read ing the war on terro better understan r. By painstakingly by anyone who is d the nature of analyzing the empi our enemies and rical data, they they offer important why they employ help us insights on how these barbaric tacti terrorism can be In so doing, they cs. Most crucially, effectively confr have performed onted and ultim an invaluable servi crucial battle. ately defeated. ce for all those who are committed to winning this —Benjamin Neta nyahu, former Prime Minister of Israe l
falk Morgenstern
SUICIDE TERROR
Understanding
edite
ophir falk and hed by nry Morgenstern
Understandin
g and Confro nting the threat
ing the threat
and Confront
U.s. and policymakers, first israeli experiences and detailed interv responders, and threat of suicide students of home iews with frontline personnel, terro Suicide Terror enab land security to understand and for future attacks. r. it analyzes recent suicide attac deal with the grow les ks as well as our following the expe current vulnerabili Moreover, they learn rt authors’ advic ties and likely scena ing e, readers learn how to prepare for and losses in the and imple ment an effective possible measures to prevent an rios event of an attac attac and quick response k. following an overv to minimize casua k. iew and historical lties review of suicide terror, the book cover • Global jihad s: • Israel’s confron tation with suicide te rroris m • America’s expe rience with suicide b ombings • Internationalizat ion of suicide terroris m • High-risk scena rios and future trends • Methods for co nfronting suicide terror • Medical manag ement of suicide terro rism Using eye-witnes s accounts, the text recreates the studies help reade look and feel of rs actua these very dangerousget into the minds of suicide terro rists in order to unde l terrorism incidents. Detailed threats. case rstand how to best This book is a defin prevent and confr itive study of suicide ont experts who have terror, synthesizing t dealt with it firsth he ex perience of well-kno devastating threa and. anyone respo wn Israeli and A t should read this nsible for unde meric rstan book and consider its recommendation ding, preventing, and confrontin an OPHIR FALK, LLB, g this s with all seriousne ss. institute for Coun MBA, is a Partner at the Naveh, K ter terrorism, wher of experience in e he has published antor Even-Har law firm and a Rese vario numerous articles carried out risk asses us security capacities and serve in the field. Mr. falk arch Fellow at the d as a consultant sments for olympic has over a decade for the venue 2004 s and critical natio HENRY MORGEN nal infrastructure. olympic games, where he STERN is the Presi than 500 federal, dent of security state solutions internation first responders to Is , and local agencies to effectively al, a company that of suicide terror. He rael to study Homeland Security. Mr. confront the threat of terror and regul has trained more radio stations, and has offered expert commentary on tMorgenstern is a widely publishe arly takes groups of d aut Web broadcasts. error-related issu es for NBC, ABC hor on the subject , CBS, Fox, numerous
SUICIDE TERROR
FIRSTHAND AC COUNTS AND FROM FRONTL INE PERSONNE ANALYSES L AND ExPERT IN THE wAR AG S AINS T TERROR Based on
Mr. Sexton has deployed to Afghanistan as a member of Special Forces A-Teams (ODAs) and as a security contractor and advisor to the Afghan Presidential Protective Security Detail. He is a National Guard warrant officer. The information contained in this article is based on his personal observations in Afghanistan and does not represent the perspective of any governmental agency. Mr. Sexton is the founder of Vista Tracking (www.vistatracking.com).
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THE IRANIAN ART OF WAR
Counter The
30 The Counter Terrorist ~ October/November 2011
Katyusha rocket fired from Lebanon hits Rothschild hospital in Haifa, Israel. Photo: tomer.gabel
By Tom Nypaver The ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have caused some to consider the possibility of a war with Iran,1 but the fact is that Iran has been in a cold war with the West since the Iranian revolution of 1979. Apart from the hostage crisis in that year, naval skirmishes of the 1980s, targeting of Americans in Lebanon, and Iranian weapons fielded against coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, the situation has not generally consisted of open hostilities between Iran and the United States. Iran has, however, employed espionage, sabotage, subversion, and terrorism by proxy to advance its interests.
T
he most notorious of these proxies is the Shia militia Hezbollah. As the “Arab Spring” movements reshape the political landscape throughout the Middle East, it is important to consider where Iran may try to replicate the model of Hezbollah in the region. To understand whether Iran is capable of such a feat, it is essential to understand Hezbollah’s origins, history, and evolution. In 1982 Israel conducted Operation Peace for Galilee, entering Lebanon in response to the attempted assassination of an Israeli ambassador by the Abu Nidal Organization. Following the invasion, members of the Amal militia split from that Syrian-backed
faction and adopted the moniker “Hezbollah” (Party of God). This branding was no coincidence, since the name had been used by the komiteh, “revolutionary committees,” in the Iranian revolution.2 The newly formed Lebanese version received financing, indoctrination, and military training from the Iranian Republican Guard Corps (IRGC/Pasdaran). The group made its base at Baalbek in Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley, the country’s breadbasket as well as a hub for narcotic cultivation.3 Certainly, Hezbollah was not the first group from Lebanon to target Israel. Lebanese forces first attacked Israel upon its formation in 1948. After the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, militias consisting of Palestinian refugees
Hezbollah flag in Syria. Photo: upyernoz
Hezbollah, like Iran, has turned martyrdom into a state religion. — Retired CIA case officer Robert Baer
The Counter Terrorist ~ October/November 2011 31
used Lebanon as a base from which to launch attacks. However, according to historian Martin Van Creveld, “[Hezbollah] turned out to be the most fanatic and the most effective of all.”4 Hezbollah’s fanaticism was fueled by its embrace of the radical brand of Shia
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Islam invented by Iran’s supreme leader Ayatollah Khomeini. The concept of velayat-e faqih, “guardianship of the jurist,” diverged from traditional Shia theology, which advocated that the clerics maintain a degree of separation from politics. Other prominent Shia clerics disagreed with Khomeini since they viewed his interpretation as a violation of the Shia tradition or law.5 Hezbollah, however, fully accepted the doctrine, which demanded obedience to the supreme rule of Khomeini. This zealotry allowed Iran a greater degree of control and influence over Hezbollah’s true believers than Iran would have over later proxy terrorist groups who were less influenced by its ideology and more concerned with venal incentives in the form of money and munitions. Retired CIA case officer Robert Baer noted that, “Hezbollah, like Iran, has turned martyrdom into a state religion.”6 This extremist outlook provided Hezbollah with a tactical countermeasure to the military might of its Western enemies. The use of suicide attacks would become essential to Hezbollah’s pursuit of its main objectives outlined in, “An Open Letter: The Hizbullah Program.” The 1985 manifesto calls for the expulsion of Western forces from Lebanon, the submission of the Phalanges7 to “justice,” the selection of an Islamic regime to govern Lebanon, and the destruction of Israel.8 Hezbollah initiated its campaign toward these stated objectives with kidnappings, bombings, hijackings, and assaults focused against American and Jewish targets. The 1983 bombings of the US embassy and the US Marine barracks in Beirut capitalized on the martyrdom mindset. Hezbollah perceived that its objectives were at least partially fulfilled when the United States subsequently
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34 The Counter Terrorist ~ October/November 2011
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History has proven the effectiveness of Iran’s Hezbollah template for power acquisition.
withdrew its peacekeeping forces. Activities from roughly 1982 to 1989 can be thought of as a “Buildup Phase.” Hezbollah was conducting initial growth during this period, necessitating a higher reliance on Iranian expertise and direction for attacks. Hezbollah needed “confidence targets” to prove its capabilities internally and to its Iranian sponsors. Additionally, Hezbollah was preoccupied by the ongoing Lebanese Civil War. These factors caused a focus on operations that grabbed international attention while remaining relatively limited in tactical scope. This phase culminated with the Taif Agreement, which ended the civil war and called for the militias to disband. However, Hezbollah did not demobilize following the Taif Agreement or the 1991 order by Lebanon’s National Assembly to disband militias. It resumed
its attacks with bombings of Israeli targets in Argentina in 1992 and 1994.9 Kidnappings declined in this phase as Hezbollah attempted to inject itself into the political process when Lebanon resumed elections in 1992.10 In 1995 Hezbollah began to attack Israel with rockets, indicating an increase in material from Iran and Syria. The nature of these standoff attacks required less physical presence from Iranian advisors and also may have been an attempt to manage domestic and world opinion as Hezbollah tried to enter the political process. “Once in Lebanese politics, transnational attacks became the more attractive strategy… Hezbollah’s rocket attacks against Israel did not detract from Hezbollah’s political standing, and in some cases may have increased it.”11 As an era, the 1990s represent an
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Iranian President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Photo: Marcello Casal Jr\ABr “Organization Phase” for Hezbollah. While continuing and adapting its paramilitary tactics, it simultaneously improved its capabilities in support of infrastructure, propaganda, social programs, and financing. In this stage, Hezbollah laid the foundation for what would become a shadow government. Israel’s withdrawal from South Lebanon in May 2000 was a milestone and could have been an opportunity for peace. Instead, Hezbollah appears to have used Israel’s continued presence in the 10-square-mile Shib’a Farms as a pretext for refusal to disarm.12 Hezbollah ignored the 2004 UN Resolution 1559 calling for militias to disarm, and continued to conduct rocket attacks and kidnappings of Israeli soldiers. In July 2006, Hezbollah took two Israeli soldiers hostage and Israel retaliated with 34 days of sea and air attacks.13 UN Resolution 1701 brought a cease-fire, and Hezbollah claimed victory in the stalemate. Baer notes the significance of this relatively
short burst of violence: [T]he Iranians constantly adapted, innovated, and tested new weapons and tactics. Advanced shaped charges, car bombs, precision-guided rockets, ambushes, swarming, decoys, and underground bunkers halted an Israeli advance into Lebanon in 2006… There’s a good argument that Iran’s modernization of guerilla warfare is a military development as important as the introduction of the machine gun… Confident in its proclaimed victory, Hezbollah turned to internal matters. Its ministers resigned from parliament in 2006 when the cabinet approved a UN tribunal into the assassination of Rafik Hariri.14 In 2007, Hezbollahled opposition held a general strike in an attempt to force the government to resign.15 In 2008, a US embassy motorcade was attacked with an IED.16 Later that year, Hezbollah fought in street battles against government forces. Then in 2009 Hezbollah won 44 percent of the seats in the parliamentary election. Lebanese and Israeli forces exchanged fire at the border in August 2010. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad visited Lebanon in October 2010 and attended a Hezbollah rally.17 In January 2011 the Hezbollah ministers of parliament resigned over the UN’s indictment of four suspects in the Rafik Hariri murder.18 This chain of events demonstrates that Hezbollah is not content with legitimate participation in the political process but rather uses it as a supplementary effort to install its shadow government apparatus and impose the rule of the Supreme Leader upon Lebanon. In this third “Mobilization Phase,” Hezbollah emerged as a matured guerilla resistance movement now capable of more complex terrorist attacks as well as more conventional Circle 106 on Reader Service Card
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confrontations with internal and regional opposition. It has a well-developed infrastructure, international financial enterprises,19 and continued external support from Iran. This leads to the question of where Iran might replicate the Hezbollah model within countries experiencing the “Arab Spring” movement. History has proven the effectiveness of Iran’s Hezbollah template for power acquisition. The issue then will be whether the situations in the various countries would support such Iranian influence. At the most basic level, this will depend upon demographics. Hezbollah’s success in Lebanon was due in large part to its ability to mobilize support among the populace, which is 36 percent Shia. Countries with higher percentages of Shia population will provide a greater potential for an internal auxiliary apparatus to support incipient terrorist networks. On this basis, the countries of greatest concern for Iranian influence operations are Bahrain with 70 percent Shia and Syria with a 13
percent Shia (Alawite) ruling minority.20 Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia may be less vulnerable in this sense with less than 1 percent Shia population in each, but would logically face the risk of Muslim Brotherhood influence.21 Of course, cross sect initiatives have been witnessed. Beyond this factor the question of support becomes more complex, and thus it is more difficult to predict potential for Iranian support. Political science Professor F. Gregory Gause III, of the University of Vermont, notes that many academics were surprised by the Arab Spring and were unable to account for how stability would be affected regarding control over militaries and economies.22 Lisa Anderson, president of the American University in Cairo, adds that these events were not a cohesive Arab revolt with key contrasts being economic grievances and social dynamics.23 Similarly, Iran may miscalculate and overestimate its ability to interfere in these countries. Analysts from Rand Corporation claim that, “[T]he Iranian brand is losing its luster…” They
Lebanese Army, Beirut, Lebanon 1982. Photo: James Case Circle 328 on Reader Service Card
38 The Counter Terrorist ~ October/November 2011
also conclude that in Egypt, policies less friendly to the United States and Israel do not mean automatic support for Iran.24 Iran’s true intentions may be harder to accurately measure. Whether its decisions are motivated more by practicality or religion remains a point of debate. Regardless, one should note the private and public statements made by Iranian leaders. An IRGC commander recently announced, “Our boundaries have expanded and we must witness victory in Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria. This is the fruit of the Islamic Revolution.”25 In October 2000, Ayatollah Khamenei told Iran’s National Security Council that, “Lebanon…is Iran’s greatest foreign policy success. We will repeat it across [the Islamic world] until all Islam is liberated.”26 There is little to indicate that Khamenei’s view has changed, yet implementing it may prove more difficult. Some contend that a rift between Khamenei and Ahmadinejad will limit Iran’s powers abroad.27 Others suggest that protests in Iran, disgruntled clerics, hyperinflation, high unemployment, and the (believed) political falling out of Ahmadinejad will prompt Khamenei to make Ahmadinejad a “sacrificial lamb.”28 In such a scenario, Khamenei may ramp up foreign intervention to distract from the domestic chaos, or he may do so out of principle after his internal opponents have been marginalized. Though Iran, Hezbollah, and Syria have reached a level of “unprecedented security coordination”29 and weapons transfers among them have increased,30 some maintain that they are less a coherent bloc than a temporary coalition in which local and short-term tactical interests have always trumped ideological or religious affinity.”31 However, whether these are relationships of control or cooperation, ad hoc or a lasting pact,
they remain a serious concern. Each is currently mired in its own domestic turmoil, but this chaos and the rapid change in the region may play to their benefit more than that of Western powers. The import and complexity of the situation in the Middle East and North Africa demands vigilance. In this uncertain environment, it would be a grave mistake to allow Iran another conquest, whether from terrorism, political subversion or any other combination of unrestricted warfare disciplines.
•
ABOUT THE AUTHOR Mr. Nypaver commanded U.S. Army Special Forces A-Teams (ODAs) on multiple international deployments. He is a National Guard captain and is currently a graduate student focusing on national security issues at the Bush School at Texas A&M University. Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the current Supreme Leader of Iran.
ENDNOTES For additional detail, see: White, Jeffery. 2011. “War with Iran: What Would it Look Like?” The American Interest. 6:6. 80-88. (July/August) Academic Search Complete. (June 5, 2011). See also: Malley, Robert & Peter Hartling. 2010. “Beyond Moderates and Militants.” Foreign Affairs. 89:5. 18-29. (September/October). Academic Search Complete. (June 5, 2011). 2 Ward, Steven R. 2009. Immortal: A Military History of Iran and Its Armed Forces. Washington: Georgetown University Press. 226. 3 Wege, Carl Anthony. 2010. “Hizballah’s Bekaa Organization.” Perspectives on Terrorism. 4:3 (July): 2938. 4 Van Creveld, Martin. 2006. “Excessive – Or Not Enough?” The American Conservative. September 11, 2006: 16-17. 1
Lebanon…is Iran’s greatest foreign policy success. We will repeat it across [the Islamic world] until all Islam is liberated. — Ayatollah Khamenei
The Counter Terrorist ~ October/November 2011 39
Nasr, Vali. 2007. The Shia Revival: How Conflicts within Islam Will Shape the Future. New York: W.W. Norton. 125126. See also: Baer, Robert. 2008. The Devil We Know: Dealing With the New Iranian Superpower. New York: Crown. 70-73. See also: Hamzeh, Ahmad Nizar. 2004. In the Path of Hizbullah. Syracuse: University Press. 33. 6 Baer. 13. 7 A secular, right-wing Lebanese paramilitary group comprised mainly of Maronite Christians. A Phalangist attack in 1975 is considered to have been the start of a civil war amongst various militias from 1975-1990. 8 Stand With Us. 2011. “An Open Letter: The Hezbollah Program.” http:// www.standwithus.com/pdfs/flyers/ hezbollah_program.pdf (June 7, 2011). 9 Saudi Hezbollah conducted the 1996 bombing of Khobar Towers at 5
Iran’s direction during this period. See: Heiser v. Iran. 2006. https://ecf.dcd. uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/show_public_ doc?2000cv2329-133 10 Mannes, Aaron. Et.al. “Stochastic Opponent Modeling Agents: A Case Study with Hezbollah.” University of Maryland. 5. 11 Mannes, Aaron. Et.al. “Stochastic Opponent Modeling Agents: A Case Study with Hezbollah.” University of Maryland. 6. 12 Congressional Research Service. 2006. Lebanon: The Israel-HamasHezbollah Conflict. Washington, D.C: U.S. Congress. 8. http://www.fas.org/sgp/ crs/mideast/RL33566.pdf 13 BBC News. 2011. “Timeline: Lebanon.” http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ middle_east/country_profiles/819200. stm (June 7, 2011). 14 Rafik Hariri was the Lebanese
40 The Counter Terrorist ~ October/November 2011
Prime Minister from 1992-1998 and 2000-2004 who was assassinated by an improvised explosive device on February 14, 2005. Two of the four indicted for the murder by a U.N. Tribunal are suspected members of Hezbollah. See: Bakri, Nada. 2010. “Tribunal Names 4 in ’05 Killing of Lebanese Leader.” NY Times, June 30. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/01/ world/middleeast/01lebanon.html 15 BBC News. 2011. “Timeline: Lebanon.” http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ middle_east/country_profiles/819200. stm (June 7, 2011). 16 http://lebanon.usembassy.gov/ latest_embassy_news/press-releases08/ pr011508.html 17 BBC News. 2011. “Timeline: Lebanon.” http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ middle_east/country_profiles/819200. stm (June 7, 2011). 18 Karam, Zeina. 2011. “Lebanon’s
Circle 203 on Reader Service Card
Government Falls as Hezbollah Pulls Out.” Washington Times, January 12. http://www.washingtontimes.com/ news/2011/jan/12/hezbollah-resignslebanese-government/ 19 See: Rudner, Martin. 2010. “Hizbullah Terrorism Finance: FundRaising and Money Laundering.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 33:8. 700-715. See also: Freeman, Michael. 2011. “The Sources of Terrorist Financing: Theory and Typology.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 34:6. 461-475. 20 PBS. 2007. “Pilgrimage to Karbala Sunni and Shia: The Worlds of Islam.” March 26. http://www.pbs.org/wnet/ wideangle/episodes/pilgrimage-tokarbala/sunni-and-shia-the-worlds-ofislam/1737/ (June 6, 2011). 21 Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life. “Mapping the Global Muslim Population.” http://pewforum.org/ uploadedfiles/Orphan_Migrated_
Content/Shiarange.pdf (June 5, 2011). 22 Gause III, F. Gregory. 2011. “Why Middle East Studies Missed the Arab Spring.” Foreign Affairs. 90:4 (July/ August). Academic Search Complete. (June 5, 2011). 23 Anderson, Lisa. 2011. “Demystifying the Arab Spring.” Foreign Affairs. 90:3. 2-7. (May/June). Academic Search Complete. (June 5, 2011). 24 Kaye, Dalia Dassa & Frederic Wehrey. 2011. “Arab Spring, Persian Winter.” Foreign Affairs. 90:4. 183-186. (July/ August) Academic Search Complete. (June 5, 2011). 25 Peterson, Scott & Nicholas Blanford. 2011. “Iran Sees Threat to its Clout Amid Arab Spring.” Christian Science Monitor. May 31. Academic Search Complete. (June 5, 2011). 26 Baer. 55. 27 Kaye, Dalia Dassa & Frederic Wehrey. 2011. “Arab Spring, Persian
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Winter.” Foreign Affairs. 90:4. 183-186. (July/August) Academic Search Complete. (June 5, 2011). 28 Milani, Abbas. 2011. “Ahmadinejad vs. The Ayatollah.” The National Interest.42-50. (July/August). Kaye, Dalia Dassa & Frederic Wehrey. 2011. “Arab Spring, Persian Winter.” Foreign Affairs. 90:4. 183-186. (July/August) Academic Search Complete. (June 5, 2011). 29 Malley, Robert & Peter Hartling. 2010. “Beyond Moderates and Militants.” Foreign Affairs. 89:5. 18-29. (September/October). Academic Search Complete. (June 5, 2011). 30 2011. “Chapter Seven: Middle East and North Africa.” The Military Balance. 111:1. 299. London: Routledge. 31 Kaye, Dalia Dassa & Frederic Wehrey. 2011. “Arab Spring, Persian Winter.” Foreign Affairs. 90:4. 183-186. (July/ August) Academic Search Complete. (June 5, 2011).
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BOOK REVIEW
Global Warrior By H. John Poole
G
lobal Warrior (Posterity Press, 2011) is the latest in John Poole’s series of books on tactics and strategy. Poole, a veteran of combat operations in Vietnam and criminal investigations in Chicago, shares the insights of a lifelong student of foreign, unconventional warfare tactics and current events. His works are identifiable by deceptively simple covers and copious endnotes drawn from exhaustive opensource research and extensive regional travel. Poole’s series highlights the value of skills over technology. He has raised questions not generally discussed in public outside of defense and security institutions. Global Warrior explores the possibilities of eliminating or reducing expensive overseas support bases and basing national defense and security assistance on the concept of a myriad of semi-independent light infantry squads, linguistically and culturally competent, paying locally for what they required in the way of supplies. Their job would be to help friendly elements in contested regions. In essence, a modernized, everyman’s Special Forces ODA (operational detachment alpha) that is more widely available in recognition of the greater need than can be sourced by existing SFODAs. Instead of appearing as occupiers, the young Americans would combine the skills of foreign-aid workers, law enforcement officers, and highly skilled light infantry forces. Poole recognizes the fact that modern combat generally requires investigative skills, advanced fieldcraft skills,
Reviewed by: Chris Graham linguistic and cultural assimilation, and a heightened level of light infantry skill and initiative to succeed. His intent is to field squads fully adept at small-unit maneuver, unconventional warfare, and evidence collection, and imparting those skills to others. The squads in a given country would collectively function as a force multiplier in order to save it. Whether you fully agree with Poole’s strategy or not, you will find that he has a more comprehensive understanding of the threats and adversaries that the “free world” faces than many others do. Possibly owing to his investigative experience, he has the ability to connect voluminous circumstantial evidence when many are unable or unwilling to “connect the dots” and ask important questions. Although it may be fashionable to consider conspiracies ridiculous, students of history will note that if we are living in an era free of conspiratorial efforts for national and political power acquisition, then we are living in a severely anomalous period. Global Warrior is divided into three sections. In part one, “The World’s Ongoing Crises,” Poole begins with a review of the current National Intelligence Estimate. He reviews the Islamic supremacist threat and the communist threat. The author discusses global organized crime and gang threats, and concludes with the very important chapters “Where Threats Combine” and “If Current Trends Continue.” One of few writers to have noted the similarities in Islamist terrorist/subversion tactics and the tactics historically demonstrated
44 The Counter Terrorist ~ October/November 2011
in communist revolutionary warfare, he explores the possibilities of synergistic employment of these disciplines against a shared enemy. The author also raises questions based on the benefit to criminal groups/networks of both passive and active relationships with the previous two enemies mentioned. In part two, Poole takes “A Closer Look at Peripheral Hot Spots.” The author describes the situation in Yemen, and “Al-Qaeda’s Takeover of Somalia.” He discusses the questionable ally, Pakistan, and that nation’s importance. Poole discusses Thailand and concludes by raising questions about the relevance of ocean chokepoints to maritime trade and naval power projection. In part three, Poole reveals his conclusion, “Winning WWIII Through Tiny Detachments.” The author describes Eastern tactics and strategies and suggests an Americanized evolution of these tactics. He discusses the importance of agility and the ability to exploit opportunities in “Opportunities Based Defense” and “Opportunities Based Offense.” Finally, Poole explores “Rifleman Tactics,” “Policeman Tactics,” and “Acquiring Enough Individual Skill.” Readers may be deterred by cover art that looks like it came from a counterfeit GI Joe coloring book. This would be unfortunate. One need not share Poole’s conclusions to benefit greatly from his superior insight into the nature of modern conflict. I have no doubt that you will find as many nuggets of wisdom in Global Warrior as I have.
•
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AL-MANAR:
SATELLITE PROPAGANDA NETWORK “Jihad leads to Arab and Islamic unity, and it nourishes the Palestinian cause. It is the path of life, pride, and dignity. And what our Palestinian brothers live today highlights the need for all kinds of jihad: political, military, financial, and cultural jihad. Our jihad against Israel is in defense of humanity and the civilized world. Resistance in Lebanon and in the beloved Palestine is an obligation for the Arab and Islamic world. Lastly, the Islamic resistance in Lebanon was the key that awakened the Arab and Islamic masses. The martyrs of the intifada are heroes. God bless the martyrs and their families, and may God give them more strength.”1 – Al-Manar, 2002 Counter The
A television broadcast building in Beirut, and the results of an arson-caused fire in May 2008 after it was shut down by Hezbollah fighters. Photo: Lannie Naas
46 The Counter Terrorist ~ October/November 2011
By M. Zuhdi Jasser
L
ev Dassin, the U.S. attorney for the Southern District of New York, noted for the record in 2009 that “Al-Manar [the Beacon] is a Lebanonbased television station operated by Hezbollah and designed to cultivate support for Hezbollah’s activities and mission.” 1 Dassin was announcing the conviction of John Iqbal for giving material support to Hezbollah through his workings with Al-Manar. Understanding Al-Manar’s history and utility is instructive regarding the central part that a television medium plays in radicalization and implementation of a systematic program for the indoctrination of instruments of Islamic supremacist terror within a population. Hezbollah began broadcasting locally via Al-Manar in Lebanon in 1991. It went global, transmitting by satellite in May, 2000. It is now available in most Arab countries on satellite and in Lebanon terrestrially. Since December 2005 the station has been banned in Europe and the United States.2 Although the ban has kept the station from radicalizing Western Muslims, the ban has also paradoxically enabled them to operate
globally with little awareness of their actions among Westerners. Some polls list Al-Manar as one of the top four so-called news stations in the Middle East.3 Al-Manar’s goal is to promote the ideology and advancement of Hezbollah as a political, cultural, religious, and military organization. Al-Manar broadcasts have included glorified representations of attacks on Israeli soldiers in southern Lebanon. After Israel pulled out of Lebanon in 2000, AlManar’s Islamist mantra did not change. It maintained Israel as its primary target, but changed focus to Palestinian advocacy instead of the occupation of Lebanon upon which it was founded. Ideologically, its anti-Israeli focus positions Muslims (Islamists) as the perpetual victims in a “holy war” against the Jews. It sculpts the perspective that Israeli strength is a myth and that the Muslim resistance will be victorious. Nayef Krayem, Al-Manar’s general manager and chairman of the board, stated: There is no act of resistance that can be classified as terrorism .... Civilians and military are both occupiers and therefore,
Ideologically, its antiIsraeli focus positions Muslims (Islamists) as the perpetual victims in a “holy war” against the Jews.
The Counter Terrorist ~ October/November 2011 47
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both are legitimate targets …. We do not create these acts [acts of terrorism], but we do support any resistance acts through our media. We cover and promote any act of resistance on our programming .... Hezbollah uses Al-Manar to express its stands and its views etc. Al-Manar, in turn, receives political support for its continuation.4 Its reporters are often “embedded” with Hezbollah fighters. “Who’s Next?” is a program that is part of its psychological campaign to show Israeli casualties leaving a blank space for future soldiers.5 The Jerusalem Media Communication Center reported that most Palestinians watch Al Jazeera, Abu Dhabi TV, and Al-Manar. Terrorism analyst Avi Jorisch reported that on a 2003 poll on “Palestine” 28% of Jordanians tuned into Al-Manar first, followed by Al Jazeera (27.5%).6 Some sources have cited an annual cost of running Al-Manar at $10–15 million with more than 300 employees of American, Egyptian, Jordanian, Lebanese, Moroccan, and Palestinian nationalities. Whether through Hezbollah or via other indirect Shia sources, Al-Manar is intimately connected to the radical Shia movement of clerics in power in Iran. Hezbollah constituents have 20% of their income tithed in Lebanon. A large portion of Al-Manar’s sustenance comes from that tithing. Al-Manar does not have a history of being notably profitable. It lost a large number of Western advertisers after they became more aware of Al-Manar’s ideology and terror links. All Western advertisers eventually dried up after the US government’s terrorist designation of Al-Manar. Hezbollah leaders also invoked the channel’s own religious extremism and rejected many advertisers on “morality grounds”.7 Al-Manar broadcasts include a variety of programming from news and current
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Al-Manar propagandizes the United States as the “Great Satan”. Cartoon: Carlos Latuff
affairs to children’s programs and drama, with an emphasis on religious and political programming. It has correspondents across the world from Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Persian Gulf to Belgium, France, and Kosovo. The Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA) reviewed Al-Manar television content from December 2008 to January 2010. It found that the religious programming focused on general recommendations on religious practices from both Sunni and Shia clerics. The political programming included “martyr and martial programming” that glorified suicide bombers and showed martyrs (shahids) with patriotic settings and music. Hezbollah leaders are featured giving speeches and other political programming that is anti-American and anti-Israeli, and promotes the belief that Muslim lands are “occupied.”8 According to the ACMA report, it felt “that certain styles or forms of programming (for example, martial, martyr, memorial, and unmediated party political programming) could amount to advocacy of a terrorist act in periods of heightened conflict in the region.”9 Al-Manar not only broadcasts outright
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militant and radical views, but it also addresses various facets of domestic and foreign policy for the Hezbollah Islamist agenda. For example, with regard to US actions in Iraq, Al-Manar news reports refer to US forces as the “the American occupation army.” What are neutrally termed “insurgents” to the United States are labeled “resistance” by Al-Manar, and action against the “insurgency” is referred to as action against the “Iraqi people.” These actions are “depicted in all their tragedy” with “details of [alleged] torture, indictments, and rapes by American troops.”10 Al-Manar’s programming is primarily dedicated to inspiring resistance against Israel and against the United States. According to Avi Jorisch, Lebanese and Palestinian terror groups use Al-Manar as the primary venue to “claim responsibility for suicide attacks against Israelis.” With regard to the United States, Al-Manar has had programming that has spread unfounded conspiracy theories, fabricated American history, and attacked American foreign policy. The Iraq war gave AlManar a renewed vigor of propagandizing an anti-American narrative against its “Great Satan,” the United States. It openly called for suicide attacks and other violent acts of armed resistance against the United States in the region.11 Interestingly, more than one-fourth of Al-Manar programming is music videos (anashid). These videos amplify emotions for the Palestinians and against Israel and the United States in an incendiary way. The station admits that these images are meant to stimulate suicide operations by driving viewers toward violence. Reportedly one viewer, Ayat al Akhras, a young Palestinian woman, watched AlManar incessantly before blowing herself up in front of a Jerusalem supermarket in March, 2002, killing two Israelis and wounding twenty-eight others.12
It glorifies suicide bombers as martyrs and their families as heroes. It openly and repeatedly calls for the obliteration of Israel and the death of the United States.
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Memorial plaque for Haim Smadar at the entrance to the Kiryat HaYovel “SuperSol” supermarket, Jerusalem, Israel. Haim Smadar died here March 29, 2002, when stopping female Palestinian suicide bomber Ayat al-Akhras from entering the supermarket. Photo: Utalempe
The station uses images of the IsraeliPalestinian conflict to drive war. The programming according to CNN13 was a “drum beat of carefully selected, dramatically composed, one-sided visual accounts of West Bank and Gaza violence beamed across Lebanon and, via satellite to a vast regional audience, transmissions which incite the Arab world to mobilize popular support for the Palestinian cause.” Jeffrey Goldberg called the station “The Suicide Channel” in The New Yorker. AlManar News Director Hassan Fadlallah told Goldberg, “We’re not looking to interview [Ariel] Sharon, we want to get close to him in order to kill him.” It glorifies suicide bombers as martyrs and their families as heroes. It openly and repeatedly calls for the obliteration of Israel and the death of the United States. It calls for Palestinians to violently overthrow their “racist oppressors,” and
portrays the Israelis as “baby-slaughtering terrorists.” An Al-Manar public service message tells families of suicide bombers where to go to collect a “subsidy” from the martyrs’ “foundation.”14
AL-MANAR’S IMPACT Al-Manar’s reach should not be underestimated. According to Ilan Berman, in testimony before the House Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation and Subcommittee on Middle East and Central Asia in 2006, Al-Manar has become a: …media powerhouse, broadcasting around the clock via satellite to an estimated 10 to 15 million viewers daily throughout the world. And, while European nations have undertaken a major effort to silence Al-Manar in recent months, the station has proven resilient. Al-Manar still claims to have the ability to reach a potential 200 million viewers worldwide,
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We must shape the narrative that the United States is not an enemy of Islam, but an enemy of governments and ideologies that usurp the power of the people through theocratic ideologies like Islamism.
providing Hezbollah with a global platform from which to spread its radical message.15 In a speech televised on Al-Manar on March 20, 2002, Nasan Nasrallah, secretary general of Hezbollah stated: Today the main source of evil in this world, the main source of terrorism in this world, the central threat to international peace and to the economic development of the world, the main threat to the environment of this world, the main source of … killing and turmoil, and civil wars and regional wars in this world is the United States of America …. The American political discourse is to terrorize the countries of the world …. America is a beast in all meanings of the word. A beast that is hungry for power and hungry for blood.16 Al-Manar reaches its millions of viewers through a vast network of satellite providers and some Western corporations.17 In 2006 Al-Manar
headquarters and infrastructure were bombed by the Israeli Air Force. The station, though severely damaged, continued to broadcast. This was after a March, 2006 move by the United States that designated Al-Manar a terrorist organization much like its paternal organization, Hezbollah. At the time, Stuart Levey, US Treasury undersecretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, said that Al-Manar is an “entity maintained by a terrorist group” and therefore “as culpable as the terrorist group itself.” The European Union then concluded that Al-Manar violated European law and four European satellite providers discontinued transmission as did others in Barbados, Australia, Brazil, and Hong Kong. According to Mark Dubowitz, many Western companies discontinued more than $2 million in annual corporate advertising after being alerted to Al Manar’s programming.18
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Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, President of the Republic of Tunisia. ARABSAT, a satellite company owned primarily by the Saudi government, and Nilesat, owned by the Egyptian government, continue to provide AlManar with a venue to spread its hate globally. ACMA reported in February, 2010 that Al-Manar was also carried by an Indonesian-owned and controlled satellite, PT Indosat Tbk (PT Indosat). It verified that the programming was transmitted on the global beam in Palapa-D satellite.19 Its goal is to engage and inflame its ever-growing Muslim constituencies. Al-Manar has described its Palestinian viewers as its Palestinian “human nuclear bomb.”20 Al-Manar also operates a website enabling viewers to watch streaming video. This streaming video is available in the United States through the Wa3ad (“promise” in Arabic) website, which is hosted by a Las Vegas-based Internet service provider. The Arabic language Wa3ad website claims to be “for the support of the resistance movement” and consists of various sections, including
those entitled “Zionist affairs,” “the resistance support,” and “divine victory.” For anyone who may assert Al Manar’s “journalistic” ethics, the recent transformations sweeping across the Middle East exposed Al-Manar’s method of doing business. The LA Times reported on May 24, 2011, (citing Tunisian newspaper, Sabah) that Al-Manar was paid $100,000 to promote the human rights image of Tunisian dictator Zine el Abedine Ben Ali, who is now exiled in Saudi Arabia. Al-Manar had allegedly received $150,000 a year to support the Ben Ali regime and asked for an extra $50,000 annually if he wished positive coverage in light of recent developments.21
Islamists have a propaganda advantage with organizations like Al-Manar that do not play by the same rules as Western networks.
WINNING THE WAR OF IDEAS Islamists have a propaganda advantage with organizations like Al-Manar that do not play by the same rules as Western networks. When we look back at the cold war, one of the most important tools The Counter Terrorist ~ October/November 2011 55
employed was the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe that highlighted the benefits of individual liberty and made an effort to counter the ideological dogma of communism and socialism. The following policies need to be enacted: • Sanctions against Al Manar’s funders and satellite providers. • Open criticism regarding Al Manar’s conflicts of interests with autocrats, absence of journalistic ethics, and inherently corrupt operations. • Western media should be encouraged to build a “firewall” with regard to refusing to “do business” with so-called media agencies that promote violence and Islamic supremacist ideas that are incompatible with free societies. • Nonprofit groups and mediamonitoring organizations can prioritize countering any “mainstreaming” of Al Manar or similar networks into American households and expose the ethical lapses that these networks frequently exhibit. The United States and our allies have to be willing to engage in the ideological battle. We must help foster a debate within the Muslim consciousness about modernity and the role of shariah in governance. We need to engage leading American Muslims who are libertyminded and anti-Islamist to take the offense and reshape the narrative of freedom and liberty against agents of the Islamic state. If we are able to shape the narrative of liberty as being one fully open to Muslim devotion and practice as long as there is a separation of mosque and state, that can ultimately be the way toward victory in the war of ideas. We must shape the narrative that the United States is not an enemy of
Islam, but an enemy of governments and ideologies that usurp the power of the people through theocratic ideologies like Islamism. Understanding the types of ideas, programming, and networks disseminated and promoted on Al-Manar and similar networks is of the highest priority in our counterterrorism efforts. We cannot continue to allow Al-Manar to define who we are as a Western society without an equally accessible counter message. Winning the ideological war will minimize the need for military confrontation and set the stage for real national security.
•
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Dr. Jasser is a devout practicing American Muslim and a former physician to the U.S. Congress. He is the founder and president of the American Islamic Forum for Democracy (AIFD, www. aifdemocracy.org).
ENDNOTES U.S. Attorney Southern District of New York. Staten Island Man sentenced to 69 months in prison for providing material support and resources to Hizballah. April 23, 2009. 2 CATM removes Hizballah’s Al Manar Television from Satellite broadcasting into North and South America. Foundations for the Defense of Democracy. December 29, 2005. 3 Al-Manar and Alhurra: Competing Satellite Stations and Ideologies,” by Dr. Anne Marie Baylouny, George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, Oct. 2, 2006. pg 7. 4 Avi Jorisch. Beacon of Hatred: Inside Hizballah’s Al-Manar Television. Washington Institute of Near East Policy. 2004 pg. 15 5 Oct. 2, 2006. pg 10. 6 Ibid. p.18 7 Ibid. p. 8 8 The Australian Communications and 1
56 The Counter Terrorist ~ October/November 2011
Media Authority (ACMA). Al Manar Television Programming: Investigative Report. ACMA. Australian Government. December 2010. 9 Ibid. 10 Ibid. p.11-12 11 Avi Jorisch. Beacon of Hatred: Inside Hizballah’s “Al-Manar” Television. Washington Institute of Near East Policy. 2004. 12 Ibid. 13 Frank Sesno and Brent Sadler, “Crisis in the Middle East: Al –Manar Airs Hezbollah’s High-Tech Propaganda Campaign,” CNN Newsday, October 26, 2000. 14 “Who’s Afraid of Hezbollah TV? Not me,” by Jack Shafer, Slate, December 29, 2004. 15 “Hezbollah: made in Tehran”: Testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation and Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia, by Ilan Berman, Vice President for Policy, American Foreign Policy Council, September 28, 2006, p.5. 16 Hassan Nasrallah. Speech broadcast on Al Manar, March 20, 2002 in Avi Jorisch. Beacon of Hatred: Inside Hizballah’s Al-Manar Television. Washington Institute of Near East Policy. 2004. 17 Mark Dubowitz. Watching Al Manar. National Review Online. July 16, 2006. 18 Ibid. 19 The Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA). Al Manar Television Programming: Investigative Report. ACMA. Australian Government. December 2010. Pg. 15. 20 Avi Jorisch. Beacon of Hatred: Inside Hizballah’s Al-Manar Television. Washington Institute of Near East Policy. 2004. Pg. 70 21 Lebanon: Did Tunisia’s tyrant buy off Hezbollah TV? LA Times. May 24, 2011
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LASHKAR-E-TAIBA: A THREAT BEYOND THE INDIA-PAKISTAN EQUATION By A. S. Sekhon
Counter The
Afghan National Police scan the area for insurgent activity along the Afghan and Pakistan border, Paktika province, Afghanistan. U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Justin P. Morelli
58 The Counter Terrorist ~ October/November 2011
“In my judgment, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) today remains—after al-Qaeda—the most important terrorist group of global reach operating from South Asia. Like al-Qaeda, LeT too has a universalist ideology focused on establishing a universal Islamic Caliphate through the instrument of jihad, but unlike al-Qaeda, which is truly a stateless terrorist organization, LeT remains primarily Pakistani in its composition, uses Pakistani territory as its primary base of operation, and continues to be supported extensively by the Pakistani state, especially the Pakistani Army and its Directorate, Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).” — Ashley J. Tellis in his testimony to the U.S. House of Representatives in March 2010.1
I
believe Mr. Tellis’ statement is accurate. Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), “Army of the Pure,” is the military wing of the Markaz Dawat ul-Irshad (MDI), the center for proselytization and preaching, which was established during the 1980s.2 It is an entity that remains closely linked, unfortunately, with the ambitions of senior people in the Pakistani government.
IDEOLOGY AND AMBITION MDI is affiliated with Ahl-i-Hadith, a way of life based on the traditions of the prophet Mohammad. It is against all “unlawful innovations” like Sufism and “imitations” of the traditional schools of Islamic jurisprudence and attempts to refashion the worldwide Muslim community in the mold of the
LeT has supported insurgents by recruiting, training, and housing fighters and facilitating their infiltration into Afghanistan from the tribal areas of Pakistan.
©istockphoto.com/mpiotti The Counter Terrorist ~ October/November 2011 59
The Vale of Kashmir, from Talmarg. Kashmir, India. Copyright 2001 Michael Petersen companions of the prophet. The decade of the 1980s saw an overlap of two important drives in the region that were to leave a lasting shadow on the years that followed. First, of course, was the “jihad” against the Soviets in Afghanistan that caught the imagination of some Muslim groups from far-off regions, such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Chechnya, Yemen, and others, to converge together to fight. Second was the Islamization drive undertaken by General Zia-ul-Haq to transform Pakistan into an “Islamic State” based on shariah law. Widespread growth of madrassas (religious schools) was soon to become breeding ground for young minds to be transformed into fanatic fighters ready to take on the designated enemies of Islam.
After the Soviets withdrew in defeat, LeT was re-targeted against India in support of operations over contested territory. However, LeT’s ideology goes beyond merely challenging India’s control of the states of Jammu and Kashmir. According to Professor Hafeez Saeed (LeT leader), the purpose of this jihad is to carry out a sustained struggle for the dominance of Islam in the entire world and to eliminate “evil forces” and the ignorant.3 He considers India, Israel, and the United States to be his prime enemies and has threatened to launch Fedayeen (suicide) attacks on American interests as retaliation for ongoing international counter-terrorism operations. US officials appear to view LeT as less threatening than al-Qaeda despite
60 The Counter Terrorist ~ October/November 2011
knowing the links between these groups. For instance, the shoe bomber Richard Reid apparently trained at an LeT camp in Pakistan, and one of the London subway bombers Shazad Tanweer spent time in an LeT camp in Muridke, Pakistan.4 LeT links to al-Qaeda go back even further, however. In 1998 LeT signed Osama bin Laden’s fatwa for Muslims to kill Americans and Israelis.5 Revelations from the recent investigation and trial of David Headley in the United States reveal that LeT (in coordination with the Harkat-ul-Jihadi-al-Islami) planned to attack the US embassy and Indian High Commission in Bangladesh around the one-year anniversary of the 2008, Mumbai attacks.6 Involvement of LeT in Afghanistan
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has increased in recent years as the Taliban started regaining influence in that country. LeT has supported insurgents by recruiting, training, and housing fighters and facilitating their infiltration into Afghanistan from the tribal areas of Pakistan. LeT also helped al-Qaeda by recruiting men from the Jalozai refugee camp in Peshawar for training at al-Qaeda camps to become suicide bombers.7 Professor Saeed was at the forefront in leading prayers after the killing of Osama bin Laden and fomenting anti-American sentiment among people in the heartland of Pakistan.
PRESENT The radicalization of Pakistani society, which started during General Zia-ul-Haq’s rule in the 1980s, may be beginning to haunt Pakistan. Widespread intolerance for any divergent point of view is manifest. The murder of Mr. Salman Taseer, the governor of Punjab province, during broad daylight on January 4, 2011, by his bodyguard,8 and the killing of another minister, Mr. Shahzad Bhatti,9 the only Christian minister in Pakistan, on March 2, 2011, who had aired his views against blasphemy laws, are cases in point to the extent of the radicalization in Pakistan, especially in the heartland. Mobs demonstrating on the streets after each event related to US counterterrorism action should be a cause for concern. Many terrorist groups operate from the soil of Pakistan. Jaish-eMohammad, Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan, Afghan Taliban, Haqqani Group, or LeT may have ideological differences, but they have two things in common. First, they are all anti-American, and second, they are supported by Pakistan’s intelligence services, Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), in some fashion. I believe that a dualpurpose strategy adopted by Pakistan to
Salman Taseer, former governor of Punjab province murdered on January 4, 2011. Photo: State Department use these groups against the United States and Afghanistan on one side and against India toward the east is sustaining these relationships. Pakistani authorities have shown a halfhearted desire to move against operatives of LeT despite clear evidence from the 2008, Mumbai attacks’ investigations and revelations during the David Headley and Tahawar Hussein Rana trials in Chicago.10 It is all too clear that despite repeated requests from the United States, Pakistani authorities are not prepared to relinquish the leverage of using groups like LeT to pursue their agendas. This scenario is particularly evident in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region where Pakistan has shown reluctance to move against groups such as the one led by Haqqani in North Waziristan or the Quetta region where senior Taliban leaders are known to be enjoying similar comforts under the patronage of authorities as was enjoyed by Osama bin Laden in Abbotabad close to the Pakistan Military Academy at Kakul. Another matter of grave concern is the evidence of the infiltration of radical/militant elements into governmental institutions in Pakistan. The successful attack on the Pakistani
Although it appears that LeT generally refrains from directly targeting Americans, the killing of US citizens in Mumbai being an exception, it has the potential of posing a significant threat to US interests in the long term.
The Counter Terrorist ~ October/November 2011 63
A U.S. Army Soldier searches through a hay stack in search of weapons and various other contraband located within a Taliban safehouse discovered during a patrol near the Pakistani border. Photo: U.S. Army naval installation at Mehran on May 22, 2011, with apparent inside help,11 is a case in point. The recent arrest of Brigadier Ali Khan and two other officers of the Pakistan Army on June 21, 2011, for their suspected links with terrorists show the extent of such infiltration. We need to remember that control of Pakistan’s strategic weapons, including nuclear weapons, lies with the army.
THREAT ASSESSMENT The United States appears to have begun taking terrorism seriously only after facing direct attack from al-Qaeda in the form of the September 11, 2001, attacks on the twin towers. I believe that the United States failed to sufficiently appreciate the epicenter of terror that has always been in the Af-Pak region and erred when it hesitated to aggressively pursue fleeing terrorists into Pakistan in 2003. Perhaps nonoperational reasons overshadowed tactical exploitation. Although it appears that LeT
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generally refrains from directly targeting Americans, the killing of US citizens in Mumbai being an exception, it has the potential of posing a significant threat to US interests in the long term. The events that unfold in Afghanistan will have lasting impact on the strategic environment in South Asia and Central Asian Republics where the United States has long-term interests. A clear victory for the United States in Afghanistan now seems unlikely. A stalemate in a conflict between a superpower and loosely affiliated militant groups with limited military equipment at their disposal would be considered a victory for the latter. Based on announcements of phased troop withdrawal by President Barack Obama, it seems that the Muslim militant groups, such as the Taliban (supported by other groups and elements in ISI), can look forward to forcing a second superpower to leave Afghanistan under disadvantaged circumstances. This would certainly give a boost (in global perception) to the operational viability of violent jihad for achieving goals and a similar boost to groups like LeT who have been openly advocating action against US interests. LeT draws its rank and file mainly from the Pakistani state of Punjab. Pakistan’s politics, government, military, and other institutions are dominated by the Punjabi elite. Punjabis as a group are holding prominent places of authority in the Pakistani military hierarchy and important institutions. Pakistan is a proven nuclear power with its arsenal increasing with each passing year. How safe are Pakistan’s nuclear weapons? In the words of Dr. Pervez Hoodbhoy, who teaches physics at Islamabad’s government-run Quaid-i-Azam University, Pakistan’s establishment lacks the ability to keep its nuclear weapons safe (claims to the contrary made by
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the Pakistan Army notwithstanding). Hoodbhoy says, “It seems to me that the Pakistan Army is playing with fire. It knows that these nuclear weapons are ultimately in the hands of their own people and their own people have been affected by decades of radicalization. They may claim that they have personnel reliability tests, but I do not believe that answering questions on a form may indicate his [true] intentions.” In recent times, we have seen the infiltration of radicals into the ranks of the army. Militants have even targeted the Police Training Academy in Lahore12 and Pakistan Army General Headquarters on March 30, 2009,13 and October 10, 2009, 14 respectively, with inside assistance. I believe that we can conclude the following: 1. The Punjabi population has immense influence in the government and the army in Pakistan. 2. LeT draws its rank and file, and support from Punjab, though some elements from Sindh and NorthWest Frontier Province are also there. 3. LeT has strong bonds with the Pak army, especially the ISI, and continues to enjoy its patronage because LeT has proven itself to be an important instrument to pursue Pakistani interests through terrorist pressure against India. 4. Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are as safe as Pakistan’s credibility in terms of its claims to participate sincerely in the war against terror. 5. Pak military installations and their leadership are vulnerable to infiltration by radical elements. LeT has remained close to authorities and therefore has the right contacts to arm itself and the militant Islamic supremacists in pursuit of their global agenda.
CONCLUSION LeT and the strategic actions Pakistan has demonstrated are difficult to separate since they are complementary. LeT was born in Pakistan, and draws manpower, official patronage, and apparently operational directions from individuals in authority in Pakistan; the two are intertwined. LeT has continued to remain openly antiAmerica in its outlook. LeT’s support for the groups fighting US forces in Afghanistan is well known. As al-Qaeda operatives fled across the Pak Afghan border in October 2001 and US forces began destroying the jihadi training camps in Afghanistan, LeT was the primary jihadi group to escape the Pakistani crackdown with its camps intact. From October 2001 through 2003/ early 2004, LeT served as a major provider of military training for jihadi actors in the region.5 The group has enjoyed immunity of action on account of an apparent dual-purpose policy adopted by Pakistan. Given the radicalization of Pakistan’s population, the country’s vulnerability as a state (whose economy is a mess and major tracts of territory are out of effective control), LeT is a coherent group with widespread support amongst the people of Punjab and could become an increasing menace in years to come. I continue to hope that the United States will apply pressure with whatever means are available upon Pakistani authorities to dismantle the infrastructure supporting organizations like Lashkar-e-Taiba and encourage that nation to take steps to de-radicalize the radicalized by moderating its education institutions.
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ABOUT THE AUTHOR Mr. Sekhon is a retired lieutenant general of the Indian Amy. He has command experience in the insurgencies of the northeast region and Punjab province of India. He commanded a brigade and later a division countering infiltration and carrying out counterterrorist operations in the Poonch and Rajaouri regions. The general later commanded a corps in Srinagar and finally served as Director General of Military Operations at New Delhi.
ENDNOTES Prepared Testimony by Ashley J Tellis, senior associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace to the United States Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, March 11, 2010. 2 ibid. 1
Lashkar-e-Taiba agenda outlined in a pamphlet titled Why are we waging Jihad, quoted in www.satp.org/satporgtp/ countries/india/states/jandk/terrorist_ outfits/lashkar-r-toiba.htm. 4 James Kirkup, Pakistan Ready to Extradite 7/7 Terror Link to U K, The Scotsman, March 10, 2010. 5 Quoted from testimony of Lisa Curtis, senior research fellow, The Heritage Foundation. before the US House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Sub-committee on the Middle East and South Asia, March 11, 2005. 6 ibid. 7 Stephen Tankel, Lashkar-e-Taiba in Perspective: An Evolving Threat, Counterterrorism Strategy Initiative Policy Paper, New America Foundation, February 2010, p.2. 8 BBC NEWS South Asia January 4, 3
68 The Counter Terrorist ~ October/November 2011
2011. www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south asia-12111831. 9 indiatoday.intoday.in/site/story/ Pakistan-christian-cabinet-ministershahzad-bhatti-assassinated/1/131496. html. 10 David C. Headley, a Pakistani origin American was arrested in 2010 and charged with plotting attacks on Danish newspaper that had published cartoons of the Prophet. In addition, he along with Tahawar Rana was charged for their role in the Mumbai terror attack of 2008. As per the leading Indian news channel NDTV, coverage dating July 3, 201,1 on its website www.ndtv.com. 11 Daily News Paper DAWN, Karachi, May 24, 2011. 12 Daily News Paper INDIAN EXPRESS dated March 31, 2009. 13 ibid. 14 ibid dated October 11, 2009.
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TRAINING REVIEW
Master Covert Neutralization of Locks By Chris Graham
C
Breachers would benefit greatly from lock neutralization skills. Photo: Security Solutions International
overt lock neutralization should be required training for military and SWAT breachers. These skills are valuable for escape and evasion capabilities, and necessary for some investigations. In addition, these skills are becoming increasingly necessary for EOD (explosive ordinance disposal) operations. Recently, I had the opportunity to attend two weeks of Master Covert Neutralization of Locks training at the National Intelligence Academy (NIA). Our class consisted of law enforcement
officers and military personnel from four countries. Bob Duman was the instructor for both weeks of training that I attended at NIA’s south Florida classroom. Duman is a retired SWAT officer and A.L.O.A.certified master locksmith, and possesses a full career’s experience in joint covert entry operations. One of the most experienced men in the country with these skills, Duman regularly took phone calls throughout the course from various agency personnel in the field seeking his
72 The Counter Terrorist ~ October/November 2011
insight into particularly challenging locks, alarms, and safes. Further distinguishing NIA’s training is the comprehensive array of locks, tools, and training aids provided for each student’s use. On the first day of the master course, we decoded locks and created master keys so that a lock would not need to be picked multiple times in an ongoing operation. We disassembled door locks and shimmed the lock from back to front while withdrawing rakes. Students released the pins one at a time to keep
them in order, measured them, and determined the number of cut for that manufacturer. With that information in hand, we cut new keys. Duman explained the relationships of a family of keys and what function each performed. The next day we watched a Framon code machine video, disassembled a lock, and created another key. After lunch, Duman introduced safe locks and we practiced resetting combinations. The following day was spent drilling Sentry Safes. On the fourth day, Brian Blayney, an experienced alarm installer and services technician, gave classes on alarms. He explained zones, common features, and vulnerabilities. The following day, students practiced turning off alarms and recoding them. We practiced using magnets to defeat magnetic alarm sensors and discussed wedging rollerball
sensors in place with toothpicks. Blayney identified the sources for alarm data relevant to operations planning. Day one of the master II class began with a video on safe deposit boxes and a video on key cutting by code. Students disassembled, reassembled, and tested safe deposit box locks. We discussed forcing entry and then practiced this skill. The second day started with a PowerPoint on B-rated safes. Students drilled holes in safe doors and used scopes to look inside and align gates. We were careful not to drill wheels or release relockers and successfully opened safes in minutes. The following two days included videos on electronic safe locks, the ease of defeating cheap safes, and “spiking” electronic safes. Students reprogrammed electronic safe locks, used override codes, and manually defeated them. We spent
some time working with smart keys and secure keys. On the final day of training, we discussed high-security locks and refreshed on the use of curved icepicks for entry. Students were given the opportunity to test for surreptitious entry specialist certification from the International Association of Surreptitious Entry Specialists and we left early enough to catch departure flights. One of the wisest men I have worked for used to regularly say, “Hope is not a course of action.” If you agree with this insight, you may choose to ensure that your personnel are appropriately trained. The National Intelligence Academy and Bob Duman provide entry training of a quality that would be difficult to duplicate. www.nationalintelligenceacademy.com
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