OPINIONS

Continued From Page 14 plete daily tasks. Regarding the claimant’s use of narcotics, the ALJ did not provide any discussion as to whether stopping their use would increase her pain, even if it decreased her GI symptoms. Moreover, if the ALJ believed that the claimant’s GI symptoms were caused by narcotics, it is unclear why the ALJ partially discounted her complaints of GI issues.

The ALJ’s determination that the claimant’s daily activities were inconsistent with her complaints of disabling pain was not supported by substantial evidence, and the ALJ erred in considering the lack of objective evidence as a primary reason for rejecting the claimant’s subjective complaints.

Vacated and remanded.

Langston v. Commissioner of Social Security Commission (Lawyers Weekly No. 003-002-23, 10 pp.) (Per Curiam) No. 22-1257. Appealed from USDC at Orangeburg, S.C. (Kaymani Daniels West, USMJ) Daniel Mayes for appellant; Brian O’Donnell, Corey Ellis and Timothy Reiley for appellee. 4th Cir. Unpub.

■ COURT REVERSES STATE COMMISSION’S FINDINGS Administrative

Workers’ Compensation – Appeals –

Reinstatement Denial – Lack of

Findings

Where the Workers’ Compensation Commission summarily denied a motion to reinstate an appeal without engaging in a rational analysis of the good cause standard, the commission failed to exercise its discretion; consequently, there was no exercise of discretion to which we would defer. Plaintiff’s counsel mistakenly placed the due date for his appellate brief on his calendar at January 31 rather than its actual due date of January 16. While the failure to accurately calendar a filing deadline will not constitute good cause for reinstating an appeal in every instance, we find plaintiff’s counsel has demonstrated good cause.

We reverse the commission’s decision refusing to reinstate the appeal and remand for consideration of the appeal on the merits.

No court is entitled to the deference associated with the discretion standard of review until that court has earned deference by fulfilling the responsibility of exercising its discretion according to law.

The exercise of discretion requires first that the trial court recognize it has the responsibility of discretion. The exercise of discretion is then to follow a thought process that begins with the trial court’s clear understanding of the applicable law, continues with the court’s sound analysis of the situation before it in light of the law, and ends with the trial court’s ruling that follows the law and is supported by the facts and circumstances. When a trial court’s—or the commission’s—thought process of applying sound principles of law to the court’s view of the facts and circumstances is evident in the record of proceedings in a hearing, in a written order, or otherwise, the appellate court will defer to the trial court’s exercise of discretion, even when the judges on the appellate court might have made the decision differently.

In this case, the commission’s initial decision to dismiss the appeal required no explanation. The Form 31 set a clear due date for counsel’s brief, and counsel clearly failed to file the brief in time. Regulation 67-705(H)(3) specifically permits the commission in that circumstance to “issu[e] an administrative order dismissing the appeal.”

The commission’s decision first to refuse to reinstate the appeal, however, and then its decision to deny reconsideration, are different. Regulation 67-705(H)(4) requires the commission to soundly apply the principle of “good cause” to the facts and circumstances before it. This “thought process” requires analysis, and the “discretion” standard we employ for reviewing the commission’s analysis requires the analysis be explained. Because the commission offered no explanation for its decision, we find the commission did not act within its discretion in refusing to reinstate the appeal.

The failure to accurately calendar a filing deadline will not constitute good cause for reinstating an appeal in every instance. We have reviewed the record in this case, however, and we find counsel demonstrated good cause.

Reversed and remanded.

Morris v. BB&T Corp. (Lawyers Weekly No. 010-007-23, 5 pp.) (John Few, J.) Appealed from the Workers’ Compensation Commission. Robert David Proffitt, petitioner; Carmen Vaughn Ganjelisani and James Keith Roberts for respondent. S.C. S. Ct.

■ STATE DEPARTMENT’S RULING AFFIRMED Labor & Employment

Public Employees – Unemployment Compensation – Resignation without Good Cause – Threat by Client

A month after she was threatened by a client, a social worker resigned. Because the social worker did not wait for the employer to complete its process of following up on her complaint, take her complaint up the chain of command, or show that she had been or would be penalized for failing to continue working with the threatening client, the Department of Employment and Workforce could find that the social worker had resigned without good cause.

We affirm the department’s ruling that the social worker was indefinitely ineligible for unemployment benefits.

Geohaghan v. South Carolina Department of Employment & Workforce (Lawyers Weekly No. 011-011-23, 16 pp.) (Paula Thomas, J.) Appealed from the Administrative Law Court (Shirley Robinson, ALJ) Adam Protheroe for appellant; Eugene Hamilton Matthews, Todd Stuart Timmons and Benjamin Thomas Cook for respondents. S.C. App.