NINE MONTHS OF COVID:
Science + Policy
What lessons Sir Peter Gluckman for science advising? Chair International Network for Government Science Advice (INGSA) President Elect international Science Council (ISC)
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e are nine months into the coronavirus pandemic. While it is too soon for the inevitable and important retrospective governmental reviews, it is not too soon to reflect upon what we have learnt about the evidence-policy interface. There are many questions to ask: why were so many countries ill prepared or slow to respond, despite many warnings by experts in recent years about the high likelihood of an impending severe viral pandemic ? Why were such risk assessments ignored? Why were indicators such as those in the Global Health Security Index so misleading? What can this experience tell us about the gap between advice and action? There are many reasons why political and policy communities might defer action on predicted crises, be it about addressing pandemic risk, aging infrastructure or climate change, but when existential risks are at play, we need to understand the obstacles to action and how to cut through. INGSA has been tracking the use of evidence in over 120 countries’ pandemic-related decisions made during the first few months of the evolving pandemic. (see https://www.ingsa.org/covid/tracker-report-1/). COVID has created a classic case of urgent science-
informed decisions having to be made in the face of uncertainty. Indeed, there remain many unknowns about the behavior of the SARS-CoV-2 and the pathophysiological and immune responses it triggers. However, it is becoming clear that those countries that made rapid and uncompromising decisions to take the virus seriously and impose severe restrictions on travel and social interactions, have done better in terms of health outcomes. What we now appear to be seeing is that the premature relaxation of such restrictions leads to a resurgence of community spread at well above any societally acceptable threshold. But how has science really been used in making these decisions? In some countries there has been a plurality of disciplinary inputs from the outset. In others, the advice has tended to be more narrowly constrained. In choosing whether to foreground economic, behavioral, or sociological advice alongside public health and epidemiological advice in their responses, different governments are demonstrating their specific interpretations for the problem and its solution. What impact will such different interpretations and framings have as the global pandemic progresses into a more chronic phase.
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