EDITORIAL
STAFF
ADVISORY
Kathleen Bailey. adjunct associate professor of political science and associate director of the Islamic Civilization and Societies Program
EDITORS-IN-CHIEF
Brooke Loughrin '14 Nicholas Moffa '14
LAYOUT
BOARD
Ali Banuazizi, professor of political science. and director of the Islamic Civilization and Societies Program
EDITORS
Nasser Behnegar, associate professor of political science
Kyla Longman '15 Liza Magill '17
Sheila Blair. Norma Jean Calderwood co-chair of Islamic and
Asian art SENIOR
COPY EDITOR
Jonathan Bloom. Norma Jean Calderwood co-chair of Islamic
Narintohn Luangrath '14
and Asian art
MANAGING
David Deese. associate professor of political science
EDITORS
Paul Davey '15 Tate Krasner '16
lecturer in political science and Islamic Civilization and Societies
Sean Sudol '16
James Morris. professor of theology
EDITORS
Dana Sajdi, assistant professor of history
Caitlin Horsfield '15 Emily Vasiliou '16
Franck Salameh, assistant professor of Near Eastern studies
David Dil'asquale,
Catherine Cole' 17 Mackenzie Arnold '17 Matt Sanborn '17 IsraHussein
'17
THANKS Special thanks to those who helped to make this publication possible:
Morgan Daugherty' 17 Enise Koc '17 Hagop Toghramadjian
'17
Donald Hafner. professor of political science and vice-provost for undergraduate academic affairs Cover Photo: Refugees flee Basra. Iraq. during an intense artillery exchange between British Forces and mobile artillery trucks of the
Ben Birnbaum. editor of Boston College Magazine and special
pro-Saddam militia. April 2. 2003. Š Peter Turnley/Corbis
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Government of the United States. Al-Noor, The Boston College Undergraduate
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TABLE
OF CONTENTS
6 Baghdad College A BEACON OF by Al-Noor Staff
LIGHT
16 The Confessional Model and Sectarian Politics LESSONS
FROM
LEBANON
AND
by Scott Preston
26 Journey to Morocco A PHOTO ESSAY by Sarah Bertin
THE
FUTURE
OF IRAQ
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@?B"
r.,; --- ---0<
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r- -- If'.
X'I>
he power-sharing
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inherited by postcolonial
framework
Lebanon, while preventing the tyranny prevalent in
neighboring Arab states, has fostered shared fear among religious groups. This system of governance, known as Confessionalism, embodies the de jure incarnation of the "consociational"
model advocated chiefly by political scientist Arend
Lijphart as a means of guaranteeing different demographic groups government representation
in ethnically conflicted societies.
1
Confessional government has
steadily directed loyalties toward the recognized religious communities and away from a cohesive Lebanese nationalism.
This fragmentation
contributed
to the
Lebanese Civil War of 1975-1990, which further deepened ethno-religious tensions. Iraq, having recently experienced its own civil war under U.S. occupation, is also at risk of falling into the confessional trap that has marred Lebanese society for
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Barbed wire and ferris wheel, Beirut. Photograph:
Scott Preston
decades. Nearly ten years after the overhaul of Iraq's governing institutions, Baghdad finds itself in a critical transition period. Hope remains for coexistence and sustainable development, but the Lebanese record reveals that this outcome does not follow from the tenets of confessionalism. For Iraq to achieve modernization and stability, it must mitigate the impact of sectarianism on politics and education.
Educational Polarization
Development in Lebanon
and Sect
By 1840, in Ottoman Lebanon, deteriorating relations within an intermixed Druze and Maronite population drove the Druze to armed conflict with their Christian compatriots. War and ethnic cleansing in 1860 drew the attention of the French, who felt obliged to protect their fellow Catholics from Druze aggression. Soon thereafter, the French deployed troops to the Mount Lebanon territory, where the Christian population was concentrated.' The end of World War I resulted in the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. France assumed the League of
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Nations mandate for the Lebanese territory, creating the Greater State of Lebanon in 1926.3 Along with the consociational principles, the new constitution also laid the groundwork for Lebanon's education system. Article 10 of the original document granted each ethno-religious group the right to administer its own private schools. However, in an effort to gain cultural autonomy from the French, Lebanon's first officeholders revised the law so that the Ministry of Education would oversee all private schooling. Domestic debates about national identity, in addition to heated national disputes over foreign policy, resulted in a brief civil war in 1958. Shortly thereafter, it was decided that private schools should instead be supervised by Lebanon's six regional governotates.' At the time of independence, these learning facilities provided an alluring alternative to those of the weak and inexperienced state and have become the dominant form of education. Lebanon's second civil war, lasting from 1975 to 1990, stagnated educational development and accelerated an emerging brain drain problem. Nearly fifteen years of fighting fatigued Lebanese militias and resulted in all but state collapse. Lebanon's crippled municipalities contributed to an environment of lawlessness, which invited foreign guerilla forces. A militia emerged due to the influence of Imam Sayyed Musa al-Sadr, a Shia who mobilized his coreligionists in Lebanon's Beqaa Valley. In 1968, Musa al-Sadr founded the Movement of the Deprived to empower the impoverished Shia and embolden them to confront the government. When Lebanon found itself in a civil war less than a decade later, the movement
For Iraq to achieve modernization and stability, it must mitigate the impact of sectarianism on politics and education. formed an army; called Amal, the army was led by Musa al-Sadr." When Ayatollah Khomeini came to power in Iran, the conventionally subordinate Shia of the Middle East found themselves with a state to call their own. Eager to export its revolutionary ideology in search of allies, Iran decided to back Shia Amal in Lebanon. Thus Hezbollah, which favored Iranian intervention, was born. In the following years, a young Hezbollah found itself waging pitched battles against Israel and the renegade South Lebanese Army. 6 In 1989, Saudi Arabia led an international summit that arbitrated the end of the second Lebanese Civil War. Under the terms of the agreement, both Israel and Syria maintained military presences within the country, the former holding ground in the South and the latter in the East and West. In 1990, the United States granted Damascus unrestricted control of Lebanese affairs in order to recruit Syria for the first Bush Administration's Gulf War.7 Syria's unchecked foreign policy allowed it to preserve Hezbollah as an armed militia, which was intended to be used as a bargaining chip to reclaim the Golan Heights from Israeli occupation.
Educational Polarization
Development in Iraq
and Sect
Independence was granted to Iraq in 1932 after the British Mandate installed a Hashemite Sunni monarchy to rule over a Shia majority. The discovery of massive oil resources came soon after the establishment of the University of Baghdad in 1957. The inflated budget allowed President al-Bakr's regime to embark on an ambitious centralized campaign to combat illiteracy. Over the next 20 years, Iraq fortified its educational policy until it was recognized as one of the most advanced academic systems in the Middle East.
THE
All schooling, from the primary through university levels, became free and open to all Arabs. However, sectarian polarization began to increase following the 1968 military coup that brought the Ba'ath Party to power. This party outwardly promoted an ideology of secularism, socialism, and Pan-Arab Nationalism and set the stage for the events to follow in 1979.8 1979 was a year marked by the Iranian Revolution, the rise of Shia fundamentalism, and the coming to power of Saddam Hussein. As a majority Shia country neighboring Iran, Iraq's Sunni administration cautiously attempted to forestall the rise of a religiously galvanized opposition movement." At the same time, Hussein also intensified his campaigns against Kurdish separatists in the north. Hussein's two-front sectarian assault set the state on a trajectory of ethnoreligious tensions that would ultimately have catastrophic consequences. In late September 1980, Hussein launched attacks against the revolutionary Iranian state, initiating the Iran -Iraq war, which spanned the better part of the decade. In 1988, the United States withdrew its support for Kurdish fighters in the interest of fortifying Hussein against the prospects of Iranian regional hegemony. That year, chemical gas attacks and mass executions ravaged the Kurdish north, leaving upwards of 100,000 dead.'? In 2003, the U.S. invaded Iraq on the pretense of eliminating weapons of mass destruction. After the initial invasion, the U.S.-led Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), in charge of reconstructing Iraq, quickly embarked on a campaign of drastic restructuring. Alternative frameworks proposed by the CPA reflected the authorities' ignorance of Iraq's sectarian rifts. By the time it was realized that primordial communal animosities had been reawakened, armed clashes had become a regular occurrence. I I Under Paul Bremmer, the Iraqi Interim Governing Council (IGC)
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was created according to the confessional model. The high government posts of the IGC were reorganized along sectarian lines so that the president would be Kurdish, the prime minister would be Shia, and the speaker of parliament would be Sunni." At the same time, Bremmer implemented an aggressive policy of "De-Ba'athification," which forced many members of Hussein's former bureaucracy into unemployment. Approximately 30,000 officials, mostly Sunnis, were out of work as the Shia majority filled the vacancies. By the time the new constitution was ratified in 2005, many victims of De-Ba'athification had organized into an insurgent movement. Tensions between Sunnis, Shias, and Kurds resulted in civil war in 2006.\3 Fighting among coalition forces, al-Qaeda, and a Sunni insurgency intensified following the bombing of a sacred Shia shrine at Samarra in 2006. Soon after, civil war ensued. Kurdish Peshmerga forces also waged pitched territorial battles; however, most of the fighting progressed between Sunni and Shia.
The Modern
Educational
Structure
The structures of Lebanese and Iraqi educational systems differ greatly. In theory, public and private Lebanese schools operate in coordination with one another, although in practice, these two sectors are quite independent." The state of Lebanon offers free education from the primary through secondary levels, and elementary education is universal and mandatory for children aged six through twelve. Lebanon boasts one of the highest enrollment rates in the Middle East region, especially with regard to higher education. However, only 37% of the total student body is enrolled in public schools." All schools are principally governed under the direction of the Ministry of Education and Higher Learning (MEHL). For those that do attend public schools, the curriculum is largely secular, with special priority given to the construction of national identity. The majority of private schools are administered by religious communities and operate independently of the government. In contrast, Iraq's model is much more centralized. The Ministry of Education governs preschool through secondary education, while the Ministry of
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Higher Education and Scientific Research governs tertiary establishments. Within this framework, each Governorate has a Directorate of Education that handles administrative responsibilities, and provincial education committees may make policy recommendations." Opposite of the Lebanese system, Iraq spends a large amount of its budget on education and covers the costs of schooling from the primary through university levels. At present, schooling may begin as early as age four, though compulsory education starts with the primary education phase and includes grades one through six. Free secondary education is provided to all citizens but is not mandatory. During this final phase, students may choose either a humanities- or science-based track. Following the baccalaureate year, some may enroll directly in a state-sponsored elementary teacher training program or go on to university."
Attempts
at Reform
The Ta'if Accord, which ended Lebanon's second civil war, offered an opportunity for education reform. First, the agreement aimed to reintegrate school children into a cohesive national identity. Second, it attempted to standardize textbooks, which helped instill future generations with tolerance and protect the sustainability of the state. IS Unfortunately, the Ta'if Accord undermined the potential of its two educational goals in three ways. First, Article 95 redistributed the government's GradeOne Posts, the highest of five promotional levels, according to sectarian status. Second, a Constitutional Council was created in order to introduce an additionallayer of judiciary oversight, but it could only be appealed by religious leaders. Third, the Ta'if Accord upheld the power of private schools to teach their own variations of history." According to a study by Nisreen Salti and [ad Chaaban of the American University in Beirut, "the Ta'if Accords reinforced sectarian rifts by focusing reform on power sharing and confessional redistribution rather than the creation of a secular citizenry."? Researchers used voting records from 1993 to 2005 to estimate the sectarian composition of each district. The percentages were then compared with the sects'
Iraqi pupils sit in their classroom at Faw Primary School, Baghdad. Photograph:
share of public funding for development-related fields such as health care and education from 1996 to 2005. The results showed that the distribution of public expenditure closely mirrored each sect's proportion of the overall population." Iraq's watershed opportunity arose with the ratification of a new constitution in 2005. Significant measures were taken to mandate a nondiscriminatory provision for education services. Article 34 stipulated that education is a fundamental factor for societal progress and is a right guaranteed by the state. Additionally, Article 4 established Iraq's two primary languages as Arabic and Kurdish while upholding the right of every citizen to use his or her mother tongue."
Further
Reform
Initiatives
Lebanon's 1993 Educational Development Plan had three primary ambitions, inspired in part by
Š ReuterslCorbis
the guidelines of the Ta'if Accord. First, the plan was intended to cultivate a unifying sense of Lebanese national identity among the eighteen competing sects. Second, it sought to encourage tolerance and coexistence in educational settings. Third, development was meant to promote democratic principles. Two years later, committee personnel returned with the New Framework for Education in Lebanon. Similarly to the Ta'if Accord, it was designed to reduce sectarianism through emphasizing a shared sense of identity, or "national upbringing;' and the creation of standard textbooks." Like Lebanon, Iraq also proposed educational reforms three years after major structural alterations. In 2008, the New Education Philosophy was finalized. Its most salient objectives included promoting democratic principles, stressing tolerance and coexistence, and teaching creative problem solving and critical thinking skills. However, the new blueprint also called
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Following the fall of the Ba 'atli regime, crime rates rose and 84 % of tertiary establishments were looted, leaving Iraq's previously renowned school system in shambles. for an integration of religion into the national curriculum." These reforms culminated in the 2010 creation of Iraq's Education Development Plan.
Contemporary
Challenges
In Lebanon, a 40 billion USD national debt has severely restricted the resources available to public education facilities. Faced with inadequacies in state schooling, citizens widely prefer private religious alternatives, which are almost always highly sectarian and segregated. This divide has been exacerbated by the emigration of whole populations as a result of Lebanon's civil war. Decreased diversity within constituencies disconnects government officials from members of other sectarian groups, perpetuating the power of ruling religious factions in education. Lebanon's attempts to improve the school system post -Ta'if have mainly focused on resolving the divisive textbook issue. As mandated by the New Education Framework, a revised standard set of textbooks was produced in 1998. However, the Minister of Education suspended the use of the revised history text in 2001.25 The setback meant that Lebanese curriculums would once again suffer from a lack of a shared national experience. Schools of the Shia South are increasingly administered by the Hezbollah quasi -state, which has developed since the withdrawal of the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) in 2000. With Iranian financial assistance, the organization has filled some gaps in the substandard education system. Hezbollah's Education Unit operates schools from the elementary through college levels at low costs in comparison to other private sector alternatives." In Iraq, widespread disintegration of civil society followed the coalition invasion. Following the fall of
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the Ba'ath regime, crime rates rose and 84% of tertiary establishments were looted, leaving Iraq's previously renowned school system in shambles." Within the first month, an estimated 12 billion USD worth of equipment and supplies had been stolen across the country." and Iraq lacked 12,522 of the schools required to accommodate the student population. Children were packed into classes at a ratio of 44:1.29 Schools and agencies left standing were in poor condition and fell victim to national infrastructure deficiencies. The hazards of the civil war years often prevented Iraqis from venturing outside their homes. Unrestricted by law enforcement, gang violence proliferated and militia death squads terrorized the streets. Between 2005 and 2006, school attendance rates plummeted from 75% to 30% as a result of this violence. The MEHL reported that only 40% of children passed their primary examinations, down from 60% in 2005.30 The 2007 Surge largely subdued the civil conflict but did not resolve the lack of access to education faced by Iraqi children or address the destruction of Iraqi state education services. The alarming level of violence compelled Iraqi residents to flee from ethnically mixed areas and seek protection within their sectarian neighborhoods. As civil war continued, Iraq increasingly self-segregated into ethnically homogenous communities." This de facto partition may result in ethnically uniform schools where the lack of diversity could facilitate the emergence of differing historical narratives, each favoring a particular sect. In addition to repairing its educational infrastructure and training a new generation of teachers, the new government must find common ground in redesigning the state curriculum.
Toward the Future In 2010, the Lebanese government passed new Quality Teaching for Development legislation. The plan aimed to improve the teaching abilities of educators over the subsequent five years." No matter the qualifications of the teachers, however, a lack of shared historical perspective continues to impede Lebanese nationalism and contributes to ethno-religious segregation. The prospects for reform remain bleak, as the communal religious leaders with the most power to reform education are more interested in perpetuating the current system. Iraq has shown more promise in recent years. The results of the 2010 parliamentary elections signal a shift away from sectarian politics, as the majority of successful candidates ran on secular platforms. However, a closer inspection of vote casting exposes that votes tended to be cast along sectarian lines. For example, although the two most victorious Shia parties campaigned on secular and national messages, the majority of their constituent votes were also Shia." Further cause for pessimism comes from sectarianism's deepening entanglement with geopolitical issues. At the end of 2012, tensions between the Kurdish regional government and Baghdad came to a head when Turkey forged a unilateral deal with the Kurds to build an exclusive oil pipeline from northern Iraq to Turkey. In December, when Iraqi federal agents went to arrest a Kurdish man in the northern autonomous region, a firefight broke out and spurred the deployment of Iraqi military forces into the area. In response, the President of the Kurdish region, Masoud Barzani, deployed his Peshmerga forces." The standoff drastically escalated Kurdish tensions with the Shia dominated government of Baghdad.
THE
Unrest has also intensified between Iraq's Shia and Sunnis. In February 2013, hundreds of thousands of Sunni protesters took to the streets in an effort to end the rule of Shia Prime Minister Nouri al-Malaki." Although these efforts began as peaceful demonstrations, tensions between Sunnis and Shias grew violent. According to the UN, over 700 people were killed in April alone, the highest monthly death toll since the civil war," Lebanon also faces the threatening effects of renewed sectarian fervor in 2013. The civil war in Syria has drawn in the involvement of Hezbollah, which supports the Syrian Alawite regime against the mostly Sunni insurgency. The increasingly sectarian nature of the civil war has stirred tensions throughout Lebanon, especially in northern cities with Alawite populations and in Hezbollah-controlled areas." Both Iraq and Lebanon face enormous challenges to creating a common sense of national identity for a sustainable future. Although reform initiatives have tried to steer education in constructive directions, sectarian politics and foreign influences have reduced them to little more than rhetoric. It is unclear whether either country can move beyond their current challenges. Lebanon's mistakes illustrate that educational Tank Monument
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success will hinge on rehabilitating public school infrastructure, checking the power of religious institutions' and encouraging a shared sense of national character. The confessional model poses a distinct challenge to these goals.
Paul Dixion. "Is Consociational Theory the Answer to Global Conflict? From the Netherlands to Northern Ireland and Iraq:' Political Studies Review 9, no. 3 (2011): 309-310. 2
Kamal Salibi. A House of Many Mansions: The History of Lebanon Reconsidered. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988): 15-16.
3
Ibid,17.
4
Abouchedid, Kamal, Ramzi Nasser, and Van Blommestein Jeremy. "The Limitations ofInter-Group Learning in Confessional School Systems: The Case of Lebanon:' Arab Studies Quarterly 24, no. 4 (Fall, 2002): 63. chttp://search. proquest.com/docview/220607844?accountid=15099.
6
Nicholas Blanford. Warriors of God: Inside Hezbollah's Thirty- Year Struggle Against Israel. (New York: Random House Publishing Group, 2011): 17-21. David Sorenson. Global Security Watch-Lebanon: A Reference Handbook. (Santa Barbra: Praeger Security International, 2010): 104-105.
7
Basel Sollukh, interview with the author, October 26, 2011.
8
Issa, [irian Hatem and Hazri Iamil, "Overview of the Education System in Contemporary Iraq:' European Journal of Social Sciences 14, no. 3 (2010): 361-362. http://search. proquest.com/docview/881056337?accountid=15099.
9
Hazran, Yusri. "The Rise of Politicized Shi'Ite Religiosity and the Territorial State in Iraq and Lebanon:' The Middle East Journal 64, no. 4 (Autumn, 2010): 528-532. http://search. proquest.com/docview/759466218?accountid=15099.
10 Samantha, Power. ''A Problem from Hell: America in the Age of Genocide:' (New York: Basic Books, 2002): 172. 11 Rajiv Chandrasekaran. Imperial Life in the Emerald City: Inside Iraq's Green Zone. (New York: Alfred A. Knpof Publishing, 2006). 12 Kenneth Katzman. "Iraq: politics, governance and human rights:' Congressional Research Service, 3. Accessed on January 17, 2013: 3. 13 Mokhtar Lamani and Bessma Momani. From Desolation to Reconstruction: Iraq's Troubled Journey. (Ontario, CA:
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14 Nahas, Charbel. "Financing and Political Economy of Higher Education: The Case of Lebanon:' Prospects 41, no. 1 (03, 2011): 71. doi:http://dx.doi.orgIl0.l007/s11125-011-91839. http://search.proquest.com/docview/867027704?accoun tid=15099. 15 Ibid,71-73.
ENDNOTES
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Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2010): 119
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16 "Iraq Education Sector Scoping Study."Geopolicity: Specialists in Economic Intelligence, 2009: III-51 17 Issa and [arnil, "Overview of the Education System in Contemporary Iraq:' 362-363. 18 Maha, Shuyab, "Education, a means for social cohesion of the Lebanese confessional society:' in Breaking the Cycle; Civil Wars in Lebanon. Youssef Choueiri (London: Stacey International, 2007). 19 Ibid, 169-172. 20 Salti, Nisreen and [ad Chaaban. "The Role of Sectarianism in the Allocation of Public Expenditure in Postwar Lebanon." International Journal of Middle East Studies 42, no. 4 (11, 2010): 652. doi:http://dx.doi.org/l0.1017/ S0020743810000851. http://search.proquest.com/docview/75 8392954?accountid=15099. 21 Ibid,637-655. 22 "Iraq:' World Data on Education. 7ed, 201012011: 3 23 Shuyab, "Education, a means for social cohesion of the Lebanese confessional society:' 170-717. 24 "Iraq:' World Data on Education: 1-3. 25 Jonathon Kriener. "Different Layers ofIdentity in Lebanese Textbooks:' in Politics of Education Reform in the Middle East: Self and Other in Textbooks and Curricula, ed. Samira Alayan, Achim Rohde and Sarhan Dhouib (New York: Berghahn Books, 2012): 285. 26 Sean Flanigan and Mounah Abdel-Samad. "Hezbollahs social jihad: nonprofits as resistance organizations:' Middle East Policy 16, no. 2 (2009): 122-134. 27 Issa and [arnil, Overview ofthe Education System in Contemporary Iraq:' 360. 28 Mokhtar Lamani and Besma Momani. "From Desolation to Reconstruction: Iraq's Troubled Journey:' (Canada: Wilfred Laurier University Press, 2010): 119. 29 "Iraq Education Sector Scoping Study." Geopolicity, 2-4. 30 Shereen Ismael. "The Lost Generation ofIraq: Children Caught in the Crossfire:' International Journal of Contemporary Iraqi Studies 2, no. 2 (2008): 157-158.
31 Chaim Kaufmann. "Why Iraq Partitioned Itself' Columbia International Affairs Online, (2007). 32 Dorine Mattar, "Factors affecting the performance of public schools in Lebanon;' International Journal of Educational Development 32, (2012): 253. 33 Adeed, Dawisha. "Iraq: A Vote Against Sectarianism:' Journal of Democracy 21, no. 3 (07, 2010): 26-40. http://search. proquest.com/docview/634966944?accountid=15099. 34 Tim Arango and Duraid Adnan. "For Iraq, the year ends the way it begun, with guns drawn:' New York Times. (December 3,2012). 35 Jane Arraf. "Protests surge in Iraq's Sunni regions, testing Maliki," Christian Science Monitor. (February 1, 2013). 36 "Iraq violence: Baghdad car bomb kills at least 66:' BBC. (May 27,2013). 37 Andreas Gorzewski. "Syria's shadow war reaches Lebanon:' Deutsche Welle. (May 29,2013).
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