Use Seabees for Stability Operations

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Use Seabees for Stability Operations | Proceedings - July 2010 Vol. 136/7/1,289 Jul. 1st, 2010

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Since World War II, Naval Mobile Construction Battalions (NMCBs or Seabees) have supported the Navy's combat mission and promoted goodwill through construction projects. In 2005 then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld challenged all military services to adapt existing capabilities to advance "U.S. interests and values." Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Gary Roughead responded in 2007 with A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, directing the Navy to deter war and encourage international stability by nonconventional means including economic development, governance, and establishing the rule of law in developing and war-torn countries.

Although the Navy does not have oďŹƒcial stability-operations doctrine, the CNO has recognized that we must step beyond our blue-water role to embrace 21st-century counterinsurgency and state-building challenges. This is a made-to-order Seabee mission.

The Department of Defense understands that stability operations are too complex and costly to be left exclusively to the armed forces: "Integrated civilian and military eorts are key to successful stability operations, [and the military] shall be prepared to work closely with . . . U.S. Departments and Agencies."1 Some may argue that stability, security, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) is not the military's role. But the military has always performed this mission. It is at present carrying out this mission, and other agencies are poorly resourced to take the lead on it.

For this reason, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have identified four broad categories of military activity—combat, security, engagement, and relief and reconstruction—and stated that commanders will conduct at least two of these for any military operation.2 But Afghanistan and Iraq have reminded us that the impact of combat, security, and engagement may be ephemeral if unreinforced by humanitarian relief and reconstruction. If one rapidly deployable unit could tackle these four functions simultaneously, it would become the gold standard for both the multiplication and the economy of force.

The strategic purpose of stability operations is to "leverage the coercive and constructive capabilities of the military force to establish a safe and secure environment; facilitate reconciliation among local or regional adversaries; establish political, legal, social, and economic institutions; and facilitate the transition of responsibility to a legitimate civil authority." In short, "successful stability operations are predicated on identifying and reducing the causes of instability."3 This complex mission requires a mix of skill sets from across the military, agencies of the federal government, civilian contractors, and nongovernmental organizations. The solution chosen for integrated SSTR missions has been the Army's provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs), descendants of the Vietnam-era Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support program. PRTs were founded in Afghanistan soon after the 2001 initiation of Operation Enduring Freedom and then co-located in Iraq as of 2005.

Provincial Reconstruction Teams A PRT is a hybrid civilian-military, inter-agency organization consisting of 60-90 personnel, structured to execute the six operational capabilities identified by U.S. Joint Forces Command as essential to effective SSTR operations: "creating a safe, secure environment; delivering humanitarian assistance/disaster relief; reconstituting critical infrastructure and essential services; supporting economic

development; establishing representative, effective government and the rule of law; conduct[ing] strategic communication."4 By 2007, 28 PRTs in Iraq were staffed by 700 people. In areas where force protection is a concern, they are embedded with U.S. Army Brigade Combat Teams or Marine Regiments.

A typical PRT includes the following personnel: Team leader Deputy team leader Multinational force liaison officer Rule of law coordinator Provincial action officer Public diplomacy officer Agricultural advisor Engineer Development officer Governance team Civil affairs team Bilingual bicultural advisor The teams have proven adaptable to the joint operating environment, able to "address each situation on its own terms, in its unique political and strategic context, rather than attempting to fit the situation to a preferred template."5 They are mission oriented, or scalable, to fit the host nation's requirements.6 For example, if it is determined that a host nation is strong on the rule of law, then that coordinator is not assigned to the team.

The Seabee Stability Team

If the PRTs are proving effective, why propose a Seabee-led variant? The Seabee stability team would combine an NMCB with elements of a PRT, offering at least five distinct advantages over the current doctrine and team composition: It would maximize Navy capabilities to pursue national objectives in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The self-sufficient, highly mobile force would be designed for an SSTR environment, unlike a PRT, to conduct military missions in unsecure environments.

Its organic construction capabilities would reduce contracting delays. These trades are inherent to the Seabees, while supplying capacity-building vocational training to the indigenous population.

The team would be scalable and deployable within 48 hours to any global emergent contingency mission.

It would provide a U.S. approach to a PRT system that in Afghanistan is a collage of national strategies, objectives, and resources.

Security Contribution A Seabee stability team centered on an NMCB will facilitate and enhance the contribution of the Navy in general, and the Seabees in particular, to SSTR missions, thus fulfilling the requirement of DOD Directive 3000.05.

The team can be used in all six phases of an operation, particularly in phase-zero shaping, phase-four stabilizing, and phase-five transfer of governance to civil authority. Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom have demonstrated the need to conduct stabilization and security operations simultaneously, unlike in postWorld War II Germany and Japan, when the enemy was soundly defeated and a secure environment was established before attention shifted to post-conflict reconstruction.

The capabilities and skills of the Seabees are well suited to supporting such a combination of missions, a considerable advantage when compared to the Army's provincial reconstruction teams that "do not conduct military operations."7 For this reason, Army PRTs lack an integrated security element, relying on attached units for security that can delay mission launch.

In the Seabees, following the motto "We Build, We Fight," military missions are inherent to the organization and key to ensuring self-sufficiency. Seabees can provide a convoy security element, a core mission that has greatly evolved in Iraq and Afghanistan. As an integral part of SSTR, the proposed Seabee stability team could operate in a dual environment to stabilize a region before conflict begins, or increase governance capacity in a post-conflict environment.

In fact, the presence of a stability mission in the post-conflict early years significantly lowers the risk of war reigniting and promotes lasting peace.8 A Seabee battalion fitted with additional stability elements offers a highly mobile team to fulfill the mission goals of the Secretary of Defense and CNO.

Inherent Construction Capabilities Reconstruction is the key component in any stabilization mission. The PRT has no inherent construction trades or skill sets. Its engineer is a coordinator of construction projects supervising a contractor. The procurement and subsequent management of the contract based on U.S. government regulations is a nightmare of red tape and procedural delays, totally incomprehensible to internationals.

Worse, as experienced in Iraq, local contractors and their workers who are seen cooperating with U.S. government representatives have been intimidated, murdered, forced to abandon the construction project site or split dollars allocated for construction projects with insurgents. The Seabee stability team can secure and oversee the site to minimize the problems of coercion and corruption. A Seabee

battalion, with its integral construction crew, has no need to contract, while the quality of the work is guaranteed.

The Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction has identified multiple reasons (listed here) for construction contracting delays.9 The Seabee can-do attitude can remedy these problems in the following ways.

"Afghan holidays": Seabees do not take holidays on deployment.

"Afghan National Army commanders demanding contractor perform work outside the scope of the original contract": This is common in the construction industry. Extensive meetings are held before the contract is awarded to coordinate the wishes of the client, but circumstances and ideas often change later. For example, the contractor has been told what to build and the price has been agreed to, but after the contract is let, the client wants to change the design. The new request usually costs more, because the client invariably wants more work done.

"Contractor delays in filling out the Synchronized Pre-deployment and Operational Tracker, a DOD program for tracking contractors": This paperwork is not a requirement for Seabees.

"Contractor delays in getting Defense Base Act Insurance": Seabees are insured by the U.S. government.

"Delays due to field engineer inexperience": Seabees are trained and experienced.

"Mobilization efforts not being executed in a timely manner": Seabees "can do."

"Re-solicitations due to high bids over programmed amounts": Seabees do not bid.

"Security issues": Seabees have their own security.

"Unreliable subcontractor": Seabees are both the primary and the subcontractor.

Putting the Populace to Work

Ever since Vietnam, Seabees have incorporated local labor into apprenticeship programs on construction projects. The civic action team, which routinely deploys to the island of Palau in the Pacific Ocean, apprentices locals on a one-year basis, with new groups following in a continuous rotation. Thus the native population has an opportunity to learn new construction and administrative skills through an onsite Seabee project manager.

Projects that involve local labor offer significant benefits in a conflict-ridden society.

The fact that they teach a useful livelihood can be especially important in deflecting potential recruits from joining gangs or insurgencies. It can also reintegrate former members of both of those into productive society. People take ownership and pride in a community project in which they played a part, and they will defend it against insurgent attacks.

Greg Mortenson, founder of the Central Asia Institute and coauthor of Three Cups of Tea: One Man's Mission to Promote Peace, One School at a Time (Penguin, 2007), has since 1993 built more than 80 schools and clinics in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Since the recent surge of attacks by the Taliban in both Pakistan and Afghanistan, only one of these public buildings has been destroyed. CAI works for community support in placing schools and ensures that the people donate the land and labor to build them. In this type of community involvement, "villagers protect the school with their lives."10 Finally, these projects jumpstart the community's micro-economy, allowing it to export construction skills and import materials that generate disposable income.

This spurs other parts of the economy. Using local labor under the supervision of a Seabee project manager is a force multiplier in a conflict region, and even the limited number of Seabees can attend to many construction projects across an area of operation.

Mobility, Scalability and Sustainability

The proposed Seabee stability team organization, incorporating elements of a NMCB, will be deployable as a highly mobile and self-sustaining force. This article proposes using the Army's PRT organization and the guidance of the U.S. Joint Forces Command as a foundation for the Seabee team, but in fact the Army's organization is large, cumbersome, and slow to mobilize. The counterinsurgent needs to be as mobile as the adversary, and PRTs are designed for wars of attrition, not as quick-reaction forces.

Speed and adaptability are critical for both counterinsurgency and disaster-relief operations, so, as much as the U.S. government would like to have PRTs in every region to thwart insurgencies, the reality is that resources are constrained. Even though they do not conduct military operations, some PRTs have a small convoy security element to transport civilians in the organization. An NMCB typically has two convoy security teams. Because SSTR missions are often conducted in hostile environments, a unit with organic military capabilities would provide more options on the ground using a single unit. And a mobile element with military capabilities that can quickly create a self-supporting base of operations is an added bonus.

The commander of the First Naval Construction Division understands the Joint Chiefs of Sta's vision and has directed that all NMCBs will train and organize as scalable units.11 Scalability is a core Seabee characteristic that battalion commanders have enforced for years, both during peacetime deployments and in times of war. If parts of the Army's PRT model are integrated into an NMCB, the Seabee stability team can be task-organized and able to deploy in 48 hours to begin security and construction operations.

The ability to rapidly launch construction and security operations will give a decided advantage in a counterinsurgency environment where popular support is critical to success. No other force can match it. These advantages provide combatant commanders a critical tool to meet the challenges of the "future operating

environment . . . characterized by uncertainty, complexity, rapid change, and persistent conflict."12

Uniformity Finally, the Seabee stability team offers the prospect of a uniform approach to SSTR. At present, PRTs in Afghanistan make up a collage of national approaches, each with its own strategies, objectives, and resources. International cooperation in Afghanistan has been beneficial, but PRTs do not all read from the same sheet of music. Their approaches often diverge, and their foci are different, which can make coordination to achieve overall policy objectives problematic.

A conventional PRT requires multiple interagency assets to sustain and secure it incountry. A Seabee stability team is a self-sufficient, highly mobile organization. A PRT attached to a Seabee battalion hands the combatant commander more assets available to execute multiple objectives.

In addition to the inherent construction and security elements of an NMCB, the attached PRT element provides expertise in justice and the rule of law, social and economic well-being, and good governance elements that are lacking in conflict or politically fragile, developing countries where the United States seeks to deter war and shape events to prevent insurgency. If the U.S. government is to "leverage the coercive and constructive capabilities" in stability operations, a Seabee stability team offers flexibility, stamina, and security.13

1. Department of Defense Directive, 3000.05, 4.4.

2. Department of Defense, Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, Version 3.0 (15 January 2009), p. 13.

3. Headquarters Department of the Army, ed., FM 3-07: Stability Operations (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, October 2008), 2-2 and D-1.

4. U.S Joint Forces Command, Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations Joint Operating Concept, Version 2.0 (December 2006), viii.

5. Headquarters Department of the Army, FM 3-07: Stability Operations, p. F-3.

6. Department of Defense, Capstone Concept for Joint Operations Version 3.0, p. 13.

7. Headquarters Department of the Army, FM 3-07: Stability Operations, F-1.

8. Paul Collier, Policy for Post-Conflict Societies: Reducing the Risks of Renewed Conflict (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 17 March 2000), p. 8.

9. Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, Report to Congress, 43. All quotes in the list following are from this document.

10. Karin Ronnow, "Educate Girls, Change the World," Central Asia Institute, Journey of Hope (2008), p. 21.

11. First Naval Construction Division, U.S. Navy Seabees Strategic Plan (Washington, D.C.: 1st Naval Construction Division, 2008), p. 1.

12. Department of Defense, Capstone Concept for Joint Operations Version 3.0, p. 2.

13. Headquarters Department of the Army, FM 3-07: Stability Operations, 2-2. https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2010/july/use-seabees-stability-operations