Green Zone Red Zone by Malkit Shoshan

ICTY

Congresgebouw OPCW

uindorp

THIMUN Peace Palace

The Hague Green Zone Red Zone

Central St

Centrum

Segbroek

City Hall

Hollands Spoor The Foundation for Achieving Seamless Territory

Transvaal

Green Zone Red Zone in Den Hague is a project by

for Achieving Seamless Territory.

the Foundation

FAST is an architecture practice based in Amsterdam and is dedicated to expos-

ing and countering situations of human rights violations caused by the uses and abuses of architecture and planning tools. www.seamlessterritory.org | info@seamlessterritory.org

Authors

Research, maps, text and design by Malkit Shoshan and Camila Pinz贸n Cortes

Contents Introduction

The Hague

Basic Map

Urban Layers

Alert levels definition

Current Green Zone in the Hague at alert level LOW

Green Zones at alert levels LOW-HIGH

Green Zone at alert level GUARDED Green Zone at alert level HIGH

Scenario of Ethnic Revolt, background information Neighborhood Index

Ethnicity and places of Worship

Extreme Ethnic Revolt scenario

Ethnicity by Neighborhood Population, Ethnicity Growth 1995-2007

Revolt by the Poor, background information

Poverty, Shopping areas and Main firms HQs

Green Zones at alert level LOW

Green Zones at alert level GUARDED - HIGH

Water Levels in the Netherlands

Scenario of Flood

Extreme Revolt by the Poor scenario

Flood scenario, background information

Water levels in the Hague Extreme Flood scenario 1

Extreme Flood scenario 2 Sources

The Foundation for Achieving Seamless Territory

Baghdad Green Zone Red Zone

GREEN ZONE

5 km The Foundation for Achieving Seamless Territory

Introduction

BAGHDAD Green Zone / Red Zone 0

The Red Zone is a term designating unsafe areas in Iraq after the 2003 invasion by the United States, Britain, and other allies. It is contrasted with the high-security sector of Baghdad called the Green Zone. Since the Green Zone is a very small area, “Red Zone” is applied to most of the rest of Baghdad. The Red Zone is also loosely applied to all unsecured areas outside the off-site military posts. Both terms originated as military designations.

e Zo n n

The Green Zone is the common name of the International Zone of Iraq, also known as the Emerald City. It is a 10 km² area in central Baghdad that was the centre of the Coalition Provisional Authority and remains the center of the international presence in the city. Its official name beginning under the Iraqi Interim Government is the International Zone, though “Green Zone” remains the most commonly used term.

explore in a number of scenarios how it could come about. In order to do this, we have chosen three cataclysmic events (Ethnic Revolt, Revolt of the Poor and Flood) and developed scenario’s on how these events would influence the creation of green zones and red zones in Den Hague. Using the ‘ Homeland National Security in Urban Areas’ regulations, with its different alert levels, we have tried to envision how the urban structure of Den Hague will be transformed under threat. We have speculated about what areas will be secured and what areas will be fenced, about the safe areas and the unsafe areas, the Green Zones and the Red Zones of the city.

Gr ee

Since the American invasion in Baghdad, the city has been divided into green Zones (safe and secured areas) and Red Zones (unsafe areas).

5 km

Our scenarios are based on a quick snapshot of the city. Far from being exhaustive, they will hopefully help raising questions on issues of equality, freedom and prosperity of the different communities that inhabit the city.

American Embassy

While Baghdad is an extreme case, it is often argued that the separation between secure areas and insecure areas is found in many ways and with different intensities in more and more places around the world. Separations between poor and rich and between ethnicities become more and more common in the city. In the last decades, we have seen that a series of catastrophic events have increased the economics, ethnics, social, cultural separations in our world. The 9/11 attack on America by Al Qaeda, followed with a perplexed occupation in the Middle East and the War Against Terror (Islam), the tsunami waves that washed away the coastline of the Indian Ocean, leading to a painful obliteration of millions, lives and livelihood, increased the gaps between rich and poor (since private resorts took the place of the local villages), and the flood in New Orleans, which exposed the adversity of global worming and brought to light the ways capitalist power uses disasters to create economical and structural reforms, are the most prominent examples. Could this separation between red and green, as a result of a catastrophe, occur in the Netherlands, and, if it happened, what would be the consequences? Whereas, we cannot really say if it could happen, we have tried to

THE The Foundation for Achieving Seamless Territory

FOUNDATION FOR ACHIEVING SEAMLESS TERRITORY

The Foundation for Achieving Seamless Territory

DThe e Hague n H 7

The Foundation for Achieving Seamless Territory

Basic Map N

Watertoren

Scheveningen NATO

Duttendel

Iran-US Claims Tribunal

Scheveningse Bos

Staten Kwartier

ICTY

Koninklijk Huis

Mariahoeve

Congresgebouw OPCW

Duindorp

THIMUN Peace Palace

Westduinpark

Central Station

Centrum

Segbroek

T N T

City Hall NationaleNederlanden

Hollands Spoor

Kijkduin

Transvaal Kwartier

Prins Clausplein ADO Stadium

Zuiderpark

Loosduinen

Plaspoelpolder

Ypenburg

Vrederust

The Foundation for Achieving Seamless Territory

0,5

1,5

2 km.

Legend

Church

Public and Ministry buildings

Mosque

High Buildings

Synagogue

Main military areas

Hindu temple

Main industrial areas

Monuments

Schools

Main office areas Main public area Under surveillance Sport fields

TV, Radio tower

Forest / Park

Radar

Dunes

Water tower

Water

Hotel

Rail road

CCTV

Highway

Medical Clinics

Hospital

National road Main road

The Foundation for Achieving Seamless Territory

Embassies embassies

Governmental building governamental buildings

2 Km

Poverty poverty

Schools schools

Hospitals hospitals

Squares squares

The Foundation for Achieving Seamless Territory

Main shopping areas main shooping areas

Built areas buildings

Open Spaces open space

2 Km

Infrastructure infrastructure

Water water

Green areas green

Offices and industrial areas workship areas

HeadQuarters companies headquarters largelarge companies

Hotels hotels

The Foundation for Achieving Seamless Territory

buildings high High buildings

Ethnicity ethnicity

2 Km

Religious buildings religious buildings

Survelliance cameras camera surveillance

TV and radio Hospitals towers

German bunkers WW2 german bunkers (2WW)

The Foundation for Achieving Seamless Territory

Military areas military areas

Green Zones in the Hague at alert levels LOW-HIGH

Alert Level

SEVERE

HIGH

ELEVATED

GUARDED

LOW

The Foundation for Achieving Seamless Territory

of worship, presenting targets with the potential for many casualties. Much of America lives in densely populated urban areas, making our major cities conspicuous targets. Americans subsist on the produce of farms in rural areas nationwide, making our heartland a potential target for agroterrorism.

The American Population • An estimated 284.8 million people lived in the United States on July 1, 2001 Source: U.S. Department of Commerce • 54.2% of the Nation’s population lives in ten states – three in the Northeast, three in the Midwest, three in the South, and one in the West • The average population density within the United States is 79.2 people per square mile of land • The average population density in metropolitan areas is 320.2 people per square mile of land • Over 225 million Americans live in metropolitan areas

Threat and Vulnerability The U.S. government has no higher purpose than to ensure the security of our people and preserve our democratic way of life. Terrorism directly threatens the foundations of our Nation—our people, our democratic way of life, and our economic prosperity. In the war on terrorism, as in all wars, the more we know about our enemy, the better able we are to defeat that enemy. The more we know about our vulnerability, the better able we are to protect ourselves. One fact dominates all homeland security threat assessments: terrorists are strategic actors. They choose their targets deliberately based on the weaknesses they observe in our defenses and our preparations. They can balance the difficulty in successfully executing a particular attack against the magnitude of loss it might cause. They can monitor our media and listen to our policymakers as our Nation discusses how to protect itself—and adjust their plans accordingly. Where we

• Nearly 85 million Americans live in metropolitan areas of 5 million people or more • Each year, the United States admits 500 million people, including 330 million noncitizens, through our borders

insulate ourselves from one form of attack, they can shift and focus on another exposed vulnerability.

Source: 2000 Census

We remain a Nation at war. Even as we experience success in the war on terrorism, the antipathy of our enemies may well be increasing, and new enemies may emerge. The United States will confront the threat of terrorism for the foreseeable future.

• Over 4 million people were processed through security at the last Olympics, over 85,000 at the last Super Bowl, and approximately 20,000 each at the Republican and Democratic National Conventions.

Our Free Society Is Inherently Vulnerable

Source: U.S. Secret Service

The American people and way of life are the primary targets of our enemy, and our highest protective priority. Our population and way of life are the source of our Nation’s great strength, but also a source of inherent vulnerability. Our population is large, diverse, and highly mobile, allowing terrorists to hide within our midst. Americans congregate at schools, sporting arenas, malls, concert halls, office buildings, high-rise residences, and places

T H E N AT I O N A L S T R AT E G Y F O R H O M E L A N D S E C U R I T Y

The responsibility of our government extends beyond the physical well-being of the American people. We must also safeguard our way of life, which involves five key elements: democracy, liberties, security, economics, and culture.

Democracy. Our way of life is both defined and protected by our democratic political system. It is a system anchored by the Constitution, which established a republic characterized by significant limits on governmental power through a system of checks and balances, a distribution of state and federal rights, and an affirmation of the rights and freedoms of individuals. Our democratic political system is transparent and accessible to the populace. It requires that all actions adhere to the rule of law. And it relies on the stability and continuity of our government, which is ensured by constitutionally prescribed procedures and powers. Liberties. Liberty and freedom are fundamental to our way of life. Freedom of expression, freedom of religion, freedom of movement, property rights, freedom from unlawful discrimination—these are all rights we are guaranteed as Americans, and rights we will fight to protect. Many have fought and died in order to establish and protect these rights; we will not relinquish them. Security. Our federal system was born, in part, out of a need to “provide for the common defense.” Americans have enjoyed great security from external threats, with no hostile powers adjacent to our borders and insulated from attack by two vast oceans. Our approach to security has had both external and internal dimensions. Externally, the United States has over the course of the past six decades sought to shape the international environment through strong global political, economic, military, and cultural engagement. Internally, we have relied primarily on law enforcement and the justice system to provide for domestic peace and order. Economy. Our country’s economy is based on a free market system predicated on private ownership of property and freedom of contract, with limited government intervention. We ask our able population to work for their individual prosperity, as our government ensures that all have equal access to the marketplace. Our formula for prosperity is one that has succeeded: we are the most prosperous Nation in the world. Culture. The United States of America is an open, welcoming, pluralistic, diverse society that engages in dialogue rather than the dogmatic enforcement of any one set of values or ideas. Our culture is also characterized by compassion and strong civic engagement.

T H E N AT I O N A L S T R AT E G Y F O R H O M E L A N D S E C U R I T Y

The Foundation for Achieving Seamless Territory

The Means of Attack Terrorism is not so much a system of belief, like fascism or communism, as it is a strategy and a tactic— a means of attack. In this war on terrorism, we must defend ourselves against a wide range of means and methods of attack. Our enemies are working to obtain chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons for the stated purpose of killing vast numbers of Americans. Terrorists continue to employ conventional means of attack, such as bombs and guns. At the same time, they are gaining expertise in less traditional means, such as cyber attacks. Lastly, as we saw on September 11, our terrorist enemies are constantly seeking new tactics or unexpected ways to carry out their attacks and magnify their effects. Weapons of mass destruction. The knowledge, technology, and materials needed to build weapons of mass destruction are spreading. These capabilities have never been more accessible and the trends are not in our favor. If our terrorist enemies acquire these weapons and the means to deliver them, they are likely to try to use them, with potential consequences far more devastating than those we suffered on September 11. Terrorists may conceivably steal or obtain weapons of mass destruction, weapons-usable fissile material, or related technology from states with such capabilities. Several state sponsors of terrorism already possess or are working to develop weapons of mass destruction, and could provide material or technical support to terrorist groups. Chemical weapons are extremely lethal and capable of producing tens of thousands of casualties. They are also relatively easy to manufacture, using basic equipment, trained personnel, and precursor materials that often have legitimate dual uses. As the 1995 Tokyo subway attack revealed, even sophisticated nerve agents are within the reach of terrorist groups. Biological weapons, which release large quantities of living, disease-causing microorganisms, have extraordinary lethal potential. Like chemical weapons, biological weapons are relatively easy to manufacture, requiring straightforward technical skills, basic equipment, and a seed stock of pathogenic microorganisms. Biological weapons are especially dangerous because we may not know immediately that we have been attacked, allowing an infectious agent time to spread. Moreover, biological agents can serve as a means of attack against humans as well as livestock and crops, inflicting casualties as well as economic damage. Radiological weapons, or “dirty bombs,” combine radioactive material with conventional explosives. They

can cause widespread disruption and fear, particularly in heavily populated areas. Nuclear weapons have enormous destructive potential. Terrorists who seek to develop a nuclear weapon must overcome two formidable challenges. First, acquiring or refining a sufficient quantity of fissile material is very difficult—though not impossible. Second, manufacturing a workable weapon requires a very high degree of technical capability—though terrorists could feasibly assemble the simplest type of nuclear device. To get around these significant though not insurmountable challenges, terrorists could seek to steal or purchase a nuclear weapon. Conventional means. While we must prepare for attacks that employ the most destructive weapons, we must also defend against the tactics that terrorists employ most frequently. Terrorists, both domestic and international, continue to use traditional methods of violence and destruction to inflict harm and spread fear. They have used knives, guns, and bombs to kill the innocent. They have taken hostages and spread propaganda. Given the low expense, ready availability of materials, and relatively high chance for successful execution, terrorists will continue to make use of conventional attacks. Cyber attacks. Terrorists may seek to cause widespread disruption and damage, including casualties, by attacking our electronic and computer networks, which are linked to other critical infrastructures such as our energy, financial, and securities networks. Terrorist groups are already exploiting new information technology and the Internet to plan attacks, raise funds, spread propaganda, collect information, and communicate securely. As terrorists further develop their technical capabilities and become more familiar with potential targets, cyber attacks will become an increasingly significant threat. New or unexpected tactics. Our terrorist enemies are constantly seeking new tactics or unexpected ways to carry out attacks. They are continuously trying to find new areas of vulnerability and apply lessons learned from past operations in order to achieve surprise and maximize the destructive effect of their next attack. Our society presents an almost infinite array of potential targets, allowing for an enormously wide range of potential attack methods.

The Terrorists Our enemies seek to remain invisible, lurking in the shadows. We are taking aggressive action to uncover individuals and groups engaged in terrorist activity, but often we will not know who our enemy is by name until after they have attempted to attack us. Therefore,

T H E N AT I O N A L S T R AT E G Y F O R H O M E L A N D S E C U R I T Y

Organizing for a Secure Homeland The tactics of modern terrorists are unbounded by the traditional rules of warfare. Terrorists transform objects of daily life into weapons, visiting death and destruction on unsuspecting civilians. Defeating this enemy requires a focused and organized response. The President took a critical step by proposing the creation of the Department of Homeland Security. The creation of the Department, the most significant reorganization of the federal government in more than a half-century, will give the United States a foundation for our efforts to secure the homeland. The Department would serve as the unifying core of the vast national network of organizations and institutions involved in homeland security.

The Foundation for Achieving Seamless Territory

American Federalism and Homeland Security American democracy is rooted in the precepts of federalism—a system of government in which our state governments share power with federal institutions. The Tenth Amendment reserves to the states and to the people all power not specifically delegated to the federal government. Our structure of overlapping federal, state, and local governance—the United States has more than 87,000 different jurisdictions—provides unique opportunities and challenges. The opportunity comes from the expertise and commitment of local agencies and organizations involved in homeland security. The challenge is to develop complementary systems that avoid duplication and ensure essential

T H E N AT I O N A L S T R AT E G Y F O R H O M E L A N D S E C U R I T Y

Alert levels definition The world has changed since September 11, 2001. We remain a Nation at risk to terrorist attacks and will remain at risk for the foreseeable future. At all Threat Conditions, we must remain vigilant, prepared, and ready to deter terrorist attacks. The following Threat Conditions each represent an increasing risk of terrorist attacks. Beneath each Threat Condition are some suggested Protective Measures, recognizing that the heads of Federal departments and agencies are responsible for developing and implementing appropriate agency-specific Protective Measures: LOW

1. Low Condition (Green).

This condition is declared when there is a low risk of terrorist attacks. Federal departments and agencies should consider the following general measures in addition to the agency-specific Protective Measures they develop and implement: 1. Refining and exercising as appropriate preplanned Protective Measures; 2. Ensuring personnel receive proper training on the Homeland Security Advisory System and specific preplanned department or agency Protective Measures; and 3. Institutionalizing a process to assure that all facilities and regulated sectors are regularly assessed for vulnerabilities to terrorist attacks, and all reasonable measures are taken to mitigate these vulnerabilities. GUARDED

2. Guarded Condition (Blue).

This condition is declared when there is a general risk of terrorist attacks. In addition to the Protective Measures taken in the previous Threat Condition, Federal departments and agencies should consider the following general measures in addition to the agency-specific Protective Measures that they will develop and implement: 1. Checking communications with designated emergency response or command locations; 2. Reviewing and updating emergency response procedures; and 3. Providing the public with any information that would strengthen its ability to act appropriately.

Alert Level

addition to the Protective Measures taken in the previous Threat Conditions, Federal departments and agencies should consider the following general measures in addition to the agency-specific Protective Measures that they will develop and implement: 1. Coordinating necessary security efforts with Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies or any National Guard or other appropriate armed forces organizations; 2. Taking additional precautions at public events and possibly considering alternative venues or even cancellation; 3. Preparing to execute contingency procedures, such as moving to an alternate site or dispersing their workforce; and 4. Restricting threatened facility access to essential personnel only. SEVERE

SEVERE

HIGH

ELEVATED

GUARDED

LOW

5. Severe Condition (Red).

A Severe Condition reflects a severe risk of terrorist attacks. Under most circumstances, the Protective Measures for a Severe Condition are not intended to be sustained for substantial periods of time. In addition to the Protective Measures in the previous Threat Conditions, Federal departments and agencies also should consider the following general measures in addition to the agency-specific Protective Measures that they will develop and implement: 1. Increasing or redirecting personnel to address critical emergency needs; 2. Assigning emergency response personnel and pre-positioning and mobilizing specially trained teams or resources; 3. Monitoring, redirecting, or constraining transportation systems; and 4. Closing public and government facilities.

Green Zone Area

In most cases, at alert level Low to High both the Green Zone and the Red Zone are expending. However, in Severe Alert situations the Controlled and Safe Areas â&#x20AC;&#x201C; the Green Zone - is shrinking and the Unsecured areas â&#x20AC;&#x201C; the Red Zone - is growing.

Alert Level

ELEVATED

SEVERE

HIGH

ELEVATED

GUARDED

LOW

3. Elevated Condition (Yellow).

An Elevated Condition is declared when there is a significant risk of terrorist attacks. In addition to the Protective Measures taken in the previous Threat Conditions, Federal departments and agencies should consider the following general measures in addition to the Protective Measures that they will develop and implement: 1. Increasing surveillance of critical locations; 2. Coordinating emergency plans as appropriate with nearby jurisdictions; 3. Assessing whether the precise characteristics of the threat require the further refinement of preplanned Protective Measures; and 4. Implementing, as appropriate, contingency and emergency response plans. HIGH

4. High Condition (Orange).

A High Condition is declared when there is a high risk of terrorist attacks. In

The Foundation for Achieving Seamless Territory

Red Zone Area

Legend

Current Green Zone at alert level Low LOW N

Scheveningen NATO

Iran-US Claims Tribunal

Scheveningse Bos

Staten Kwartier

Guarded

ICTY

Koninklijk Huis

Mariahoeve

Congresgebouw OPCW

Duindorp

Elevated

THIMUN Peace Palace

Public and Ministry buildings

Mosque

High Buildings

Synagogue

Main military areas

Hindu temple

Main industrial areas

Monuments

Schools

Main office areas Main public area Under surveillance Sport fields

TV, Radio tower

Forest / Park

Radar

Dunes

Water tower

Water

Hotel

Rail road

CCTV

Highway

Hospital

Westduinpark

High

Church

Medical Clinics

Duttendel

Central Station

Centrum

Segbroek

T N T

National road Main road Tram Line

City Hall NationaleNederlanden

Severe Hollands Spoor

Kijkduin

Transvaal Kwartier

Prins Clausplein ADO Stadium

Zuiderpark

Loosduinen

Plaspoelpolder

Ypenburg

Vrederust

The Foundation for Achieving Seamless Territory 0

0,5

1,5

2 km.

Legend Legend Church

Den Haag 18

When alert level raises to GUARDED Low Green Zone the Guarded expands N

Duindorp

Elevated

Watertoren

Scheveningen NATO

Duttendel

Iran-US Claims Tribunal

Scheveningse Bos

Staten Kwartier

ICTY

Koninklijk Huis

Mariahoeve

Mosque Church Synagogue

High Buildings Public and areas Ministry buildings Main military

Mosque Hindu temple Synagogue Monuments

High Buildings Main industrial areas Main military Main office areasareas

Hindu temple Medical Clinics Monuments Schools Medical Clinics TV, Radio tower Schools Radar

Main public area areas Main industrial Under surveillance Main office areas Sport fields Main public area Forest / Park Under surveillance Sport fields Dunes

TV, Radio Water towertower

Forest / Park Water

Hotel Radar

Rail road Dunes Highway Water

CCTV Water tower

Congresgebouw OPCW

Hospital Hotel

THIMUN Peace Palace

CCTV Westduinpark

High

Hospital

Central Station

Centrum

Segbroek

Public and Ministry buildings

National road Rail road Main road Highway Tram Line National road

Main road

T N T

City Hall NationaleNederlanden

Severe Hollands Spoor

Kijkduin

Transvaal Kwartier

Prins Clausplein ADO Stadium

Zuiderpark

Loosduinen

Plaspoelpolder

Ypenburg

Vrederust

The Foundation for Achieving Seamless Territory

0,5

1,5

2 km.

Legend Legend

Den Haag

At alert level HIGH the Green Low Zone takes up Guarded third of the Elevated city area

Church

Watertoren

Scheveningen NATO

Duttendel

Iran-US Claims Tribunal

Scheveningse Bos

Staten Kwartier

ICTY

Koninklijk Huis

OPCW

Duindorp

THIMUN Peace Palace

Mosque Church Synagogue Mosque Hindu temple Synagogue Monuments Hindu temple Medical Clinics Monuments Schools Medical Clinics TV, Radio tower Schools Radar TV, Radio tower Water tower Radar Hotel

High Buildings Public and Ministry buildings Main military areas High Buildings Main industrial areas Main military areas Main office areas Mainpublic industrial Main areaareas Main office areas Under surveillance Sport Main fields public area Under surveillance Forest / Park Sport fields Dunes Forest / Park Water Dunes Rail road

Water tower CCTV Hotel Hospital

Water Highway National Rail roadroad Main road Highway Tram Lineroad National

CCTV

Westduinpark

High

Mariahoeve

Congresgebouw

Hospital

Central Station

Centrum

Segbroek

Public and Ministry buildings

Main road

T N T

City Hall NationaleNederlanden

Severe Hollands Spoor

Kijkduin

Transvaal Kwartier

Prins Clausplein ADO Stadium

Zuiderpark

Loosduinen

Plaspoelpolder

Ypenburg

Vrederust

The Foundation for Achieving Seamless Territory

0,5

1,5

2 km.

An Ethnic Revolt scenario in the Hague From speech of the major of Den Hague Wim Deetman in the Int. symposium Accountability of intelligence and security agencies and human rights (juni’07) “It is crucial to realise that the phenomenon of radical ways of thinking that lead to violence is not the preserve of a specific population group or faith community. Radicalisation can also occur among native born people.”

school leader. - How can we prevent radicalization? It is important to treat each other with respect. People who feel themselves discriminated can get rather radical ideas. Also people who see no future for themselves, can form a risk. It is the role of the government to offer real possibilities to everyone. In a job or in a training for example All those security cameras on the street and stations, is that allowed? Yes, it is allowed. In more and more streets and on stations there is camera surveillance. There are also more and more security cameras in buildings. For our security we must submit a little of our privacy.

Terrorisme - vragen en antwoorden - In mijn wijk wonen mensen van veel verschillende nationaliteiten. Ik ben wel eens bang dat ik tussen terroristen woon. Is dat terecht? - Is de school van mijn kinderen voorbereid op een aanslag? Scholen, maar ook bedrijven en instellingen, hebben een plan klaarliggen voor noodsituaties. Als u daarover meer wilt weten, informeert u dan bij de leiding van de school. - Hoe kunnen we radicalisering voorkomen? Het is belangrijk om elkaar met respect te behandelen. Mensen die zich achtergesteld of gediscrimineerd voelen, kunnen eerder radicale ideeën krijgen. Ook mensen die geen toekomst voor zichzelf zien, kunnen een risico vormen. Het is de taak van de overheid om iedereen waar mogelijk kansen te bieden. Op een baan of een opleiding bijvoorbeeld - Al die beveiligingscamera’s op straat en stations, mag dat wel? Ja, dat mag. In steeds meer straten en op stations is tegenwoordig cameratoezicht. En ook staan er steeds meer bewakingscamera’s op gebouwen. Voor onze veiligheid moeten we een beetje van onze privacy inleveren. Downloaded from: http://www.denhaag.nl/smartsite.html?id=51156

Still five arrests in terror case

“If people have an exaggerated sense of lack of security with regard to members of a certain group, this can turn to hate or even violence if nothing is done to counter these feelings. We consequently need to be alert in all directions, but without becoming fixated on a particular group.” “We encourage the initiatives of religious institutions to ensure that their members feel at home in Dutch society. But we also have a critical word to say if we find out that a religious organisation is passing on messages that whitewash radicalisation or even promote it.” Downloaded from: http://www.denhaag.nl/smartsite.html?id=57403

Terrorism - questions and answers - There are people from several nationalities living in my district. I am sometimes frightened that I live between terrorists. Is that correct? - Is the school of my children prepared for an attack? Schools, but also companies and institutions, have a plan ready for emergency situations. If you want know more about that, you can get information from the The Foundation for Achieving Seamless Territory

Irruption Two men have been arrested in The Hague in the building at the Antheunisstraat. The blockade of the house was concluded around 16.30. The police force stormed the house in the Laakkwartier, where the whole day, two terror suspects were hiding. One of them refused to follow the police force after his arrest. The police force shot him for this reason in the shoulder. He was removed by ambulance to the hospital. The police force was assisted at the action by several special entities, among which ME. The roofs around the building were covered by snipers. Even helicopters were used. The airspace above the district was closed in a range of seven kilometres for fly activity. Hand grenade The siege started last night after the police force tried to go into the house, within the framework of a terrorism research. That failed. There was a booby-trap in the front door and a hand grenade was thrown to the police force. Thereby four agents were wounded. One of them is badly injured, but not in life danger. Two others could go home after treatment in the hospital in the course of the day. A fourth agent just noticed that he was also injured by grenade shards, after he had brought his injured colleagues to the hospital. Evacuation The district was closed and approximately 200 local residents were evacuated. They were placed in a canteen of a college. From them, 80 must spend also the night in the school, because the police force is not yet ready with the research of the house. Only when it is certain that the house is free of explosives, the removed people can return home. At the time of the police force action, fights appear between ultra-right-wing young people and Islamic local residents. The police has controlled the fights with the help of dogs. Three rebels have been apprehended.

Nog vijf arrestaties terreurzaak Inval In Den Haag zijn twee mannen aangehouden in het pand aan de Antheunisstraat. De belegering van het huis werd rond 16.30 uur beëindigd. De politie bestormde de woning in het Laakkwartier, waar zich al de hele dag twee terreurverdachten ophielden. Eén van hen weigerde bij zijn arrestatie de politiebevelen op te volgen. De politie schoot hem daarom in de schouder. Hij werd per ambulance afgevoerd naar het ziekenhuis. De politie werd bij de actie bijgestaan door verschillende speciale eenheden, waaronder de ME. Op de daken rond het pand lagen scherpschutters. Er werden zelfs helikopters ingezet. Het luchtruim boven de wijk werd in een straal van zeven kilometer gesloten voor vliegverkeer. Handgranaat De belegering begon vannacht nadat de politie in het kader van een terrorismeonderzoek had geprobeerd het huis binnen te vallen. Dat mislukte. Er zat een boobytrap aan de voordeur en er werd een handgranaat naar de politie gegooid. Daarbij raakten vier agenten gewond. Eén van hen is zwaargewond, maar verkeert niet in levensgevaar. Twee anderen konden na behandeling in het ziekenhuis in de loop van de dag naar huis. Een vierde agent merkte pas dat hij ook door granaatscherven was getroffen, nadat hij zijn gewonde collega’s naar het ziekenhuis had gebracht. Evacuatie De wijk werd afgesloten en ongeveer 200 buurtbewoners zijn geëvacueerd. Ze zijn ondergebracht in een kantine van een hogeschool. Van hen moeten er 80 ook de nacht doorbrengen in de school, omdat de politie nog niet klaar is met het onderzoek van de woning. Pas als zeker is dat de woning vrij is van explosieven, kunnen de omwonenden naar huis. Ten tijde van de politieactie braken relletjes uit tussen extreem-rechtse jongeren en islamitische buurtbewoners. De politie heeft de rellen met behulp van honden

21 de kop ingedrukt. Drie relschoppers zijn aangehouden. NOS nieuws binneland 10-11-04 h t t p : / / w w w. n o s. n l / a r c h i e f / 2 0 0 5 / n i e u w s / a r t i ke l e n / 2 0 0 4 / 1 1 / 1 0 / drieagentenarrestatieteamgewond.html

Fights at demonstration in The Hague By the redaction AMSTERDAM - The police force arrested Saturday afternoon in The Hague some hundreds of antifascist activists after violence at a demonstration. The police force conducted Saturday afternoon actions to keep a group of left antifascist demonstrators under control. According to a police force spokesman, it dealt with approximately 250 demonstrators, who wanted to reach a group of extreme right demonstrators of the Nederlandse Volks Unie. According to the spokesman, some home slaps have fallen. The police force had assigned, in advance, demonstration places far from each other to the two groups which far each other layers. Left could demonstrate around the square, Right around the Malieveld. Major Deetman had stated in a need regulation that the police force should intervene if the demonstrators left the determined route. By 15.30 the calm returned. The police force arrested around two hundred demonstrators who were kept on the Korte Voorhout. All activists are moved by buses to the head office of police force where they are interrogated

AMSTERDAM - De politie heeft zaterdagmiddag in Den Haag enkele honderden antifascistische activisten gearresteerd na ongeregeldheden bij een demonstratie. De politie voerde zaterdagmiddag enkele acties uit om een groep linkse antifascistische demonstranten in het gareel te houden. Het ging om ongeveer 250 betogers, die naar een groep extreemrechtse demonstranten van de Nederlandse Volks Unie toe wilden, aldus een politiewoordvoerder. Volgens de woordvoerder zijn er enkele rake klappen gevallen. De politie had van tevoren de beide groepen demonstratieplaatsen toegewezen die ver uit elkaar lagen. Links mocht rond het Plein demonstreren, rechts rond het Malieveld. Burgemeester Deetman had een noodverordening afgekondigd waarin stond dat de politie moest optreden zodra de demonstranten van de vastgestelde route zouden afwijken. Tegen 15.30 uur keerde de rust weer. De politie arresteerde ruim tweehonderd demonstranten die werden ingesloten op het Korte Voorhout. Alle activisten worden met bussen weggeleid naar het hoofdbureau van politie waar ze worden verhoord. De Telegraaf za 05 jun 2004, 13:52

http://www.telegraaf.nl/binnenland/11107881/Rellen_bij_demonstratie_in_Den_ Haag.html Rellen bij demonstratie in Den Hague door de redactie

Police attacked on multicultural party in The Hague Monday 15 October 2007 08.01

vernielingen aangericht en verschillende brandjes gesticht. Uiteindelijk werd de Mobiele Eenheid (ME) ingezet, en werden zes aanhoudingen verricht. De ME bleef met jeeps door de buurt patrouilleren om de orde te bewaren. Onvrede Een ooggetuige zegt tegen elsevier.nl dat er al wel onvrede onder de Marokkanen in de buurt heerste. Bij het Ha-Schi-Ba-festival dat jarenlang in de wijk werd gehouden, had elke bevolkingsgroep zijn eigen podium. Wegens geldgebrek ging het festival dit jaar verder onder de naam Kaschba en was er nog maar één podium. Een paar jonge Marokkanen uitten hun onvrede toen ‘hun’ muziek was afgelopen, en uiteindelijk zijn er dan ‘vijf gasten die het verknallen’. Overigens was het feest verder een groot succes, benadrukt de ooggetuige. Ook volgens de politie Den Haag was het evenement de hele zondag in een ‘goede sfeer’ verlopen. Elsevier http://www.elsevier.nl/nieuws/nederland/artikel/asp/artnr/174619/rss/true/index. html

The multicultural event Kaschba in the Schilderswijk in The Hague has gotten completely out of hand Sunday evening: two hundred youngsters turned themselves against the police force, attacking them with stones and eggs. The fights started at the end of the day, when a boy threw a bottle to the podium at the Oranjeplein, where the festival was taking place. That was a reason for the musicians to stop playing. Outside the festival area, afterwards, some young people started running through the streets of the Schilderswijk. According to regional broadcasting RTV West, the group grew fast until about two hundred young people. Mobile entity (ME) They attacked the police force with stones and eggs. There was also vandalism and several fires started. Finally, the mobile entity (ME) was used, and six arrests took place. The ME continued patrolling with jeeps the neighborhood to maintain the order. Dissatisfaction An eye witness said to Elsevier.nl that there was already dissatisfaction between the Moroccans in the neighborhood. At the Ha-Schi-Ba-festival, hold for many years in the district, had each population’s group its own podium. Because of lack of money, the festival went this year further under the name Kaschba and there was only one podium. A couple young Moroccans expressed their dissatisfaction when ‘ their ‘ music finished, and finally there where ‘five guests who spoiled it’. Besides, the festival was a big success, emphasizes the eye witness. Also according to the police force of The Hague, the complete Sunday, there was a ‘good ambiance ’ through the event.

Solution to Moslem terror against Hindus in The Hague

Politie bekogeld op multicultifeest Den Hague

“In theorie is het te rechtvaardigen dat diepgelovige Marokkaanse moslims in Den Haag begonnen zijn met een religieuze zuivering. Een groep Marokkanen is al maandenlang bezig met terreuracties tegen bezoekers van de Rammandir (Hindoetempel) aan de mijtenstraat in Den Haag.”

maandag 15 oktober 2007 08:01 Het multiculturele evenement Kaschba in de Haagse Schilderswijk is zondagavond volledig uit de hand gelopen: tweehonderd jongeren keerden zich tegen de politie en bekogelden hen met stenen en eieren. De rellen begonnen aan het eind van de dag, toen een jongen een flesje gooide op het podium op het Oranjeplein, waar het festival werd gehouden. Dat was voor de muzikanten reden niet verder te spelen. Buiten het festivalterrein begonnen enkele jongeren vervolgens door de straten van de Schilderswijk te rennen. Volgens regionale omroep RTV West groeide de groep al snel aan tot zo’n tweehonderd jongeren. Mobiele Eenheid Zij bekogelden de politie met stenen en eieren. Ook werden The Foundation for Achieving Seamless Territory

Author: Dewanand “In theory, it is justified that deep believers Moroccan Moslems in The Hague have started with a religious purification. A group of Moroccans is already for months busy with terror actions against visitors of the Rammandir (Hindu temple) in the mijtenstraat in The Hague.“ “There have been some god images stolen from this mandir, threats spoken, and some Hindu women have been even robbed, maltreated, and threatened with death.”

HLM HinduLife Magazine Oplossing moslim terreur tegen Haagse Hindoes Author: Dewanand

“Er zijn enkele afgodsbeeldjes gestolen uit deze mandir, bedreigingen geuit en enkele Hindoevrouwen zijn zelfs beroofd, mishandeld en bedreigd met de dood.” http://www.hindulife.nl/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=683&Itemi d=145

Neighborhood Index

1 70 71

2 03 72

4 6

5 46

69 48

55 18

25 0

23 20

10 39

89 88

11 98

43 11

21 20

49 65

11 43

40 3

The Foundation for Achieving Seamless Territory

55 18 32

25 0

10 39

89 88

43 11

34 22

14 10

21 20

11 98

40 3

01 Oud Scheveningen 02 Vissershaven 03 Scheveningen Badplaats 04 Visserijbuurt 05 v Stolkpark/Schev Bosjes 06 Waldeck-Zuid 07 Statenkwartier 08 Geuzenkwartier 09 Vogelwijk 10 Rond de Energiecentrale 11 Kortenbos 12 Voorhout 13 Uilebomen 14 Zuidwal 15 Schildersbuurt-West 16 Schildersbuurt-Noord 17 Schildersbuurt-Oost 18 Huygenspark 19 Laakhaven-Oost 20 Moerwijk-Oost

21 Groente- en Fruitmarkt 22 Laakhaven-West 23 Spoorwijk 24 Laakkwartier-West 25 Laakkwartier-Oost 26 Noordpolderbuurt 30 Rustenburg 31 Oostbroek-Noord 32 Transvaalkwartier-Noord 33 Transvaalkwartier-Midden 34 Transvaalkwartier-Zuid 35 Oostbroek-Zuid 36 Zuiderpark 37 Moerwijk-West 38 Moerwijk-Noord 39 Moerwijk-Zuid 40 Nieuw Waldeck 41 Zorgvliet 42 Stadhoudersplantsoen 43 Sweelinckplein eo

44 Koningsplein eo 45 Zeeheldenkwartier 46 Archipelbuurt 47 Willemspark 48 Nassaubuurt 49 Haagse Bos 50 Bloemenbuurt-West 51 Bloemenbuurt-Oost 52 Bomenbuurt 53 Vruchtenbuurt 54 Heesterbuurt 55 Valkenboskwartier 60 Binckhorst 61 Landen 62 Rivierenbuurt-Zuid 63 Rivierenbuurt-Noord 64 Bezuidenhout-West 65 Bezuidenhout-Midden 66 Bezuidenhout-Oost 67 Kampen

68 Marlot 69 Burgen en Horsten 70 Oostduinen 71 Belgisch Park 72 Rijslag 73 Westbroekpark 74 Duttendel 75 Uilennest 76 Duinzigt 77 Waalsdorp 78 Arendsdorp 79 v Hoytemastraat eo 80 Morgenstond-Zuid 81 Bosjes van Pex 82 Rosenburg 83 Eykenduynen 84 Leyenburg 85 Kerketuinen/Zichtenburg 86 Houtwijk 87 Venen/Oorden/Raden

The Foundation for Achieving Seamless Territory

88 Morgenstond-West 89 Morgenstond-Oost 90 Ockenburgh 91 Kijkduin 92 Bohemen/Meer en Bos 93 Componistenbuurt 94 Waldeck-Noord 95 Kom Loosduinen 96 Zijden/Steden/Zichten 97 Kraayenstein 98 Dreven en Gaarden 99 De Uithof 100 Duindorp 101 Erasmus Veld 102 Hoge Veld 103 Parkbuurt Oosteinde 104 Lage Veld 105 Zonne Veld 106 Vlietbuurt 107 Vliegeniersbuurt

108 Bosweide 109 Tedingerbroek 110 De Reef 111 De Venen 112 Morgenweide 113 Singels 114 Waterbuurt 115 De Bras 116 Westvliet 117 De Rivieren 118 De Lanen 119 De Velden 120 De Vissen 121 Rietbuurt

Nederlands Turks Marokkaans Surinaams Antilliaans & Arubaans Zuideuropees

The Foundation for Achieving Seamless Territory

03 71

Overig geindustrialiseerd Overig niet-geindustrialieerd

121 Rietbuurt

120 De Vissen

119 De Velden

118 De Lanen

117 De Rivieren

116 Westvliet

115 De Bras

114 Waterbuurt

113 Singels

112 Morgenweide

111 De Venen

110 De Reef

109 Tedingerbroek

108 Bosweide

107 Vliegeniersbuurt

106 Vlietbuurt

105 Zonne Veld

104 Lage Veld

103 Parkbuurt Oosteinde

102 Hoge Veld

101 Erasmus Veld

100 Duindorp

99 De Uithof

98 Dreven en Gaarden

97 Kraayenstein

96 Zijden/Steden/Zichten

95 Kom Loosduinen

94 Waldeck-Noord

93 Componistenbuurt

92 Bohemen/Meer en Bos

91 Kijkduin

90 Ockenburgh

89 Morgenstond-Oost

88 Morgenstond-West

87 Venen/Oorden/Raden

86 Houtwijk

85 Kerketuinen/Zichtenburg

84 Leyenburg

83 Eykenduynen

82 Rosenburg

81 Bosjes van Pex

80 Morgenstond-Zuid

79 v Hoytemastraat eo

78 Arendsdorp

77 Waalsdorp

76 Duinzigt

75 Uilennest

74 Duttendel

73 Westbroekpark

72 Rijslag

71 Belgisch Park

70 Oostduinen

69 Burgen en Horsten

68 Marlot

67 Kampen

66 Bezuidenhout-Oost

65 Bezuidenhout-Midden

64 Bezuidenhout-West

63 Rivierenbuurt-Noord

62 Rivierenbuurt-Zuid

61 Landen

60 Binckhorst

55 Valkenboskwartier

54 Heesterbuurt

53 Vruchtenbuurt

52 Bomenbuurt

51 Bloemenbuurt-Oost

50 Bloemenbuurt-West

49 Haagse Bos

48 Nassaubuurt

47 Willemspark

46 Archipelbuurt

45 Zeeheldenkwartier

44 Koningsplein eo

43 Sweelinckplein eo

42 Stadhoudersplantsoen

41 Zorgvliet

40 Nieuw Waldeck

39 Moerwijk-Zuid

38 Moerwijk-Noord

37 Moerwijk-West

36 Zuiderpark

35 Oostbroek-Zuid

34 Transvaalkwartier-Zuid

33 Transvaalkwartier-Midden

32 Transvaalkwartier-Noord

31 Oostbroek-Noord

30 Rustenburg

26 Noordpolderbuurt

25 Laakkwartier-Oost

24 Laakkwartier-West

23 Spoorwijk

22 Laakhaven-West

21 Groente- en Fruitmarkt

20 Moerwijk-Oost

19 Laakhaven-Oost

18 Huygenspark

17 Schildersbuurt-Oost

16 Schildersbuurt-Noord

15 Schildersbuurt-West

14 Zuidwal

13 Uilebomen

12 Voorhout

11 Kortenbos

10 Rond de Energiecentrale

09 Vogelwijk

08 Geuzenkwartier

07 Statenkwartier

06 Waldeck-Zuid

05 v Stolkpark/Schev Bosjes

04 Visserijbuurt

03 Scheveningen Badplaats

02 Vissershaven

01 Oud Scheveningen

Ethnicity by Neighborhood

15000

12000

9000

6000

3000

Onbekend/missing

Population etniciteitsgroep (VNG) [personen], 1995-2007 - alle Buurten Ethnicity Growth 1995-2007 300000

250000

200000

150000

100000

50000

Nederlands

Turks

Marokkaans

Nederlands

Surinaams

Turks

Antilliaans & Arubaans

Marokkaans

Surinaams

Zuideuropees

Antilliaans & Arubaans

The Foundation for Achieving Seamless Territory

Overig geindustrialiseerd

Zuideuropees

Overig geindustrialiseerd

Overig niet-geindustrialieerd

Onbekend/missing

2007

Nederlands

Turks

Marokkaans

Surinaams

Antilliaans & Arubaans

Zuideuropees

Overig niet-geindustrialieerd

Overig geindustrialiseerd

Onbekend/missing

o 1995

2007

1995

2007

Nederlands

1995

2007

Turks

1995

Marokkaans

2007

Surinaams

1995

Antilliaans & Arubaans

The Foundation for Achieving Seamless Territory

2007

Zuideuropees

Hypothetical scenarios: what if growth trends continues as it use to be in the past decade

25,000

Overig geindustrialiseerd

Overig niet-geindustrialieerd

Onbekend/missing

Legend 27

Ethnicity and places of Worship N

Scheveningen

Scheveningse Bos

Koninklijk Huis

Mariahoeve

Duindorp

Westduinpark

Public a

Mosque

High Bu

Synagogue

Main mi

Hindu temple

Main ind

Monuments

Schools

Main offi Main pu Under s Sport fie

TV, Radio tower

Forest /

Radar

Dunes

Water tower

Water

Hotel

Rail road

CCTV

Highwa

Medical Clinics

Duttendel

Staten Kwartier

Church

Nationa Main ro

Hospital

Central Station

Centrum

Segbroek

Hollands Spoor

Kijkduin

Transvaal Kwartier

Prins Clausplein

Zuiderpark

Loosduinen

Plaspoelpolder

Ypenburg

Vrederust

100% Dutch 100% Moroccan and Turks

The Foundation for Achieving Seamless Territory 0

0,5

1,5

2 km.

Legend

Extreme Ethnic Revolt Scenario

Church

Public and Ministry buildings

Mosque

High Buildings

Synagogue

Main military areas

Hindu temple

Main industrial areas

Monuments

Schools

Main office areas Main public area Under surveillance Sport fields

TV, Radio tower

Forest / Park

Radar

Dunes

Water tower

Water

Hotel

Rail road

CCTV

Highway

Medical Clinics

Hospital

National road Main road

Introducing elements of control Check points Control towers Earth mounts Patrols by tank, car , boats Control by snipers Security fence: Wall Wire Soldiers patrol Temporary Military Base New Prison Defining areas Secured zones Non secured zones Buffer Zones Non functioning programs Schools Medical clinic Guerilla reaction Vandalized public space Under ground spaces Explosions HQ The Foundation for Achieving Seamless Territory

29 N

Watertoren

Scheveningen NATO

Duttendel

Iran-US Claims Tribunal

Scheveningse Bos

Staten Kwartier

ICTY

Koninklijk Huis

Mariahoeve

Congresgebouw OPCW

Duindorp

THIMUN Peace Palace

Westduinpark

Central Station

Centrum

Segbroek

City Hall

Hollands Spoor

Kijkduin

Transvaal Kwartier

Prins Clausplein ADO Stadium

New Prison

Special Zone Family reunion Food delivery Market Place Zuiderpark

Loosduinen

Plaspoelpolder Vrederust

Ypenburg

The Foundation for Achieving Seamless Territory 0

0,5

1,5

2 km.

uindorp

Duttendel

Iran-US Claims Tribunal

Scheveningse Bos

Staten Kwartier

ICTY Congresgebouw OPCW THIMUN Peace Palace

Central St The Foundation for Achieving Seamless Territory

Centrum

Koninklijk Huis

Mariahoeve

ntral Station The Foundation for Achieving Seamless Territory

Central St

Centrum

Segbroek

City Hall

Hollands Spoor

Transvaal Kwartier

New Prison

Special Zone Family reunion Food delivery Market Place

The Foundation for Achieving Seamless Territory

ntral Station

oor

Prins Clausplein ADO Stadium

The Foundation for Achieving Seamless Territory

New Priso

Loosduinen

Vrederust

The Foundation for Achieving Seamless Territory

w Prison

Special Zone Family reunion Food delivery Market Place Zuiderpark

Plaspoelp

The Foundation for Achieving Seamless Territory

Vrederust

The Foundation for Achieving Seamless Territory

Plaspoelp 37

The Foundation for Achieving Seamless Territory

Revolt by the Poor Scenario

CBS Webmagazine Monday 12 Feb. 2007 10:00

Laakkwartier.

ARM door Bart Zuidervaart Den Haag en armoede gaan hand in hand. Althans, in een flink aantal wijken. Nergens in Nederland is het verschil tussen arm en rijk zo duidelijk als hier. Dwars door Den Haag loopt de Laan van Meerdervoort, een kilometerslange weg die de stad grofweg verdeelt in arm en rijk, het ’veen’ en het ’zand’. Boven de Laan liggen dure wijken als Statenkwartier en Benoorderhout. Verderop het centrum van ’Recht en Bestuur’, waar belangrijke organisaties als het Internationaal sentence court, het Joegoslavië-tribunaal en het Internationaal Gerechtshof zijn gevestigd. Daar wonen de expats in dure appartementen. Daar liggen vijf wijken die al jarenlang in de toptien van armste gebieden van Nederland staan, zoals Transvaal, Schilderwijk, Stationsbuurt en Laakkwartier. Downloaded from: http://www.iswebsite.nl/aardrijkskunde/Armdenhaag.pdf

“In The Hague there are also many poor autochthons.“ “The Hague is the only large city that has districts where the proportion of low incomes under autochthon households ended up above the 20 percent. In Amsterdam and Rotterdam it lay on maximum 16 percent, in Utrecht on 12 per cent.“

CBS Webmagazine Maandag 12 februari 2007 10:00

“In Den Hague ook veel arme autochtonen” “Den Hague heeft als enige grote stad wijken waar het aandeel lage inkomens onder autochtone huishoudens boven de 20 procent uitkwam. In Amsterdam en Rotterdam lag het op maximaal 16 procent, in Utrecht op 12 procent.” http://www.cbs.nl/nl-NL/menu/themas/inkomen-bestedingen/publicaties/ artikelen/archief/2007/2007-2133-wm.htm

ARM by Bart Zuidervaart The Hague and poverty go hand by hand. At least, in a considerable number of districts. Nowhere in the Netherlands is the difference between poor and rich as clear as here. Straight through The Hague runs the Laan van Meerdervoort, a road one kilometer long that roughly divides the city in poor and rich, ‘peat’ and ‘sand’. Above the Laan, lie expensive districts such as Statenkwartier and Benoorderhout. Further, in the centre of ‘ right and governance’ important organisations are located such as the International Criminal Court, the Yugoslavian tribunal and the international Court of Justice. There, the expats live in expensive apartments. There are five districts that stand already many years in the top ten of poorest areas of the Netherlands, such as Transvaal, Schilderwijk, Stationsbuurt and The Foundation for Achieving Seamless Territory

Public and Ministry buildings

Poverty, shopping areas and main firms HQs

Hotel Main Hotel building

Shopping Area Company HQ Scheveningen

NationaleNederlanden

T N T

Duttendel

Minimum income per household 0 Iran-US Claims Tribunal

Staten Kwartier

Scheveningse Bos

0% - 10% Koninklijk Huis

10% - 20%

Mariahoeve

Congresgebouw

20% - 30%

OPCW

Duindorp

30% - 40%

Peace Palace

40+% Westduinpark

Ministry of Finance Central Station

Centrum

Segbroek

T N T

City Hall NationaleNederlanden

Hollands Spoor

Kijkduin

Transvaal Kwartier

Prins Clausplein

Zuiderpark

Loosduinen

Plaspoelpolder

Ypenburg

The Foundation for Achieving Seamless Territory 0

0,5

1,5

2 km.

Green Zones at alert level LOW

Minimum income per household

Public and Ministry buildings Hotel

Main Hotel building

0% - 10%

Shopping Area

10% - 20% Scheveningen

Company HQ

20% - 30% 30% - 40% Duttendel

NationaleNederlanden

T N T

40+% Potential riot hub:

Scheveningse Bos

Staten Kwartier

Police Station Fire Brigade

Main Secondary

Iran-US Claims Tribunal

Main industrial areas Koninklijk Huis

Mariahoeve

Public squares

Congresgebouw OPCW

Duindorp

THIMUN Peace Palace

The Green and Red Zone is changing

Westduinpark

Ministry of Finance Central Station

by the type of threat

Centrum

Segbroek

T N T

City Hall NationaleNederlanden

Hollands Spoor

Kijkduin

Transvaal Kwartier

Prins Clausplein

Zuiderpark

Loosduinen

Plaspoelpolder

Ypenburg

The Foundation for Achieving Seamless Territory 0

0,5

1,5

2 km.

Green Zones at alert level GUARDED HIGH

Minimum income per household

Public and Ministry buildings Hotel

Main Hotel building

0% - 10%

Shopping Area

10% - 20% Scheveningen

Company HQ

20% - 30% 30% - 40% Duttendel

NationaleNederlanden

T N T

40+% Potential riot hub:

Scheveningse Bos

Staten Kwartier

Police Station Fire Brigade

Main Secondary

Iran-US Claims Tribunal

Main industrial areas Koninklijk Huis

Mariahoeve

Public squares

Congresgebouw OPCW

Duindorp

THIMUN Peace Palace

Westduinpark

Ministry of Finance Central Station

Centrum

Segbroek

T N T

City Hall NationaleNederlanden

Hollands Spoor

Kijkduin

Transvaal Kwartier

Prins Clausplein

Zuiderpark

Loosduinen

Plaspoelpolder

Ypenburg

The Foundation for Achieving Seamless Territory 0

0,5

1,5

2 km.

Revolt by the Poor Scenario

Demonstrations and Riots

Public and Ministry buildings Hotel

Car Burn

Main Hotel building

Vandalizing of stores and businesses

Shopping Area Company HQ

Blocking roads HQ mob

NationaleNederlanden

T N T

Curfew Zone Severe curfew zone Police control Police patrol

Police Station Fire Brigade Main industrial areas

Minimum income per household 0 0% - 10% 10% - 20% 20% - 30% 30% - 40% 40+%

The Foundation for Achieving Seamless Territory

Legend

Den Hague

Demonstrations and Riots

Public and Ministry buildings Hotel

Car Burn

Poverty in relation to shopping areas, ministry buildings, hotels and companies head quarters.

Main Hotel building

Vandalizing of stores and businesses

Watertoren

Scheveningen

Shopping Area Company HQ

Blocking roads HQ mob

Duttendel

NationaleNederlanden

T N T

Curfew Zone Iran-US Claims Tribunal

Staten Kwartier

Scheveningse Bos

Severe curfew zone Koninklijk Huis

Mariahoeve

Congresgebouw

Police control

OPCW

Duindorp

Police patrol

Police Station Fire Brigade Main industrial areas Main office areas

Minimum income per household 0

Peace Palace

0% - 10%

Westduinpark

Ministry of Finance Central Station

Centrum

Segbroek

10% - 20% T N T

City Hall

20% - 30%

NationaleNederlanden

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Koninklijk Huis

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Ministry of Finance Central Station

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Flood Scenario

Flood control in the Netherlands

The Netherlands has been struggling against floods since the first people settled there. Over 60% of the country lies beneath mean sea-level. Countless people have lost their homes and their lives to floods from the sea or the rivers that could not be held by the flood-defences. The importance of the protection has led the Dutch to dedicate a Department solely to the protection against floods. Furthermore, local waterboards are an extra layer of government specially dedicated to protection against floods and water management. This has resulted in a very high level of flood-protection. Flood-protection remains a continuous point of interest due to the vulnerability of the Dutch economy with regard to flooding. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flood_control_in_the_Netherlands

The North Sea flood of 1953

The North Sea flood of 1953 and the associated storm combined to create a major natural disaster which affected the coastlines of the Netherlands and England on the night of 31 January – 1 February 1953. Belgium, Denmark and France were also affected by flooding and storm damage. A combination of a high spring tide and a severe European windstorm caused a storm tide. In combination with a tidal surge of the North Sea the water level locally

exceeded 5.6 metres above mean sea level. The flood and waves overwhelmed sea defences and caused extensive flooding. Officially, 1,835 people were killed in the Netherlands, mostly in the south-western province of Zeeland. 307 were killed in the United Kingdom, in the counties of Lincolnshire, Norfolk, Suffolk and Essex. 28 were killed in West Flanders, Belgium. Further loss of life exceeding 230 occurred on watercraft along Northern European coasts as well as in deeper waters of the North Sea; the ferry MV Princess Victoria was lost at sea in the North Channel east of Belfast with 133 fatalities, and many trawlers sank.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flood_control_in_the_Netherlands

Global warming poses flood threat to Dutch

For hundreds of years, the dikes, dunes and ditches that crisscross the Netherlands have helped the Dutch succeed where King Canute failed. But experts say the lowlands cannot hold back the tide forever. Global warming, accompanied by torrential rain and rising seas, could bring catastrophic floods to the Netherlands in the next millennium. Sea levels will rise by 24 inches in the next century, compared with an average of eight inches a century over the past 1,000 years, according to some forecasts. This, coupled with predictions of monsoon-type rains, is worrying the Netherlands, where two-thirds of the population of almost 16 million already live below sea level. “Environmental experts predict global warming will bring drier summers and wetter winters with extreme rainfall,” said Jacob Hugo van der Vliet, chairman of one of the 63 regional water boards responsible for water management. “The rivers will have to drain more water and that means problems since we are at the end of the catchment area (in continental Europe).” In 1953, catastrophic flooding killed 1,850 people in the Netherlands. On the night of Jan. 31, the dikes between the raging North Sea and the southern province of Zeeland proved too weak to hold back freak high tides and gale-force winds. Surging waters submerged a large area of land, affecting thousands of homes and farms and forcing many people to take refuge on their roofs until they could be rescued. Of 72,000 evacuees, 10,000 still had no home nine months later. The disaster led to the Delta Project to build dams to regulate sea levels around Zeeland’s peninsulas and reinforce dikes. Zeeland has not suffered a severe flood since. Rhine biggest threat today The mighty River Rhine, cutting across northern Europe from the snow-laden Alps to the North Sea, poses the gravest threat to the Netherlands. This became clear in February 1995 when water levels along the key shipping route rose to 20 feet above normal, raising fears its banks would burst and forcing 250,000 people to flee their homes. In the end the last wall of winter dikes held firm. Van der Vliet said the problem arose when the first line of defense, the summer dikes, overflowed, submerging the plains between the summer and winter dikes. The floods caught thousands napping. Lulled into a false sense of security by The Foundation for Achieving Seamless Territory

many flood-free years, they thought it was safe to settle between the summer and winter defenses. City councils had pursued a policy of reinforcing the summer dikes in order to allow construction in the basin, though this reduced the river’s drainage area. “Sometimes we need a flood to wake us up,” Van der Vliet said. After the 1995 floods, parliament passed an emergency law to strengthen 360 miles of dikes before the end of 2000, copying the 1953 Delta Plan. But experts warn that strengthening the dikes could ultimately increase the danger. “The higher you build the dikes, the bigger the catastrophe when they break,” said Van der Vliet. “When the tide is high, the water level is already five meters (15 feet) above land.” In addition, the Netherlands is sinking along an axis that runs from the southwest to the northeast. By 2050 land north of the line, already below sea level, will have fallen another 16 inches. Cities such as Amsterdam and Rotterdam, with solid foundations, should stay above water, but they could become islands if the dikes break. Taking a step back After heavy rains in September of last year, the government decided more had to be done and founded the advisory committee Water Management in the 21st Century (WB21). The committee will present possible solutions in the middle of next year. “We can and did control the water to a large extent. We narrowed the river beds by using the flood plains for farming and even for urban expansion,” said WB21 Project Manager Jan Hoeks. “But when it rains very hard there is not enough room for water storage and it accumulates in the low areas.” The committee is not seeking solutions in modern water management techniques such as raising dikes or increasing pumping capacity. “We have to take a step backward and give more room to water and to the rivers,” Hoeks said. While maintaining dikes along the coastline, the committee favors giving the flood plains back to the rivers. “Building is out of the question,” Hoeks said. It also says the authorities must set aside large areas to store excess flood water. This could pose the biggest challenge of all for policymakers as farmers, homeowners and local lobby groups are determined to keep their land. “We have a lot of knowledge of water management in the Netherlands. Technically we can calculate how much land should be set aside for storage. But it will take quite some work to make this land available as there are still a lot of financial, legal and environmental problems to solve,” Hoeks said. Maybe the prospect of wet feet in the next millennium will provide the incentive the Dutch need. Wednesday, December 1, 1999 By Otti Thomas

Zuyderzee Flood (1916)

The Zuyderzee Flood of 1916 was not as severe as any of the other disasters described on this site. This however, does not mean it was unimportant. It had a large influence on the decision to build the Zuyderzeeworks. That is, the reclamation of the Zuyderzee. The storm had been brewing for the few days leading up to January the 14th, 1916. Finally, on that day, the winds increased to over 100 km/h. Usually, this would not have been a problem. Unfortunately though, this time, the water levels were already very high due to the continuing storm. Some areas were already slightly flooded. Dikes eroded on two sides. The “Waterland’s Seadike’, which was on the westside of what was then the island of Marken, was swept away for over a distance of 1.5 kilometres. The dike near Edam also collapsed, resulting in the surrounding areas, including Purmerend and Broek in Waterland and Durgerdam being flooded. Dikes also collapsed near the Anna Paulowna polder. The lower part of the ‘Gelderse Vallei’ (Valley of Gelder) was also hit, particularly the area between Eemnes, Spakenburg, and Bunschoten. Amersfoort was also flooded. The disaster caused mostly material damage, but sixteen people were killed on the island of Marken. Marken was only protected by low quays, so the water was able to engulf the island with ease. Various fishing boats were washed

49 inland and many people were just unable to escape. The water also caused problems outside North-Holland. Further dikes collapsed in Friesland, leading to the area near the Tjeukermeer and the area around Wolvega being flooded. The significance of this disaster was not only due to the number of victims and the level of material damage, but also because it instigated a discussion about the reclamation of the Zuyderzee. Mansholt, a farmer from Groningen, thought that damming the Zuyderzee was both unnecessary and dangerous, and would likely lead to new disasters. The plan to dam the Zuyderzee came from Ir. C. Lely, who had previously been the Minister of Public Works. Following the advise of Lely, Queen Wilhelmina announced in the Queen’s Speech of 1913, that the time had come to begin the reclamation of the Zuyderzee. The First World War however put a sudden stop to this, but on June the 13th, 1918, the Dutch Parliament passed a bill to finally start with the reclamation of the Zuyderzee.

The majority of Jonkman’s doctoral research was devoted to devising the socalled ‘victim functions’. ‘If the water is four meters deep, then 20 percent of the people in that area would not survive’, is an example of how this function works. For the victim functions, Jonkman based his data on the calamitous flood in the Netherlands in 1953 and other such disasters. To determine if his model’s findings were realistic, Jonkman also processed data from the floods caused by Hurricane Katrina in August 2005, when the dikes protecting New Orleans were breached. Jonkman’s model calculated 2,000 victims for that disaster – a figure that Jonkman is pleased with: “This is of the same order of magnitude as the 1,100 bodies that have actually been recovered so far.” An in-depth article about this research subject has been published in the latest edition of Delft Integraal / Delft Outlook, the independent science magazine of TU Delft. (www.delftintegraal.tudelft.nl).

http://www.deltawerken.com/Zuider-Zee-flood-(1916)/306.html

Evacuation no option for Randstad flood 04 December 2006 by M&C Press release - A flood in the southern Randstad will claim thousands of victims. And evacuating the area would only save precious few lives, TU Delft researcher Bas Jonkman states in the latest edition of Delft Outlook (Delft Integraal). If the seawalls at Den Hague and Ter Heijde are breached and the fast-flowing seawater floods the polder land behind the dikes, there will be more than 4,000 casualties, according to a new calculation method devised by TU Delft PhD candidate Bas Jonkman. Jonkman’s method also reveals that evacuating this area would only save at most 600 lives. “It’s possible to predict a North Sea storm a day or two in advance,” Jonkman says. ‘But before an evacuation could begin, the government would deliberate and everyone would have to be warned. Then, people would pack up their belongings. All this would cost a lot of time.” However, in the less densely populated polder lands along the rivers, if people were warned well enough in advance of an impending flood, Jonkman’s model predicts that an evacuation would indeed save many lives. For the densely populated polders bordering the coastline, Jonkman says it would be more effective for example to build stronger and higher dikes, as this would reduce the likelihood of a flood.

Red dots: casualties per district; blue areas: flood depth in metres. High resolution file available

By Bas Jonkman, Roy Meijer, http://w w w.tudelft.nl/live/pagina.jsp?id=7ab9cb2a-7cd2-48bc-8acdaf24c762f495&lang=en

Until now, various rules of thumb have been used to estimate the number of possible casualties resulting from a flood. Jonkman’s model for estimating casualties is more precise. It consists of various parts, including a model that simulates an evacuation and thereby determines how many people would still be in the area if the dike were breached. Determining how many of these people would survive is dependent on how fast the water flows, how fast the water rises and how deep the water is. To make such predictions, Jonkman uses a model that was developed by TU Delft and the research institute WL Delft Hydraulics. Jonkman combined the models to simulate the evacuation and the course of the flood. The Foundation for Achieving Seamless Territory

Water Levels in the Netherlands

bellow sea level

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Main office areas Main public area Under surveillance Sport fields

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Sources -

Ambachtsheer, H.F. Harmelen, C.J. Van verdediging naar be scherming; de Atlantikwall in Den Hague. Gemeente Den Hague, Den Hague, 1995.

Schmitt, M. Den Hague 7 lijnen. Gemeente Den Hague, Den Hague, 2004.

Schmitt, M. DNA Atlas Den Hague. Gemeente Den Hague, Den Hague, 2002.

Van Schuppen, S. Historische atlas van Den Hague : van Hofvijver tot Hoftoren, Amsterdam : SUN, 2006

Gemeente Den Hague. Armoedemonitor Den Hague 2006. Nummer 1. Juli 2006

Vos, P.C. Rieffe, E.C. Bulten, E.E.B. Nieuwe Geologische kaart van Den Hague en Rijswijk. Afdeling Archeologie, Dients Stadsbeheer, Gemeente Den Hague Bureau Monumentenzorg en Archeologie, Gemeente Rijswijk. Den Hague, 2007.

Bos, J. Gebedsruimte in Den Hague, eindrapport. Regioplan, Amsterdam, 2005. http://www.regioplan.nl/gfx/content/ Eindrapport%20Gebedsruimte%20in%20Den%20Haag.pdf

Topographise Kaart Den Haag

Google Earth

http://denhaag.buurtmonitor.nl/

http://www.denhaag.nl/smartsite.html?id=58972

http://www.antenneregister.nl/

http://puurdenhaag.com/

State and Urban Areas Homeland Security Strategy July 22, 2005

National Stratagy for Homeland Security, Office of Homeland Security, July 2002

The Foundation for Achieving Seamless Territory

Green Zone Red Zone in Den Hague is a project by the Foundation for Achieving Seamless Territory.

FAST is an architecture practice based in Amsterdam and is dedicated to expos-

ing and countering situations of human rights violations caused by the uses and abuses of architecture and planning tools. www.seamlessterritory.org info@seamlessterritory.org

Authors

Research, maps, text and design by Malkit Shoshan and Camila Pinzón Cortes

Malkit Shoshan, the director of the Foundation for Achieving Seamless Ter-

ritory since 2005. She studied Architecture and Urban planning in the University of Venice and in the Technion (Technical University) in Haifa. During and after her study she has worked on various projects, exposing and countering situation of human rights violations caused by architecture and planning. Her work was published at the Architecture biennale in Venice in 2002 as part of the Border-Disorder project. She has contributed to the ‘Civilian Occupation’ and ‘Politics of Verticality’ a project by Eyal Weizman and Rafi Segal. In 2004 she started ‘One Land Two Systems’ project, highliting and developing alternive planning strategies for the unrecognized village of Ein Hud. The Foundation FAST was born out of that and Shoshan has since realized various research and design projects, international exhibitions, lectures, workshops, articles.

Camila Pinzón Cortes, architect, lives and work in the Netherlands, re-

cently finalized her PHD in Development of mapping strategies of formal logics in peripheral areas of the contemporary city, as tool for analysis and intervention. She has a Master of Science in Architecture: Renewal and redesign of city areas, Specialization Urbanism from TU Delft and she studied architecture in the Universidad Nacional de Colombia. Sede Bogotá. She worked as architect, researcher and as a designer in various architecture offices and academic institutions, and since November 2007 she works also for FAST.

Special thanks

Robert Kluijver, Alwine van Heemstra, Willem Velthoven, Michiel Schwarz, , One Architecture, Rashad Selim and Steven van Schuppen

Transvaal Kwartier

New Prison

Special Zone Family reunion Food delivery Market Place Zuiderpark

Vrederust The Foundation for Achieving Seamless Territory