A to Z
Maritime Security
Maritime Security What is Maritime Security? It seems a very simple question, but the answer can get rather complicated. Maritime security affects almost every aspect of shipping and by default modern society. It involves the United Nations, governments, law enforcement, the military, non-governmental organizations, even oil companies too. Add to that private security companies, the World Food Programme, hardware and technology manufacturers, insurers and lawyers, not to mention ports and people, shops and ships, and you can start to see how complex it all is. From pirates and terrorists, drug smugglers to poachers there is much more to maritime security than first meets the eye. The Security Association for the Maritime Industry (SAMI) has produced this guide to aid understanding and to ensure that the issues can be discussed in a joined up, informed manner. Inside we assess the maritime security role of organisations, companies and people – creating a snapshot of a global and complex industry, one that is vital to modern industry and society. People’s lives, jobs, the meals on their plates and even the warmth and light in their homes depend on the safe, secure movement of ships globally. Maritime security plays a vital role in keeping trade moving. This A-Z guide provides a snapshot of this exciting, fast evolving, challenging and occasionally misunderstood sector of the shipping industry. From hinterland to homeland, this is maritime security...
AtoZ
Copyright © SAMI Second Edition Published 2012 Author: Steven Jones While this guide has been developed using the best information currently available, it is intended purely as guidance and is to be used at the user’s own risk. No responsibility is accepted by SAMI or by any person, firm, corporation or organization which has been in any way concerned with the furnishing of information or data, the compilation, publication or authorised translation, or supply of this guide, for the accuracy of any information or advice given herein or for any omission here from or for any consequences whatsoever resulting directly or indirectly from compliance with or adoption of guidance contained herein.
Images courtesy of Steven Jones, EUNAVFOR, Miris International, BMS Ltd, USCG and US Naval Forces.
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Armed Guards The use of armed guards on ships has slowly been gaining acceptance since 2008. Indeed the use of armed guards has frequently been reported in the media as having kept vessels safe from hi-jack. Given this, it seems understandable that increasingly shipowners are looking to an armed deterrent. Equipped with a varied arsenal, the armed guards are on watch as the vessel passes through the High Risk Area (HRA) for pirates and they monitor the security of the vessel. If pirates are spotted, the security team will liaise with the master to ensure that the pre-agreed security plans are implemented. If the actions laid down do not keep the pirates clear then the next phase will be to initiate an armed response. Dependent upon the exact nature of the applicable “Rules for the Use of Force” (RUF) this will likely involve a clear display of force and warning shots. If the pirates are still not deterred, if they continue to close onto the vessel then the team will begin shooting at the pirate skiff and the pirates. In most instances this has led pirates to break off their attack. As armed guards are used more frequently, it became clear that guidelines were needed to clearly state the minimum standards to be demonstrated and assisting owners and flag States to make decisions on which companies and personnel to use. The International Maritime Organization (IMO) and International Organization for Standardization (ISO), have produced guidelines setting out the minimum standards and experience expected of the security company, and of the individuals they use. Most are ex-military, or law enforcement personnel. Placing weapons onto ships has not been an easy choice for many – for years the shipping industry had tried hard to avoid the decision to “go armed”. Sadly it seems the threat posed by pirates is simply too great and armed guards are now a fixture of many vessels trading in pirate affected waters. The Security Association for the Maritime Industry (SAMI) has been a leader in developing the standards and certification of maritime security providers and their personnel. See www.seasecurity.org for more information.
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Best Management Practices
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The threat posed by pirates to commercial shipping has led to a range of “Best Management Practices� (BMP) being produced by the Shipping Industry in consultation with the combined naval forces - EUNAVFOR, the NATO Shipping Centre and the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO). The BMPs are essentially targeted at the operational staff onboard ship, and so contain a wealth of guidance and instruction on the ways of best either keeping clear of pirates or keeping any pirates which are encountered away from the ship. The publication comes in the form of a pocket-sized booklet, which includes illustrations and a small chart of the region. It is important that shipping companies make all efforts to distribute this booklet to their ships and their crews so that BMPs can be followed and implemented as a tool for counter piracy by those Masters and crews during transit through the High Risk Areas. The BMPs are based on lessons learned and experience, so they are regularly updated and revised. The latest version, BMP4, has brough together the shipping industry and partner organisations to ensure that as many shipping companies as possible distribute it to their vessels and personnel. With guidance on issues such as passage planning, reporting, establishing self protection measures, as well as using private security guards and establishing citadels onboard the BMPs should be read and understood by all Masters and senior officers prior to transiting High Risk Areas. The guidance should also be widely promulgated amongst all crew onboard. The practices which BMP stresses are in the main fairly common sense ones, and relatively straightforward to implement. Still however too many vessels do not adequately adopt or follow the guidance. Following BMPs makes ships safer, and they are less likely to be attacked and if they are, then they are far better equipped to deal with the pirates. See the Maritime Security Centre – Horn of Africa website for more details and the latest updates www.mschoa.org
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Citadels The use of safe places of refuge, or “citadels” onboard vessels attacked by pirates has been on the increase since late 2009. There have been a number of instances where crews have foiled pirates because they could not gain control of the vessel and could not physically capture crew members. The benefits of having a locked-down place of refuge are lost, however, if it is not possible to get all personnel inside. It is important to fully understand both the technical aspects of creating a citadel and the operational facets of managing their effective use. There is a considerable degree of misunderstanding of the “citadel” concept in merchant shipping. The fact it is a new concept on commercial vessels, and indeed far removed from usual shipboard considerations has given rise to some difficulties. BMPs stress that citadels should only be created onboard under the guidance of maritime security experts. Once constructed there are other requirements, such as preparing and mustering for entry. There are a number of important aspects of making the citadel work. On some vessels, they can be an excellent security solution and work well as part of a layered defence. However this depends partly on a genuine and functioning security culture within the company and onboard the vessel. Those who simply think the citadel is a space in which they can hide probably need to look at the intricate requirements for making a citadel approach really work. Reports are emerging that in addition to their usual piracy paraphernalia, pirates are taking plastic explosives onboard with the aim of blasting their way into citadels and strongholds. The pirate threat continues to evolve as we instigate new protective measures. Use of, and perhaps overreliance on, citadels has prompted regular updates to advice. It is strongly recommended that citadels are seen as complementary to, rather than a replacement for, all other self-protection measures. NATO has been quick to stress that it remains the responsibility of owners, operators and Masters to decide and implement policy in relation to the use of citadels. It also stresses that the use of a citadel does not guarantee a military response. See www.seasecuritybridge.com for the shipping industry position on citadels.
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Dangerzones
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The actual footprint of piracy operations off Somalia has grown vastly since the first widespread attacks back in 2005. The latest Best Management Practices reflect this, and they are now termed as, “Best Management Practices for Protection against Somalia Based Piracy. As the title suggests the spread of pirates has now gone beyond easily defined geographical limits, and this is aided by the fact that increasingly they have been making use of “motherships”. These are captured vessels, usually trawlers or dhows– but sometimes large commercial ships, from which they launch skiffs to attack other vessels. Despite some successes against Somali pirates, the range afforded by moving onto Mother Ships means that essentially there are very few parts of the Indian Ocean which can be considered safe. If you are on a vessel which either hasn’t taken the right precautions, or which is deemed a risk owing to its speed and freeboard, then you are in potential trouble. That said, the pirate “danger zone” cannot simply be considered off Somalia and around the Indian Ocean. The spread of maritime crime goes much further than that. With different types of piracy, violence, robbery and terrorism taking place in ports, anchorages and off a number of countries the danger zone extends wide across the globe. The latest focus has shifted to the West of Africa. Criminality, piracy and terrorism have long blighted Nigeria’s waters and have slowly seeped further out into the wider Gulf of Guinea (GoG), especially off the coasts of Benin and Togo. Over the Atlantic too there has long been a problem with opportunistic attacks on vessels in various South and Central American ports and while anchored in the vicinity. The birthplace of “modern piracy” was Southeast Asia and the Indian Subcontinent. Long before the boom in piracy off Africa, attacks off Asian ports and inside the region’s waters were commonplace. While various local and international initiatives have reduced the overall scale of attacks, the means and capability to attack ships still exist. It will perhaps come as no surprise when Asian piracy figures rise once again. To learn more about the current piracy dangerzones see the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) and their live piracy map and reports: http://www.icc-ccs.org/piracy-reporting-centre/imb-live-piracy-map
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EU NAVFOR As a result of the considerable escalation in acts of piracy over the past years off the coast of Somalia, the European Union launched a naval operation called EUNAVFOR Somalia – Operation ATALANTA. The aim was to protect humanitarian aid and reduce the disruption to shipping routes and the de-stabilising effect of piracy on the maritime environment in the region. The operation was scheduled for an initial period of twelve months, until 13 December 2009, but subsequent extensions have meant that Operation ATALANTA will now run until at least December 2014. However there are many who can foresee that a naval presence cannot be guaranteed indefinitely. EUNAVFOR is made up of contributions from a number of EU States, 13 EU Member States have provided an operational contribution to EU NAVFOR, either with ships, with maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft, or with Vessel Protection Detachment (VPD) team. This includes France, Spain, Germany, Greece, Sweden, Netherlands, Italy, Belgium, United Kingdom (also hosting the EUNAVFOR Operational headquarters), Portugal, Luxembourg, Malta and Estonia. While others have participated in the effort providing military staff to work at the EU NAVFOR Operational Headquarters (Northwood – UK), and 4 non EU Member States, have made operational contributions . Funding for the operation amounted to EUR 8.4 million for 2010 and EUR 8.05 million for 2011. This budget, which is shared between the EU Member States and is established on the basis of their GDP. The force size fluctuates according to the monsoon seasons, which determine the level of piracy. It typically consists of 5 to 10 Surface Combatants, 1 to 2 Auxiliary ship and 2 to 4 Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircraft. Including land-based personnel, EU NAVFOR consists of a total of around 2,000 military personnel. EUNAVFOR operates in a zone comprising the south of the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden and the western part of the Indian Ocean including the Seychelles, which represents an area of 2,000,000 square nautical miles (almost 4,000,000 square kilometres, equivalent to 30 times England, 10 times Germany, or 7 times France or Spain). See www.eunavfor.eu for more details.
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Foreign Navies
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There is a considerable international naval presence in the piracy High Risk Area. The Combined Maritime Forces, NATO and independent deployers like China, Russia, Japan, Taiwan, India and others make up a vital component of the naval effort in the area. The largest presence is that which comes under the US Combined Maritime Forces banner. This includes approximately three dozen ships from Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Pakistan, Canada, Denmark, Turkey, the U.S. and U.K., as well as other naval forces and personnel from several other nations. Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) patrol more than 2.5 million square miles of international waters to conduct both integrated and coordinated operations. Anti-piracy operations are a major part of the remit and are made up of Combined Task Forces 150, 151 and 152. Combined Task Force (CTF) 150 was established near the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom, CTF 150 conducts Maritime Security Operations (MSO) in the Gulf of Aden, Gulf of Oman, the Arabian Sea, Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. Maritime Security Operations help develop security in the maritime environment, which promotes stability and global prosperity. These operations complement the counterterrorism and security efforts of regional nations and seek to disrupt violent extremists’ use of the maritime environment as a venue for attack or to transport personnel, weapons or other material. Since its inception, CTF 150 has been commanded by France, Netherlands, UK, Pakistan, Canada and Australia. Combined Task Force (CTF) 151CTF 151 operates in the Gulf of Aden and off the eastern coast of Somalia covering an area of approximately 1.1 million square miles. CTF 151 is a multinational task force established in January 2009 to conduct counterpiracy operations under a mission-based mandate throughout the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) area of responsibility to actively deter, disrupt and suppress piracy in order to protect global maritime security and secure freedom of navigation for the benefit of all nations. CTF 151 has previously been commanded by the U.S. Navy, the Korean Navy and the Turkish Navy. The command staff is comprised of personnel from a number of coalition countries, and it manages daily operations from onboard the USS Anzio. See http://www.cusnc.navy.mil/ for more details
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Gulf of Aden (GoA) The Gulf of Aden (GoA) was the initial focus of Somali pirates as they hit vessels passing through this busy and strategic point. The GoA acts as a funnel as shipping passes from East to West, and vice versa – heading to and from the Suez Canal. It is a major shipping lane linking Europe and Asia, and much of the world’s trade and oil moves through it. The fact that pirates were able to strike at vessels passing through the area quickly became a real concern. Very quickly from 2004 onwards it became clear that this was not a small scale, short time problem. As the attacks mounted in frequency and ferocity it was clear that action was needed. One initial response was to try to establish a convoy system. This however did not prove wholly successful as the sheer volume of traffic and the vast sea area made it difficult to corral the vessels safely through. The next concept was to establish the International Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC). This is an area in which military assets (Naval and Air) are strategically deployed to best provide protection and support to merchant ships. Ships then transit the area in a Group Transit (GT). The premise behind the IRTC and the GT is that it allows naval forces to ensure that the areas of highest risk within the Gulf of Aden are sanitised at the times of greatest risk, being around sunrise and sunset, and that groups of vessels are together in these locations at these times. The IRTC runs in a NE-SW orientation, and the usual rendezvous points for joining are: • Point “A” 11-50N, 045-00E • Point “B” 14-28N, 053-00E The IRTC is not a Traffic Separation Scheme, nor is it marked with navigational aids and vessels are to comply with the requirements of the International Regulations for the Preventions of Collisions at Sea at all times. Masters using the IRTC are not relieved of their obligation and should continue to maintain a strict 24 hour lookout using all available means to get an early warning of an approaching threat. Some vessels have been attacked/hijacked in the corridor. For more details and the latest updates see the Maritime Security Centre – Horn of Africa website www.mschoa.org
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Hostage Taking
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The attacks by Somali pirates on commercial vessels have one aim, they want to take control of the vessel. From this position they then take the crew as hostages and demand a ransom is paid for the release of the seafarers and the ship. This very simple model has proven to be incredibly effective and difficult to counter. Seafarers have proven to be valuable hostages, and given that it has proven relatively straightforward for the Somalis to capture vessels, then the problems are expected to continue until some real solutions are forthcoming. What is life like for the seafarers who fall into the hands of pirates, and how does the hostage scenario usually play out? Initially there appeared some form of begrudging respect between the parties, seafarers and pirates rubbed along reasonably well, albeit under intense stress. Rumours were rife that a pirate “Code of Conduct” existed, and that seafarers were in relatively safe hands. However this has not been the experience in recent years. The hostages have been increasingly violated, both physically and mentally, as the pirates have looked to increase pressure on owners and insurers to settle their demands. The routine aboard a captured ship is one of highs and lows. The vessels are usually kept in the hands of “holding gang”. These tend to be either younger or older pirates, who are not used in the actual attacks. For much of the time there is a mundane element to life as a hostage. It is about quietly coping and getting through, and as food, water and other supplies run low the pirates and hostages are bound in a wary and weary co-existence. Then there will be flashpoints – when demands aren’t met, or if crew get ill, or if rumours of rescue surface, then the hostages can be attacked and made to suffer. There is an interesting dynamic which emerges, as the pirates want the ransom paid and so too do the crew. So despite the violence and fear both parties have a significant degree of mutual interest. There can be no doubt however that any time spent as a hostage is terrifying, stressful and dreadful, and the stages of getting seafarers freed must be followed up by efforts to ensure that they are supported in their struggle to recover from what for many will be the worst experience of their lives. See www.saveourseafarers.com for more information.
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Incident Reporting What is the true global extent of piracy? Look at the statistics produced by the International Maritime Bureau (IMB), and the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and a range of other bodies and you will still be none the wiser. The fact is that the reporting of piracy activity does not wholly reflect the true global level of activity. However there are efforts to improve with regards to Somali piracy as the issue of post incident reporting gains prominence. However there is a constant criticism that incidents are not being routinely reported. BMPs encourage owners to provide a copy of any post incident reports to the IMB. It is also stressed that any report contains descriptions and distinguishing features of any suspicious vessels that were observed. The post incident reporting emphasis is evolving as the legal process evolves, and in the latest BMPs there is a section on, “Prosecution of Pirates – Assisting Law Enforcement authorities.” Law enforcement authorities will routinely request permission to conduct post-release crew debriefs and to collect evidence for ongoing and future investigations and prosecutions following captivity. A thorough investigation is critical to ensure that potential physical, including electronic evidence, is not tainted or destroyed or potential witnesses overlooked. The company and crew are advised that the quality of the evidence provided and the availability of the crew to testify will significantly help any investigation or prosecution that follows. Reporting is vital as the date produced allows for allocation of naval and law enforcement assets, and will assist in any impending prosecution of pirates or financiers. Elsewhere progress is not so positive, and reporting of global piracy and maritime crime is far too low. There are reasons for this, ranging from lack of understanding of the process, through to fear that investigations may slow vessels or that breaches in security may impact on a vessel’s capacity to trade. To report an incident or to find out more see www.icc-ccs.org/piracy-reporting-centre/report-an-incident
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Jail
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One of the most frustrating elements of the global naval battle against piracy was the seeming uncertainty with which captured pirates were dealt. The “Catch and Release” programmes favoured by some forces saw pirates caught with weapons onboard their boats, or even in the process of attacking vessels. They have then been brought onto the naval vessel, before being provided with water, fuel and even new outboard engines and sent back towards Somalia. This, as has been pointed out, is not a deterrent. Critics believed that such an approach simply fuelled more piracy and leaves the multi-million, perhaps even billion dollar navies looking rather ineffective. The call from many observers has been to ensure that any suspected pirates captured are prosecuted and if found guilty then they are given a custodial sentence. It seems logical then, sensible even, to have not only the will and desire to prosecute pirates, but the capacity to actual detain them. This was a rather difficult proposition, but driven by the UN Contact Group, the UK and US governments - it seems there has been progress. While the complex and global nature of shipping, made it hard to pinpoint just who has/ should take responsibility. The fact that Kenya and the Seychelles have become legal clearing houses for pirates has made a real difference. Now with jails close to the HRA pirates are being taken from the seas and contained.
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This form of localised incarceration is seen to be working, and as the United Nations has funded the development of a prison in Somaliland, the so called, “Hargeisa pirate prison” there are signs of being able to do ever more to really deter pirates, and to lock up those who are tempted to attack vessels . Though there are conflicting reports on how this project is developing. Paraphrasing James Austin’s definition of law, as “a set of rules....enforced by sanctions”. It seems that for too long the international community was lacking the means of a deterrent. No sanctions meant it was increasingly difficult to apply the rules and law and order inevitably broke down. Now it seems we are making progress. See the United Nations website for more information: http://www.unodc.org/easternafrica/en/piracy/index.html
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The problems of piracy have been exacerbated by the violent, desperate and unpredictable actions of the pirates. If pirates manage to board a vessel they are likely to be aggressive, highly agitated and possibly under the influence of drugs (usually the local favouite, “khat”) and so shipboard personnel should be aware of the risk of violence and should try to avoid heightening the already tense situation.The use of khat really does fuel the problem of piracy, making bad situations into lethal ones. Khat is a herbal substance derived from a leafy green plant of the same name, and contains many different compounds. Its main effects are due to two compounds with stimulant properties similar to, but less powerful than, amphetamines. The stimulants speed up the mind and body, with potentially deadly results. According to research long term use of khat can give you feelings of anxiety and aggression. It can make pre-existing mental health problems worse and can cause paranoid and psychotic reactions (which may be associated with irritability, anxiety and losing touch with reality). Dutch and Spanish scientists have warned that usage lowers inhibitions with potentially dangerous results. This makes users more impulsive, and mildly euphoric, they also tend to have increased energy and enhanced self-esteem. Given the way in which pirate attacks are launched, it can perhaps be seen that khat use does fuel piracy in a very real way. When facing a much larger commercial vessel from a skiff, you would need to feel aggressive, uninhibited and euphoric to even begin to attempt a boarding. When one looks at images of pirates attacking vessels often one of the questions raised is of just how they manage to scale such seeming heights. Especially vessels such as the Ro-Ro “Faina” , perhaps drugs is partly the answer. The increased energy and a belief that you are able to achieve incredible things does perhaps allow them to do some amazing things. Add greed and desperation into this heady mix and we are perhaps close to understanding the threat posed by pirates in a little greater detail. For more information on khat see http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/publications/drug-profiles/khat
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Lloyd’s of London
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Much of what happens in the shipping industry is driven by insurance. Shipping as we know it would not exist if it weren’t for the ability for shipowners and investors to transfer some of the risks posed by their “marine adventures”. As such the Lloyds Market, headquartered in London is the key hub around which the world of marine insurance revolves. This is where underwriters add their names to take on exposure to the risks, and by so doing take on some of the perils posed. To insurers, piracy is a vital issue. If ships do not get to their intended destination, then there can be immense financial ramifications. This will be covered by insurance and the underwriters can be hit. The same if a vessel is lost, or if the cargo is stolen. The premise of shipping is to get the cargo and ship safely to its contracted (chartered) destination. If the worst does happen then the implications and ramifications, both financially and legally can be severe. For these reasons the underwriters at Lloyd’s have an important role to play in the piracy saga. They are able to impose financial penalties on those who travel into places which they have deemed unsafe, (as assessed by the Joint War Committee) in fact they can force policy holders to take out new forms of insurance or pay higher premiums. They are also able to encourage shipowners to do more to protect their vessels. In fact much of the drive towards using armed guards has actually stemmed from underwriters being uncomfortable with vessels they provide cover on trading in High Risk Areas without adequate protection. Lloyd’s underwriters also do a significant level kidnap and ransom cover business. They provide policies which will pay ransoms, cover the costs of negotiators, the delivery costs of getting ransoms to pirates and of a range of other costs. Business in this relatively new area has boomed over the past couple of years, however there have been changes as more claims have arisen. Once again it has been the requirements of underwriters which have forced many shipowners to more about the threats facing their vessels than many would have done voluntarily. Shipping has been shaped by insurance in the past, and it continues to be so. For more information see www.lloyds.com
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Masters The pressure of piracy rests on the shoulders of many groups – but perhaps none more so than the Masters of commercial vessels. They have to protect their crews, cargoes and vessels, and they have the weight of responsibility squarely laid at their door. At all stages of the voyage, Masters have to be sure that things are done in the right way. They need to ensure that their pre-voyage plans are adequate, and that any onboard security provisions are in place and working. To manage, albeit with the support of the Ship Security Officer (SSO), the full range of responses which piracy requires place a great deal of strain on the Master. Whatever security is used onboard the Master retains overall control; however this can be a little simplistic if there are armed guards onboard. There has long been concern of the basic security interactions between master and crew and armed guards. Some operatives strike up wonderfully positive working relationships with those onboard, while others quite simply don’t. It is important therefore that the Master and crew should be briefed on the High Risk Area, location and duration of the ship’s passage, the role of the guards within the security plan and watch rota, and the crew’s actions when under attack. The issues of legal implications and potential liability have naturally been a concern especially where the actions of Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel (PCASP) may cause injury or death to any person, including the PCASP themselves, or any other damage caused to the ship or its cargo. The possible legal consequences a ship’s Master could face and that the fact that masters are deemed to have “overriding authority” could be construed in such a way that they can be held ultimately responsible for any actions taken by the PCASP which were beyond the master’s control. Until something goes wrong we are all simply guessing as to the legal ramifications of the issue of shipboard command and control. The use of weapons changes everything, and further adds to the pressure on the Master. For more details on the role of Master, and of the problems facing them visit the International Federation of Shipmasters Associations www.ifsma.org and the Nautical Institute, www.nautinst.org
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Norwegian Shipowners Association
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Shipowners across the world are naturally concerned about piracy. One of the most pro-active groups on the issue of pirates and indeed maritime crime has long been the Norwegian Shipowners Association (NSA). NSA has drawn a range of briefing documents to aid its member shipowners on how to apply the requirements of the Norwegian government, and of the steps to also apply the rules and regulations which emerge from the International Maritime Organization (IMO). The Norwegian government, through the Norwegian Maritime Directorate (NMD) has been at the forefront of the efforts to ensure that private security companies are checked and verified. The following links provide insight into the NMD work, and also the guidance issued by the NSA. http://seasecurity.org/index.php/publications As we have said, the efforts of the Norwegians are not in isolation and the International Chamber of Shipping (ICS), has been working extremely hard to ensure that the problems of piracy are heard both at an international and national level. They have helped to fund efforts such as the Save Our Seafarers campaign, www.saveourseafarers.com and they are pushing the political agenda that there is no acceptable level of piracy. Shipowners are faced with many problems as piracy has taken grip. They have their commercial responsibilities, i.e. delivering the cargo safely and in a timely manner as per the charter party. They also have a duty of care towards their crew. Sadly for every company which takes the care of crew seriously there are other less scrupulous owners who do not. There have been instances of ships being taken by pirates and the owners simply walk away, leaving the crew in mortal danger. Increasingly the shipowning community is pushing for long term, “proper� solutions. It remains clear to so many that while the battles against piracy may be won at sea, the overall war will be won ashore. Until there is a concerted effort to fix the ills on the land, then it seems shipowners will continue to worry about their vessels in High Risk Areas. To find out more visit the Norwegian Shipowners Association website http://www.rederi.no/nrweb/english.nsf
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One Earth Future The Somali piracy problems have indicated that some new form of thinking is going to be necessary to end the menace out on the seas. Thankfully an organisation called, the One Earth Future (OEF) Foundation has emerged as a thought leader and has been successful in driving much debate and new research. OEF is a US-based, non-profit, non-governmental organisation founded in 2007 by a business entrepreneur. Formed with a vision of developing effective systems of global governance to achieve a world beyond war, under the strapline, “Peace Through Governance”. In bringing this philosophy to the problems of piracy OEF believes the world needs to develop a global solution. The “Oceans Beyond Piracy” Project was launched to develop short- and long-term collaborative approaches to solving maritime piracy. As part of this, they have taken the innovative approach of quantifying both the economic and human costs of piracy. According to Oceans Beyond Piracy, In 2011, at least 3,863 seafarers were fired upon by Somali pirates armed with assault rifles and rocket propelled grenades. While the number of hostages has gone down over the past year, the violence faced by seafarers has remained high and attacks are often carried out with a determined ferocity – even against vessels protected by private security teams.” Of that number, 968 seafarers faced armed pirates who managed to board their vessels. 413 of these seafarers were rescued from citadels (secured rooms) on their vessels by naval forces after waiting, terrified, for hours or even days while pirates tried to break into the citadels. A total of at least 1,206 hostages were held captive by Somali pirates in 2011. These included 555 seafarers who were attacked and taken hostage during the year, 645 hostages captured in 2010 who remained in pirate hands during 2011, and 6 tourists and aid workers kidnapped on land. The average length of captivity has also increased by 50% over last year, up to an average length of over 8 months. Often these hostages face systematic and daily psychological and physical abuse and were even used as human shields: See http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/ for full details.
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Piracy
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Piracy is an ancient and established threat to ships, people and cargoes and reemerges whenever and wherever the circumstances are attractive. Over the past 30 years we have found ourselves in the grip of a modern piracy epidemic, with a form of piracy that has evolved into a faster, more ruthless, organised and violent threat than ever before. Modern piracy is violent, bloody and ruthless. The main aim of piracy can vary, depending on where it occurs and by whom it is perpetrated. A definition of piracy was laid down in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas (Article 15), which also makes up Article 101 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the sea (UNCLOS) 1982 and declares piracy a criminal act. The UNCLOS definition contains five elements: • Piracy must involve a criminal act of violence, detention or depredation • Piracy is committed on the high seas or in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State • The two-ship rule. Pirates need to use a ship to attack another ship, which excludes mutiny and privateering • Piracy needs to be committed for private ends, which excludes the acts of terrorists or environmental activists • Piracy must be committed by from a privately-owned vessel, which excludes attacks by naval craft Attacks inside territorial water are not piracy, while those outside are. Restricting piracy to the high seas means that an alternative term has to be created for attacks against ships within territorial waters. The IMB has adopted the following definition: “an act of boarding or attempting to board any ship with the intent to commit theft or any other crime and with the intent or capability to use force in the furtherance of that act”. This definition covers actual or attempted attacks whether the ship is berthed, at anchor or at sea. Petty thefts are excluded, unless the thieves are armed. See www.un.org/Depts/los for more information on the UN Law of the Sea.
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Q-Ships Of all the various attempts to capture or to attack pirates, one which has been discussed but not yet attempted has been to use “Q-ships”. These are armed vessels which are disguised as regular commercial vessels in order to actively attract an attack. The first use of Q-Ships was by the Royal Navy during the First World War as an answer to use of German U-boats. The U-boats would come to attack what they believed to be an unarmed commercial vessel, when suddenly they would find themselves in battle with an armed naval ship. As the fight against Somali pirates has dragged on, there have been some who have suggested that such an approach could reap some reward. It can be seen that the doubt it could sew in the mind of pirates could be useful. However it is considered unlikely that such an approach would be used by modern navies in the High Risk Areas. It is often left to the private security providers to innovate and come up with new ways of protecting vessels. Uppermost in these plans has been the use of escort vessels to travel alongside clients ships in order to provide security. There are a number of companies offering such services, and the reports thus far are that they can provide an effective deterrent. One of the largest scale plans has been to build a “private navy”, which would be provided by the insurance industry. The Jardine Lloyd Thompson Group (JLT) concept has been around for a while now, and it seems that gaining access to the finance required for such a project has been difficult. However there are many who believe that such a step may be necessary in the future. As government spending on navies is cut back, as is happening in many countries, it seems increasingly likely that a large scale, effective naval presence will be withdraw. Such moves will leave a security gap which will need filling, and it seems that only private security will be able to fill the void. According to JLT, the “private navy” would work under the direct control of the military with clear rules of for the use of force. It is anticipated that the use of private escorts will increase, especially as flag States wrestle with the dilemma of how to best manage the use of armed guards on the vessels flying their flags.
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Ransoms
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Pirates off Somalia look to gain access to the ships in order to take their crews hostage – they then demand a ransom for their release. The issue of ransoms is therefore fundamental to the whole piracy chain. While some say that ransoms shouldn’t be paid, there are others who recognise that there really isn’t much option if a ship and crew are held. There have been attacks by Special Forces to reclaim vessels, there have even been crews who have fought back and freed themselves. However it remains that the payment of a ransom is the most effective way of getting the vessel and crew freed. Professional hostage negotiators are usually employed by shipowners, and trusted “intermediaries” are used by pirates. The negotiations can go on for some months until both parties are able to eventually settle on a mutually acceptable figure. According to Stephen Askins of Ince & Co, the length of time taken to negotiate has been rising and so too have the amounts paid out. Analysis of ransom payments for ships hijacked make rather depressing, but perhaps predictable reading. From 2008 when the average figure (in US$) was 1.3million, the trend has been inexorably upwards. Through the 3million mark in late 2009, continuing up to where the average now breaks the 5million mark. There are also spikes, where payments have moved far from the average. In 2011 the trend for such high payments had worryingly become commonplace. However, as hijacks have dropped the pirates are no left with ships which they have been trying to ransom for some time - as such the demands have dropped to reflect their need to get paid. Once a ransom is paid, the ‘hawala’ route of illegal money transactions is being used to move Somali piracy ransoms. According to Interpol, ”hawala” is an alternative or parallel remittance system operating outside of, or parallel to ‘traditional’ banking or financial channels. The system works by transferring money without actually “moving it”. Pirate leaders and facilitators receive income both from investors and ransom payments, and disburse a portion of the proceeds of ransoms back to their investors and to the pirates who actually hijack the ships and hold the crews hostage. Often getting the cash to the pirates is a major logistical problem and there are a number of companies which specialise in arranging delivery either by sea or air. See www.interpol.int/ for more information on ransoms, the flow of cash and illegal payments.
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Shipping Associations There are number of organisations which have been pressing hard to end piracy, or at least to limit the effect of it on vessels and crews. Uppermost in these have been the “shipping association” – these are membership organisation made up of particular shipowner interest groups. While these all have their own special areas of interest, where necessary they come together as the Round Table of international shipping associations for major issues such as piracy. The mission of the Round Table is to work together as associations in order to serve, represent and advance the international shipping industry. Given their own areas of influence the Round Table is important as it brings them together to act together to avoid duplication on issues of consensus, where, “the combined effort of the Round Table can exceed the sum of the individual efforts.” The members of Round Table are: • BIMCO www.bimco.dk • International Chamber of Shipping/International Shipping Federation www.marisec.org • INTERCARGO www.intercargo.org • INTERTANKO www.intertanko.com The Round Table joined together with a range of other shipping associations as signatories of Best Management Practice (BMP). These include: • Cruise Lines International Association www.cruising.org • IG P&I (The International Group of P&I Clubs) www.igpandi.org • IMB – ICC International Maritime Bureau www.icc-ccs.org/home/imb • ITF – International Transport Workers Federation www.itfglobal.org • IPTA – The International Parcel Tankers Association www.ipta.org.uk • OCIMF – Oil Companies International Marine Forum www.ocimf.com • SIGTTO – The Society of International Gas Tankers and Terminal Operators www.sigtto.org
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Training
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Training is a vital part of any security regime and the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code specifically states that training and drills must be conducted for all involved with security in order to hone their skills. In addition to helping crew members to perform better, training instils confidence and teaches the skills and attributes that will allow any security regime to work. The ISPS Code requires training for the Company Security Officer (CSO) and appropriate shore-based personnel, the Shipboard Security Officer (SSO) and shipboard personnel having specific security duties and responsibilities to ensure all have sufficient knowledge and ability to perform their duties. Duties within the Ship Security Plan (SSP) include gangway watches, security patrolling and searching and escorting visitors. Security awareness training should include the necessity for limiting discussion about specifics of the ship with non-company personnel, reporting suspicious acts or behaviour on or near the ship and on shore leave and protection of company-supplied identification cards or other documentation. Also BMP states that crew training sessions should be conducted, (including Citadel drills where utilised) prior to transits and debriefing sessions post transits. The key to the vessel’s security response must be based on having trained and drilled, having learned what to do and when. When a vessel is due to transit the High Risk Area it is vital to train for the passage in order to ensure proper and effective action if an attack occurs. Exercises and training could include drills to: • Respond to attackers • Call for assistance and practise ongoing communications • Muster and/or withdraw personnel into a citadel • Deal with pirates once they are on board • Practise measures to manage a hostage situation In addition, the Master should brief all personnel of the dangers posed by the transit and of the measures to be implemented to mitigate the risks. All personnel should ensure they understand their duties and the means of fulfilling them.
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United Nations The United Nations is an international organization founded in 1945 after the Second World War by 51 countries committed to maintaining international peace and security, developing friendly relations among nations and promoting social progress, better living standards and human rights. While piracy does take place at sea, and naturally comes directly under the auspices of the UN Specialised body, The International Maritime Organization (IMO). The UN has retained a number of key roles in maritime security and especially with piracy. The UN Convention on the Law Sea (UNCLOS) relate to the sea, such as UNCLOS and so defines piracy. Since the upsurge in Somali piracy the UN has also developed a specialised groups to deal with the problems. The Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) was created on January 14, 2009 pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1851. This voluntary, ad hoc international forum brings together countries, organizations, and industry groups with an interest in combating piracy. Participating states seek to coordinate political, military, and other efforts to bring an end to piracy off the coast of Somalia and to ensure that pirates are brought to justice. The Group meets three times a year at the United Nations, while its four Working Groups meet regularly around the world to develop and implement national counter-piracy policies and programs. Aside from this wider UN role, the maritime dimension is covered by the IMO – headquartered in London. The IMO is the specialised agency with responsibility for the safety and security of shipping and the prevention of marine pollution by ships. IMO currently has 169 Member States, three Associate Members, and a range of NonGovernmental Organizations (NGOs) that have consultative status. The most important legislation to emerge from IMO with regard to maritime security is the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code. This sits within the Safety of Life At Sea (SOLAS) Convention and requires wide ranging security provisions of shipping companies. There have been calls for the UN to provide “peacekeepers” to safeguard commercial vessels, but so far this concept has not gained traction. For more information see www.un.org and www.imo.org
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Violence
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Pirates have grown steadily more violent over recent years, and they are reportedly further hardening their attitude and as they look to apply every greater pressure to get ransoms paid. According to media reports, the pirates are stating that if a rescue is attempted they will immediately kill hostages. It seems that killing hostages may eventually become part of the rules. Pirates use whatever types of weapons that they can get. They differ from region to region. Most of the weapons of the Somali pirates originate from the Somali capital Mogadishu. They are Russian models generally made in China, the Indian region or in Eastern European countries. Most popular is the AK-47, this rifle has been around a long time, the first version was issued to the Russian Army in 1949. They are still very popular because they are cheap, readily available and extremely reliable. Over 50 million AK-47 or variants have been made all over the world. The effective range is around 300-400m. The AK-47 is not particularly accurate however in skilled and experience d hands it can lay down sustained fire on a tight target area. Pirates have shown that even from an unstable platform the bridge windows are easy to hit, for instance. Pirates, not unsurprisingly, place an enormous amount of reliance on their weapons. They use them in a challenging marine environment, and yet are able to keep the working – often when pirates take a vessel one of their first demands is for WD-40 or diesel, so they can clean and maintain their weapons. Another favourite is the Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG-7). This grenade is shot using rockets and they are readily available in arms markets. The RPG-7 can hit a target at around 500m, but if the target is moving then it works best if the target is 300m or closer. These grenades are popular choice of terrorists and pirates, but some believe they will soon turn to the more deadly RPG29. As armed shipboard teams have gained something of an upper hand, it is inevitable that pirates grow more frustrated and desperate they will resort to an escalation in weaponry as they look increase the haul of hijacked vessels. This will also potentially see an increase in violence when if they do get onboard.
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West Africa While much of the recent piracy focus has been on the East Coast of Africa, it has been increasingly seen that the West has serious security issues too. A surge in pirate attacks off West Africa has led to mounting concern, as an increase in attacks in recent months has been concentrated along the Gulf of Guinea (GoG) off the coast of the small nation of Benin, which neighbours Nigeria, Africa’s largest oil producer and where piracy has long been a problem. At the moment the targets appear to be well selected, and the operations are conducted with pirates grabbing the cargo and whatever else they can take. Thankfully the raids are over relatively swiftly, as the cargoes are the main target – so it does not appear at this stage as though we will see a large-scale move to the kidnap and ransom techniques employed off Somalia and in the Indian Ocean. This does not make the ordeal any less terrifying for those who suffer at the hands of the gangs, but at least the vessels are released quickly once the thefts have taken place. The attacks have even led to changes in the War Risk excluded areas. The London insurance market’s Joint War Committee has added Benin to the list of countries where additional war risks premium may be charged. The move means that an additional premium will have to be paid to enter the high risk areas. The moves further out into the GoG seem to have been prompted by the success of Nigerian navy and local police in clamping down on illegal activities in Nigerian waters. A number of sources believe that the attacks are currently being launched by one particular gang, and they are extremely violent. Attacks have been launched in fast boats with attackers carrying heavy weapons. They have also been known to strike during ongoing Ship-to-Ship transfer operations, so there are concerns about not just the safety and security of the crew, but it seems there could also be significant environmental issues too. See www.lmalloyds.com for more details on War Risks.
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X-Band Radar
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One of the most important capabilities for a vessel in the High Risk Areas is the ability to spot threats at an early enough range to take action. This becomes even more important if, as is feared, pirates are start using weapons with increasing range. So the need to spot approaching pirates at an even greater range becomes ever more important. It has proved difficult enough when they have to get within 300m to fire – but if they can extend their range and hit harder, well this becomes an even greater problem. Allied to the use of physical watchkeepers on lookout duty, radar naturally plays an important part in security monitoring. However traditional radars are not at their best when identifying small, fast targets close to the ship. Usual “navigation” radars also suffer from ‘blind spots’, where the signals are obscured by masts, funnels etc, and in particular the astern view. In order to use radar as a tool to spot the real threats, it takes new technology and “Broadband (high-frequency surface) radars have been introduced. These are referred to as X-band radars and they enable important targets at ranges down to 1/32n-mile. They can also expect 2-3m target resolution to 10 miles with a maximum range of 24n-miles. These new systems integrate both long-range conventional (‘pulse’) radar and shortrange broadband radar. This provides an enhanced ability to spot small fast moving targets, and this can be vital in gaining time when attacked by pirates. The X-band radars send a continuous transmission wave with linear increasing frequency (hence the term Broadband). The wave retains its frequency as it travels out and reflects back from any objects. The systems provide target detection superior to pulse radars while transmitting at far lower energy levels. As such the benefits of the next generation radars can be significant, and could make all the difference if watchkeepers are able to spot potential trouble far in the distance.
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Yachts Security of yachts is a major issue. This can be broken down into further strands, with the “Mega/Superyacht” markets and pleasure sailors. The security of the mega and superyachts is an industry all by itself. The huge value of the vessels and of the high net-worth individuals who own or use them means that security is always an issue – wherever they are. These vessels are over 30m (100ft) in length and their values can range between millions to perhaps billions. The net worth of the owners, and guests will often be in the same range. Maritime security merges into the world of close protection in this market. Then we get to the pleasure sailors – those who may take their yachts into inhospitable waters. The Somali pirates have captured a number of such vessels and their unwitting crews. The Chandlers, a retired British couple were caught and were very fortunate to escape with their lives after a long tortuous hostage situation ashore in Somalia. Americans onboard the yacht “Quest” were not even lucky enough for that – they were murdered on their boat. While the crew from a South African yacht and a Danish family were also taken - thankfully after much suffering all were finally freed. The message to yacht owners is simple, sail around the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean and you may well fall victim to piracy. The pirates will board your yacht, you will be taken hostage and ransom demands will be issued. The crew do not have any role in the negotiations, other than tearfully pleading on satellite phone-calls home. It is at this point they often regret that decision not to purchase kidnap and ransom insurance. They often leave family and friends back at home having to sell their houses and raid savings, as they desperately try to raise funds to get the crews freed. The International Sailing Federation (ISF) deems it irresponsible to sail in the High Risk Area. See www.sailing.org for more details.
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Zeitgeist
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The word “zeitgeist” means the spirit of the time. The modern piracy epidemic is seemingly very much of its time, as too is the retreating naval force and the rise of private security. The battles being waged in the Indian Ocean or off West Africa perfectly encapsulate the age, with the dreadnaughts of globalisation ploughing temptingly past their waters, the temptation became too much and these soft targets were picked off. Piracy will always spring up where the conditions allow and the three main factors which lead to, and subsequently drive piracy in a particular region are the sides of the “piracy triangle”: • Instability Areas which suffer from political, social or religious instability tend to be a breeding ground for piracy. Instability often turns to armed conflict, which in turn can drive criminal activity. • Complexity Areas which are geographically or territorially complex can support piracy. Such conditions may allow pirates to hide and to move between jurisdictions to avoid capture and prosecution. • Economic disparity In areas of poverty the temptation to plunder vessels can be strong. Locals are more susceptible to the overtures of organised crime, and are often tempted into illegal activities. Many are familiar with the concept of the “fire triangle” in which heat, fuel and oxygen are all necessary to support combustion. The piracy triangle theory works in the same way. If one or more of the three drivers listed above are removed, then piracy will be reduced or may disappear completely. The rewards for pirates must outweigh the risks. Pirates want and need areas where it is possible to avoid detection and or which provide safe havens. Once the stakes are raised all but the most committed, desperate or greedy pirate will revert back to their other lines of business.
SAMI The Security Association for the Maritime Industry (SAMI) is a global organisation representing companies working in maritime security and related industries. SAMI has introduced a level of compliance and scrutiny to ensure that the maritime industry can easily identify reputable private maritime security companies. SAMI provides reassurance, guidance, and minimum quality and standards in the delivery of maritime security where none has existed before. The SAMI Standard was established as the international benchmark for standards within the industry, and this work now informs the ISO process as the launch of 28007 approaches. The Association is an international non -governmental organisation (NGO), which exists to facilitate clear dialogue and a common standards framework in the delivery of maritime security products to the shipping community. The international membership encompasses maritime security providers, consultants, trainers, individual operatives and the maritime security equipment, technology and hardware manufacturers to provide direct links to the commercial shipping industry, offshore oil & gas industry and ports too.
Secretariat Peter Cook - Founder and Security Director Peter was an officer in the Royal Marines for 24 years and spent a significant part of his career involved in aspects of maritime security from maritime counter terrorism to formulating counter piracy policy and procedures. He has become a leading commentator on maritime security issues and has represented SAMI within the UN, and to governments of a range of nations - as well as appearing in the media, from BBC, CNN and Al Jazeera.
Steven Jones - Maritime Director Steven spent a decade working as a navigation officer in the merchant navy and was even attacked by pirates while serving. He has advised numerous shipping companies on security planning and has written numerous publications on maritime security. His Nautical Institute publications on “Maritime Security”, “Anti-piracy” and “Stowaways by Sea” are industry standard texts.
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