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The Need for Labor Law Reform in the Age of Workplace Fissuring
The Need for Labor Law Reform in the Age of Workplace Fissuring
By Professor Charlotte Garden
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When an employee is sexually harassed at work, how might they respond? Their options might include reporting the harasser to a higher-level supervisor or filing a complaint with the human resources department. But what if the harasser is the owner of the company? Filing a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission could be a possibility – but workers might also decide to picket outside the place they work each day, to demand better treatment at work and shine a public spotlight on their situation. These workers should be able to count on the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) to protect them against retaliation by their employers. But in today’s age of workplace “fissuring,” the NLRA often falls short, failing to protect picketing workers and even rendering their conduct illegal.
Workplace “fissuring” refers to a constellation of practices that allow large enterprises to shed legal responsibility for groups of workers, especially those whose work is not core to the enterprises’ mission. The term, coined by former-Department of Labor official David Weil, encompasses practices including subcontracting, franchising, and reclassifying workers as independent contractors.
Consider the following example of fissuring, drawn from Weil’s book, “The Fissured Workplace.” Seeking to streamline its operations, a large hotel chain decides to stop hiring hotel housekeepers directly and instead contract with a small janitorial company. The hotel’s existing housekeepers might lose their jobs, but it is also possible that they will be hired by the janitorial company with which the hotel contracts. In this scenario, the housekeepers’ day-to-day jobs might not feel very different than when they were working for the hotel directly. But a different entity will sign their paychecks; there might also be fewer opportunities for advancement because a cleaner who applies for a different job in the hotel will no longer be an “internal” candidate; and if the housekeepers’ employment rights are violated, it will be the small, likely undercapitalized janitorial company – and not the international hotel conglomerate – that will be on the hook. At the same time, the large company will likely retain the practical ability to influence workers’ wages and working conditions. This is especially true when a contractor has only one or a few large clients, who can demand cost concessions to which the contractor will have little choice but to accede.
For many reasons, it is both intuitive and smart strategy for workers who want to influence their working conditions through collective action to protest outside the place where they work – in our example, outside the hotel chain – and not in front of the office of the contractor that is their nominal employer. The problem is that labor law can prohibit this. Specifically, a portion of the NLRA bans unions and workers from engaging in some forms of what is known as “secondary” activity, including picketing aimed at dissuading a so-called “neutral” employer from doing business with the workers’ employer. Because the housekeepers in our example work for a contractor, labor law will likely regard the hotel as a “secondary” or “neutral” employer. This means that the housekeepers could lose the protections of the NLRA, leaving them with no recourse if their employer retaliates against them for picketing. A labor organization that supports picketing workers could also face an injunction and be required to pay damages.
The NLRA’s ban on secondary picketing and other protest is increasingly in tension with the First Amendment. In recent years, the Supreme Court has struck down limits on protest by other entities – including civil rights boycotts, offensive picketing at funerals, and anti-abortion sidewalk counseling – and it has found that restrictions on the speech of corporate entities are legally suspect. In light of this growing body of case law, it is difficult to mount a credible argument that limiting unions’ abilities to picket and engage in other forms of protest is constitutional.
The questionable constitutionality of the NLRA’s secondary boycott provision has at times led the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to interpret the statute narrowly and not apply it in close cases. But the NLRB’s General Counsel, under the Trump Administration, is now urging the Board to take the opposite approach, arguing that unions’ use of giant inflatable rat balloons, which signal the presence of a labor dispute, should be treated the same as picketing. But this strategy – presumably aimed at chilling union speech – could backfire by providing new vehicles for federal appellate courts to address the questionable constitutionality of the secondary activity ban.
It is possible that the Supreme Court will strike down the NLRA’s secondary activity ban, but it is more likely that the Court will construe the ban narrowly to avoid having to decide whether it conflicts with the First Amendment. More significant legislative change is also a possibility. Federal labor law reform, including repealing the secondary activity ban, is likely to be a hot issue in the coming years. For example, the Protecting the Right to Organize Act, a bill that has been proposed in Congress, would repeal the NLRA’s secondary activity provision and make other changes to the NLRA. Whether this change comes through the courts or Congress, it is overdue – both the evolving state of employment relationships and the evolving First Amendment mean that unions and workers should be free to protest where it is likely to be most effective.
This article was based on Professor Garden’s recent testimony before the House Subcommittee on Education and Labor this past July, in support of the Protecting the Right to Organize Act of 2019. Professor Garden has written about the constitutionality of the NLRA’s secondary boycott provisions in several articles, including her forthcoming article, “Avoidance Creep,” which will appear in the University of Pennsylvania Law Review later this year.