SHIFT mag [n°2] - Europe's borders by SHIFT mag

04⁄06 2007

[n°2]

europe talks to brussels

Europe's borders

content >

Visas in the Western Balkans

Kaliningrad, from Europe with love

08 >

10 >

Breaking the boundaries of communication

Mediterranean border: of boats and men >

Berlin: What is left of the Wall? >

Rock around the border

Turkey: the EU's gateway to the world

Soldout tĂŠ 67 EHooverphonic

ENP: between enlargement and foreign policy >

Europeans without frontiers

editorial Fifty years ago, six European countries created a zone of cooperation that cut across the territorial divisions of the past. Since then, bridges have been replacing barriers throughout most of the continent, as former neighbours have become partners – for better or for worse.

SHIFT Mag

Victor Fleurot SHIFT Mag Editor Brussels

EUROPE TALKS TO BRUSSELS Avenue de Tervueren 270 1150 Brussels – Belgium http://www.shiftmag.eu Publisher: Juan ARCAS juan.arcas@shiftmag.eu Editor: Victor FLEUROT • T. +32 2 235 56 21 victor.fleurot@shiftmag.eu Contributors to this issue: Paolo CUTTITA (Palermo), Péter HORVATH (Budapest), Daniele MARCHESI (Bruges), David MONKCOM (Brussels), Sergey NAUMKIN (Kaliningrad/ Manchester), Salvatore PALIDDA (Genoa), Ilija TALEV (Pisa), Özcan TIKIT (Istanbul), Laurent VAN BRUSSEL (Brussels), Nanne ZWAGERMAN (Berlin) Illustrations: Mi Ran COLLIN, François TACOEN, Emmanuel TREPANT, Roberto TRIOSCHI, Christophe WANLIN Photography: Nigel DICKINSON, Peter MERTENS, Nanne ZWAGERMAN, Eté 67, Soldout, Reuters, www.zlepoizon.com Production & coordination: Nadine SCHWIRTZ nadine.schwirtz@ascii.be Design & Graphics: ASCii Studio Printed by: Van Ruys, Brussels Administration & subscription: Gabriela OLSSON • T. + 32 2 235 56 44 gabriela.olsson@ascii.be To advertise in SHIFT Mag contact: Guy DE SAN • T. +32 2 235 56 75 guy.desan@ascii.be

As an overarching project, the EU has brought down a number of fences that used to breed suspicion and bitter rivalry. France and Germany, East and West, perhaps soon the Balkan nations: the EU has a proven record of blurring the lines and imposing its model of institutional cooperation. But borders do not only divide, they also define. And in its search for fresh momentum and direction, the EU is desperate to define what it is and what it is not. Answers to these two questions abound, fuelling a lively debate about the political and geographical essence of the project. What are the lines we draw between us and them, between inside and outside? Are these set in stone or do they move with the times? Are they perceived equally by all of us – and all of them? From Kaliningrad to Gibraltar via Berlin and Istanbul, the second issue of SHIFT Mag takes a transgressive look at Europe’s borders. We talk to the people who live with today’s borders, be they internal or external, political or cultural. As usual, the blog version of the magazine is available online at www.shiftmag.eu to gather your views and reactions. Jump in and have your say as we try to read the lines in Europe’s palm.

SHIFT Mag • 2007

ASCii Communication – A SWORD Group Company. Avenue de Tervueren 270 – 1150 Brussels – Belgium. Free quarterly publication (cannot be sold). Published by ASCii Communication. Reproduction in any form is prohibited without prior consent. The views expressed by contributors are their own and do not necessarily represent those of SHIFT Mag.

[ n° 2 ] > SHIFT mag

europe's borders

Visas in the Western Balkans: the consequences

"What? 100 dollars? I am not coming to your country!!!" This was (the polite version of ) the answer an Italian friend of mine gave to the American consulate official, when the latter informed him of the price of a tourist visa for the United States. My friend had wanted to spend Christmas on the beaches of Florida. Lacking the necessary biometric

passport which would have exempted him from the visa requirement, he telephoned the American consulate and was promptly informed that he had to present himself for an interview and pay the abovementioned "administrative" fee to obtain the visa. In the end, he had to settle for the equally alluring, and more easily accessible Isle of Martinique. Unfortunately not everyone enjoys the benefits of such choices. Historically, Western Europe has almost always benefited from visa-free travel within and outside its borders. Since the early 90s, travelling between Western European countries has even become passport-free, transforming the red and white metal bars at border-crossings into blue and yellow signposts indicating the name of the country. The benefits of this, which many in Western Europe take for granted nowadays, are immense: intensified intercultural exchange, time-saving and cost-reduction of travel to mention

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but a few. Low cost air-travel for example is partly possible because of the facilitated cross-border movement of people, which significantlyxxxxxxxxxx raises demand. Imagine a scenario in which a Belgian citizen would have to apply for an Italian visa, wait two weeks to obtain it, and pay forty Euros

of administrative fees (not mentioning the costs incurred and time needed to obtain additional required documents such as bank-statements, insurance certificates, health certificates, birth certificates, certificates of good behaviour etc, etc.). Suddenly low-cost flights from Brussels to Rome would lose their appeal, and would probably cease to exist. No wonder low-cost airlines don't fly to destinations in the Western Balkans. Travelling is quasi-synonymous with travail, discouraging many from even thinking about it unless it becomes utterly necessary. The documents I listed in the imaginary scenario above are exactly the ones (or some of the ones) required to obtain a visa to visit Western Europe for citizens of the Western Balkans. Once in possession of the documents, the story is far from over. Next stop: the embassy of the country of destination. Rows of people form outside the diplomatic representations from very early morning. In their desire to enter the embassy as soon as possible, some arrive as early

of a travel embargo

as three o'clock in the morning. By arriving late and being at the end of the line one risks failing to

submit the documents before the consulate closes for business for the day. Mercilessly, the guard would say: "It's closed. Come back tomorrow!" Amid the wide© Robe rto Triosc spread unemhi ployment that has reached pandemic proportions among the young people in Macedonia, a new profession emerged, that of a "waiter". Not to be confused with the person who serves you food in a restaurant, a "waiter" here is used to describe the profession of a young unemployed (usually also well educated) person who, for a small fee, would be willing to get up early in the morning and spend many hours waiting in line for someone else who wishes to apply for a visa but lacks the time to stand in line. My friend Zoran made some extra bucks for waiting in front of the Greek consulate for businessmen who had no time to wait themselves. He worked as a barman in a cafÈ in my hometown, a hundred kilometres away from the capital. In the early morning hours,

EUROPE TALKS TO BRUSSELS

upon finishing his work in the bar, he would take the first bus to Skopje and make his way to the embassy and stand in line until the man he kept the place for showed up.

Facilitated travel would mean more contact and thus greater understanding of cultures, traditions and societies between citizens in the Western Balkans and in the EU. And in the long run, to the realisation that the similarities between the two are greater than the differences. >

In November 2005 the International Crisis Group issued a report on the EU visa requirements for the Western Balkans. The report addressed the logic behind and the consequences of the visa regime. Reading through it one begins to doubt the logic and dread the consequences. On the consequences side, the report talks of "consular sadism", the "Balkan Ghetto", isolationism that leads to intolerance, black market for visas and other problems springing from the visa regime. Arguments in favour of maintaining the visa regime as tight as possible include immigration control and protection from organised crime, smuggling, human trafficking, etc. The fact is, however, that criminals, smugglers and traffickers do not need visas as they rarely, if ever, use the border crossings, and when they do, they usually bribe their way through. Visas, therefore, harm primarily those with valid reasons for travel. More than 70% of students in Serbia have never been abroad, while 94% of Montenegrins have never been to a foreign country. Similar statistical data are available for other countries in the region. Although most of these people would not travel abroad even if the visa regime were lifted tomorrow,

some would. And that is the first step towards true Europeanisation of the Balkans. It is also one that immediately and directly affects ordinary citizens, who are usually the last to benefit from most other measures. Facilitated travel would mean more contact and thus greater understanding of cultures, traditions and societies between citizens in the Western Balkans and in the EU. And in the long run, to the realisation that the similarities between the two are greater than the differences. Local business and entrepreneurship could become more internationalised bringing economic benefits and a large dose of much needed political stability. Eliminating the visa regime would require a change in perception on behalf of the EU leaders vis-a-vis the western Balkans, from that of an appendix, to that of a vital organ of the European body. The sooner it is done, the sooner the Balkans can recover from the turmoil of recent history, leave the past behind and march towards a better future. •••

> Ilija Talev PhD student Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna, Pisa Macedonian

[ n° 2 ] > SHIFT mag

europe's borders

Kaliningrad

from Europe with love Lawyer Kaliningrad/Manchester Russian

Ask a random group of Europeans where Kaliningrad is located and you will find it hard to get a correct answer. But ask a resident of Kaliningrad what he knows about Europe and you will be quite surprised: not only can they talk about Warsaw or Berlin, but they have often spent more time there than on their home territory of Russia. Therein lies the paradox of the Kaliningrad region: it is much closer to Europe than to the Russian mainland. The region was a part of East Prussia and so belonged to Germany until it became part of the Soviet Union as a result of the Second World War. The location of the region is unique: Poland on one side, Lithuania on the other, with Sweden just across the Baltic Sea. The

http://www.russian-lawyer.co.uk/ Kaliningrad_Integration.pdf

The enlargement of the European Union in 2004 was a crucial event for the Baltic States – and an equally significant headache for Moscow and Brussels. For the first time, the territory of Russia was cut into two parts by an administrative unit and visas were required for Russian citizens to travel from one side to the other. After many months of negotiations between Russia and the European Commission, Kaliningraders travelling regularly to Russia can now get a “multiple entry simplified transit document” (STD) from the Lithuanian consulate. It costs 5 euros and is valid for travel on any kind of ground transport for a period of three years. I do not know whether the transit agreement has brought “stability and peace” to

Paradoxically, the most positive repercussions of EU enlargement for Kaliningrad seem to have come from Moscow rather than Brussels or Warsaw. > distance from Kaliningrad to the Polish border is a mere 35 km, and only 70 km to the closest Lithuanian town. However, Russia is a long way. This enclave in the Baltic is literally cut off from its parent. To reach their “motherland”, Kaliningraders need to cross the territories of at least two independent states (Lithuania and Latvia or Lithuania and Belarus) and cover around 600-700 km.

Sergey’s research work on Kaliningrad is available on his website:

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Europe, but it certainly has not made Kaliningraders very happy. They do not see why they should suddenly need to queue in consulates and pay for visas. Has the enlargement of the EU brought positive changes for Kaliningrad to outweigh the costs? Well, perhaps the most immediate advantage was the accession of its two neighbours (Poland and

Lithuania) to the “Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation” between the Russian Federation and the EU. This gives Kaliningrad a privileged position in trade relations between Russia and the enlarged EU. Paradoxically, the most positive repercussions of EU enlargement for Kaliningrad seem to have come from Moscow rather than Brussels or Warsaw. For the first time since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Kaliningrad started to receive special attention from the Russian federal government. Moscow decided to develop the economic potential of the region, which suddenly rose to the top of the strategic agenda as a Russian enclave in the EU. While maintaining the region’s status as a

> Sergey Naumkin

F or more information on K aliningrad , visit :

EUROPE TALKS TO BRUSSELS

“Special Economic Zone”, a preferential customs and tax regime that has significantly boosted the local economy, Moscow has launched large-scale investments to link up the region with its trading partners (including the reconstruction of the road that leads to Poland and the modernisation of Khrabrovo airport). The most recent boost for Kaliningrad was President Putin’s decision in December 2006 to sign a law that creates special gambling zones in Russia. The law limits casinos to specific zones in Russia and Kaliningrad is one of them. By July 2009, the region should witness the establishment of numerous casinos and hotels that will cater for a new type of Russian

http://www.delrus.cec.eu.int/en/cis_8.htm http://kaliningradexpert.org http://www.schiff.uni-kiel.de http://www.tukkk.fi/pei/e/

and European tourist. No one knows the size of investment yet or where exactly this “new Vegas” will be built, but it will inevitably become part of Kaliningrad’s landscape and economy. While Moscow is increasingly active in promoting the economic development of its European outpost, Brussels is also taking a strong interest in Kaliningrad. The region is widely represented in various EU programmes (Euroregions, “Northern Demention”, TACIS, etc.). Many municipal administrations in Kaliningrad have established direct contacts and cooperation with regions in Sweden, Poland and Lithuania. Since 1991, the EU has spent more than 100 million euros on various projects under regional programmes in Kaliningrad. Thanks to these combined efforts from its new neighbour and distant parent, Kaliningrad has become one of the most dynamic regions in Russia. According to senior analysts, it topped the 2006 growth index of industrial production (beating stiff competition from the other 88 regions that form the Russian Federation). It is also foremost in terms of foreign trade turnover. Yet despite these impressive economic results, as far as Russia is concerned, Kaliningrad still lags behind in comparison with Poland and the Baltic States. It is obvious that local resources are not sufficient to bridge the regional gap in socialeconomic development. Hence the estimate by the Russian Institute

of Economy that to enable Kaliningrad to come even close to the countries of the European Union, it is necessary to invest around 36 billion dollars by 2010. Russia and the EU could probably do more to help Kaliningrad. It has already been three years since the region became an EU enclave, but the main question remains unresolved: what should its exact status be for Russia and the EU? Today, there is an impression that Moscow has no clear vision regarding a geopolitical strategy for the region and is happy to focus on economic development. This is hardly surprising given that Russia as a whole, unlike Kaliningrad, has no pressing interest in joining the EU and prefers to consider opportunities in the framework of the WTO. There it can negotiate the terms of a free trade zone and how to lower travel barriers for citizens of both Russia and the EU. As for the European Union, it has always correctly viewed Kaliningrad as an integral part of Russia, and therefore believes that the initiative on closer cooperation should come from Moscow. In my view, a closer partnership with the EU is necessary for Kaliningrad, which would require the development of a new institutional ground for such a relationship. This could take the form of a separate agreement between Russia and the EU regulating relations with Kaliningrad, something the EU has already refused a number of times to keep a single “Partnership and Cooperation Agreement” with the Russian Federation. The future should be bright for this small Russian territory lost between the borders of an expanded Europe. If it takes advantage of its geopolitical location Kaliningrad could become one of the thriving Russian regions associated with the European Union. However an agreement between Russian and European governments is much needed. And time and tide wait for no man. •••

[ n° 2 ] > SHIFT mag

europe's borders

Breaking the boundaries of communication

Imagine you are President of the European Commission. You have been invited to give a lecture on a subject of your choice to an audience in the Basque country. What would you talk about? Romano Prodi chose to focus on the role of the regions in the European Union. As his speechwriter I was asked to do the research and the drafting. It took me two days of solid work and I was pleased with the result. But when a Cabinet member read it he told Prodi he could not possibly deliver this speech. Not because my draft was bad (well, not worse than usual!) but because the Basque people consider themselves a nation, not a region, and a speech about regional policy would cause great offence. So I had to hastily compose an entirely different script on a non-political subject.

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This is just one example of how carefully European politicians and institutions have to tread in their public communication. They have a responsibility to explain what they are doing and why – and they employ people like me to write the material for them. But how do you explain a complex political and economic reality in clear and simple language? How do you take account of the cultural sensitivities of 500 million people in 27 countries? It is not easy.

We try to ensure that the photos in our publications maintain an ethnic and gender balance. Minorities must not be overlooked. Buy how far should you go? Should every picture of a "typical" group of Europeans contain old and young, black and white, Nordic and Mediterranean types, men and women, someone in a wheel-chair and someone wearing a gay pride tee-shirt? Let’s Explore Europe, our booklet for children, includes a list of forty famous Europeans who have achieved success in various fields. But such a list inevitably offends by not including all EU countries or not having enough women or having francophone Belgians and no Flemings. Another of our booklets (Europe in 12 lessons) had to be withdrawn from circulation for a while because, in

EUROPE TALKS TO BRUSSELS

“

Successful communication does not consist of selfcongratulatory speeches, or of printing pretty pictures of smiling people waving the European flag. Nor is it a matter of putting masses of documents on the web and leaving it up to the reader to find them.

”

our efforts to use the language of ordinary people, we referred to the country of Macedonia as Macedonia. The problem is that there is a region of Greece also called Macedonia, and Greeks are sensitive about a foreign country using this name. So in all EU publications we have to call that country "The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia". Never mind that this name is too long to fit onto our maps – except in tiny print you cannot read. Never mind that, for children and most teenagers, "former Yugoslav" is a meaningless phrase. Not long ago, one of our maps was criticized for labelling Scotland and Wales but not England. Was the wicked EU trying to abolish English national identity? No, it is just that England is not an administrative region for EU purposes. But this explanation failed to pacify our critics, so we had to change the map. If European geography is a minefield, European history is a nuclear bomb with child-friendly detonators! Almost any attempt to give a simple account of the EU’s origins that children can understand (as in Let’s Explore Europe) invites accusations of revisionism and propaganda, or at least of distortion through over-simplification. Even when addressing adults, European history is a very thorny subject. EU publications and

Commissioners’ speeches deplore the horrors of the Second World War but carefully avoid saying who started it or how it ended. That way we do not rub German noses in a very painful past. On the other hand, British people feel we are ignoring what they helped achieve in 1944-45. We rejoice that there has been peace in most of Europe since then: but is the EU right to claim all the credit for it? What about the role played by NATO and the Cold War balance of terror? If the European Union were scrapped, would fighting break out between our 27 countries? Eurosceptics raise these questions – and the EU tends to ignore them. It seems politically incorrect to consider any challenge to the orthodox view. EU enlargement is another area where political correctness tends to prevent a real debate from taking place. The EU mantra says that enlargement benefits both old and new member states – and I think it does. But I also think we should do more to address the concerns of people who see their jobs migrating eastwards and of those who see Turkey as a bridge too far. As the EU celebrates its 50th birthday, I am glad the Commission – on the initiative of Vice-President Margot Wallström – is urging a completely new approach to EU communication. Successful communication does not consist of self-congratulatory

speeches, or of printing pretty pictures of smiling people waving the European flag. Nor is it a matter of putting masses of documents on the web and leaving it up to the reader to find them. Communication is essentially about debate and dialogue. We have to put people in touch with each other across this continent and encourage them to discuss what kind of Europe they want for the future. We, the institutions and the people, should be asking ourselves the tough questions. Why (if at all) is the EU needed in the 21st century? What should it be doing and not doing? What should be the geographical limits to EU enlargement? The political leaders of Europe should be listening to the answers the people come up with. In an honest debate of this kind, political correctness has to give way to controversy. Controversy is good for democracy – and the future course of European integration ought to be decided democratically. •••

> David Monkcom Speechwriter European Commission, Brussels British David Monkcom is currently speechwriter to Commission Vice-President Margot Wallström. Previously he worked as a publications author and editor in the Commission's communication department. Any views expressed in this article are those of the writer himself and do not necessarily represent the point of view of the European Commission. [ n° 2 ] > SHIFT mag

europe's borders x x x

Europe’s Mediterranean BORder: of boats and men 2002, only 10% of the foreigners who resided illegally in Italy had entered the country by sea, while 15% had come by land and 75% were overstayers – people who enter the country legally and remain beyond the expiring date of their visa or permit of stay.

Every year, thousands of people try to evade strict maritime border controls while risking their lives on old and overcrowded cockleshells, in an attempt to reach Southern Europe illegally by sea. Following tougher restrictions on legal entry in many European countries, the maritime route has become the best chance to enter Europe for many would-be immigrants and refugees. They often spend years of savings to pay smugglers and traffickers in the hope that they will not be apprehended by border guards during their journey.

Nevertheless, enormous financial and diplomatic efforts are being made by European political actors to tackle undesired immigration arriving by sea from But the number of those who enter North Africa. This is partly due to the fact Europe illegally by sea is still relatively small. that illegal arrivals by sea (including casualAvailable data suggest that fewer than ties) have a much stronger impact on the 100,000 people are apprehended by border media and public opinion than overstayers guards every year while attempting to sail or illegal immigrants entering the country towards Europe. In fact, most migrants by land. residing illegally in European countries did But while European countries try to come not arrive by sea. According to data proup with adequate solutions to deal with vided by the Italian ministry of interior for illegal immigration, a daily tragedy is taking

place along Europe’s Mediterranean border. Thousands of men and women die every year trying to reach European territory on makeshift boats or small merchant ships. According to EU Commissioner for security, justice and freedom Franco Frattini, up to 3,000 people may have died in the summer of 2006 while attempting to reach Europe illegally by sea.

lack the necessary resources to control their land and sea borders, but often any interest in it at all. Most countries of emigration have a peculiar interest in keeping migration levels high, since remittance flows sent by their citizens from abroad to the families back home represent a significant share of their GDP.

The Mediterranean is not the only deadly obstacle migrants have to overcome. People coming from sub-Saharan countries must cross an even more dangerous frontier before attempting to leave Africa: the Sahara desert. Many of them – it is impossible to venture even a rough estimate – die before reaching the North African coast. The situation is pressing and explosive: does the production of illegality through the adoption of restrictive EU immigration measures also result in more deaths?

Countries of transit have no interest in stemming the tide of illegal migration either. On the contrary, they often benefit from transit migration movements. In Libya for instance, a lively border economy – consisting in specific shops, inns and car-repair garages for travellers and their vehicles – flourished along main migration routes from southern neighbouring countries in recent years. The closing of the Sudan border caused the crisis of these activities and thus undermined the economy of the whole region.

Of course, full responsibility for these daily tragedies cannot be placed on the destination countries. Countries of transit and origin have a key role to play in avoiding the avoidable. However, not only do they

This is why very convincing arguments are needed in order to gain collaboration from countries of transit and origin. What kind of arguments has the EU come up with so far? 444

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Number of illegal immigrants reaching Spain and Italy from the sea

Illegal migration across the Mediterranean has always been one of the core issues of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, which was started in Barcelona in 1995 to promote cooperation between EU member states and their neighbours of the southern and eastern Mediterranean. But little substance has come to back up these political commitments. The Euro-African conference on migration and development held in Rabat in July 2006 showed that, eleven years after Barcelona, not much had been done to achieve the objectives of the partnership – including cooperation in the fight against illegal immigration. One of the few practical steps taken by the EU (beyond intensified coastal patrols) has been the push towards delocalised border controls. EU countries have gone to great lengths to encourage their North African partners to perform tighter checks on migrants and allow them to apply for asylum there. But there are strong humanitarian problems linked to this process, not least because there is no legal framework and monitoring for the treatment of refugees and illegal immigrants in those countries.

In the autumn of 2005, around 2,000 Sudanese refugees spent three months in front of the seat of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Cairo, asking for their applications of asylum or resettlement to be processed. Their protest against the UNHCR’s decision to stop granting refugee status to Sudanese applicants came to a brutal halt on 30 December 2005, when Egyptian police charged the refugees without prior notice to evacuate the area. Twenty-seven of them died during the police raid. Unfortunately, the main result of the delocalisation of European southern border controls to North Africa seems to be the delocalisation of the “side-effects” of restrictive immigration policies (including human rights violations related to the detention and expulsion of aliens), often for the worse. What then are the options available to the EU to tackle the roots of illegal immigration in the Mediterranean? Maybe EU Member States could start by going back to the objectives they set themselves more than ten years ago. For instance, the promotion of human rights

was one of the main goals of the EuroMediterranean Partnership of 1995, but has somehow been completely sidelined by short-term measures to reduce migration flows. Another neglected priority in need of attention is the promotion of understanding between cultures and dialogue between civil societies. So far, it seems the actual cement of the Mediterranean partnership is the fight against terrorism and illegal immigration, together with the gradual establishment of a Euro-Mediterranean free-trade area to broaden the market for European industrial products by 2010. But for migrants and refugees, the Mediterranean seems destined to remain the moat of Fortress Europe. ••• > Salvatore Palidda Professor of Political Science University of Genoa Italian

Paolo Cuttitta > Research fellow University of Palermo Italian [ n° 2 ] > SHIFT mag

europe's borders

Berlin:

what is left of the wall?

Most traces of the original border have been erased. Berlin has definitely grown (or in some areas, been melded) back together. But have its people? Statistics, from property prices to unemployment levels and voting patterns, show that the East is still very different from the West in many respects. Cross the line in the North between Wedding, a poor western district, and Pankow, a generally poor eastern district, and the streets and buildings look very similar at first. The wall has been brushed away with grass, trees and bushes. On the piece of no

Moving down the wall's trail, you head into the Prenzlauer Berg district, the place where Berlin goes to drink its lattes and shop in small boutiques. This is the East, gentrified. While Wedding and Pankow can sometimes feel a bit similar, Prenzlauer Berg has a more bohemian mood. It's also more expensive than either. How do you

Although the differences between East and West have not worn off as quickly as the paint on the East Side Gallery, there are hopeful signs. >

man's land between the East and the West, there is now a children's farm called Pinke Panke where kids from both boroughs can mess around with woodwork and get back in contact with nature. But look closer, and you will notice a difference. While the streets of Wedding are filled with a mix of people with German, Turkish and other national backgrounds, Pankow is nowhere near as diverse. Changes to that are slow, and sometimes painful. Recently, construction has begun on

the first Mosque in Pankow – the first in former East Berlin and East Germany. However, the start of construction was accompanied by street protests, and a truck on the site was torched just a few days ago.

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notice that this was the East? By and large, you don't. Each district in Berlin has its own distinct character, as Berliner Jörg W. notes in a short conversation. There is no real difference between East and West, there is a difference between districts. You sometimes think of East Berliners as “Hartz IV types”, but there are plenty of those in some West Berlin districts. His own memories of the wall only date back to the time where he was a kid. At a time of the “Wende”, Jörg

remembers there was a fear that a lot of people from East Berlin would flee to the West. They even reserved the gym hall where he played handball in order to provide a place for them to sleep. "It's a bit selfish", he says, but that is one of his main memories. The people, however, didn't come fleeing in droves from the east. They stayed put. “I think they were confident that the change would be permanent.” Most East Berliners stayed in East Berlin. Most West Berliners, like Jörg, stayed in West Berlin. To a large extent, this is still the case. People grow up in one neighbourhood, go to school and have most of their friends there. This only really changes once they go to college. On the southern side of the former border, the largest piece of remaining wall is slowly decaying. The “East Side Gallery” runs from the Ostbahnhof to the Warschauer Brücke, a stretch of around 1.3 km along the river Spree. After the wall fell, artists from around the world came to decorate the eastern side, to match the western side that had always been decorated. But here on the East, it was not accessible as the real border was the river Spree. The no man's land between the wall and river has since been filled with beach bars. Partying here with a couple of crazy East Berliners, I remember one of them climbing over the wall to smuggle a bottle of Jägermeister – a very West German liquor – inside…

Almost 18 years after its fall, most of the erstwhile border between East and West Berlin is only marked by a line of bricks on the ground, adorned by the occasional bronze plaque. It reads “Berliner Mauer 1961 – 1989”. Time and urban planning have grown parks, brought property development and renovated buildings and streets.

EUROPE TALKS TO BRUSSELS

Although the differences between East and West have not worn off as quickly as the paint on the East Side Gallery, there are hopeful signs. Angela Merkel, besides being the first female Chancellor, is also an “Ossi”. Many East and West Germans have grown conscious of the stereotypes that exist on both sides. East Germans are often perceived as naive, having an odd accent, or unreformed racial attitudes. West Germans are perceived as arrogant and often talk in anglicised fashion. “The clichés”, my neigbour M. – a twenty-something from the former East – remarks, “are also changing. And they don't exist. The naive East German doesn't exist; the solidarity between East Germans also doesn't exist. They're all proto-capitalists.” Under the slow process of integration bringing East and West Germans together, there is love. In the most literal sense of the word. The reunification of Germany brought with it many a romantic tome about the reunion of old flames separated by the wall. But the force of love is maybe even stronger in the young generation of twenty-somethings around me. Among my personal friends, I could count at least three East-West couples off the top of my head (and many more affairs). If anything, it is love that will tear asunder what is left of the wall. ••• F or related information on B erlin ’ s development , visit :

http://www.stadtentwicklung.berlin.de/wohnen/wohnungsmarktbericht/ pdf/wohnungsmarktbericht_summary_2005.pdf http://www.eastsidegallery.com/index.htm http://www.iht.com/articles/1996/04/22/east.t_0.php http://www.spiegel.de/international/0,1518,456751,00.html

> Nanne Zwagerman Environmental management student Freie Universität Berlin Dutch Nanne is also an active EU blogger. You can check out his work at http://djnozem.blogspot.com [ n° 2 ] > SHIFT mag

europe's borders

Turkey: the EU’s gateway to the world >

Over the past few years, most EU actors and politicians have clearly expressed their position on Turkish accession. But few would suspect that a debate of similar intensity and divergence is taking place on the Turkish side. What are the common views held by Turkish politicians on EU membership? What are the motivations driving EU supporters in Turkey? What do they expect from the EU and why do they feel part of Europe? Who are those who fear accession and try to steer away from it? Why do they see EU membership as a nightmare? The road between Ankara and Brussels is full of obstacles. Not knowing the answers to these questions will inevitably lead to an accident. Europe will realise its full political and economic potential once it has embraced Turkey; this is the core belief shared by EU yea-sayers in Turkey. Turkeys’ strategic, economic and geopolitical assets are too good to be ignored. Moreover, once it has reconciled itself with its minorities, Turkey and its mainly Muslim population can be the EU’s gateway to the world. If politicians and media on both sides show enough composure and vision, the rocky road could become the path to success. At first sight, it is impossible to detect any Turkish political group against membership. Even those who dream of an Islamic republic comparable to postrevolution Iran pretend to support EU membership, their actual aim being to “attain political rights and obtain power” during the negotiations. These groups see the current political system of authoritarian democracy as a steel barrier blocking their extremist ideals. They say the scarf ban in schools and official places contravenes EU requirements yet they do not support democratic rules regarding other minorities; they say lifting the ban on religious sym-

SHIFT mag > [ n° 2 ]

bols for Kurds, Christians or Armenians would amount to “high treason”. These groups are not just extremist but also racist, under the guise of EU supporters. They see membership negotiations as a big hammer that can bring down the secular barriers that have obstructed their path for years. The main opposition party, the CHP (the People’s Republic Party), also appears to support EU membership – but this is further chicanery. In fact, the CHP opposes all steps to make Turkey more democratic. It declares that Turkey should become a member of the EU but refuses negotiations, while opposing democratic amendments to domestic laws. Despite the assassination of Armenian journalist Hrant Dink in Istanbul on 19 January, the so-called leftist party did not encourage the government to lift “law 301”, Mr Dink's real killer. In short, the current opposition in Turkey says: “Yes, we back membership negotiations, but democratic requirements by the EU are unacceptable”, and goes on to pursue a disingenuous political programme. To the right, the Turkish nationalist front is made of two main parties and their non-governmental organisations. The MHP (Nationalist Movement Party) and BBP (Great Union Party) are known extreme nationalist parties. They are the most intransigent political groups and F or information on E U - T urkey developments and history, visit :

http://ec.europa.eu/ enlargement/turkey/index_ en.htm http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Hrant_Dink http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Halabja_poison_gas_attack

stand firmly against EU membership. Their common slogan is “The Turk has no friend but the Turk” and this pretty much sums up their whole programme. They deny the reality of Kurdish existence and its 15 million citizens, and do not accept any nationality but Turk or any language but Turkish. They have renewed their efforts to get the Turkish Army on their side against the government and all democratic groups supporting EU membership, in the hope that the threat of a military coup can deter those pursuing an EU agenda. In this context, an important event took place recently. Under pressure from the nationalists to send a strong warning to charismatic Prime Minister Recep Tayip Erdogan (advising him not to stand in the April presidential election), the army’s top general recently declared that they do not need suggestions and will not be part of this issue as armed forces of the government. Mr Erdogan, together with his closest friend, Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul, are skilful politicians and have received all the admiration of EU supporters for their courage in taking positive steps towards Brussels over the last 4 years. Chances are, Mr Gul will become President and Mr Erdogan will remain Prime Minister after April. Their ruling party, AKP (Justice and Development Party), finds favour with both conservatives and EU supporters – a rewarding but challenging position. As a conservative party, the AKP hesitates to take more democratic steps, fearing they would lose nationalist and conservative support. Under fire from the opposition CHP and other nationalist parties, they have adopted a more nationalist and conservative approach than ever before. PM Erdogan has halted reforms; the moderate majority of AKP supporters, as well as all Europeans in favour of Turkish

EUROPE TALKS TO BRUSSELS

accession, hope he will restart them after December. In the meantime, any negative information coming from Brussels will further entrench parties against membership - hence the need for the real friends and partners of European Ankara to refrain from taking such steps, as reassuring as they may be for the people back home. With its historical relations and heritage, Turkey is a strategic and respected partner in the Caucasus and the Middle East. It is the only country that enjoys good relations with the US, Iran, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Israel. When Israeli soldiers were captured by Hezbollah and Hamas last year, Mr Erdogan was the first leader contacted by Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert for mediation. Because of its historical mission in Afghanistan, the Turkish army is the only force that is never attacked by Taliban terrorists. Recently, the day after the revelation of the hostage crisis between Iran and Britain, British Foreign Minister Margaret Beckett was already in Ankara and Mr Erdogan called on Iranian President Mahmud Ahmedinejad to urge for the release of the British soldiers. But such strategic considerations seem to be absent from the debate in most

EU countries, where politicians are happy to ride the waves of popular suspicion and discontent instead of exposing the real issues. French presidential candidate Nicolas Sarkozy and German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s negative portrayal of Turkish accession do not necessarily reflect reality; they are mainly steps to secure the votes of their constituents. This is of great concern for supporters of Turkish membership on both sides, as sporadic defiance in the EU can only breed similar sentiment in Turkey. To prevent the vicious circle of mutual distrust from leading to a reluctant and unhappy partnership, a couple of arguments are worth restating to keep minds (and doors) open. Without Turkey, Europe will become stuck in its borders and isolated from the Middle East. The “Union of Civilisations Project”

put forward by Mr Erdogan and Spain PM Luis Rodriguez Zapatero is the antithesis of Samuel Huntington’s “Clash of Civilisations” hypothesis. Turkey joining the EU would send a strong signal to the world that democracy and dialogue can spread across all religions and cultures, provided there is mutual respect and understanding. The benefits for the EU, both external and internal, would certainly outweigh the costs of another digestive effort. •••

> Özcan Tikit Foreign News Editor Aksam Newspaper, Istanbul Turkish

[ n° 2 ] > SHIFT mag

europe's borders x x x

xxxx the Rock around border xxxixxxxxxxxxxxxx

In Belgium, everything seems to boil down to the linguistic border. Culture is no exception: RTBF and VRT, the French and Dutch-speaking broadcasters, each have their own “Greatest Belgian” competition. The Flemish sing “You’ll never walk alone” while the Walloons dance to Louise Attaque… But is it really impossible to cross the cultural border? Can the artists from the North not be the idols of the South and vice versa? SHIFT Mag meets bands from the three regions to see what it’s like to rock around the border > Interview by Laurent van Brussel EU journalist Brussels Belgian

Having toured Belgium’s stages, what can you say about the different audiences? E67: In Wallonia, we have played both in big festivals where people just came to have fun and in small cultural centers where the atmosphere was more intimate, with older audiences interested in the lyrics as much as in the music. So, in Belgium like everywhere, the audience can be really different from one place to another, even in the same city. It’s certainly not a case of Walloons vs. Flemish!

Are you equally visible in the French-speaking and Flemish public arena? HP: Our place in the French-speaking and Flemish public space is nearly equal. It was certainly not the case ten years ago. It shows that everything is possible. But it’s a matter of musical style above all.

SHIFT mag > [ n° 2 ]

Soldout

Soldout is the re between a guy sult of an unexpected enc o , David, and a girl, Charlotte unter around a drink , experimental a in a Brussels café. They com one night nd bine p sy chedelic Chopin and PJ Harvey. New w electronic music with a electro and po p, they also ta ve, they talk about lk about rock. F ind

HP: If you want us to speak about out more the differences between the “Flem- w w w.s o ld o u t. b e about the duo on : ish” and the “Walloon” audiences, w w w.m y s p a c e .c o m /w e a re s o maybe it sounds cliché but it’s ld o u t true that the Walloons are more enthusiastic, warm and sociable; that the Flemish are more serious. It is not specific to Belgium, SO: Our audiences can it is true everywhere. be really different from one spot to On the other hand, the “Belgian audience” another. We don’t have to cross the does have a common feature: it’s a very borders to notice that. For example, demanding audience with many the people of Liège are a real bunch of expectations. People don’t get ecstatic merrymakers! Certainly more so than in over the first note but once they catch the rest of Wallonia… on… here we go! That’s why Belgium is an excellent testing ground for many foreign bands.

SO: Our songs are written in English. So we could logically hope to succeed all over the country. But the media from the North and the South being unfortunately separate, it is difficult to get national coverage. Until now, we have been mainly supported by the Brussels and, in general, French-speaking media. We are convinced that the Flemish audience could enjoy our music. It’s just a question of visibility. If the Flemish can’t hear about us, they can’t know about us!

E67: We enjoy coverage all over the country but certainly more so in the French-speaking areas. And that’s normal. Singing in French, we can’t ask to be on Flemish radio every day. It happens from time to time and that’s not too bad at all. It proves that the Flemish media are open-minded. It’s not easy for them to put us on at a time when all is a matter of keeping with the norm.

Y ou can find the full version of the interview on the blog at w w w . shiftmag . eu

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Does the weight of the linguistic border have a real impact on your work?

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Are cultural differences really irreconcilable in Belgium? HP: We can perceive differences between Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels but it’s more a strength than weakness. Especially today, in the 21st century, because we are all world citizens.

According to you, what’s a true “Belgium-made” artist? E67: There is no real Belgian typecast. But there are some features like not taking oneself seriously, self-mockery, etc.

Hooverphonic

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cided to es from Liège de album at m ol ho sc ur fo n t house. Their firs began in 1998 whe For Eté 67, it all y Sunday afternoon in a suburban tour of the country. 8 get together everonally in March 2006 with a major m, making them the best was released nati 67 had sold 7,500 copies in Belgiu months later, Eté r of 2006. : band on francophone selle

SO: The community dimension doesn’t influence us artistically at all. But it takes on a whole new meaning afterwards. We have more opportunities to play in Wallonia just because the Walloons know us! It’s always the same challenge: being present on both sides of the linguistic border. Two years ago, we had two concerts on the same day: the first one in Flanders in front of 50 people, and a few hours later, a couple of kilometers from there in Wallonia, there were 2000 people! At least we only have to go and play in Flanders to come back down to earth!

Eté 67

HP: Something funny with our own career is that we were successful internationally first. Then we became famous in Belgium, and first in Wallonia! So the weight of Belgium’s internal borders never really had an impact.

E67: Wallonia and Brussels are widely French-speaking but geographically limited. It forces us to export our music. An artist can’t earn his living in Belgium if he confines himself to touring the region he comes from.

E67: Our differences are everywhere, not only between the North and the South but inside each region. It’s also true abroad but what makes the difference in Belgium is the proximity between all these realities. Getting the chance to mix them in our daily life is an opportunity for unique richness.

SO: Everything is reconcilable in Belgium. We know people from everywhere in Belgium and we don’t really feel different from them.

SO: A Belgian artist gets the opportunity not to contemplate his navel. He is interested in what’s happening everywhere else. He feeds off foreign influences. Belgium is a meeting point for many trends and borders. In any case, Souldout doesn’t see itself as a Brussels band nor as a French-speaking band. We are Belgian before all!

HP: A “true Belgium-made artist”… It’s difficult to answer this question because there is no true Belgian music style. There are so many different musical styles in Belgium, so it’s impossible to define a Belgian artist exactly. Hooverphonic is famous internationally because it makes universal music, not because it is a Belgian band! [ n° 2 ] > SHIFT mag

eur o p e's borde rs

European Neighbourhood and foreign policy

There is at least one thing Europeans seem to agree on: the EU is going through a crisis. Arguably, an important cause of the public’s disenchantment, the political stalemate and the general confusion lies in the so-called “enlargement fatigue”. As if the EU needed a prolonged siesta to digest the great feast it had with the enlargement in 2004. The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was launched at the time and is one of the main projects feeding and feeling Europe’s uncertainties. Outward-looking by definition, it is the product of deep introspection and reflects the importance of issues such as enlargement, neighbours and borders for the EU.

Inevitably, the ENP is hindered by these hesitations and its ambivalent (some would say hypocritical) nature. On the one hand, it is an alternative to neverending enlargement and a shift from the logic of expanding membership to that of expanding norms. The official rhetoric is one of preventing Europe from turning into a fortress and “blurring the borders”, by extending the benefits of the EU to its neighbours SHIFT mag > [ n° 2 ]

without actually granting candidate status. But one would not really bother about blurring the lines if there was not a clear need to actually establish them. It seems that one of the main objectives of the ENP, albeit an unspoken one, is to define the EU’s borders. On the other hand, the ENP is an interesting and wide-ranging instrument of foreign policy. It allows the EU to enhance political, economic and cultural relations with its neighbours with a view to strengthening stability, prosperity, good governance and, ultimately, its own security. From the Brussels perspective, the ENP makes a lot of sense, as a means to answering certain tough questions. The slogans that have surrounded it from the start, such as the strategic objective of promoting a “ring of well-governed states”, sound catchy and reassuring for the public. The policy implicitly promotes a Europe of concentric circles, an idea that regularly comes up as a brilliant compromise between those member states eager to expand the single market and those fearful about diluting the political project. Going beyond the surface, one can identify three main ideas driving the new policy that defines the EU’s relations with its neighbours. The first big idea is the geographical scope of the policy, putting together the new neighbours to the East with the old

neighbours of the South. Today, the strategy includes countries in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus as well as the countries facing the Mediterranean Sea, which are also part of the so-called “Barcelona Process”. Some of the more problematic regimes, such as Belarus and Libya, are wisely excluded. For its part, Russia refused to be put in the same basket as Moldova and Ukraine and held on to its imposing title of “strategic partner”. In this mixed bag, one can already sense the underlying weakness and ambivalence of the ENP. The second novelty should be the increased political commitment of the EU towards its neighbours. As a substitute for the enlargement “accession carrot”, the ENP is supposed to sustain the EU’s soft power of attraction in the region. It does this, by offering neighbours a “stake in the internal market” and “everything but institutions”, as former President of the Commission Romano Prodi once put it. The ENP tries to favour the countries willing to undertake politically costly reforms, a method already applied to candidate countries negotiating accession. Unfortunately, the EU’s determination to actually apply this system of incentives is often ambiguous, schizophrenic and volatile. The very same EU member states who hoped to reap the benefits of the new policy (through proximity or influence) are the most reluctant when it comes to full implementation. They feel

F or more information on the E uropean N eighbourhood P olicy, visit :

http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/index_en.htm http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/academic_en.htm http://shop.ceps.eu/BookDetail.php?item_id=1479

EUROPE TALKS TO BRUSSELS

Policy: between enlargement The very same EU member states who hoped to reap the benefits of the new policy (through proximity or influence) are the most reluctant when it comes to full implementation. > vulnerable, directly exposed as they are to the effects of trade liberalisation and visa facilitation.

short of an accession perspective is an insufficient recognition of their place in Europe and of their effort to reform.

The third big idea behind the ENP is the adoption of a clearly bilateral approach. Action plans are negotiated with full involvement of the recipient country and tailored to its specific needs and priorities. Of course these negotiations cannot be anything but asymmetric. Despite this, they should create a feeling of ownership in the partner country and make actual implementation easier. The flip side is that, putting together the bilateral approach and the heterogeneous membership, the ENP can easily lose its coherence and ultimate purpose through fragmentation. Towards the South this risks undermining the progress made in regional integration in the framework of the Barcelona Process. Tellingly, the Commission is now pushing the thematic dimension of ENP, focusing on sub-regional cooperation on specific issues such as energy, infrastructure, immigration or counter-terrorism.

Consequently, the ENP can only postpone the debate on their actual membership, which is what really anchors them to the EU.

These shortcomings all come from the same original mismatch between the two objectives governing the EU’s relations with its neighbours. Should the ENP consolidate Europe’s borders and put a brake on enlargement by offering a new deal to neighbours? Or should it just be the “mature phase” of European foreign policy towards its region of influence?

the others from drifting further away into poor economic performance, lack of democracy and radicalism. The Mediterranean is perhaps the area where the trade-off between the promotion of democracy, security and stability is more palpable. What the EU needs there is more consistent foreign policy priorities and more courage in pursuing them.

As a proto-enlargement strategy the ENP cannot work. It is unlikely to be able to create new borders to the East, nor to blur existing ones to the South. To Eastern European countries and to a lesser extent to the Caucasus, any deal

To the South, instead, the ENP is simply another policy layer. It can accelerate reform in the countries that are already motivated and close to the EU, but it will not, by itself, prevent

The EU should therefore concentrate on the foreign policy aspect of its

neighbourhood policy and separate it from the enlargement debate. By rationalising the EU’s policy towards its neighbourhood, by raising its commitment to it, and by maintaining a comprehensive and structural approach, the ENP can be an effective tool in influencing and transforming countries in its neighbourhood. Not only those who have a legitimate claim to full membership, but also those who have turned their back on the EU. •••

> Daniele Marchesi Academic assistant College of Europe, Bruges Italian Daniele has recently written a book chapter on the Barcelona Process and the European Neighbourhood Policy in Europe's Near Abroad: Promises and Prospects of the EU's Neighbourhood Policy, (ed.) Dieter M. Mahncke, College of Europe Studies, Peter Lang (forthcoming 2007). [ n° 2 ] > SHIFT mag

eur o p e's borde rs

Europeans without frontiers of social disadvantages, like a low level of education, unemployment, poverty, poor housing conditions, bad state of health, low life expectancy, high scale of criminality, as well as prejudice, discrimination and social exclusion. These factors form a vicious circle, with one feeding the other, and lead to a poverty spiral that is very difficult to break. © Nigel Dickinson

For decades, the communist governments of Central and Eastern Europe, insensitive to minority status, sought to solve the social problems of the Romani population through extensive allocation of state aid and the employment of Roma in low-profile jobs. This policy led to a sentiment of security among Roma while they became dependent on the state. When the winds of change started blowing, and democracy and liberal market economy were introduced in these countries, Roma saw the acknowledgement of their minority rights but also the disappearance of their safety net.

All over Europe, the situation of Roma is characterised by the accumulation

1,030,000

The Romani language in Europe 1,200,000 1000,000

1,000

9,500

1,000

300,000 8,000

4,000

7,000

4,000

18,500

260,000

Source: Peter Bakker in The Other Languages of Europe, Clevedon 2001 SHIFT mag > [ n°2 ]

42,000

160,000

215,000

85,000

3,000

1,100

28,000

10,000

200,000

20,000

400,000

1,500

600,000

140,000

600,000

800,000

Austria Belgium Bulgaria Croatia Czech Republic Denmark Estonia Finland France Germany Greece Hungary Italy Latvia Lithuania Netherlands Poland Romania Slovakia Slovenia Spain Sweden United Kingdom

Roma, most probably, originated from Northern India and arrived in Europe between the 10th and 12th centuries. Today, most of them live in Central and Eastern Europe and in the Balkan countries, around 4-5 million people in total. The Romani population is the most significant in Romania (around 1.5 million), Bulgaria (550,000), Hungary (600,000 thousand), Serbia (500,000), Slovakia (380,000) and the Czech Republic (175,000). There have also been Roma in Western Europe since the 10th century. They arrived

through North Africa and the strait of Gibraltar to Spain and spread from here towards the North. They are often referred to as “gypsies” or “travellers”. In the second half of the 20th century, more Roma arrived to this part of the continent from Eastern Europe due to wars and persecution, or simply in the hope of a better life.

The Romani population living in Europe is estimated at between 10 and 12 million. Providing exact demographic data poses a double difficulty. On the one hand, the Romani population is a heterogeneous minority group, composed of many ethnic branches speaking different dialects, having different traditions and on different levels of assimilation. On the other hand, there is a reluctance on the part of many Roma to identify themselves as such, being afraid of stigma, discrimination and exclusion. Sometimes governments also seem to be uninterested in providing exact data.

F or more information on the R oma people in E urope , visit :

EUROPE TALKS TO BRUSSELS

“

Not having the necessary skills to adapt to the new circumstances, masses of Roma lost out to democracy and liberalisation.

”

Not having the necessary skills to adapt to the new circumstances, masses of Roma lost out to democracy and liberalisation. Ironically enough, the acknowledgement of their rights seemed to be coupled with experiences of exclusion never known before. While lots of Roma had to live in inhuman conditions and without prospects for a better life, anti-Romani sentiment grew strong among the majority of the population. Roma were blamed for their asymmetric participation in the social security system (being beneficiaries without contributing). Along with increasing social tensions, the Roma issue started rising on political agendas in the postcommunist countries towards the end of the 90s. It was finally realised that both for human rights and economic reasons, the integration of the Romani population into society – and the labour market – was key for the development of these countries. Following the last two rounds of enlargement, Roma became the largest © Nigel Dickinson

minority in the European Union and the Romani language one of the largest minority languages. The inclusion of Roma into the single market is now in Europe's interest. Throughout the accession negotiations, the EU paid special attention to the situation of Roma in the candidate countries. In its regular or progress reports, the European Commission did not tackle this question in the frame of civic and political rights, nor in that of economic, social and cultural rights, but under a separate chapter on minority rights. This seemed surprising at first sight as some of the Member States, like Greece and France, do not even recognise the existence of minorities in their constitution. The Commission’s rationale was probably that the integration of Roma was not only considered as a human rights issue but, due to the size and mobility of this population, as a security matter. As a matter of fact, during the decade before the 2004 enlargement, Europe witnessed several waves of Romani diaspora towards the West, namely from the Balkan Peninsula, Romania, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Hungary. This led to the rise of anti-Romani sentiment in Western Europe and the identification of the Roma-issue as a potential risk of enlargement. The EU assisted the candidate countries in answering these problems with pre-accession funds supporting the education and employment of Roma. Nevertheless,

http://www.errc.org/ http://ec.europa.eu/employment_ social/fundamental_rights/pdf/pubst/ roma04_en.pdf http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Roma_people

due to the scale of the problem, the issue could not be handled satisfactorily before enlargement. In the EU of 27, there are at least 10 million citizens of Romani origin. Most of them have to face extreme poverty and social exclusion, as well as the lack of education and jobs. This raises, beyond serious human rights concerns, a set of economic challenges: the EU, desirous of becoming the most dynamic knowledge-based society in the world by 2010, cannot afford to keep millions of currently inactive people out of the labour market. Efforts aiming at the social inclusion of the Romani population should be coordinated at European, national and local levels. Education and employment policies should be tailored to the needs of both Roma and the single market. The European financing instruments, like the European Social Fund and the European Regional Development Fund, should give explicit recognition of the situation of Roma in their application guidelines. EU initiatives, like the 2004 Commission report entitled “The situation of Roma in an enlarged European Union”, show that the challenge and the urgency of the matter are understood. Now adequate action must follow. •••

> Péter Horváth Assistant Professor Corvinus University, Budapest Hungarian

[ n° 2 ] > SHIFT mag

EUROPE TALKS TO BRUSSELS

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SHIFT mag > [ n° 2 ]

Soldout té 67 EHooverphonic

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