Road to People by Sławomir Redo

ON THE ROAD TO PEOPLE Jubilee Book in Commemoration of the 70th Birthday of Michael K. Platzer

Vienna 2016

ON THE ROAD TO PEOPLE Jubilee Book in Commemoration of the 70th Birthday of Michael K. Platzer

Content

ON THE ROAD TO PEOPLE Jubilee Book in Commemoration of the 70th Birthday of Michael K. Platzer

Maximilian Edelbacher, Friedrich Forsthuber and Sławomir Redo Introduction for Michael

02 H.E. Dr. Wolfgang Brandstetter, Austrian Minister of Justice Foreword

03 H.E. Luis Alfonso de Alba, Permanent Representative of Mexico to the United Nations, Chairman of the United Nations Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, 2015-2016 Preface

Marcia Kran, F. Director, Research and Right to Development Division, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights The sustainable development goals 2016-2030: What has law got to do with them? A tribute to a human rights hero

05 Josephine Papst, Mag.Dr.phil., Centre for Philosophy, Theory of Science, and Philosophy of Art (Graz, Austria) On human dignity: What is it we ask to respect?

Christian Kuhn International Commission of Catholic Prison Pastoral Care, member of the Board, Ministry of Justice (Vienna, Austria) Dr. Michael Platzer Advisor to ICCPPC, member of the "Soziale Gerichtshilfe"

07 Jean-Luc Lemahieu, Director, Division for Public Analysis and Public Affairs, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime “Embedded in the past, yet embracing the future?”: Fragile States, transnational crime and the new 2030 Development Agenda

08 Wendelin Ettmayer, F. Ambassador of Austria to Finland, Canada, and at the Council of Europe Power politics and welfare thinking in international relations

09 Irmgard Marboe, Professor, Department of Public International Law, University of Vienna The role of the UN in the use of outer space technology for sustainable development

10 Grzegorz Donocik, F. Chief, Europe and Newly Independent States Programme, United Nations Industrial Organization (ret.) SDGs links with Inclusive and Sustainable Industrial Development, human rights and dignity

11 Ugljesja Ugi Zvekic, Dr., F. Ambassador of Serbia to the United Nations Office at Geneva; President of the World of the General Assemblies of World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), 2011 – 2013 Corruption and organized crime challenges in the western Balkans

Sławomir Redo, Dr. hab, Senior Adviser, Academic Council on the United Nations System (ACUNS, Liaison Office, Vienna, Austria); F. UN Senior Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Expert and UNODC staff (ret.) The 3 Ms: A recipe to (un)learn helplessness and clear the road to people?

13 Helmut Kury, Prof. em., Dr. mult. h.c., Evelyn Shea, PhD Restorative Justice: A cooperative process that changes the rules of the game?

14 Janice Joseph, Distinguished Professor of Criminal Justice, Stockton University, Galloway Township, NJ, USA Violence against women and the sustainable development goals

15 Monika Stempkowski, Institute for Criminal Law and Criminology, University of Vienna Facing the challenge of juvenile delinquency: The innovative approach of family-group-conferencing in probationary services

100

16 Roland Miklau, F. Director General for Criminal Legislation, Austrian Ministry of Justice, Friedrich Forsthuber, President of the Regional Court for Criminal Matters in Vienna The successful abolition of death penalty

108

17 Maximilian Edelbacher, F. Chief of the Major Crime Bureau of the Federal Police of Austria, Vienna Security and safety in the context of the UN Sustainable Development Goals

112

116

Alistair Edgar, Dr., Executive Director, Academic Council on the United Nations System Peace and justice in the post - 2015 agenda: Challenges, opportunities and prospects

19 Karin Bruckmüller, Dr., Ludwig-Maximilians-University (Munich, Germany), Dr., Johannes Kepler University (Linz, Austria) “Victim-offender” in cases of human trafficking

123

20 Anthony Mills, Journalist, PhD Candidate, Department of Communications, University of Vienna (Vienna, Austria) Human rights defenders must remain vigilant on all fronts

128

21 Thomas Walsh, President, Universal Peace Federation Building just, peaceful and inclusive societies: The role of religion, virtue and social capital

132

22 Brian Gowans, President, International Commission of Catholic Prison Pastoral Care “The mustard seed”

142

23 Andrada Filip, Project Co-ordinator for Women Against Violence Europe Inspiring the young generation to take action against femicide

146

Anikó Szalai, Regional Academy on the United Nations/RAUN, Radim Sršen, RAUN, Billy Batware, RAUN The creation of a new concept: A knowledge-based citizenship and their application in practice via the Regional Academy on the United Nations

152

Leszek Wieczorek, Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Kielce (Kielce, Poland); Jolanta Redo, Permanent Representative, Asia Crime Prevention Foundation (United Nations Office at Vienna, Austria) A noble nature: The case of Michael Platzer

156

References

164

Captions Collage

182

Imprint

186

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Introduction for Michael Maximilian Edelbacher, Friedrich Forsthuber and Sławomir Redo

It was Sławomir Redo’s idea to write this Jubilee Book and to honour Michael Platzer's special birthday, also with a special event at the Vienna International Centre on 25 May 2016. Maximilian Edelbacher, Friedrich Forsthuber and Sławomir Redo became the Editors and Pablo Farassat joined us as the master of graphics, logos and formatting issues. We invited many friends of Michael and we received 25 contributions (and enough money) to fund this wonderful publication. Several colleagues, friends, and the son of one Co-Editor contributed their work to make this book project possible technically. These are Shlomo Einstein, Lucille Dunn Kratcoski, Kathryn Platzer served as English-language Editors. Lamin K. Janneh helped in referencing the texts and Piotr Redo contributed his expertise in computer graphics. Thanks to the Minister of Justice of Austria, this Jubilee Book could be printed in time. When Max met Michael Platzer in the mid-nineties he immediately had the impression of an extraordinary personality, a man extremely balanced between his intellectual and emotional capacities. Reading all these contributions from his friends around the world this personal experience was reaffirmed. As Alistair Edgar, Executive Director of the Academic Council on the United Nations System, emphasized: “Michael's power of persuasion, his optimism and his determination to achieve positive goals on those causes to which he was committed, meant that he was always his own boss”. Michael's role in relationship to the activities of the United Nations is so important, Alistair analysed, because: “...international civil service is criticized for failing to prevent, or effectively respond to, [the] new global security crisis“. Persons like Michael balance this criticism by their personality, individual character and engagement for a better world we can live in. It is remarkable that all of his friends describe Michael as a tremendous contributor to the fundamental purpose of the United Nations: Peace, Development and Human Rights. He is intensively involved in defending human rights. Dr. Wendelin Ettmayer, a former Austrian Ambassador, wrote: “Whereas foreign policy concentrated traditionally on power politics, Michael Platzer and ACUNS demonstrated that serving the people has become an integral part of foreign policy as well“. This Jubilee Book entitled “On the Road to People” is a case in point, and a festive contribution to the United Nations Sustainable Development Agenda 2016-2030. Many thanks to all friends of Michael who contributed to this publication or to the event of 25 May! And congratulations to Michael Platzer! We all thank you, Michael, for being our friend!

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Foreword of the Austrian Minister of Justice Dr. Wolfgang Brandstetter

Dr. Michael K. Platzer, as the Vienna Representative of the ACUNS, organized many conferences and meetings on issues related to human rights, many of which also dealt with Austrian law and practice. Recently, a book regarding the improvement of the situation of juvenile prisoners in Austria was published by ACUNS with assistance from the Austrian Federal Ministry of Justice. Noting his achievements, it is, therefore, not surprising that so many essays by world-renowned authors on various aspects of human rights and humanity have been gathered together for this Jubilee book in honour of his 70th birthday. It is, therefore, a great pleasure for me that these important essays are published by the Austrian Ministry of Justice to recognize Dr. PlatzerÂ´s manifold contributions over the years. Congratulations

Dr. Wolfgang Brandstetter, Austrian Minister of Justice

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Preface H.E. Luis Alfonso de Alba

The year 2016 is an auspicious year. The United Nations Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice turns twenty-five years old, the entire organization has launched the 15-year implementation of its sustainable development agenda and Dr. Michael K. Platzer turns 70 years old. Since well before my chairmanship of the twenty-fourth session of the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, I have come to know him from his very versatile involvement in the business of the United Nations. I have realized that his vast professional experience within the UN and engagement assisted the global civil society in conveying to Member States relevant international priorities and concerns. Dr. Platzerâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s considerable experience and dedication helped the Commission to channel its attention into the ever-growing problematic of inclusive, peaceful and prosperous societies, which is well targeted by General Assembly resolution 70/1. As I have said at numerous UN processes and fora (climate change, migration, human rights, sustainable development, women and indigenous peoples), and particularly at civil society meetings within the context of the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, the time has come for the UN to work together with civil society and non-governmental actors. We need to strengthen our efforts and measures to achieve positive results. This Jubilee Book in honour of Dr. Michael K. Platzer is the festive expression of many related to such ideas and proposals. Several friends of the UN Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Programme contributed to it. As one of them, through this foreword, I introduce to you this book and express on their behalf our sincere wishes of many happy returns to the Jubilarian!

H.E. Luis Alfonso de Alba Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Mexico Chair of the 24th session of the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice

The sustainable development goals 2016-2030: What has law got to do with them? A tribute to a human rights hero Marcia V. J. Kran1

Introduction In the year when both he and the United Nations turn 70, I am pleased to participate in the celebration of Michael Platzerâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s admirable professional life. A tribute to him is undoubtedly in order given his tremendous contributions to the fundamental purposes of the United Nations: peace, development and human rights. I especially have in mind his contributions to the advancement of human rights and justice, as, in my view, Michael Platzer should be considered a human rights hero for the actions he has taken over the last few decades culminating in what he is doing today. His advocacy and action regarding human rights over the years have been nothing short of exemplary. Michael Platzer has relentlessly pursued better human rights promotion and protection in myriad ways during his career at the UN and, at least as robustly, since his retirement from UN service. It was 25 years ago that my husband, Luis Molina, and I met Michael while we were working at the (then) UN Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Branch at the UN Office in Vienna. At the time, he was the Chief of Staff to the Director General of the UN Office in Vienna. Not far from where we were, the war in the former Yugoslavia was ongoing. As an example of his many contributions over the years, Michael boldly spearheaded efforts in Bosnia-Hercegovina on behalf of women survivors of the war. In all of his work, he has tirelessly advocated for womenâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s human rights. He was the driving force behind a side event at the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice in 2013 dedicated to the most extreme manifestation of genderbased discrimination: the killing of women because they are women. He invited me to speak at the side event on behalf of the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights where I was working at the time. The year before, the UN Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women had devoted her thematic report to the Human Rights Council to the issue of gender-motivated killings of women, highlighting how globally, the prevalence of such killings was increasing, while a lack of accountability remained the norm. According to her report, gender-related killings, or femicide, are not isolated incidents that arise suddenly and unexpectedly, but are rather the most extreme end of a continuum of violence. The Special Rapporteurâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s thematic report on gender-motivated killings painted a grim picture of the realities women face around the world and Michael saw 12 | 13

the need to galvanize greater attention. He called for UN action to break the cycle of impunity for these serious violations of women’s human rights, notably the right to life, the right not to be subjected to torture, the right to personal integrity and the right to liberty. Thanks to his efforts, femicide has a more prominent place on the UN agenda. This cause is only one of the great number of human rights concerns Michael Platzer has supported as an individual. His action on this issue illustrates a forceful commitment to human rights. Earlier this year, this earnest commitment culminated in Michael and his wife Kathryn opening their Vienna home to a family of Syrian refugees. It is hard to imagine a more heartfelt and tangible demonstration of his determination to advance human rights. It is fitting that the year that Michael turns 70 coincides with the launch of the Sustainable Development Goals, which envisage a world free of fear and violence, with universal respect for human rights and human dignity. To mark Michael’s 70th birthday and commemorate his contribution to justice and human rights, I am sharing my observations on the links between human rights, the rule of law and sustainable development. A goal on Justice in the sustainable development goals 2016 – 2030 In September 2015 world leaders gathered at the United Nations in New York to agree on a universal development agenda which – for the first time – included a goal on access to justice, accountable institutions and the rule of law. That this is a first may seem startling for those whose work revolves around justice and the rule of law, so why is it a new feature in this global agreement? I would like to offer some comments on this subject by addressing the following three questions: First, what role has the rule of law played in international development cooperation to date, including in previous global development goals? Second, how does the rule of law feature in this new agenda, in this new set of goals – the Sustainable Development Goals? And are there any gaps that remain in this respect? Third, why does this matter to Canada and to Canadian lawyers who have an interest in working internationally?2 Let me begin by outlining how the relationship between development and the rule of law has emerged over time. After World War II, the action countries took to improve development in other countries focused mainly on economic dimensions but since the 1970s the focus has expanded to include social policies and programmes. This kind of cooperation was mostly understood as charitable and, sometimes, albeit less overtly, as the pursuit of donors’ own economic interests overseas. On the other hand, the rule of law at the national level was considered a political matter that fell within the sovereign jurisdiction of each individual country and with which other countries should generally not interfere. The exception, of course, was in countries where peace was threatened. These situations were to be addressed in the UN General Assembly or by the Security Council. In other words, development was officially seen as apolitical whereas the rule of law was considered political.

These lines started to blur in the 1980’s when international financial institutions (IFIs) such as the World Bank and the IMF realized that their programmes in developing countries were not as successful at boosting economic growth as they had expected. The IFIs began to suspect that ineffective governance structures were to blame. In response, they introduced structural adjustment programmes, which made loans conditional on governance reforms, for instance cuts in social spending and privatization of basic services. These programmes had a number of problematic effects including on people’s social and economic rights. However, they did achieve one thing: they connected the notion of development to the principle of the rule of law. Put another way, they made the economic case for the rule of law. From then on, many bilateral government donors as well as non-governmental organizations increasingly accepted the idea that the rule of law is instrumental for economic development. However, push back was looming. In 2001, The UN Secretary General proposed the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) to focus national and international efforts on development and the elimination of poverty. The eight MDGs focused on economic and social goals such as health, education and employment. They did not include a goal on rule of law or governance.3 Why not? The economic case for governance reform had long been recognized by the international community. I believe there were two main reasons: a political one and a technocratic one. The political one was a direct response to the structural adjustment programmes of the preceding decades. Many developing countries realized the importance of rules and institutions for their national development. But they had experienced the governance adjustments imposed by the IFIs as humiliating interferences with their sovereign “policy space”. They also saw the negative social impacts of these governance interventions on their people’s wellbeing. The World Health Organization has since concluded that the Structural Adjustment Policy slowed down improvements, or worsened the health of people in countries implementing the policies, for example through lower nutrition for children, an increased incidence of infectious diseases, and higher infant and maternal mortality rates. (The situation was, in fact, not unlike what Greece is experiencing today.) When the UN Secretary General put the MDGs forward, he likely knew that developing countries would not accept global goals that aimed to reform their governance systems further. The technocratic reason for excluding the rule of law and governance from the goals was explained by the UN experts who drafted the goals, targets and indicators. They agreed that rule of law was less tangible and harder to measure than sectors such as health or education. It does require effort to develop governance indicators, and there was very limited consultation during the MDG drafting process. The MDGs were supposed to be straightforward, with results that could be readily captured and depicted (Alston 2005).4 As a result, the MDGs did not balance the emphasis on freedom from want (development) with issues related to freedom from fear (human rights) or give sufficient attention to discrimination and inequalities.4

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During the life of the MDGs, some things changed, while others did not. Countries remain concerned about interference in what they consider their own sovereign affairs. Therefore, in 2012 countries decided that they would not leave the drafting of the next set of development goals to a small group of UN experts. They would draft them themselves. UN Member States initiated the intergovernmental drafting process that culminated in the global summit in New York, which adopted the SDGs. What changed, however, was that in many countries, civil society had gotten involved in the MDGs. Followers were becoming almost as important as leaders. People pointed out where development funds had been embezzled, where development programmes had led to forced evictions, and where entire groups such as persons with disabilities were ignored in development initiatives. And these people demanded to be involved. In this way, questions regarding the rule of law and governance resurfaced and could not be pushed under the carpet any longer. The UN, in the spirit of its Charter, which begins with the words, “We The Peoples…” decided to involve everyday people in crafting the new development goals. The process included a series of extensive global and national consultations on The World We Want, and an online global survey called My World where people could share how they envisaged the future. These consultations reached several million individuals worldwide and represent the largest engagement of people the UN has ever facilitated. In 2013 while I was at the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), OHCHR and the UN Development Programme facilitated one of the global thematic consultations, the Post-2015 Global Consultation on Governance. It concluded with a gathering in South Africa of over 250 stakeholders from civil society, business and academia. The messages from these non-governmental actors on what was needed were clear: • First, that rule of law, governance and respect for human rights are indeed critical to achieve – and perhaps even more importantly – to sustain development. •

And that governance is not just about ensuring that a country’s administration functions smoothly. It is also about how people can review what those in power do and how they can hold them accountable if something goes wrong. Human rights and the accountability of those in power are the core of rule of law and governance. If human rights are not respected and there is no accountability, rule of law and governance are empty concepts that can be abused. In fact, many authoritarian regimes rule their people through very well functioning public administrations.

• Second, while the rule of law certainly facilitates private sector development and investment, the private sector is also accountable to the public, especially for the management of public goods and services. • Third, that the rule of law and governance can be measured and need to be monitored in the Post-2015 Development Agenda (Kapto 2013).

One could argue that, by now, all stakeholders have come to recognize the link between development and the rule of law, even if they highlight different aspects. International financial institutions and the private sector stress the importance of reliable rules and institutions for investment and growth, Governments generally want to develop effective systems for tax collection and service delivery, and ordinary people largely insist that all of these processes need to be transparent, accountable and support people’s human rights. Let me now turn to the second question: How does rule of law feature in the new goals – the Sustainable Development Goals? What, if any, gaps remain? Over the past year, UN Member States have drafted 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) on economic, social and environmental issues. The structure is in the form of a simple action plan: Each goal is broken down into several targets and each target will be monitored through indicators. The goals are the heart of the Post-2015 Development Agenda – we can say they constitute the WHAT that countries want to achieve. In addition, governments have agreed on an introductory Declaration – we can call it the WHY as well as a system for Review and Follow-Up of the goals – the HOW. How does the rule of law feature in this agenda? The SDGs include the rule of law in all three parts – in the WHY, the WHAT and the HOW. The rule of law is explicitly mentioned as part of the vision for the new agenda, the WHY which states: “We (Member States) envisage a world of universal respect for human rights and human dignity, the rule of law, justice, equality and non-discrimination […]” (para. 8). On the WHAT, the set of 17 goals now includes one stand-alone goal on rule of law issues, Goal 16. For all the reasons mentioned earlier, this was the most contested goal of all and brought the negotiations to the brink of breakdown several times. Securing this goal was a remarkable achievement, to which Canada contributed a great deal. The goal includes targets to ensure the rule of law at the national and international levels and equal access to justice for all (target 16.3). It also calls for effective, accountable and transparent institutions (target 16.6) and the provision of legal identity, including birth registration (target 16.9), and it seeks to ensure public access to information and the protection of fundamental freedoms (target 16.10). The rule of law also features in several other goals. For example, Goal 5 on gender equality includes a target to adopt legislation for gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls (target 5.c), and to secure equal property and inheritance rights for women (target 5.a). In addition, an overall goal to reduce inequalities, Goal 10, includes a target to eliminate discriminatory laws and to promote appropriate legislation (target 10.3). Sections of the population who are vulnerable and must be empowered, and whose needs are reflected in the goals and targets include children, youth, persons with disabilities, older persons, indigenous peoples, migrants regardless of migration status, refugees and internally displaced persons.5 The SDGs also require disaggregation of data on marginalized groups as official statistics to aid policymakers in identifying the disparities faced by vulnerable members of society. 16 | 17

The idea is that targets should not be considered achieved unless they are met for all population sub-groups (A/RES/70/1). So far so good – the SDGs promote the rule of law. But how will they be achieved? Throughout the negotiations, civil society in particular insisted that the rule of law also needed to guide the process of implementing the goals. Practically speaking, responsibilities need to be clarified and stipulated. Progress needs to be reviewed regularly. Governments have now agreed on a review and follow-up mechanism at national, regional and global levels. At the global level, reviews will take place at the new High Level Political Forum.6 We can therefore say that the rule of law has been included in the post-2015 Agenda in an explicit and crosscutting manner. Overall, I consider this a good result, coming from the MDGs which were completely silent on rule of law, governance and human rights to an agenda which includes a specific stand-alone goal as well as key rule of law principles integrated throughout the new agenda. However, The political dynamic of this intergovernmental process, which relies heavily on negotiating consensus, has also left gaps that require our continued attention. Let me mention three. National prerogatives: Some targets have been made subject to the prerogative of national law by including formulations such as “in accordance with national law” or “as nationally appropriate”. Not surprisingly, these formulations only appear in targets that try to advance rule of law and human rights most explicitly, namely those on women’s rights (e.g. targets 5.4, 5.a) and on fundamental freedoms (e.g. target 16.10). National laws do not always codify international human rights norms. In practice, this could mean that these targets will not be pursued in countries where they are most needed. Restrictive laws could be used to perpetuate restrictive laws. Indicators and Review: We all know that numbers count. Data makes issues visible and drives action. We must make sure, therefore, that indicators for the new agenda measure what we want to achieve and create the right incentives. This seems obvious but did not always work with the MDGs. For instance, an indicator on “maternal mortality”’ meant that much effort went into estimating death tolls. Had the indicator measured the “attendance of skilled staff at birth” more policy efforts may have been directed towards training and deploying more health staff.7 Another indicator measured “people living in slums”. In an effort to reduce these numbers, this indicator prompted some governments to carry out forced evictions instead of providing people with secure tenure. In short, we must “measure what we treasure”, not what seems easiest to measure. We also know that any monitoring process needs to be open and transparent to be effective. The SDGs stress that reviews “will be open, inclusive, participatory for all people and will support the reporting by all relevant stakeholders” (A/RES/70/1, para. 74D). This provision was highly contested which means many Member States will probably be reluctant to engage civil society, academia and bar associations, where these actors are independent, in reviewing progress. Private sector: The private sector has been very actively involved in the post-2015 consultations. Business has supported the inclusion of the rule of law and governance in the agenda. They will also play an important role in helping to finance and implement the new goals, for example by

engaging in public-private partnerships. Areas that tend to attract support from the private sector include energy, water, health, education, technological innovation or infrastructure. While the support of business has been welcomed, civil society, the UN and a number of governments have stressed that engagement with the private sector must be balanced with accountability. Where the private sector is engaged in the financing or implementation of the agenda, it must also be held accountable for its actions. In practice, this means companies need to assess the impacts of their engagement in advance, including how their engagement can help realize rather than undermine human rights including workers’ rights. In this regard, they will be expected to build in safeguards and provide redress if things go wrong. Governments need to consider carefully where it is suitable and most beneficial to collaborate with the private sector. It is very good news, therefore, that the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights are now explicitly referred to in the Outcome Document that world leaders are expected to sign next month. Third, and finally, let me conclude with a few thoughts on what the post-2015 Agenda may mean for Canada and for Canadian lawyers. Let us recall that the post-2015 Agenda comprises a universal agenda. It takes a while to grasp the full implications of the universality of the new agenda. It means that the 17 goals will apply to Canada equally with Mozambique, Mexico or Nepal. In other words, the goals will affect not only Canada’s external policies on development cooperation but also its domestic policies on health, education, equality, sustainable consumption and production, rule of law and justice, and other sectors. One could therefore say that the new goals will need to be implemented in and through Canada. Canadian lawyers can contribute at both levels. Implementation in Canada Where Canadian domestic policies are concerned, we can contribute in at least two ways: • On indicators: Canada will need to develop national indicators on all 17 goals. For Goal 16 – on rule of law issues – our perspective is essential. Industrialised countries tend to underestimate and understate gaps in the rule of law in our own countries. Lawyers are an indispensable source of information and expertise in this regard. How do you think rule of law related targets should be measured for Canada, e.g. what are good indicators for measuring access to justice or for reducing violence or corruption? For which groups in Canada should data be collected to make sure we can see who is progressing and who is not? All these questions will be asked. The CBA as well as many of you individually can make valuable contributions to these discussions. •

On review and follow-up: The Canadian government will need to identify an institution to organize the review of Canada’s progress to achieve the new goals. The CBA and lawyers can get involved by calling for a process that is transparent, participatory and accountable. We can also recommend stakeholders that should be involved in these reviews, for example, expert NGOs in the area of justice and the Canadian Human Rights Commission. The CBA itself may be well positioned to submit information to the reviews, especially on targets on justice and rule of law, drawing on the experiences of its members. 18 | 19

Implementation through Canada Where development cooperation is concerned, Canada can support efforts overseas. Businesses can consider funding the implementation of the new goals through a variety of channels. For instance, many of the new goals will be complemented with sectoral partnerships or “vertical funds”, for example, initiatives such as Sustainable Energy for All, Scale Up Nutrition and Every Woman - Every Child of which Canada is a founding partner.8 In addition, various UN agencies will seek funding to support developing countries on specific issues, e.g. the UN Capital Development Fund (UNCDF) to develop microfinance schemes. Bilateral donors, including the Canadian government could support private-public partnerships and blended finance instruments, for example in the area of health, urban development or infrastructure. As individual lawyers and a professional association, we and the CBA can share expertise, for example by reaching out to Bar Associations in developing countries where there is push-back on promoting the rule of law. We can share experiences on how Canada will measure progress on justice and the rule of law so that they can adapt and build on these ideas, and effectively participate in their national discussions. In all these efforts abroad, we need to make sure we “walk the talk” and contribute to the promotion of the rule of law ourselves. We should invest our funds end expertise in initiatives that build rather than weaken local institutions.9 We should support programmes that promote human rights rather than respond to donor priorities. Businesses need to assess the impact of their action and provide redress in case initiatives have unintended negative side effects. Good intentions are not enough. For Instance, Recent research showed that the millions of bed nets distributed in Africa by philanthropists such as Bill Gates are often used for fishing.10 The insecticides that the nets are imbued with have gotten into the water, into people’s food and even make the mosquitoes resistant to the substance meant to kill them. Here again, the UN Guidelines on Business and Human Rights are a helpful resource in this re-gard and we should all recommend their systematic application. Conclusion I will conclude with a quote from Kofi Annan, which seems timely even a decade after he made it at the General Assembly.

“Those who seek to bestow legitimacy must themselves embody it; and those who invoke international law must themselves submit to it… No nation must feel excluded. All must feel that international law belongs to them, and protects their legitimate interests.” “Every nation that proclaims the rule of law at home must respect it abroad; and every nation that insists on it abroad must enforce it at home. Yes, the rule of law starts at home.” 11

As lawyers, we live the rule of law on a daily basis. Let us then play our parts in ensuring that lawyers use the SDGs to advance the rule of law at home and abroad. 1 Formerly Director of the Research and Right to Development Division at the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) in Geneva, Head of Policy and Programmes at UN Development Programme (UNDP) Regional

Centre for Asia and the Pacific in Bangkok and Democratic Governance Practice Leader at UNDP Regional Centre for Europe

and the Commonwealth of Independent States in Bratislava.

2 I originally presented these views at the Canadian Bar Association (CBA) annual meeting in Calgary, Canada in August 2015 at a panel on Strengthening Justice Globally. Thanks are due to Julia Kercher in Berlin, formerly of OHCHR and UNDP, for

preparing the research for this paper. Thanks also go to Simon Bill in Vancouver for editing this paper prior to publication.

3 They did include one ROL-related indicator which was an exception: MDG Indicator 3.3: Proportion of seats held by women

in national parliament.

4 Philip Alston Ships Passing in the Night...(2005). While The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) had a great deal in common with human rights commitments neither the human rights nor development communities embraced this linkage with

conviction. The two agendas resembled ships passing in the night, even though they are both headed for similar destinations.

5 Key human rights elements are incorporated in many of the goals and targets including the requirements of the International

Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1976) on availability, accessibility, affordability of socio-economic goals.

6 It will convene annually under the auspices of the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and every four years under

the auspices of the General Assembly. The UN’s Statistical Commission has been given the mandate to develop a set of indicators

to measure global progress.

7 Research by Alicia Yamin, Harvard School of Public Health, as part of an OHCHR-supported study with Sakiko Fukuda-Parr,

The Power of Numbers - A Critical Review of MDG Targets for Human Development and Human Rights (2013).

8 It is likely that the global review mechanism will also review the successes and failures of partner-ships. 9 For example, by investing in national health systems rather than development parallel systems that create dependency. 10 A study about “alternative” uses of malaria bed nets was carried out by the organization Lake Tanganyika Floating Health

Clinic of Dr Amy Lehman (http://floatingclinic.org/).

11 United Nations, Address to the General Assembly, by Kofi Annan (New York, United Nations, 21 September 2004), http://www.un.org/sg/STATEMENTS/index.asp?nid=1088

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On human dignity: What is it we ask to respect? Josephine Papst1

Introduction There seems to be the social tendency to speak about something just in times when it is regarded to be lost or is about to disappear: human dignity. What is it? Simply a noun phrase in legal and political contexts? The first time it appears was in the Preamble of the Irish Constitution in 1937:

“And seeking to promote the common good, with due observance of Prudence, Justice and Charity, so that the dignity and freedom of the individual may be assured, true social order attained, the unity of our country restored, and concord established with other nations, […]” (Irish Constitution 1937, Preamble).

After the Second World War Then, some years later after the end of the World War II in 1945 the notion of human dignity, this time with the scope of universality, appeared in the Preamble of the UN Charter (UN 1945) in the following formulation: “We the Peoples of the United Nations determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom, […]” (UN Charter 1945, Preamble). Already on the path of time, in 1948 the concept of human dignity entered to the Preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UN 1948) with the additional characterisation as an inherent property of human beings. The original formulation is: “Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal an inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world […]” (UN 1948, Preamble). And: “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood” (UN 1948, Article 1). Here, dignity stands as something additional to be born free and is connected to rights – the social sphere – in terms of being born equal in dignity and rights, and, for example, it is not written: born free with [inherent] dignity and equal in rights. Although the notion of human dignity dates back to ancient times (compare Horstmann 1980, 1124–1127) and can be assumed to be implicitly contained in the everyday practice of the manifold former and contemporary cultures, it is the post- Second World War area in which the concept of human dignity is explicitly introduced in the context of an internationally valid legal documents for the purpose of peace keeping in the world, either to derive from it the basic freedoms and rights or to justify them on that ground. 22 | 23

Only one year later the concept of human dignity can also be found in the Post World War II German Grundgesetz (1949) in the formulation: “Human dignity shall be inviolable [in German it is written “unantastbar” that means “untouchable” ]. To respect and protect it shall be the duty of all state authority” (Deutsches Grundgesetz 1949, Art. 1, Abs. 1 GG).2 It can be derived from this formulation that “human dignity” is touchable, and, therefore, it must be protected by the authorities. These various written formulations cause the puzzle, in my opinion, whether or not human dignity is an inherent constituent of human beings or nothing else than an ascription to human beings or persons3 by social conventions. Therefore, the question arises: Is human dignity an inherent property of human beings, and if so, it could never be taken away, but be touched or violated, or simply a conventional mode of speaking. Besides that, it is to mention that neither the Austrian Law of Basic Freedoms and Rights (1867) or the Austrian Constitution (1930) including all the Austrian laws containing basic rights nor the American Constitution (1787)4, as well as the constitutions of many other countries, contain or use explicitly the concept of human dignity in order to formulate the basic freedoms and rights. The situation is similar with respect to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as formulated by the members of the Council of Europe (European Court of Human Rights 1950) and the European Convention on Human Rights (European Court of Human Rights 1958): they do not make use of the concept of human dignity.5 Nevertheless, in the European Human Rights tradition there can be found one exception, namely in 2002 in the Protocol No. 13 to the “Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms concerning the abolition of the death penalty in all circumstances”, where it is written: “Convinced that everyone’s right to life is a basic value in a democratic society and that the abolition of the death penalty is essential for the protection of this right and for the full recognition of the inherent dignity of all human beings […]” (European Court of Human Rights 2002). It is to note that in the 21st century up to now the concept of human dignity appears nearly in each document of the United Nations, and in this manner also in the latest one, the General Assembly resolution “Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development).” In this document the first of the four occurrences states: “People. We are determined to end poverty and hunger, in all their forms and dimensions, and to ensure that all human beings can fulfil their potential in dignity and equality and in a healthy environment” (A/RES/70/1). Therefore, we might wonder what human dignity is. Is it implicitly and silently contained in our cultures and based on that sometimes explicitly referred to in the legal documents, or is it nothing else than a noun phrase that is said to be empty (Macklin 2003, 1419-1420) in itself, simply an old-fashioned formula, a relic of bygone times that, in fact, nobody understands nowadays. It might cause worries that there cannot be found at least one single legal document where a legal investigation in a court would have taken place because of the violation of human dignity itself. In the same way the violation of human dignity did not enter into a specific justification of a concrete judgment. It is said, that what really matters is the positively formulated law, exactly in the way it is written down, namely as the specifically formulated human rights or basic freedoms, and in practice human dignity itself became left out as an abstract notion without legal force and without empirical content. It is said so.

Against this background the aim of my contribution to the Jubilee Book to commemorate the 70th birthday of Dr. Michael Karl Platzer is to show that human dignity is unavoidable for an understanding of human beings and their nature. Without an understanding of our innate nature, it would not be possible to get a glimpse of an appropriate picture of human beings, the world, and the universe as a whole. My task is, therefore, to provide the arguments according to which human dignity is ontologically given and prior to whatever might follow from it. Based on the ontological status and quality of human dignity the demand for the respect for it and the protection of it by the governments and public institutions is of crucial importance for an eudaimonic or harmonic life of persons and societies over time (compare Papst 2000). Therefore, it is an honour for me to contribute on this topic to the Jubilee Book for Dr. Michael Karl Platzer who has devoted his life and his endeavor to advocate human dignity. Therefore, dear Dr. Michael Platzer: Congratulations to you on your 70th birthday! What is dignity? Although it seems to be the case that everybody is familiar with the word dignity, human dignity, or being dignified or worthy, it is far from clear what it means, because it is unclear what it is. Examples are: “This was a dignified welcome.” “All these poor people live under undignified circumstances.” “Human beings shall die in dignity.” “Who is dignified to become our leader?”6 And less sophisticated or folk style: “People should not have to live under unworthy conditions!” “Who is worthy to become our leader?” “I do reject to do this, because it is beyond my dignity.” And: “I do not want to make my hands dirty, it is beyond my dignity.” Or: “It is better to live under a bridge than to let me buy or blackmail, because it is absolutely beyond my dignity.” Or from Mt 8:8; Lk 7:6: "Lord, I am not worthy to have you come under my roof."7 These examples give an outline of the crucial difference between two types of the use of the notion of dignity. On the one hand it is a social ascription of dignity to a person or to her living and dying circumstances, and, on the other hand, it is an existential attitude of the person herself that has an existential impact for her. Different to the social ascription that is based on a third-person perspective, the existential attitude is a first-person existential experience, not simply an ascription to oneself by a first-person perspective. I baptise the first-person existential-experience-type of dignity “the existential dignity” and the third-person-ascription-type of dignity “the conventional dignity”. From this distinction the questions arise: What is the difference between these two types of human dignity and why is it so important? An outline of the history of dignity The word dignity appears explicitly already in works by Cicero (106–43 B.C.).8 Based on the arguments by Plato (429?–347 B.C.), the Stoics, and other former philosophers and political leaders Cicero uses two applications of dignity. The dignity of a person is her status in society that might be a high or a low one. In this sense a person possesses dignity in the case that she is the bearer of dignity; for example a king. The other application of dignity describes the unique characteristics that human beings possess different to all the other living creatures on earth. The dignified person showed her dignity by her personal virtues: wisdom or logos, justice, temperance, and courageousness. It is to mention that in those days the social order on earth was regarded as derived from the divine order, which had to be respected in order to avoid the just divine punishment. For example in the Digest of the Roman Law, it was regarded as a sacrilege, when a free born person sold her freedom. 24 | 25

The ancient societies were concerned with both aspects of dignity: The virtue of person as an inherent characteristics of herself and the social position of a person, although in the translations of ancient works the Latin words “dignitas” and their versions are translated in a way to avoid “dignity”, as position, competence, etc. For example: “habeat nullos gradus dignitatis” means “are not familiar with grades of dignity” or “have no grades of dignity”9, or to be competent as a professional, a medical one or a leader. In the middle ages human dignity was argued for by Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274) and other Christian philosophers. They hold that different to all the other creation, in the human being god is shaped, which provides the human being its special place in the universe: The human being can use her mind and can choose her actions freely. In this sense freedom does not include political freedom, but means freedom of signs. Human dignity is, therefore, an innate feature of human beings and at the same time it demands for their self-responsibility of their actions carried out. Later on, on the basis of the idea of human dignity with the request for freedom, equality, and fraternity of all people the French Revolution occurred. Then, in the political context the concept of “human dignity” became popular in the 19th century formulated by the early socialist who fought for the rights of the new class, the workers in the factories with a poor income. The demand was a material one: better income in order to allow these people to live under worthy conditions for humans (compare Baranzke 2010, 10–24). On the crucial distinction between the “existential dignity” and the “conventional dignity”: the ontological difference For me it is still a surprise that at the same time when the notion of human dignity appeared in the documents of the UN in 1948 and later in the German constitution in 1949 after the 2nd World War, in the scientific – particularly in popular positions or psychology, sociology, analytic philosophy, and others – and the cultural context of literature, music, performance, paintings, etc. – human dignity was said to be over; it is a fiction a fata morgana. The belief in human dignity was declared to be a kind of psychotic sublimation and self-love, and nothing else. In the culture and the various kinds of art there was the cry for giving up even the notion of the existence of music oeuvres, because the popular cultures and arts claimed that oeuvres do have a smell of elitism. For example, in the German literature the so-called postmodern literature became popular together with the slogan: “Nieder mit Goethe!” (Hagestedt 1999). This is simply one example. The sublime in terms of dignity became regarded as a kind of elitism and got a pejorative touch. But this was not all! The intellectuals in the German speaking community felt that they had to fight against it: “Nieder mit Goethe!”, in English: “Down with Goethe!”. Within literature and cultural studies in the German speaking part it is still this attitude that is popular and this kind of intellectuals use repressive means in there scientific and educational field, too, against those who do not belong to their block. The same holds for the other kinds of arts, and for the interpretations of literature, music, and arts. Art became reduced to sociology or

psychology. Sociologically and psychologically speaking: Where in the world can you find or see or touch “human dignity”? From this scientifically based observation they conclude: Human dignity must be a product of phantasy by very naïve people; it is folk belief. And even when you ask a Professor of basic freedoms and rights, what human dignity is, he will give you the answer: What a stupid question! It is an empty notion that does not matter at all (compare Macklin 2003). Against this background my intention is to investigate the problem in order to be able to show that “human dignity” is in fact something that exists and human beings possess. Furthermore, that human dignity cannot become reduced to a conventional notion. If it would be solely a conventional notion it could appear and disappear from time to time depending on the society alive at a particular time. A first argument for the existence of human dignity is that even it may get lost at a particular period of time or at a particular place of the world in time, it never disappears: Human dignity finds its way to become reinforced again, again, and again. Therefore, it makes sense to do all we can to keep human dignity alive. Dr. Michael Karl Platzer stands for a good example of this way. In the following the ontological difference between the existential and the conventional human dignity will be investigated. This will provide us with an ontological bedrock of human dignity that resists against an elimination of it. On the existential dignity and the identity of a person over time At least since the tabula rasa doctrine of the human mind formulated by John Locke (1632–1704) as a trial of a critique of the cogito ergo sum by Rene Descartes (1596–1650) the Anglo-Saxon empiric tradition became the prominent one; followed by the positivists, the neo-positivists, and the analytic philosophy. In this naturalist tradition the human mind is nothing else than an apparatus that receives sense data from an outer source and is a bundle of sense data. The existence of a “self” or an “I” is denied, because it is claimed that these words do not possess a referent, an object these words refer to. The only object we can see is the body of a person and her actions, but nothing else. Therefore, the words “I” and “self” are fictions of the language without an equivalent in reality, mainstream theories of psychology, medicine, and philosophy claim. However, as investigations brought about, up to now neither Descartes’ “self” and “I” as mental entity different to the physical stuff could not become rejected nor his notion of introspection (compare Papst 1993), which is the basis for the experience of human dignity. The introspective abilities allow the human being to have direct and self-evident access to her inner live, no thirdperson could have. The “I” or “self” is ontologically given and is innate. You may say: I am my soul and I have a body. What continues over time is the soul, the “I” with a specific self-reflexive structure and binding to all her inner occurrences over time and guarantees personal identity. The self has the irreversible choice to keep its identity over time or to deny itself. The puzzle of Adam Smith’s (1723 – 1790) poor man’s son is a good example for the self-negation case that was brought about voluntarily chosen. The story is the following: “The poor man’s son, whom heaven in its anger has visited with ambition, when he begins to look around him, admires the condition of the rich. … He sees his superiors carried about in machines, and imagines that in one of these he could travel with less inconveniency. … He thinks if he had attained all these, he would sit still contentedly, and be quiet, enjoying himself in the thought of the happiness and tranquillity of his 26 | 27

situation. He is enchanted with the distant idea of felicity. It appears in his fancy like the life of some superior rank of beings, and, in order to arrive at it, he devotes himself for ever to the pursuit of wealth and greatness. […] … through the whole of his life he pursues the idea of a certain artificial and elegant re pose which he may never arrive at, … if in the extremity of old age he should at last attain to it, … it is then, in the last dregs of life, his body wasted with toil and diseases, his mind galled and ruffled by the memory of a thousand injuries and disappointments … that he begins at last to find that wealth and greatness are mere trinkets of frivolous utility, no more adapted for procuring ease of body or tranquillity of mind, than the tweezer-cases of the lover of toys” (Smith 2001 [1759]), 181).

The existential relevance of the story of the poor man’s son is not only that in the end he becomes somehow unhappy, although he became very rich, but rather that he lost his self-esteem, his identity, his soul or his self. He could manage to come up to live financially in very good circumstances; not to say here dignified or worthy social circumstances.10 Against this background we might wonder why contemporary popular mainstream scientific theories in humanities and moral theories are based on naturalist assumptions that deny personal identity and claim that what matters is survival over time; probably in the way the poor man’s son did. One of the advocators of such a naturalist account of human beings is the Oxford Professor of Philosophy Derek Parfit. In his work “Reasons and Persons” (1984) he demonstrates with the help of the thought experiment “teletransportation” that identity of a person over time does not matter. The story is the following: Imagine that you enter a beamer that makes a screening of all your data: the body, the mind, the soul. Then all your data will be beamed to a beamer station on the Mars. There, all your data will be recollected. At the same time, all the data on Earth will be deleted. Now the question is: Are you still the same person you were on Earth? And now, suppose the luxury version of this story: Everything runs the same way as in the simple version until to that point, where your earthy version will become deleted. In the luxury version your earthy original will not become deleted: You became doubled. This would be an advantage, because, for example, as Parfit argues, in the future you could nicely stay at home with your family and your doubled you could carry out your business by giving papers, attending conferences and travel around the word or have fun wherever you want (compare Papst 1993). Parfit also formulated arguments according to which the “lowering [of] the quality of life might be worse for no one”, and furthermore that “[A]s a community, we must choose whether to deplete or conserve certain kinds of resources”, because it becomes effective not for us, but for future generations who do depend on our social decisions (Parfit 1984, 361). What do these stories, Smith’s poor man’s son and Parfit’s teletransportation thought experiment, have to do with human dignity? On the conventional dignity Conventional human dignity is that kind of dignity communities or society ascribe to circumstances of living or of human existence. Therefore, these circumstances primarily refer to material aspects, such as monthly income, housing, nourishing, health care, education, and so forth. The absence or the lack of these material goods – public or private ones – designates a poor living

standard that is regarded as unworthy or undignified. It is the economic sphere of communities, societies and nations to which it is referred to when the phrase human dignity appears in legal documents.11 The only exception is the dead penalty case. Politically speaking: The problem of the socialist programme, although it is very important, is that it accepts and promotes only the conventional dignity and does not recognize its fallacy in which it is enclosed. It is similar to Smith’s poor man’s son. Whereas the poor man’s son is the single case the socialist programme is the collectivist case, therefore, it might even be worst. On the relevance of conventional dignity and existential dignity vice versa In a nutshell: Smith’s poor man’s son lacks existential dignity, although he was able to bring it about to live under worthy circumstances! Without going into detail here, the difference between the both types of dignity is an ontological one (compare Papst 1993b). Personhood in the classical sense matters and identity of a person over time matters, and Parfit fails completely (compare Papst 1993a). From this it does not follow, the living circumstances are irrelevant, whether they be good or bad ones. It simply is the case that they are not deterministic and cannot determine in the end human dignity or personhood. Within economics, for example, the economist Manfred Max-Neef – who was the winner of the Alternative Nobel Prize in economics in 1983 – takes care of the identity of a person in his framework of human development: the human scale development.12 The consequence for the existential dignity: It might be object of being touched or offended As formulated in the German Grundgesetz, Art. 1, human dignity is untouchable. This includes the option that it might be touched. The political and legal focus for the protection of human dignity in terms of human freedoms and rights seems not to respect or even address existential dignity that is a personal one. The most serious case it that of victims of crimes of the various kinds: scientific crime, corruption etc., which needs further investigations. Conclusion It is human dignity that is existentially crucial to each individual human being – for former, present, and future generations, independent of good or bad or even the worst case material circumstances of life. To concentrate the focus only on the conventional-type-dignity might the society as a collective let run into a fallacy: The fallacy of self-destruction by self-negation. This should not happen! 1 Josephine Papst, Mag.Dr.phil., is Philosopher; Philosophy of Science, Philosophy of Law; Research projects at LMU in Munich,

CUNY – New York, London School of Economics, University Complutense – Madrid, Sorbonne – Paris; and others. Director

of the scientific society indexicals – Centrum for Philosophy, Theory of Science, and Philosophy of Art, Vienna and Graz.

http://www.indexicals.ac.at. 2 The text in German: “(1) Die Würde des Menschen ist unantastbar. Sie zu achten und zu schützen ist Verpflichtung aller staatlichen Gewalt.“ 3 The concepts human being and person are not equivalent, although they have a somehow overlapping scope. 4 There can be found a very carefully worked out comparative study of the notion of human dignity in the German Constitution

and the American Constitution (Lehnig 2003).

5 It is to say that – like in various constitutions, independent of the fact that the notion of human dignity is referred to or not –

there can be found the reference to God, what cannot be discussed here, but is of high relevance in order to understand the

intentions of the laws that protect the human beings (compare Irish Constitution 1937, Preamble). 28 | 29

6 In English “to be dignified” has nearly the same meaning as “to be worthy”, although “to be dignified” seems to be the more

sophisticated version. It is a difference in style. In German “würdig sein” und “wertvoll sein” has a different meaning, although

they might overlap. For example. In German we could not say: “Oh Herr, ich bin nicht wertvoll, dass du eingehst unter mein Dach.”

In German “würdig” belongs to persons and cirumstances in an abstract sense, such as “a dignified ceremony“,“a dignified

attitude“, or “a dignified behaviour“, whereas “wertvoll” are things, but also persons, comments etc.

7 Mt 8:8; Lk 7:6. In German: “Herr, ich bin nicht würdig, dass du eingehst unter mein Dach.“ 8 Compare Ciceros definition of “dignitas” (Cicero, De invention II, 166). 9 Compare for example: “habeat nullos gradus dignitatis (Cicero, De re publica, I [XXVIl)”; in German in my version “kennen

keine Grade der Würde” oder “kennen keine Rangordnung”, or to be competent in a profession, a medical one, or as a leader.

10 Compare also the interpretation of the poor man’s son by the economist A. Sen 1977, 1987, 2002a, 2002b [1985]) 11 Human dignity is mentioned four times in the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals(A/RES/70/1); namely p. 2

(people shall “fulfill their potential in dignity”), p. 3 (Declaration, Introduction, 4, “that the dignity of human person”), p. 4

(Our vision, 8, “universal respect for human rights an human dignity”), and finally p. 5 (Our world today, 14, “Billions of our

citizens continue to live in poverty and are denied a life of dignity.”) This is all that can be found in this document.

12 Manfred Max Neef, Human scale development: conception, application and further reflections, with a contribution by Antonio

Elizalde and Martin Hopenhayn (New York and London: The Apex Press, 1991), especially 32f. Compare also the symposium 2005,

Manfred Max-Neef, “The negation of identity as a condition for neo-classical economics”. (Forthcoming.)

http://www.indexicals.ac.at/programmevienna05.html

Dr. Michael Platzer. Advisor to ICCPPC, member of the

“Soziale Gerichtshilfe” Christian Kuhn1

Introduction One of the main outcomes from the UN Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20) in 2012 was international agreement to negotiate a new set of global Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) to guide the path of sustainable development in the world after 2015. The Rio+20 Outcome Document “The Future We Want” (A/RES/66/2882 para. 247) indicates that the goals are intended to be “action-oriented, concise and easy to communicate, limited in number, aspirational, global in nature and universally applicable to all countries, while taking into account different national realities, capacities and levels of development and respecting national policies and priorities.” They should be “focused on priority areas for the achievement of sustainable development.” The Secretary General’s synthesis report of December 2014 powerfully reinforces the message of universality, stating “universality implies that all countries will need to change, each with its own approach, but each with a sense of the global common good.”3 My friend and colleague Dr. Michael Platzer is a living example of somebody who has committed himself to the promotion of these goals, especially with a view to promoting human rights, to promoting peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels (goal 16), to ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote life-long learning opportunities for all (goal 4), and to achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls (goal 5). After the UN Michael Platzer, during his UN retirement continued to work, on a voluntary basis, but with fulltime-commitment, with NGOs and organizations for the assistance of prisoners and released persons, he is fighting all forms of femicide at different levels, he is personally accompanying people released from prison, helping them when they are searching for job and shelter, he is chairing the Vienna Alliance of NGOs on crime prevention and criminal justice, and… and… I have started to work with Dr Michael Platzer in the 1990s when he was a senior officer at the then Division for Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, and I was occasionally working, beside my fulltime job as Catholic prison chaplain in Vienna, as consultant with the UN. 30 | 31

Michael Platzer was in charge to organize and supervise missions to Bosnia with a view to assisting the country in the re-establishment of a functioning criminal justice system. Together with a colleague from the United Kingdom, Mr Jack Holland, I was travelling twice to Bosnia, visiting the prisons there and elaborating recommendations. Michael was a competent, empathic and effective supervisor and, for the first time, I also discovered his sense of humour. Prison work in Vienna and elsewhere Soon after his retirement at the UN, he came to see me in my office in the central prison of Vienna and offered assistance as a volunteer in the field of prison pastoral care. He started to meet a group of English-speakers prisoners in the Vienna central prison Josefstadt (where among the approximately 1200 inmates more than half of them are foreigners, and many among them, often Africans, are English speaking) and offered to them the presentation of a movie in English language, following discussion with the group. Michael came regularly every week over several years, and – when he was unable to come – his son Nicholas replaced him for that purpose. In 2003, I was elected President of the International Commission for Catholic Prison Pastoral Care (ICCPPC, www.iccppc.org ) at the ICCPPC world Congress in Dublin, a function which I had for two terms until 2011 (world Congress in Cameroon). ICCPPC which represents, with its 100 member States, the Catholic prison ministry worldwide, is an NGO in consultative status with the UN and committed to promote human rights for prisoners. Michael immediately started to assist, consult and support, with its large experience as a former senior UN-officer, the work of ICCPPC. He was aware that prison chaplains can and shall play a role in the efforts to implement international human rights standards in prisons. Prison chaplains usually have access to all parts of a prison, have the possibility to speak with all inmates and the staff, and try to maintain trustful relationship also with the prison administration. All this puts them into a crucial and central position with a large inside in prison life. Of course, prison chaplains have to respect confidentiality with regard to the inmates, they have to respect their duty of secrecy, but – at the same time – they feel committed to fight against abuse of power and to struggle to preserve human rights. It is a permanent challenge for the chaplains to find the right balance between these two duties. Especially in cases where chaplains become witness of torture, it needs great wisdom, strategic acting and a good network in order to successfully find a way to help protecting prisoners. Handbooks and other advisory service This was largely discussed at the ICCPPC world Congress in Rome (2007) which was attended by Michael Platzer. At that Congress, several prison chaplains from African and Latin American countries reported on facts of torture of which they got knowledge in the prisons where they were working. Prof Manfred Nowak, former UN Special Rapporteur on Torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, was a keynote speaker at the Congress. Immediately after the Congress, ICCPPC started to elaborate a handbook which was then issued under the title: “A Guide for Chaplains Confronted with Torture” (http://iccppc.org/pdf/torture_ in_prisons.pdf). Michael was, from the beginning, involved in the elaboration of that handbook which was drafted with the help of experts from different continents. The handbook was prepared to serve as a guide for chaplains and prison pastoral workers to prevent and combat torture

and other inhuman treatment. It offers several strategies how prison chaplains can and should act when they witness cases of torture. The Church and its representatives are bound to act against torture because promoting the dignity of human life is part of the gospel. Furthermore, a passive attitude towards acts of torture could be well interpreted as acquiescence and over time such an attitude legitimises human rights violations as socially acceptable. The handbook offers analysis on who practises torture, why and when does torture take place in prison, where in prison are the tortured prisoners more likely to be found, and: what is to do. Among these principles on the right acting are chapters on networking, on the principle of subsidiarity, on acting in accordance with legal principles – and it provides different practical guidelines. One prominent example for Michaels commitment in this field is his friendship and cooperation with Rev. Günther Zgubic, Catholic prison chaplain in Sao Paulo, Brazil, and for many years the head of the Brazilian Catholic Ministry in Brazil. Günther Zgubic, an Austrian priest who was working 20 years in Brazil, became one of the most known and respected human rights activists in Brazil, receiving also international awards for his commitment. He brought cases of torture, on which he got knowledge, to justice, provided that he had the approval of the respective inmate to do so. Günther took personal risks in his actions but did not stop his commitment. Michael always was a reliable and important supporter of these activities. Michael Platzer became one of the most important advisors for ICCPPC with regard to its activities at the UN, always with full respect towards the autonomy of the organization. He helped in the preparation of so many ancillary meetings, organized by ICCPPC. On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the adoption of the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners in 2005, Michael organized the production of a movie “Making standards work”, which was dedicated to the late Ahmed Othmani, former chairman of Penal Reform International, an internationally recognised human rights activist who tragically died in a traffic accident. This movie was presented at the Eleventh United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (Bangkok, April 2005). ICCPPC has sponsored the reproduction of 2000 copies of the CD “Making standards work” which were distributed among the participants of the Congress. ICCPPC was privileged to take advantage of Michael’s passion and skill for movies also on other occasions, e.g. with regard to a movie on the ICCPPC art contests. ICCPPC has organized two worldwide art contests for prisoners. With the help of the local prison chaplains in the respective countries, ICCPPC invited inmates to provide drawings and paintings for these two art contests (in 2005 and 2009) on the themes: “Discover the Face of Life”, and “Signs of Life”. More than 3000 prisoners from 60 countries in all five continents took part. An international jury of art experts had to decide on 100 winners at each contest, the winners received certificates and money prizes. Michael was a passionate supporter of that project, he helped to organize an exhibition of selected paintings at the premises of the UN in Vienna which was opened by the Director - General and visited by the then Austrian Minister of Justice (later, international exhibitions took place in many countries. e.g. Scotland (U.K.), Germany, Hungary, Italy, France, Sweden, Ukraine, Cameroon, Brazil: at the UN Crime Congress in Salvador de Bahia in 2010, 32 | 33

the Czech Republic and several others). A major contribution to the dissemination of the paintings was the movie produced by Michael. Michael’s personal experience in the work with prisoners in the central prison of Vienna even more sensitized him for the issue of foreign prisoners. He encouraged ICCPPC to issue a handbook on “UN and EU Recommendations for the Treatment of Foreigners in Prison” which was elaborated together with the University of Tilburg, Netherlands. It contains a practical summary of the UN recommendations (as approved at the Seventh UN Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders in Milan, 1985), together with the Model Agreement on the Transfer of Foreign Prisoners, - as well as the EU recommendations following a two year study of best practises in 25 European countries. A major project, with Michael Platzer’s strong cooperation and support from the very early stage, was the idea to produce a handbook on “Religion in Prison”. This project was initiated by ICCPPC, but – from the beginning – representatives from other religious denominations were invited to participate in the project. Finally, it was elaborated in cooperation with pastoral workers from the Buddhist, Hindu, Jewish, Muslim, Eastern Orthodox, Protestant, Christian and Roman Catholic faiths. It was reviewed by prison managers and contributions were received from the UN Special Rapporteur on the Freedom of Religion or Belief and two members of the European Committee for Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. It was revised during the Twelfth United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice. Suggestions were received from the Governments of Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Fiji, Italy and Uganda. The handbook “Religion in Prison” compiles the basic principles on religious freedom and assistance in prisons, as contained in the international documents. It is available today in seven languages and has served and still serves as an important tool for prison pastoral work. Forewords were provided by eminent persons, among them His Eminence Metropolitan Hilarion, Chairman of the Department for External Church Relations, Moscow Patriarchate, His Eminence Cardinal Christoph Schönborn, Archbishop of Vienna, Mme Kiran Bedi, former Director of Indian Prison Service and Police Advisor to the United Nations, Mr. Tony Cameron (Scotland, U.K.), President of the International Corrections and Prisons Association, and Senior Prosecutor Mrs. Karin Dotter-Schiller (Austria). Five hundred copies of the handbook, which is also available in Russian translation, was given, upon request, to the Russian Orthodox Church, hundred copies were allocated, upon request, to representatives from Egypt (it was the ICCPPC representative for the Middle East, Rev. Elie Nasr from Lebanon, who has provided the Arabic translation). Michael Platzer is also active as a member of the “Soziale Gerichtshilfe”. This Austrian organization invites members of the civil society, after training and introduction to that task, to take a responsibility for one or even some more inmates, paying visit to him or her on a regular basis, and offer, with regular exchange and evaluation in the group of the around 40 members, accompaniment. I recall several examples of prisoners and ex-prisoners, some of them with a traumatic past as refugees, who had the chance to find a human and patient companion in the person of Michael Platzer.

Conclusion In conclusion, these are just a few examples of important projects and activities, all of them “action-oriented, concise and aspirational” (Rio+20), aiming at the preservation of human dignity and human rights, which owe so much to Michael Platzer’s inspiration, assistance and continuous and reliable support. I take this opportunity to thank Michael for his commitment, particularly for his friendship, and I congratulate him to his 70th birthday. 1 International Commission of Catholic Prison Pastoral Care, member of the Board, Ministry of Justice (Vienna, Austria):

F. Chair of the NG0 Alliance of the United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Programme (Vienna).

2 This is the title of the Outcome Document of the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (2012), otherwise

called the “Rio+20 resolution”. The first United Nations Conference on Environment and Development was held 20 years

earlier (Rio de Janeiro, 3-14 June 1992).

3 A/69/700, The Road to Dignity by 2030: Ending poverty, transforming all lives and protecting the planet. Synthesis Report

of the Secretary-General on the Post-2015 Agenda, 14 December 2014, para 48.

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Embedded in the past, yet embracing the future?: Fragile states, transnational crime, and the new 2030 Development Agenda Jean-Luc Lemahieu1

Introduction One of the many joys I have had since first meeting Michael years back on Bajan (Barbadian) shores has been the long hours of debate on topics that have been as diverse as Michael’s human interests – and that, really, is huge. No doubt the essay that follows, a first outline on the “functionality of crime,” is to undergo the same fate – with Michael certainly taking the side of the vulnerable and unprivileged. We are a tipping point, between the old which is fading and the new that is not yet born “What we face today is a set of transnational ideological and structural forces that can play havoc with the social order in even middle incomes states and create crises that spill across borders and affect regional and global security” (Goldstone et al. 2014). Prior to the 1980s transnational organized crime and terrorism, viewed through prism of the Cold War, were seen as proxies serving political agendas in an essentially bipolar world. The fall of the Berlin Wall in late 1989 sparked not only the transformation of institutions, governments, and economies but also global crime. Organized crime started using terrorism as a means to further institutional gains, and terrorist groups ventured into crime to replace the state sponsorship of the past, blurring the lines of modus operandi between the two previously distinct groups (Makarenko 2004; Masden 2009, 66). The demise of a regulatory system wherein rival superpowers were able to coach their allies and client states, moved the security concept away from territorial protection toward new external threats influenced by globalization, technical developments, and ongoing economic integration. Security interests are no longer longer bound by territorial threats but instead have extended their scope to cybercrime, transnational terrorism, migration flows, and human trafficking, with fragile or complex countries characterized by weakened states, often miles away, becoming targets of transboundary criminal operations.

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With politics apparently out of the equation, academics such as Herschel Grossman (1999, 267-283) and Paul Collier (Collier and Hoeffler 2004, 563-595) postulated that greed became a major motivation behind rebellion and insurgency, defining these latter as resource wars. In this concept, economic competition for access to commodities between state and non-state actors was at the core of conflict. In this model, insurgents such as the FARC in Colombia were seen as separate from their ideological motives and in the case of the FARC, demoted to a mere narco-cartel with the same profit intent as any other criminal group. The response to this greed model was to focus on actions against money laundering in the belief that if profits were to be taken away, crime/conflict was subsequently without aim or purpose. However, the implementation of the latter proved more challenging than was advocated. Crime as a political actor Today, with a detour, crime has resurfaced as a political actor. While globalization plays an increasing part in the lives of ordinary people, the nation-state has “less and less control over flows of information, technology, diseases, migrants, arms, and financial transactions, whether licit or illicit, across their borders” (CIA 2015; Varese 2012). As Karen Ballentine (Ballentine and Nitzschke 2005, 2) argues, weakly regulated globalization and the existence of weak states facilitate the collusion between insurgents and terrorists, criminal networks, and unscrupulous corporate entities. Transnational crime in this theory is no longer purely a means for achieving economic ends but has become an active player in the political economy – a virus embedding itself in a weak immunity system of failing governance and impunity, while further wearing down any resistance (UNODC 2014). Crime groups of economic significance obtain and seek legitimacy as a distributor of commodities (resource loyalty), basic services and protection, or even by offering a sense of uniqueness to youth (identity loyalty) as in the case of Central American gangs, which are effectively competing with the legitimate authorities (UNODC 2014). Alan Whaites (2015) is even more explicit, proposing that classic political violence has been surpassed by non-state violence, either criminal or extremist, “with a common process of undermining and displacing the nominally dominant (formal) “model” of governance.” This does not imply that traditional state actors have no role to play; they do – and significantly so, despite their diminishing impact in this global world. In a positive sense, the current challenges can prompt national authorities to regain their legitimacy by doing better, rolling out services and engaging in a dialogue2 with those who felt excluded. It also obliges them to actively become part of regional and international (support) networks. Yet the scenario is not always this benign. State actors can also steer towards active or passive collusion with crime on the basis that if you can’t beat them, you’d better join them, or to construe the latter more simply, form a mutually favourable partnership with one or more criminal groups. In some cases, this takes place just to avoid the harmful consequences of crime, such as excessive violence. The benefit for the crime group is to acquire impunity and monopoly positions at a relative low competitive cost. The political elite in turn can maintain or regain their position of influence, eventually expanding their patronage networks with the new returns and remain on top of a political economy. In extreme cases the government itself becomes an extension of criminal gangs.3

While such collusion existed in the past, the scale, incentive system, and the geographic scope of the current criminal challenge are unprecedented. In 2009 the value of illicit trade around the globe was estimated at US$1.3 trillion and is increasing (UNGA 2012). The destabilizing effect of this on development aid and governance has been since recognized. The African Development Bank estimates that it takes about 12 to 33 years on average for fragile states to return to their potential GDP level had these countries not experienced fragility and conflict (Ncube et al. 2014, 38). The 2005 World Summit Outcome Document expresses: “grave concern at the negative effects on development, peace and security and human rights posed by transnational crime, including the smuggling of and trafficking in human beings, the world narcotic drug problem and the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons” (UNGA 2005). Much of the discussion surrounding the new 2030 Development Agenda is based on the recognition that conflict and insecurity act as obstacles to sustainable development (High Level Panel 2013). Hence the inclusion of Sustainable Development Goal 16, to “Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels”..4 Crime as a strategy for governance? It is to be noted that this negative link between crime and development is not an unqualified postulate. James Cockayne (2011) for instance suggests treating organized crime as a strategy of governance and differentiates among different strategies: predatory, parasitic, and symbiotic. One step further is to accept that crime might have functional benefits at least in a transitional phase of state and institution building, as a provider of primitive state functions at a time when legitimate alternatives and/or resistance are obsolete or fragile. This also assumes that crime can be valued without its excesses of confrontation, violence, and conflict. This functional view on crime apparently contradicts the principles of the 2030 Agenda. For instance, the Report of the High Level Panel of Eminent Persons recommended to “stem the external stressors that lead to conflict, including those related to organised crime” (High Level Panel 2013). Yet both the goals and targets of the new Development Agenda are in essence aspirational, even if 2030 is indicated as the target date.5 Hence, while the final objective remains a peaceful and inclusive society resulting in sustainable development, a transitional phase of modus vivendi with crime groups is not excluded, at least theoretically. Could peacefulness thus eventually be achieved through a Pax Mafiosa? A temporary pact of tranquillity between crime and state actors could arguably create an opportunity to concentrate on areas where illicit sectors pose the most significant risks to development and governance outcomes while reducing risks and improving outcomes by strengthening the licit sector. This presumes somewhat ironically but not inconceivably in specific contexts, that the crime actors are now implicitly engaged with state actors in a simultaneous effort to improve development outcomes in the licit sector and, eventually more challenging, to “disincentivize the illicit sector – by increasing the cost of doing illegal business, preventing crime and offering more opportunities for vulnerable populations within the rule of law,” as the Report of the High Level Panel of Eminent Persons (2013) prescribes.

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2030 Development Agenda and organized crime Notwithstanding this broad interpretation of the 2030 Development Agenda, the aspirational end goal would not allow a modus vivendi with organized crime anything else than of transitory or temporary nature. Certainly the argument can be made that crime is a societal phenomenon inherent to our community life, but it is equally obvious that those strains of organized crime threatening the fundaments of political institutions, peaceful and inclusive societies, and sustainable economic growth, have no place in the 2030 Agenda. The new Development Agenda fits ill with the concept that it is the role of the government to end harm caused by crime, such as excessive violence, not as a means but as an end goal. It is true that the mano dura approach in Mexico, resulting in gang warfare and resulting in over 35,000 deaths, contrasts poorly to the 2012 delicate gang truce in El Salvador, which slashed homicide rates by about half. Yet the El Salvador truce ended in renewed bloodshed only two years later (Gurney 2015). Indeed, crime truces prove very volatile, as Mexico earlier experienced with its own breakdown of a narco-peace in 1985 resulting in the current turmoil. Worse, a decade of Pax Mafiosa allowed the further erosion of the political institutions and of the rule of law, finally resulting in structural impunity and corruption. In the Mexican case, the peaceful coexistence with narco-crime resulted in exact the opposite of what the 2030 Development Agenda stands for. The government has since taken corrective measures and is still in the process of adjusting these. On functionalism of crime This discussion on functionalism of crime is reminiscent of the French sociologist Durkheim’s (1895) proposition that crime plays “a useful role in the societal evolution,” although Durkheim would not then have envisaged the contemporary context of globalization and inter-dependency. Besides, Durkheim also admitted that crime becomes dysfunctional when the crime rate is unusually high (or low). More relevant to this paper is the similarity to an earlier debate among scholars on the functionality of corruption. Among others, Samuel Huntington (1968) saw corruption as an inevitable (and thus acceptable) aspect of developing countries, or societies in transition. Puritanism within anticorruption was in this context viewed as less than helpful and even counterproductive. Corruption might eventually alleviate some of the early pains of modernizing economies, such as capital formation or administrative inflexibility (Montinola and Jackman 2002, 150). In this concept of pragmatism, when countries reach a certain level of economic development, corrupt practices will wane. Research of a more recent date, based on increasing cross-country data, previously not available to the same degree, contradict this functionalism demonstrating instead that corruption does lower investment thereby reducing economic growth (Ibid.). Sarah Cayes (2014, 1) goes a step further directly linking corruption to conflict and instability, stating that: “acute corruption should be understood not as a failure or distortion of government but as a functioning system in which ruling networks use selected levers of power to capture specific revenue streams. This effort

often overshadows activities connected with running a state. Such systematic corruption evokes indignation in populations, making it a factor in social unrest and insurgency. It contributes to other international security threats, such as symbiotic relationships between states and transnational organized crime networks, facilitation for terrorist organizations, permeable international security regimes, and acute economic disruptions. Corruption does not fuel these threats alone. It combines with other risk factors, such as ethnic, religious, or linguistic rifts in a population or severe economic disparities, to increase the likelihood of a security challenge.”

The discussion centres on the dilemma between pragmatism and puritanism. Puritanism implies that any illicit act would prompt strict application of the rule of law. This ideal is in many settings ultimately not feasible in the absence of rule of law and eventually not even desirable, as prompt action runs the risk of affecting security and stability in already fragile situations. Much will depend on the local resilience existing to deal with crime. Accepting that pragmatism is oftentimes the only choice available, the principle of respecting national ownership and the principle of noninterference suggests that corrective measures undertaken by the national actors themselves are the preferred method for facilitating the transition from illicit to licit. Situations, however, do occur when outside help is invited. Guatemala is such an example, with the International Commission against Impunity (CICIG) being established in response to a request for assistance from the government. Acting as an independent international body, the CICIG aims to investigate illegal security groups and clandestine security organizations in Guatemala – criminal groups believed to have infiltrated state institutions, fostering impunity and undermining democratic gains in Guatemala since the end of the country’s armed conflict in the 1990s. It represents an innovative initiative by the United Nations, together with a member state, to strengthen the rule of law in a post-conflict country A complex reality challenging principles Nevertheless, as any aid or security practitioner in the field will bear witness to, the local playing field can be extremely complex transcending local solutions and the CICIG model is not common practice. The reality is that most countries find themselves in delicate situations of vulnerability and fragility at different stages of their existence. Closer to home, it can be argued that Germany, Japan, and most of Western Europe that was destroyed or economically struggling after WWII, benefited from strong “black” or illicit economies serving as a transitional coping mechanism and finally resulting in legitimate and functional systems. Bruce Jones and Ben Tortolani (2013, 2) inform that fragility takes several forms: states with weak institutions, divided states, authoritarian security states, and post-conflict states, while recognizing that these are not mutually exclusive categories. Stergios Skaperdas (2001, 173) argues that: organized crime emerges out of the power vacuum that is created by the absence of state enforcement, and which can have many sources: geographic, social, and ethnic distance, prohibition, or simply collapse of state institutions. Mafias and gangs are hierarchically organized and can be thought of as providing primitive state functions, with economic costs that are typically much higher than those associated with modern governance. Though organized crime cannot be completely eradicated, its control is necessary, since it can easily corrupt existing institutions of governance. 40 | 41

Fragile states stand in contrast with those benefiting from well-functioning political institutions. For instance, Belgium and the Netherlands witness relatively low levels of violent crime and related harm, despite being major entry points for Latin American cocaine (Paoli and Greenfield 2015). If a symbiotic relationship between state and transnational crime exists in this context, it is due to an effective rule of law that suppresses the negative effects of organized crime. Open warfare between competing gangs, a sign of disorganization and even chaos, is disavowed by immediate and effective action. As Vanda Fellab-Brown (Caldéron and Fellab-Brown 2012) provocatively argues, “law enforcement needs to make good criminals out of bad ones.” The open standing question is how to define and grade, if at all feasible, functional crime, especially in the fragile or complex countries that will benefit most of the 2030 Development Agenda. How to embrace a future of peaceful and inclusive sustainable development while being embedded in a past and present where organized crime plays a significant and even dominant societal role.6 Emerging research suggests that actors (non-state, state, criminals, gangs, armed groups, terrorists, etc.) do matter as much as the criminal strategy they apply to suit specific contextual needs at changing points in time (de Boer and Bosetti 2015, 10). Accepting thus that organized crime itself is a fluid and often hybrid phenomenon, what criteria or benchmarks do we currently have available to define an incentive structure prodding robber barons towards change and pushing criminal strategies in a helpful direction? There need to be positive incentives towards a transformation that will enable the growth of an equitable and inclusive governance system based on the rule of law. This is to be alternated with negative incentives where the strong arm of the law is to be felt – assuming that such a strong arm is available within a country or part of a country, and that the political will exists to enforce the rule of law. Lessons learned Studying Afghanistan and Myanmar do provide two opposite lessons learned. The toppling of the Afghan Taleban brought the old in-fighting class of militia leaders back to Kabul. New institutions had to be built from near scratch but eventually the most important directive for the outside coalition was preventing Afghanistan from remaining a safe haven for terrorists. The end-result was a Pax Militia described by current President Ashraf Ghani in 2009 as follows: “Poor governance, underpinning all these problems, is now so entrenched that many organs of the government are seen as instruments of corruption, not of legitimacy and the rule of law.” The former Commander of the International Security Assistance Force and U.S. Forces Afghanistan (USFOR-A), Gen. John R. Allen stated in 2014: “the great challenge to Afghanistan’s future isn’t the Taliban, or the Pakistani safe havens, or even an incipiently hostile Pakistan. The existential threat to the long term viability of modern Afghanistan is corruption. Indeed, … the ideological insurgency, the criminal patronage networks, and the drug enterprise have formed an unholy alliance, which relies for its success on the criminal capture of your government functions at all levels. For too long, we’ve focused our attention on the Taliban as the existential threat to Afghanistan. They are an annoyance compared to the scope and magnitude of corruption with which you must contend.” Myanmar is a second illustration of a country which mobilized warlords and militia, largely funded by an illicit economy, to further goals of peace and state building. It achieved very different

outcomes compared to Afghanistan. Although still an ongoing process marred by intermittent upheaval, sporadic bloodshed, and shifting alliances, the Pax Militia within Myanmar was always a means to an end – keeping a fragmented Myanmar with its about 135 ethnic groups unified. Despite the rhetoric to the contrary, Afghanistan’s political leadership, equally multi-ethnically fragmented, did not share the same political vision of a strong unified state or, at least, was never able to turn words in deeds. Figuratively speaking, providing impunity in Myanmar was a government decision taken by Yangon, whereas impunity in Afghanistan demonstrated the weakness of the government in Kabul. In the case of state building of Afghanistan and accepting that this is still work in progress, the process, in Ghani’s words, did not weaken informal actors but actually strengthened them. Accepting that state building in Myamnar has not fully matured, the process has led to very different outcomes than was the case for Afghanistan. It is, however, true that the situation in Afghanistan was more trying than in Myanmar. For instance, the Afghan situation is an illustration of a third party inviting actors of crime to pursue a valid objective of improved homeland security, for instance, by chasing Osama bin Laden up and over the Tora Bora mountain range. After 9/11, Afghan institution or state building were not the primary goal, US homeland security was. When Afghan governance finally became an issue of interest to the international coalition, well-intended assumptions were to prove incorrect. For instance, the creation of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams, providing both security and development aid within the majority of the Afghan provinces, abetted the historic fragmentation of the periphery away from Kabul (see also de Boer and Bosetti 2015, 12). Myanmar never had the problem of gigantic aid flows entering the country and creating parallel structures next to a nascent government. In turn it is true that Myanmar also witnessed proxy fighting and armies operating from its territory destabilizing the country. But since the Cold War came to an end, Myanmar’s neighbours have generally favored stability across its borders. The same cannot be said about Afghanistan, with several of today’s international political break-lines crossing its territory. In conclusion political will has not been the only factor in explaining different outcomes. Camino Kavanagh (2013) writes to this regard, “The literature rarely focuses on the interaction of political and economic elites and organized criminal groups, and how this interaction serves to undermine, reinforce or replace political institutions and processes. Underlying structural factors receive scant attention, with both observers and practitioners falling back on the facile “lack of political will” argument to describe government failures to effectively respond to organized crime.” Conclusion The first recommendation of this article is that during the planning phase of any substantial development aid or security support, or a combination of both, an assessment study is to be undertaken on the underlying structural factors in the particular area – mapping the political economy and its incentive system in order to appreciate the loyalties, impediments, and push factors towards the reform anticipated by the support provided. Based on this and a continued updating of the mapping in a fluid context, mutually agreed conditionality (or to use a more 42 | 43

positive term, benchmarking) and pressure points (such as sanction listing of individuals) are to be negotiated with the national and local authorities to ensure that if not all, then most of the aid arrives where the needs are, and increasingly so over the time of the intervention, with a clear articulation of the endgame. A second recommendation is to end the schizophrenic Cartesian method of splitting licit and illicit economic realities, as if the latter functions independently of the former. The international financial institutes and finance ministries continue issuing statistics, forecasts, and planning, that negate a large chunk of economic reality, namely, the illicit economy, as if the criminal economies in Afghanistan, the DR of Congo or Guinea-Bissau have no bearing on macroeconomic variables such as the trade balance, currency fluctuations, investment, employment, or even land ownership. Coping mechanisms and incentives are found in both the formal and illicit economies – for the local economies the difference is often trivial. The objective of the 2030 Development Agenda is to gradually further the licit economy to the detriment of the illicit one. Segregating, neglecting, or denying the existence of the latter is of no help and is actually counterproductive. Allow me to conclude by quoting Kavanagh (2013): “if left unchecked, organized crime, even at a small scale, can produce long-term negative impacts, particularly in development settings where institutions remain weak and democratic processes are still consolidating.” The High Level Panel of Eminent Persons, preparing for the new 2030 Development Agenda, had it indeed right. However, the feat is to realistically bridge the gap between aspirational and operational. 1 Director, Division for Public Analysis and Public Affairs, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC, Vienna, Austria);

Regional Representative for Afghanistan and Neighbouring Countries, 2011 – 2013 (Kabul, Afghanistan); Special Advisor to

the UN Special Representative Afghanistan and Representative of Country Office, 2009-2013 (Kabul, Afghanistan). The views

expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations Secretariat in which the author is employed.

2 “Services should be understood not simply as a good to be delivered, but as a channel of interaction between citizens and the

state,” based on survey date collected by the Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium (Gordon and Mazurana (2015)). Alan

Whaites talks about “emotive appeals, even only in the form of a sense of loyalty or belonging” (Whaites 2015).

3 Ashraf Ghani, current President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, warned in 2009 that “Poor governance, underpinning

all these problems, is now so entrenched that many organs of the government are seen as instruments of corruption, not of

legitimacy and the rule of law” (Ghani 2009).

4 Open Working Group proposal for Sustainable Development Goals, UN General Assembly, A/67/L.48/Rev.1, of 14 January 2013 states that :“People are at the centre of sustainable development and, in this regard, in the outcome document, the

promise was made to strive for a world that is just, equitable and inclusive.”

5 See also the final draft of the outcome document for the UN Summit to adopt the Post-2015 Development Agenda, Transforming

our World: The 2030 Agenda for Global Action, 8 July 2015. The aspirational is reflected in the transformative steps as in

“We are determined to take the bold and transformative steps needed to shift the world on to a sustainable path.” (Preamble);

“All people yearn to live in peaceful and harmonious societies, free from fear and violence. We want to foster peaceful, safe

and inclusive societies; to strengthen governance and institutions at all levels; to ensure equal access to justice; and to protect

the human rights of all men, women, boys and girls.”(Peace); “We, the Heads of State and Government of the 193 member

States of the United Nations, meeting in New York from 25-27 September 2015 as the Organization celebrates its seventieth

anniversary, have decided today on new global goals for the sustainable development of humanity and of our planet.” (Introduc-tion

para 1); and “In these goals and targets, we are setting out a supremely ambitious and transformational vision (…)” (Vision, para 7).

6 Analysis of crime trends by considering changes in crime rates in relation to the income level of countries suggests a relation

ship with the high-income countries doing the best, and reports decreasing trends over the last decade for both violent and

property crimes. Report of the Secretary-General: State of crime and criminal justice worldwide. Thirteenth UN Congress

on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (A/CONF. 222/4).

Power politics and welfare thinking in international relations Dr. Wendelin Ettmayer1

Introduction Dr. Michael Platzer was for years the Liaison Officer of the Academic Council on the United Nations and Chair of the Vienna Alliance of Non-Governmental Organizations of the United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Programme. In this capacity and by his other work within the UN, in the field of human rights, technical cooperation or peace keeping, Dr. Platzer has represented a new dimension of International Relations: promoting the welfare of the “People” - targeted by the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals 2016-2030. Whereas foreign policy concentrated traditionally on power politics, Michael Platzer and ACUNS demonstrated that serving the People has become an integral part of foreign policy as well. Traditional power politics For thousand years, foreign policy was mostly power politics: great powers wanted to dominate the weaker ones, emerging countries tried to establish a new balance of power, and international relations were characterized by struggles for existence between states. The competition among great powers was the main subject of books dealing with international relations. To cite only a few examples: Wolfgang Windelband published his book about “The Foreign Policy of the Great Powers from 1441-1919“ in 1922 with the following chapters: • the preliminary battles for predominance in Italy (1494-1519); • the fight against the predominance of Spain (1619-1659); • the fight against the predominance of France (1659-1815); • England dominating the world (1815-1919). Paul Kennedy published his best-seller “The Rise and Fall of Great Powers” in 1988 and put the following events at the centre of his theory: • The Habsburg Bid for Mastery (1519-1659); • Finance Geography and the Winning of Wars (1616-1850); • Industrialisation and the Shifting Global Balances (1815-1885); • The Coming of a Bipolar World and the Crisis of the Middle-Powers (1885-1918); (1919-1942); • Stability and Change in a Bipolar World (1943-1980).

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The literature about international relations was dominated by one subject, and that was power politics. Even today, many history books are written the same way. Brendan Simms’s book “Europe – the struggle for supremacy from 1453 to the present,” places the theme of “power” at the middle of his account. The first chapter of the book, entitled “Empires,” begins in 1453. In that year, the conquest of Constantinople brought the collapse of the Byzantine Empire, and the English had to abandon their empire in France. Simms goes on to describe the power politics of Charles V, Louis XIV, Napoleon and many other rulers until today. Ulrich Menzel from the Technische Universität Braunschweig published in 2015 “Die Ordnung der Welt”. Among the predominate states, he distinguishes between empires and hegemons. He sought to demonstrate if a country was a hegemonic power or just an empire. Going back to the SongDynasty in China (960-1204) and Pax Mongolica (1230-1350), he asks if today the United States should be portrayed as a hegemonic power or an empire. That shows that even today foreign policy and history are almost exclusively presented as traditional power politics with traditional goals, traditional means, and traditional players. The traditional goals of foreign policy were to safeguard the sovereignty of the state and to increase the power of the ruler. This was also its basic legitimacy. According to the teachings of Jean Bodin (†1536), the ruler was the sovereign. He was entitled to exert his power in his own discretion, towards his subjects any other individuals and nations as well. The endeavour of the state to become more powerful was an essential element of the theory and the practice of international relations. The traditional means of foreign policy were Realpolitik, Raison d’état, and war. Realpolitik meant the reversal of values in the field of international relations. Behaviour, that in the private realm would be most strongly condemned, and would be the highest honour if it served the power of the state: destroying, killing, plundering and waging war. As the great philosopher Johann Gottlieb-Fichte put it: In dealing with other states there is no law that could hinder any action taken by our sovereign. The one in power is always right. According to this way of thinking, deals among the monarchs were made without taking into consideration the needs of the people. Provinces and countries, like Poland, were divided and even disappeared from the map, according to the decisions of the Great Powers. The soldier and the diplomat acted jointly: after wars followed peace conferences. As soon as one questioned the newly established order, new wars could ensue. An almost permanent series of wars was the consequence, if we only look at the “seven world wars” from the Spanish War of Succession to the Cold War. The traditional players were the monarchs: they considered themselves rulers by the grace of God. They demanded obedience for the sake of their dynasties; their rule quite often was based on censorship and suppression.

Welfare thinking in international relations What does that mean? Even if power politics is still an essential part of today’s international relations, a new dimension has developed, occupying an important place within the relations among nations: policies oriented towards an improvement in the standard of living of the people, increasing their welfare and their well-being; insuring human security and human development. In some regions, like in Europe, those policies have become more important than the traditional endeavour to increase the power of the state. The promotion of the well-being of the people has become an essential part of foreign-policy legitimacy. In this respect, foreign policy is primarily not oriented anymore towards the interest of the state, but towards the well-being of its citizens. This development has become very evident beginning one generation ago: the sudden implosion of the communist system in Eastern Europe in the years 1989-1991 was in large part due to the fact that the standard of living was much higher in the West than in the communist East. The western way of life was much more attractive, especially for the young people: a “cultural revolution” had taken place in the West, not in the East. The revolution in information and technology made it easier not only to communicate with one another, but also to compare the different economic and social systems. This comparison showed very clearly that the communists had no chance. The predictions of the party chairman Khrushchev in the early 1960 that the communist economies would overtake the west, utterly failed. Three examples for welfare thinking in International Relations • The diplomatic revolution in Europe; • The UN System; • Globalization. The diplomatic revolution in Europe During the last two generations, since the founding of the Council of Europe in 1949, a revolution has taken place in European diplomacy, which has led to drastic changes regarding the goals, the means, and the participants in foreign policy among European states. Those changes also had major repercussions concerning the understanding of power and security. As far as the goals are concerned, it is no longer the aim of foreign policy of a European country to increase the power of the state, but to support the welfare of the people. Foreign policy is now oriented towards the citizen, not the state. Connecting people has become a preeminent task of European diplomats. The means of foreign policy are no longer Realpolitik and war. The founding members of the Council of Europe replaced power politics with common values like democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. Those values determine not only the internal structure of European states, but also the relations among themselves. Within the Council of Europe and within the European 46 | 47

Union, confrontation was replaced by cooperation. The fields of cooperation include human rights, as well as the protection of the environment, education and employment policies, economic development, and security questions. Most internal political issues became international issues as well. Traditional security was based on the sovereignty of the state and non-interference from the outside. The UN Charter of 1945 and the Helsinki agreement of 1975 still include those principles. Today, contrary to the principles of power politics, interference in internal affairs takes place concerning the monitoring and implementation of all treaties, regulations, and directives concluded by the members of the Council of Europe and the EU. Welfare thinking has replaced warfare. The logic of war was replaced by the logic of values and well-being. There is no doubt that the EU has to face some grave difficulties concerning, for example, the Euro or migration. The fundamental reason for those difficulties lies certainly in the fact of “divided sovereignty”: the members of the EU abandoned national sovereignty, and the step towards European sovereignty was not taken. Member states gave up their national currency or their border control, but they were not able to create a common economic policy or a common policy for refugees and migrants. In addition, European aspirations quite often do not correspond to reality: CFSP should stand for common foreign and security policy, which in reality does not exist. CFSP never achieved more than a kind of crisis management. But in spite of all those difficulties the EU has opened a new area of international relations, as improving living standards has become more important than traditional power politics. The United Nations system The UN was founded after World War II, but the preliminary work was already done in the early 1940s and heavily influenced by the social and political development in the United States in the decade before: primarily by the New Deal. The UN established new foreign policy goals, which were oriented towards the well-being of the people. The improvement in economic and social conditions, and the promotion of human rights became an essential part of international relations. As Franz Schurmann put it, “the UN should provide security that would protect mankind not only from major wars but also from economic collapse.” Thereby a new area of international relations was established. Economic and social questions like development and human rights became part of foreign power legitimacy. Franz Schurmann: “Security for the world had to be based on American power, exercised through an international system.” For the economic and social areas, a number of institutions were established, including the following: • the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCATD); • UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF); • UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR); • UN Development Programme (UNDP);

• • • •

UN Environment Programme (UNEP); World Food Programme (WFP); UN Found for Population (UNFPA); Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948.

All those new organizations developed a number of activities and organized international conferences on all levels, such as: • World Conference “Education for all” (Jomtien 1990); • World Population Conference (Cairo 1994); • World conference for Social Development (Copenhagen 1995) • UN Habitat Conference (Istanbul 1996); • World Conference against Hunger (Rome 1996); • Millennium-Summit (New York 2000); • Conference on Development Financing (Monterrey 2002); • Conferences concerning the protection of the environment (Rio-Kyoto-Johannesburg). One could discuss at length what these conferences actually achieved. One thing can be said for sure: for many people who were informed about these conferences, from Latin America to Africa, and from Asia to the Pacific, one idea took hold - people were encouraged to be aware of what they are entitled to. People considered the international community to be responsible for their well-being and their fate. A great number of new players support that drive for new goals in foreign policy. There are countless NGOs promoting human rights issues, development aid, or the protection of the environment. Additionally, the media, quite often acting in conjunction with those NGOs and the transnational companies, set their own agenda. In the same way, regional and municipal authorities, traditionally concentrated on internal affairs, now form trans-border coalitions in order to promote their policies. What has been achieved? The promotion of the well-being of the people has become an important part of international relations, equal to the questions of peace and security. The people’s awareness of what they are entitled tois prevalent and affects the internal situation of states and also the international cooperation. People all over expect help from the government and from the international community. Governments and international organizations are judged according to the contribution they can make to achieve those goals. Issues which in former times were exclusively an internal affair of a country have now become part of transnational discussions and international operations. The Human Development Index and countless other statistics indicate to what extent personal wellbeing can be compared among different countries. The notion of “national interest” has changed: not only are questions of power and security part of it, but also the respect for values like human rights and the prosperity of the citizens.

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The impact of globalization There is one decisive question concerning globalization: who wins and who loses? Advocates, as well as opponents, of globalization argue along the lines as to what impact it has on the wellbeing of the people. Which countries are affected in what way, or to what extent can social justice be achieved? The basic question, who profits from globalization, is relatively simple to answer: those who succeed in a world-wide competition, who can use global networks, who know how global mechanisms function. That can be a big pharmaceutical or car company, or also a tennis player or a musician, a global media conglomerate or McDonalds. There are countless statistics which indicate to what extent people profit from global developments or not. Global or regional trade agreements like TTIP (Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership) or TPP (Trans-Pacific Partnership) are analysed to what extent they affect the protection of the environment, working conditions, labour standards, and human rights. To quite an extent, a “global empathy” has arisen, concerning natural catastrophes, violation of human rights, or sometimes even personal casualties. New instruments were developed to meet those challenges like the “responsibility to protect,” “humanitarian interventions,” or “regime change.” Sometimes it is not that easy to distinguish between the humanitarian nature of these instruments and their power political implementations. But the humanitarian dimension of international relations exists and is winning momentum. Welfare thinking has become an essential issue for the international community. 3. Power politics today Power politics continues to be relevant There are power political contests and conflicts from the Near East to the Far East and from Central Africa to Central Asia. Sometimes it is possible to manage a crisis, and on other occasions it is not. A deal was concluded with Iran; North Korea continues to build its atomic bombs. Some conflicts are frozen and others can break out again any day. There are conflicts within the Islamic world, and there are conflicts with the Arabic world. Some even speak about a “Clash of Civilizations.” If the terrorist attacks of September 11th 2001 showed what kind of threats we could face in the future, the “war on terror” during the last 15 years, it is sad to say, can hardly be considered a success. There are pirates, there are failed states, and there is organized crime, from drug trafficking to human trafficking. Only the trade in weapons amounted to $100 billion in 2012. And there is a special aspect to power politics: “American exceptionalism.” The United States constitutes the most powerful empire the world has seen since the Romans defeated the Carthaginians in the 2nd Punic War. America, as the chosen nation, plays a special role and has a special destiny. This belief is deeply rooted in American political thinking and goes back to the founding fathers and to puritanical, Calvinistic thinking. Already one of the first governors of Massachusetts, John Winthrop, spoke of America as “the shining city upon the hill, a model of Christian virtue, which can lead mankind in a Christian spirit.” George W. Bush was not the first who spoke about the “Axis of evil.” Three hundred

fifty years before him, in 1656, Oliver Cromwell declared the fight against the Axis of evil as one of the prime objectives of English foreign policy. Today, large parts of the US foreign policy establishment are very much convinced that the US is and ought to be the only hegemonic power in the world. Across party-lines, Zbigniew Brzezin ´ ski, Henry Kissinger, and Madeleine Albright were convinced, that America´s might should be the source of global security. In this sense, the US spends $700 billion a year for defence, which is half of all the military spending in the whole world. And the US is ready to use its power. It maintains a force of 1.6 million soldiers; 500,000 of them are deployed abroad in 148 countries on 662 military bases. Most important: the US sets the rules for itself and for others. Thereby, the US attitude is basically different from what often is expected from other countries: the US insists on her sovereignty; is hardly willing to comply with decisions taken by international organizations, and its foreign policy is, if necessary, backed by the military. In this context, one question is essential concerning international relations: should other countries like Russia, China or India be allowed to have their own national interests and their own sphere of influence? For example, the Russians concerning their “near aboard” or the Chinese in the South China Sea. If those rights are denied and anyone who dares to have dissenting interests is considered on “aggressor,” then the potential for new conflicts all over the world is great. Every year, the US publishes reports which should show to what extent countries anywhere in the world live up to the rules set by America. Even if there are no immediate consequences, these reports demonstrate to what extent a government can be considered a member of the “international community” or at least a potential ally. If former empires were mostly ruled by military power, the American Empire relies on rules enforced by Washington. There are other changes concerning the exercise of power, mostly caused by the revolutions in information and education. Concerning power and security, there are essential changes in 3 domains: • there are new dimensions concerning the essence of security and power; • it has become more difficult to win wars; • often the theoretical concepts of peace-making do not turn into reality. It has become more difficult to exert power New dimensions of security and power Exerting power means to force one’s will upon someone else. After the revolutions in information and education during the last generations, which improved the knowledge especially of young people and made them quite often more defiant, it has become much more difficult to exert power. For centuries, international security was to 90 per cent military security, whereas today it is only based on military strength to 10 per cent. In former times, there was one question which dominated international relations: security based on military power. Today many aspects of everyday life concern security, and also international security: from the protection of the standard 50 | 51

of living to financial security, from health questions to the security of the environment; there are human rights and human security. All those questions can neither be solved nor decided on the battlefield; they can only be solved by cooperation. The essence of power has changed in a similar way. Today there are a multitude of players who exert power as mentioned above NGOs, media and transnational corporations. It has become more difficult to legitimize power. Power as well, for hundreds of years was predominantly military power. But today - beside these new players - military power comprises only to 10 percent. In former times there was one issue dominating international relations: who was the strongest. And that issue could be decided on the battlefield. A military victory was at the same time a political victory. Today, a military victory does not mean that the will of the victor can be imposed. In former times there was one player who exercised power: the monarch, supported by his generals and ministers. To a considerable extent the changes which took place in the international arena in recent years arose because new players have appeared. Besides the traditional actors, the nation states, new players have succeeded to use their power and their influence. They have created a new way of thinking in which existing structures cannot stand up to the new pressures that have followed. At the same time, people have become more critical and more defiant. Therefore, it has become much more difficult to exert power. Whereas in former times it was possible to command others, nowadays it is necessary to convince them. It has become more difficult to win wars It has become much more difficult to win wars and to impose one’s will upon someone else by military means. War has a physical component, to destroy, and a psychological-political component, to impose one’s will. After the democratic revolutions and the information and education revolution, people have become more defiant. It has become much more difficult to force one’s will upon someone else. Thus, a multitude of issues in the fields of economics, environment or health cannot be solved by military means. Today, foreign policy is also guided by democratic principles. If we want to unite Europe, and if we want to improve the standard of living in the world, we have to appeal to the citizens. Today the formal legitimacy of any policy is based on elections; but the real legitimacy of foreign policy is to increase the welfare of the people by international cooperation. Today, it has certainly become much more difficult to wage wars and practically impossible to solve problems by war. Wars nowadays take place in public: in front of the TV camera, observed by human rights NGOs, and they are linked to parliamentary hearings. If one can say that wars were decided up to 90% on the battlefield in former times, today they are only decided up to 10% on the battlefield. Considering the multitude of issues in today´s international relations it has become very difficult to formulate clear goals for any war. If we take Afghanistan as an example: the American and Allied troops were ordered not only to destroy the Taliban, but also to improve the economic and social situation in the country, to safeguard women rights, and to set up new system for education. How should soldiers, who are trained “to be a killing machine,” achieve all those

goals? After the revolution in education and information, it has become almost impossible to defeat ideas by military means. More importantly, the home front, the environment at home, has drastically changed. There is a new concept of honour. In former times, even 10,000 casualties in one day were considered as “great” and a great honour for the country. Today, especially in Western countries, we have developed a zero-casualties mentality. Not even professional soldiers are supposed to die on the battlefield anymore. In some countries even the word “war” was replaced by other notions like “no fly zone”, “interventions”, or just that we have to “step in”. Under these new circumstances, problems can hardly be resolved by military confrontation. Military power has been reduced to only one part of the international security structure; many non-military issues can only be solved by cooperation. Security has developed a supra-national dimension. Under those circumstances it has become very unlikely to win a conventional war. How successful are humanitarian interventions? Only a few years ago, some experts were euphoric and thought humanitarian interventions under the name of “peace-making”, “nation building”, or “regime change” could established a new area of safeguarding human rights. In the meantime the results achieved are rather disappointing: • “peace making” was supposed to establish peaceful circumstances after internal strife or a civil war. Such effects were undertaken in countries like Afghanistan, in Bosnia, and in Kosovo. After years of military intervention and many billions of dollars spent, Afghanistan has no functioning political system, Bosnia is politically and economically bankrupt, and refugees are still pouring out of Kosovo; • The concept of nation building was also optimistic: historically “nation-building” in Europe took hundreds of years from the “Great Migration” to the Middle Ages. Some thought that it could now be done within a few years, in Iraq, Somalia, or Haiti. But reality shows that it takes more to build a nation than money and a military. And a national identity cannot be established by law; • In the same way, “regime-change” was doomed to failure wherever it was attempted. Starting with the false conception that all the evil of a political system is concentrated in one person– in Siad Barre in Somalia, Saddam Hussein in Iraq or Muammar al-Gaddafi in Libya. Instigators of regime change were convinced that overthrowing one ruler would change a country. But that did not take into account national interests, ethnic divides, or regional characteristics. In most cases, the result was not the coming of a new democracy, but turmoil and chaos. Does it matter how we see the world, from a power political and military viewpoint or from a perspective of welfare-thinking? This is certainly not a theoretical question and matters quite a lot. A leader who sees the world as it has been for 1000 years will always prefer a power politics/ military view-point. Someone who concentrates on the personal well-being of the people, also in international relations, will give priority to negotiations and reconciliations.

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Conclusion In Europe, a “Diplomatic Revolution” has taken place. The “Logic of War,” prevalent for more than 1000 years, was replaced by a logic of values and property. With 7% of the world population, the EU has become a zone of peace and consumes 50% of the world social expenditures. The “old continent” has become a leader in many ways: from implementing human rights to protecting the environment and from quality of life to human security. The argument that Europe does not count anymore in international relations because its military is weak is not shared by those who find the European way of life attractive. There are certainly millions of people all over the world who want to improve their way of life and expect international relations to make contributions to achieve this objective. This article was edited by Melissa Jane Taylor, PhD. 1 Ambassador of Austria to Finland, Canada, and at the Council of Europe; Author of International Relations. Member of the

Member of the Austrian National Parliament (1977- 1993); author of several foreign policy publications.

The role of the UN in the use of outer space technology for sustainable development Irmgard Marboe1

Introduction In its 70 years of existence, the United Nations has developed its role as a universal peace organization most impressively. From the focus on military aspects to prevent the outbreak of another world war, a comprehensive approach for ensuring world peace has evolved. While, in practice, the system of collective security has seen many obstacles to its functioning, numerous other areas of activity of the United Nations have been remarkably successful. At the 70th anniversary of the organization in 2015, there is, indeed, something to celebrate. This connects the United Nations, with the person that we congratulate on his 70 years and who is celebrating his own jubilee this year, Michael Platzer. At the United Nations, Michael worked for the ideal of a world of peace, justice and equality. Of course, 70 years is not enough to achieve such ambitious aims. Yet, this is an occasion for evaluating the past and formulating goals for the future. One of the most striking endeavours of the past was to bring the United Nations closer to the people. The title of this book, “On the Road to People”, shows very clearly where the focus of Michael Platzer’s activities has lain – in the human person. No world organization makes any sense, if it does not serve the people. The United Nation’s efforts in promoting human rights and in numerous humanitarian missions are witness to this focus in the past. Michael has contributed to this endeavour through his professional career. After his retirement he dedicated himself to the improvement of cooperation between educational institutions, most importantly universities, and the United Nations. As an activist for the Academic Council for the United Nations System (ACUNS) he achieved remarkable results, not the least as the facilitator of the ACUNS Regional Academy which builds upon the competence of reputational universities in Central and Eastern Europe and offers fascinating opportunities for students. For the future, starting at the Millenium, a new focus has more and more crystallised within the United Nations system, the active promotion of more economic equality and justice. The concept of sustainable development shows the way forward. It combines the organization’s original mission of preserving world peace with the goal of achieving prosperity and equal opportunities for all. As the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development puts it: “There can be no sustainable development without peace and not peace without sustainable development.”2 The formulation of 17 Sustainable Development Goals at the occasion of the 70th session of the United Nations General Assembly is a major achievement which will hopefully have lasting 54 | 55

effects on the years to come. The eradication of poverty remains a difficult and complex task and needs to be addressed at various levels and by various means. In the following, the role of technology, and more particularly of space technology, in this endeavour will be addressed. Technology for sustainable development The term “technology” appears 40 times in the General Assembly resolution on the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. This shows its importance for the “plan of action for people, planet and prosperity”(A/RES/70/1, PP). It is most prominently present in Goal 17 calling for action to “Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the Global Partnership for Sustainable Development”. More precisely, “regional and international cooperation on and access to science, technology and innovation” (Goal 17.6) should be fostered. Knowledge sharing on mutually agreed terms, including through improved coordination among existing mechanisms, in particular at the United Nations level, is mentioned as an example. Furthermore, the development, transfer, dissemination and diffusion of environmentally sound technologies to developing countries on favourable terms should be promoted (Goal 17.7). With regard to outer space technology, similar aims und principles were laid down in the Declaration on International Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for the Benefit and in the Interest of All States, Taking into Particular Account the Needs of Developing Countries adopted by the UN GA in 1996, the so-called “Space Benefits Declaration” (A/ RES/51/122). It raised the awareness of the importance of international cooperation among States and between States and international organizations in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes, irrespective of their degree of economic, social or scientific and technological development (Hobe et al. 2015, 299, 306 ff). The Space Benefits Declaration of 1996 paved the way for the organization of a major international conference on space and development, UNISPACE III, which took place in Vienna in 1999 (UN DPI, 1999). From this conference, several new UN initiatives emerged, amongst which the Basic Space Technology Initiative (BSTI) and UN SPIDER will be presented in more detail in the following. Furthermore, the current efforts within the United Nations Committee for the Peaceful Sues of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS) on the “Long-term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities” will be discussed. The Basic Space Technology Initiative (BSTI) One of the most important roles of the United Nations in the area of space activities is to serve the capacity building needs of countries in space science and technology. The United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA) fulfils this task in a variety of projects, most of them under the Programme on Space Applications (UNOOSA 2012). An important means of capacity building is the development, launch and operation of small satellites. Since the early 1980, a series of satellites were developed at the University of Surrey which showed the potential of small spacecraft for education Balogh 2012, 327). During the UNISPACE III conference, a dedicated workshop on small satellites was organized in cooperation with the International Academy of Astronautics. Since the year 2000, the United Nations organized a series of workshops on the topic of small satellites in the service of developing countries at the annual International Astronautical Congress

(Balogh 2016, 33). In 2007, UNOOSA prepared a proposal for a new initiative under the Programme on Space Applications, the Basic Space Technology Initiative (Balogh and Haubold 2009, 1847). The BSTIâ&#x20AC;&#x2DC;s aim is to â&#x20AC;&#x153;to enhance access to space application tools for sustainable development through building capacity in basic space technology developmentâ&#x20AC;?.3 This mission statement highlights the role of capacity building as a means to enhance and promote the use and application of space technology and to help establish it as an operational tool in support of policy- and decision making for sustainable development (Balogh 2016, 36). Based on the experience with the earlier workshops, including the series of United Nations/International Academy of Astronautics Workshops, and in consultation with representatives from member States and space technology experts, the Programme on Space Applications developed a multi-annual workplan. The organization of international conferences on capacity building in various regions of the worlds is included in the workplan. Since 2012, such conferences have been organized, in collaboration with local partners, in Nagoya (Japan), Dubai (United Arab Emirates) and Ensenada (Mexico). The conferences showed the wide range of benefits that could be derived from space technology applications. As regards the field of small satellite, they reflected the speed with which developments were taking place. Substantial discussions focused on the issue of the long-term sustainability of outer space activities with regard to small satellite activities and the role of the ITU Radio Regulations related to the use of frequency bands and notifications of small satellite systems (A/AC.105/10). Another important project under the BSTI is the development of space technology education curricula. In collaboration with the Regional Centres for Space Science and Technology Education affiliated to the United Nations in Brazil, China, Jordan, Mexico, Morocco, and Nigeria,4 several curricula on space science and applications have been developed. They include remote sensing and geographical information systems, satellite communications, satellite meteorology and global climate, space and atmospheric sciences and data management. While these curricula initially were designed for courses offered at the Regional Centres, many other educational institutions have started to use them in the planning of their educational activities. It can therefore be concluded that the BSTI under the Programme on Space Applications administered by UNOOSA contributes significantly to sustainable development as it is described and understood in the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda. It can only be hoped that, in view of declining public budgets, the financing of this remarkable initiative will also be secured in the future. UN-SPIDER Another initiative launched in the wake of the UNISPACE III conference related to the use of space technology for the exchange of information in case of natural disasters. In case of earthquakes, landslides, floodings and tsunamis it is essential to receive satellite data as quickly as possible (Soucek 2011, 597 ff). The first step taken was the adoption of the International Charter Space and Major Disasters.5 It was initiated by European and the French space agencies (ESA and CNES) and declared formally operational on 1 November 2000. Currently, agencies and institutions of 15 countries are members. The Charter aims at providing a unified system of space data 56 | 57

acquisition and delivery to those affected by natural or man-made disasters through authorized users. Each member agency has committed resources to support the provisions of the Charter and thus is helping to mitigate the effects of disasters on human life and property. In the following years, the activities with regard to the use of space technology for disaster management were intensified and integrated more directly in the United Nations system. In 2006, the United Nations Platform for Space-based Information for Disaster Management and Emergency Response (UN-SPIDER) was established under UNOOSA. It has its offices in Vienna, Beijing and Bonn. UN-SPIDER aims at improving actions to reduce disaster risk or support disaster response operations through knowledge sharing and the strengthening of institutions in the use of space technologies.6 It also facilitates cooperation between satellite data and information providers and the different groups of users of such data, such as policymakers, disaster risk managers or emergency responders. The objective is a better flow of information on disaster risks or disaster impacts between all stakeholders and affected populations. UN-SPIDER builds on its international network of Regional Support Offices7 and National Focal Points.8 It organizes expert meetings and conferences to take into account the needs and prerequisites of the disaster, disaster-risk, and space communities which can vary considerably from region to region. UN-SPIDER addresses a significant imbalance: while space-based technologies are emerging fast and quickly find their way into numerous applications of Earth observation, telecommunication and navigation, they are not always appropriated uses for disaster-risk management and emergency response. Particularly developing countries are not yet fully taking advantage of the opportunities that space-based information offers to an improved risk assessment, early warning or mitigation of disasters. UN-SPIDER's technical advisory support therefore aims to bridge this gap by raising awareness and by building capacities. Its activities are focusing on ad hoc technical support in disaster situations, training programmes and technical advisory missions. It follows that the activities of UN-SPIDER represent exactly what the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda aims to foster regional and international cooperation on and access to science and technology (A/RES/70/1, Goal 17.6). It provides knowledge sharing on mutually agreed terms and is dedicated to improving coordination among existing mechanisms. Long-term sustainability of outer space activities The fast development of space technology and the increased access to space by numerous new actors has raised the awareness of an acute threat to outer space activities: the growing problem of space debris. It is particular in this respect that the principle of sustainable development unfolds its importance for space activities (Viikari 2015, 711 and 761). In light of the principle of sustainable development it is necessary to ensure that economic and technological development does not take place at the cost of the environment, in this case the environment in outer space, upon which all actors, governments, private entities and people in all regions of the world depend. Finding a balance between economic and technological progress and preserving the environment for future generations is a most difficult task, also in other policy areas.

In the area of space policy, this has turned out to be particularly challenging. Despite several efforts, a binding international instrument on the mitigation of space debris has not yet been adopted. The United Nations currently addresses the problem of space debris, together with other threats to the safety and security of space activities, under the agenda item of “Long-term Sustainability of Space Activities” in a Working Group of the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee of UNCOPUOS established in 2010. 9 Already previously, the United Nations has addressed the problem of space debris. In 2007, UNCOPUOS adopted Guidelines on the Mitigation of Space Debris which had been developed by its Scientific and Technical Subcommittee.10 They contain seven guidelines distinguishing between different scenarios potentially leading to the creation of space debris. The Guidelines contain the following specifications: “Limit debris released during normal operations” (Guideline 1), “Minimise the potential for on-orbit break-ups” (Guideline 2), “Limit the probability of accidental collision in orbit” (Guideline 3), “Avoid intentional destruction and other harmful activities” (Guideline 4), “Minimise potential for post-mission break-ups resulting from stored energy” (Guideline 5), “Limit the long-term presence of space craft and launch vehicle orbital stages in the Low-Earth Orbit (LEO) region after the end of their mission” (Guideline 6), and “Limit the long-term interference of spacecraft and launch vehicle orbital stages with the geosynchronous Earth orbit (GEO) region after the end of their mission” (Guideline 7).11 The Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines by UNCOPUOS, although not legally binding and only of recommendatory character, have been very well received in practice. They are integrated in many national space debris mitigation programmes and standards.12 It can be said that the success of the Guidelines proves that they represent a broadly accepted standard which should be respected by all participants in space activities, whether they originate from highly developed economies or from developing or emerging countries. As a consequence, a violation of this standard may lead to liability in case of damage caused by a collision of space objects in outer space (Marboe 2012 at 119 & 158 ff). Yet, not all actors are aware of this consequence and rely on the non-binding nature of the Guidelines. Nevertheless, liability only represents a remedy available after damage has already occurred and depends on many factual and evidentiary conditions. A more preventive mechanism would certainly be preferable. The Scientific and Technical Subcomittee of UNCOPUOS has therefore launched the new agenda entitled “Long-term Sustainability of Space Activities” which should address the issue of space debris in a more proactive and preventive fashion. It was adopted as an agenda item under a work plan and included the establishment of a Working Group to support the preparation of a report on the Long-term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities.13 It should elaborate an appropriate set of voluntary best-practice guidelines focused on practical and prudent measures that could be implemented in a timely manner. The Working Group established four Export Groups to address various aspects of the topic.14 Expert Group B on “Space debris, space operations and tools to support space situational awareness sharing” developed draft guidelines for actors in the space arena are designed to facilitate best-practice regulation and information sharing in a way that benefits the long-term sustainability of outer space activities. 58 | 59

The outcome of the Working Group should be a joint report containing a consolidated set of current practices and operating procedures, technical standards and policies associated with the safe conduct of space activities. Furthermore, the Working Group should produce a set of guidelines to be applied by States, international organizations and non-governmental entities on a voluntary basis. The guidelines still would not have a legally binding force and not establish international obligations. Yet, they are intended to represent the current standard of good practices in the conduct of space activities. The original mandate of the Working Group lasted until 2014. It was extended to 2015, and then to 2016. At the time of writing, it is uncertain whether the programme of work will be finalised in 2016. The reason is that, after the four Expert Groups had finalised their report and submitted their respective set of candidate guidelines, some governmental representatives submitted further proposals and amendments which required further debate and discussion. This unsatisfying situation shows how contentious the issue of long-term sustainability can turn out to be in reality. While, in principle, everybody agrees on it, the positions of governments sometimes turn out be far away from each other when it comes to concrete issues. States are still averse of potential limitations of their freedom of action. In this respect, the area of outer space is not distinct from other policy areas dealing with environmental issues. It can only be hoped that the long-term perspective will ultimately prevail. Conclusion The brief overview shows that a number of interesting activities and initiatives of the United Nations in the area of outer space are already in line with the principles and goals of the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda. This is due to the fact that, with regard to space activities, the United Nations has strengthened its efforts to take into account the particular needs of developing and emerging countries in recent years. The 1996 “Space Benefits Declaration” and the UNISPACE III conference of 1999 have had lasting effects on the planning and implementation of projects administered by UNOOSA. It can only be hoped that these projects and initiatives will not decline in times of financial constraints and austerity which have direct consequences on the United Nations budgets. The most notable initiatives, BSTI and UN-SPIDER, would, of course, also benefit from an increase of their budgets which, however, seems illusory. A more critical note should be addressed not to the United Nations, but to (some of) its member States. There is still a lot of hesitation to accept the concept of sustainable development in its full meaning. This can be observed in the problems to finalise the report on the “Long-term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities” in UNCOPUOS. May the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda, solemnly adopted by all member States of the United Nations, serve as a reminder to join efforts and to agree on compromises for the benefit of all humankind, including for the future generations. 1 Professor, Department of European, Comparative and International Law, University of Vienna. Specialises in compensation

and damages in international law, international investment law, international arbitration, space law and other legal regimes

outside national jurisdictions, intercultural dialogue.

2 A/RES/70/1, Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, Resolution of the General Assembly,

25 September 2015 (hereinafter“2030 Sustainable Development Agenda“).

3 United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, Basis Space Technology Initiative (United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs,

Vienna) http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/psa/bsti/index.html

4 United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, Capacity Building in Space Science and Technology (Vienna: United Nations

Office for Outer Space Affairs, 2008), http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/publications/st_space_41E.pdf.

5 Charter On Cooperation To Achieve The Coordinated Use Of Space Facilities In The Event Of Natural Or Technological

Disasters, Rev.3, 24 April 2000, https://www.disasterscharter.org/web/guest/text-of-the-charter.

6 United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, United Nations Platform for Space-based Information for Disaster Management

and Emergency Response (UN-SPIDER) (Vienna: United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs)

http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/un-spider/index.html. 7 Regional Support Offices have been established in Europe, Africa, Latin America and Caribbean and Asia Pacific. See United

Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, UN-SPIDER Knowledge Portal (Vienna: United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs)

http://www.un-spider.org/network/regional-support-offices. 8 National Focal Points are national institutions, nominated by the government of their respective countries, to represent the

disaster management and space applications communities. See United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, UN-SPIDER

Knowledge Portal (Vienna: United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs)

http://www.un-spider.org/network/national-focal-points. 9 See the definition of this new agenda item in A/65/20, Report of the Fifty-third Session of the Committee for the Peaceful

Uses of Outer Space Affairs, 2010. For more background information see Gerard Brachet, “The Origins of the ‘Long-term

sustainability of Outer Space Activities’ Initiative at UN COPUOS, Space Policy 28 (2012), 161-165.

10 United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer

Space, (Vienna: United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, 2010) http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/publications/st_space_49E.pdf.

11 For a commentary and a detailed discussion of the seven Guidelines see Peter Stubbe and others, “The 2007 Space Debris

Mitigation Guidelines of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space,” in Cologne Commentary on Space Law, Volume III,

ed. Stephan Hobe and others (Carl Heymanns Verlag, 2015) 605, 629-652.

12 See the collection of national mechanisms for the prevention of space debris in a Compendium, regularly updated by UNOOSA: United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, Compendium. Space Debris Mitigation Standards adopted by States and

International Organizations (Vienna: United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, 2015)

http://www.unoosa.org/documents/pdf/spacelaw/sd/Space_Debris_Compendium_COPUOS_Sept_2015.pdf. 13 See the terms of reference of the Working Group in A/AC.105/C.1/L. 307/Rev.1, Terms of reference and methods of work of

the Working Group on the Long-term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities of the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee,

28 February 2011.

14 Expert Group A on “Sustainable space utilisation supporting sustainable development on Earth”; Expert Group B on “Space

debris, space operations and tools to support space situational awareness sharing”; Expert Group C on “Space Weather”; and

Expert Group D on “Regulatory regimes and guidance for new actors in the space arena”.

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SDGs links with Inclusive and Sustainable Industrial Development for human rights and dignity Grzegorz Donocik1

Introduction Michael’s 70th birthday can be a formidable opportunity to stop for a moment, look around our UN Vienna world and contribute to the main topic of this book, eloquently addressed by its Editors “On the Road to People”. Yes, indeed we are on the road that started shortly after the Second World War and has not ended yet. It is still in front of us. That road, with both its barriers and bridges, known, unknown and unknowable, never ends. Many of us were on this road for many years and still go forward, perhaps, at times, side tracked or temporarily in a cul de sac. Among them is Michael who does not give up. He consistently and steadily keeps to and on the main track, though in a different capacity as organizer and teacher. He tries to help new comers, above all young people, to enter the same path as he was exploring and advancing, marked by signposts and ongoing guidance about the current international agenda and decisions resulting therefrom. Michael knew how to do it. His initiative undertaken a few years ago, within the framework of the Academic Council on the United Nations System, to create the Regional Academy on the United Nations (RAUN) was the best evidence of his long term vision and its importance, assigned to the capacity building for young scholars and students coming from the Central and Eastern European region. There is no other way but only through capacity building to effectively enable, and sustain, succeeding generation more involved in the current UN development agenda. One cannot imagine advances in sustainable development without educated people engaged in an ongoing learning process. The road has its destination “to end poverty and hunger, in all their forms and dimensions, and to ensure that all human beings can fulfil their potential in dignity and equality and in a healthy environment…and secure the participation of all…including migrants and indigenous peoples, in the realization of the Goals and targets” (A/RES/70/1, PP 1). How do we understand “dignity”? How do we understand “dignity”? Does it apply to us? The word “dignity” is unique. It is primarily associated with a human being, with people. It is purposely left undefined in the UN, but has 62 | 63

very universal application regardless of the colour of skin, ethnicity, gender, age, status and religion. I share the view that dignity, beyond its letters and semantics, means nothing else other than “innate rights to be valued, respected and ethically treated. In the contemporary context it can function as an extension of the Enlightenment - era concepts of inherent, inalienable rights” (Wikipedia). As such dignity goes hand in hand with human rights and is inextricably tied. The whole UN system established 70 years ago to save the world from the scourge of war has been primarily anchored on human rights and dignity. The UN Charter “reaffirms faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small…”. Dignity thus in a nutshell is a fundamental paradigm of the whole UN system. All people who believe in the UN mandate and its long-term mission, both the government officials, UN staff and ordinary people benefitting from the UN programmes find themselves on this road. It is up to us to encourage people to enter and pursue this road and make it straightforward to the maximum extent. Michael gives an extraordinary example. One can assume that the this book’s contents not incidentally draws its inspiration from the UN Secretary-General’s reports “The road to dignity by 2030: ending poverty, transforming all lives and protecting the planet” (A/69/700) that paved the way for the new Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) up to 2030 adopted by the UN Summit on 25 September 2015 in New York. The purpose of both is the same: expose the new tasks in front of international community in making the world more safe from and free of poverty at local to global levels. The S-G Report released on the threshold of “the most important year of development since the founding of the United Nations itself” (so the Report) addresses the most fundamental development assumptions for the next 15 years. As such it has a pioneering significance. It laid the ground for the new set of SDGs. Adoption of these goals was a coronation of a long-term process to rejuvenate the UN development agenda. The new set of goals constitutes a genuine “plan of action for people, planet and prosperity”, as the SDGs preamble specifies. The unfinished work of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) was used as a “springboard into the future, free from poverty and built on human rights, equality and sustainability”(Ibid). Similarly to the MDGs, at the heart of the new development agenda are people, is an individual person together with other people. At stake is to ensure that all human beings can fulfil their potential for dignity and equality in a healthy environment. The anthropocentric attitude remains thus a guiding principle. In addition to people, the highest concern is expressed for our planet; to protect it from degradation, inappropriate consumption and production patterns and overexploitation of natural resources and climate change. Our planet needs to be enabled to support the needs of future generations. The plan refers also to prosperity. Human beings have an inherent, full, right to enjoy prosperity and to fulfil their lives in full, experienced, dignity. This can be achieved not only through economic, social and technological development but also thorough more participatory attendance of all poor countries, whatever their natural and human resources, and people

in the development process and equitable availability, accessibility and distribution of income and profits. The progress will be measured not merely in terms of quantitative results but whether it occurs in harmony with nature and how people-individuals, families, and communities- will benefit therefrom; with no or minimum harms. The tasks in front of the international community is tremendous and require the mobilization of the whole society from South, North, West and East. This calls for the wide international campaign and preparation of the best-qualified actors, individuals and systems, to implement it. The role of RAUN in this respect cannot be overestimated. The link between the S-G Report and the mandate of RAUN is obvious. The S-G Report clearly says that â&#x20AC;&#x153;young people will be the torch bearers of the next sustainable development agenda through 2030â&#x20AC;? (para. 3). Hence the RAUN capacity building platform created in Vienna is to be considered as a forwardlooking initiative to facilitate the implementation of the Summit results. It is indeed so. During the last four years the RAUN annual sessions have created excellent opportunities for young scholars and students coming from the Universities in Austria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Serbia, Slovakia, Ukraine, the Russian Federation and other countries to upgrade their knowledge and understanding about the current activities of the Vienna - based organizations, such as International Atomic Energy Agency, The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, UN Office on Drugs and Crime, UN Office for Outer Space Activities, the UN Information Service and United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO). Above all RAUN creates an enabling platform to present innovative concepts, thesis and solutions on various aspects of international agenda and the best ways, and means, towards achieving once MDGs and now SDGs. Most of the studies and papers presented by students are rich with new ideas, intellectually matured, follow high methodological academic standards and constitute highly professional expertise, sometimes for immediate application by the institutions whom they are addressed to. Overarching objectives of SDGs The SDGs are now in place. The time to carry them out has started. Eradicating poverty and hunger by 2030 are the overarching objectives (SDGs 1 and 2). The defining challenge is to close the gap between ensuring a life of dignity for all on the one hand, and the persisting poverty as well as deepening inequality on the other; becoming aware of both the interfering structural barriers and the enabling bridges to needed changes. The challenge is extremely complex. The inequalities instead of narrowing are augmenting. Contrary to the intentions of world leaders and intellectuals appealing for the world to foster and to enable a more equitable distribution of wealth, the trend is opposite: The rich- people and places- become richer and the poor become poorer (Oxfam 2016). It is therefore extremely important to continue the effort to get the richest people more involved and committed to help the poorest countries and people, expand development and charity programmes, establish new foundations and invite them to earmark more resources for various development needs along the line of all 17 SDGs and 169 targets. The primary aim should be the faith, norm and value, in restoring human dignity. This requires serious, viable, responses from all of the international community. Above all, from those who 64 | 65

have the necessary means and can effectively help to finance the follow up activities at a much higher scale than has been manifested so far. This includes also sharing their ideas and experiences; successes as well as failures. One of the most important “transformation shifts” is to “transform economies for decent jobs and inclusive growth”, as 27 members of the High-Level Panel of Persons formulated it prior to the UN Summit in its Report (2013). Yes indeed, human dignity of, and for, the individual, the family, the community, is always associated with appropriate standards of living; beyond biological existence. It is difficult to find a dignified person in ongoing temporary or more permanent conditions of prevailing poverty, malnutrition, hunger, ongoing daily uncertainties, and existential threats. This does not mean that poor people do not possess dignity. We all are born with an innate, inherent dignity. This should be well remembered. The critical and relevant question is, however, how to reemphasize the importance of, and to strengthen the innate dignity of human beings; our well being daily adapting and functioning. The answer of the Panel is straightforward. It can be done by stimulating economic growth, structural transformation, productive capacity building including accompanying services and creating new working places, particularly for the young generation. To develop and to maintain a better life, people need jobs adequate to their level of education and skills. The honest work should be decently and fairly remunerated. Higher incomes lead to higher, sustainable, standards of living. The SDGs Agenda devotes much attention to economic growth, transformation, full and productive employment and decent work for all (SDG 8). A great deal of attention is paid to the private sector in this regard. Yes, indeed it is the private sector that creates the largest opportunities for increased employment, higher living wages and economic growth. In this context, a priority attention should be given to forward-looking private companies transforming their business models for sustainable development that follow the ethics-driven investments. Additional creative initiatives are needed to promote models of sustainable production and consumption everywhere (SDG 12). The strength of economy must be measured not only by its quantitative output by also by the degree to which the economy meets the needs of people, and on how sustainably and equitably does so. It should be measured in ways that go beyond GDP only and include the social aspects as well. The ultimate goal of economic growth should lead to prosperity to be equitably shared and to embrace the maximum number of population. It should entail the rising real income and widening livelihoods for all. Economic growth and transformation is closely linked with the access to energy for all (SDG 7). This is another UN programme launched only recently with a similar time span as SDGs. Any economic activity requires energy. At present 1.5 billion people do not have access to electricity. Could these people be actively involved in economic and social life of their societies? Hence the objective is to expand the availability of energy sources, above all alternative sources of energy, such as solar, wind, biomass, geothermal, hydrogen and others. This can be done through developing indigenous sources of energy available locally without a need to get access to central electric transmission systems. Extended access to decentralized energy sources is a pillar of the third industrial revolution (Rifkin 2011).

This concept is based upon the production of green energy at homes, offices, factories and sharing it with each other through â&#x20AC;&#x153;energy internetâ&#x20AC;?. It requires a transformation of building infrastructure into green micro-power plants to collect renewable energies, especially hydrogen on-site using modern storage technologies. In addition, the further development of transportation vehicles is to be predominantly based upon electrically driven power. The motorcars need transitioning to electric plug-in and fuel cell vehicles that can buy and sell green electricity on a small interactive power grid. The Internet technology is to facilitate the industrial revolution to become effective. Extended and decentralized use of alternative sources of energy go hand in hand with a need to widely promote the conservation measures in energy use and to make it more efficient. A great deal of energy is lost through poor insulation, obsolete technological installations, outdated electrical and motor engines, machines and technological processes in manufacturing and extracting industries. Energy efficiency programmes respond to these needs through decoupling economic growth from environmental degradation (UNIDO 2016). Conservation measures and alternative sources of energy are needed both to save energy and decrease costs of production as well as to decarbonize the world economy by reducing carbon dioxide emissions. The results of the recent Climate Change Summit in Paris clearly articulate these needs. One of the SDGs (13) addresses this concern and appeals for urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts. A great deal of attention is devoted in SDGs to sustainable agriculture, fisheries, food systems (2) fostering sustainable management of water resources (6) waste and chemicals (6, 14, 15). All these segments of economy are closely linked with dignity of life. A widespread access to unharmful and healthy food has a fundamental significance for all; both producers and consumers of food. On the one hand agriculture is still the primary source of livelihood for billions of people especially in the poor regions. On another hand, a growing tendency is observed to have access to healthy and tasty food, which is highly diversified, properly preserved and packed. Considering water resources, in contrast to food production that has still a good growth potential, scientists warn against the scarcity of water resources in many places on the globe, particularly in the arid zones. Therefore a rational use of water resources including water recycling, new techniques for water purification and cleaning as well as modern sewage systems need to be widely developed and available for all people. The extended access to scarce water resources should be regarded in terms of common goods at concessional prices. Another problem addressed by SDGs is associated with reducing health risk because of contaminated soil, water and air by various chemicals produced by the manufacturing sector known as persistent organic pollutants (POPs) and/or ozone depleting substances (ODSs). The POPs are mainly poisoning soil and water and their excessive presence can easily be transferred into agricultural products, food and potable water. The release of ODSs into the atmosphere by manufacturing products for daily consumption such as cosmetics, household equipment, refrigerators etc. mainly pollute the air. Their excessive presence have direct impact on reducing the ozone layer that is directly in charge of protecting human beings against ultra violet radiation causing skin cancer. To remedy the situation there is an urgent need to intensify all follow up 66 | 67

activities towards eliminating the production and use of POPs and ODSs. Regardless of many achievements in this regard many alarming signals are still coming from independent scientists and NGOs. One of the most challenging tasks is to make proper use of unprecedented achievements in science and technologies. Modern technologies are unlocking possibilities for sustainable development. Regrettably, access to vital and environmentally sound technologies is today not evenly available or accessible, both within and between countries. Many poor nations are excluded from the newest technologies; especially those being first developed and applied in military sectors. Large amounts of public resources are allocated to military purposes while comparatively less is spent on research and development (R&D) for public goods that could find universal application. This requires a change and the new approaches so that unsustainable technologies are phase out and new investments promoted in the sectors addressing the needs of ordinary people in line with the highest environmental standards. Such investments should enjoy priority funding. The technologies to be developed should be fairly priced and widely distributed among all poor nations. In this context it would be quite relevant to review and to consider an interesting initiative in the S-G Report “On the road to dignity;” the proposal to establish the Technology Bank for the least developed countries (LDCs). The Bank is to help scale up cooperation for sharing technologies, strengthening knowledge and capacity building for usage, innovation capacities, including Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs). The UN S-G expects that this Bank would help to make the adjustments necessary in the policy frameworks and thus achieve needed, substantial progress in the development, transfer, and dissemination of new technologies and know-how to developing countries on preferential terms. SDG 9 The above goal addresses exclusively the concern of the developing countries for “building resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization and foster innovation”. It involves three broad thematic areas: (i) infrastructure (ii) industrialization (iii) innovation. All of them are closely interrelated. One cannot promote industrialization without appropriate infrastructure and, vice versa, industrialization contributes to the development of infrastructure; it is a main source of inputs for infrastructural investments. Simultaneously innovation is nowadays a driving force of any economic and technological progress needed both in the industrial sectors as well as in promoting civil engineering for unfolding infrastructures. The logic of putting all three elements together appears to be clear. It does not, however, mean that each of them cannot be considered separately in the context of its links with other SDGs. The linages, weaker or stronger, are visible practically across all SDGs. The validity of this goal should be seen, above all, in the light of its contribution to improving the quality of life and wellbeing. The development of infrastructure should serve not only industrialization but first of all the needs of all ordinary people to live more comfortably, get extended access to well-developed transportation systems, communication and social facilities

The infrastructure is needed across all activities associated with economic growth, clean production and human settlements in cities and villages. Promotion of manufacturing, extractive industries and industry-related services should satisfy the needs of all people for manufacturing goods as well as also provide opportunities for income generation through job creation. Innovative undertakings should boost manufacturing industries to develop a new generation of products based upon advanced technologies designed and developed to meet changing demands of people in parallel with civilization’s progress. Five targets and three sub-targets were adopted to measure the progress in achieving this goal. They are formulated rather broadly and vaguely. Regrettably, no deeper specification can be found. They give only general orientation regarding the priority actions to be taken to develop the necessary infrastructures, promote industrialization and innovations by 2030. The geographical focus is placed on LDCs. As such, they need further elaboration and support by specific viable indicators as well as by a more concrete plan of action Regarding infrastructures, the targets insufficiently describe what types are needed: “quality, reliable, sustainable and resilient”. It should support the economic development and human well-being with a focus on affordable and equitable access for all“ (9.1). By 2030 the targeted and consensualized infrastructures should become sustainable with increased resource-use efficiency and greater adoption of clean and environmentally sound technologies and industrial processes with all countries taking action in accordance with their respective capabilities (9.4). Special emphasis is put on developing resilient infrastructure through enhanced financial, technological and technical support to African countries, LDCs, landlocked developing countries and small island developing countries (9.a). As to innovation, the first target appears to be more concrete but still does not include any indicators. It only stipulates that innovation should be encouraged and the number of research and development professionals per 1 million people should be substantially increased (9.5). Another one puts emphasis on the support to be given to domestic technology developments, research and innovation in developing countries (9.b). Finally, the targets refer to general guidelines in which access to information and communications technology should significantly increase and efforts be taken to provide universal and affordable access to the Internet in LDCs by 2020. The indicators “substantially”, and “significantly” are insufficiently quantified. The targets relating to industrialization, appear to be slightly more specific. They stipulate that by 2030 the industry’s share of employment and gross domestic product should be significantly raised in accordance with national circumstances and such shares in LDCs should double (9.2), though the indicator “significantly” is not further defined. The access of small-scale industries in developing countries to financial services, including affordable credit, and their integration into value chains and markets should increase (9.3). This again raises the problem of how to measure the increase and what type of methodology to apply. By 2030 the industries should be retrofitted. Similarly to infrastructure, industrialization should become sustainable with higher resource-use efficiency and clean technologies in industrial processes in all countries taking action (9.4). The indicator “higher” is not specified. The next target refers to scientific research and technological capabilities which are to be enhanced and upgraded (9.5). Regrettably both 68 | 69

indicators “enhance” and “upgrade” are not further defined. The same applies to the next target that a “conducive policy environment” should be ensured for industrial diversification and value addition to commodities (9. b). Again, it is not specified how it can or should be ensured. Special focus on inclusive and sustainable industrialization The UNIDO Second Lima Declaration (2013) set a new vision of inclusive and sustainable industrial development (ISID). The Declaration encouraged appropriate consideration of this issue in the elaboration of the post-2015 agenda. As the result, the ISID concept was incorporated in Goal 9. Its novelty lies in integrating a sustained industrialization to be carried out in harmony with the environment but also includes, for the first time, social requirements of people. Industrialization should offer equal opportunities and ensure equitable distribution of benefits. At the same time UNIDO has become responsible for supporting and monitoring the progress in the implementation of this goal (UNIDO 2013). The questions can be raised why inclusive and sustainable industrialization were selected as one of the specific goals, in addition to infrastructure and innovation and to whom it is addressed. There is the need to consider and to delineate in which viable ways industrialization can contribute to its overarching objectives, reducing poverty and hunger, combating climate change, building green economy, while also increasing the observance of human rights and upgrading the dignity of human beings. Historically it is perhaps not so difficult to show the impact of industrialization on reducing poverty and hunger as well as its links with the environment. More controversy arises around its connections with human rights. During the last two centuries -at least since the time of the first and second industrial revolution- industrialization has been perceived by politicians and economists as being a vehicle of growth and development. The development of the new sources of energy made it possible to construct energy-driven machines and replace the work of man by machines. This entailed the increase of productivity, income generation by the labour force and massive delivery of investment and consumable goods including processed foodstuffs. Thus industrial production decisively contributed to reducing prevailing poverty and hunger. During this process developed countries were named simultaneously “industrialized” countries as a synonym of advanced development. For many years their manufacturing goods dominated the international markets worldwide bringing them huge profits. It is time now to share the experience and lessons learned with developing countries, which are entering the path of industrialization. This goal is addressed specifically for them. The closer links between economic growths, structural economic transformation, industrialization and poverty reduction are of the highest relevance for their development; the higher growth, balanced structural transformation, strong manufacturing sector, the lower is poverty. The structural transformation defined as the development of an economy’s structure from low productivity, labour intensive to higher productivity, capital and skill intensive activities, is essential for economic development. It should be perceived in the context of a dynamic evolutionary process from low productivity activities, such as traditional agriculture, to higher productivity, such as manufacturing and services. Manufacturing by its virtue performs very special functions

as an engine of growth and a driver of technological progress due to the linkages and spillover effects into other sectors of the economy. For example, the spectacular progress in ITCs would be impossible without advances in hardware technologies, i.e. production of semiconductors based upon silicon. The advances in hardware technologies triggered the development of a whole range of new electronic products that in parallel ignited the progress in software technologies (computer programming). This in turn stimulated further progress in hardware technologies. The feedback loop effect entailed technological modernization of many other manufacturing industries through automation, application of robots as well as digitalization of economy. Though the manufacturing is not the only driver of growth, it is still one of the most crucial engines of development and continues to account for the greater part of R&D expenditures. The best indicator of the importance of industry in the economy is its share in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) structure. It amounted to 26.1 % in 2010 (average worldwide), while the share for agricultural sector accounted only for 3.2%. Services occupied the first place (70.7%). For BRICS countries the share of industry accounted for 33.6%. The highest was in China,46.8%; for upper middle countries, 36.7% (emerging economies); for lower middle countries, 31.3% and for OECD, 23.7%. This is not surprising. In many OECD countries the share of industry is gradually declining after having reached its peak level 20-30 years ago and that of services growing (74.8%) (UNIDO 2012). It has to be noted, however, that in some countries that are experiencing deindustrialization, or a declining share of industry in their GDP, the effort is undertaken to stop this trend and return to the policy of reindustrialization. The Industrial Development Report (UNIDO 2016) reveals that the declining manufacturing in developed countries does not necessarily mean the same in developing countries. It can be attributed to country specific conditions rather than to systematic and long-term reduction in manufacturing’s potential contribution to the economy. Premature deindustrialization can be a serious threat to growth in developing countries, suppressing the potential development of manufacturing. Since the beginning of industrialization a great deal of attention has been devoted to the question of industrial policy. Should government policy makers intervene in markets or not, and if the decision is to do so, what type of policy instruments should be used? The industrial policy can be understood as “guiding government intervention to promote selectively certain industries or activities…” (i.a. Lin and Chang 2009). There is a long list of economists who believed that selective interventions in markets are necessary in order to stimulate economic and industrial development and structural changes. UNIDO’s industrial policy approach is defined as government interventions “aimed at steering economic activity, particularly the intra-and inter – sectoral structure of production, towards areas that are expected to offer better prospects for economic growth than would be the case in the absence of such interventions” (Browne 2012). Strategic industrial policy makers should concentrate on interventions that are most likely to achieve long lasting effects.

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However, some economists assume that â&#x20AC;&#x153;uncertainty ensures that even optimal policies will lead to mistakes. The task for government is to recognize those mistakes and withdraw support before they become too costlyâ&#x20AC;? (Rodrik 2010). The Great Recession of 2008-2009 has led to a major rethinking towards rejuvenating industrial policy (Stiglitz et al. 2013). As the majority of countries today carry out some form of industrial policy, the relevant question is no longer whether it is needed, but rather how it should be implemented in order to achieve the optimal effect, reduce rent-seeking, corruption, maximize learning and contribute to necessary structural transformation. Human rights-based approach in industrialization The direct relationship between industrialization and human rights and dignity appear upon first glance not easy to prove. If you look into the concept of industrialization from a narrow perspective it appears, indeed, that it has nothing to do with human rights. Industrialization has been always associated with extracting or processing raw materials and semi-finished products to obtain final products with higher value addition. However, when the process of industrialization is considered in a broader context, also including social inclusiveness, it is easier to draw a common ground and relevance with human rights and dignity. Social aspects of industrialization are of particular relevance, but not only. A human rights-based approach is deeply incorporated in the current post 2015 development agenda. The ultimate beneficiaries are people. By adding social inclusiveness to industrialization in SDG 9 the feedback loop has become clear; industrialization issues received a new social dimension. The focus is no longer placed exclusively on manufacturing but on people who are attending these processes and their social requirements. The approach facilitates creating and finding linkages between industrialization and human dignity and rights Human rights and dignity belong to the most fundamental rights incorporated into various international and domestic legal acts (constitutions, treaties and conventions, laws, codes, etc.). They are the statutory backbone of the United Nations and its agencies. Due to universal application in civic, political, economic, social or cultural spheres, they are formulated in a holistic manner. Special relevance for establishing the links between human rights and social inclusiveness in industrialization will have those, which address the social, economic, quality of life, wellbeing and cultural rights of each human person. The process of industrialization teaches not only what and how to produce, but also with whom and for whom the goods are manufactured. The process is highly complex and multidimensional. Throughout the production process people are placed at its center. People- men and women, regardless of their gender identities, skin colour, ethnicities, statuses, religious beliefs and practices or lack of, as well as their productive age. They organize, supervise, control and participate in the whole production cycle. People cannot be entirely replaced by machines regardless of advances in technological development, automation, and/or the extensive use of robots. More and more specialists are increasingly needed with advanced managerial and technical skills. The relationship between more sophisticated industrial production and the growing demand for higher technical education and training is obvious.

The structural changes driven by new technologies boost the development of new industries and industry-related services entailing good prospects for absorbing the unemployed labour force from agriculture and informal sectors. They trigger productivity increases, higher wages and family income. In turn, the higher income has a direct effect on upgrading social conditions of work, social security, ensuring better social protection for employees as well as for their families and their communities. Properly managed industrial enterprises are able to generate funds for retirees and provide them with pensions. Conclusion Wide participation of people in the production cycle requires adequate enabling behaviors, supportive personal and systemic cultures and ethics in line with UN standards and norms. Industrialization creates conditions for upgrading the production culture and necessary ethical behaviors, which can differ among countries, and regions, depending upon the original system of traditions, values and social priorities. It teaches tolerance, equal treatment of men and women participating in the production process as well as a freedom of choice. Inclusive and sustainable industrial development enables opportunities for enhancing standards of living. As noted above, it builds and sustains connections with human rights and enables people, in their diversities, to live in a more dignified way. As such industrialization responds directly to human rights embodied in Articles, 22, 23 and 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other UN legal instruments. 1 F. Chief, Europe and Newly Independent States Programme, United Nations Industrial Organization (retired). Member of

ACUNS; participant in RAUN sessions as practitioner and jury member; civil society activist in the Vienna International Center.

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Corruption and organized crime challenges in the western Balkans1 Ugljesa Ugi Zvekic2

Introduction With the adoption of the “Transforming our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development” by the United Nations General Assembly at the Summit on Sustainable Development, and particularly Goal 16 “Peace and Justice,” organized crime, corruption and other illicit activities were for the first time consensually recognized as important components of the development process, and as an impediment to the successful achievement of the agreed goals. The 2030 Agenda fully appreciates that there is no peace without justice and development. This was a long process which lasted over decades and to which many people contributed through their work in academia, governments, civil society, as well as the United Nations Secretariat and specialized agencies, funds and programmes. Michael Platzer with his long career in the United Nations, and in particular in the drugs and crime programme at the Vienna headquarters and in the field (now United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime-UNODC), was among those United Nations staff who understood well, and well ahead of the formal recognition, the linkage referred to above between peace, justice and development. His long UN career placed him in the position to work and understand the complexity of crime and development linkage in many parts of the world, including the Caribbean and the post-conflict context of the former Yugoslavia, especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina. He worked with the justice sector knowing that bringing peace means bringing legal certainty and functioning justice. In a certain sense, Michael’s engagement in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the mid-1990s in a very practical sense exemplified what was to be formally adopted some twenty years later as Goal 16 of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. What follows next attempts to capture some of the features of the crime-development nexus in the western Balkans; thus, in tune with Goal 16 and the developments in the region in which and for which Michael Platzer worked with full professional commitment and full humane passion. Corruption and organized crime in the regional perspective: The western Bakans The discussion of corruption and organized crime will focus on the western Balkans namely, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia and Kosovo3. The 2014 Corruption Percepions Index (CPI) shows the perceived level of corruption in the western Balkan region and illustrates that the majority of countries from the region have an average level with from 74 | 75

64 to 80 out of 175 points. Albania with a rank of 110 and Kosovo also with a rank of 110 stand out. It is important to note that southeastern Europe is equally divided among five EU members (Greece, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia) and the non-EU members (the western Balkans); EU members on average have a much better Transparency International (TI) ranking than non-EU members. This shows that by reducing public administration corruption, which is usually reflected in the TI, CPI – one of the requirements for joining the EU – can be met. According to the findings from TI and also the UNODC surveys (2010) on both population and businesses in the western Balkan region, bribery has one of the highest prevalence rates (13%). Figure 1. Annual prevalence rates for different types of crime. Annual prevalence rates for different types of crime, western Balkan region (2010) 14% 12% 10% 8% 6% 4%

Car theft

Robbery

Burglary

Assault/ Threat

10%

Theft

2% 14% 0% 12%

Bribery

Annual prevalence rates for different types of crime, western Balkan region (2010)

Source: UNODC (2011), “Corruption in the western Balkans: Bribery as experienced by the Population”, p.47. 6%

Robbery

Burglary

Assault/ Threat

Car theft

Performance of Government

Theft

Corruption

Bribery

Percentage distribtion ofmostly adult population selected issues as thewith mosta preThe second crime field which is prevalent in considering the western Balkan region is “theft” 2%Balkan region (2010) important in their country, western valence rate of slightly over 4%. Note the enormous difference of eight percentage points regar0% ding the occurrence of conventional crimes like theft and assault, on the one hand, and bribery, Unemployment Poverty/Low standard of living issue in the context of the regional security picture. on the other. Corruption is therefore a serious

Figure 2. Percentage distribution of adult population considering selected issues as the Crime and security mostBuilding important in their country. a functioning public administration Conditions of of infrastucture Percentage distribtion adult population considering selected issues as the most Poor performance education Balkan region (2010) important in their country,ofwestern Relation between ethic groups Unemployment Environment degradation Poverty/Low standard of living 0%

5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35%

Corruption Performance of Government Crime and security Building a functioning public administration Conditions of infrastucture Poor performance of education

Percentage distribution of bribes paid by purpose of payment, western Balkan region (2010)

Relation between ethic groups

Environment degradation

Receive better treatment 0%

5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35%

Speed up procedure

Source: UNODC (2011), “Corruption in the western Balkans: Bribery as experienced by the Population”, p. 43.

Avoid payment of fine

Finalization of procedure Receive information Reduce cost of procedure

Percentage distribution of bribes paid by purpose of payment,

Poverty/Low standard of living Unemployment Corruption

Poverty/Low standard of living Performance of Government Corruption Crime and security

Performance Government Building a functioning publicof administration Crime and security Conditions of infrastucture

Building a functioning public administration Poor performance of education

Further, it was of outlined that the most important issues in the western Balkan region are perceived to Conditions Relation between infrastucture ethic groups Poor performance education be unemployment (33%), poverty (20%) and then corruption (19%). Another outstanding issue conEnvironment of degradation Relation between ethic groups cerns the performance of the 0% government (15%) which may also30% be connected to the these issues. In5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 35% Environment degradation frastructure, education, environmental deterioration, and ethnic equality concern few Balkan adults. 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% There is no doubt that on the agenda of public opinion concerns, corruption is ranked very high. Figure 3. Percentage distribution of bribes paid by purpose of payment (2010). Percentage distribution of bribes paid by purpose of payment, western Balkan region (2010) Percentage distribution of bribes paid by purpose of payment, western Balkan region (2010) Receive better treatment Speed up procedure Receive better treatment Avoid payment of fine Speed up procedure Finalization of procedure Avoid payment of fine Receive information Finalization of procedure Reduce cost of procedure Receive information Don‘t remember Reduce cost of procedure Avoid other problems Don‘t remember No specific purpose Avoid other problems No specific purpose

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

5% Balkans: 10% Bribery 15% as20% 25%by the 30% Source: UNODC (2011), “Corruption0% in the western experienced Population”, p. 23.

Percentage distribution of bribes paid, bypaid, purpose of payment, Figure 4. Prevalence distribution of bribes by purpose of payment (2012). western Balkan region (2012) Percentage distribution of bribes paid, by purpose of payment, western region (2012) SpeedBalkan up procedure No specific purpose stated Speed up procedure Receive better treatment No specific purpose stated Finalization of procedure Receive better treatment Reduce cost of procedure Finalization of procedure Receive information Reduce cost of procedure Don‘t remember Receive information

10%

15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 45%

10%

15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 45%

Don‘t remember Source: UNODC (2013) “Business Corruption and Crime in the western Balkans: The Impact of Crime and other Bribery on Private Enterprise”, p. 28. Prevalence of bribery by public officials receiving the bribe, western Balkan region (2010) For citizens, used as anofficials effective instruments to: to speed up procedures (45%), receive Prevalence ofbribery briberyisby public receiving the bribe, western Balkan region (2010) Police officers better treatment (0.28%), avoid payment of a fine (16%) and finalize a procedure (12%). Further,

Doctors

a connectionCustoms with illicit elements and those who pay bribes is always visible, for corruption is Police officers officers Nurses mostly a partnershipDoctors composed of corruptor and corrupted. As a result, the center of the problem LandCustoms registry officers officers was locatedJudges/Prosecutors in publicNurses administration, as for it to function efficiently for clients, administrators Municipal registry officers officers need to beLand bribed. Tax officers

Judges/Prosecutors Car registration Municipal officers officers Public utilities Tax officers officers Similarly, business paid bribes to public administration (nearly 40%) to speed up procedures, Teachers/Lecturers Car registration officers Social protection officers officers whereas Public moreutilities than 15% of bribes were paid with no specific purpose. To receive better treatMunicipal elected representatives Teachers/Lecturers ment, Social less than 15% of bribes paid. Also the finalization of procedures was listed among protection officers 0%were 2% 4% 6% 8% 10% 12% Municipal elected representatives the reasons for bribery, accounting for some 12%. 0%

10%

12% 76 | 77

Percentage distribution of bribe-paying businesses that pay bribes to selected types of public official, western Balkan region (2012) Percentage distribution of bribe-paying businesses that pay bribes to selected

Speed up procedure No specific purpose stated Receive betterPercentage treatment

distribution of bribes paid, by purpose of payment, region (2012)

Finalization ofwestern procedureBalkan

Reduce cost of procedure Speed up procedure Receive information No specific purpose stated public administration Don‘t remember sector there Receive better treatment 0% 5% 10%

Within the are certain occupational categories and public 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 45% institution that are more vulnerable to corruption. Finalization of procedure

Reduce cost of procedure

Figure 5. Prevalence of bribery by public officials receiving the bribe. Receive information

Prevalence of bribery by public officials receiving the bribe, western Don‘t remember 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% Balkan region (2010) Police officers Doctors Customs officers PrevalenceNurses of bribery by public officials receiving the bribe, Land registry officers Balkan region (2010) Judges/Prosecutors Municipal officers Tax officers Police officers Doctors Car registration officers Customs officers Public utilities officers Nurses Teachers/Lecturers Land registry officers Social protection officers Judges/Prosecutors Municipal elected representatives Municipal officers 0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10% 12% Tax officers

40% 45%

western

Car registration officers

Source: UNODC (2011), “CorruptionPublic in the western utilities Balkans: officersBribery as experienced by the Population”, p. 25.

Teachers/Lecturers Social protection officers Public officials receiving bribes are mostly police officers (11.5%) but also doctors (9%), customs Municipal elected representatives

officersdistribution (6.5%) and judges or prosecutors (5%).0% 2% bribes 4% to 6% 8% Percentage of bribe-paying businesses that pay selected types of public official, western Balkan region (2012)

10%

12%

Figure 6. Percentage distribution of bribe-paying businesses that pay bribes to selected Municipal or provincial officers types of publicTax/revenues official officers Customs officers

Public utilities officers Percentage distribution of bribe-paying businesses that pay bribes to selected Police officers types of public official, western Balkan region (2012) Inspection officers Land registry officers Municipal or provincial officers Health authorities Tax/revenues officers Municipal or provencial elected representatives Customs officers Other public officials Social protection agency/ministry Public officersutilities officers Judges/Prosecutors Police officers Inspection officers Members of Parliament/Government Land registry officers 0%authorities 5% 10% Health

15%

20%

25%

30%

Municipal or provencial elected representatives Other public officials Social protection agency/ministry officers Judges/Prosecutors Members of Parliament/Government 0%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

Source: UNODC (2013) “Business Corruption and Crime in the western Balkans: The Impact of Crime and other Bribery on Private Enterprise”, p. 30.

Not only citizens, but also businesses pay a vast amout of bribes to public officials, as depicted in Figure 6. Correspondingly, nearly 30% of bribes paid by businesses are directed towards municipal or provincial officers, closely followed by tax/revenues officers (27%) Members of parliament or government as well as judges or prosecutors are among the least bribed public officials at less than 5%. As a result, it was stated that the largest share of bribes is paid to local public officials, further reinforcing the impact that corruption exercises on the public admnistration sector, incuding tax revenues.

As pointed out above much of the perceived corruption is centered within public administration in the western Balkans which clearly identifies it as a target for much of the anti-corruption work, particularly in view of EU accession conditions. Police corruption in Serbia It is noteworthy that not all sectors of public administration are affected by corruption to the same extent; certainly the more serious the case in question, the more public officials will engage with the public and the more likely it is that some form of bribery could take place. It also depends on the position and function the public official enjoys. Specifically for Serbia, some police sectors vulnerable to corruption were researched: among the most common sectors are traffic police (75%) and economic crime (71%), border police (68%), criminalistics (59%) the ministry of interior (47%) and also special police units mostly concerned with anti-drug cases (32%) –the latter is traditionally most exposed to corruption (Djordjevic 2015).4 The forms of police corruption were singled out as follows: bribery by criminals for favours regarding their sentence or fine (47%), bribery by citizens, e.g., if they need an administrative document (23%), selling of “secret investigative” information usually to the defense in preparation for a trial (6%). These are very serious indicators of the weaknesses of the police sector in Serbia. Correspondingly, the utmost priority areas for police reforms considered important are: increasing accountability and fighting corruption in police. Concluding observations: Political economy of organized corruption in the western Balkans Corruption is becoming less and less an individual act, given that it requires organization, division of labour and people who act, launder and in the end legalise the profits. The distinction between active and passive corruption is increasingly fading. The process occurring in the Balkan region was fuelled by the fall of the Berlin Wall which enormously affected the rest of the world. Part of eastern Europe went through a “Wild West” privatization experience when the former Communist party nomenclature and organized crime bought up formerly state-owned real estate like factories, enterprises and land. This process led to the legalization of the representatives of the old regime and organized crime in a new environment – as businessmen; it still affects the ability to prevent and control organized crime and corruption. On the other hand, organized crime in the Balkan region was traditionally involved in drug trafficking and cigarette smuggling, and later on also focused on human and arms trafficking (in particular during the Yugoslav wars). Attention was also called to the process of legalizing profit through money laundering in the real estate business, banking, gambling industry and the financial markets. Corruption plays an important instrumental role in the process of the legalization of illicit gains. The main problem in the future will be the entry of organized crime into the financial market through the acquisition of shares and the use of corruption for “trading in influence”. Moreover, it has been warned that this phenomenon is particularly difficult to fight on a local and international level and will require more partnerships with the corporate sector, and requiring companies to take responsibility for the illicit flow of money within their enterprise. This would also pose a problem of interference by government in the market economy; this would mean that a totally different economic model could be prompted because of the penetration of the new modalities of operation by organized crime and corruption. 78 | 79

Summing up, organized crime and corruption go hand in hand. This is particularly evident in the western Balkans which has a certain level of political and economic instability. The Yugoslav war and the privatization of the economic sector provided ample opportunities for organized crime to launder, corrupt, and legalize its presence. Today it is no longer a question of whether there is police and judicial capacity to tackle organized crime and corruption. It is a matter of political commitment and good public and corporate management – good governance. 1 This is an abridged and modified version of the contribution to the forthcoming: Ursula Totel, Gergana Bulanova-Hristova and Gerhard

Flash: Research Conferences on Organized Crime at the Bundeskriminalamt in Germany” (Vol.III) 2013-2015, Wiesbaden, BKA.

2 Senior Advisor, Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime; Adjunct Professor at the Law School, University of Belgrade,

Serbia; School of Government, LUISS, and the Law School, University Roma Tre, Rome, Italy; former Ambassador of Serbia to the

United Nations at Geneva; former United Nations official at UNICRI and UNODC.

3 Kosovo as per the UN Security Council resolution 1244. 4 Based on the research project “Integrity and the Trust in the Police in the western Balkans”, sponsored by the EU.

The 3 Ms: A recipe to (un)learn helplessness and clear the road to people? Sławomir Redo1

Introduction The Preamble to the 2015 Declaration by the United Nations General Assembly, “Transforming our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development,” implies that “people” are one of the five essential elements of sustainable development (SD), which aims, inter alia, to “end poverty and hunger, in all their forms and dimensions, and to ensure that all human beings can fulfil their potential in dignity and equality and in a healthy environment…and secure the participation of all…including children…migrants and indigenous peoples”. In 2013 the Secretary-General of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) said that over the next 50 years: “The world our children and grandchildren inherit may be starkly different from ours” (OECD 2013). Moreover, research informs that: • In 2050, 10.2% of the European population will be Muslim (PEW 2015); and • It has been calculated, and proven experimentally, that 10% of like-minded people in a society can be a tipping point for massive behavioural change (Minority 2011). If these findings are true, would they impact the culture of lawfulness in the OECD countries and in the world in general? Whatever happens, this brief criminological essay will try to answer the first-order, but very “iffy,” policy question of the impact of immigration on lawfulness by: • Explaining what is meant by the three “Ms” (Migration, Mercy, and Multiculturalism) in the title; and • Looking at how the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals can be best implemented in the next 15 years in order to foster a culture of lawfulness. Migration In 2015 the migrant population grew to 250 million people (World Bank 2015). People smuggling and other international irregular forms of migration – more often than not South-North – involve approximately 10-15% of the entire migrant population (ILO 2006). The relatively small proportion of irregular migration in total immigration still raises troubling security and welfare concerns globally and locally. This is because illegal migrants are vulnerable 80 | 81

to human rights abuses everywhere and generate law enforcement and criminal justice problems themselves. Resolving the problem of irregular migration certainly involves crime abatement, particularly if the immigrants come from strikingly different legal cultures. However, a legal culture alone cannot explain other overwhelming law enforcement problems. As mentioned above, once international migration from a particular region reaches a certain point, it tends to take on an internal momentum of its own (Sanderson and Kentor 2009, 316). Generally, too little is known about how that momentum develops and how it can be countered over time (de Haas 2009). However, according to Coleman (2016) and various other press accounts, the 2015-2016 immigrant intake problems in Western Europe have caused: • a massive number of sexual assaults during the 2016 New Year festivities in some cities; • desperate attempts by migrants in the so-called Jungle camp in Calais, France, to board cross-Channel ferries to England by hiding in trucks; • in situ gang-type burglaries and robberies; • single acts of violence, including the stabbing to death of an asylum worker by a 15-year-old immigrant (BBC 2016). Such acts are happenstance. In other cases, they result from complex criminal entrepreneurship that brings together illicit drug trafficking with inter-ethnic competition for the control of central aspects of distribution networks (Friman 2004). Immigrant-related crime problems may also involve religious and political violence, other unrest, and, last but not least, problems with acculturation. At their core is the issue of trust. This is not only absent on the side of the immigrants but has been withdrawn by receiving communities offended by the uncivil behavior of some immigrants. Where trust is absent and despair prevails, no country in the world is able to work for the sort of peaceful, inclusive, and prosperous sustainable development envisioned for 2030. Other forms of migrant crime have been compared with crime by non-immigrant (indigenous) populations. A comprehensive review of studies compared Europe and the USA (Ellis et al. 2009, ch. 2). The review found that in Europe where, since the 1950s, substantial immigration from various African, Middle Eastern, and East Asian countries has occurred into France, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, crime and delinquency rates have been higher among first-generation immigrants and their descendants than among nativeborn populations. However, the review continues, the immigrant’s country of origin seemed to be more relevant to criminal and delinquent acts than to immigrant status per se. For example, a French study found that immigrants who came from other European countries had crime rates that were actually lower than the overall French average, but that immigrants from Algeria had higher crime rates than the overall French average. Similarly, two British studies found that there were higher rates of crime among immigrants from various African countries than among the indigenous British population, while immigrants from Asian countries (mainly India and Pakistan) actually had somewhat lower rates. A study in Israel found that

Jewish immigrants from Africa had higher rates of delinquency, while those from India had essentially the same rates of delinquency as Jews of European or American descent (Ellis et al. 2009, ch. 2). Mercy Since the time of the Protestant Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), one of the founders of public international law, mercy or assistance to those in need has been regarded as, first, beneficence (an action done to benefit others) and, next, as benevolence (being disposed to act to benefit others). Eventually, in positive law, mercy/assistance has become synonymous with distributive justice, but it has not become a part of natural law (Fleischacker 2004; Szalkoczai 2007). According to another Protestant philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), caring for the poor should be a state rather than a private obligation (Kant 1800/1996). With this interpretation of distributive justice, mercy /assistance has gradually become recognized as a virtue separate from justice. In the Western world it has become legally enforceable and a part of the state’s duty-based ethics (Kennedy 2003). Since Kant, it has internationalized. For example, in 1885 the international anti-slavery conference in Berlin forbade slave trade and introduced a soft legal norm, the principle of “native welfare,” as a matter of international concern, although “native welfare” was often applied by the colonizers in a remarkably perverse form (Woodward 2010, 160-161).2 Protestant lawyers and philosophers have helped give current public international law a strongly reformist social influence (Kooijmans 1976). No wonder therefore that the “social gospel of Protestantism” (Mitman 1992, 69) can also be felt in the UN Charter (arts. 13 and 55). The said “gospel” and the UN Charter, in fact, compete for influence. The UN Charter legitimized welfare assistance as the duty of states, as part not of natural law, but of public international law. By virtue of Article 55 of the Charter, meeting welfare needs is pivotal for good governance. Through various forms of such governance (global, state, local) the UN promotes social justice, human rights, and humanitarian cooperation. “Access to justice” is the newest UN contribution to good governance, elsewhere known as pro bono public service or benevolence (e.g., Confucianism). For all practical purposes, the UN not only finds welfare assistance as right and moral, but also uses it as a capacity-building instrument for reducing helplessness that is self-sustaining due to over-dependency on welfare. Early education for reformist attitudes and values that may limit that over-dependency is one of the keys to reaching the 2016-2030 UN sustainable development goals (SDGs) at the level of the individual. Multiculturalism Multiculturalism refers to the policy of absorbing immigrant groups, particularly the institutional ability of modern states to integrate them culturally. Accordingly, this criminological essay specifically focuses on a recent integration issue, namely: (a) successful education into a UN culture of lawfulness, and (b) its post-2015 time frame within that culture.

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Conceptually, this section of the essay is intended to cover the developmental/transitional phase which aims to: “ensure that all learners acquire the knowledge and skills needed to promote sustainable development and sustainable lifestyles, including, among others… human rights, gender equality, promotion of a culture of peace and non-violence, global citizenship and appreciation of cultural diversity and of culture’s contribution to sustainable development” (A/RES/70/1, SDG 4.7). This target is a normatively aspirational benchmark for the UN’s “unity in diversity” approach.3 It implies advancement of unity through the countering of uncivil behaviors: on the one side, xenophobic victimization of immigrants; on the other side, culturally condoned immigrant conduct choices, for example, so-called honor killings, female genital mutilation, and other forms of violence toward women, domestic or not (including those during 2015/16 festivities). Both xenophobic victimization of immigrants and violence toward women show two things. First, the dark side of culture of lawfulness. In Western societies group or other sexual molestation of women, public disapproval of adultery and other forms of collective harassment (“charivari”- “rough music”) were customarily allowed in feudal and early capitalist time (Davis 1971). They continue as gang rapes, group sexual assaults or “taharrush jama’i” elsewhere. Immigrants’ “festive” behavior is a case in point. Second, it is surprising to note how de facto little from modern European culture has permeated other legal cultures in terms of global values and contents of civil conduct. De jure, civil and civic contents of the UN culture of lawfulness is being progressively enhanced by an ever-growing number of interculturally relevant crime prevention and criminal justice standards and norms. From the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) to today, some 70 other UN legal instruments have been adopted with over 2,000 substantive standards and norms, as well as many more such legal instruments of a non-criminological character. However, such progress is not linear but has ups and downs and twists and turns. The UN process of global integration is remarkably similar to the academic concept of a state “process…by which peoples of diverse racial origins and different cultural heritages, occupying a common territory achieve a cultural solidarity sufficient at least to sustain a national existence” expressed by Park (1930, 281). But the UN process also involves a notion of global identity through which individuals from various cultures can relate to each other and sustain international coexistence. The UN notion of identity is much more heterogeneous compared with national identity or regional identity (e.g., European). Based on these interlaced state/UN features and instruments, a review of research on acculturation challenges suggests that in the post 9/11 era, Islam has been seen as the biggest threat to Western states and that Muslim culture and practices are no longer embraced by them (Nagra and Peng 2013). Research shows that Muslims are unwelcome even in Canada, which is indexed as structurally the most multiculturally adaptive (MPI 2015) and most naturalization-friendly country (Bloemraad 2006), in the Western world. Indeed, the researchers’ conclusion is that affiliation with Islam is seen as a sign of disloyalty to the Western world (Nagra and Peng 2013).

Thus, the level of mutual trust has dropped drastically, and religious values are a major factor in this. In the case of irregular migrants who may exclusively depend on welfare benefits (unless they turn to crime and are imprisoned), their Muslim faith, as close-held and important as it is, may hinder trust especially in a shrinking job market. A shrinking job market increases the perception of ethnic over-dependency on welfare, including reliance on one’s own family. It hardens the ethnic fabric, facilitates criminal entrepreneurship, other crime, and fear of victimization. The EU “welfare land” is less economically and culturally adaptable to external immigration than is North America, the land of immigrants and job seekers. The USA is not so attractive for welfare seekers, as the level of public expenditures there is 25% lower than the EU15 average (Kerr and Kerr 2011, 20). Europe and the USA, however, share one common feature – punitiveness. It makes their societies resentful toward the offenders in their prisons, mainly people who are socioeconomically disadvantaged (Kury and Shea 2011). Muslim inmates are no exception, accounting as they do for around 5% of the UK population and over 10% of its prison population (Shaw 2015). The official UK prison report records that among the Muslim inmates interviewed in one highsecurity prison4, there are also recent converts to Islam, either as a result of intimidation and/ or in order to gain protection from Muslim inmates (IMB 2015). The supporting expert report adds that conversion to Islam has become a fairly frequent in-prison phenomenon in the UK, making the religion a part of “prison subculture.” This is reportedly because of the absence of pro-social alternatives perceived by some inmates (the effect of poor education in prisons which promotes the learning of helplessness) coupled with “politically correct” but emotionally withdrawn and unconfident prison staff. This has led to mistrust and anxiety between the prison staff and Muslim inmates (Liebling et al. 2012, ch. 8). The European Social Survey (ESS) suggests that the market assimilation (the prerequisite of integration) of immigrants from Eastern European and developing countries in the former EU15 destination countries (plus Norway) is proceeding faster than their cultural integration (Aleksynska and Algan 2010).5 The ESS analysts report significant progress among first- and second-generation immigrants in learning the language of the receiving state, gaining citizenship, taking up an occupation and earning an income, and civic participation. Moreover, the first-generation immigrants had more trust in police and other authorities than native-born and second-generation immigrants, may be because of higher unemployment. The latter had comparatively higher rates of citizenship than the first generation. Both have continued their original religious practices in their new countries. However, it is the tolerant anti-discrimination policies of host countries that influence immigrants’ perception as to how they feel there. In tolerant countries, migrants follow their religious practices less intensively. Nonetheless, first-generation immigrants from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) are particularly unsettled and vulnerable. The ESS analysis shows that in comparison with most other immigrants, they endure hardship because of their: • insufficient knowledge of the language(s) of their host country, and • fewer years of schooling in comparison with the native born and other immigrants, both of which reduce their eligibility for tertiary education.

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Separately, among MENA immigrants and others from the African and South American group of first-generation immigrants with that reduced eligibility, the ESS analysis indicates immigrants’ strong preferences for income redistribution in the host countries (the feeling of economic deprivation). Criminologically, this spells trouble.6 The ESS analysis finally suggests that: • Unlike in the past, host countries now offer less room for immigrants to express their own cultural identities, and are also seeing new immigrants’ (particularly MENA immigrants’) level of formal education deteriorating. In other words, in receiving societies that do not readily embrace multiculturalism, poorly educated immigrants may find it hard to accept social assimilation according to monocultural values and norms. This invites conflicts with the law. • The reduced number of years of education of immigrants and their adherence to some of their original religious values within their new environment stand in many immigrants’ way of living successfully in a modern secular state; • A conscious civic act of gaining the host country’s citizenship and playing by its rules poses a great multicultural and security challenge to (non-)secular educationalists and educators. The 2015 immigration crisis and the 13/11 Paris terrorist attack which largely involved MENA immigrants bound for, or living in, Europe greatly tested the European culture of lawfulness with its security precepts and priorities; • In ESS countries with friendly labor market access, immigrants have lower unemployment rates than those that have poor access. The OECD (2015) complementary analysis confirms that the greater the size of the immigrant population in the EU countries (plus Canada and the USA), the more likely the immigrants are to find employment there. However, by contrast, there is no correlation between a host country’s immigrant unemployment rate and the size of immigrants’ population. In addition, new arrivals are, on average, better educated than longer-settled immigrants, and their children feel less discriminated than those of longer-settled immigrants. The above suggests that it is not the unemployment rate alone but other factors (demographic, ideological, cultural, etc.) that affect the pace of integration, probably including the relative size of national origin groups. If the proportion of the immigrant population is high in comparison with a host country’s native population, this can slow down immigrants’ integration into its culture, especially when a host country is politically, institutionally, and socioeconomically ill-prepared to deal with them. No doubt, the length of time for economic assimilation and cultural integration varies greatly among host countries and among immigrants. It may be shorter or longer, depending on the political or economic motivation for immigration (asylum seeking or economic migration). This way thus invites various political, social welfare, civic, religious and other criminological concerns. They go beyond the economic market alone into general “Prosperity” - another essential element of the UN SDGs. These factors should prompt: • Long-term coordinated work by various UN stakeholders to redistribute responsibility for shared prosperity may help achieve SD Goal 16 of peaceful and inclusive societies;

• • •

Thoughtful and effective harmonization within Europe and the UN SDGs 2016-2030 agenda across the North-South and South-South axes will foster security and an improved intercultural, humanitarian, and welfare framework; The revisiting of elementary pedagogical elements, precepts, and priorities for education and re-education in order to foster peace and justice in a multicultural society according to modern civil society precepts; The question as to whether OECD’s general finding of better educated immigrants contradicts the ESS finding of a comparatively poor education of MENA new arrivals, or it is a methodological artifact. In other words, do better educated MENA people stay in home countries and seek development opportunities there, while others (more helpless and more desperate?) leave them for the EU?

Conclusion The arithmetically based “Königstein key” proposed for the 2015 EU-wide migrant distribution originally featured in the title of this essay. Since arithmetical calculations alone cannot do justice to the problems outlined above, the word “recipe” was substituted as a more sensitive way of looking into integration as the major vehicle of multiculturalism. The parenthetical “(un) learn” in the title, and the question mark at the end suggest that any answers to the impact of immigration on the culture of lawfulness are at best ambiguous. However, the reader who expected this ambiguous answer to the central questions posed by the statement of the OECD Secretary-General, namely, that world our children and grandchildren inherit may be starkly different from our own, may take account of the following: • In view of the empirical evidence that over 10% of like-minded people in a given population may cause a tipping point, it is actually (in)formal education that makes a difference as to what ideas will take hold in the mind. It is therefore of utmost importance that a concerted effort be made within the OECD Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA), UNICEF, UNESCO, the EU Bologna Process, and the United Nations Academic Impact Initiative to address the question of the moral education of young and older students’ (including training of their parents), within the context of multiculturalism in line with the United Nations civic education standards and norms; • The UN’s responses to various rule-of-law challenges have been driven by the powers of the developed world. However, round about the time of the Fourteenth UN Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (2020) emerging economies will have risen in importance and China may have surpassed the USA on the list of world’s top ten largest economies in GDP terms. The overall balance of economic power in the world will then be tipped in favor of developing countries (China and India among them).7 By 2025 about 52% of global output may be produced by emerging and developing economies and 48% by the advanced economies of today.8 As a result of the above shift, a new “hegemonial logic” (Falk 1992, 34) will start taking hold in people’s minds. What then will be the orientation of the UN Rule of Law and the UN’s capacities in terms of normative language, logic, and judgment?

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The 2011 World Bank Report estimates, based on current trends, that it may take 42 years for the 20 fastest-growing developing countries to reach threshold levels on the rule of law (World Bank 2011, 11). The questions are: What sort of rule-of-law indicators will there be in 2050? Will there be fewer or more checks and balances? What will be the interplay between these and the subtleties of acculturation, which is, after all, the prerequisite of integration? Rather than replying to these baffling questions relating to a new culture of lawfulness, it is probably more useful to conclude that prosperity, peace, and democracy are not a given anywhere. Making them happen is a developmental imperative. There is no development without education. Making development sustainable calls for more education. From cradle to grave this education should include the learning of problem-solving skills to reduce the self-sustaining poverty of thought9, so migrants will not feel foreign in their new home country. Poverty of thought may doom and deprive people of sustainable livelihood and result in their living on others’ mercy in their home country or new host country. An intercultural dimension of education must be introduced and effectively thought in all countries. Peaceful, non-violent and prosperous societies cannot tolerate “rough music”. Let us hope that the road to “people” can be well cleared and serviced. According to projections, the number of migrants will keep growing beyond 2030 when the aims of the current UN SDGs will be hopefully achieved. That road needs effective intercultural education and communication. It must also be a pragmatic construction with a strong civic and work ethic at the global and local level. The author salutes Michael Platzer for his landmark contributions to “people” and “partnerships” on both the educational and civil society fronts. Such individual and collective efforts are undoubtedly the best recipe for the future “peace” and “prosperity” of everyone on our “planet.” 1 Dr. hab. (Law/Criminology); Senior Adviser, Academic Council on the United Nations System (Liaison Office, Vienna, Austria);

former United Nations Senior Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Expert and staff of the United Nations Office on Drugs

and Crime (retired); Guest Lecturer at the universities in Austria, China and Poland. Teaches a graduate course on “The United

Nations and Crime Prevention”.

2 Leopold II, King of the Belgians, was able to procure Congo in Central Africa by convincing the European community that

he was involved in humanitarian and philanthropic work, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Congo_Free_State.

3 http://unchronicle.un.org/article/unity-diversity-integrative-approach-intercultural-relations/ 4 Some of them convicted for 7/7 London bombings (2005). 5 This ESS analysis is also presented in Redo (2016; forthcoming) providing other sources and data on unlearning helplessness

relevant to the implementation of the post-2015 UN sustainable development agenda.

6 Generally, poor education, economic inequality, and religiosity are correlated with various forms of crime and delinquency.

Yet there is no single religion that particularly matters (Ellis et al. 2009: 35-36, 60, 114-115). Situationally, other data show

that poor education facilitates a Muslim facet of prison subculture in the UK (Liebling et al., 2012; IMB, 2015).

7 www.therichest.org/world/worlds-largest-economies/ 8 Altogether 55 countries (see Global Economic Outlook 2013, http://www.conference-board.org/data/globaloutlook.cfm.

“Output” means here capital plus labor inputs plus a residual (salvage) value composed of a value of technological progress

plus production efficiency remaining as an asset after it has been fully depreciated).

9 Poverty of thought results in a pattern where a person keeps returning to the same limited set of ideas (edited from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mental_status_examination).

Restorative Justice: A cooperative process that changes the rules of the game? Helmut Kury1 and Evelyn Shea2

Introduction The most common spontaneous reaction to (severe) crime almost everywhere is to punish the offender and, should this not stop his criminal activities, to punish him more severely. The concept is simple: if the cure does not work, increase the dose. This call for severe punishment also has to be seen as a reaction to increasing insecurities and fears in a more and more complex world with open frontiers, a seemingly overwhelming immigration rate of refugees and deteriorating living conditions in big cities. Dramatizing media reporting also plays a considerable part in generalizing such fears. (Platzer et al. 2013; Platzer 2016; Kury, Redo & Shea 2016). Yet even if at first glance a "tough on crime" policy may seem reassuring, it does not hold what it promises: in England, for instance, a country with one of the highest prison population rates in Europe (152 inmates per 1000,000 population), 59 % of inmates with short prison terms (12 month and less) re-offend in the first year after their release (Ministry of Justice, England and Wales, 2014). In Italy, a slightly older study puts the figure even higher with a recidivism rate of ex-inmates of 68 % (Leonardi 2007). Western industrial countries are therefore increasingly “re-discovering” other ways of addressing crime and social deviance, ways that were already employed in centuries past, for example in Medieval Europe, and even earlier in tribal societies. These forms of conflict resolution are usually summarized under the headings of mediation or restorative justice, about which there exists now already a substantial body of literature (see, for example, Hopt & Steffek 2008; London 2011). A brief history of conflict reduction in society after criminal events and its development in Germany Mediation and restorative justice are not a new way to reduce conflicts between partners, groups or in society. Frühauf (1988, 8) discusses the history of restitution and presents it as one of the most interesting topics in the history of punishment. Old regulations concerning conflict resolution describe various forms of mediation as an alternative to punishment. Extensive regulations of restitution seem to have been a general phenomenon in most cultural regions. Frühauf (1988, 11) illustrates this with examples from antiquity, the Islamic penal system and other highly developed cultures, as well as in tribal societies. In short: “Reparation has been a vehicle for justice throughout human history” (Sharpe 2007, 26). Based on behavioural research, Rössner (1998, 878) even concludes that penalizing behaviour with the aim of establishing peace is part of a biological program of mankind.

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With the establishment of kingdoms, the distribution of power between state and tribes changed dramatically, as the new rulers were interested in the abolition of the old ways of regulating laws in order to increase their power by bringing the jurisdiction under their own control (Frühauf 1988, 37). This was the beginning of a fundamental change in the means of social control. The kingdoms established a generalized penal system and law, violations of which were now increasingly sanctioned by the rulers. As the influence of the population diminished, conflicts that were before private became now public (Rössner 1998, 880). The restitution of the social balance damaged by the criminal act was taken away from the community and was instead managed by the state in a special relationship of power between state and offender. No longer it was inclusion and integration but exclusion and separation that became the goal – until today. This also meant that the conflict, as well as the cooperation in solving and reducing it, was taken away from the victim (Christie 1977). Punishment was now used as a measure of power. This new system did not change substantially until very recently. Only in the last decades because of the emergence of victimology and the strengthening of the women's movement the “other” side, the victims, were again seen as part of most crimes. A large number of empirical research studies have during the last decades provided convincing evidence that punishment (alone) has a reduced effect on preventing further crimes (see Kury & Shea 2011). Trevena & Weatherburn (2015, 1), for instance, examined in a recent research project (end 2015) the question “of whether short prison sentences (up to 12 months) exert a special deterrent effect. Propensity score matching was used to compare time to reconviction among 3,960 matched pairs of offenders, in which one of each pair received a prison sentence of 12 months or less and the other received a suspended sentence of two years or less … No significant differences were found between the matched prison and suspended sentence groups in the time to first new offence. These results suggest that short custodial sentences exert no more deterrent effect than comparable community orders”. The authors give an overview of other methodologically sound studies on the same topic and come to the conclusion that “neither study found any evidence that custodial penalties reduce the risk of re-offending” (p. 4). This realization that punishment has little deterrent effect is not new. Thomas More (1516; 1992, 51) described already 500 years ago a dinner conversation at the Cardinal-Archbishop's of Canterbury residence, where an English lawyer highly commended the harsh execution of justice upon thieves, who, as he said, were then hanged so fast that there were sometimes 20 on one gallows. He added that he could not wonder enough how it came to pass that, since so few escaped, there were yet so many left, robbing in all places. This early example of extremely severe punishment illustrates clearly the dilemma of punishment: its questionable efficiency. Ancient societies knew that there must be more than only punishment to “solve” a problem. Most western states had established various special laws concerning restitution for victims of violent crimes, before the system changed to “punishment” of the offenders only (for Germany see Schwind 2013, 445ff.). In German legal practice, even today only a relatively small number of victims actually receive (financial) restitution, mainly because of extensive formal obstacles. Schmidt (2012, 191) succinctly summarizes the situation as follows: victim-offender restitution has recently regained importance, but overall in the handling of crimes it still only plays a minor role.

Developments in other countries In cooperation with the German Ministry of Justice, Hopt and Steffek (2008b) have published a reader on mediation, which provides an overview of the current issues in mediation in Europe but also in other parts. The authors argue that mediation, as a form of conflict reduction, needs to be promoted further as it provides numerous advantages: easier access for citizens to the law, more effective conflict resolution, increased support for the parties involved, constructive approaches to crime reduction, less court overloads, and a reduction of costs for all parties involved, including the state. The authors present regulations and research from many eastern and western states. They found in Europe significant differences in the frequency of mediation programs, especially concerning juvenile offenders (see also Mestitz 2005, 13). While Germany and France offer many victim offender restitution programs, other countries only have few. The authors also point out differences in the nature of these programs based on different legal backgrounds. Extensive differences can be seen as well between the “design and delivery” of these programs or, in Weitekamp’s words: Restorative justice “…means different things to different people” (2002, 322). The theory of mediation clearly stipulates that cooperation on a voluntary basis is a key element of mediation, yet some states still discuss whether the parties could be forced to cooperate under certain circumstances. Also the role of the mediator is not uniformly defined, for example in regard to the question if the mediator is allowed to bring in suggestions and solutions. Extralegal problems, such as in family matters or at the work place, can similarly be handle through mediation. The positive impact of mediation can be seen in all societies where the procedure is focused on the social conflict, and the legal regulation is limited to a supportive function. All legal systems accept that mediation is not intended for spontaneous or random support but for the facilitation of communication between the different parties through experts. Hopt & Steffek (2008c, 13) point out that, in spite of their differences, the definitions of mediation in various countries concentrate on four topics: conflict, voluntariness, systematic support of the communication between the parties, and a solution identified by the parties with the support of a mediator who has no decision-making power. Confidentiality of the procedure and neutrality of the mediator play a central role in the success of this process. Despite different approaches, most countries report positive results of their mediation programs. Hopt and Steffek (2008c, 42) underline that for obtaining positive results it is essential that the reduction of conflicts is not being pressed into a rigid structure but that the parties and the mediators can remain flexible in their approach on the basis of the characteristics of a given conflict. The flexibility of the concept is a central characteristic, which not only excludes a rigid procedure but also requires a specialized training of expert mediators. In Germany, for example, the Bundesarbeitsgemeinschaft Täter-Opfer-Ausgleich e. V. (BAG TOA e.V.) gives trained experts a diploma of quality which should guarantee high standards in the praxis (Lippelt & Schütte 2010, 66). Walgrave (2007, 570) points out: “It is now almost generally accepted that a statecontrolled legal framework is needed to locate restorative justice within the principles of a constitutional democracy.” Since the early 1980s, restorative justice has been increasingly employed in practice and in theoretical criminological discussions, but it is still less known in Eastern European countries, 90 | 91

even in those countries which orient their penal policy towards the west. Willemsens & Walgrave (2007, 491) put it this way: “Although a number of countries in Central and Eastern Europe already have well established victim-offender mediation practices (for example, the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovenia), others are still struggling to take the first steps”. On the background of their experiences in cooperation with Eastern European countries the authors (p. 491) point to problems and opposition such as: “a highly punitive attitude among the public and policy makers, an uncritical reliance on incarceration, strong resistance within law enforcement, prosecutors and judges who fear competition from alternatives, a passive civil society and weakened public legitimacy of the state and its institutions, limited trust in NGOs and in their professional capacities, lack of information about restorative justice and of restorative justice pilots, low economic conditions making it difficult to set up projects, lack of a tradition of co-operation and dialogue in several sectors and professions, a general loss of trust in a better future and a mood of despondency and cynicism, forms of nepotism and even corruption in parts of the criminal justice system, heavy administrative and financial constraints on the agencies preventing investment in qualitative work” (see also Kury & Shea 2011). Kurzynsky-Singer (2008, 837ff.) report on Russia where mediation is a relatively new development without specific legal foundations or regulations. The Russian court has to accept the result of a mediation settlement, but the procedure is not confidential and is not defined by law. In Hungary, on the other hand, a special law regulating mediation was passed already in 2003. The procedure is as yet limited to civil cases and the law provides only little motivation to begin mediation; the procedure was established principally in view to reduce the caseload of the courts (JesselHolst 2008, 906ff.). Meanwhile mediation is used in Germany and other countries not only in penal or civil law cases but also to address other conflicts such as controversies within families (Bannenberg et al. 1999), in schools, at work, within communities, between commercial companies, within law enforcement, or in prisons (Sasse 2010). The English Ministry of Justice (2013b), for example, reports in a press release from 14 March 2013 that it is committed to using this approach to help couples in the process of separation. “The Government strongly supports mediation – a quicker, simpler and more effective way for separating couples to agree how they divide their assets or arrange child contact, which avoids the traumatic and divisive effect of courtroom battles.” The Ministry points to cost reduction and reduction of time needed: “The average cost of resolving property and financial disputes caused by separation is approximately £500 through mediation for a publicly funded client, compared to £4,000 for issues settled through the courts. The average time for a mediated case is 110 days compared to 435 days for non-mediated cases” (Ministry of Justice 2013a). But overall it can be said that “it is within criminal justice that it is fast becoming most influential” (Green 2007, 183). Van Ness (2007, 314) reports on mediation programs in US-American prisons, in particular in the context of changes in the attitudes of prisoners towards their victims through participation in “victim awareness and empathy programmes” and in finding solutions to conflicts between inmates and prison staff. In some programs victims or their substitutes are also included. In Europe, similar programs have, for instance, been implemented in Hamburg/Germany (Hagemann 2003, 225), and in Belgium through Suggnomé, an organization, which offers victim-offender mediation in prisons, including in very serious cases such as homicides (Buntinx 2012).

Also some war-torn African countries, such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone, Sudan or Uganda, have rediscovered restorative justice as a means for the successful reintegration of former child soldiers at the end of hostilities. All of these children and adolescents had been exposed to extreme forms of violence and many had also been active participants. Communities were understandably reluctant to welcome such young fighters back, especially if their violence has been directed at their own or neighbouring villages. Some communities remained openly hostile in their reception, but others opened up possibilities of reconciliation through purifying rites, in which the child soldiers tell their part of the story and apologize to the whole community for the harm done, followed by a process of restorative justice in which the returnees make a contribution to the community by providing free labour or other services (Wessells 2006; Drumbl 2012; Fischer 2013). Results of empirical evaluation of mediation In recent years the body of literature about the effects of mediation has expanded greatly and research overwhelmingly documents “…the positive impact of restorative practices at multiple levels, with case types ranging from first-time offenders and misdemeanants to more serious chronic and violent offenders” (Bazemore and Elis 2007, 397). The authors argue that in contrast to empirical research about treatment programs for offenders whose results are not uniformly successful, the positive research results of restorative justice programs are more consistent: “Most studies of restorative programmes, including recent meta-analyses … indicate some positive impact …, and some suggest that restorative programmes may have equal or stronger impacts than many treatment programmes …”. The data on the positive impact for the victims of crimes are particularly strong. To this day only few studies address the preventative effect of participation in victim-offender restitution programs through the reduction in recidivism rates. The existing studies were carried out primarily in the USA, Great Britain and Australia (Hayes 2007, 433). A discussion of these research results is insofar difficult as there are many methodological problems associated with such studies that often reduce their validity. In particular it is difficult to generalize the results – a problem already present many years ago regarding the evaluation of other offender treatment programs (see Lipton et al. 1975; Kury 1986). Restorative justice is a broad concept with procedures varying widely between programs and these programs, in turn, are used in different stages of the penal procedure. In many cases the conferences, and so the direct “treatment” of the offender, only last 60 to 90 minutes per session, far too short for consistently high impacts. Consequently the effect might be low, especially considering that many other factors can influence recidivism, like unemployment, inclusion in different social networks after release and problems related to this, special live events, or possible drug and alcohol issues. There can also be a “self-selection bias” because offenders and victims have to agree to participate in the programs, thus motivated offenders with an already better prognosis might volunteer more often (Gromet 2009, 41). Conclusion Existing research on mediation clearly demonstrates its impressive positive effects, even on recidivism rates. Braithwaite (2009), one of the founding fathers of restorative justice, presents 92 | 93

results of empirical research from different countries, which all show a remarkable reduction in recidivism rates. These data also indicate reductions in domestic violence; in some cases even reduced alcohol consumption after participation in restorative justice conferences. Gromet (2009, 41ff.), in his study of the effects of mediation on victims, concludes that not only did the recidivism rate of offenders after participating in programs of restorative justice decline but that the programs also had a positive effect on the victims, who expressed greater satisfaction than after a traditional penal process. They reported feeling treated more fairly and experiencing better emotional health, had less fears of repeated victimization, and expressed less feelings of revenge. In sum, there is strong evidence that restorative justice as an alternative to traditional criminal justice produces altogether positive results for all parties concerned: society, the victims, and the offenders. 1 Prof. habil. Helmut Kury, Dr. h.c.mult. former senior researcher at Max-Planck-Institute for foreign and international penal Law – Department of Criminology and Prof. at the University of Freiburg/Germany. Nearly 700 publications on various

criminological topics. Editor of several books about crime, criminology or Forensic Psychology. Co-Editor of “Women and

Children as Victims and Offenders”, Springer 2016.

2 Evelyn Shea holds a doctorate in law from the University of Basel Switzerland and a doctorate in criminal law and criminology

from the University Robert Schuman in Strasbourg. She works as an independent researcher and prison visitor in Zurich,

Switzerland. Co-Editor of “Women and Children as Victims and Offenders”, Springer 2016.

Violence against women and the sustainable development goals Janice Joseph1

Introduction Violence against women is a pandemic which affects every country in the world. The impact of violence affects women’s health, education, and participation in public life, thus affecting the personal development of the victims. The United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) agenda is currently the highest-level expression of the international community's development priorities. It consists of 17 goals with 169 targets designed to fight inequality and injustice and tackle climate change by 2030. The SDGs, and the broader sustainability agenda, go much further than the 2000-2015 Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), and some attempts have been made to address violence against women in these new SDGs. This essay critically examined the connections between the sustainable development goals and the prevention of violence against women. The scope and magnitude of violence against women Definition Violence against women is a problem rooted in discrimination against women, in law, and also in practices related to the persisting inequalities between men and women. The World Health Organization (WHO) defines violence against women as any act of gender-based violence that results in physical, sexual, or mental harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts (WHO 2016). It is also a form of gender-based violence. In 1992, the General Recommendation of the United Nations (UN) Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women because she is a woman or that affects women disproportionately” (Article 6) and a form of discrimination that seriously inhibits women’s ability to enjoy rights and freedoms on a basis of equality with men” (Article 1). The 1993 United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women (Article1) states that: “violence against women’ means any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life (p. 3). Violence against women is also considered one of the most prevalent human rights violations of women. The Council of Europe Convention (2011) on Preventing and Combating Violence against women defines it in Article 3 as “as a violation of human rights and a form of discrimination against women and shall mean all acts of gender-based violence that result in, or are likely to result in, physical, sexual, psychological or economic harm or suffering to women.” 94 | 95

It occurs in various settings. According to the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995, violence against women involves violence in a variety of settings (art. 113) including: • physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring in the family, including battering, sexual abuse of female children in the household, dowry-related violence, marital rape, female genital mutilation and other traditional practices harmful to women, non-spousal violence, and violence related to exploitation; • physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring within the general community, including rape, sexual abuse, sexual harassment and intimidation at work, in educational institutions and elsewhere, trafficking in women and forced prostitution; and • physical, sexual and psychological violence perpetrated or condoned by the State, wherever it occurs. (UN Report of the Fourth World Conference on Women, pp. 48-49.) Extent/prevalence According to the WHO (2016), almost one third (30%) of women who have been in a relationship report that they have experienced some form of physical and/or sexual violence by their intimate partner. A study with 42,000 women across the 28 Member States of the European Union (EU) conducted by European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (2014) found that one in 10 women had experienced some form of sexual violence since the age of 15 years, and one in 20 had been raped. In addition, the results of this study indicated that one in five women had experienced physical and/or sexual violence from either a current or previous partner, and one in 10 women reported that they had experienced some form of sexual violence by an adult before they were 15 years old. The first multi-country study (10 countries) on violence against women by World Health Organization (2005) found that the prevalence of physical and/or sexual violence by a partner varied from 15 percent in urban Japan to 71 percent in rural Ethiopia, with most areas being in the 30–60 percent range (Garcia-Moreno, Jansen, Ellsberg, Heise and Watts 2006). The effects of violence on women, which include physical and psychological effects, are devastating. Violence can negatively affect women’s physical, mental, sexual and reproductive health, and may increase vulnerability to HIV. Physical health effects can include headaches, back pain, abdominal pain, fibromyalgia, gastrointestinal disorders, limited mobility and poor overall health. It also has sexual and reproductive health consequences, including forced and unwanted pregnancies, unsafe abortions, traumatic fistula, sexually transmitted infections including HIV, and even death. It can lead to psychological problems such as depression, posttraumatic stress disorder, sleep difficulties, eating disorders, emotional distress and suicide attempts (World Health Organization 2016). The costs of violence against women are extremely high. The costs include the direct costs of services to treat and support abused women and their children and to prosecute perpetrators. The indirect costs include lost employment and productivity, and the costs in human pain and suffering. Globally, the total economic cost of intimate partner violence has been estimated to be at least 5 per cent of global GDP. In the United States alone, the annual costs of intimate partner violence have been calculated at 5.8 billion dollars (UN Department of Public Information 2011). In general, one in three women worldwide has experienced physical or sexual violence,

mostly by an intimate partner. The violence occurs in the home, on the streets or during war (UN Women 2015). On the international level, there are activists who advocate for women's rights and against violence against women. Their objectives are to address and draw public attention on the issues of violence against women as well as to seek and recommend measures to prevent and eliminate this violence. Michael Platzer, Liaison Officer for the Academic Council on the United Nations and Chair Vienna NGO Alliance for Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, has been playing a vital role in addressing the global epidemic of violence against women and girls. Dr. Platzer has organized many side events on violence against women and in particularly on femicide at various United Nations meetings in Vienna. In addition, he has coedited several books on femicide, including Femicide: A global issue that demands action and Femicide, targeting women in conflict: A global issue that demands action. However, more importantly, he was instrumental in getting the UN General Assembly resolution 68/191: Taking action against gender-related killing of women and girls adopted on 18 December 2013. Sustainable development goals In 2015, the United Nations passed its landmark Sustainable Development Goals declaration designed as benchmarks to comprehensively address a range of issues towards the sustainable development by the year 2030. The SDGs constitute an integrated set of goals for the global community and the most recent attempts of the international community to establish priorities of human development. The new Goals are unique in that they call for all countries, poor, rich and middle-income to promote prosperity while protecting the planet. According to UN SecretaryGeneral Ban Ki-moon, they are our â&#x20AC;&#x153;shared vision of humanity and a social contract between the worldâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s leaders and the peopleâ&#x20AC;? (UN-DPI 2015, para. 1). He further stated that the SDGs are a blueprint for success for people and the planet. The Secretary General also appointed a group of eminent persons who would assist with the campaign to achieve the SDGs. These advocates are expected to promote the universal sustainable development agenda, raise awareness of the integrated nature of the SDGs, and assist with their implementation (United Nations 2016). The goals, which are broad in scope, address the needs of people in both developed and developing countries. Outline of the SDGs The SDGs expand on the MDGs which expired at the end of 2015. The SDGs center on a 15-year agenda to tackle poverty and hunger. They replace the MDGs, which provided a focal point for governments to develop policies and programs designed to end poverty and improve the lives of poor people. However, the MDGs were considered too narrow and did not address issues related to the rule of law, justice, and governance. The eight MDGs failed to take into consideration the root causes of poverty and gender inequality. The MDGs, adopted in 2000, aimed at an array of issues that included slashing poverty, hunger, disease, gender inequality, and access to water and sanitation. It appears that the MDGs were targeted towards poor countries, and rich countries were to provide finance and technological assistance (Sach 2012). On the other hand, the SDGs are directed at every country which is expected to achieve these goals. Consequently, they are a significant improvement over the MDGs.

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The SDGs were the outcome of the Rio+20 summit in 2012, which mandated the creation of an open working group to come up with a draft set The Open Working Group (OWG) was established on 22 January 2013 by the decision of the UN General Assembly. Representatives from 70 countries attended the first open working group meeting which was held in March 2013 and published its final draft, with its 17 suggestions, in July 2014. The OWG was also given the task to prepare a proposal on the SDGs for consideration during the 68th session of the General Assembly, September 2013 â&#x20AC;&#x201C; September 2014. In addition, the UN conducted a series of â&#x20AC;&#x153;global conversationsâ&#x20AC;?, which consisted of 11 thematic and 83 national consultations, and door-to-door surveys. The SDGs were approved by the General Assembly on 25 September 2015. In the resolution, the 193 United Nations Member States declared goals, targets, and indicators directed towards all Governments, practitioners, UN entities as well asl the civil society and private sector. They are a universal set of goals, targets and indicators that UN member states will be expected to use to frame their agendas and political policies over the next 15 years. They are to be pursued at all levels of government (local, national, regional) and by public and private stakeholders, including business, civil society, academia, and research. While the SDGs are not legally binding, governments are expected to establish national frameworks for their achievement. Countries are responsible for follow-up and review of the progress made in implementing the Goals. There are also 169 proposed targets and indicators associated with the 17 goals. The SDG indicators are a management tool and a report card to help countries develop and implement strategies for achieving the SDG and to monitor their progress. This is to ensure that the governments are accountable to their citizens (Sustainable Development Solution Network 2014). SDGs and violence against women The problem of violence against women was absent from the Millennium Development Goals, but it is evident in the Sustainable Development Goals. Its inclusion in the SDGs seems to indicate a serious attempt to address this problem. Not only do these goals provide powerful arguments and entry points for a variety of approaches to eradicating violence against women, many of the SDGs targets, such as SDG 1 (eradicate poverty), 3 (Ensure healthy lives and promote wellbeing for all at all ages); 4 (Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all); 10 (Reduce inequality within and among countries); 11 (Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable); and 16 (Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels) are useful to target risk factors associated with violence against women. SDG 5, a stand-alone goal, is dedicated to achieving gender equality and empowering all women and girls. SDG 5 includes six targets/indicators and three of them relate to violence against women. They are as follows: 5.1 focuses on ending all forms of discrimination against all women and girls everywhere; 5.2 proposes to eliminate all forms of violence against all women and girls in the public and private spheres, including trafficking and sexual and other types of exploitation; and

5.3 proposes to eliminate all harmful practices, such as child, early, and forced marriage and female genital mutilation. The UN Women (the UN Secretariat’s entity coordinating the system-wide work on gender mainstreaming) advocated for this stand-alone goal in the post-2015 development agenda. The UN Women view it as necessary to achieve gender equality, women’s rights and women’s empowerment. In addition, the UN Women called “for the integration of gender equality concerns throughout the other priority areas and goals of the post-2015 development agenda, with clear targets and indicators” (UN Women 2015, para. 1). The UN Women also recommended that this stand-alone goal should achieve gender equality, women’s rights, and women’s empowerment (Ibid.). In addition to SDG 5, SDG 16 may appear to be only indirectly relevant to countering violence against women. However, a closer examination reveals that this SDG is highly relevant. It focuses on promoting peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, providing access to justice for all and building effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels. The goals of SDG 16, as they relate to countering violence against women, include significantly reducing all forms of violence and related death rates everywhere (16.1) and ending abuse, exploitation, trafficking and all forms of violence against and torture of child (16.2). These goals focus on violence in general (which would include women) and children (which would include girls but not women). Need for appropriate targets and indicators Although the SDG 5 focuses on the issues of gender equality, there is one major issue with this goal. The indicators lack a time frame which is necessary to determine the progress of the elimination of gender inequality and disparities. In fact, out of the 17 goals, SDG 5 is one goal that does not have a single time-bound target (Burchi, Hampel-Milagrosa and Rippi 2015). The Sustainable Development Solutions Network (SDSN) has suggested that two indicators are needed in order to monitor progress towards Target 5.2. These can be Indicator 41 to track the “Prevalence of women 15-49 who have experienced physical or sexual violence by an intimate partner in the last 12 months”, and Indicator 42 that tracks the “Percentage of referred cases of sexual and gender-based violence against women and children that are investigated and sentenced”. The SDSN also suggested two indicators to monitor progress towards Target 5.3. They are Indicator 43 which would track the “Percentage of women aged 20-24 who were married or in a union before age 18” and Indicator 44 which would focus on the “Prevalence of harmful traditional practices, including female genital mutilation/cutting” (Burchi, Hampel-Milagrosa and Rippin 2015). There are also no timeframes and indicators for SDG 16.1 and 16.2. The SDSN suggests two indicators to measure the target. They are Indicator 88 which is the number of “violent injuries and deaths per 100,000 population” and Indicator 89 that will examine “refugees and internal displacement caused by conflict and violence.” In addition, this particular target should have included all victims of human trafficking, children, men and women (Fiedler, Furness, Grävingholt, and Leininger 2015).

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It is difficult to measure whether targets are met without the establishment of proper indicators. Indicators provide policymakers and watchdog organizations with data that would determine whether or not goals and targets are being met and to ensure the accountability of the state. Indicators on violence against women are useful in creating awareness of the nature and extent of the problem. What is clear is that targets and indicators are lacking in SDGs 5 and 16, which focus on violence against women and violence in general. Specific targets and indicators were necessary to provide guidance for states on how to create infrastructures to address violence against women and its impact on development. In addition, the effects of violence against women are complex, so it is necessary for states to develop a comprehensive global framework for assessing the relationship between violence against women and sustainable development. This framework should include the different types of violence against women, incorporate clearly defined goals, targets, and indicators that are necessary to provide a complete understanding of the causes of violence against women and the full impact on sustainable development. Conclusion Violence against women is a major obstacle to social and economic development, and to the achievement of sustainable development goals. Because violence against women is rooted in inequality, it prevents womenâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s participation in development and undermines the goals of development. The major causes of womenâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s poverty are embodied in unequal power relations between women and men and are intertwined with patterns of gender-based violence. Given the diffuse effects of violence against women, it will be necessary to adopt a clearly-defined global framework for assessing the full scope of the relationship between violence against women and sustainable development. This framework should incorporate the goals, targets and indicators necessary to glean a full understanding of the causes of violence against women and its effects on sustainable development. The adoption of the 2030 Agenda is a step forward in the efforts to help prevent and end violence against women across the globe. This constitutes a potentially powerful agenda in the prevention of violence against women, but more work is needed to achieve the goal of eliminating violence against women. 1 Janice Joseph, Distinguished Professor of Criminal Justice, Stockton University, Galloway Township, NJ, USA. Editor of the

Journal of Ethnicity in Criminal Justice. Her research interests include gangs, youth violence, juvenile delinquency, violence

against women, and women and criminal justice. She has over 65 publications on delinquency, gangs, domestic violence,

femicide, stalking, sexual harassment, and minorities and crime.

Facing the challenge of juvenile delinquency: The innovative approach of family-group-conferencing in probationary services Monika Stempkowski1

Introduction The protection and the support of children and young people has always been a core issue for the actions of the United Nations. This is demonstrated not only in the many guidelines prescribed by the UN2, but it is also reflected in the resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 25 September 2015 Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, where it is written: “What we are announcing today – an Agenda for global action for the next 15 years – is a charter for people and planet in the twenty-first century. Children and young women and men are critical agents of change and will find in the new Goals a platform to channel their infinite capacities for activism into the creation of a better world. (…) The future of humanity and of our planet lies in our hands. It lies also in the hands of today’s younger generation who will pass the torch to future generations” (A/RES/70/1, 12). Unfortunately not for every young person an untroubled adolescence is possible. Obstacles such as family problems, violence or unemployment sometimes lead to juvenile delinquency. To find ways out of criminality, young offenders need professional help to get back on their path to a rightful life. As emphasized in goal no. 16 of the 2030 Agenda it lies within a states responsibility to “Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels” (A/RES/70/1, 25), wherefrom it can be derived that supporting juveniles in this specific situation is mandatory. Michael K. Platzer, highly qualified and recognized expert on both criminal law and human rights likewise, has constantly dedicated himself to set the focus of those responsible on the special needs of marginalized groups. His study on the situation of juvenile inmates with a migrant background, conducted in two Austrian prisons (Peintinger at al. 2009, Platzer 2009), shows that real change within the future of those affected can only be achieved when we do not solely deal with crimes committed but concentrate on the juveniles as human beings with their needs and the potential to reintegrate into society.

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Within this article an innovative and promising approach for working with juvenile offenders shall be introduced: Family-group-conferencing is a well-established tool, where juveniles in trouble are, supported by and working together with their family, seeking for a solution of a current problem or task, with the support of a facilitator. The procedure shall be explained and special attention shall be drawn to a pilot-project about conferencing within the Austrian legal system, which was scientifically accompanied and evaluated by a research team of the department of criminology at the University of Vienna. The main results shall be presented here. Juvenile delinquency in Austria Within the Austrian penal law juvenile offenders fall under the scope of a specialized regulation, the Juvenile Justice Act (Jugendgerichtsgesetz, JGG). Through measures such as for example lowering the maximum penalty and defining specific procedural requirements it shall be taken into account that adolescence is a time of curiosity and change, where young people search for their identity and try to find their place within the society. The JGG defines people between the age of fourteen and eighteen to be juveniles, whereas people from eighteen to twenty-one are considered as young adults.3 In 2014 a total of 3905 judgments were rendered concerning juveniles, mainly because of crimes committed against another personâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s property, like theft or property damage. In 668 cases a crime was committed against the health or the life of another person, 477 incidents concerned illicit drug use (BMJ 2014, 48). These convictions mainly led to probationary prison sentences, whereas fines were imposed significantly less often. A small group of juveniles had to serve time in jail, in 2014 99 juveniles were affected (cut-off date 1st of September). This number has been decreasing constantly for the past years since 2009, where 191 juveniles served time in prison (BMJ 2014, 98). Probationary services play an important role when it comes to supporting offenders finding their way back into a lawful life. In Austria this responsible task is carried out by the association NEUSTART. In 2014 23.7% of the clients supervised by NEUSTART were juveniles, a total of 2.484 people (BMJ 2014, 83). Their longstanding experience in the assistance of juvenile offenders predestines the social workers at NEUSTART to also carry out conferencing as a part of their support system. Family Group Conferencing Conferencing has its origin in New Zealand. In the 1980s the indigenous Maori people demanded from the state of New Zealand to accept their specific tradition in dealing with conflicts. The state reacted (Ministerial Advisory Committee on a Maori Perspective for the Department of Social Welfare 1988) and in 1989 the Children, Young Persons and their Families Act was issued, making conferencing a mandatory procedure if dealing with endangerment of a childâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s welfare or juvenile delinquency (MacRae 2004). Subsequently conferencing was implemented in various countries in their legal system, for example Australia, Belgium, Canada, England, Ireland, South Africa, Sweden, the United States (Morris 2004) as well as Norway, Israel or France (Mutter et al. 2008). The procedure has a wide field of application, ranging from youth welfare over school related problems, domestic violence, drug issues to criminal offences (Milos 2011).

Conferencing is based on the firm belief that the juvenile and his or her family are capable of finding a better solution for their specific situation than any professional helper could, if they are provided with the necessary information and surrounding. The moderated process aims at activating resources within the respective social system and establishing a plan capable of helping the juvenile through the difficult development by providing participation and support. Although the main stakeholders within the process are the juvenile and the family the facilitator plays a very important role. He or she has to be a neutral person, having no other binding with the juvenile (such as the respective probation officers would have), whose responsibility is solely organizing, accompanying and moderating the conference. They are not involved into the development of the plan itself. The facilitator’s responsibility is the procedure, not the outcome. The second important professional stakeholder is the person who initiates the conference. Within some systems, including the Austrian, this task is performed by the juvenile’s probation officer. Apart from launching the conference, the probation officer is in some cases also responsible for introducing the underlying problem and accepting the final plan, which was elaborated by the family during the conference (Schlechter 2011; Straub 2005). “Sozialnetz-Konferenzen” and evaluation In 2011 the Austrian Ministry of Justice approved a pilot project to be conducted by the association NEUSTART in order to try conferencing4 as a new type of probationary service also within the Austrian legal system. During a two-year-period 16 social workers were trained as facilitators and 60 conferences were planned to be held. Initially three different types of conferences were prepared: • Problem-focused-Conference, intending to find solutions concerning difficult situations and specific problems such as employment or housing; • Pre-Release-Conference, to be held briefly before the release date of the juvenile inmate, aiming to plan the support for the time afterwards; • Restorative-Conference, which additionally includes the social network of the victim. All of these conferences are structured in the same way: During a preparatory phase, the idea of the conference is presented to the juvenile client by his or her probation officer. Once the client agreed to the proposal, two facilitators start the preparation of the conference. They meet with the juvenile and compile a list of key members of his or her social network who are then invited by the facilitators or the juvenile. Additionally, the surroundings, like a neutral location for the conference, have to be arranged. The actual conference starts with the information exchange phase, during which the facilitator explains the procedure, its goals and rules as well as everyone’s task. It is important for the facilitator to explain that the developed plan has to be as precise as possible, clearly identifying responsibilities, deadlines and procedures. This is then followed by the probation officer’s expression of his or her concerns which have led to the conference. If professional helpers are attending, they are then asked to give an overview on how they can provide assistance to the juvenile and his or her social network. 102 | 103

After all the necessary information has been exchanged, probation officer, facilitator and professional helpers leave the room to give the juvenile and the members of his or her social network time and space to work on the previously discussed issues coming up with a common plan. This is called the private-family-time. Once their plan is finished, the decision-making-phase begins and the probation officer and the facilitators enter the room again. The plan is explained to them by the juvenile or a member of the social network and the probation officer and facilitators have the possibility to ask question and help concretizing the plan. As soon as all participants agree on the terms and conditions of the plan, it is put in writing and the conference ends by setting a date for the follow-up-meeting. Such a meeting should take place about three months after the initial conference. At this meeting the implementation of the plan is evaluated, opening the possibility to discuss difficulties and to make adjustments to the plan. Political discussions, resulting from a severe incident during which a juvenile in pretrial custody became the victim of a sexual insult, led to an expansion of the conferencing project and the target group. A new type of conference was developed: â&#x20AC;˘ Pretrial-custody-Conferences aiming at finding alternatives to imprisonment for the juvenile who is awaiting his or her trial. This type of conference largely follows the procedure as described above, however certain distinctions have to be made, such as the judge requesting the conference and no follow-upmeeting is to be held. To conduct the evaluation, a combination of quantitative and qualitative research methods was chosen, in order to ensure a comprehensive collection of the relevant data. Online questionnaires were set up for the probation officers and the facilitators, whereas paper-pencil-questionnaires were given out to the juvenile and the other participants of the conference. Additionally, members of the research team took part in several conferences of different types as participating observers and subsequently conducted interviews with the facilitators, the probation officer, the juvenile and, where he or she was present, the victim. Due to the large amount of findings only selected results5 can be presented here, however already an overview through the main findings provides with an idea of why the conclusion of the research team was a clear recommendation of the regular use of this type of family group conferencing as a part of the probationary services. During the survey period 56 conferences took place. Concerning the preparatory phase the participants were asked about their attitude toward the conference in the beginning, which for the most part turned out to be positive. Additionally it was inquired whether they had enough information about the procedure, which also was largely affirmed. As a key factor for the motivation of the juvenile, the participation of a person of trust was identified, who supports the juvenile through the whole process of the conference. The availability of somebody who can undertake this task should therefore already be explored during the initial conversation between the facilitators and the juvenile.

Asked about obstacles during this early phase of the conference, it was expressed that the preparations were highly time-consuming for the facilitators, especially because it sometimes proved to be difficult to reach members of the social network and that some of them tried to influence who would attend the conference in the end. Especially concerning the pretrial-custody-conferences the facilitators stated that they often had to work under time constraints, both in the preparation as well as during the conference itself. In many cases the conference took place in premises of the court or prison, which sometimes turned out to be unsuitable for the purpose. Generally the probation officers reported that the preparation of the conference affected their relationship to the clients in a positive way. It was also inquired from them, whether they found the procedure as a whole suitable for their client. In general it can be said that this probationary tool has a wide field of application, however certain limitations are given concerning juveniles who suffer from psychiatric disorders which could influence their concentration capacity and their ability for contractual commitment. In these cases a prior medical clarification is recommended. During the conference well-functioning communication between the participants is crucial. In the beginning of the meeting, the facilitators therefore established conversational rules. The results show that basically all the parties involved agreed that communicating had worked well. Facilitators and probation officers confirmed that the compliance with those rules was generally high and that the interaction between the participants was characterized by respect. The juveniles stated that they were taken seriously by the other parties involved and they were able to express whatever it was they wanted to say. This aligns with the assessment of the facilitators and the probation officers that the focus of the procedure was generally on the juvenile. They also widely agreed that the members of the social network showed an openminded attitude and contributed broadly and in a constructive manner to the process. Concerning the communication between the facilitators it was often indicated that working together as a team of two facilitators is a valuable resource as you can share the responsibility and rely on a partner. The aim of every conference is for the juvenile and the social network to come up with a plan that covers the prior discussed issues. In order to simplify this assignment for the participants NEUSTART offered a basic structure for these plans, suggesting that tasks should be specified as well as who is responsible for their implementation. Where necessary a time limit and somebody to supervise the realization of the plan can be established. Predominantly this structure was followed by the participants. Almost all of the plans contained tasks to be carried out by the juvenile, closely followed by assignments for which members of the social network were responsible for. Highly relevant topics, as measured by the frequency of their occurrence in the plans, proved to be housing as well as the occupation of the juvenile. Also the themes of a code of behavior for the juveniles (e.g. â&#x20AC;&#x17E;I will not hang out with my old friends anymore.â&#x20AC;&#x153;), a structure for their daily life respectively their leisure behavior and support from the social network were often mentioned in the plans. 104 | 105

The probation officers indicated that within the established plans good solutions for the previously discussed problems were found. In general the juveniles were just as content with the developed plans as were the members of the social networks and the probation officers. The clients stated their belief in the plans and their feasibility. In this context it is important to point out that, especially in the pretrial-custody-conference, the juvenile and the social network are under intense pressure, since a release from custody partly depends on the plan. Therefore it is to be feared that the juvenile might agree to measures that afterwards turn out to overstrain him or her. Correspondingly the balancing act for the facilitator is to make sure that the plan is detailed enough to provide a reliable structure for the juvenile after the release and at the same time does not overextend the juvenile or the supporters from the social network. Finally, the participants were asked about their degree of contentment with the conference in general. It can be said that satisfaction with the procedure was very high for the juveniles as well as for the probation officers and the facilitators. Furthermore both the juveniles and most of the members of the social network reported that they had felt comfortable during the conference. Unfortunately, only very few follow-up-meetings were held during the survey period, which is why real results from this phase of the conferences cannot be presented. The very small amount of information that was available on time indicates contentment with the implementation if the plans on the side of the juveniles, whereas statements from the probation officers show a more differentiated picture. They report that in some cases the realization of the goals is working out well, while in other cases a lack of motivation or newly arisen problems hinder a satisfactory outcome. Consistently positive is the estimation of the consequences the conference had on the juvenile as a whole. Repeatedly it was stated by the probation officers that, even if the specific measures the participants of the conference agreed upon together turned out to be unenforceable, the initiated processes and the experiences the juvenile made during the conference led to an overall positive and noticeable effect on the client. Conclusion In summary it can be said that conferencing proved to be a highly valuable tool in working with juvenile offenders. On the basis of the extensively positive results generated throughout the evaluation a general implementation into probationary work over the whole of Austria was recommended by the research team. The Ministry of Justice decided to follow this recommendation concerning pretrial-custody-conferences and pre-release-conferences6. In 2015 a legal basis for these two kinds of procedures was established7. One goal of the pilot project was testing a new restorative-justice-tool through this specific type of conference. Throughout the whole survey period, only three restorative-conferences were conducted and in the end, this type of conference was not yet implemented into the nationwide probationary system. During the evaluation the author had the chance to participate as an observer in one of the conducted conferences of this type. To witness the progress that was made between the victim, the juvenile offender and their social networks was an enriching and valuable experience and the plan that was developed during the conference later proved to ensure a successful outcome.

In conclusion several extensions of this promising tool in probationary service can be imagined. Additionally to the above mentioned possibilities in restorative justice processes, conferencing could also be used as a technique within the support of adult offenders. 1 MMag. Monika Stempkowski, Institute for Criminal Law and Criminology, Faculty of Law, University of Vienna; Research

assistant at the Austrian Center for Law Enforcement Sciences.

2 For example, specifically in a forensic context: United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile

Justice ("The Beijing Rules"), United Nations Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency (“The Riyadh Guidelines”),

United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty (“Havana Rules”).

3 § 1 JGG BGBl 1988/599 idF BGBl I 2015/13. 4 Within the Austrian system the term “Social-network-Conference” is used, in order to take into account that supporters of

the juvenile do not exclusively have to be family members, but can also be friends, neighbors, teachers or any other person

important to the juvenile.

5 Because of their homogeneity, the results for the different types of conferences are presented together, except for the restorative

type, where only data from three conferences could be collected within the survey period.

6 Decree of the Ministry of Justice from October 6th, 2014, BMJ-S618.019/0001-IV 2/2014. 7 §§ 17a, 35a JGG BGBl 1988/599 idF BGBl I 2015/154; § 29e BewHG BGBl 1969/5146 idF BGBl I 2015/154.

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The successful abolition of death penalty Roland Miklau1 and Friedrich Forsthuber2

“Convinced that the death penalty undermines human dignity and can amount to cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment…” (London Declaration 2011)

Introduction In his essay “Réflexions sur la Guillotine“ (1957) Albert Camus argued, that capital punishment is ineffective to prevent people from committing crimes and therefore reduced to an act of revenge that only breeds further violence, fueled only by sadism and perpetuated by tradition. Camus likened this act of state revenge to the concept of lex talionis and emphasized that the death penalty destroys the last bit of solidarity among men - that against death. The Vienna Regional Court for Criminal Matters (Landesgericht für Strafsachen Wien) and the Palace of Justice hosted the Vienna Conference on the Abolition of the Death Penalty in 2011 organized by Michael Platzer - ACUNS Vienna Representative. Austria and the death penalty Since the age of Enlightenment, when Cesare Bonesana, Marchese di Beccaria, published his remarkable book “Dei delitti e delle pene” (“Of Crime and Punishments”, 1764) concluding that the death penalty should be abolished because it has no deterrent power, the issue of capital punishment has been debated. Austrian Emperor Joseph II abolished the death penalty for some years (instead of that he introduced the penalty of ship-pulling). Further attempts at abolition were made by the Frankfurt National Assembly (§ 139 “Frankfurter Reichsverfassung”, 1849) and by the Justice Committee of the Austrian Parliament in 1867. The last public execution (seen by 50.000 people) in Vienna took place on 30 May 1868. After that convicted people were executed within the walls of a prison. On 3 April 1919 the Provisional National Assembly of the Republic of Austria abolished the death penalty under criminal law. The Justice Committee's Rapporteur Dr. Arnold Eisler argued that “in a free democratic state nothing is more sacred than human life, and nobody has the right to encroach uponm it.” However capital punishment was reintroduced by the “Dollfuß”-government on 10 November 1933 (first in cases of extraordinary procedure – “Standgericht”, since May 1934 also under ordinary criminal law). The Nazi regime brought the guillotine – more than 1200 prisoners were sentenced to death and beheaded by the Nazi authorities inside the Vienna Regional Court between 1938 and April 1945. After World War II still 40 people were executed in Austria, 30 of them sentenced as war criminals. The last execution took place on 24 March 1950. Two month later the Austrian Parliament abolished the death penalty under criminal law. It took 18 years more till Christian Broda and other Members of the Austrian Parliament presented a motion 108 | 109

to abolish capital punishment totally and under all forms of legal procedure which was unanimously adopted as constitutional law on 7 February 1968. The United Nations and the death penalty After the Charter of the United Nations was signed in 1945 the issue of capital punishment received worldwide attention within the framework of crime prevention and criminal justice. In 1959, in a resolution on the death penalty, the UN General Assembly invited the Economic and Social Council to initiate a study of the question of capital punishment, of the laws and practices relating thereto, and of the effects of capital punishment - and the abolition thereof - on the rate of criminality (A/RES/1396(XIV)). As the result of the 1962 and 1967 reports the UN did not find convincing evidence in favour of capital punishment and started to support the aim of abolishing the death penalty by pursuing at least a restriction of the number of offences for which it might be imposed. A major step forward was the Amnesty International Conference on the Abolition of the Death Penalty (Stockholm 1977). The famous Soviet dissident and human rights activist Andrei Sakharov fully supported the arguments by opponents of the death penalty. In a letter to the Organizing Committee of this Conference he emphasized: “I regard the death penalty as a savage and immoral institution which undermines the moral and legal foundations of a society. – There are no simple solutions for reducing and eliminating crime, but in any event, the death penalty provides no answer. - I believe that the death penalty has no moral or practical justification and represents a survival of barbaric customs of revenge. - I hope that this symposium will make a contribution to the noble effort of many generations towards the complete abolition of the death penalty throughout the world.” These efforts have been – and still are – very successful. At the beginning of the 20th century only three states (Costa Rica, San Marino and Venezuela) had permanently abolished capital punishment for all crimes. In 1948 the number stood at eight, in 1978 it had risen to 19 and by the end of 1998 to 63. The UN Commission on Human Rights has called on states that still maintain capital punishment “to establish a moratorium on executions, with a view to completely abolishing the death penalty” (resolution 1998/8 of 3 April 1998). Today more than 140 countries in the world have abolished capital punishment in law or practice, and the number continues to grow. In Europe the trend is especially remarkable: the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (of course the EU as well) requires a commitment to abolition as a condition of entry into the organization. As a result all European countries – without Belarus – and all international crime courts already renounced the death penalty. Conclusion But the battle has not yet been won. Symbolic therefore is the absence of the goal of eventual abolishment of the death penalty in the 2016-2030 Sustainable Development Goals Agenda (A/RES/70/1). It will not be easy to persuade the remaining countries that still use the death penalty to renounce capital punishment.

Justice should be based on law and principles and not on instinct and emotions â&#x20AC;&#x201C; as Albert Camus stated. All of us have a responsibility to work for the day when capital punishment will disappear from Earth. This day will come thanks to people like Michael Platzer. 1 F. Director General for Criminal Legislation, Austrian Ministry of Justice, and Head of Mission (Team Leader) of the European

Assistance Mission to the Justice System in Albania; Organizer and participant of many anti-death penalty conferences.

2 President of the Regional Court for Criminal Matters in Vienna (Austria). Initiator, organizer and participant of many anti-death

penalty conferences.

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Security and safety seen in the context of the post-2015 United Nations Sustainable Development Goals Maximilian Edelbacher1

Introduction After the break down of Communism in 1989 and the “Fall of the Iron Curtain,” the vision of personal freedom and a new world became virulent. It seemed that the so-called Western philosophy of Capitalism was the sustainable backbone of freedom, but the negative influence of Neoliberalism was underestimated. The new freedom pushed the development of a gap between the poor and the rich and led directly to the reaction of terrorism. People in the poorer parts of the world became dissatisfied and hopeless, and fundamentalist theories became attractive. The terrorist acts of 9/11/2001 in New York, 2004 in London, 2005 in Madrid and 2015 in Paris were the basis for the new development of the issues of “Security” and “Safety” in our modern societies and became a growing, important concern. This development continues, because the gap between the poor and the rich still is increasing, with no end in sight. Nearly ten percent of the world’s population owns more than seventy percent of all resources. Global warming, worsening living conditions, political instability, and economic shortcoming in some parts of the world have resulted in global movement of people, primarily from Africa and Asia to Europe and America. The United Nations estimates that more than sixty million people are leaving their home countries and can be characterized as refugees. About hope, dignity and prosperity The United Nations initiatives and programs offer hope, dignity, and prosperity for all human beings in the world to deal with the future of the planet and the people. And so are the current sixteen United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), adopted on 25 September 2015 by the General Assembly in resolution A/RES/70/1. In my personal understanding important goals are, for example: 1. To eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; 2. To achieve universal primary education; 3. To promote gender equality and empower women; 4. To reduce child mortality; 5. To improve maternal health; 6. To combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases; 112 | 113

7. 8.

To ensure environmental sustainability; To develop a global partnership for development.

About security Concerning security issues, for many decades “Safety and Security” seemed to be the main goals in the security philosophy. Modern societies try to describe themselves and their characteristics by using impressive “etiquettes” (Prisching 2003, 13ff). Among these “etiquettes” are terms which define the economic structure, like “Service Society,” terms which try to cover up the nature of a complex society, like “Working Society,” and, seen from a security perspective, “Security Society” is used. “Security” is based on the Latin word “securus” that means “sine cura,” to be free from all sorrows. Already in 1765 an Austrian scholar, Joseph Freiherr von Sonnenfels, remarked: “Security is a state [in which] we have nothing to fear.” A more actual definition describes Security as “the absence or avoidance of insecurity.” That means absence or avoidance of threats, danger, and fear of such insecurities. Of course, there exist an enormous variety of possible dangers and threats. Spree (2010, 192) following Kaufmann (1970), formulates “Security” as a kind of “container-term” in which different political and societal order ideas and understandings of security find their place. The term “Security Society” was developed by Legnaro (1997). This happened shortly after Lyon (1994) and Lindenberg/Schmid-Semisch (1995) created the terms of “Surveillance Society” and “Controlling Society” respectively. With this term, “Security Society,” Legnaro followed especially the concept of Beck`s “Risk Society,” which can be characterized in the following way: Human beings have always been exposed to risks such as natural disasters; these risks have been perceived as produced by non-human forces. Modern societies, however, are exposed to risks that are the result of the modernization process itself, e.g., industrial pollution, newly discovered illnesses, change of climate, or nuclear catastrophes (Beck 1986/2007). These manmade risks do not stop at the borders of national states. Beck (2007) speaks about a “World Risk Society,” in which – in consequence of globalization – risks are now without borders. The consequence is that new structures of international strategies must emerge. At the end of the last millennium, two main different approaches in the philosophy of security arose. In the European Union, the idea of “Comprehensive Security” became the number one issue, and in the United Nations the idea of “Human Security” was pushed. The concept of “Comprehensive Security” is a much broader concept than that of “Safety and Security.” When the energy crisis became important and threatening, especially when Russia stopped sending gas to Europe, the idea of “Comprehensive Security” tried to offer a solution for shortcomings with energy. The main issue was to find ways of protecting the main infrastructure, and energy of course is a core part of it. Austria, for example, adopted this concept and started a project of research concentrating all research and studies on security issues and supporting those that seemed essential for the Austrian security concept. This project still is running and concentrates valuable ideas of researchers in all kinds of security areas. For example, one study deals with the issue of virtual money. This study tries to elaborate on the advantages and disadvantages of BITCOIN. It even researched how much virtual money is of interest to organized

criminals or terrorists. Another research question is the issue of BITCRIME. What can be damaged by virtual crimes? An example of a broader understanding of security, namely that one which is the basis on the term, is that of the so-called “Human Security.” As the word “human” suggests, this term concentrates on the individual as the object of security policy, instead of the former concentration of the policy on the state itself. What can be understood more exactly as “Human Security”? The 1994 Human Development report of the United Nations Development Programme describes it very bluntly, stating: “Human Security is a child who did not die, a disease that did not spread, a job that was not cut, an ethnic tension that did not explode, a dissident who was not silenced. Human Security is not a concern with weapons – it is a concern with human life and dignity” (UNDP 1994, 22). By such a comprehensive understanding, this term became a rather prominent catchphrase in the field of political science in the late 1990s. At about the same time, the term “Security Society” was introduced in the scientific discussion (Edelbacher and Norden 2006). The United Nations concept of “Human Security” involves many more aspects of human beings. The basic background question of this concept is: “What is important to make the life of each human being more secure and safe?” Personally, I hope that the Millennium Goals of the UN are a vision for all human beings. This concept seems to fulfill in a much better way the hopes and wishes of future generations. The frame-conditions are not really convincing. As a prognosis estimate, in 2030 out of nine billion people living on our planet about seven billion will be hungry and poor. As the “Rich” become richer and the “Poor” become poorer, a rising conflict situation seems unavoidable. Does it mean revolution? Does it mean war? What will all the people living under bad conditions do, knowing that in other parts of the world life could be managed in a much better and more satisfying way? As we are confronted with all these burning issues, we need men with visions, with power and energy, to teach the important ones, the leaders, to motivate the young ones and to change the greedy ones so that they understand and live in solidarity. A person with vision It seems a privilege that sometimes we Austrians are gifted with wise and diplomatic people. For example: It was an Austrian, the former Chancellor of Austria, Dr. Bruno Kreisky (1970-1983) who convinced the United Nations to come to Austria, as a result of which the Vienna International Centre was built between 1973-1979. Today, we are proud of hosting the UN Office on Drugs and Crime that works together with the UN Headquarters in New York and other UN offices worldwide. History teaches us that we need people with visions. Such a special gifted person, like Dr. Bruno Kreisky was, is Dr. Michael Platzer, an Austrian with a very broad international background, who will celebrate his 70th birthday in May 2016. He grew up in the United States and always showed a strong interest in social issues. When he was a young man, studying in the Boston area, he was very much engaged in social programs 114 | 115

supporting members of weaker social environments. I remember attending a conference of the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences in Boston together with Dr. Michael Platzer and, since he grew up in this area, he showed us all different places where he lived and helped young men and women coming from poorer families to find conditions of a proper life, using sports or other activities to avoid violence, aggression and radicalization. Another of his activities demonstrates his strong links to the understanding of history and human rights. When a friend made him aware that an old sailing ship that was used to transport slaves from Africa to America was going to be destroyed, both men tried to save the slave ship and raised a large sum of money for restoring the ship as a symbol and warning against slavery that could be used to help people learn and understand the history of human rights of freedom. When the ship was restored, they published a book about their efforts and the history of the ship. Conclusion Dr. Michael Platzer`s life is densely connected to the SDGs â&#x20AC;&#x201C; the Sustainable Development Goals of the United Nations: To reduce or abolish poverty, to guarantee food and life-sustaining essentials all over the world, to establish health services, to guarantee education for everyone, to fight discrimination, to guarantee hygienic conditions for everyone, and to guarantee clean energy, good working conditions for all human beings, social acceptable industrialization, reduction of in-equality, quality living in all towns, sustainable conditions for consumption, protection of climate, protection of the sea, protection of nature, peaceful living conditions for all, and worldwide co-operation. He is a person who has succeeded in promoting these goals throughout his life. Hopefully, he will do this for the next decade and pass his ideas to the next generations. The international society needs men like him. 1 Legal Advisor and Chief of the Major Crime Bureau of the Federal Police of Austria, Vienna (1972-2006); since 2016 Chair of

ACUNS Vienna Liaison Office (Austria); Security Advisor of AVUS Group World Wide Claim Service (Austria).

Peace and security in the post-2015 agenda: Challenges, opportunities and prospects Alistair Edgar1

Introduction Meeting in New York City on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the founding of the international organization, the UN General Assembly on 25 September, 2015 unanimously adopted the document setting out the successor to the Millennium Development Goals, Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (A/RES/70/1). Even before the Member States of the UN adopted this new agenda, however, my good friend and colleague Michael Platzer for almost a decade – and throughout his career in the organization had been pressing ahead with a series of globally- and locally-oriented activities, in Vienna and elsewhere, which have paralleled these “transformational” ideas. Femicide, juvenile justice, refugee rights, and fostering greater conversation and engagement between the UN and civil society – with a focus on engaging youth – have been important issues advanced by Michael Platzer and the tremendous team of young ACUNS Vienna collaborators. It was my privilege, in my role as executive director of ACUNS, to work with Michael over this past decade. Introduced to others by Michael as “my boss”, as they and I knew, Michael’s powers of persuasion, his optimism, and his determination to achieve positive goals on those causes to which he was committed, meant that he was always his own “boss”! If the United Nations could function in a similar manner, it might be able to accomplish a great many more transformational tasks. It might even have become the incipient world government that so many right-wing critics and conspiracy theorists accuse it of being, or that advocates of a world federation might desire. However, the UN has significant limitations, imposed initially by the Charter and subsequently throughout its 70 years of existence and operations by the political interests and goals of its Member States, whether in the General Assembly, the Security Council, or other parts of the system. The United Nations from three perspectives To give an informed assessment of what the United Nations has accomplished and what it can be expected to achieve in its core functions of peace and security, in the overall context of the new post-2015 agenda, or in specific instances such as individual peacekeeping operations, we need to pull apart – to deconstruct, as scholars today would say - what we mean by “the UN”.

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Most casual observers take the UN as an obvious and straightforward entity – primarily referencing the landmark Secretariat headquarters building in Manhattan, New York, with the public face of the international organization understood to be the Secretary-General. There is relevance to this popular image, but such a conception also is unhelpful and misleading, in that it fails to identify and differentiate at least two other, critically important dimensions of the global body. To see where it succeeds or fails, and to be able to offer useful suggestions for reform (or perhaps, convincing reasons for abandoning it), the United Nations has to be understood in at least three forms: first, as an international civil service in the Secretariat; second, as an arena of states’ governments pursuing their national interests; and third, as a source or conduit of new ideas and values. These are the permanent UN, the political UN, and the normative UN. These three dimensions are intertwined, but need to be understood separately as their characteristics, strengths and deficiencies, and the possibilities for addressing these, also differ in important ways. The permanent United Nations: an international civil service The permanent United Nations is portrayed at times as a bloated and increasingly costly global body, steadily and stealthily impinging upon states’ sovereignty as it seeks to become a “world government”. At the same time, this international civil service is criticized for failing to prevent, or effectively respond to, new global security crises. Here, comparisons are useful, and since the UN headquarters is located in New York, a comparison to other New York-based organizations providing security and justice can be illustrative. For 2014-15, the core budget for the United Nations, as approved by the Member States, was approximately US $5.53 billion. This total included costs for all employees in every category – full-time, part-time, and contract staff – worldwide. The UN employs about 42,000 individuals, including 6,300 based at the Headquarters in New York, 3,200 at the UN Office in Geneva, and 1,700 in Nairobi (home to the UN Environment Program or UNEP, and UN Human Settlements Program, UN Habitat). In Vienna, another 4,000 individuals work at UN technical agencies (UNIDO, UNODC, UNIS, UNOOSA, UNCITRAL) and at several special international bodies such as the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization Preparatory Commission, which are not part of the UN itself. In the previous year, the UN lost 260 full time positions, and its core budget was cut by 1 percent; its staff also had a one-year freeze in compensation levels. By comparison, in New York City the Police Department (NYPD) had 47,000 employees in all categories, with a total department budget of approximately US $5 billion. The Fire Department (FDNY) reported 16,000 employees, and a budget of approximately US $1.8 billion. These two units together – this does not include the ambulance service, social services, court services - the City of New York spent US $6.8 billion and employed 63,000 personnel in providing core security and justice functions and services for its population of approximately 8.5 million people. Compare this to US $5.53 billion and 42,000 personnel for UN organs and agencies, delivering to a worldwide population of approximately 7.3 billion people in almost 200 countries (with 193 of these being Member States of the UN).

This is not intended to suggest that New York City does not need, or benefit greatly from, the work of these bodies, or that they are spending excessively on the provision of these services. It simply illustrates the relative scale and size of the permanent United Nations, the international civil service that is charged with identifying, managing, supporting, fostering, and building “global governance”, and the human, financial and material resources with which the UN is expected by Member States to accomplish its daily tasks. We can go beyond the UN’s core budget and functional structure, to highlight the rapid post-Cold War growth in its peacekeeping operations. Today, the United Nations is engaged in 16 peacekeeping missions led by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, including approximately 107,000 uniformed personnel (military and police) and 18,000 civilians including local staff and international volunteers. The budget for these peacekeeping missions in 2014-15 was US $7.06 billion, provided by additional contributions from Member States of the United Nations. The largest financial contributors are the United States, Japan, France, Britain and Germany. As of reporting in March 2015, however, the Member States owed US $2.17 billion in unpaid current and backdated peacekeeping dues. The troops and police forces operating under the UN DPKO’s direction come from Member States, as does the additional funding – and while these troops’ salaries are paid by their own States at their own regular levels, for each individual military personnel provided to it the DPKO repays the Member State a contribution of US $1,028 per soldier. With the very large majority of troops being provided by “Global South” countries Bangladesh, Pakistan, India, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Nepal, Senegal, Ghana and Nigeria, the reimbursement can be more than those soldiers’ normal monthly salaries. The cost of these Security Council authorized commitments in often highly-complex, challenging peacekeeping operations – in several cases, involving active and ongoing fighting including the targeting of UN troops - is the equivalent to approximately 0.5 percent of UN Member States’ total global military expenditures, which in 2014 were estimated at US $1,747 billion. From another perspective, while the UN required US $7.06 billion for all of its global peacekeeping commitments, the reported 2015 annual defense budget of Singapore was US $9.5 billion. Member States - chiefly, the leading financial contributors – have been pressuring the UN to reduce its peacekeeping budget, although global defense spending continues to rise. Singapore’s national defense budget of US $9.5 billion included a 5.7 percent increase over the previous year. It is misleading, at best, to portray the permanent UN, and the “UN system”, as a bloated global bureaucracy with a huge and wasteful budget, that Member States cannot afford and which challenges states’ sovereignty and authority. If we add the UN core and peacekeeping budgets together, the total is less than one percent of annual global military spending. Instead, and more concerning, should be that most of the 260 staff positions cut at the various UN bodies and agencies are expected to come from the work areas of sustainable development, poverty eradication, and regional commissions - at the same time that the international organization is being directed to “ramp up” its capacity to provide support for the post-2015 Sustainable Development Goals. 118 | 119

The political United Nations: states, governments, and national interests It is the United Nations as a site of, and forum for, states’ diverging national interests – the political UN, especially the Security Council – which has borne the brunt of popular criticisms. It was the political UN which failed to act to stop genocide in Rwanda. It was the political UN which responded inadequately as the former Yugoslavia collapsed into conflict. It is the political UN, in the form of the Security Council, which has been hamstrung in formulating a stronger response to end the brutal civil war in Syria by the veto privileges given to the P-5 (USA, Russia, China, UK, and France There are many valid criticisms that can be directed at the politics of the Security Council and the General Assembly, and equally many constructive ideas for reforms that address these structural and procedural flaws. What many of these criticisms and suggestions ignore, is that the Council and the Assembly - and other oft-criticized UN bodies such as the Economic and Social Council in New York, and the Human Rights Council in Geneva - are chambers, halls, and rooms occupied periodically by groupings of Member States. The Security Council does privilege the P-5 states with veto power; the General Assembly often is the site of bloc voting, and political horse-trading of votes. In each case, the successes, failures, actions and inactions, of these bodies are the result of the Member States pursuing their national policy priorities, at the direction of their governments who also decide on what levels of resources they are prepared to commit to support the implementation of any of these policy choices. The UN Charter gives primary recognition and responsibility in matters of peace and security to Member States of the global organization. Article 2 notes the sovereign equality of all Members, and includes commitments that Member States will fulfill the obligations of the Charter “in good faith”. Those obligations include refraining from the threat or use of force to settle international disputes, and instead using “peaceful means”; and providing the UN “every assistance in any action” it takes in accordance with the Charter. Article 8 observes the right of Member States to enter into regional arrangements to ensure their security, and notes that states in such regional bodies “shall make every effort” to settle disputes by peaceful means. Only when all of these obligations, and levels of action, have been undertaken, should matters be referred to the United Nations – either to the General Assembly or to the Security Council. In practice, the UN receives matters when Member States and regional organizations do not want to resolve a dispute, when they have failed to resolve a dispute, or when they are the causes of the dispute. Since the political UN is a forum in which these same Member States debate the problems that they have failed to resolve, the permanent UN in turn becomes the responsible body – or less politely, the dumping ground - for Member States’ failures and most difficult problems. This, as Kofi Annan once reportedly quipped, is when “SG” means Scape Goat instead of SecretaryGeneral; or as a senior UN official observed at the 2012 ACUNS Annual Meeting, “where I sit every day I have a very good vantage point of what’s happening in the world, what’s not happening to respond to those things in the world, and seeing what is dumped on the UN that no one else can solve anywhere else” (ACUNS 2012).

The UN Secretariat, staff and others of the “permanent UN” by no means are free of faults and failures in their own right, or of institutional and personal failures that compounded those crises that were political in origin. Here, in some instances at least, the third UN – the normative UN, as a source of ideas – may be seen to intersect in a potentially constructive manner. The normative UN: new ideas and practices, old limitations? Following the Rwanda genocide in 1994, and the mass murder (or genocide) in Srebrenica, Bosnia, in 1995, the UN undertook two investigations which in 1999 produced detailed reports that were highly critical of parties including the relevant states and non-state bodies, but also of the UN itself – including individual senior officials, and the core assumptions of UN peacekeeping operations. In November 2000, the Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations (the “Brahimi Report”) called for major changes in UN peacekeeping, ranging from more robust mandates given by the Security Council and more rapid and assured provision of the military, financial and intelligence resources required to fulfill that new mandate, to significant reforms in the institutional structures of peacekeeping. Five years later, in 2005 the UN also established a Peacebuilding Commission, Peacebuilding Support Office and Peacebuilding Fund. More controversially, the UN General Assembly in 2005 accepted the concept of the “Responsibility to Protect”, intended to establish clear guidelines under which external interventions might be conducted to protect civilian populations from mass, systematic atrocities. The mandates of UN peace operations in the past 15 years have reflected the recommendations of the Brahimi Report, being undertaken with greater frequency under a robust Chapter 7 authorization to use force when necessary not only in self defence but also to implement the mandate. More, and larger, UN peace operations have been undertaken, several of which have seen direct military engagements by UN forces against armed state and non-state opposition – most notably, the UN combat brigade in the Democratic Republic of Congo which took on, and defeated, the M23 militia. The R2P doctrine has been called into service at least twice (Cote d’Ivoire, and Libya) by the United Nations Security Council, and was raised by peace negotiators as a serious option at least once (Kenya). However, these reforms depend on the willingness of Member States to provide resources and to agree on new mandates. Today, Member States are reluctant to do so, for a wide variety of reasons related to their own changing national (and global) political, military, and economic, interests. Instead, reports on global security and justice continue to worsen. The 2014 report of the UN High Commission for Refugees noted a post-1945 record high number of 59.5 million refugees, asylum seekers and other persons displaced by conflict. The 2015 total was an increase of 16 percent over 2013, and 59 percent higher than reported in 2004. There were 14 million newly displaced people in 2014, including 11 million new internally displaced persons (IDPs) – 4 million of these in Syria, where the violence has left over 11.5 million people as refugees and IDPs. The states of Sub Saharan Africa reported 15 million displaced persons including more than 4 million newly displaced in 2014. At least half of the 59.5 million displaced persons are children; and the total reflects only those people who have reported their displacement to UNHCR as based on fear of violence. It does not include those displaced by natural disasters, climate change, or other causes. 120 | 121

Conclusion None of the above is meant to suggest that the UN at 70 has become obsolete as a framework or an actor in security and justice. The UN remains the critical global body for global security and justice; but it depends ultimately on the support in political, material, and financial terms of the Member States. Without that, the UN as an ideal is not obsolete since its purposes remain as fundamental and essential today as ever; but its capacity to achieve these purposes suffers from political sclerosis no less than it did during the Cold War. 1 Executive Director of the Academic Council on the United Nations System (ACUNS), Associate Professor of Political Science,

Balsillie School of International Affairs, Wilfrid Laurier University (Waterloo, Canada).

“Victim-offender” in cases of human trafficking Karin Bruckmüller1 and Stefan Schumann2

Introduction In many cases, victims of human trafficking are initially identified as offenders. They are caught by the police or other relevant authorities as offenders against the criminal law or criminal administrative law. Typically, they will be suspected of having committed migration offences or other crimes (UNODC 2008, Tool 6). It is mostly during the first interrogation, but also sometimes at an advanced stage of the (administrative) criminal proceedings, that the authority becomes aware of the fact that the offence was directly related to the person’s victimization by a human trafficker and that the offender was forced by a human trafficker to commit the offence. In those cases all of a sudden the authorities are facing a constellation where the person caught is both an offender and a victim at the same time. The “victim-offenders” as a typical phenomenon of human trafficking In the usual scenario of a criminal case the police, prosecutors, and judges are confronted with the “classic” two-party-system where, on the one hand, there is a person being the (suspected) offender, and on the other, another person being the victim. In cases of human trafficking, however, there is another category – the “victim-offender”– which has to be taken note of. Although, in general, there are rare criminal cases, where the police, prosecutors, and judges are confronted with offenders who are also victims (e.g., when a gang member is forced to commit criminal acts), often the phenomenon of being an offender and a victim at the same time is a characteristic of victims of human trafficking. The offence of human trafficking, as defined by the international instruments (e.g. UN 2004, EU 2011, CoE 2005) consists of three elements:3 the gaining or having or delivering control over another person by using illegal means (as a threat or coercion) for its purpose – the exploitation of the victim. Typically, but not obligatory, human trafficking includes translocation of the victim from a (usually poor) source country to an (economically more developed) destination country, where the victim will be exploited. Although human trafficking does not involve a transnational element by definition, in practice THB is mostly a transnational crime. If so, victims are likely to violate migration laws of the destination country by entering the country with false documents or staying or working illegally there. When being exploited by the trafficker, victims often are forced to commit (administrative) criminal offences, e.g., illegal prostitution, begging, or other criminal acts such as drug trade or theft (UNODC 2014, 9). There is also an increasingly common phenomenon in Western countries of traffickers coercing minors in particular into committing various acts of fraud. A common task assigned to them, for instance, is getting change for counterfeit money from shops or passers-by.

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Enforcement of criminal law vs. international obligations not to punish In many national jurisdictions victim-offenders face obligatory punishment for their offences4 − be this a fine, administrative detention, or even imprisonment − regardless of the fact that they did not commit those criminal acts of their own volition but under coercion by their human trafficker. But since the offences are committed under threat, deception or exploitation and the fact that human trafficking tremendously violates the trafficked person’s dignity and human rights (UNHCR 2014)5, the authorities need to put greater emphasis on the victim status than on the offender status during any further proceedings. Ignoring the victims’ status and needs, but punishing these victim-offenders, means that they are denied the comprehensive protection they need as victims of human trafficking and refused the victims’ rights they would be entitled to.6 International and national legislators and institutions have reacted to the situation of victimoffenders in order to adequately meet both legal and ethical standards supporting them as victims. In addition to this victim support, and as consequence of it, under certain preconditions the non-prosecution or the non-application of penalties for the victim is demanded. Michael Platzer, as a UN staff member as well as a NGO official, is among the early proponents of comprehensive victim protection. His passionate commitment is truly catching; so over the last decade we had fruitful discussions on human trafficking and victim support, as well as on much more topics of international criminal justice, which we are grateful for! The main difficulties in providing victim support as needed by the victim-offenders originate from practical and legal impediments. Identification of victims of human trafficking – a practical problem The identification as a victim of human trafficking is a fundamental precondition for obtaining victim protection and victim rights. Although during the last years more and more offenders are being identified as victims due to various improvements and awareness-raising actions (UNODC 2008, Tool 9.8),7 the identification of victims of human trafficking is still a major practical problem (European Migration Network 2014, 5, Simich et al. 2014 5, 11). This is due to the fact that these victims regularly do not reveal that they have been trafficked because of the fear of what the human trafficker might to do to them or their families. Therefore, it is of vital importance to establish and maintain a high standard of social and psychological proficiency, particularly with the authority that is first in contact with a victimoffender (UNODC 2008, Tool 6.7 et seq.). Since victim-offenders are typically caught by the police, police officers in particular need to be equipped with professional ability to recognize victims of human trafficking. Emphasis should be laid on necessary skills as part of a police officer’s training, in-job training, and other appropriate modes of instruction. Moreover, effective cooperation with NGO experts and courts is required when it comes to the identification of victims, especially in unclear or difficult cases.

Handling of victim-offenders – a legal problem Even if the offenders caught are identified as coincidently being victims of human trafficking, problems often remain that obstruct victim protection because the law and law enforcement are focused on the offender and the offence committed. Especially in (civil law) countries where compulsory prosecution (principle of legality) is applied, prosecutors in principle do not have any other choice but to accuse an offender, irrespective of his coincidently being a victim of human trafficking. In those national jurisdictions the vast majority of victim-offender cases are brought to the courts and most of them will be sentenced for the offence they committed. Therefore, in many cases it is unlikely that victims of human trafficking will seek help from official authorities on their own initiative. Even more, often traffickers will avail themselves from the victims’ fear of punishment. Contrariwise, protection of victim-offenders is much easier in (mostly common-law) jurisdictions where it lies within the prosecutor’s authority to decide whether the charges are dropped or prosecution is initiated (opportunity principle). Non-prosecution or non-application of penalties to the victim When taking the comprehensive protection of victims of human trafficking seriously, protection also shall be granted to victim-offenders (Bruckmüller/Schumann 2011, 115 et seq.). General rules of exclusion of criminal liability might apply from case to case, but certainly will not cover all victim-offender constellations. Hence international instruments and national regulations demand or plea for immunity from prosecution or for refraining from punishment under certain preconditions: It is common requirement in all of those regulations that the offence has to be directly related to the process of victimization through the trafficker. This is the case when offences are committed as a result of the illegal migration, and/or the offence is a criminal act the victim is coerced into committing within the exploitation situation. Beyond this common understanding, the international and national regulations differ in detail. It is a merit of the United States that they approached the dilemma of victim-offenders quite early. In the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (US 2000) Sec 102 [19], it is stipulated that “[v]ictims of severe forms of trafficking should not be inappropriately incarcerated, fined, or otherwise penalized solely for unlawful acts committed as a direct result of being trafficked, such as using false documents, entering the country without documentation, or working without documentation”. According to Sec 103 (8): “[t]he term severe forms of trafficking in persons' means (A) sex trafficking in which a commercial sex act is induced by force, fraud, or coercion, or in which the person induced to perform such act has not attained 18 years of age; or (B) the recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision, or obtaining of a person for labor or services, through the use of force, fraud, or coercion for the purpose of subjection to involuntary servitude, peonage, debt bondage, or slavery”.

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The exemplary list of victims’ offences focuses on violations of public/administrative interests/ regulations related to migration and labor market. It is significant that those offences violating individual interests which are mostly committed during the exploitation as theft are not mentioned explicitly. A broader approach is included in the Model Law against Trafficking in Persons of the UNODC (UNODC 2009). The Model Law assists national states in implementing the provisions contained in the UN Human Trafficking Protocol. Although its regulations are not legally binding, it has a great influence on national legislators when implementing corresponding rules to human trafficking. The UN Model Law (Art. 10) recommends that victims of human trafficking should not be held criminally or administratively liable for offences committed by them, to the extent that such involvement is a direct consequence of their situation as trafficked persons. This recommendation refers to all victims of human trafficking; a certain degree of severity of the case is not a precondition. The recommendation of non-liability is not limited to migration offences; it rather refers to all offences committed, to the extent that such involvement is a direct consequence of the victims’ situation as trafficked persons. However, the model law provides for an exclusion where the crime is of a particularly serious nature as defined under national law. Hence, the applicability of such an exclusionary rule depends on the national legislator. The heading of Art. 10 UN Model Law is as follows: “Non-liability [non-punishment] [nonprosecution] of victims of trafficking in persons”. A closing of the proceedings against a victim-offender at a quite early stage in other countries with the principle of compulsory prosecution is common to all those proposed alternatives. This spares the mostly traumatized victim a trial and secondary-victimization. The Model Law proposes Art. 10 as an optional rule for national legislators, whereas European documents demand national legislators for a non-liability rule as a compulsory measure. This obligation of EU member states derives from the Directive 2011/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2011 on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims (EU 2011). In the wider system of the Council of Europe, the Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings (CoE 2005) demands such national measures. Both instruments are legally binding. The directive has to be implemented by all member states of the European Union; and the Convention binds those CoE member states and third countries, which ratified it. Art. 8 of the EU directive states: “Member States shall … take the necessary measures to ensure that competent national authorities are entitled not to prosecute or impose penalties on victims of trafficking in human beings for their involvement in criminal activities which they have been compelled to commit as a direct consequence of being [a victim of human trafficking.]”8 Here all offences committed by victims of human trafficking are included, there are no restrictions.

This provision is to be interpreted in the light of recital 14 of the directive which stipulates i.a. that “[v]ictims of trafficking in human beings should, in accordance with the basic principles of the legal systems of the relevant Member States, be protected from prosecution or punishment for criminal activities such as the use of false documents, or offences under legislation on prostitution or immigration, that they have been compelled to commit as a direct consequence of being subject to trafficking. The aim of such protection is to safeguard the human rights of victims, to avoid further victimisation and to encourage them to act as witnesses in criminal proceedings against the perpetrators.” In the national laws those rules can be developed as substantive criminal law provisions, procedural ones, or by any other legally binding and effective measure (CoE 2005, Explanatory Report). This elbow room is a precondition giving the national legislator the possibility to implement the regulation in accordance with the basic principles of the national legal systems. But this margin of discretion also offers the possibility to develop the rule with a quite narrow application. Although Art. 8 of the EU directive calls for the entitlement of the victim-offender not to be prosecuted, and the non-liability i.a. aims to encourage victims of human trafficking to act as witnesses against the trafficker, this cooperation should not, however, be made precondition to a decision for non-liability of victim-offenders. Measures to protect victim-offenders in criminal proceedings If, due to the national jurisdiction, initiation of criminal proceedings is inevitable, then at least appropriate support of the victim-offenders has to be granted (Bruckmüller 2006). Although there is broad consensus that the victim-offender – as a victim – is entitled to full victim-rights in criminal proceedings against his trafficker, and that the victim-offender – as a suspect – is entitled to full suspects rights in criminal proceedings against himself, his needs as a victim of human trafficking often are not sufficiently taken into account or are even ignored by law and/ or practice in this latter proceeding. Yet, victims of human trafficking also need support and protection in criminal proceedings commenced against themselves − not only because they are not in their home country, and they often cannot understand or speak the language of the country where the proceedings take place, but because they are mostly traumatised by their experiences as a victim of human trafficking in the past and under ongoing pressure as to what the traffickers might do to them or their families. Hence, it is necessary to support and protect them as victims when their offence is investigated or brought before the court. It would be of vital significance to involve a qualified victim protection organization, and − if indicated − psychosocial support and medical treatment, as well as accommodation in secret premises. Subsequently, no details of the victim-offender should be made public that might enable the trafficker to track him. Furthermore, especially if the suspect is a victim of sexual exploitation, s/he should be heard in contradictory hearings or in closed court. It is the task of the police or judge to create a pressure-free atmosphere, an atmosphere of understanding so that the victim-offender is willing to talk about his experiences as a victim. These victims’ right will contribute to preventing secondary victimization. Generally, they are only granted in trials where the victim-offender is the victim, meaning the trial against the human trafficker. Effective victim protection shall not be limited to the proceedings against the trafficker, but needs to be applicable (and actually applied) in proceedings against the victim-offender.

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Although victims’ and suspects’ rights have genuinely different aims, they are not mutually contradictory. Hence it is possible to combine them in order give adequate protection and support to the victim-offender. And this protection should not be seen as interfering with the legal position and procedural rights of another party to the proceedings brought against victimoffenders: their victims. The proposed concept of a victim-offender will additionally support the victim-offender’s willingness to make a statement on the offence committed as well as to witness against the human trafficker. This approach contributes to receiving more comprehensive testimonies, which can be used to grant impunity to the suspect on a substantive level. Simultaneously, this would also lead to more information about the human trafficker, leading to captureand penalization. Conclusion In order to comprehensively strengthen the protection of victims of human trafficking no victim-offenders should be detained, charged, prosecuted, or punished for any criminal act committed as a direct consequence of their situation as trafficked persons. To provide for the fact that victims of human trafficking are under the continuous pressure of their trafficker, suffer dependency and exploitation, and are afraid of their traffickers, there should be no preconditions on any kinds of cooperation with the authorities. To fulfill the human rights approach in a comprehensive way, there should also be no strict limitations on severe forms of human trafficking or on special kinds of offences. A non-liability should be possible regardless of the criminal act a victim-offender has committed. Nevertheless there has to be a margin of discretion for the prosecutor or the court that allows the situation of pressure of the victim-offender on the one hand and the violation of the individual interests and needs of the direct victim of the victim-offender on the other to be balanced. If administrative or criminal proceedings are started against a victim-offender, for him/her victims’ rights need to be granted. Victims’ rights and suspects’ rights will not interfere with each other; likewise the position of a victim as a victim-offender will not be affected. 1 Karin Bruckmüller, Dr., Ludwig-Maximilians-University, (Munich, Germany). Focuses in her research on the prevention of

trafficking in human beings, victims' and suspect' rights, juvenile justice systems, medical criminal law, comparative criminal

law analysis.

2 Stefan Schumann, Dr., Johannes Kepler University, (Linz, Austria). Focuses in his research on economic criminal law, European

and international criminal law, criminal procedural law and suspects rights, and comparative criminal law. 3 See an overview of the elements: https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/human-trafficking/what-is-human-trafficking.html

(access to all homepages: 1.1.2016), in detail see Winterdyk et al. 2011, Shelley 2010.

4 The US Victim Act describes the problem as follows: “Existing laws often fail to protect victims of trafficking, and because

victims are often illegal immigrants in the destination country, they are repeatedly punished more harshly than the traffickers

themselves” (US 2000, Victim Act 210 (17)). See more on the Victim Act in B. III.

5 It is also a severe violation of fundamental rights – as outlined in Art. 5(3) of the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights,

available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/pdf/text_en.pdf

6 See the listed victim rights in the international documents as UN 2004, EU 2011, CoE 2005, some of them are also mentioned

under B. IV.

7 There are many awareness-raising campaigns by the international organizations like the International Organization for

Migration (IOM), see: https://www.iom.int/news/human-trafficking-awareness-raising-campaigns-launched-puntland and

the International Labour Organization, see: http://www.ilo.org/global/topics/forced-labour/news/WCMS_145959/lang-

en/index.htm, Organizsation for Security and Co-Operation in Europe, see: http://www.osce.org/secretariat/165226.

8 This wide approach is also mentioned in non-binding documents, as in the OSCE, Action Plan to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings, decision 557/Rev.1, 7 July 2005, and in the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human

Rights, Recommended Principles and Guidelines on Human Rights and Human Trafficking – E/2002/68/Add.1.

Human rights defenders must remain vigilant on all fronts Anthony Mills1

Introduction It is often said that freedom of expression, in particular media freedom, is the fundamental human right that upholds all other rights in democracies. Unfortunately, in democracies and elsewhere media freedom remains under attack.2 Across the world, journalists, especially those doing investigative reporting, are being arrested, imprisoned, subjected to unfair trials and in many instances killed. Thatâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s why it is vital that human rights defenders, including both fellow journalists and those working for NGOs, international organizations, and on behalf of states committed to freedom of expression and the media, continue to promote the press freedom cause, and to stick up for those journalists suffering because of their reporting. I first met Michael Platzer when I started working with the International Press Institute in Vienna, and quickly came to learn that he was absolutely committed not just to the broader global struggle to uphold all human rights, including those of refugees and women, but also more specifically to the effort to promote freedom of expression and of the media. About media freedom For many in Austria and other Western democracies, media freedom is taken for granted. Attacks on media freedom, it is thought, happen in countries ruled by dictators, and where rule of law is weak or absent. While it is true that in Western democracies, generally speaking, the degree of press freedom is more elevated, that does not mean that it is not being eroded. Take the revelations regarding mass surveillance as revealed by whistleblower Edward Snowden. Not only were and in many cases still are citizens in general being subjected to invasive data gathering, but journalists are also being caught up in the net. Only recently did it emerge that journalists in Ireland3 have been the subject of unwarranted surveillance including the obtaining of their phone records and the reading of their emails. How are journalists to continue to enjoy the trust of sources and whistleblowers if these must fear that the police will be accessing journalistâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s private communications. 128 | 129

Following coverage by the Guardian newspaper in Britain of the Snowden files, representatives of British listening spy agency GCHQ came to the newspaper’s offices to oversee the smashing up in the basement of computer hard drives on which some of the Snowden material was stored. The two representatives, sporting suited sinister sartorial style and sunglasses, watched as the drives were smashed up and one of them then reportedly said: “I guess we can call off the Black Hawk now.”4 Ewan MacAskill, one of the Guardian editors who worked on the Snowden story, said in an interview with Austrian public radio: “Who would have thought that this could happen in the 20th Century in a Western democracy like Britain?”5 And one must ask oneself the question: Why did it happen? Copies of the material existed elsewhere, in Berlin and in Brazil. It appears to have been purely vindictive and designed to serve as psychological harassment. Indeed, MacAskill said that for six months after the story broke, every time he departed England via Heathrow he was pulled out of the line for questioning by police.6 Intimidation is not necessary, surveillance suffices? It is not necessary to imprison, or torture, journalists to intimidate them. Freelance journalists such as those under investigation in Britain for covering protests by environmental protestors, who don’t have the weight of a big newspaper to back them up legally, may very well think twice in the future before covering sensitive stories. And even journalists who do work for a powerful media outlet will not necessarily all run to cover such stories going forward. This is because psychological harassment and pressure in the age of surveillance, even in Western democracies, can be a powerful deterrent. The chilling effect, in democracies too, of perceived ubiquitous surveillance is documented. Internet users in the US, for e.g. are wary of discussing Edward Snowden online (Lyon 2015). Just the perception of the possibility of surveillance has a chilling effect, even if the surveillance is not continuous (Foucault 1977) (Bart 2005). Even in Western democracies, then, surveillance of this nature creates a ‘Panopticon’ effect – in reference to a prison design conceived of by English philosopher and social theorist Jeremy Bentham in the late 18th Century and allowing for constant [possibility of] surveillance of inmates (Bentham 1791). For investigative journalists, the fear of possible surveillance, which can engender a degree of paranoia about real and imagined risks of retribution, including arrest and imprisonment under anti-terror legislation, is enough to dissuade many from pursuing sensitive stories about the state in particular and therefore from holding state actors to account. The chilling effect risk intensifies when such surveillance is combined with broader undemocratic political developments in Western democracies, such as movement towards illiberalism, nationalism, populism etc, together with erosion of other checks and balances such as the independence of the Constitutional Court, judiciary and so on.

When that happens, democracy suffers because it is the role of watchdog journalists to constitute the checks in a system of checks and balances, so that those in public office are held accountable in a transparent manner before the electorate. When journalists are intimidated in any way by the authorities, their ability to perform that vital function is threatened. Not content with harassing journalists who worked on the Snowden story, the British government for e.g. is seeking to pass legislation – the Investigatory Powers Bill – that would enshrine in law the mass surveillance of British citizens.7 The law would oblige Internet providers to retain information on every single user for a year, including the address of each website they have visited. The police would not require judicial permission to access those records. In the case of journalists the request must be signed off by a judge, but this may well simply amount to rubber stamping. Britain is not alone among Western democracies in passing surveillance legislation that threatens civil liberties and the ability of watchdog journalists to do their job. From France8 to the Netherlands9 and Austria10, new surveillance legislation has been passed or is in the works. And in every case concerns have been and are being raised by civil society activists and journalists. In fact the human rights representative of the Council of Europe recently warned in a New York Times op-ed11 that “Europe is spying on you”. How are Western democracies to raise human rights concerns about freedom of expression and of the media with their less democratic counterparts if they do not lead by example? China12, carefully observing the new surveillance legislation in Western democracies, is passing new, restrictive online media legislation of its own. Russia13 wants to have its own Internet that it can more easily surveil. Conclusion It falls upon those human rights defenders following in the footsteps of Michael Platzer to of course hold actors in non-democratic countries to account over human rights violations and infringements upon freedom of expression and the media. But they must not look the other way when more subtle violations, but with enormous impact for democratic accountability, occur in Western democracies. The erosion of human rights is a sliding slope. Human rights defenders must remain vigilant on all fronts. 1 PhD Candidate, University of Vienna, Department of Communications; Journalist, BuzzfeedNews & France 24; Media &

Communications Consultant; former Deputy Director, The International Press Institute; former CNN Beirut correspondent.

2 https://cpj.org/reports/ 3 http://www.theguardian.com/media/greenslade/2016/jan/18/irish-media-companies-fight-over-accessing-of-journalists-phones 4 http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2397827/The-Guardian-allowed-GCHQ-spies-offices-oversee-destruction leaked-NSA-data.html

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5 http://oe1.orf.at/programm/422520 6 http://oe1.orf.at/programm/422520 7 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/02/investigatory-powers-bill-snoopers-charter-will-remain-firmly-in-place 8 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/24/france-big-brother-surveillance-powers 9 http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/04/03/the-dutch-surveillance-kings-of-europe-are-about-to-get-even-nosier.html 10 http://arstechnica.co.uk/tech-policy/2015/09/austria-plans-ten-new-spy-agencies-with-vast-surveillance-powers/ 11 http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/28/opinion/europe-is-spying-on-you-mass-surveillance.html?_r=0 12 http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/28/world/asia/china-passes-antiterrorism-law-that-critics-fear-may-overreach.html 13 http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/technology/2014/04/russia_internet_sovereignty_vladimir_putin_is_tightening_ his_grip_on_the.html

Building just, peaceful and inclusive societies: The role of religion, virtues, and social capital Thomas G. Walsh1

Introduction On September 25, 2015, the United Nations Sustainable Development Summit was convened, just a few days prior to the opening of the 70th Session of the United Nations General Assembly. Pope Francis himself spoke that very morning, and was very well-received, as had been his encyclical Laudate Si, “Praise Be To You: On the Care of Our Common Home,” which focused on climate change and economic inequality, and was released earlier in the year, no doubt with an eye looking toward the UN Summit and the Paris “Climate Change” Summit scheduled for December 2015 (Pope Francis 2015). More than 150 world leaders had gathered for the Summit and adopted the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) as the core set of objectives for the UN and member states’ agenda over the next 15 years, leading up to 2030. The final draft is entitled, “Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development” (A/RES/70/1). The new goals for 2016-2030 The SDGs follow after the 15-year period of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) that had been launched during the Millennium General Assembly in the year 2000, featuring a set of 8 goals.The SDGs continue many of the MDGs, while also building on the achievements that have been made, which are not inconsiderable, such as in the area of reducing poverty, education, empowerment of women and girls and a focus on the environment. SDG Goal 16 aims to “promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels.” Listed under this broad goal are twelve specific targets that, inter alia, aim to reduce violence, corruption, exploitation, and trafficking, while also promoting rule of law, good governance, and fundamental freedoms. These are listed in full in A/RES/70/1 (Ibid.). The achievement of such noble goals will require the strenuous efforts of governments, along with civil society institutions, and individuals the world over. The two-year process of developing, drafting and editing the SDGs involved a wide range of discussions that sought to be as inclusive as possible, with numerous non-governmental organizations and civil society representatives 132 | 133

weighing in, offering their insights and recommendations. Some were more effective than others in having their voices heard, and/or affirmed. Yet, overall the process was inclusive, fair, transparent and productive of a very impressive document, and a set of goals that few found objectionable, though some have argued that the sheer number and range of the goals - 17 goals and 169 targets - undermines the hope for success. For example, Bjorn Lomborg of the Copenhagen Consensus Center writes that “The chief problem with this new laundry list of targets is that trying to prioritize 169 things looks very similar to prioritizing nothing.” (Lomborg 2015, C1) But with all due respect to the “less is more” argument, the 2030 development agenda has been set and we now need to work to make the most of it, applying all available assets to seek maximum effect. With this in mind, I would like to articulate what I believe are some “marginalized” capacities that are not fully thematized in the document and yet which are going to be essential if substantial progress is to be achieved. These traditional, though often marginalized assets include religion, virtues and the more general concept of social capital. Each of these has relevance of the execution of the 2030 agenda. While they have not been highlighted in the final document, they may nevertheless be incorporated into the thought and the strategic planning going forward. It has been my good fortune, and that of the Universal Peace Federation, to have collaborated over many years with Dr. Michael Platzer of the Advisory Council on the United Nations Systems. While what follows should not be taken as in any way representative of Dr. Platzer’s or ACUNS’ perspective, it is fair to say that the general principles are consistent with and inspired by Dr. Platzer’s visionary work over the past 25 years, work which has consistently drawn on moral and spiritual foundations, applying these to a wide range of endeavors dedicated to preventing injustices and, at the same time, improving the lives of women and youth around the world. The relevance of religion It is not insignificant to note that Pope Francis’ address at the United Nations was presented at the outset of the Sustainable Development Summit. Moreover, 2015 is the 50th anniversary of another important religious document, Nostra Aetate (In Our Time), the Declaration on the Relationship of the Church to Non-Christian Religions promulgated by Pope Paul VI on October 28, 1965 during the Second Vatican Council. 50 years later, a religious leader, the Roman Catholic Pope, stood in the General Assembly Hall, in front of the heads of 193 UN Members States, and delivered a spiritual message that was recognized as relevant to the topic at hand. Perhaps more than any of the political leaders, Pope Francis drew the widest and most intensive media coverage. As much as the prospect of a secularized world governed exclusively by nation states has been anticipated over the past couple of centuries, at least since the Enlightenment era of 18th century Europe, we have found, from any objective historical, sociological or anthropological study, that religion persists in being a significant factor at play in human affairs. In the words of Jonathan Sachs, “Ever since the rise of modern science, intellectuals have been convinced that faith is in intensive care, about to die or at least rendered harmless by exclusion from the public square… Religion has lately demanded our attention not as a still, small voice but as a whirlwind.” (Sachs 2015)

And, whereas it may be the not infrequent linkage between religion and violence or various forms of extremism that necessitates our attention, religion also continues to have its legitimate and constructive place alongside politics, economics, culture, the arts, the media, etc., within the spheres of ordinary life. The tenacity of religion may be attributed to its capacities to provide an overarching narrative that gives meaning to life, especially, though not exclusively, at significant transition points in life, birth, death, marriage, childbirth, suffering, tragic loss, or the experience of blessing and grace. And while an experience of profound meaning can be, and is often felt also through art, music, great literature, nature itself, intimate friendship, and love, there has also been a human impulse that draws many, if not the wide majority of human beings throughout history to some sense of the transcendent, in search for a broader context of meaning, and answers to questions about ultimate origins, human destiny, or the root cause of evil and suffering. According to a 2015 report from the Pew Research Center, entitled “The Future of World Religions: Populations Growth Projections, 2010-2050,” in a world of approximately 7 billion people, there are 2.1 billion Christians, 1.6 billion Muslims, 1 billion Hindus, nearly .5 billion Buddhists, and, one of the fastest growing religious populations, the “unaffiliated” at nearly .5 billion (Pew Research Center 2015). Suffice to say that the report has a vast majority of the world’s population subscribing to some form of religious worldview. This trend shows no sign of abatement. Such statistics are not presented to suggest that religion dominates human affairs, but only that it remains a significant factor. For those who lament this data, I have no solution. It’s just the way things are. Moreover, for very many of those who subscribe to a religiously-informed worldview, the ideas, norms, values and culture that derive from religion impact their fundamental identity, their perspectives, and their behavior. Thus, religious ideas at the very least leak into the spheres of ordinary life, even if they are not articulated as such by the actors. In recent decades, particularly since the end of the Cold War era, religion has enjoyed extensive resurgence. Most notably, religious resurgence is evidenced in the Balkans with the breakup of the former Yugoslavia along ethnic and religious fault lines; across the Islamic world in the rise of a theocratic regime in Iran; in a somewhat de-secularized Turkey; in, regrettably, a violent split among Sunni and Shiite in the Middle East; even in India with the ascendancy of hindutva philosophy and the election of Narendra Modi as Prime Minister; as well as in the widespread popularity of iconic religious figures such as Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King Jr., Mother Teresa, the Dalai Lama, and, most recently, Pope Francis. Even in the new Russia of President Putin, there is a revived alliance between the state and the church, to the extent that interventions in Crimea, Ukraine are described not only geopolitically, but almost American-style as “sacred duties.” And, speaking of America, religion has never been very far beneath the surface of the political sphere, as Christianity has for quite some time been socially engaged and politically engaged, addressing issues from slavery, to economic justice, to abortion, and most recently same-sex marriage. While various forms of religious extremism have taken command of the headlines, and rightfully so, there are other trends to be seen on the religious horizon. Of particular importance is 134 | 135

the rise of a movement that cuts across all religions to promote dialogue among religions, not merely as an end in itself, but as a means toward achieving increased understanding, respect and cooperation among believers of diverse traditions. Organizations such as Religions for Peace, United Religions Initiative (URI), the Parliament of the World’s Religions, the Universal Peace Federation (UPF), the Advisory Council on the United Nations System, the King Abdullah International Center for Interreligious and Intercultural Dialogue, the Vatican’s Pontifical Council for Interreligious Dialogue, as well as countless others, carry out extensive programs aimed at drawing on religious assets to promote peace and human development. The United Nations, in 2005, and led by governments of Spain and Turkey, launched the Alliance of Civilizations, which includes interreligious and intercultural dialogue among its core areas of responsibility. In 2010, building on the work of H.M. King Abdullah II of Jordan, and a proposal from the government of Jordan, the UN General Assembly passed resolution A/RES/65/5 calling for the World Interfaith Harmony Week to be celebrated each year in the first week of February. The UN Population Fund has worked closely for years with faith-based organizations, and a United Nations Inter-Agency Task Force on Religion and Development, working with the World Bank, has been established, giving special focus to reducing poverty and economic inequality (actalliance.org 2015). Governments such as Spain, Turkey, Kazakhstan, and Macedonia convene interreligious gatherings periodically. The State Department of the United States has developed its own office of religious affairs. In March 2015, several UN-related entities -UN Alliance of Civilizations, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, the Holy See Permanent Observer Mission to the UN, the Academic Council on the UN System (ACUNS), and the Universal Peace Federation (UPF) -collaborated to convene a conference on the theme of “Interreligious Dialogue and the Sustainable Development Goals.” Dr. Michael Platzer played a significant role, on behalf of ACUNS, in developing this conference which, overall, promotes the ideal of inclusive and peaceful societies (Dialogue and Alliance 2015). Thus, when we consider SDG 16 and the effort to create “peaceful, inclusive societies” characterized by reduced levels of abuse, violence, corruption, etc., it seems clear that religions bring capacities, indeed a robust set of capacities that may contribute to such as effort. In particular, religion, throughout history, has been closely linked to morals, and while its ultimate telos may have often been the “other world,” its impact has inevitably been very much felt in “this world.” Furthermore, while often spoken of disparagingly as calling adherents to a joyless life of selfdenial and grim asceticism, this has only been one strain of religion’s profile. Religion has also served to provide a basis for socially and personally constructive self-restraint, altruism, personal fulfillment, and social engagement for the sake of others. Additionally, as evidenced with Nostra aetete, all religions are coming to terms with “the other” or what may be described as the “disconfirming other,” namely, other religions that propose alternative teachings. Both intra-religious dialogue, as in the Christian ecumenical movement, and interreligious dialogue, promote the ideal of inclusive and peaceful societies.

If we are to be successful in achieving SDG 16, the capacities, strengths and insights of religion should not be overlooked. Of course, neither should its pathologies, which also must be addressed openly and constructively with an aim to correct, reform and encourage religion’s constructive role in the world. At the bottom line, religions are essentially comprised of people, and these people can contribute to the 2030 sustainable development agenda. Virtues There are a variety of factors at play in the effort to move from the articulation of goals to the achievement of those goals. Words such as “political will” are often used to describe a prerequisite for such an achievement. Now that the SDGs have been formulated and the “political will” seemingly established, the hard work of implementation begins. But, just as we cannot ignore the capacities of religion, we also should not overlook either the moral dimension of the SDGs or the moral agency required to move from “is”, where we are today, to “ought”, where we want to be. SDG 16 uses language that is strongly moral in nuance if not essential meaning. As much as the SDGs are political, economic and social in nature, they are also moral, and could essentially be defined as an expression of a “global ethics.” The SDGs contain moral exhortations, if not commands for inclusivity, justice, reduction of violence, equal access, combatting organized crime, corruption, bribery, and non-discrimination. The normative nature of the SDG agenda is transparent. Like politics and religion, however, morality is multi-layered and complex, especially when one ventures beyond a realm of taken-for-granted assumptions about morality. For example, when we utter the word “justice” moral agents may hear different moral commands. We all want to think that we all mean more of less the same thing when we talk about justice. But, closer inspection, shows that it’s not quite that simple, whether we speak about distributive justice, retributive justice, restorative justice, criminal justice, or the virtue of justice. In other words, like economics and politics, ethics is also often polarized once one moves beyond abstract concepts. Consider the concept of rights, as in human rights. While there is a general consensus about the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, affirmed by the global community in 1948, there are myriad issues that arise when it comes to the prioritization of those rights. Which comes first? Political rights? Economic rights? Cultural rights? Social rights? Civil rights? The moral enterprise, in fact, is threatened on a variety of fronts. Let me mention two. The first is the lack of consensus among theorists, some of whom, following Kant, speak of universal imperatives that apply no matter what the context or consequences, and others of whom, following John Stuart Mill, focus on consequences and define the good in terms of the outcomes achieved, even when the means may be morally counterintuitive. The deontological approach and the utilitarian or consequentialist approaches to ethics represent to two dominant, yet very different ways of thinking about morality and arriving at moral decisions. Another threat to morality comes in the form of relativism, the view that there is not, never was, and never will be consensus in matters of morality. Morality is shaped by culture, context, 136 | 137

situation, feeling, preferences, circumstances, and so on. Relativists not only argue that the effort to establish a secure foundation for morality by appeal to rationality has failed, but that the effort itself was often a mask to cover over some form of cultural imperialism. Post-modernists, building on the legacy of thinkers such as Nietzsche and Heidegger, hold in suspicion universalist claims made by Enlightenment thinkers such as Kant. Others hold that modern moral theories have lost their foundations in the real world of human communities whose members are bound together by shared values, culture and a common history, all of which become embodied in something that may be called tradition. This latter approach may be described as communitarian, whereby moral agents are seen as persons formed within particular traditions that have their own history or narrative that underscores best practices and virtues that have been proven over time to contribute to the building of a good community or good society. The work of Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, is often cited as an example of communitarian thinking about ethics (MacIntyre 1982). MacIntyre, in particular, proposes a retrieval of an Aristotelian approach to ethics, one that highlights the centrality of virtues that are linked to excellence in practices that have evolved over time as areas of excellence, from commercial trades, to the arts, education, and governance. That is, the capacity for good governance or building a good society, cannot be divorced from the virtues, such as generosity, temperance, fortitude, justice, discernment or good judgement. Moreover, these virtues are not cultivated by a reasoning process alone, but through practice or habit formation. Too often the moral imperative is assumed to be something that strikes the conscience and that subsequently leads to good actions. However, just as we might raise the issue of the “political will” to do the right thing, when considering the role of governments, there is the moral will of moral agents as well, and, moreover, the moral capacities of agents. If the agent has not cultivated virtues that allow an agent to move from a relatively selfish or individualistic outlook toward his or her social or natural environment then it is very possible, if not likely that such an agent will not have the “power” to act according to what is required. If we apply this to the SDGs, we may say that the achievement of the SDGs could suffer from the failure of nation states to comply or carry out their mandates enthusiastically, we may also anticipate that individual moral agents may also fail to comply or respond enthusiastically; Thus, moral agency is rooted not merely in rationality or moral intelligence, but also in character and virtues, the moral capacities and strengths needed to effect agency. Jeffrey Sachs discusses virtue ethics in a chapter on “Social inclusion” in his book, The Age of Sustainable Development. He says, “Virtue ethics marks one vital approach to social inclusion. It is based on the idea that human beings have a responsibility to others and must cultivate their own attitudes and virtues in order to meet these responsibilities.” (Sachs 2015) Many if not most nation-states are no longer populated by peoples of one cultural, religious or ethnic tradition. We live in diverse, pluralistic societies. As such, the state itself may not be able to provide a cultural framework of shared values that are deeply felt or which might serve as

the basis for appeal to moral action in support of the SDGs. Stated a bit differently, states are generally too large, too remote, and beholden to too many interest groups to serve as the basis for character formation and the development of the virtues, even though the virtues are necessary to achieve inclusivity, mutual respect, empathy and a will to care for not only the members of my community, but the stranger. The call for “inclusive” societies is an affirmation of the many communities that comprise the nation state, and a call to recognize the value and contribution of these many sub-cultures within the defined territory of the state. These communities, and their respective communitarian ethics, are needed to provide the basis for moral education, especially of the youth, which, in turn, is required to achieve the SDGs. It is very important that the capacities and strengths which such communities bring are recognized, encouraged and supported. Such communities are also often linked to religious worldviews. Hence, we can conclude that religious freedom is an essential component of building inclusive societies, for religion is a major factor in the formation of moral character and virtue. The secular state can also encourage civic virtue and character development of citizens, but often its power to convict the moral agent to act accordingly is not as strong as a local community which is bound closely together by shared values and traditions. While the secular state may at times be suspicious of such communities, owing to the potential for disloyalty to the state, the majority of such communities enhance and strengthen the state apparatus. Social capital The concept of capital, initially applied to financial assets, has been extended to apply more widely to other assets. Thus, it is not uncommon to come across terms such as “human capital” in reference to the skills, productivity, creativity, etc. of human beings; “intellectual capital” in reference to the benefits and assets associated with well-educated persons who create a strong labor market and capacity to increase overall productivity, leading to greater prosperity; or “family capital” in reference to the ways in which the family brings value and contains hidden asset values for the wider society through good practices associated with parenting, mutual care of family members, etc. Social capital is another of these hybrid words that attempt to draw out what might otherwise be an intangible, unthematized asset, and, in so doing, create an environment whereby such an asset can be encouraged and strengthened. Robert Putnam (Putnam 1995) and Francis Fukuyama have written extensively on the concept of social capital, and the World Bank utilized the concept to expand awareness of the extra-economic factors that contribute to development and prosperity. Fukuyama describes social capital as “society’s stock of shared values” which include moral values, social virtues and social rules which underlie all forms of social communication, coordination and cooperation. (Fukuyama 1999, 14) The concept of social capital is often associated with civil society, that sphere of human society that is set apart from the systems controlled by state administration or by market forces. Social capital is cultivated in various social settings, from family, to neighborhood, community,

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religious or spiritual associations, voluntary associations, and a variety of social networks that contribute to a sense of belonging, offsetting tendencies toward alienation. Classical sociology, from Weber (Weber 1930), to Tonnies (Tonnies 1955) to Durkheim (Durkheim 1938) considered the ways in which traditional norms, values and cultural traditions could be undermined by modernization, instrumental modes of reasoning, and the disruptive nature of market forces. The concept of social capital is closely linked to social solidarity which, in turn, is linked to the trust that exists among citizens, even within diverse pluralistic communities, or between citizens and their elected officials, or between major economic institutions and ordinary people. When the social capital index is running at a deficit, the level of trust, solidarity and mutual respect declines, leading to increased distrust, suspicion, conspiracy theories, and social phobias. As a result, the major institutions of government and the economic system are less effective, creating an environment that breeds poverty, corruption, social division and estrangement, and adversarial divisiveness across political, social, economic, racial, ethnic divides. The successful integration of diverse, multi-cultural communities within a larger community, nation or transnational entity – that is, the creation of inclusive communities – is a great challenge. The factors that create solidarity, justice, accountability to one another, and a willingness to share burdens, have often been linked to a shared history, a meaningful narrative of past, present and future the binds people together; these factors are often inseparable from ethnic, religious, racial, or cultural identity. Thus the challenge of SDG 16 is to establish a broad base of solidarity that functions at the multi-cultural level in the same way it often does on the communitarian level. In order to accomplish this, along with other forms of “capital,” social capital is required. Such capital is not produced by the economic system or the state apparatus, but through a variety of mediating institutions that are associated with civil society, from family, to neighborhood, to a local church or mosque or other place of worship, to community associations, and any number of face-to-face associations that bring people together. The solidarity that is needed to “make things work” and to achieve goals cooperatively is not automatic or mechanically generated. Social trust, expectations of reciprocity, mutual respect, and other social virtues are necessary. They must be fostered, nurtured and preserved. Thus, if we are to achieve the SDGs, especially in the area of peaceful and inclusive societies, social capital must not be squandered or lost. Charles Murray (Murray 2013, 265) has created a set of benchmarks to evaluate social capital in a given context. These include group involvement, organized group interactions, giving and volunteering, informal social interactions, and electoral participation. Conclusion The consensus achieved by the member states of the United Nations is a significant achievement of the world’s premier transnational inter-governmental organization. Such a consensus indicates

that there are universally shared values or goals that have a moral dimension. This effort also implies, if not affirms an ideal of cosmopolitan solidarity. At the same time, the cosmopolitan aspiration does not include a capacity that supplants the role that communities play in the character-formation and virtue-acquisition of the moral agent, and neither the thick construction of social capital needed for a strong sense of social solidarity, cohesiveness and fellow-feeling that strengthens any appeal to promote the well-being of the whole community. Such strengths and capacities of moral agents are necessary if the noble aims of the Sustainable Development Agenda are to be successful. Stated a bit differently, the affirmation and strengthening of the constructive assets of religion, virtues and social capital will go a long way to improving the deliverables on the SDGs. In a message delivered on September 24, 2015, at a meeting co-sponsored by the World Bank Group and the UN Inter-Agency Task Force on Engaging with Faith-Based Organizations for Sustainable Development, with a focus on “The Moral Imperative to End Extreme Poverty,” UN Secretary General, Ban Ki Moon spoke as follows:“There are moments in history when our humanity fills us with hope and courage; when we discover our common spirituality and values, and build a shared vision of where the future must lead. We are at such a moment today – and we must seize it.” (Ban Ki-moon 2015) The Sustainable Development Agenda 2030 is not only a political, economic and social challenge; it is clearly also a moral and a spiritual challenge. All human capacities need to be brought to bear in this cosmopolitan effort to build a world of lasting peace and prosperity for all humanity. 1 President, Universal Peace Federation. Teacher, author, and editor, with specialization in areas of interfaith, religious studies,

peace studies, philosophy, and social theory. Serves on the International Council of the World Association of Non-Governmental

Organizations and on the board of directors of the International Coalition for Religious Freedom.

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“The mustard seed” Brian Gowans1

The Kingdom of Heaven is like a grain of mustard seed, which a man took, and sowed in his field; which indeed is smaller than all seeds. But when it is grown, it is greater than the herbs, and becomes a tree, so that the birds of the air come and lodge in its branches. (Matthew 13:31-32).

Introduction In 1998 I was appointed Chaplaincy Adviser to the Scottish Prison Service having served as a chaplain for almost five years, a post I still hold today. Shortly after my arrival I was introduced to the International Commission of Catholic Prison Pastoral Care (ICCPPC) by my predecessor Dr. Christian Kuhn which was to lead to many significant changes in my own life. “Gets things done” In April 2001 I attended my first United Nations Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice in Vienna International Center (Austria) a situation which fascinated me from day one but now one in which I feel very much “at home.” Christian had informed me that I would meet a man whose energy, commitment, and drive would carry me off like some tsunami wave and have me involved in every programme, project, and plan imaginable. He was not joking, and I was soon to discover that man was Michael Platzer, a gentle giant of a man who embodies all the UN stands for and who can bridge the divides created by a somewhat human failure to understand the many cultures and faiths that make up the planet we inhabit. My first impression of Michael when I met him in 2001 was here is a man who “gets things done.” His broad smile and stature makes it difficult to say “No”; hence Michael usually gets what he asks for and more! During my annual visits to the Crime Commission I have been involved in Prison Staff Training at the ”Justizwacheschule”, numerous side events on prisoners with special needs, mental health issues, overcrowding, treating people with respect and using the correct language, adequate accommodation, a balanced diet, healthy living, and the list goes on. All of these events have been driven by Michael’s enthusiasm and encouragement to engage and get involved wherever possible. I should also make special mention of the great contribution Michael has made to the role of women in prison and Femicide. Against torture At the XIIth World Congress of ICCPPC held in Rome in September 2007, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Prof. Manfred Nowak, reported on his activities. During the subsequent discussion among more than 200 participants from 62 countries from all five continents, it turned out that prison chaplains, in several parts of the world, are confronted with the tragic fact that torture takes place in the prisons where they work. A memorandum of cooperation has subsequently been signed between the ICCPPC and the Special Rapporteur to combat the problem.

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Pope Benedict XVI stressed in his opening address to the same meeting that: “Public authorities must be ever vigilant, eschewing any means of punishment or corrections that either undermine or debase the human dignity of prisoners. In this regard, I reiterate that the prohibition against torture cannot be contravened under any circumstances.” Impressed by such an august body and powerful words, Michael went on to advise and engage with ICCPPC in producing a booklet entitled “A Guide for Chaplains Confronted with Torture” which is still in use today. He even recruited his wife Kathryn to provide the editing and typesetting! “Yes, when do I start”? Michael’s finger is firmly on the pulse of the world at large, gauging the planet’s health with an eagerness to make a difference with an energy and enthusiasm which draws people in, forever increasing his volume of smiling volunteers. When Michael asks for assistance in any sphere the reply is usually “Yes, when do I start”! Likewise when ICCPPC approached Michael for some assistance in preparing its second booklet “Basic Principles: Religion in Prison,” Michael immediately agreed to be the Project Coordinator. The project itself engaged many people from various faiths, resulting in a “guidebook” which endorses the principle that prisoners do not lose their right to pray and practice their religious observances in prison. Basic principles such as forgiveness, mercy, charity, and compassion are found in the world’s mainstream faiths such as Buddhism, Christianity, Confucianism, Hinduism, Islam, Judaism, Taoism, and none – qualities that Michael Platzer also embodies in an open approach to people of all faiths and none. Michael ensured that we consulted far and wide in our research for this guide and, of course, underpinned that in exercising our right to belief there is also the right not to believe. When I enter the now familiar entrance to the Vienna International Center “M Building” where the United Nations Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice is held each spring I automatically feel at home when I hear Michael’s welcoming voice. As always he is rushing from one meeting to another or setting up one of many side events in which he will play a pivotal role. He is seldom on his own and usually surrounded by a group of young people from ACUNS, ensuring the future is secure in terms of research and education making our world a better place. Hence the title of this submission “The mustard seed”. Michael plants a little thought into our minds and then stands back and observes as something fairly prominent develops. His ability to engage people of all ages is outstanding and his enthusiasm is infectious. Outside the Academic World of the UN, Michael is very much a family man; I have had the privilege of staying with Michael and Kathryn in the family home in Vienna and he is the perfect host. Don’t expect a quiet time however, as Michael will keep you engaged in topical events or historical interest – he is a walking encyclopaedia! One thing is certain – you will never be bored. Michael also uses every modern means of communications and his family holidays and various events can be found on “Facebook” usually with Michael in the certain of things broadly smiling.

Conclusion I cannot imagine Michael ever retiring for that would certainly be a great loss to so many of us from numerous backgrounds. But inevitably that day will come, hopefully some time away from now. However, we can be assured that Michael will have a long legacy of memories, documents, frameworks, and so much more, that I think many of us will look up at the “M Building”’ and think it is so aptly named. “M” for Michael! As a colleague and friend I offer my sincere good wishes, prayers and blessings to Michael on the occasion of his 70th birthday and hope he has many years of hard work, good health, and happiness ahead. AD MULTOS ANNOS! 1 President of the International Commission of Catholic Prison Pastoral Care.

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Inspiring the young generation to take action against femicide Andrada Filip1

Introduction Scores of women are being killed every year by their intimate partners, be it in the public or private sphere, under circumstances which are often labelled as family or domestic violence. Thousands more are targeted in conflict zones by insurgent groups, captured and enslaved, abused and exposed to horrendous brutalities before being killed. Millions of women have perished during the past decades in India due to the practice of selective abortion, a phenomenon which some have called ‘the silent genocide’2, because many families prefer to have a male child, instead of a female one. A report of the UN Secretary-General from 2006 stated that prenatal sex selection and infanticide have accounted for half a million girls gone missing every year in India for the past two decades (A/61/122/Add. 1). Furthermore, according to UN estimates between 113 million and 200 million women are demographically ‘missing’ worldwide.3 Many other women in several countries across the world are forced to undergo harmful practices such as female genital mutilation (FGM), breast ironing or forced feeding, in order to make them conform to patriarchal social rules and expectations that undermine their human dignity and attribute them an inferior social position and value. To be more precise, is estimated that over 130 million girls and women alive today have undergone FGM, mainly in Africa and some countries in the Middle East (A/61/122/Add. 1). In other places lesbian or transgender women are brutally murdered for having transgressed gendered roles and refused to adhere to the social rules imposed by the majority. All these heinous crimes committed against women because of their gender have a name: “femicide”. Explaining the term The academic Diana Russell was the one who coined the term femicide back in the 1970s at the International Tribunal on Crimes against Women4 and it refers to the “intentional killing of females by males because they are females” (Russell, 2011). In the book co-edited by Radford and Russell Femicide: The Politics of Woman Killing it is stated that femicide has many different forms, be it racist femicide, homophobic femicide or lesbicide, marital femicide, femicide committed outside the home by a stranger, serial or mass femicide (Radford 1992a, 7). Prof. Rashida Manjoo, the former UN Special Rapporteur (UN SR) on Violence against Women (VAW), elaborated on this definition in her thematic reports. She argued that femicide is: “the extreme manifestation of existing forms of violence against women[…] gender-related killings are not isolated incidents which arise suddenly and unexpectedly, but are rather the ultimate act of violence which is experienced in a continuum of violence”(A/HRC/20/16). Furthermore, she contends that femicide can be perpetrated directly or indirectly, and identified an extensive set of categories.5 146 | 147

In the two existing UN resolutions Member States preferred to use the term “gender-related killing of women and girls” instead of femicide. Many people consider it to be a political term, as it implies that there are people out there keen on exterminating women. According to Radford, when a state attempts to recognize femicide as a problem, it will do it in a way that minimizes the threat to the patriarchal status quo (Radford 1992b, 355). Hence, it will involve a reformulation of the problem that excludes a feminist analysis (Radford 1992b, 355). Femicide therefore remains a term which is not as widespread as it ought to be among people in general, and policy and decision-makers in particular. Efforts undertaken by the UN system to tackle VAW and end femicide Apart from the UN SR on WAV, several other UN agencies have addressed this phenomenon in their analytical studies and projects implemented in various countries: UN Women, UNFPA, UNODC, UNDP and UNICEF. A recent study published by UN Women indicates that at the global level, sexual violence and other gross human rights violations against women appear much more frequently in the mandates of peacekeeping missions or sanctions committees (UN Women 2015, 70). It is important to acknowledge that States themselves can be both perpetrators of femicide, when these crimes are committed by its armed forces and are part of a systematic policy or strategy. In Guatemala for example during the 36-year-old civil war a culture of violence against women was instituted, whereby the systematic practice of targeting and raping women was used by State agents as a counterinsurgency practice (Thompson, 2014). Furthermore, States can be responsible for not investigating and prosecuting such crimes, not because of the act itself, but because of the lack of due diligence to prevent the violation or to respond to it as required by the corresponding legal instruments. The UN Declaration on Violence against Women from 1993 draws attention to the principle of due-diligence, emphasizing that States need to exercise it in order to “prevent, investigate and, in accordance with national legislation, punish acts of violence against women, whether those acts are perpetrated by the State or by private persons” (UN Declaration VAW, Article 4c). Nevertheless, a recent UN study acknowledged that women around the world continue to bear the burden of conflict, and unfortunately continue to be excluded from peacebuilding and peacemaking efforts (UN Women 2015, 28). Goal number five included in the 2030 Development Agenda seeks to realize the human rights of all and achieve gender equality and the empowerment of all women and girls (A/RES/70/1). In the Agenda women are also acknowledged as important agents of change, who will make a crucial contribution to progress across all the goals and targets. Under goal number 5 it is explicitly stated that gender equality cannot be achieved without eliminating all forms of violence against women in public and private spheres. Femicide happens to be the extreme manifestation of violence against women, occurring in public spaces, but frequently also in the very homes where women live. Women, peace, and security The UN system has been established shortly after the end of the Second World War. Its founding documents were meant to represent the realities with which humanity was confronting itself at that time. Of course, the world is in perpetual change, people, societies, and the structures

and entities which make up this world evolve. The UN system itself however cannot be praised for its fluid, flexible and malleable structures, on the contrary. Many people voicing their criticism call it a bureaucracy which is not in tune with the challenges we are experiencing halfway through the second decade of the 21st century. Fortunately, we have not had a third world war, but the number of intra-state conflicts has risen dramatically. And so have the identities and allegiances of belligerents. In spite of an array of international legal instruments, which happen to be non-binding – so-called soft laws, atrocities continue to occur at an alarming rate in conflict-ridden countries. Women and children are particularly at risk in such situations. Scores of women have been murdered, enslaved, and sexually assaulted in conflict zones all over the world. Femicides are thus being carried out at high rates, and the world seems incapable of putting a stop to this. The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) was adopted in 1979. Although the Convention does not directly address the nexus between women’s rights and conflict, it underscores the importance of women’s participation and leadership in all contexts. Nevertheless, since resolution 1325 on women, peace and security was adopted in 2000, the normative framework for the protection and promotion of women’s rights in conflict and post-conflict settings has expanded dramatically (S/RES/1325). A remaining shortcoming is the collective failure of the UN humanitarian system to recognize the ability of local civil society organizations (CSOs) and women and girls to act as partners with valuable knowledge and experience (UN Women 2015, 88). ACUNS Femicide Project The Academic Council on the United Nations System (Vienna Liaison Office) has become particularly active in the field of femicide as of 2012. Dr. Michael Platzer, a career diplomat and university professor, was the Head Liaison Officer at that time, a position he occupied until the end of 2015, when he retired from a yet another fruitful, lengthy career: that of leading the Vienna office of a CSO affiliated to the United Nations system. ACUNS is a CSO in a general consultative status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council. ACUNS’ mission is that of stimulating, promoting and disseminating knowledge related to the UN system, bringing forward recommendations to the UN and engaging in collaborative activities with UN agencies. In Vienna, the relevant agency to address the topic of femicide was the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), as it is the custodian of the standards and norms on crime prevention and criminal justice, accounting now for some 70 legal instruments containing them. Moreover, UNODC also implements technical assistance projects in the field of criminal justice reform across the globe. The Vienna Declaration against Femicide was initially presented during the first femicide symposium held at the UN Headquarters in Vienna in November 2012. It brought the consequences of these heinous crimes committed against women to the attention of the participants, who were asked to sign it in order to show their commitment to putting an end to this practice. The document urged not only Member States, but also UN organizations and civil society to join forces and take responsibility to extinguish femicide. 148 | 149

The first UN resolution against the gender-related killing of women and girls was adopted at the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice in April 2013 (A/RES/68/191). Two years later a second resolution was adopted also at the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, building on and complementing the first resolution, emphasizing that women are overwhelmingly targeted during conflicts (E/CN.15/2015/L.8/Rev.1). The year 2013 also marked the publishing of the first issue of the ACUNS Femicide Journal. Subsequently, three other issues were published by the end of 2015, each focusing on different aspects of the phenomenon known as ‘femicide’. A vibrant, dedicated team of young students and human rights activists, who felt passionately about this cause, have been involved in this project, together with Dr. Platzer, compiling materials for the aforementioned publications, writing and editing articles, but also organizing symposia and other high-level events throughout the years. This series of events jointly organized by ACUNS and the Permanent Missions of various Member States willing to commit their efforts to end the scourge of femicide, have been essential in disseminating knowledge about this issue among members of the international, diplomatic community. It is quite possible that the two aforementioned resolutions would not have been adopted if it had not been for the efforts undertaken by ACUNS Vienna to bring this crime to the attention of Member State Representatives within the diplomatic forum provided by the UN, and embark on a strategic campaign to create a stir surrounding this topic among key actors: ambassadors, high-profile academics, civil society representatives, UN experts and other diplomats. ACUNS Vienna has been instrumental in organizing informal consultations and was at the front of negotiations that led to the drafting of the first and second resolution on the gender-related killing of women and girls. Dr. Michael Platzer was the driving force behind this entire process, using diplomatic negotiation skills acquired throughout his five-decade-long career with the United Nations. Furthermore, Dr. Platzer was also willing to share his social capital with a team of dedicated students, who over a short period of time turned into human rights activists operating in a prominent diplomatic forum, championing a cause that was relevant to their life principles and field of academic study. Potential of the civil society A few years ago Weiss et.al (2009) wrote an article in which they spoke about “the Third United Nations”. The main argument put forward emphasized how civil society could engage with the UN and create a space for change within the structures of this system. Thus, according to Weiss et.al. the role of the “Third UN include advocacy, research, policy analysis, and idea mongering, and often implies joining forces to put forward new information and ideas, push for new policies, and mobilize public opinion” (Weiss et.al. 2009, 123). Additionally it also fulfills a key characteristic – the Third UN is independent from governments and UN secretariats (Weiss et.al. 2009, 127). Civil society organizations have the freedom to operate outside the confines of the UN system, thus keeping a critical perspective, and being aware of what is happening on the ground. Very often it is civil society organizations that have direct access to victims of conflict, crime or abuse in general. Their knowledge and experience is crucial and has to be integrated within the efforts and projects implemented by the UN.

This is exactly what the team working at ACUNS Vienna has sought to do â&#x20AC;&#x201C; put femicide on the agenda of UNODC and other UN entities across its system and disseminate knowledge about this phenomenon. Hence, the symposia organized every year as of 2012 at the UN Headquarters in Vienna on the occasion of the International Day on the Elimination of Violence against Women (25th of November), the side-events organized during several sessions of the UN Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, and further high-level events organized within the frame of other UN conferences, such as the Commission on the Status of Women, created a narrative within the Vienna-based UN community: that women still need a champion, because femicide is a scourge that is yet to be eradicated, happening in a variety of circumstances in every country. The UN became more aware of this issue. Various Member States endorsed this cause and cosponsored many of the aforementioned high-level events and symposia, joining efforts with the civil society to take action against these heinous crimes. Conclusion At a first glance, the legacy of the ACUNS Femicide Project is represented by the adoption of the two UN resolutions on taking action against the gender-related killing of women and girls. Furthermore, the series of femicide publications which have served as important instruments during the negotiation and drafting process of the aforementioned resolutions are also part and parcel of this legacy. Nevertheless, the most important legacy of the efforts undertaken throughout this project is that of having brought forward a young generation of scholars and human rights activists who have embraced this cause. They are carrying forward this legacy by continuing to disseminate knowledge on this important issue, fighting to stop these crimes, many of us having embarked on professional careers addressing VAW and the phenomenon of femicide. 1 Andrada Filip joined ACUNS Vienna Liaison in 2013. She currently works as a project co-ordinator for Women Against

Violence Europe, and is also affiliated to a think-tank, the Human Security Centre.

2 The silent genocide you arenâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;t hearing about. 2012. http://dailysignal.com/2012/08/29/the-silent-genocide-you-arent-hearing-about/ 3 http://www.un.org/events/women/iwd/2007/factsfigures.shtml 4 The International Tribunal on Crimes against Women was a people's tribunal which took place on March 4â&#x20AC;&#x201C;8, 1976 in Brussels.

The event was created with the intention to make public the full range of crimes, both violently brutal and subtly discriminatory,

committed against women of all cultures. Diana E. H. Russell and Ven Nicole Van Den, the main organizers of the tribunal, were

inspired by Bertrand Russell's International War Crimes Tribunal, a people's tribunal on crimes committed in the Vietnam War.

5 The direct category includes: killings as a result of intimate-partner violence; sorcery/witchcraft-related killings; honour

related killings; armed conflict-related killings; dowry-related killings; gender identity- and sexual orientation-related killings;

and ethnic- and indigenous identity-related killings. The indirect category includes: deaths due to poorly conducted or clandestine

abortions; maternal mortality; deaths from harmful practices; deaths linked to human trafficking, drug dealing, organized

crime and gang-related activities; the death of girls or women from simple neglect, through starvation or ill-treatment; and

deliberate acts or omissions by the State. A/HRC/20/16, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, its

Causes and Consequences, 2012, p. 5.

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The creation of a new concept: a knowledge-based global citizenship and their application in practice via the Regional Academy on the United Nations Billy Batware,1 Radim Sršenš 2 and Anikó Szalai3

Introduction Education builds bridges and connects people worldwide around human values that respect individuals’ dignity and human rights, promote social and economic equality, and ensure sustainable living for future generations. The UN system has recognized this fact and taken the lead in ensuring that education and knowledge are placed at the center of its work towards sustainable development. The first major sign of global activism and participation in shaping an agenda for the future was an online discussion that aimed to engage all stakeholders on global concerns for the post-2015 development agenda, the Future We Want. One of the issues at the top of the list for young people was the ability to access education. According to the 2012 Education for All Global Monitoring Report on Youth and Skills: Putting education to work,4 education must provide young people with the necessary knowledge and skills to become “responsible global citizens who can take joint actions.” Education in the SDGs During his remarks at the launch of the United Nations Global Education First Initiative5, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said: Education is a major driving force for human development. It opens doors to the job market, combats inequality, improves maternal health, reduces child mortality, fosters solidarity, and promotes environ mental stewardship. Education empowers people with the knowledge, skills and values they need to build a better world (Ibid.). After extensive consultations at all levels, the UN Open Working Group for Sustainable Development6 produced a development agenda that was adopted by the UN General Assembly on September 25th in its resolution (A/RES/70/1) entitled “Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development”. Two of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are directly linked to education and youth, and thus to a knowledge-based adulthood.

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Goal No 4 states that inclusive and equitable equality education should be ensured for all. This goal promotes lifelong learning opportunities from early childhood development and preprimary education, to education at primary and secondary level, without discrimination and free of charge. It expresses the need for affordable and quality vocational education (including university level) to provide youth with the relevant skills for the job market. Goal 4.7 directly addresses what values, knowledge and skills should be provided to all learners: among others, sustainable lifestyles, human rights, gender equality, culture of peace and non-violence, global citizenship, and appreciation of cultural diversity (A/RES/70/1, 17.). These are not “newly discovered” ideas. Human rights conventions and UN documents, such as the resolutions of the Human Rights Council, the Economic and Social Council, the General Assembly and other organs of the UN have promoted their spread for decades. In the beginning this requirement was addressed only to governments, but later the scope widened and many different actors and stakeholders were defined (see, for example, the inclusion of the business sector by the Secretary-General and the Human Rights Council in Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights, 2008.) Universal knowledge of these values and skills is essential to the successful realization of the SDGs. To reach this aim the 17th goal of the 2030 agenda calls for a global multi-stakeholder partnership to strengthen the means of implementation, including the promotion of effective public, private and civil society partnership as well as targeted capacity building to support national plans for implementation (A/RES/70/1, 26-27). This Global Partnership has been a key element of MDGs and is being continued in the SDGs, being “based on a spirit of strengthened global solidarity, focused in particular on the needs of the poorest and most vulnerable and with the participation of all countries, all stakeholders and all people” (A/RES/70/1, 2.). A revitalized and enhanced Global Partnership is needed to achieve the SDGs, bringing together governments, civil society, the business sector, scientific community and international actors. To achieve the ambitious goals in the new agenda, the participation of academia will be crucial to ensure good knowledge-based policies are adopted nationally and within the UN system. In this regard, ensuring a systemic, forward-looking and inclusive knowledge hub is necessary especially among the next generation of academics. To create this demographic, a parallel system will need to be put in place. Goal 4 of the agenda aims to ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and to promote lifelong learning opportunities for all. Achieving this goal will have a significant impact on the sustainability of future agendas and the maintenance of the achievements of the Millennium Development Goals for various reasons. First, the 2030 agenda for sustainable development is universal in its reach. This universality requires a balanced approach and for the gap between the developed and the developing states to be bridged. This can happen only if societies of the South and the West cooperate based on mutual interest and respect. Education and knowledge exchange will be key to ensuring that this happens.

Second, the agenda of humane character is being based on human rights at all levels. The success of this pillar will also require that human rights-based education is incorporated into all aspects of society, including national institutions, academia, civil society organizations and the public sector. International cooperation set down in goal 17 will also have to be based on this aspiration to ensure that development aid and country-to-country projects reflect international human rights standards. In this regard, training a new generation of internationalists in understanding sustainable development as a human rights-based human development agenda and an agenda for cooperation at all levels is the only approach that will guarantee its success. This was fully understood by the founders of the Regional Academy, the father of which is Dr. Michael Platzer. The Regional Academy on the United Nations: Promoting global values through local and regional partnership Think globally, act locally! The need to connect global values to the local needs and approaches as well as to build global identity on local and regional diversity stood in the beginning of the Regional Academy on the United Nations. Originally the idea of a UN Academy came from the United Nations Association of Hungary, which established a biannual project of UN lectures for university students in Budapest, later also rotating through the country and connecting both to the academic and the practitioners’ sphere. Through the cooperation of European UN Associations (UNAs), the seed of the UN Academy also “flew” to the Czech Republic. The Jan Masaryk Centre of International Studies, the seat of the Czech United Nations Association, decided to launch a similar project, however, with a slightly different focus. Its goal was to connect practitioners with the academic field, to enable them to share their priceless experience with students, to connect theory and practice as a puzzle, and to attract students to the ideas of the United Nations. The interest for the project was enormous – exceeding six times its capacity. It was nice to notice how much young people are still interested in the United Nations. The first foreign practitioner coming to give a lecture to the Czech UN Academy was Dr. Michael Platzer, an experienced retired UN officer with amazing enthusiasm. Enthusiasm to share experience, enthusiasm to work with young people, and enthusiasm to change the world. In comparison with UN practitioners of his age he looked like an extraterrestrial. One winter evening in early 2012, when Dr. Michael Platzer, Professor Zuzana Lehmannova, President of the Czech UNA, and three young UNminded PhD. students Anikó Szalai, Billy Batware and Radim Srsen were sitting together at an informal dinner at the Annual ACUNS Vienna Conference, they came up with the idea to “restore” the former Austro-Hungarian Empire, at least at the level of UN studies. A yellow bus full of young students, participants of the Czech UN Academy invited by Michael to this amazing event, served as a strong lobby for the idea. During the discussions the participants expressed their wishes for closer cooperation between our nations, building bridges by focusing on our shared values and generating enthusiasm for global aims and the UN. The last step before launching the Regional Academy on the United Nations was the inspection visit of Dr. Platzer to the small Moravian village of Dolni Studenky, 154 | 155

which the young mayor Dr. Srsen will never forget, especially the discussions about the concept of “glocalisation”: thinking globally and acting locally, as a value added during drinking local beer. The Regional Academy on the United Nations (RAUN) has had already three generations of participants from Central Europe. Its growth is especially due to the enormous support of Michael Platzer, his ACUNS Vienna team, his relations with UN Vienna and valuable personal contacts he used to develop RAUN. At the same time, it is due to his enthusiasm for the United Nations and work with young people. As a result, 150 selected young people from more than 15 countries, envoys of UN ideas and potential leaders of the world, have had the possibility to get new knowledge, experience and competence on a wide array of topics related to the UN, to meet new friends, learn how to cooperate internationally and share culture in compliance with the wise motto of “unity in diversity.” He is now the grandfather of a colorful family of young UN scholars and a sort of UN father of three of us, Anikó, Radim, and Billy. We have learnt a lot from him and it is a great pleasure and inspiration for us to cooperate with such an enthusiastic person, a true UN advocate fighting for UN ideals for decades. We wish to cooperate with him at least for another 30 years, bringing not hundreds but thousands of young UN enthusiasts to our RAUN family and celebrating the centenary of Michael Platzer sound in health and mood health and mood… always thinking globally and acting locally! 1 Regional Academy on the United Nations Coordinator, ACUNS Vienna, Austria. 2 PhD, Senior lecturer, University of Economics, Prague, the Czech Republic. 3 PhD, Senior lecturer, University of Szeged, Hungary. 4 The report examines how skills development programs can be improved to boost young people’s opportunities for decent

jobs and better lives.

5 The United Nations Global Education First Initiative (GEFI) was launched by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon in September

2012 to accelerate progress towards the Education for All goals and the education-related Millennium Development Goals.

www.globaleducationfirst.org/about.html#sthash.2EK5tm8y.dpuf. 6 UN Open Working Group for Sustainable Development (OWG) was established on 22nd of January 2013 by Resolution

A/67/L.48/rev.1 of the General Assembly to prepare a proposal on the SDGs. https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/owg.html

A nobel nature and the case of Michael Platzer Leszek Wieczorek1 and Jolanta Redo2

Introduction As one of the authors of this text and a Professor of Criminology in Poland, I have had many opportunities to get involved in international cooperation through the Academic Council on the United Nations (ACUNS) and the American Society of Criminology. I have also had several opportunities to meet their members, including Dr. Michael K. Platzer, to whom this Jubilee Book is dedicated, and also Dr. Sławomir Redo, who is its co-editor. As a member of ACUNS, I realize how much the organization has achieved worldwide and how much credit can be given to Dr. Platzer and his collaborators, including Billy Batware, the Programme Coordinator of the Regional Academy on the United Nations (RAUN). I would like to compliment all the above people for their work and now focus on Dr. Platzer himself whom I will now call by his first name, Michael, as he would wish me to. Michael is a charismatic personality who carries out his United Nations “missionary” work with, it must be said, great nobility. But there is more to it than that. Later, the co-author of this text, Mrs. Jolanta Łopusiewicz-Redo – a Polish barrister living in Vienna – and I will explain the title of the essay and describe what took place when she and the ACUNS delegation from Vienna visited Sosnowiec, Poland, the town adjacent to Katowice and the location of the University of Silesia where I then worked. ACUNS and RAUN at the Silesia University When my students from the University of Silesia joined RAUN in Spring 2014, Michael and his ACUNS team visited the University in Katowice. It was then that I learned from him that part of his family comes from Upper Silesia and lived from 1878 to 1945 in Sosnowiec. Sosnowiec At the time of Poland’s partition between Austria, Prussia, and Russia (1772-1918) the part of Upper Silesia, in which Sosnowiec is located, belonged to Russia. It was then one of the border towns in the vast Russian Empire. This location proved crucial for the success of Sosnowiec when industrialization began. Not only was the area rich in natural resources for development and construction (coal, lead and zinc ore, carpentry timber, quarries) but Sosnowiec became an important Russian centre for foreign and domestic commerce (Austria and Prussia). From 1854 to 1859 Sosnowiec was on the railway line between Vienna and Warsaw. A Customs Office and railway station became important symbols of its rapid urbanization and industrialization. Michael mentioned the exact location in Sosnowiec where part of his family had lived. I realized that he was referring to the Dietl Palace (Pałac Dietla), a remarkably well renovated (1998-2010) neo-Baroque building, now in private ownership. Thanks to the present owners’ commitment 156 | 157

and funding, the palace has been restored to its past glory, something that was lost in the darkness of the Second World War and the post-war period. I learned that his mother, Hertha, was related to the Dietls and was a frequent visitor. I contacted the Mayor of Sosnowiec, and asked him if through his good offices we could visit this private residence. The owners gladly agreed and invited us. Going through the residence and its surroundings, the whole “Dietl story” came to light, about which is the next part of our text. The story of the Dietls As mentioned, the Dietls came to Sosnowiec in 1878. Heinrich Dietl (1838-1911), polonized as Henryk Dietel, settled at that time in Sosnowiec (German Sosnowitz) which was part of so-called Congress Poland – a Russian vassal territory in post-Vienna Congress territory (1815-1918), and elsewhere ruled by Austria and Prussia. Dietl’s arrival with his nineteen-year-old wife Klara Jacob (1857-1930) followed a customs war between Prussia and Russia the previous year, in which Russia introduced protection tariffs on the import of foreign goods. This prompted German investors to open businesses inside the Russian Empire, and Sosnowiec became the promised land for the forty-year-old Heinrich Dietl, a former textile industry student in the USA, a graduate of, and teacher at, the Dresden Polytechnic, and later the co-owner of a textile factory in Wiklau in Saxony, a confederate province of the Kingdom of Prussia in the German Empire (Ziółkowski 1960). Like many other German investors Heinrich was attracted by the city’s border location and bought real estate in this Russian outpost. In 1879 he started to build a spinning mill for worsted wool, the first-ever in that area, and, in fact, in the entire Russian Empire. Like other German investors he was not politically sympathetic to Polish independence, but he was very reasonable in the treatment of his Polish and German employees (altogether some 2,000 in 1890) which formed his community of workers. In fact, Dietl was an exemplary factory owner, and his employees were insured against accidents at work (Rocznik 1899). Heinrich Dietl had a truly Protestant ethic of pragmatism. He believed in hard work and sharing the benefits of his prosperity with others. In 1880 he temporarily opened a Lutheran chapel on the premises of his factory, and in 1888 he finalized the construction of an Evangelic-Augsburg church, designed by local architect Dionizy Odrowaz-Waligórski. In 1901 Dietl financed a sumptuous Orthodox church for the Russian authorities (he paid for eight bells for the church – the heaviest being 1,000 kg) and paid 10,000 roubles (now about 100,000 euros) for the construction of another church. This was the maximum sum allowed to be donated for the public good by a private donor. Except for that first church, most of other structures survive in Sosnowiec to this day. Dietl also co-founded in Silesia the construction of a Russian military barracks in Bedzin (Ziółkowski 1960). Until the turn of the century Dietl managed to build a modern and architecturally well designed factory that in the early 1900s became one of the best equipped and technologically advanced factories of the Russian Empire. He also built two settlements with low-rent residences for his employees, a Neo-Gothic administrative building, and a railway station (Wiadomo´sci 1985).

Around the factory he added a Neo-Romantic park with a Roman-Doric temple of contemplation, plus houses for his plant managers. Dietl cared for the education of children. In 1882 he created the first primary-grades religious school in which children were taught the Russian language. In 1888 he created an Evangelical choir school that later became a two-class grammar school in six locations. The school was financed from the interest on a sum deposited by Heinrich in a dedicated bank account. The children were taught by six teachers and three lawyers. In 1894 Dietl got permission to fund and open his own seven-grade middle school using the Russian language with a practice-oriented school programme certified by the Russian authorities. In 1895 he started the construction of a bigger building for a higher-level vocational school in the Italian Renaissance style by Polish architect Anthony Jasie´ nczyk-Jabło´ nski from Warsaw (Owczarek 1992, Redzi´nski 2014). Three years later the construction was complete. It included specialist classrooms, a library, a bathroom, etc. Near the school was a garden with various species of flora, with explanation plates for the students, and next to it a dormitory for them, paid for by Dietl. In cooperation with the school’s principal, Dietl provided also special train transportation for students (Smiałek 2002). Until 2009 this beautiful building housed the Faculty of Informatics of the University of Silesia. The Sosnowiec Yearbook 1899 sums up Dietl’s accomplishments as follows: “If in the past 20 years of his sojourn with us he had done nothing more than open and finance a grammar and middle school (educating 763 pupils), he could have felt justifiably proud of his accomplishment … We see him as an energetic welfare activist on many concurrent fronts. He is a member of the Evangelic church committee, member of the construction committee of a Catholic church … member of various state institutions: the Society of the Support for Trade and Industry, the Division of Commerce and Manufacture in the City of Łódz, and the Committee of the Warsaw Polytechnic on the work week” (Rocznik 1899). In 1900, by then “The King of Wool,” Heinrich Dietl moved to his own residence, most likely designed by the same Warsaw architect. The palace – one of the most interesting examples of industrial-era architectural designs in the land – combined Dutch and Italian artistic influences. Baroque, Rococo, and Secession styles were gently inscribed inside the palace interior, and their elegance remains today. But they were not his own designs. Dietl was not known to have any artistic preferences but could tap into the advice and expertise of others, and of course he also could afford the implementation of high-quality artistic designs. Heinrich Dietl’s funeral in 1911 was attended by about one-fifth of the entire population of Sosnowiec. In 1912 another Polish architect completed the construction of Dietl’s tomb in which his body rests. In the same cemetery rest also the bodies of his wife, her sister and her sister’s husband. Emma Niukanen – the Finnish governess of Dietls’ children – is also is buried there. After Dietl’s death, his wife Klara and their five sons (particularly Alfred and Włodzimierz who lived in the palace) continued the welfare and industrial work until 1945, despite the difficult post-World War One economic downturn period in Poland and the pre-World War Two global financial crisis. None of his sons stayed in post-World War Two Poland. All fled it, fearing 158 | 159

persecution. After the war, both the palace and the tomb were ransacked and devastated by the Polish and Soviet authorities and civilians. Boris and Ludwig: The Dietls’ story revisited for peaceful, prosperous, and inclusive societies, 2016-2030 In 1943 Michael’s mother, Hertha, visited the Dietls in in Sosnowiec for the wedding of Heinrich and Klara’s grandson, Ludwig Waldemar Dietl, to Johanna Rauscher. Ludwig arrived there from Munich. To avoid in Munich the conscription into Wehrmacht, he pretended to be sick and was recommended unfit for service by his friend – medical doctor Rauscher, a staunch antiHitlerist, who housed him. In Rauscher’s house Ludwig met Johanna (Mika 2007, 89). Hertha, the cousin and best friend of Johanna (they were like sisters) was to be Johanna’s bridesmaid. Ludwig Waldemar was then thirty-eight years old. He had often been at odds with his brother Boris, who was three years his senior. Both were the sons of Boris Edward Dietl, Heinrich’s son. Heinrich’s son had three sons: Boris Ludwig joined the German army, while Ludwik Waldemar Dietel (1915-2001) and his twin brother Andreas or Andrzej (1915-1979) (note the transcription change) joined the ranks of the Polish cavalry – the most revered part of the military – trained in Grudziadz (Poland). Following the German defeat of the Poles after the 1939 invasion of Poland (comparable in length to the later German campaign to defeat France) Ludwik Waldemar was interned in a prisoner of war camp (Oflag Krakau). In Cracow, he was pushed hard to sign the Volksliste as an ethnic German. When he refused, he was moved to another Oflag in Murnau. There, under the threat that his family would be sent to a concentration camp, with the agreement of his former Polish military commanders he signed the list, but he refused to join the German Army. After his release from the Oflag VII a Murnau he helped the Polish officers in that Oflag, while the rest of his family, who were living in Sosnowiec, helped other prisoners in concentration camps, like Auschwitz. In 1945 he returned to the Oflag (then already freed by the US Army) and he asked for, and received, from his former Polish commanders, a positive opinion of his Polish loyalty (Mika 2009, 86-88). In 1945 the Dietls left Poland for Bavaria (Burghausen) where Hertha Platzer and her husband Norbert lived. The Platzers in Burghausen accommodated Ludwik Waldemar with his wife Johanna. Ludwik got a job in a chemical plant nearby and moved to Ortenburg not far away from Burghausen. Here, he sought the confirmation of his Polish citizenship from Poland but his petition was refused (Mika 2007, 74). Michael was born in 1946 in Burghausen. From Bavaria a part of the family moved to the Cologne area. In 1950 Ludwik Waldemar left with his wife Johanna for Brazil, while others in the family went to the USA around this period. Michael with his parents and brother was among them. In 1988 Michael returned to Europe, settled in Vienna, and continued his UN work. There are still a few points in this story, before we can finalize it. Perhaps the most obvious and remarkable point is that as the Dietls grew in Sosnowiec, they gave their children Russian, Polish, and German names – a quite understandable melange.

Less understandable for the reader may be the connection of Michael (to whom this Jubilee Book is dedicated) to Dietl family history in Sosnowiec. After all, by Western standards, Michael’s mother’s blood relationship with the Dietl family was distant. Ludwig (or Ludwik) Waldemar was Michael’s cousin whom he called “Onkel Ludi”. Did that distant relationship impact on Michael’s worldview which started to form in 1946 when he was born? Contemporary scientific developmental psychology points to the formative years as having a strong impact on the personality subsequently in life. But even without this observation, the reader will surely agree that, as far as family informal education is concerned, we are belabouring the obvious. Hence, it is likely that Michael’s time with his Onkel Ludi was defining for Michael’s subsequent interests and development. Hertha and Johanna (Tante Hansi) are still in contact in 2016, aged 94 and 95, respectively. For Michael, they have been a ready source of family history, including the history of the Dietl family. The two families were so close that they came back from the USA and Brazil, respectively, to spend their summers in Bavaria. The relationship between Michael and Onkel Ludi strengthened. Ludi and Hansi moved to the Hague after Brazil, and during his college years Michael spent a semester at The Hague Academy of International Law and stayed with his aunt and uncle. Michael’s own career development mirrors in quite a remarkable way the Dietl family involvement in social welfare issues across Europe in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Michael shows a great commitment to the social welfare agenda of the United Nations. And we saw evidence of that shared Dietl philosophy when we visited the Mayor of Sosnowiec with Michael. When the Mayor spoke about the city authorities’ urban ideas, we realized three things: First, that the revitalization concept behind contemporary Sosnowiec had much to do with the idea of garden cities launched in Dietl’s time throughout Europe by Sir Ebenezer Howard, in his book entitled in old–fashioned English: “To-Morrow: a Peaceful Path to Real Reform” (1898), republished a few years later. This British author envisioned that residential, industrial, and agricultural areas should be in certain proportions to each other. In that often reprinted and translated book, he expressed the Weltanschauung (worldview) of many European urban planners, among whom were German academics. All of them called for the alienation of people from nature to be reduced. Howard advocated the town planning movement based on garden city principles, now pursued in modern town planning throughout the world. Second, Dietl’s plant project coincides remarkably with the visionary urban planning idea of “tomorrow.” The garden adjacent to his plant (with another garden across the nearby river), was completed in the years 1901-1904 by the German garden architect Fritz Hanisch. What Dietl felt and contributed with his garden and the two workers’ settlements is, in reality, the implementation of an urban planning participatory concept of self-contained communities as “fraternal industries,” regarded then as utopian, but in this twenty-first century very much more appreciated. Dietls’ vision of prosperity has indeed been very inclusive at its own time and in its own way. 160 | 161

Finally, there is no coincidence between Dietl’s project and Michael’s conscious choice to enter the career path in the United Nations. He started it in 1970 with preparing the SecretaryGeneral’s report on science, technology, and human rights. In 1979-1981 he worked in the UN-Habitat Programme in Nairobi (Kenya). The like-mindedness of the extended Dietl family (i.e. his mother, her cousin, his uncle) must have later influenced Michael’s professional career, which is a mixture of progressive normative, cultural, and developmental goals. His career with the United Nations altogether lasted 34 years (1970-2004). In its course he was involved in programmes and projects of humanitarian, human rights, and religion-related and peace-keeping concerns, as well as with technical assistance for developing countries, and countries with transitional justice systems. His experience often came out in our talks with him. As a young student in the USA he assisted prison chaplains in their work among juveniles in New Mexico and he has continued that work until this day in Austria. No wonder that his half-century effort was rewarded with a Papal knighthood – Michael received the Pontifical Equestrian Order of Saint Sylvester in 2015. Yet, the title of our essay can neither justify this important fact, nor can our Dietl story bear out what we believe. In fact, Michael’s “noble” nature may originally be credited to the United Nations. Indeed, all those who create and/or implement the United Nations ideals and ideas, all of whom, in our opinion, have noble blood in their veins. We would thus like to emphasize Michael’s hard work, pragmatism, and passionate involvement in making the United Nations work for its peoples. Michael’s most recent contributions are to the peaceful, inclusive, and prosperous societies created by the United Nations through its sustainable development goals agenda 2016-2030. After retiring from the UN, he strengthened ACUNS in Vienna and across the region. As its Liaison Officer, he has made remarkable contributions to education and training of students, young scholars, and international civil servants. Conclusion In the contemporary context, one element in that story that involves peaceful path for societies is particularly worth emphasizing. However, we first must return to the Dietl “melange” story and re-emphasize the diversity of interests and cultures in his family: European welfarism, German-led industrialization, the German, Russian, and Polish intellectual mix of ideas and designs, and an overall tremendous drive for education and modernization. Last but not least, the patriotism of Boris Ludwig, Ludwik Waldemar and Andrzej – the three brothers (and Michael’s uncles) who served in hostile armies, must also be added to that sometime volatile mix. As the Polish authors of this essay, we would like to recall that it was only on 12 November 1989 (after the peaceful “Polish Revolution” and likewise peaceful fall of Berlin Wall), that the Polish Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki and the German Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl held a reconciliation meeting in Krzyzowa/Kreisau (Lower Silesia). This has led to a growing empathy between Poles and Germans. Perhaps Michael’s memory of his uncles and hearing of their deeds can inform all of us today who may be at odds with one another.

Michael due to his experience and spirit belongs to the United Nations peoples, the fraternal community of like-minded individuals, groups, and entities concerned about peace and security in the world to be guarded by the United Nations Charter, born one year before him. We wish him, the United Nations with its many governmental and non-governmental actors including ACUNS, many successful years and accomplishments to come in 2016-2030 and beyond. We need such noble blood to flow freely to make our world more peaceful, inclusive and prosperous.

1 Professor, Uniwersytet Jana Kochanowskiego, Kielce, Poland. Author of sevral publications on social pathologies and urbanization. 2 Barrister, Permanent Representative of the Asia Crime Prevention Foundation to the United Nations Office at Vienna (Austria).

Author of several articles on international legal assistance, the right to defence, privatization law and financial liability in Poland.

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Foucault, Michel. 1977. Discipline & Punishment, Tavistock: London.

Lyon, David. 2015. The Snowden Stakes: Challenges for Understanding Surveillance Today. Surveillance and Society Journal 13, No. 2: 139-152.

21 Building just, peaceful and inclusive societies: The role of religion, virtues, and social capital Thomas Walsh

A/RES/65/5, World Interfaith Harmony Week, 23 November 2010.

A/RES/70/1, Transforming Our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, 25 September 2015.

Ban, Ki Moon. 24 September 2015. Message to the High-Level Event: Meeting the Moral Imperative to End Extreme Poverty. United Nations: New York.

Dialogue and Alliance 29, No 1, Summer 2015. This issue features articles from this conference on the theme of “Interreligious Dialogue and the Sustainable Development Goals.”

Durkheim, E´mile 1938. The Rules of Sociological Method, Free Press: Glencoe, IL.

Fukuyama, Francis. 1999. The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstitution of Social Order. The Free Press: New York.

Lomborg, Bjorn. 2015. “The UN Chose Too Many New Development Goals,” Time, September 29, Time.com.

MacIntyre, Alasdair. 1982. After Virtue. University of Notre Dame: South Bend, IN.

Murray, Charles. 2013. Coming Apart: The State of White America, 1960-2010, Crown Forum: New York.

Pew Research Center. 2015. The Future of World Religions: Populations Growth Projections, 2010-2050.

Pope Francis. 2015. Laudato Si: Praise Be To You: On the Care of Our Common Home. Libreria Editrice Vaticana: Vatican City.

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The United Nations Inter-Agency Task Force on Religion and Development, along with the World Bank, the World Council of Churches and other Faith-Based Organizations, convened a conference at the Church Center for the United Nations on the theme of “Moral Imperative to End Extreme Poverty and Advance the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), www.actalliance.org. 26 September 2015.

Tonnies, Ferdinand. 1955. Community and Association. Routledge and Kegan Paul: London.

Weber, Max. 1930. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. Allen and Unwin: London.

Inspiring the young generation to take action against Femicide Andrada Filip

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A/61/122/Add. 1, Report of the Secretary-General, In-depth study on all forms of violence against women. 2006. http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/vaw/violenceagainstwomenstudydoc.pdf A/HRC/20/16, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, its Causes and Consequences 2012. http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session20/A-HRC-20-16 Add2_en.pdf A global study on the implementation of UN Security Council resolution 1325: Preventing conflict, trans forming justice, securing the peace, 2015, UN Women. http://wps.unwomen.org/~/media/files/un%20women/wps/highlights/unw-global-study-1325-2015.pdf

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Radford, Jill. 1992a. Introduction. In Radford, Jill, and Russell, Diana E. H. (Eds.), Femicide: The Politics of Woman Killing, ‘Where do we go from here?’, Twayne Publishers: New York, pp. 3-13.

Radford, Jill. 1992b. Where do we go from here?. In Radford, Jill & Russell, Diana E.H. (Eds.), Femicide: The Politics of Woman Killing, ‘Where do we go from here?’, Twayne Publishers: New York, pp. 351-359.

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The creation of a new concept: a knowledge-based global citizenship and their application in practice via the Regional Academy on the United Nations Billy Batware, Radim Sršen, Anikó Szalai

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A noble nature: The case of Michael Platzer Leszek Wieczorek and Jolanta Redo

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Captions Collage* 01 „As I had known Kofi personally, we had both joined the Secretariat as young professional officers at approximately the same time, he will always be “my” Secretary-General. He was a perfect gentleman, a knowledgeable insider, and very wise political scientist.“ 02

At The Thirteenth United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (Qatar, 2015) with Yury Fedotov, Director-General of the United Nations Office at Vienna, accompanied by Jean-Luc Lemahieu (Director, Division for Public Analysis and Public Affairs, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime).

“My next challenge was to work as the special assistant of the first woman Under-Secretary. Dame Margaret Anstee had risen through the ranks of UNDP from the position of a secretary in a field duty station and knew everyone and everything about development work…Dame Margaret had brought me with her to Vienna, first to the Crime Prevention Programme in the UN Centre for Social Development and Humanitarian Affairs and then as Chief of her office.”

At the ACUNS side event “’Delivering as One’ on the UN post-2015 agenda: Peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development” (The Thirteenth United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, Qatar, 2015). launching ACUNS book on the implementation of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals 2016-2030 by the Vienna-based intergovernmental, non-governmental and civil society organizations (see also photograph No. 11). With Mr. Martin Sajdik, 70th President of the Economic and Social Council; Jean-Luc Lemahieu (Director, Division for Public Analysis and Public Affairs, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime); Magdy Martínez-Solimán, UNDP‘s Assistant Administrator and Director of the Bureau for Policy and Programme Support, and Dr. Elobaid Ahmed Elobaid (Head of the Training Centre, Office of the Higher Commissioner for Human Rights, Qatar).

05 With the participants of the Global Challenges World Cup workshop „Youth, Music and Action for a Sustainable World”, organized by the International Association for the Advancement of Innovative Approaches to Global Challenges (Klagenfurt, Austria, 2014). 06

Participants of “Leadership Challenges of the 21st Century: The Prevention of Violence against Women and Femicide” (2013). With Michael Platzer on his right Zhannat Kosmukhamedova, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. On his left: HRH Princess Bajrakitiyabha Mahidol, Permanent Representative of Thailand to the United Nations Office at Vienna; H. E. Ayoob Erfani, Permanent Representative of Afghanistan to the United Nations Office at Vienna; Carolyn Handschin (Women‘s Federation for World Peace International/ WFWPI - UN Office Director, Geneva; Dr. Maria Riehl (WFWPI UN Representative, Vienna ); Elisabeth Riedl (Conference Coordinator and UN Representative of WFWPI, Vienna)

“What I have appreciated particularly about ACUNS, is to meet academic/practitioners who can reflect more honestly about the potential but also the limits of the United Nations. Plus I learned about the activities that hard working colleagues were undertaking in the silos of the Atomic Energy Agency, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization, UNIDO, the Trade Law Office, Danube River Basin Secretariat, and the Office of Outer Space Affairs.“

With Alistair Edgar, Executive Director of the Academic Council on the United Nations System and Peter Haider (left), President, Universal Peace Federation (Austria).

“Article 29 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights says we all have an obligation to give back to the community and fight for justice, wherever we live.” In Carinthia (Austria) at the workshop for the “Green Party”, with Mirjam Polzer-Srienz, Head of the Political Academy of the Green Party (2010).

“I have tried to encourage the idealism of students who are drawn to ACUNS but also give them a sense of realism- which is why we try to involve our collaborators in the actual sessions of intergovernmental bodies, organize substantive side events on real topics, and to publish scientific papers, even books. I would still encourage young scholars to seek UN careers but also to become activists in topics they and the UN care about – human rights, defence of women, climate change, local environmental causes, youth projects, criminal justice and prison reform, development work in foreign countries or the inclusion of the poor and vulnerable on a national level.” Michael Platzer and members of ACUNS at the Diplomatic Academy (Vienna, Austria) during the annual ACUNS Vienna Conference 2015 “Lessons Learned from the Millennium Development Goals and Perspectives for the Post 2015.” On his right: Boris Brkovic; on his left: Lena

182 | 183

Sykorova, Milica Dimitrijevic, Ihsan Resat Özkan, Richmond Ojobor, Stephanie Krauth, Christopher Grafinger, Agnes Steinberger, Mona Zaher, Barbara Ziegler, Heike Seeman, Megi Plaku, Daria Petrova Vashchilko.

At The Thirteenth United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (Qatar, 2015).

At the Vienna International Centre with Kathryn Platzer (wife, standing behind) and members of the Academic Council on the United Nations System- from left to right: Maximilian Edelbacher, Leila Salehiravesh, Stefan Schumann; from right to left: Miroslav Polzer, Nadja Polzer, and Helmut Prantner – one of the founders of ACUNS Vienna.

“What I remember clearly was that interns and junior professionals debated global issues in the cafeteria and in coffee/tea breaks and had strong opinions how the Secretary-General should deal with the Israelis, Russians, and the US – unlike the more focused career minded young professionals today, who seem to concentrate on office gossip and which colleague now has influence or access.” With Dullas Daham Kumara Alahapperuma, Minister of Youth Affairs and Skills Development, Sri Lanka delivering the Keynote Lecture at the Conference “Sustainable Development, Innovation and Youth” (Klagenfurt, Austria, 2014).

“I believe I got my permanent appointment because I had been an assistant reference librarian as part time job at university, and looked up new articles and research pertaining to bioethics, computer/privacy issues, and damage to the environment; whereas others had simply cut and pasted previous S-G reports.” At the workshop on “The United Nations and the New Media” at the World Wide Education GmbH (Wels, Austria, 2010).

„Living in the United States, with a German mother and Austrian father, it also solved my “nationality” issue. By the time of my university years, I was a confirmed “internationalist” and pacifist... My boss was now a Chinese Under-Secretary – in Nairobi, the Executive Director was Indian. The working relations were, of course, different but very correct; we travelled around the world together and I got to know the Chinese mind.” With Sławomir Redo at the meeting of the ACUNS delegation with the staff of the Investigation Bureau, Ministry of Justice, Republic of China (Taipei, 2011).

Discussing with Billy Batware, Boris Brkovic and Sławomir Redo ACUNS side events at The Thirteenth United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (Qatar, 2015).

With Maher Nasser (Director of the United Nations Information Service (UNOV), currently Director of the Outreach Division, UN Department of Public Information, New York), promoting the book Can the United Nations be Taught? A Compendium of Innovative Teaching Techniques (ACUNS, Austrian Science and Research Liaison Office Ljubljana, Diplomatische Akademie Wien, Vienna, 2009).

Michael Platzer at an age of 18: “Lay Apostle at Reform School,” Daily News, 7 September 1964.

Michael Platzer at an age of 18: “’Door to a New World. Area Student Teaches in Reform School’”, The Catholic Observer, 11 September 1964.

Michael Platzer at an age of 18: “Worked at Reform School” (n.d.).

At the conference “Schlepper: Fluchthelfer oder Kriminelle?” (Smugglers: Helpers or Criminals?), Collegium Juridicum, University of Vienna, Austria, 2015. From left to right: Dr. Clemens Villinger (Historian, Germany), Gerald Tatzgern - Chief, Division on Human Trafficking (Bundeskriminalamt Wien); Friedrich Forsthuber, President of the Regional Court for Criminal Matters in Vienna; Josef Phillip Bischof, Barrister; Prof. Christian Grafl (Law Faculty, University of Vienna), President of the Austrian Center for Law Enforcement Sciences; Stephanie Öner, Judge, Regional Court for Criminal Matters in Vienna; Prof. Andreas Schloenhardt, University of Brisbane (Brisbane, Australia).

As Chair of the Alliance of Non-Governmental Organizations of the United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Programme (Vienna), 2005-2015.

Closure of The Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders (Havana, 1990). Among the officials: Fidel Castro, Head of State of Cuba (at the rostrum) with Margaret J. Anstee, Under Secretary-General, Director-General of the United Nations Office at Vienna (far right table side). Behind left corner desk Michael Platzer, Chief of the Cabinet of the Director-General.

At the ACUNS side event „Educating Succeeding Generations for Justice: The 2030 Road to Dignity“ at the Thirteenth United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (Qatar, 2015) with the official delegation of Qatar to the Congress and other Friends of the United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Programme.

At the Forum on ”The Relevance of Interreligious and Inter-Civilizational Dialogue to the Post-2015 Sustainable Development Goals” (United Nations, New York , 2015), organized by the Universal Peace Federation and the United Nations Alliance of Civilizations. Among the participants from left to right: H.E. Mr. Nassir AlNasser, UN High Representative for the Alliance of Civilizations; Tageldin Hamad, Secretary-General, Universal Peace Federation; Archbishop Bernardito Auza, the Permanent Observer of the Holy See to the United Nations (New York, USA); Eli Epstein, Co-founder “The Children of Abraham”; Dr. Rick Clugston, Co-Director, “Association of University Leaders for a Sustainable Future”.

“I was one of the lucky ones to help establish UN Habitat in Nairobi. Building up an institution from the ground is always an exciting enterprise, particularly with the newly independent countries and planning new capitals for Tanzania and Nigeria. But my children were also born during this period in Nairobi, when the city was still safe and had a vibrant cultural life. Of course, there is nothing like the Big Sky and wildlife in Africa.” With Peter Haider (President, Universal Peace Federation, Austria) at the Conference “Peace and Security in Multicultural Societies” (Moscow, Russia, 2012).

“I… had the fantastic chance to work in peace operations myself and became the head of the reconstruction and development support unit affiliated with UNPROFOR and UNDP. We first tried to establish normal relations in the ethnically divided town of Pakrac in Croatia and to assist Bosnian women refugees who had been victimized. Operation “Blitzkrieg” put an end to the best laid plans. We then focused on Bosnia, providing economists and experts to rebuild the infrastructure and connections between the ethnic communities but also lawyers and penitentiary officials to re-establish an uncontaminated criminal justice and penal system. Despite enduring warm friendships and innovative ideas involving “peace volunteers”, I regret that our efforts did not succeed in re-establishing the harmony that existed in Yugoslavia.” With Thomas G. Walsh, President of the Universal Peace Federation/UPF (left) and Dr. Yong Cheon Song, Chairman of UPF Europe (right) at the Conference “Europe and Russia – Partners in a Globalized World” (Vienna, Austria, 2012), organized by the UPF-Austria in cooperation with ACUNS.

At the Conference “Peace and Security in Multicultural Societies” (Moscow, Russia, 2012) organized by the Universal Peace Federation (Russia) with Zoya Krot, Regional Chair of the Belarus Peace Fund, on the right.

Michael Platzer (far right), his wife Kathryn (in the middle) and Syrian refugee family at the award ceremony of the Pontifical Equestrian Order of Pope Saint Sylvester, with Christoph Cardinal Schönborn at his residence in Vienna (20 November 2015).

Michael Platzer and his relentless interest in prison reform challenges (symbolic photograph).

In front of the Penal Institution in Sosnowiec (Upper Silesia, Poland). With Michael Platzer on his right: Prof. Leszek Wieczorek, Dr. Gertruda Wieczorek, Billy Batware, Jolanta Redo. On his left: Martha Wieczorek (University of Silesia, Katowice).

In the Penal Institution in Sosnowiec (Upper Silesia, Poland): Prisoners’ tokens of remembrance given to Michael Platzer during ACUNS visit (2014).

With HRH Princess Bajrakitiyabha Mahidol, Permanent Representative of Thailand to the United Nations at Vienna (Austria), launching the book Femicide. Targeting of Women in Conflict (ACUNS 2015).

Participants at the ACUNS symposium “Femicide: A Global Issue that Demands Action” (Vienna International Center, 2013). From left to right: Elisabeth Riedl, Women’s Federation for World Peace International; Serin Duzdar, Orient Express; Andrada Filip, ACUNS; Somah Ibrahimi, journalist from Afghanistan, currently with Caritas Burgenland, Austria; H. E. Gilka Ivelisse Melendez Fernandez, Alternate Permanent Representative of the Dominican Republic to the United Nations (Vienna); H.E. Ayoob Erfani, Permanent Representative of Afghanistan to the United Nations Office at Vienna; Edilberto Loaiza, Senior Monitoring and Evaluation Adviser at the United Nations Population Fund; Michael Platzer; Farhan Raza, ACUNS. From right to left: Nora Gerdes, ACUNS; Sandra Mueller, ACUNS; Simona Domazetoska, ACUNS.

184 | 185

At the meeting with Kazimierz Górski, Mayor of Sosnowiec (Upper Silesia, Poland, 2014), accompanied by Jolanta Redo.

36 Hertha Platzer with her grandaughter Miriam (right), assisted by Martha Wieczorek (left) and Janusz Szymanowicz (major domus, above), look into the 1940s family records at the Dietl Palace in Sosnowiec (Upper Silesia, Poland, 2015). 37 Hertha Platzer visiting in 2015 the tomb of Henrich Dietl, German pioneer of industralization and welfare of Sosnowitz. 38 Looking into the historical records at the St. John’s Evangelical-Augsburg (Lutheran) Parish in Sosnowiec (Upper Silesia, Poland, 2015). Among the onlookers: Michael Platzer, daughter Miriam (left), Hertha Platzer (right). In-between Agnieszka Berek-Włodarska and Radosław Włodarski – parishioners. 39 With Jolanta Redo in front of the Dietl Palace (Sosnowiec, Upper Silesia, Poland). Behind Prof. Leszek Wieczorek, the host of the visits in 2014 and 2015. 40 “Like sisters”: Hertha Platzer and Johanna Rauscher (Bavaria, Germany, 2016). 41

“I returned to Vienna to finish my career heading both the Criminal Justice Unit and the Rule of Law Section in a renamed UN Office on Drugs and Crime... Mr Ban Ki-moon had replaced Kofi Annan... I had a feeling of liberation after leaving the United Nations – despite a very fulfilling career. I could say things, write articles, and teach students freely, which I did in Australia and in lecturing in four different continents. I guess the United Nations was always my dream job.”

* Images come from the private archives of Milica Dimitrijevic´, Friedrich Forsthuber, Michael K. Platzer, Miroslav Polzer, Jolanta

and Sławomir Redo, Elisabeth Riedl, Leszek Wieczorek, Mona Zaher, or from public domain sources. Photograph No. 23 was

obtained from “UN Photo” (Department of Public Information, United Nations Headquarters, New York, USA). The newspaper

clips come from the private archive of Michael K. Platzer. Save the penultimate quotation, all other quotations derived from

the interview with Michael K. Platzer (Marko Kovacevic “Four Decades In the United Nations: Michael Platzer Reflects on His Life and Career”,

https://www.munplanet.com/articles/model-united-nations/four-decades-in-the-united-nations-michael-platzer-reflects-on

his-life-and-career). The two vintage maps of Dietl’s estate on p. 162 show on the left side how its area (marked in bold) inter-

playing with the “garden-city” concept of Sosnowitz, and on the right side a close-up of that estate (palace, garden, outbuildings,

plant). Both maps retrieved from http://klubzaglebiowski.pl/?p=1121

Published by Editors Editors: Maximilian Edelbacher, Friedrich Forsthuber, Sławomir Redo Graphic layout: Pablo Farassat Printed by: FEDERAL MINISTRY OF JUSTICE

Dr. Michael Karl PLATZER born on 7 May 1946 in Burghausen (Bavaria, Germany). He is father of three children: Miriam, Barbara, and Nicholas, and is married to Kathryn. He spent 34 years with the United Nations Secretariat (1970-2004), where he worked in the Office of the Secretary-General and in other capacities dealing with human rights, technical cooperation, UN-Habitat, UNDP, and peacekeeping. Before retiring in 2004, he worked with the UN Office on Drugs and Crime. He participated in the quinquennial congresses of the United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Programme from 1990 to 2015. From 2005 to 2015 he served as the Liaison Officer of the Academic Council on the United Nations System (ACUNS) in Vienna, Austria and as the Chair of the Vienna Alliance of Non-Governmental Organizations of the United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Programme. He was organizer of the annual ACUNS conferences in Vienna and other meetings across the world which brought together diplomats, international civil servants, academics, and students to discuss, educate, and train the new generation working for a peaceful, sustainable, and prosperous world. He has been a guest lecturer/speaker at many universities and institutes worldwide and the writer, editor, or publisher of various books and articles on United Nations topics. He founded the Vienna International Centre Society of Writers. He has produced and directed teaching videos on United Nations crime prevention and criminal justice. He is a member of the European Society of Criminology, Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences, World Society of Victimology, Penal Reform International, the United Nations Associations of Austria and of Australia, and of the International Catholic Commission of Prison Pastoral Care. In 2015 he received the Pontifical Equestrian Order of Saint Sylvester for his outreach programs for prisoners.