2010 Small Arms Survey: Gangs, Groups, and Guns by Small Arms Survey

A Project of the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva

small arms survey 2010 gangs, groups, and guns

—Antonio Maria Costa Executive Director, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

‘The Small Arms Survey 2010 provides further evidence that efforts to address gangs and gang violence must encompass a wide range of measures—including not only targeted law enforcement tactics and illicit gun interdiction, but also prevention and youth development initiatives. In the long term, we must address the factors that lead young people to join gangs in the first place.’ —Deputy Mayor Guillermo Cespedes Director, Office of Gang Reduction and Youth Development, Office of the Mayor of Los Angeles

‘The Small Arms Survey 2010: Gangs, Groups, and Guns documents the scope, seriousness, and persistence of gangs and armed groups.’ —Professor John M. Hagedorn Associate Professor, Department of Criminology, Law, and Justice, University of Illinois at Chicago

About the Small Arms Survey 2010 The Small Arms Survey 2010 reviews a range of issues related to gangs and armed groups, focusing on their use of violence, as well as emerging efforts to address the damage they inflict on society. The volume includes studies of prison gangs, girls in gangs, and progovernment groups; it also features case studies from Ecuador and Southern Sudan. Rounding out the book is original research on the global ammunition trade and on options for controlling illicit firearm transfers by air. The chapters are: • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Emerging from Obscurity: The Global Ammunition Trade Controlling Air Transport: Practice, Options, and Challenges Gang Life: Between Belonging and Exclusion Gangs, Groups, and Guns: An Overview Elusive Arsenals: Gang and Group Firearms Gang Violence Worldwide: Context, Culture, and Country The Danger of Dungeons: Prison Gangs and Incarcerated Militant Groups The Other Half: Girls in Gangs An Ecuadorian Alternative: Gang Reintegration Getting Past Suppression: Street Gang Interventions Force Multiplier: Pro-government Armed Groups Back to the Brink: Armed Violence in Southern Sudan Options for Engagement: Armed Groups and Humanitarian Norms

About the project The Small Arms Survey is an independent research project located at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva, Switzerland. It serves as the principal source of public information on all aspects of small arms and armed violence and as a resource centre for governments, policy-makers, researchers, and activists. Photograph: Chris Rainier/Getty Images

Small Arms Survey Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies 47 Avenue Blanc 1202 Geneva, Switzerland t +41 22 908 5777 f +41 22 732 2738 e sas@smallarmssurvey.org w www.smallarmssurvey.org

small arms survey 2010

‘As demonstrated in the Small Arms Survey 2010, addressing the factors that trigger conflicts and fuel gang violence has a much more lasting—and constructive—impact than simply incarcerating or marginalizing members of street gangs and armed groups.’

small arms survey 2010

gangs, groups, and guns

small arms survey 2010 gangs, groups, and guns

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, SĂŁo Paulo, Delhi, Dubai, Tokyo Cambridge University Press The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 8RU, UK Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York www.cambridge.org Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521146845 ÂŠ Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva 2010 This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press. First published 2010 Printed in the United Kingdom at the University Press, Cambridge A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication data ISBN 978-0-521-19711-3 Hardback ISBN 978-0-521-14684-5 Paperback Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or third-party Internet websites referred to in this publication, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.

Foreword Street gangs and armed groups may represent a tiny portion of all firearm holders worldwide, but the armed violence in which they engage can undermine the socio-economic progress of a nation, challenge the state’s monopoly on the use of force, and create a tipping point in political and military stalemates. Through their use of illicit arms, groups as diverse as Central America’s maras and Uganda’s Lord’s Resistance Army continue to undermine security, development, and justice. Both street gangs and armed groups rely on the illicit arms market to access their firearms. While gangs may contribute to a general climate of insecurity through criminal activities, they typically use small arms to target rival gang members, as revealed by staggering gang-on-gang homicide rates. Armed groups, which may support or oppose the government, tend to have a greater impact on their communities, whether through cattle raiding, the hijacking of aid shipments, the use of children in conflict and crime, the intimidation of voters to influence election results, or the trafficking of drugs and other resources. To reduce the harm caused by armed violence, it is essential to prevent gangs and insurgents from accessing guns—and from feeling the need to access them in the first place. As demonstrated in the Small Arms Survey 2010, addressing the factors that trigger conflicts and fuel gang violence has a much more lasting—and constructive— impact than simply incarcerating or marginalizing members of street gangs and armed groups. By examining both the causes and the responses to such violence, this volume provides policy-makers and other stakeholders with the tools to recognize relevant social, economic, and political realities in designing programmes to promote development and security at the local, national, and regional levels. To reduce the supply of illicit small arms, more must be done to improve the safekeeping and destruction of stockpiles, and to stop the corruption that enables the diversion of legally held weapons into the black market. This year, as we mark the tenth anniversary of the United Nations Convention against Organized Crime, I urge Member States to ratify and implement the Convention’s Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms. This would be a giant step towards reducing the danger posed by small arms and light weapons. —Antonio Maria Costa Executive Director, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

Contents About the Small Arms Survey ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ vi Notes to readers .............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. vi Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... vii Introduction ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 1 Chapter 1. Emerging from Obscurity: The Global Ammunition Trade Introduction ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 7 Framing the issue: key terms and definitions ............................................................................................................................................................................................................ 8 Transparency in the transfer and procurement of ammunition ...................................................................................................................................................... 10 The 2010 Transparency Barometer ....................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 13 Estimating international ammunition transfers ...................................................................................................................................................................................................... 17 Analysis of ammunition transfers in 2007 .................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 20 Technological developments in light weapons ammunition .............................................................................................................................................................. 33 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 34 Chapter 2. Controlling Air Transport: Practice, Options, and Challenges Introduction ......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 41 Arms transfers and transportation .......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 42 The political debate .................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 44 The regulatory dimension ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 49 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 62 Photo Essay. Gang Life: Between Belonging and Exclusion Chapter 3. Gangs, Groups, and Guns: An Overview Introduction ......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 85 Defining armed groups ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 86 Gangs, groups, and guns ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 89 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 96 Chapter 4. Elusive Arsenals: Gang and Group Firearms Introduction ..................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 101 Estimating non-state group small arms ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 102 Gang arsenals ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 105 Insurgent small arms ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 116 Conclusion ......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 124 Chapter 5. Gang Violence Worldwide: Context, Culture, and Country Introduction: an international approach to gang violence ................................................................................................................................................................ 129 Defining gangs and gang violence in a global context .......................................................................................................................................................................... 130 The scope and scale of gang violence around the globe ................................................................................................................................................................... 132 Explaining gang violence ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 146 Conclusion ......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 149 Chapter 6. The Danger of Dungeons: Prison Gangs and Incarcerated Militant Groups Introduction ..................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 157 Prison gangs and armed groups in prison: a brief survey ................................................................................................................................................................. 159 Consolidation, propagation, and projection of power: Brazilâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s prison-based criminal syndicates ................................................ 167 Prison gangs, small arms, and armed violence ................................................................................................................................................................................................. 172 Conclusion ......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 177

Chapter 7. The Other Half: Girls in Gangs Introduction ..................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 185 Girls and gangs ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 187 Motivations for joining gangs ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 191 Girls as perpetrators of violence .......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 193 Victimization of girls and women ....................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 198 Towards a more nuanced understanding of female agency and violence ................................................................................................................... 199 Conclusion ......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 203 Chapter 8. An Ecuadorian Alternative: Gang Reintegration Introduction .................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 209 What is a gang? ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 210 History of gangs in Ecuador ...................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 212 Gang violence in Ecuador ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 214 Gangs and the state ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 215 The SER PAZ initiatives .................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 216 Policy implications .................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 221 Conclusion ......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 223 Chapter 9. Getting Past Suppression: Street Gang Interventions Introduction ..................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 229 Analytic considerations ..................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 230 Gang prevention strategies .......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 234 Gang treatment strategies .............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 240 Gang suppression strategies ...................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 244 Conclusion ......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 249 Chapter 10. Force Multiplier: Pro-government Armed Groups Introduction ..................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 255 A spectrum of non-state armed groups ....................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 256 Pro-government non-state armed groups ................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 258 A range of roles .......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 262 Protector or predator? The impact on civilians ................................................................................................................................................................................................. 268 The end game ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 269 Conclusion ......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 272 Chapter 11. Back to the Brink: Armed Violence in Southern Sudan Introduction ..................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 277 The legacy of Sudanâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s civil wars: the SSDF and intra-Southern violence ...................................................................................................................... 278 Dynamics of insecurity in Southern Sudan ............................................................................................................................................................................................................ 280 Southern Sudanâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s security pre- and post-2011 ................................................................................................................................................................................................... 292 Conclusion ......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 296 Chapter 12. Options for Engagement: Armed Groups and Humanitarian Norms Introduction ..................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 305 The humanitarian engagement of armed groups ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 306 Lessons learned from engagement ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 310 Armed groups, small arms-related threats, and preventive measures ................................................................................................................................ 315 Conclusion ......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 325 Index

vi Small Arms Survey 2010

ABOUT THE SMALL ARMS SURVEY The Small Arms Survey is an independent research project located at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva, Switzerland. Established in 1999, the project is supported by the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs and by sustained contributions from the Governments of Canada, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. The Survey is also grateful for past and current project support received from the Governments of Australia, Belgium, Denmark, France, New Zealand, Spain, and the United States, as well as from different United Nations agencies, programmes, and institutes. The objectives of the Small Arms Survey are: to be the principal source of public information on all aspects of small arms and armed violence; to serve as a resource centre for governments, policy-makers, researchers, and activists; to monitor national and international initiatives (governmental and non-governmental) on small arms; to support efforts to address the effects of small arms proliferation and misuse; and to act as a clearinghouse for the sharing of information and the dissemination of best practices. The Survey also sponsors field research and information-gathering efforts, especially in affected states and regions. The project has an international staff with expertise in security studies, political science, law, economics, development studies, sociology, and criminology, and collaborates with a network of researchers, partner institutions, non-governmental organizations, and governments in more than 50 countries.

NOTES TO READERS Abbreviations: Lists of abbreviations can be found at the end of each chapter. Chapter cross-referencing: Chapter cross-references appear capitalized in brackets throughout the book. For example, in Chapter 3, which provides the overview to this edition’s thematic section: ‘Gang homicide rates can be as much as 100 times greater than homicide rates for the broader population (GANG VIOLENCE).’ Exchange rates: All monetary values are expressed in current US dollars (USD). When other currencies are also cited, unless otherwise indicated, they are converted to USD using the 365-day average exchange rate for the period 1 September 2008 to 31 August 2009. Small Arms Survey: The plain text—Small Arms Survey—is used to indicate the overall project and its activities, while the italicized version—Small Arms Survey—refers to the publication. The Survey, appearing italicized, refers generally to past and future editions. Small Arms Survey Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies 47 Avenue Blanc 1202 Geneva Switzerland t +41 22 908 5777 f +41 22 732 2738 e sas@smallarmssurvey.org w www.smallarmssurvey.org

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS vii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This is the tenth edition of the Small Arms Survey. Like previous editions, it is a collective product of the staff of the Small Arms Survey project, based at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva, Switzerland, with support from partners. Numerous researchers in Geneva and around the world have contributed to this volume, and it has benefited from the input and advice of government officials, advocates, experts, and colleagues from the small arms research community and beyond. The principal chapter authors were assisted by in-house and external contributors who are acknowledged in the relevant chapters. In addition, detailed chapter reviews were provided by: Dominique Antonini, Olivier Bangerter, Ilhan Berkol, James Bevan, Karina Biondi, Jurgen Brauer, Mark Bromley, David Capie, Meda Chesney-Lind, Virginia Comolli, Peter CourtneyGreen, José Miguel Cruz, Scott Decker, Finn Esbensen, Chris Field, Nicolas Florquin, Frank van Gemert, John Hagedorn, Peter Hall, James Howell, Karen Joe-Laidler, Mallika Joseph, Christopher Langton, Amy Lerman, Mike Lewis, Alan Lizotte, Louis Herns Marcelin, Erin McCandless, Ken Menkhaus, Neil Mitchell, Pablo Policzer, Dennis Rodgers, Rachel Stohl, Cordula Strocka, Mats Utas, Ivani Vassoler, James Diego Vigil, Camilla Waszink, Frank Weerman, and Nathalie Weizmann. Eric G. Berman, Keith Krause, Emile LeBrun, and Glenn McDonald were responsible for the overall planning and organization of this edition. Alessandra Allen managed the editing and production of the Survey. Tania Inowlocki copy-edited the Small Arms Survey 2010 Eric G. Berman, Keith Krause, Emile LeBrun, and Glenn McDonald Coordinator Glenn McDonald Publications Alessandra Allen Manager Designer Richard Jones, Exile: Design & Editorial Services Cartographer Jillian Luff, MAPgrafix Copy-editor Tania Inowlocki Proofreader Donald Strachan Editors

Principal chapter authors Introduction Emile LeBrun and Glenn McDonald Chapter 1 Patrick Herron, Jasna Lazarevic, Nic Marsh, and Matt Schroeder Chapter 2 Silvia Cattaneo Photo essay Tania Inowlocki Chapter 3 Jennifer M. Hazen Chapter 4 Aaron Karp Chapter 5 Scott H. Decker and David C. Pyrooz Chapter 6 Benjamin Lessing Chapter 7 Helen Moestue and Jasna Lazarevic Chapter 8 Vanessa Johnston Chapter 9 Charles Kaplan, Avelardo Valdez, and Alice Cepeda Chapter 10 Jennifer M. Hazen Chapter 11 Claire Mc Evoy and Emile LeBrun Chapter 12 Nicolas Florquin with Pascal Bongard and Emilia Richard

book; Jillian Luff produced the maps; Richard Jones provided the layout and design; Donald Strachan proofread the Survey; and Margaret Binns compiled the index. John Haslam, Carrie Parkinson, and Alison Powell of Cambridge University Press provided support throughout the production of the Survey. Samar Hasan, Sarah Hoban, Takhmina Karimova, Benjamin King, Matthias Félix Nowak, Pilar Reina, Emilia Richard, Savannah de Tessières, and Bilyana Tsvetkova assisted with fact-checking. Olivia Denonville helped with photo research. David Olivier, Benjamin Pougnier, and Carole Touraine provided administrative support. The project also benefited from the support of the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, in particular Philippe Burrin, Oliver Jütersonke, and Monique Nendaz. We are extremely grateful to the Swiss government—especially the Department for Foreign Affairs and the Swiss Development Cooperation—for its generous financial and overall support of the Small Arms Survey project, in particular Rita Adam, Serge Bavaud, Siro Beltrametti, Erwin Bollinger, Jean-François Cuénod, Heidi Grau, Thomas Greminger, Cristina Hoyos, Peter Maurer, Jürg Streuli, and Reto Wollenmann. Financial support for the project was also provided by the Governments of Australia, Belgium, Canada, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. In addition, during 2009 the project received financial assistance for various projects from the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, the UN Development Programme, and the World Bank. The project further benefits from the support of international agencies, including the International Committee of the Red Cross, the UN Children’s Fund, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, the UN Institute for Disarmament Research, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, and the World Health Organization. In Geneva, the project has benefited from the expertise of: David Atwood, Peter Batchelor, Silvia Cattaneo, Paul Eavis, Magnus Hellgren, Patrick Mc Carthy, Jennifer Milliken, and Jon Erik Strømø. Beyond Geneva, we also received assistance from a number of colleagues. In addition to those mentioned above, and in specific chapters, we would like to thank: Katherine Aguirre, Michael Hasenau, Christian Hultgreen, Kimberly-Lin Joslin, Guy Lamb, Steven Malby, Daniel Prins, John Probyn, Jorge Restrepo, Camilla Sugden, and Lauren Tracey. Our sincere thanks go out to many other individuals (who remain unnamed) for their continuing support of the project. Our apologies to anyone we have failed to mention. Finally, we wish to dedicate this edition to two friends who perished on the ill-fated flight from Brazil to France in June 2009: Ronald Dreyer and Pablo Dreyfus. Ronald coordinated our work in support of the Geneva Declaration and Pablo contributed for many years to our work on transfers and production, including many chapters in previous editions of the Survey. They are missed, but certainly not forgotten. —Keith Krause, Programme Director Eric G. Berman, Managing Director

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?djheZkYj_ed In October 2009, two heavily armed drug gangs clashed in Morro dos Macacos, a Rio favela (slum) that, like many others, is controlled by gangs. When the police sent in a helicopter, small arms fire forced a crash-landing that killed three of the officers inside. Days of subsequent street battles with the police and military left dozens of gang members, favela residents, and police dead or wounded. The intensity of the fighting, although unusual for Rio, fit a pattern of persistent gang violence in the city’s poorer slums. Gang violence is a daily concern for many public officials around the world. While such violence is typically directed at rival gang members, turf conflicts and retaliatory attacks can spread insecurity throughout an entire community. Although gang membership is associated with an increased risk of violence, not all gangs are inherently violent. Many street gangs—as opposed to the more professional drug gangs—primarily provide social structure and solidarity for their members. Gangs are groups in which young people can express themselves creatively, where internal norms are understood and respected, and where cooperation with peers is valued. All these features can be harnessed for positive ends. Acknowledging this potential is politically risky, however, and the dominant model for addressing street gangs remains suppressive police action, including long prison terms for gang leaders. Evidence indicates that this approach can improve community security over the short term, yet threaten it over the longer term. The integration of street youths into toughened prison gang organizations—typically oriented around illicit drug trafficking and violence—has presented a particularly thorny problem for policy-makers. Clearly, a wide palette of prevention-oriented approaches is needed. The Small Arms Survey 2010: Gangs, Groups, and Guns reviews current understandings of street gangs, the dynamics that give rise to them, the violence they commit, and efforts to curb the same. It examines traditional and emerging efforts to suppress gang violence as well as strategies to address the underlying factors influencing youths to join gangs. This edition also highlights another kind of organization that is widely associated with armed violence— non-state armed groups. They may oppose the government or support it in some form, although an armed group’s orientation to the state can also be ambiguous or shift over time. Gangs and groups are usually treated as distinct, but the blurring lines between politically and criminally motivated violence, and between economic or grievance-based violence, point to many similarities between gangs and armed groups. Both are organized collectives outside direct state control; each has the ability and willingness to deploy violence to achieve its objectives; and both are generally composed of young men, although the involvement of women is more prominent than often assumed. Both gangs and armed groups may be motivated by the need for social cohesion, in addition to more familiar ideological, economic, or political objectives. As in other areas, however, it is difficult to generalize; each gang or armed group has its own, context-dependent features.

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9^Wfj[h ^_]^b_]^ji Ten of the 12 chapters in the Small Arms Survey 2010 look at gangs—primarily street gangs—and armed groups. This thematic section begins with a chapter that situates gangs and armed groups in the context of current understandings of armed violence and reviews the various approaches of other chapters in the section. The first of these distills current information on the firearms of gangs and armed groups, offering global estimates of their holdings based on available data. It is followed by a study of gang violence, including geographical variations in the intensity of such violence, along with the factors that appear to shape it. The chapter on prison gangs examines their consolidation, propagation, and projection of power, both within and beyond prison walls. A chapter on the role of girls and young women considers their motivations for joining gangs, as well as the differences between men and women with respect to the commission of gang-related violence. Traditional and innovative interventions designed to reduce gang violence and discourage youths from joining gangs are reviewed in the last gang-oriented chapter. Two thematic chapters are dedicated to the subject of armed groups. The first looks at groups that can be considered ‘pro-government’, while the second reviews efforts to engage armed groups on international humanitarian norms relating to the use of weapons. Two case study chapters round out the discussion of gangs and armed groups. One focuses on the reintegration of gangs into society in Guayaquil, Ecuador, where efforts have been under way to work with—rather than try to break—existing gang structures while steering gang members towards positive social ends. The other case study places the 2009 surge of armed violence in ‘post-war’ Southern Sudan into historical context, underlining the influence of civil war dynamics. A photo essay documenting gang life in various settings completes the thematic section. Two additional chapters in the 2010 edition review different aspects of the global trade in small arms and light weapons. One offers an estimate of the annual value of international authorized transfers in ammunition, confirming that earlier valuations of the overall trade in small arms and light weapons will need to be revised upwards. The second chapter examines controls on the transport—especially by air—of small arms and light weapons, concluding that many states already have the tools in place that, with some adaptation, could be effective in curbing illicit transfers.

JhWdi\[hi i[Yj_ed Chapter 1 (Authorized transfers): As part of a multi-year project to estimate the annual value of authorized transfers of small arms and light weapons, their parts, accessories, and ammunition, this year’s transfers chapter examines the ammunition trade, supplementing up-to-date UN customs data with previously unused information sources, such as public procurement records. The chapter concludes that the average annual value of authorized international transfers of small arms and light weapons ammunition—including undocumented transfers—was USD 4.3 billion between 2006 and 2009. Small arms ammunition comprised USD 1.8 billion of this total, with ammunition for light weapons accounting for USD 2.5 billion. This finding confirms that the long-standing estimate of USD 4 billion for the total annual trade (including weapons, ammunition, parts, and accessories) will need to be revised upwards once the multi-year study is completed. Chapter 2 (Air transport): This chapter assesses the strengths and weaknesses of current—and proposed— approaches to the regulation of arms and ammunition transport, in particular air transport. While arms transfer licensing, customs, and civil aviation authorities have developed a significant body of controls over air transport, both direct and indirect, certain hurdles must be overcome if these controls are to be used to prevent or stop illicit small arms transfers. These include low levels of cooperation and information exchange among different state bodies as

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well as their different—sometimes incompatible—priorities and notions of ‘security risk’. The chapter offers a critical analysis of current initiatives for strengthened controls on air transport—most notably, that led by the French and Belgian governments.

=hekfi" =Wd]i" WdZ =kdi Photo essay: Through the lenses of two dozen photographers, Gang Life offers an intimate glimpse into the daily realities of current and former gang members around the globe. Having gained the trust of their subjects, the photographers capture what usually remains hidden from view: initiation beatings in Guatemala and Los Angeles; gang patrols in Caracas and New York; communal meals among gang girls in the Philippines; the ‘styling and profiling’ of gangs in Papua New Guinea and Spain; incarceration, injury, and death in Central America and Mexico; and the hurdles of post-gang life in El Salvador and South Africa. Chapter 3 (Overview): The first chapter in the thematic section offers a framework for the chapters that follow. It begins by highlighting important definitional issues: the wide variance in types of gangs and armed groups and the blurry distinction between these two broad categories (and the many sub-groups that fall within each). It then touches on the main findings arising from the chapters. Finally, it highlights some common themes arising in the section. In particular, the chapters call for a greater emphasis on measuring violence, obtaining better information about various gangs and groups, and conducting comparisons across different groups and contexts in order to develop effective policies and programmes for reducing violence. Chapter 4 (Firearms): Understanding the small arms controlled by non-state groups is important for gun policy and specific programmes such as disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration. This chapter, a first cut at the difficult task of estimating the number of firearms held by gangs and armed groups, shows that they are dwarfed by civilian, military, and law enforcement guns. Of some 875 million firearms worldwide, gangs probably have between 2 million and 10 million. Other non-state armed groups have roughly 1.4 million altogether, of which some 350,000 belong to groups that were actively fighting in 2009. Indirect evidence suggests that gangs are getting progressively more powerful small arms, feeding arms races with other actors. Chapter 5 (Gang violence): Over the course of the last decade, gang violence has become a global concern. Although gangs are present on six continents, their levels of violence and arms use vary greatly. While more is

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known about gangs in North America, principally in large US cities, this chapter also reviews a growing body of research in Latin America and the Caribbean, Europe, Asia, Africa, and Australia. It notes that differences in gang violence around the world mostly appear to track national variations in the availability of firearms. The chapter also offers a model illustrating the dynamic process of gang violence within and between countries. Chapter 6 (Prison): Prison gangs, although long recognized as a challenge for penitentiary administrations, have rarely been analysed as a threat to public security in general. And yet, as worldwide inmate populations have grown, prison gangs have expanded in size and reach, and in some places are now capable of organizing large-scale criminal activity and armed violence outside, as well as inside, prisons. This chapter surveys gangs and armed groups in prisons in the United States, Latin America, South Africa, and Northern Ireland. Through a detailed case study of Brazil’s powerful prison gangs, it develops a model of prison gang expansion based on three dynamics: consolidation, propagation, and projection of power, concluding that the long-term costs of mass incarceration may be far higher than decision-makers realise. Chapter 7 (Girls): Young women are involved in gangs as victims, supporters, and active participants. This chapter complements an up-to-date literature review with primary research from Haiti. It takes a global perspective, exploring parallels between gangs and other armed groups in terms of motivations for membership and the roles members play. Girls and women are both victims and perpetrators of violence. A gang’s gender composition appears to be a good proxy for its engagement in violent acts, as women and girls tend to use weapons and violence less frequently and with lower intensity (less use of firearms) than their male counterparts. The chapter shows that, while initially ‘empowering’, gangs may put females at greater risk of abuse and socio-economic marginalization in the longer term. Chapter 8 (Ecuador): High murder rates in Latin America are often attributed to the rise in youth gangs. The small country of Ecuador is no exception. Over the past three decades, political instability, urban poverty, and inequality, coupled with easy access to firearms, have accompanied the proliferation of these groups. At the same time, suppressive law enforcement measures have had limited success in combating gang violence. This chapter profiles the efforts of the non-governmental organization SER PAZ (‘Being Peace’) to reduce violent crime in Guayaquil, Ecuador’s largest city. By cultivating the positive elements of gang culture, the organization has sought, with some success, to ‘reintegrate’ youth gangs into Ecuadorian society. Chapter 9 (Interventions): This chapter examines the prevention, treatment, and suppression of youth street gangs in both theory and practice. Although gangs are a global phenomenon and appear to be influenced by US gang culture, they are ultimately context-specific, a fact that many gang interventions do not reflect. Preferences for certain types of interventions appear to be culturally entrenched. Overall, street gang interventions are more often guided by conventional wisdom than by evidence. Short-term suppressive interventions remain most common. Longer-term interventions that combine suppression with prevention and treatment, involve the community, and are tailored to a specific context (cultural, socio-economic, developmental, gender) appear the most promising, yet tend to be costly. There are no shortcut solutions to the world’s gang problems. Chapter 10 (Pro-government): Research on non-state armed groups has often overlooked those tied to, or operating in support of, a government—whether visibly or covertly. These ‘pro-government non-state armed groups’

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(PGAGs) run the gamut from youth movements to street gangs, political thugs to militias, and community defence organizations to paramilitary forces. Governments have created, co-opted, and allied with PGAGs for economic, strategic, and political gain, using them to wage war, provide community security, and win elections, while obscuring government responsibility for abuses. Despite their utility to many governments, PGAGs pose a serious risk to civilians—potentially much more so than national security forces. This is particularly true when governments outsource the worst violence to PGAGs and allow them to operate with impunity or when PGAGs turn against the government. Chapter 11 (Sudan): In 2009, four years after a peace agreement was signed to end a civil war and eliminate armed groups, armed violence in Southern Sudan led to the deaths of an estimated 2,500 people. Much of the violence involved armed ‘tribal’ groups, was spurred by competition over scarce resources, and reflected long-standing local conflicts. The fledgling Government of Southern Sudan has been largely unable to address the violence, which has become increasingly politicized ahead of national elections scheduled for April 2010 and the referendum on self-determination for Southern Sudan in January 2011. This chapter examines the context and dynamics of the recent armed violence, highlights key threats to security (from both groups and individuals), and reviews possible scenarios as the South moves towards a likely vote for independence in a few months’ time. Chapter 12 (Engagement): In recent years, a growing number of humanitarian actors have sought to elicit greater respect for international norms from armed groups. These efforts have led diverse armed groups to facilitate the delivery of aid to populations affected by armed conflict, ban anti-personnel mines, and renounce the recruitment and use of children. Existing engagement efforts, however, have yet to tackle the threats posed by armed groups’ small arms and ammunition arsenals. Drawing upon lessons learned by humanitarian actors, as well as a review of more than 50 declarations, agreements, and regulations adopted by armed groups, the chapter identifies areas of potential engagement in the small arms domain. These include measures to prohibit small arms misuse, safety precautions to prevent weapons-related accidents, and commitments to refrain from transferring arms to criminals and other ‘misusers’.

9edYbki_ed Gangs and armed groups pose particular challenges for governance and security around the world. Policies of containment and suppression have shown merit, but they also have serious unintended consequences. As this volume suggests, the show of state force—whether intermittent or systematic—is seldom effective in reducing rates of armed violence over the long term. The potential transformation and social reintegration of both gangs and armed groups warrants closer consideration as part of a broader set of strategies that look beyond the symptoms of violence to underlying causes. Through its examination of these key actors, this edition of the Small Arms Survey seeks to advance understandings of the causes, consequences, and correctives to the problem of armed violence, with a particular focus on small arms and light weapons. The 2011 edition of the Survey will continue to investigate these themes by shifting the spotlight from non-state entities to the state itself, including state security forces and national regulation and control of small arms and light weapons. —Glenn McDonald and Emile LeBrun

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;c[h]_d] \hec EXiYkh_jo J>; =BE87B 7CCKD?J?ED JH7:; ?DJHE:K9J?ED In the Southern Sudanese village of Natinga in June 2007, a dispute between Toposa and Turkana pastoralist warriors degenerated into a firefight that consumed all of their ammunition. Their guns suddenly rendered useless, the rivals chose to sit down together and resolve their differences peacefully.1 While a weapon can remain in use for decades if it is properly maintained, its utility depends on the continuous production and delivery of ammunition. Rounds of ammunition can only be used once, and they degrade over time, becoming unstable as they age. The need to take ammunition into account in the design and implementation of measures aimed at preventing death and injury from armed violence appears clear. Nevertheless, the projectiles fired from small arms and light weapons have received much less attention from policy-makers than have the weapons systems themselves. Since they are accorded such a low priority on the international agenda, ammunition transfers are characterized by an acute lack of transparency, which makes research in this area a challenging enterprise.2 Reports on arms transfers often either contain very little data on ammunition—such as the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms—or combine data on transfers of ammunition for small arms and light weapons with data on ammunition for major conventional weapons, as is the case with the European Union’s yearly report on arms exports (‘EU Annual Report’) and most national reports. As a consequence, it is extremely difficult to determine what types of ammunition are being transferred and to whom. This study addresses some of these challenges as part of the Small Arms Survey’s ongoing, multi-year reassessment of the value of authorized international transfers of small arms and light weapons, their parts, accessories, and ammunition. The re-evaluation unpacks the previous estimate of USD 4 billion (Small Arms Survey, 2006, pp. 66–67) one element of the trade at a time. The Small Arms Survey 2009 puts forward an estimate of USD 1.58 billion for the value of documented authorized transfers of firearms in 2006 (Small Arms Survey, 2009, p. 7). Light weapons and parts and accessories will be the next elements to be investigated. This chapter focuses on the ammunition component of the trade, significantly improving upon previous estimates that have analysed solely small arms ammunition data from the UN Commodity Trade Statistics Database (UN Comtrade).3 It supplements those figures with alternative research methods and data sources—particularly public procurement data—which it employs to also arrive at estimates of the global authorized trade in light weapons ammunition and the undocumented authorized trade in small arms ammunition. Major findings of this chapter include: s The average annual value of authorized international transfers of ammunition for small arms and light weapons between 2006 and 2009 is estimated at USD 4.3 billion. Of this total, USD 1.8 billion is ammunition for small arms and USD 2.5 billion is for light weapons. These figures do not include man-portable guided missiles or single-shot, disposable rockets.

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s The USD 4.3 billion ammunition finding shows that the long-standing estimate of USD 4 billion for the total trade (including weapons, parts, and accessories) considerably undervalues recent activity. s In 2007, 26 countries had documented exports of ammunition for small arms worth more than USD 10 million. s The trade in propellant chemicals is worth at least tens, and perhaps hundreds, of millions of US dollars each year. s The global trade in small arms and light weapons ammunition is considerably less transparent than the trade in the weapons themselves. This is true of both national reporting and reporting required or facilitated by international instruments. s Governments procure most of their light weapons ammunition from domestic producers when possible. Therefore, international transfers of light weapons ammunition are probably a small percentage of global public procurement. s Ammunition imported by Western4 countries is overwhelmingly sourced from Western companies. Public procurement data from seven Western states indicates that in recent years they have received less than four per cent of their light weapons ammunition (by value) from non-Western firms. s The 2010 Transparency Barometer identifies Switzerland, the United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands, and Serbia as the most transparent of the major small arms and light weapons exporters. The least transparent major exporters are Iran and North Korea, both scoring zero. s In 2007 the top exporters of small arms and light weapons (those with annual exports of at least USD 100 million), according to available customs data, were (in descending order) the United States, Italy, Germany, Brazil, Austria, Belgium, the United Kingdom, China, Switzerland, Canada, Turkey, and the Russian Federation. The top importers of small arms and light weapons for that year (those with annual imports of at least USD 100 million), according to available customs data, were (in descending order) the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, France, Germany, and Spain.5 The chapter starts by defining the key terms and concepts used before moving on to an assessment of transparency—or lack thereof—in the trade in ammunition for small arms and light weapons. This section includes the Small Arms Trade Transparency Barometer 2010. The chapter then provides a brief outline of the methods used to calculate a total US dollar value for small arms and light weapons ammunition transfers. It concludes with a more detailed and qualitative analysis of that trade.

<H7C?D= J>; ?IIK;0 A;O J;HCI 7D: :;<?D?J?EDI This section summarizes and defines key terms and definitions used in the chapter, starting with the term ‘ammunition’. In its 1999 report, the UN Group of Experts on the Problem of Ammunition and Explosives defines ammunition as ‘the complete round/cartridge or its components, including bullets or projectiles, cartridge cases, primers/caps and propellants that are used in any small arm or light weapon’ (UNGA, 1999, p. 5).6 While this description is a good starting point, a more detailed definition is needed for the purposes of this study. In this chapter, ‘small arms ammunition’ refers to: shotgun shells and their parts, and other complete cartridges— including tracer, blank, training, and less lethal rounds—that are 12.7 mm or smaller in calibre,7 and their parts.8 Cartridges that are 20 mm or larger in calibre are not included because they are normally fired from cannon, which are not considered small arms or light weapons because of their rapid rate of fire (which precludes transport of sufficient

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quantities of ammunition on light vehicles or pack animals for the weapon to be used as intended), and because they are usually mounted on larger platforms such as ships, aircraft, or armoured vehicles.9 The term ‘light weapons ammunition’ refers to the following items: s mortar bombs up to and including 120 mm; s some man- and crew-portable rockets; s grenades (hand and projected); s recoilless rifle rounds; and s their parts. This category includes less lethal, practice, training, smoke, and flash rounds. It does not include man-portable guided missiles, rockets in single-shot, disposable launch tubes,10 or rockets fired from rails, which, for the purposes of this chapter, are considered ‘light weapons’ rather than ammunition and will be addressed in a subsequent edition of the Small Arms Survey.11 The above list—and the 120 mm upper limit for mortars—is derived from the definition for light weapons in the Small Arms Survey 2008, which is based on the maximum weight that can be transported off-road by a typical light vehicle (Small Arms Survey, 2008, pp. 9–10). The analysis of transfers of small arms ammunition presented in this chapter makes use of UN Comtrade, which houses the world’s largest collection of data on international trade, containing more than 1.1 billion records on various commodities, including arms and ammunition.12 Authorized transfers of ammunition are defined here as cross-border movements of ammunition and their parts that are authorized by the importing, exporting, or transit states. For a detailed discussion of international transfers, see Box 1.1 in the Small Arms Survey 2009 (Small Arms Survey, 2009, p. 9). For the purposes of this chapter, public procurement is defined as the purchase of goods or services by public bodies. Additional terms are defined in the online methodology paper for this chapter (see Annexe 1.3).

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JH7DIF7H;D9O ?D J>; JH7DI<;H 7D: FHE9KH;C;DJ E< 7CCKD?J?ED JhWdifWh[dYo _d _dj[hdWj_edWb jhWdi\[hi e\ Wcckd_j_ed There have been improvements in transparency of authorized transfers of materials related to small arms and light weapons in recent years. While instruments such as the UN Register of Conventional Weapons, the EU Annual Report, and national reports on arms exports have contributed to this positive trend, no intergovernmental reports and very few national sources (see Table 1.1) publish specific, disaggregated information on transfers of ammunition for small arms and light weapons. UN Comtrade, which has long been a principal source of data on weapons transfers, contains plentiful—though not complete—data on the import and export of shotgun cartridges, other cartridge-based ammunition for small arms, and their parts.13 Comtrade data is not useful, however, for analysing transfers of non-cartridge-based light weapons ammunition. Data on grenades, mortar bombs, shoulder-launched rockets, and rounds for recoilless rifles are covered by customs category 930690, which also includes a miscellany of other types of ammunition, such as ballistic missiles, torpedoes, flying bombs, depth charges, and harpoons (WCO, n.d.). Since it is impossible to disaggregate data on the various items, UN Comtrade is of limited utility as a source of information on light weapons ammunition transfers. L[ho \[m

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arms and light weapons cannot be identified. Though the quantity and specificity of data in national arms export reports vary from country to country (see Table 1.1), almost all reports are similar to the international instruments mentioned above in that they either exclude data on ammunition transfers or aggregate this data in such a way that it is impossible to distinguish transfers relating to small arms and light weapons from transfers of other items. Like the EU, many governments use categories based on the Wassenaar Munitions List.14 Many others do not produce reports at all. Some additional information was acquired through extensive outreach to industry representatives and government officials, but most queries yielded little or no additional data.15 Governments consistently responded that the requested information was not known at the level of specificity required for this study, or that the information could not be released for reasons of national security.

JhWdifWh[dYo _d dWj_edWb fheYkh[c[dj e\ Wcckd_j_ed Transparency in public procurement has become a norm in many countries. It is advocated in order to ensure fair competition among contractors and as an anti-corruption measure. Transparency, along with ‘non-discrimination’, is a cornerstone principle of the Agreement on Government Procurement of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Articles IX, XVII, and XVIII of the agreement stipulate the publication of tenders and contract award notices (WTO, 1994). Similar initiatives have been pursued by other international organizations. The EU, for example, requires

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public bodies to publish both tenders and contract award notices. However, both the WTO and the EU have general exemptions for arms and other equipment purchased for national defence, including ammunition.17 Nonetheless, governments are encouraged to publish details of arms procurement, and some do so voluntarily. One voluntary regime is under the auspices of the Code of Conduct on Defence Procurement of the European Defence Agency (EDA), which encourages transparency in arms procurement by member states. Governments may publish details on public procurement in two ways: through national bulletins or databases, or through multilateral public procurement websites. The two multilateral procurement sites used in this study are the EDA Defence Contracts Opportunities bulletin board and the EU’s Tenders Electronic Daily (TED) database. Commercial databases of tender opportunities were also examined, but they did not offer comprehensive information on ammunition procurement. Publicly available information on national procurement of ammunition varies significantly. Some countries, such as Australia, place large numbers of ammunition contracts by the armed forces and other branches of government in national online databases. In other cases, the information is much less comprehensive, often excluding defence materiel. Some countries have reported highly incomplete data on ammunition to the EDA and TED databases—only a handful or a single contract over a number of years—and other countries have not reported ammunition acquisitions at all. In addition, as the provision of information is voluntary and subject to national security exemptions, it is impossible to know with any certainty whether a particular country has provided a complete record of its ammunition procurement. There are further problems with some of the transparency mechanisms outlined in this section. The EDA database only covers military procurement, and so excludes ammunition purchases by law enforcement agencies. Furthermore, both the EDA and TED databases have thresholds—EUR 1 million for the EDA and EUR 203,000 for TED—below which contracts are not required to be posted. A comparison between postings on these databases and national publications with no minimum threshold suggests that some ammunition contracts fall below these values. Another problem with reporting on arms procurement is one that can also be found in other areas of arms reporting: reports submitted by countries under different mechanisms do not always concur with each other, suggesting information supplied is not always comprehensive. Furthermore, data from government procurement clearly does not cover the

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trade in parts and finished rounds conducted before their sale to governments—either as part of the production process or between dealers. Finally, some governments have not maintained online archives of national procurement bulletins that have only been published digitally, sometimes limiting the availability of data to a single month.

J>; (&'& JH7DIF7H;D9O 87HEC;J;H The Small Arms Trade Transparency Barometer was introduced in the Small Arms Survey 2004 in order to assess Im_jp[hbWdZ" j^[ countries’ transparency in reporting on their small arms and light weapons exports. Points are awarded for timeliness, Kd_j[Z A_d]Zec" access and consistency, clarity, comprehensiveness, and inclusion of data on deliveries as well as for reporting on WdZ =[hcWdo Wh[ licences granted and refused. The Barometer examines countries claiming—or believed—to have exported USD 10 j^[ j^h[[ ceij million or more of small arms and light weapons, including their parts, accessories, and ammunition, during at least jhWdifWh[dj one calendar year between 2001 and 2008. As its name indicates, the Barometer is designed to measure—and promote—transparency. While it can also be used to highlight trends in national reporting, it does not assess the accuracy of the data states provide. The Barometer has undergone several significant changes since its introduction. Lazarevic (2010a) presents a history of the evolution of the Transparency Barometer and retroactively applies the new scoring system, introduced in 2008, to the years 2001–06. It also includes the scoring for 2007 and 2008. As a rule, the 2010 Barometer assesses national transparency in small arms export activity for 2008, based on reporting in 2009. The three main sources are: (1) national arms export reports;18 (2) the UN Register of Conventional Arms; and (3) UN Comtrade (see Table 1.2). This edition assesses 48 countries’ reporting practices: the 45 countries covered in the 2009 Barometer plus newcomers India, Montenegro, and the United Arab Emirates—all believed to have exported roughly USD 10 million worth of relevant materiel in 2007 or 2008.19 Additional countries may feature in future Barometers, when and if more information about their international transfers becomes available. Discussions of transparency also need to focus on the policies of countries that have little or no domestic production, but important surplus stockpiles. Examples include Albania (see Box 1.1) and arguably Angola. Documenting surpluses and examining how they are managed and disposed of is also important to broader considerations of responsible arms transfer practices. This year’s Transparency Barometer identifies Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and Germany as the three most transparent countries. The least transparent are Iran and North Korea, both scoring zero. Spain increased its score by 1.5 points and replaced the United States in this year’s top ten. The average score rose slightly since last year (from 11.4 to 11.5). Israel’s score underwent the greatest increase in both absolute and percentage terms, rising 4 points (or 67 per cent) since last year thanks to better reporting to UN Comtrade. It is followed by Bulgaria, which, despite not publishing a national arms export report for 2008, increased its score by 3 points (or 40 per cent) by including background information on its international small arms and light weapons transfers in reporting to the UN Register. Slovakia experienced the largest decline (15 per cent), falling to 12.5 points. For the second year under the new scoring system, more than half the countries reviewed received fewer than half the maximum number of points attainable (i.e. fewer than 12.5 of 25), suggesting that, despite some progress, states can do much more to improve their reporting.20

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;IJ?C7J?D= ?DJ;HD7J?ED7B 7CCKD?J?ED JH7DI<;HI This section explains briefly how the estimated value of USD 4.3 billion for annual transfers of ammunition for small arms and light weapons was calculated. Table 1.3 breaks down the estimate into its small arms and light weapons, and documented and undocumented components. The following sub-sections detail the methods used to generate these figures.

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;ij_cWj_d] jhWdi\[hi e\ icWbb Whci Wcckd_j_ed The documented trade in small-calibre ammunition was calculated using the method employed by the Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers (NISAT) and published in previous editions of the Small Arms Survey. As in previous years, both import and export data from UN Comtrade were examined, and a cumulative figure was developed for each country. This method can be used to develop estimates of country-specific exports based on data supplied by importers; it can also help to fill in gaps resulting from non-reporting by exporters.23 The undocumented trade in small-calibre cartridges was assessed using a method similar to that employed for light weapons ammunition (see below). Countries were grouped according to: estimates of the number of firearms owned by civilians and members of the armed forces; gross national income per capita; and production of ammunition. Using available trade data, average imports for each group were calculated, and these were applied to countries that had not reported any data. This method generated an estimate of total imports, from which documented imports were subtracted to produce the estimate of undocumented imports. An assessment of the undocumented trade in shotgun shells and parts is not required due to the higher level of reporting in these categories and the lack of significant military markets for them (some of which are much less transparent). Since some countries do not report their exports and imports to UN Comtrade, this study relies on data from countries known to be major importers and exporters to fill the gap and ensure sufficient coverage to adequately capture the global trade. Some countriesâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;such as Brazil, China, Cyprus, and Saudi Arabiaâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;report on their exports even though they withhold information on exports of small-calibre cartridges. Presumably this is because shotgun shells are mostly used by civilian sports shooters rather than the military or law enforcement, and so this type of ammunition does not attract the national security concerns associated with small-calibre ammunition employed by the armed forces. In addition, existing import data for shotgun shells and parts is much more likely to cover the major markets because these reports come from countries with the highest numbers of sports shooters (by contrast, some important military markets for small-calibre cartridges are not adequately covered in the trade data).

;ij_cWj_d] jhWdi\[hi e\ b_]^j m[Wfedi Wcckd_j_ed The absence of disaggregated data on light weapons ammunition in UN Comtrade, national reports, and the UN Register called for a radically different approach to calculating a global US dollar value estimate of light weapons ammunition transfers than the one used for small arms ammunition transfers. To overcome the near-total absence of usable transfers data, the estimate focuses on the more plentiful, though still manifestly incomplete, data on government procurement of light weapons ammunition. In spite of the problems outlined above, a sufficient number of countries do publish extensive records of public procurement, including contract award notices, which list the value of the items

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procured and the identity of the contractor. Working on the assumption that the civilian market for light weapons ammunition is negligible, public procurement records can be used to build up a fairly complete picture of the light weapons ammunition trade in a particular country. The location of the manufacturer often reveals whether the items in the contract were procured domestically or imported. This approach to estimating the value of global transfers of light weapons ammunition has numerous weaknesses. The most significant limitation is the highly incomplete list of countries that make public their procurement of defence materiel. Despite this obstacle, however, through electronic databases, procurement bulletins, requests under freedom of information laws, and responses from government and industry contacts to queries submitted by the Small Arms Survey,24 the authors were able to compile what they believe to be fairly complete data on government procurement (including imports) of light weapons ammunition in 11 countries: Australia, France, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Slovakia, South Africa, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United States, and another African state.25 Data from the 11 countries listed above documents annual imports of light weapons ammunition worth USD 302 million. Because of the large number of countries for which data could not be obtained, however, this documented figure is representative of only a fraction of the total global trade. In order to account for the significant undocumented trade, the authors extrapolated from a ten-country sample (the 11 countries except for Sweden)26 to generate values for imports by similar countries for which little or no data could be obtained. To account for key differences between the countries for which values were extrapolated, countries were assessed according to four criteria that are believed to affect the value of a state’s annual imports of light weapons ammunition: its annual military spending per member of its armed forces, the size of its armed forces, whether (and to what extent) the country is involved in armed conflict, and its capacity to produce light weapons ammunition domestically. Every country in the world was categorized according to the first two criteria. The two sets of countries were then divided into three bands: high, medium, and low military spending per service person, and large, medium, and small armed force size.27 All countries were then grouped according to these bands, creating nine categories of states: high military expenditure and large

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armed forces, high military expenditure and medium-sized armed forces, and so on down to low military expenditure and small armed forces (see Table 1.4). The groupings within the nine categories were determined on the basis of two assumptions. First, that between categories there are qualitative differences in government procurement of light weapons ammunition between countries; that is, it is not possible to extrapolate the ammunition procurement value for a low–small country from data on a high– large country.28 Second, that within those categories, light weapons ammunition public procurement doctrine is comparable for purposes of extrapolation, and scalable according to differences in armed force size. In other words, as long as the differences in countries’ armed force size and conflict status are taken into account, one can estimate a value for light weapons ammunition procurement for one low–small country based on data from another low–small country. Each of the nine country categories were then populated with an estimate of average annual light weapons pro:eYkc[dj[Z icWbb curement per active service person. Where possible, this was calculated from data on actual government procurement. Whci Wcckd_j_ed For several categories, however, the estimate is based on values from other categories and input from a range of jhWdi\[hi _d (&&- experts. The authors then multiplied the size of the armed forces of each state by the average annual light weapons m[h[ mehj^ procurement per service person of the corresponding band. This process yielded an estimate of average light weapons KI: '$, X_bb_ed$

ammunition procurement for each country in the world.29 Each estimate was then revised upwards or downwards based on the state’s conflict status and its capacity for domestic production of light weapons ammunition.30 The modifiers used for these calculations were generated through analysis of the impact of these factors within the ten-country dataset. The sum of these revised estimates (excluding countries for which the authors had data) provided a total estimate for undocumented imports of light weapons ammunition of USD 2.2 billion. By adding this estimate to the value of the documented trade (USD 302 million), the authors arrived at an estimate for the annual authorized transfers of light weapons ammunition of USD 2.5 billion. This estimate is based on data from 2006–09 and represents a typical value rather than an accounting of a single, specific year. For a fuller explanation of how this figure was calculated, please refer to Annexe 1.3.

7D7BOI?I E< 7CCKD?J?ED JH7DI<;HI ?D (&&This section looks behind the values set out above, analysing in detail the data used in this study to identify prominent importers and exporters, assess markets, and discuss the implications of developing technologies for ammunition transfers. The first sub-section deals with small arms ammunition and the second with ammunition for light weapons.

7dWboi_i e\ icWbb Whci Wcckd_j_ed jhWdi\[hi" (&&- According to data submitted to UN Comtrade, the value of documented small arms ammunition transfers in 2007 was USD 1.6 billion. This figure reflects transfers of small-calibre cartridges and parts worth USD 960 million, and shotgun shells and parts worth USD 641 million. In addition, using the methodology outlined above, the undocumented trade in small-calibre cartridges is estimated to be worth an additional USD 169 million. The customs categories used to analyse the documented trade in small arms ammunition cover both finished rounds and parts, but do not include propellant chemicals. Data on propellants is recorded under a separate customs code, which covers products ranging from black powder to smokeless powders and ammonium perchlorate. The global documented market in propellants reported to UN Comtrade was worth USD 442 million in 2007, with the

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United States being the largest exporter and importer. However, the trade in propellants is not included in the US dollar value estimates because the data includes propellants for items that are outside the scope of this study, including major conventional weapons and equipment other than arms. Nevertheless, it is safe to assume that the trade in propellants for small arms and light weapons ammunition makes up a significant proportion of the overall trade, meaning that the above estimate for transfers of small arms ammunition and parts underestimates the actual trade by tens, and possibly hundreds, of millions of dollars. Aside for some exotic products, small arms ammunition is self-contained and cartridge-based.31 The basic components are: cartridge case, primer, propellant, and projectile. A given calibre can be employed in many types of weapon and will vary according to the country as well as manufacturer, and whether it is intended for military or civilian use. The most commonly used calibres worldwide include the following NATO and former Warsaw Pact standard cartridges, along with armour-piercing, incendiary, tracer, blank, training, and less lethal variants (Bevan and PĂŠzard, 2006, pp. 24â&#x20AC;&#x201C;25). Rifle, carbine, and machine gun: s 5.45 x 39 mm Warsaw Pact s 5.56 x 45 mm NATO or .223 Remington s 7.62 x 39 mm Warsaw Pact

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s 7.62 x 51 mm NATO s 7.62 x 54R mm Warsaw Pact s 12.7 x 99 mm NATO (.50 calibre) s 12.7 x 108 mm Warsaw Pact Pistol and sub-machine gun: s 9 x 17 mm Warsaw Pact or .380 ACP (Automatic Colt Pistol) s 9 x 19 mm or 9 mm Parabellum, NATO, or Luger s 7.62 x 25 mm Warsaw Pact Shotgun: s 12-gauge (18.53 mm) Almost all small arms ammunition is mass-manufactured by modern, commercial companies that have the industrial capacity to produce well over one million cartridges per day and that actively compete for customers worldwide. Market leaders have developed flexible production lines to manage domestic and foreign multiple-contract ammunition requirements from militaries, law enforcement agencies, and sports shooters. Two additional features of this ?d (&&-" +) market are noteworthy: the general absence of licensed production agreements and the growing market demand for Yekdjh_[i ^WZ NATO-standardized cartridges. One of the world’s largest military ammunition producers is the US-based Alliant [nfehji mehj^ Techsystems (ATK). ATK operates the US government’s Lake City Army Ammunition Plant in Missouri, which has ceh[ j^Wd the capacity to produce four million rounds a day and has achieved company record annual outputs of more than KI: ' c_bb_ed$

1.3 billion rounds (ATK, n.d.a). Small arms ammunition production takes place in every populated continent of the globe.32 Particularly noteworthy is the identification of manufacturing in 11 African states (Berman, 2007), on a continent not normally associated with arms production. Such widespread production, and a secondary market in surplus ammunition, translates into a large number of exporters. In 2007, according to UN Comtrade, 24 countries had exports of small arms ammunition worth more than 1 per cent of global exports of small arms ammunition; 26 had exports worth more than USD 10 million; and 53 countries had exports worth more than USD 1 million. The remainder of this section analyses the international trade in small-calibre cartridges and shotgun shells, as reported to UN Comtrade. For the purposes of this chapter, the term ‘small-calibre cartridges’ is used to refer to ammunition for pistols, rifles, and various types of machine gun that are 12.7 mm calibre or below. The analysis below is based on data from UN Comtrade because, as mentioned earlier in the chapter, other data sources do not provide specific information on the transfer of small arms ammunition. As noted in the Small Arms Survey 2009, one of the most striking trends in transfers of small arms and light weapons over the past ten years has been an increase in the value of the documented international trade in small arms ammunition (Small Arms Survey, 2009, pp. 13–17). As shown in Figure 1.2, after adjusting for inflation, the value of the trade in small-calibre cartridges in constant 2006 US dollars increased by 50 per cent over the ten-year period, and shotgun shells by 96 per cent. While it is beyond the scope of this chapter to present a complete explanation for this rise, it is safe to assume that the military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are partly responsible for the increase in the trade in small-calibre cartridges. Conversely, growing civilian demand was the most likely cause of the increase in the trade in shotgun shells.

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The following sections disaggregate the USD 1.6 billion value of the documented authorized trade in ammunition for small arms by examining the main exporters and importers of small-calibre ammunition and parts, shotgun shells, and parts of shotgun shells (the discrepancy between that value and what is shown in Figure 1.2 is due to adjustment for inflation). The United States is by far the largest importer of small-calibre ammunition and shotgun shells. That it is not the largest importer of parts of shotgun shells suggests that these materials are being exported to manufacturers who export completed shotgun shells—to the US and other markets. The data may well reflect several stages in the production chain as components and commodities are sourced internationally and then manufactured into finished products, which are then exported to the main markets. In Tables 1.5 to 1.10 the calculation of the top five trade partners used a threshold to exclude any insignificant exporters or importers. If a country accounted for one per cent or less of transfers, it was deemed insignificant and was not included in the list of the top five exporters or importers. IcWbb#YWb_Xh[ YWhjh_Z][i

The main markets for small-calibre cartridges are the following three sectors: the military, law enforcement, and civilian sports shooters. In countries that are not at war, military and law enforcement procurement is mainly for training and to replenish ageing or obsolete stockpiles. In many countries, the number of authorized civilian firearm owners significantly exceeds personnel employed in the military and law enforcement. The value of the documented international imports of small-calibre cartridges and parts in 2007 was USD 960 million. The United States dominated the trade with some 23 per cent of global exports; no other country had more than ten per cent. The Russian Federation did not report any data to Comtrade on its small-calibre cartridge exports in 2007 and so it may deserve a higher ranking in the list of top ten exporters.34 In addition, China, South Africa, Israel,35 and Ukraine, all known from press articles and interviews to be important exporters, did not report either, and so it is possible that they also belong in the top ten list. Table 1.5 lists the top ten exporters of small-calibre cartridges.36

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bases, cases, cups, and linings.37 There is more comprehensive reporting on shotgun shells and their parts than smallcalibre cartridges. For example, China reports on transfers of shotgun shells but not on small-calibre cartridges. In 2007, documented imports of shotgun shells (excluding parts) were worth USD 379 million. The top three exporters—Brazil, Italy, and Spain—account for half of all identified exports. Table 1.7 lists the main exporters of shotgun shells in 2007. The United States was the largest importer of shotgun shells, but it did not hold the dominant position it held in small-calibre cartridges—or in other categories of small arms and light weapons (Small Arms Survey, 2009, pp. 32–47). Table 1.8 lists the main importers of shotgun shells in 2007.

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The total value of imports of parts for shotgun shells in 2007 was USD 262 million. The largest exporter was France with 17 per cent of all exports, closely followed by Italy with 14 per cent. All other countries had exports valued at less than ten per cent of the global trade. Table 1.9 lists the main exporters of parts for shotgun shells in 2007. Italy was the largest importer of parts for shotgun shells, which may be attributed to Italyâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s position as a prominent exporter of complete rounds. Table 1.10 lists the top ten importers of parts for shotgun shells in 2007. KdZeYkc[dj[Z jhWZ[

The undocumented trade (i.e. unreported authorized transactions that have not been included in the above section) in smallcalibre cartridges and parts is estimated to be worth at least USD 169 million (using the methodology outlined above). The most important countries for which this survey did not have Comtrade data were the four that experienced high-intensity conflict in 2007:38 Afghanistan, Iraq, Sri Lanka, and Somalia. Such combat is likely to have involved very high use of ammunition; these four countries comprised 71 per cent of the total value of the estimated undocumented trade. The estimate of their imports of small arms ammunition was informed by press reports and other documentation in the public domain, available Comtrade data from exporters to these countries, and an assessment of imports by other countries that were formerly involved in high-intensity conflict and reported their imports to Comtrade.

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from reusable launchers. These items differ significantly from one another in terms of purpose, size, cost, and sophistication, even within the same category. Mortar bombs are a good example. On one end of the technological spectrum is the 52mm Mk 2/1 HE bomb, which is unguided39 and has a range of just 480 metres (Jones and Ness, 2007, p. 709). On the other end is the Fireball, a 120 mm guided round that, in tests in 2008, landed within 5 metres of a target 6 kilometres away (Richardson, 2008). Mortar bombs serve a variety of purposes, including: attacking personnel, vehicles, and buildings; communicating with and concealing friendly forces; illuminating the battlefield; and setting fires. Grenades also serve a variety of functions and vary significantly in terms of cost and technological sophistication. While uses for recoilless rifles and rockets are more limited, the cost and capabilities of their ammunition also vary significantly from system to system. JhWdi\[hi e\ b_]^j m[Wfedi Wcckd_j_ed

As explained above, the USD 2.5 billion estimate for annual international transfers in light weapons ammunition was derived from contract award notices and other documents issued by 11 countries. This data, coupled with partial procurement data from several other states, highlights a number of important characteristics of the global market in light weapons ammunition that are relevant to international transfers. First, states with the capacity to produce their own light weapons ammunition tend to procure the majority from domestic producers. Since this group includes many of the worldâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s largest national markets for light weapons ammunition, the implications for international transfers are significant.40 Data on procurement by the countries studied indicates that states with an indigenous capacity to produce hand grenades, projected grenades, or mortars procured, on average, nearly 76 per cent of these items (by value) from domestic contractors. As shown in Figure 1.3, hand grenades were most frequently procured domestically, with approximately 86 per cent of contracts awarded to domestic producers. Exporters of mortar bombs and projected grenades fared somewhat better, winning approximately 25 per cent and 23 per cent, respectively, of the combined value of contracts awarded by producer states (75 per cent domestic procurement of mortar bombs and 77 per cent of projected grenades).

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While these markets are largely dominated by domestic producers, the absolute value of imports, including imports of component parts, is significant nonetheless. The estimated sum of imports of light weapons ammunition by the 11 countries studied averages around USD 302 million annually. It should be noted that these values do not necessarily reflect all foreign components imported by manufacturers for assembly in the client country, the cumulative value of which is probably significant. For example, the unit cost of the German M776 fuse, which is used in the US militaryâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s M930 120 mm illuminating mortar bomb, is approximately USD 200, or roughly 20 per cent of the total cost of the item. The total cost of M776 fuses imported by US manufacturers to fill contracts awarded by the US Army in 2008 alone was more than USD 7 million (US Army, 2009, p. 278). A second characteristic of the global market in light weapons ammunition underscored by the data is the continued dominance of Western producers of light weapons ammunition in Western markets. In fact, the data indicates that the value of contracts awarded by the United States, Australia, and five European countries41 to contractors located outside of North America, Australia, and Europe was less than four per cent of the total value of all contracts. Consequently, non-Western firms often contend that they are shut out of key markets,42 as illustrated by a 2005 statement by the CEO of the South African defence firm Denel, which manufactures a wide range of ammunition: [M]uch of global defence spend[ing] is not directly accessible to independent contractors like Denel [. . . ]. The US Department of Defense in recent years has awarded contracts almost exclusively to US and NATO companies. These companies supply most other markets, too. Developing nations like India, Brazil and Israel have strong domestic industries to serve their own customer[s], whilst giving intense competition to other independents (DID, 2009). Figure 1.4 shows the locations of suppliers that won contracts for light weapons ammunition issued by Australia, France, Italy, Latvia, Slovakia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Singapore Technologies Kinetics (STK) is the only non-Western company to claim more than one per cent of this market, winning 3.4 per cent of the value of all contracts. The market share of the other non-Western firms awarded contracts was minuscule. As illustrated in

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Figure 1.4, the only other non-Western firm to win contracts in 2006–09 was Rafael in Israel, and the value of its contracts totalled less than one per cent of the value of contracts awarded by the seven Western countries. Data on the procurement and consumption of small arms and light weapons ammunition by the Italian military provides a more detailed look at European procurement, including the dominance of Western ammunition markets by Western companies. Table 1.11 contains data on the allocation and consumption of ammunition by a highly specialized unit of the Italian armed forces. The unit is ‘an operative group of around 30 soldiers who train in Italy for 6 months and are deployed in high-intensity operating theatres for 6 months’ (Persi Paoli, 2009). Despite the obstacles to penetrating foreign markets, a few companies outside Europe and North America are winning contracts from Western governments and producing innovative products that could increase their market share in Western countries. STK, for example, produces a full range of advanced grenades that have attracted significant attention from the European market. The UK government has awarded nearly USD 100 million in contracts for projected grenades to STK since 2007, and in 2009 STK won a USD 10 million grenade contract from the Swedish government (ASDNews, 2009). It also recently won a contract with an unspecified European government for its SPARCS43 surveillance <[m YecfWd_[i round.44 In 2010, the company will be introducing a medium-velocity 40 mm round with a range of 800 metres— ekji_Z[ ;khef[ double the range of a typical low-velocity round. According to an STK representative, the round can be fired from WdZ Dehj^ 7c[h_YW common under-barrel grenade launchers and will also be more accurate since it flies at a flatter trajectory, making m_d YedjhWYji it less susceptible to environmental conditions such as wind.45 Similarly, Israel Military Industries and Rafael have \hec M[ij[hd won contracts for 120 mm mortar bombs and rifle-launched door-breaching grenades (Simon), respectively. A third characteristic of the global market in light weapons ammunition highlighted by the data is the effect of conflict on light weapons ammunition consumption. The value of mortar bomb procurement by the US Army, for example, rose from an average of approximately USD 126 million per year during the three fiscal years prior to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq (1999–2001) to approximately USD 218 million annually in fiscal years 2005–07. The value of contracts awarded by the Australian military increased even more dramatically. Australian procurement of identified light weapons ammunition from 1997 to 2000 totalled approximately USD 27 million whereas contracts awarded from 2005 to 2008 reached nearly USD 88 million, an increase of more than 300 per cent. One explanation for this increase is that during the latter period Australia had between 850 and 1,750 soldiers deployed in active war zones in Iraq and Afghanistan (IISS, 1997–2009). From 1997 to 2000, Australia had military deployments, but these were as peacekeepers who were not engaged in sustained combat. Interestingly, Australian procurement of recoilless rifle rounds jumped from approximately USD 7 million to USD 43 million between the same two periods. Detailed data on the procurement and import of light weapons ammunition by governments other than the 11 countries identified above is often difficult to find. Nonetheless, media accounts of recent deals and information gathered from country experts shed some light on ammunition transfers outside of the 11 countries. Research conducted for this chapter suggests that domestic producers also dominate many of the largest national non-Western markets, as evidenced by the near total reliance on domestically produced light weapons ammunition by the Russian military. Sources familiar with the Chinese, Indian, and Pakistani militaries report that they also procure almost all of their light weapons ammunition from domestic producers.46 Russian analyst Maxim Pyadushkin argues that the reason for the dominance of domestic sources of light weapons ammunition in the Russian Federation is twofold: 1) it has no foreign-made light weapons in service [in] the Armed Forces and [. . . ] paramilitary agencies, and 2) the local defence industry is still capable [of producing] all types of ammunition for the light weapons used by the Russian military and law enforcement agencies (Pyadushkin, 2009, p. 3).

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Media accounts provide some insight into the (very different) procurement patterns of countries in conflict and those prohibited from importing light weapons ammunition from Western producers. These countries have turned to China and smaller, regional suppliers for their light weapons ammunition. Myanmar, which has been under US and European arms embargoes for nearly 20 years, has turned to non-Western producers, including Vietnam, Pakistan, and possibly China, for light weapons ammunition. In 2001, it purchased 50,000 82 mm mortar bombs from Vietnam for USD 2 million (Karniol, 2001).47 China has also supplied large quantities of light weapons ammunition to Sri Lanka, which just recently emerged from a 26-year civil war. The Sri Lankan military reportedly signed an agreement with the Chinese firm Poly Technologies in 2007 for more than 120,000 81 mm and 120 mm mortar bombs, 2,000 rocket-propelled grenades, and other munitions. The mortar bombs alone reportedly cost USD 14 million (Karniol, 2007). Other recent importers of Chinese light weapons ammunition include Nepalâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s monarchyâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;the antidemocratic actions of which prompted countries to suspend arms sales to Nepalâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;and Zimbabwe, which is under several national and multilateral arms embargoes (Sangraula, 2006, p. 4; Davis, 2005; Beresford, 2008).

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J;9>DEBE=?97B :;L;BEFC;DJI ?D B?=>J M;7FEDI 7CCKD?J?ED Recent technological developments in light weapons ammunition range from the mundane48 to the truly revolutionary. Some of these developments have the potential to transform not only the battlefield but also the international trade in light weapons ammunition, including the illicit trade. Technological advances are increasing the range, accuracy, and lethality of projected grenades. The incorporation of micro-adaptive flow control (tiny bursts of air that alter the round’s trajectory in flight) could nearly double the effective range of grenades fired from common grenade launchers (Kucera, 2005). Similarly, grenades fired from the Individual Airburst Weapon System will reportedly allow users to consistently hit partially concealed targets up to 500 metres away with a single computer-programmed round (ATK, n.d.b). Other developments are creating entirely new battlefield roles for grenades, such as surveillance. STK’s SPARCS round consists of a camera with a parachute that ‘captures strategic aerial images during descent and transmits [them] to a receiver, a PDA [personal digital assistant] or laptop on the ground’ (Minnick, 2009).

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Key developments in mortar bomb technology include precision guidance,49 extended range (through rocket propulsion or gliding), and warheads that can deliver a variety of payloads, including sub-munitions50 (Bonomo et al., 2007, p. 37). Other projects—such as mortar bombs dropped from unmanned aerial vehicles and unmanned aerial vehicles launched from mortar tubes—illustrate the novel mixing of platforms and ammunition that is blurring lines between weapons systems.

?cfb_YWj_edi \eh j^[ _dj[hdWj_edWb jhWZ[ The effect of these developments on the international trade could be significant. Greater accuracy and the need for less training could lead to significant reductions in the quantity of imported grenades and mortars, although the higher unit costs of these items means that the total value of the international trade in these items may not decrease dramatically.51 Exporters of the new ammunition may also see significant increases in their share of the international trade; assuming they perform as advertised, the weapons will have financial as well as military appeal to potential customers. Not only do the new rounds outperform their counterparts militarily and have a smaller logistical footprint, but some may also substitute for more expensive weapons in certain circumstances, with significant cost savings for the importer. Instead of eliminating a sniper ensconced in a building with a guided bomb costing thousands of dollars, troops armed with advanced airburst grenades could ‘[d]o the same thing with a $25 round’ (Osborn, 2009).52 The lethality and ease of use of these systems may also attract attention from arms traffickers and their clients.53 Some systems are extremely accurate, require minimal training, and can be assembled and fired quickly, minimizing the risk of capture. Someone with minimal training in mortars could accurately direct a salvo of GPS-aided 120 mm mortar bombs filled with sub-munitions at a highly populated area from up to 11 km away (Bonomo et al., 2007, pp. 71–75). Similarly, since the Individual Airburst Weapon System automatically programmes its grenades to explode at the optimal distance from the target, ‘the operator need only follow two steps to hit the target’ (Bonomo et al., 2007, p. 13). Ironically, the advanced technology that makes these weapons and ammunition so lethal may also render them more controllable. A 2007 RAND report identifies several technical controls that, when applied to the guidance and warhead arming systems used in these weapons, would limit the duration and location in which they could be used (Bonomo et al., 2007, pp. 87–96). If widely adopted and combined with strong transfer controls and robust stockpile security, technical controls could curb the illicit trade in next-generation light weapons ammunition.

9ED9BKI?ED This chapter has sought to fill some of the gaps in our understanding of the authorized trade in small arms and light weapons ammunition—an important component of the wider trade in small arms and light weapons and potentially a key means of restricting the fuel of armed violence. To this end, the chapter provides a thorough overview of existing data on ammunition transfers while also estimating the value of transfers that are not reflected in data submitted to UN Comtrade. UN Comtrade data reveals that the annual documented trade in small arms ammunition for 2007 was worth approximately USD 1.6 billion, with small-calibre cartridges and parts accounting for USD 960 million and shotgun shells and parts accounting for USD 641 million. Given the large number of countries reporting on small arms ammunition in 2007, it is likely that these figures reflect most transfers worldwide. Nonetheless, several exporting and importing states do not submit data on transfers of small-calibre cartridges to UN Comtrade. This undocumented trade was estimated to be worth approximately USD 169 million in 2007.

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The international trade in light weapons ammunition is significantly less transparent than the trade in small arms ammunition. As explained above, data on transfers of light weapons ammunition in UN Comtrade and in most arms export reports is aggregated with data on other items, rendering it useless for the purposes of this chapter. Therefore, this study uses data from other sources to assess the annual trade in light weapons ammunition, whose value is estimated to be USD 2.5 billion. The combined estimate of USD 4.3 billion for authorized small arms and light weapons ammunition transfers (documented and undocumented) confirms that the previous estimate of USD 4 billion for transfers of all small arms and light weapons, their parts, accessories, and ammunition was a significant underestimate.54 This new figure for ammunition transfers remains an estimate due to the continuing lack of detailed import and export data, particularly with regard to light weapons ammunition. However, the barriers to improved understanding of the international trade in small arms and light weapons ammunition transfers are not insurmountable. The use of public procurement data in this study has filled significant gaps in our knowledge, and the authors have presented a method by which this data can be used to extrapolate a more complete picture of global imports. This method can be refined and improved through future research. Even modest improvements in government reporting on ammunition transfers and information sharing between governments, industry, and civil society could yield large dividends in our understanding of how much ammunition is being acquired and by whom. Given the critical role ammunition plays in initiating and sustaining armed violence, is it not time to bring it out of the shadows?

B?IJ E< 788H;L?7J?EDI ATK

Alliant Techsystems

EDA

European Defence Agency

European Union

NISAT

Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers

STK

Singapore Technologies Kinetics

TED

Tenders Electronic Daily (database)

UN Comtrade

United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database

WTO

World Trade Organization

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This annexe provides UN Comtrade data on transfers of small arms and light weapons from major importers in 2007.

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This annexe provides a detailed summary of the methodology used in Chapter 1, ‘Emerging from Obscurity: The Global Ammunition Trade’.

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As reported, on site, to James Bevan, Small Arms Survey, immediately after the firefight.

Consequently, there have been relatively few studies assessing the authorized trade in ammunition. Glatz (2006) is a rare exception.

See, for example, Glatz (2006, pp. 70–71), which analyses UN Comtrade to account for approximately USD 700 million in small arms ammunition transfers annually in 1999–2003.

This chapter uses the term ‘Western’ to refer to all members of the European Union, Norway, Switzerland, the United States, Canada, and Australia.

For additional information, see the online annexes to this chapter (major exporter and importer tables for 2007).

The definition of ‘small arms’ and ‘light weapons’ used by the Group of Experts is the same as the commonly used definition in the 1997 Report of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms (UNGA, 1997).

The overwhelming majority of records reported by UN Comtrade and used in this chapter concern cartridges below 12.7 mm. Yet because international standard customs categories do not have a definitive calibre threshold, it is possible that some 14.5 mm and 20 mm or larger cartridges may be included in the data, particularly cartridges used in (crew-portable) machine guns and a few models of anti-materiel rifles. For the purposes of this chapter, cartridges that are often or solely used in heavy machine guns and anti-materiel rifles—often defined as light weapons—are treated as small arms ammunition because customs data on these items is not disaggregated from ammunition for small arms.

Parts and components of small arms ammunition include bullets, shot, cartridge bases, cups, linings, wads, and cases. Propellants are considered in passing because transfer data from UN Comtrade does not disaggregate propellants for small arms, light weapons, major conventional weapons, and uses unconnected to weaponry.

A similar rationale for excluding cannon as a light weapon is provided in Small Arms Survey (2008, p. 10, box 1.2).

An example is the M72 light anti-armour weapon.

Also excluded are rockets that are crew-portable but that were designed for use in systems not typically categorized as light weapons.

For more information on UN Comtrade, including its limitations, see Small Arms Survey (2009, p. 10).

This data is not without its vagaries and limitations, however, as discussed in Khakee (2005).

See Annexe 1.3 for a full list of sources.

The Governments of Ireland (Department of Defence) and Sweden were particularly forthcoming. Both provided detailed information on light weapons ammunition procurement in recent years and promptly responded to multiple queries about the data. Detailed data was also provided by the UK government in response to a freedom of information request.

See Annexe 1.3 for a full list of sources.

National defence covers one of the two paragraphs in Article XXIII of the WTO Agreement, which deals with exemptions; the EU regulations on public procurement have a specific exemption for arms, munitions, and war material intended for military purposes (European Union, 1997).

National arms exports include information EU states have contributed to the EU Annual Report on military exports (CoEU, 2009).

For the 2010 Barometer, which covers export activity for 2008, major importers and exporters were identified using data for 2007 and 2008.

For an in-depth analysis, see Lazarevic (2010a).

Correspondence with US military official, October 2009.

According to The New York Times, the Albanian government received USD 22 per 1,000 rounds of the ageing ammunition (Chivers, 2008). Note that this estimate is from a single source.

For more information, see Marsh (2005) and Khakee (2005, pp. 98–99).

See Annexe 1.3 for a full list of sources.

Data on the unnamed African country was provided on the condition of anonymity. Data on France was taken from Gobinet (2009).

Data on Sweden was not included because it only reflects imports, not full procurement (i.e. domestic procurement and imports).

Data on armed force size and military spending was taken from IISS (2009), SIPRI (2009), and CIA (n.d.). See Annexe 1.3 for full bibliographical references.

7KJ>EH?P;: JH7DI<;HI )-

Extrapolation is not possible because of reasons such as the shift in the types and quantities of light weapons that would be procured as armed force size increased from one appropriate only for defensive purposes to one that could be used for fighting offensive wars.

Some countries were omitted from the estimate because of a lack of data on armed force size or military expenditure. It is highly unlikely that these countries account for a significant portion of global transfers. For more information, see Annexe 1.3.

Conflict status was determined using data from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al., 2002); Harbom, Melander, and Wallensteen (2008); and The Military Balance 2009 (IISS, 2009). Production capacity was determined from data in Jane’s Infantry Weapons 2007–2008 (Jones and Ness, 2007) and the Small Arms Survey 2008 (Small Arms Survey, 2008). Full references are provided in Annexe 1.3.

The following text on small arms ammunition production is drawn from author communication with Pierre Gobinet, consultant to the Small Arms Survey, August 2009.

Some facilities may be dormant or closed by their owners.

This graph differs from Glatz (2006) as Glatz did not use parts of shotgun cartridges (UN Comtrade code 930629).

Taiwan is not permitted to report to Comtrade under UN regulations. Analysis of its national customs data (see Annexe 1.3) indicates that the figure for exports of small-calibre cartridges presented in this chapter is not likely to be an underestimate.

Israel did submit data on its small-calibre cartridge transfers to UN Comtrade in 2008, however.

Apparent discrepancies in Tables 1.5–1.10 concerning the percentage of world trade are due to rounding.

UN Comtrade category 930629 also includes air gun pellets, though these comprise a small part of the trade.

These countries were selected because they had more than 1,000 battle deaths in 2007 according to the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al., 2002; Harbom, Melander, and Wallensteen, 2008).

While even unguided munitions are guided in the sense of physics/ballistics, the terms ‘guided’ and ‘unguided’ are frequently used to distinguish weapons/munitions that can have their trajectories amended after launch (the former) from those that cannot (the latter).

These findings coincide with those of an earlier study in Brauer (2000) concerning conventional weapons production.

These countries are France, Italy, Latvia, Slovakia, and the United Kingdom.

For a theoretical explanation, see Brauer (2007).

SPARCS stands for Soldier Parachute Aerial Reconnaissance Camera System.

Interview with STK representative, Washington, DC, October 2009.

Author interviews with key informants.

Many of the bombs were reportedly defective and the entire order was ultimately returned to the manufacturer, according to Jane’s Information Group (Karniol, 2001).

A good example is the replacement of sulphur with sugar in smoke grenades to make them more environmentally friendly and less irritating to troops (Taylor, 2007).

See Small Arms Survey (2008, p. 27) for more information on guided mortars.

The Convention on Cluster Munitions bans the use, development, production, transfer, and stockpiling of any munition containing submunitions

Israeli developers of a new ‘smart’ grenade estimate that it would cost about twice as much as a conventional grenade but would be as effective

unless it dispenses flares, chaff, smoke, pyrotechnics, produces ‘electrical or electronic effects’, or possesses specific characteristics (CCM, 2008). as five such grenades (JM&R, 2005). 52

Osborn cites US Col. Douglas Tamilio.

Available evidence suggests that most of the light weapons ammunition entering the black market has been technologically unsophisticated and inexpensive.

See Small Arms Survey (2009, p. 7).

8?8B?E=H7F>O ASDNews (Aerospace & Defense News). 2009. ‘ST Engineering Secures Eur 8 M 40mm Ammunition Export Contract.’ 27 April. ATK (Alliant Techsystems, Inc.). n.d.a. ‘Small-Caliber Ammunition.’ Accessed 12 January 2010. <http://www.atk.com/customer_solutions_armamentsystems/cs_as_ma_sc.asp> —. n.d.b. ‘Individual Airburst Weapon System (IAWS).’ Accessed 12 January 2010. <http://www.atk.com/Customer_Solutions_MissionSystems/cs_ms_w_fp_IAWS.asp>

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Beresford, David. 2008. ‘Chinese Ship Carries Arms Cargo to Mugabe Regime: 77-tonne Load Includes Mortars, Rockets, and Millions of Ammunition Rounds.’ Guardian. 18 April. Berman, Eric G. 2007. Illicit Trafficking of Small Arms in Africa: Increasingly a Home-Grown Problem. Paper presented at the GTZ–OECD–UNECA Expert Consultation of the Africa Partnership Forum Support Unit. 14 March. <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/33/25/38647866.pdf> Bevan, James and Stéphanie Pézard. 2006. ‘Basic Characteristics of Ammunition: From Handguns to MANPADS.’ In Stéphanie Pézard and Holger Anders, eds., pp. 17–45. Bonomo, James, et al. 2007. Stealing the Sword: Limiting Terrorist Use of Advanced Conventional Weapons. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation. Brauer, Jurgen. 2000. ‘Potential and Actual Arms Production: Implications for the Arms Trade Debate.’ Defence and Peace Economics, Vol. 11, No. 5, pp. 461–80. —. 2007. ‘Arms Industries, Arms Trade, and Developing Countries.’ In Todd Sander and Keith Hartley, eds. Handbook of Defense Economics, Vol. 2. Amsterdam: Elsevier. CCM (Convention on Cluster Munitions). 2008. Dublin, 30 May. <http://www.clusterconvention.org> Chivers, C. J. 2008. ‘Supplier Under Scrutiny on Arms for Afghans.’ The New York Times. 27 March. CIA (Central Intelligence Agency). n.d. The World Factbook. Accessed 30 August 2009. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/> CoEU (Council of the European Union). 2008. Tenth Annual Report according to Operative Provision 8 of the European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports. Accessed 12 January 2010. <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=1484&lang=en> —. 2009. Eleventh Annual Report according to Article 8(2) of Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP Defining Common Rules Governing Control of Exports of Military Technology and Equipment. 2009/C 265/01. <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2009:265:FULL:EN:PDF> COGR (Committee on Oversight and Government Reform). 2008. The AEY Investigation. Washington, DC: COGR, US House of Representatives. 24 June. <http://domex.nps.edu/corp/files/govdocs1/152/152208.pdf> Davis, Anthony. 2005. ‘Nepal Buys Ammunition from China, Pakistan.’ Jane’s Defense Weekly. 5 October. DID (Defense Industrial Daily). 2009. ‘South Africa’s Denel Forced Into Strategic Shift.’ 23 July. <http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/south-africas-denel-forced-into-strategic-shift-01200> European Union. 1997. Treaty Establishing the European Community (Consolidated Version 1997). Article 296. <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:12002E296:EN:NOT> Forecast International. 2008. ‘Mortar Ammunition (International).’ Ordnance & Munitions Forecast. November. Glatz, Anne-Kathrin. 2006. ‘Buying the Bullet: Authorized Small Arms Ammunition Transfers.’ In Stéphanie Pézard and Holger Anders, eds. Gleditsch, Nils Petter, et al. 2002. ‘Armed Conflict 1946–2001: A New Dataset.’ Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 39, No. 5, pp. 615–37. Gobinet, Pierre. 2009. Small Arms and Light Weapons Ammunition in France: An Initial Survey of Ammunition Manufacturing, Procurement, Allocation, and Transfers by French Law Enforcement and Military Services. Unpublished background paper. Geneva: Small Arms Survey. August. Harbom, Lotta, Erik Melander, and Peter Wallensteen. 2008. ‘Dyadic Dimensions of Armed Conflict, 1946−2007.’ Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 45, No. 5, pp. 697–710. IISS (International Institute of Strategic Studies). 1997. The Military Balance 1997/98. London: Routledge. —. 1998. The Military Balance 1998/99. London: Oxford University Press. —. 1999. The Military Balance 1999–2000. London: Oxford University Press. —. 2000. The Military Balance 2000–2001. London: Oxford University Press. —. 2001. The Military Balance 2001–2002. London: Oxford University Press. —. 2002. The Military Balance 2002–2003. London: Oxford University Press. —. 2003. The Military Balance 2003–2004. London: Oxford University Press. —. 2004. The Military Balance 2004–2005. London: Oxford University Press. —. 2005. The Military Balance 2005–2006. London: Routledge. —. 2007. The Military Balance 2007. London: Routledge. —. 2008. The Military Balance 2008. London: Routledge. —. 2009. The Military Balance 2009. London: Routledge. JM&R (Jane’s Missiles and Rockets). 2005. ‘Israel Develops ‘Smart’ Grenade.’ 1 April. Jones, Richard and Leland Ness. 2007. Jane’s Infantry Weapons 2007–2008. Coulsdon, Surrey: Jane’s Information Group Limited. Karniol, Robert. 2001. ‘More Bombs from Vietnam for Myanmar.’ Jane’s Defense Weekly. 25 July. —. 2007. ‘Sri Lanka Chooses New Company to Supply Ammunition.’ Jane’s Defense Weekly. 30 May.

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Khakee, Anna. 2005. ‘Reaching for the Big Picture: An Update on Small Arms Transfers.’ In Small Arms Survey. Small Arms Survey 2005: Weapons at War. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 97–123. Kucera, Joshua. 2005. ‘US Army Aims to Create Guided Grenade.’ Jane’s Defense Weekly. 17 August. Lazarevic, Jasna. 2010a. Transparency Counts: Assessing State Reporting on Small Arms Transfers. Occasional Paper 25. Geneva: Small Arms Survey. —. 2010b. Small Arms Trade Transparency Barometer 2010. Unpublished background paper. Geneva: Small Arms Survey. Marsh, Nicholas. 2005. Accounting Guns: The Methodology Used in Developing Data Tables for the Small Arms Survey. Unpublished background paper. Geneva: Small Arms Survey. Minnick, Wendell. 2009. ‘Singapore Pushes to Dominate 40mm Grenade Market.’ Defense News. 19 February. Osborn, Kris. 2009. ‘U.S. Army Testing New Small Arms.’ Defense News. 7 April. Persi Paoli, Giacomo. 2009. Analysis of the Italian Procurement, Export, and Consumption of Small- and Large-Caliber Ammunition and Munitions. Unpublished background paper. Geneva: Small Arms Survey. 15 July. Pézard, Stéphanie and Holger Anders, eds. 2006. Targeting Ammunition: A Primer. Geneva: Small Arms Survey. Pyadushkin, Maxim. 2009. LWA Production, Procurement, and Export in the Russian Federation. Unpublished background paper. Geneva: Small Arms Survey. 6 November. Richardson, Doug. 2008. ‘IMI Joins Forces with Raytheon to Develop 120 mm Mortar Munition.’ Jane’s Missiles & Rockets, Vol. 12, No. 8. August. Sangraula, Bikash. 2006. ‘Conflict Dampens Nepal Vote.’ Christian Science Monitor. 8 February. SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute). 2009. SIPRI Yearbook 2009: Armaments, Disarmament, and International Security. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Small Arms Survey. 2006. Small Arms Survey 2006: Unfinished Business. Oxford: Oxford University Press. —. 2008. Small Arms Survey 2008: Risk and Resilience. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. —. 2009. Small Arms Survey 2009: Shadows of War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Taylor, Keith. 2007. ‘Sugar-based Smoke in Colored Grenades Protects Soldiers, Environment.’ Army News Service. 3 May. UNGA (United Nations General Assembly). 1997. Report of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms. A/52/298 of 27 August. New York: UNGA. —. 1999. Report of the Group of Experts on the Problem of Ammunition and Explosives. A/54/155 of 29 June. New York: UNGA. US Army (United States Department of the Army). 2009. Committee Staff Procurement Backup Book, Fiscal Year (FY) 2010 Budget Estimates: Procurement of Ammunition, Army. <http://asafm.army.mil/Documents/OfficeDocuments/Budget/BudgetMaterials/FY10/pforms//ammo.pdf> WCO (World Customs Organization). n.d. Harmonized System V2. Accessed 12 January. <http://harmonizedsystem.wcoomdpublications.org> WTO (World Trade Organization). 1994. Agreement on Government Procurement. <http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gpr-94_e.pdf>

79ADEMB;:=;C;DJI Fh_dY_fWb Wkj^ehi Authorized transfers: Patrick Herron (Small Arms Survey), Nicolas Marsh (PRIO), Matt Schroeder (FAS) Small Arms Trade Transparency Barometer: Jasna Lazarevic (Small Arms Survey) 9edjh_Xkjehi

Authorized transfers: Ana Ivelisse Aviles, James Bevan, Pierre Gobinet, David Isenberg, Giacomo Persi Paoli, Maxim Pyadushkin Small Arms Trade Transparency Barometer: Thomas Jackson

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9edjhebb_d] 7_h JhWdifehj FH79J?9;" EFJ?EDI" 7D: 9>7BB;D=;I ?DJHE:K9J?ED In early 2006, the French and Belgian governments launched a joint initiative to prevent illicit trafficking of small arms by air. Reflecting growing concerns over the inadequacy or lack of regulations governing transportation agents—especially in the air aviation sector, which is central to much of the illicit small arms trade—the initiative rested on the claim that transport was the ‘weak link’ in the arms transfer chain, as the physical movement of weapons leaves traces—such as flight records and cargo and customs documents—that can be used to detect and stem illicit transfers.1 While the argument appears sound on paper, there is always a risk that new control frameworks ‘reinvent the wheel’ or are difficult to implement. This chapter steps back from the political debate to assess the strengths and weaknesses of current—and proposed—approaches to the regulation of arms and ammunition transport. It reviews existing laws, regulations, and procedures applicable to the transportation sector, focusing specifically on air transport. It is based on a study of control regimes in place at the international level and in 23 major small arms-exporting states.2 The chapter covers three main bodies of law: arms export legislation, customs laws, and civil aviation regulations.3 Its main conclusions include the following: s Concrete initiatives to control (air) transportation agents have been hampered by the debatable claim that the globalized nature of trade, the large number of economic actors, and the tendency to outsource arms transportrelated services to third parties make this unfeasible. s Arms transfer regimes in the majority of the world’s major exporting countries control transportation directly— through licensing—or indirectly—through the submission of transport information by exporters. s Customs rules and procedures can be used to trace fully the transport segment of an arms transfer. s Civil aviation rules are not specifically aimed at preventing arms trafficking. Many of their provisions, however, could be adapted to this goal, particularly those relating to aircraft registration and safety and security measures. s Existing rules governing arms exports, customs, and civil aviation could be used to tackle illicit weapons transport. Major obstacles in this regard include weak coordination and communication among the different spheres of control and divergent priorities. s The successful thwarting of small arms trafficking by air will require engaging a much wider spectrum of actors, including customs officials and civil aviation authorities, not only at the policy-making level, but also through monitoring and enforcement. The chapter starts with a brief description of a legal arms transfer scheme, highlighting its typical processes and actors, including transportation agents. The second section provides an overview of the political debate on transportation

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and illicit small arms transfers, and a detailed account of the French–Belgian initiative. The third section analyses existing international and national control regimes, including arms export controls, customs rules and procedures, and civil aviation regulations. This section shows that an extensive body of rules exists to control transportation agents, which could help prevent illicit small arms trafficking. Nevertheless, effective implementation for such purposes requires overcoming several practical and political hurdles, among them the divergent goals of authorities in charge of issuing arms transfer licences, enforcing customs regulations, and applying civil aviation rules.

7HCI JH7DI<;HI 7D: JH7DIFEHJ7J?ED * Arms deals are complex transactions that involve a multitude of actors—each with specific roles and responsibilities— along with several states and applicable control regimes. In basic terms, these transactions can be described as involving an exporter, importer, transportation companies, and, potentially, one or more transit countries. In practice, however, many other actors are involved. They include the following: Brokers are frequently used by producing or exporting companies and governments. They may be in charge of facilitating one or more aspects of the arms transfer, such as the initial identification of buyers and sources of weapons and the organization of transportation and financing.

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Freight forwarders are agents contracted by the exporter. Usually specialized in the organization of the shipment of the goods, they may take charge of several services, including the preparation of export and shipping documents, the booking of cargo space, and the collection of freight. Transportation agents may be thought of as ‘carriers’, companies that physically move goods—by air, land, or sea (AI and TransArms, 2006, p. 2, table). In a broader sense, they have been defined as ‘agents involved in arrangements for the transportation of the arms and associated goods, and include shipping agents and brokers, freight forwarders

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and charterers’ (UN, 2001, p. 24). The legal systems analysed in this chapter tend to define the term ‘transportation agent’ broadly, encompassing not only those responsible for physically moving arms—air carriers and ships, for instance—but also third parties in charge of the organization of transportation. Warehousing and handling agents are companies responsible for the storage of arms and their handling, especially during transit or transhipment.5 Table 2.1 offers an overview of the arms transfer process, including relevant actors, authorities, and documentation.6 One of the reasons why arms transfers are very complex is the overlap of roles among the various actors involved. For example, there may be a significant overlap between the activities of a broker and those of a freight forwarder, or between those of a freight forwarder and transportation companies. As a result, there may be confusion as to who is legally responsible for which stage of the arms transfer. 9ecfWd_[i

Another source of complexity stems from the plurality of legal frameworks that typically govern an arms transfer.

jhWdifehj_d] Whci Applicable rules tend to be a complicated combination of regimes established by the various countries concerned— Wh[ e\j[d _dlebl[Z those of origin, transit, and destination. Although international standards exist, the prevailing legal reality is one of _d j^[ i^_ff_d] e\ diversity among the countries involved in a transfer. Such complexity is not unique to the arms trade sector, but arms ej^[h ]eeZi$

traffickers can use it to obfuscate the chain of responsibility in an illicit transfer. Absent safety measures that may be needed, the transportation of small arms does not present particular logistical challenges. Materiel can be shipped in large quantities and in different types of containers; it may also be transported together with other goods on commercial ships and aircraft (AI and TransArms, 2006, p. 30). The choice of mode of transportation will depend—for small arms, as for any other goods—on the combination of exporter/importer needs, cost, and the destination. While transportation by sea is cheaper and allows for the movement of sizeable cargoes, air transfers will be favoured when ‘difficult’ places must be reached—including zones of conflict and embargoed recipients. The willingness of some air companies to take on an illicit consignment of arms, provided the pay is good, increases the likelihood that transportation by air will be the chosen means for an illicit arms deal. The transportation of small arms is usually integrated with that of other commercial goods. By the same token, companies that transport small arms will often be involved in the shipping of other goods. In fact, a recent study indicates that some of the companies involved in the illicit transfer of small arms have also been contracted by government agencies for the transport of humanitarian goods (Griffiths and Bromley, 2009). Commercial flows of small arms are thus not part of a discrete regime that can be easily controlled or restricted—a situation that is exploited by arms traffickers. While this does not preclude effective counter-measures to curb arms trafficking, it does call for more than the mere regulation of arms transfers in isolation.

J>; FEB?J?97B :;87J; J^[ [Whbo icWbb Whci Z[XWj[ WdZ j^[ =hekf e\ =el[hdc[djWb ;nf[hji ed Xhea[h_d] The role of transportation in the delivery of weapons to illicit users and destinations has been a central element of the small arms debate since its very beginning. As early as 1997, the first Panel of Governmental Experts’ report on small arms noted that the illicit supply of weapons was ‘characterized by a lack of transparency that is due to the

7?H JH7DIFEHJ *+

characteristics of small arms and light weapons which can be easily concealed during transport’ (UN, 1997, para. 52). The same report pointed to the use of ships with ‘bogus registration and flags of convenience’ as a typical means of illicitly transferring small arms (para. 53). Nevertheless, discussions regarding the role of transportation agents in illicit arms deals mainly developed as part of the debate on controlling arms brokering activities. Since 2001—with the publication of the first report by the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on small arms brokering (UN, 2001)—transportation has been defined as an ‘associated’ (or ‘related’) activity of intermediation, together with such activities as the financing of arms deals. Arguments in favour of more—or more stringent—controls on transportation have been a constant feature of this debate, albeit treated as a ‘corollary’ to the central issue of intermediation and brokerage. In fact, for at least ten years, such arguments have been effectively trumped by the claim that the nature of the transportation business— globalized and transnational, with outsourcing to third parties on the increase—makes it impossible to enforce state controls effectively.7 The elements of the transportation question that are central to current research and political action were all contained in the 2001 GGE report. Based on evidence that transportation agents play a key role in transferring small arms in violation of United Nations (UN) Security Council arms embargoes (UN, 2001, para. 69), the GGE proposed several options for control. These included: s penalizing actors that take part in the transport of weapons to embargoed destinations (para. 70); s establishing an additional licensing process for the transport of arms by air, in addition to that applying to arms exports (para. 71); s requiring the broker to disclose the names of agents, airlines, and routes used in a particular arms deal (para. 73); and s encouraging industry to adopt a code of conduct with undertakings to provide full information on cargoes and flight plans relating to an arms shipment, and not to ship arms to destinations where they ‘could be used in conflict, etc.’ (para. 74). In some sense, the GGE report took one step forwards and two back, as it coupled these proposals for control with counter-arguments that proved powerful in the debate on the issue for the following years. For example, when discussing the possible introduction of an additional ‘layer’ of licensing applicable to air transport, the GGE emphasized that this would sit uneasily with the ‘short deadlines’ typical of the airline industry (para. 72). On the other hand, such observations sought to strike a balance between security and trade considerations, a goal seldom pursued in recent transport control efforts. The GGE also considered the possibility of focusing on the effective implementation of existing legal frameworks rather than on the creation of new rules. Based on ‘international agreements and domestic legislation already available to control the airline industry’, the report underlined the need for: s verifying flight plans, particularly those of cargo aircraft on ad hoc charters, at the points of departure and transit; s comparing end-use documentation submitted at the time of the export licence application with landing permits or certificates issued by the importing state; s encouraging and assisting national administrations in the enforcement of existing civil aviation regulations, for instance those governing the certification of individual aircraft and airlines (para. 75).

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While some regional instruments following the 2001 UN small arms conference provided for the control of transportation agents, at the UN level the question remained largely in the shadows. The two major global instruments for the control of small arms—the UN Programme of Action and the Firearms Protocol—make no mention of the control of transportation agents. Indeed, this gap in the Programme of Action is one of the main reasons behind the French–Belgian initiative.8 The most significant UN process on small arms brokering to date—the second brokering GGD—resulted in a report that treated the question of transportation only tangentially (UN, 2007). The document lists transport and freight forwarding among: activities closely associated with brokering in small arms and light weapons that do not necessarily in themselves constitute brokering [but that] might be undertaken by brokers as part of the process of putting a deal together to gain a benefit (para. 10).9 The 2007 GGE report does not contain any specific recommendations for the control of transportation, although it notes that national brokering legislation may provide for: the control of financial, transport and other services when these are arranged or facilitated by a broker as an integral part of a small arms and light weapons transaction designed to benefit the broker (para. 46).

J^[ <h[dY^Å8[b]_Wd _d_j_Wj_l[ =beXWb _dijhkc[dji To date, the French–Belgian initiative represents the most concerted effort to prevent illicit small arms trafficking by ed icWbb Whci Ze air. Launched in early 2006, it is a response to the claim that around 80 per cent of small arms transfers in violation dej fhel_Z[ \eh of international arms embargoes are carried out using air transportation.10 j^[ Yedjheb e\ jhWdifehjWj_ed$

During the Security Council debate on small arms in March 2006, the French representative stated that, in the context of the crises dealt with by the Council: there is a crucial problem, a practical problem, that arises every time: the problem of the transport, including aerial transport, of small arms and light weapons (UNSC, 2006, p. 16). The problem, continued the French representative, was compounded by the absence or inconsistency of domestic regulations; the fluid connections between the legal and the illegal trade; and the unequal capacities of states to control their airspace. Emphasizing that, despite these challenges, the time to act had come, the representative proposed ‘a process of reflection on the various dimensions of this problem’ within ‘the framework of the European Union and in other contexts’ (UNSC, 2006, p. 16). The French government proposed tackling the transportation of illicit small arms as a way of dealing with the ‘weak link’ in the chain of illicit transfers; unlike brokering transactions, illicit transportation is likely to be reconstructed and potentially broken due to the ‘paper trail’ it inevitably leaves behind.11 This approach was also aimed at dealing with the lack of relevant provisions in the Programme of Action (UNSC, 2006, p. 16). From the start, the French–Belgian initiative followed a distinctly regional approach, with parallel tracks being pursued simultaneously within the European Union (EU), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA). The OSCE was the forum chosen for a first awareness-raising meeting on the issue of air traffic and small arms proliferation, held in Vienna on 21 March 2007. It was selected because

7?H JH7DIFEHJ *-

of its capacity to establish regional norms and because of its membership, which comprises some of the major small arms players. The meeting also allowed different economic and political actors to come together and debate the issue; participants included representatives from the International Air Traffic Association (IATA), the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), and the World Customs Organization (WCO) (OSCE–FSC, 2007). MWii[dWWh 7hhWd][c[dj X[ij fhWYj_Y[i

The first normative document to emerge from the French–Belgian initiative was adopted in 2007 by the Wassenaar Arrangement: the Best Practices to Prevent Destabilising Transfers of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) through J^[ \_hij dehcWj_l[ Air Transport (WA, 2007). The best practices (BP) cover air transport of small arms, ‘excluding those that are trans- ZeYkc[dj e\ j^[ ported by government, military or Government-chartered aircraft’, for which WA participating states ‘recognise that <h[dY^#8[b]_Wd they assume full responsibility’ (sec. 1).12 The core measures in the BP are aimed at enhancing WA members’ control _d_j_Wj_l[ mWi of air transport through additional requirements at the export licensing stage. In particular, the BP establish that, when WZefj[Z Xo j^[ issuing export licences, and before the actual export has taken place, a WA member may require information on: s the air carrier and freight forwarding agent involved in the transportation; s aircraft registration and flag; s the planned flight route, including stopovers; s records of previous similar transfers by air; s compliance with national and international norms relating to air transport of weapons (WA, 2007, sec. 2.1). Mindful of the fact that some of the requested information may not be available at the time of the export licence application (such as details on the transport route), the BP provide that states are entitled to condition the actual export of the material on the submission of such outstanding information (sec. 2.1). The BP also encourage Wassenaar participating states to exchange information relating to: exporters, air carriers, or agents that fail to provide requested information; ‘an identified destabilising attempt to export [small arms and light weapons] by air’; and planned exports that could ‘contribute to a destabilising accumulation’ or otherwise threaten the ‘security and stability of the region of destination’ (sec. 2.2). In addition, the BP envisage the provision by exporters of documentation confirming delivery at the intended destination (sec. 2.3) and the referral of cases of concern to ‘relevant national enforcement authorities’ (sec. 2.5). The BP were later adopted as ‘standard elements for implementation’ by the Forum for Security Co-operation of the OSCE (OSCE, 2008, p. 2). A questionnaire is annexed to the relevant decision, which OSCE members agreed to use to exchange information on national practices to prevent the proliferation of small arms through illicit air transport (OSCE, 2008, annex 2). J^[ ;K ijhWj[]o

In the context of the European Union, the French–Belgian initiative built on the Strategy to Combat Illicit Accumulation and Trafficking of SALW and Their Ammunition (CoEU, 2006). Adopted in December 2005, this document focuses on the small arms problem in parts of Latin America, Central and East Asia, the Balkans, the Middle East, and Africa. Up to that point, the EU’s small arms strategy was essentially based on reaction (such as through disarmament and peacekeeping), but the 2005 Strategy also calls for preventive measures to ‘tackle illegal supply’ and include ‘controls on exports of conventional weapons’ (para. 14). In addition, it urges members to pay greater attention to weapons

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stockpiles, particularly those in Eastern and South-east Europe, and to ‘the ways and means by which they are disseminated in Africa (illegal brokering and transport)’ (para. 14). Among its various recommendations for action, the EU Strategy emphasizes cross-border measures, including strengthened border controls—in particular air borders—in exporting and importing states (para. 20(a)). More specifically, it advocates: s programmes to provide equipment and assistance in drafting national legislation on export controls and to train institutions in the states of sub-Saharan Africa; s training programmes for customs departments and other agencies, in particular in Eastern European countries (para 20(a)). Within the EU, the Strategy calls for: implementation of the EU 2003 Common Position on the control of arms brokering; the establishment of mechanisms for the exchange of information on small arms trafficking networks, in particular for monitoring UN and EU arms embargoes; and the development of a counter-trafficking policy (illicit brokering and transport) using EU air, sea, and land space, together with new alert and cooperation mechanisms and Europe-wide police operations (para 20(a)). Within this framework, the French–Belgian initiative aimed to update and strengthen the EU Joint Situation Centre’s list of air cargo carriers of concern. First established in 2007, the list was intended as a way to exchange information on suspect air transportation companies among designated national contact points,13 and to bring this information to bear on EU states’ arms export licensing decisions. As of May 2009, however, efforts to strengthen and update the list, as pursued by the French and Belgian governments, had yielded few tangible improvements.14 In addition, during its presidency of the EU, the French government promoted the inclusion of language stressing the need to combat small arms proliferation in the Union’s cooperation agreements with third countries.15 Failure to comply with these clauses may now entail the suspension of relevant cooperation agreements (French MFA, n.d.). J^[ <h[dY^#8[b]_Wd

Overall, the French–Belgian initiative aims to prevent ‘sizeable’ small arms transfers in violation of international

_d_j_Wj_l[ jWh][ji arms embargoes. More specifically, it seeks to make states more transparent and responsible in this area through the cW_dbo Éi_p[WXb[Ê exchange of information between national authorities. The initiative implicitly encourages exporters to make greater jhWdi\[hi je use of state aircraft or state-contracted private companies, which would entail more protection for the contracted com[cXWh]e[Z panies and more responsibility for the state contracting them.16 The underlying idea is to curb the increased freedom h[Y_f_[dji$

enjoyed by private trade companies in the post-cold war era—a goal that arguably clashes with the reality of today’s globalized commodities markets, including small arms, and the pivotal role of private companies within these. The potential impact of the initiative is also likely to be limited by its restricted geographic and substantive scope. Proponents of the instruments adopted within the WA and the OSCE had intended them as the first step of an ‘incremental’ process that would lead to the adoption of similar, consensual arrangements by other regional bodies, which would eventually cover other modes of small arms transportation (maritime and land) as well.17 There are no signs of this occurring in the near future; the initiative seems to have lost momentum since the adoption of the Best Practices by the OSCE.18 Some of the measures proposed by the initiative also create practical problems of implementation as they do not adequately reflect certain trade realities. For instance, the Wassenaar and OSCE Best Practices request that information on aircraft registration and flag be submitted at the time of the export licence application. Yet, while the flag may be known at that time, ‘the registration will almost certainly not be’; in the ‘unlikely event’ it is known, the

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registration may change for technical or operational reasons.19 In some EU countries, the issuing of an export licence is made conditional on the later provision of information on transport modalities, which suggests that such a system is possible.20 The practicality of such measures is open to challenge by actors that would be called upon to implement them. Yet diplomatic discussions on the French–Belgian initiative were conducted without the meaningful involvement of customs and air industry organizations,21 despite initial signs that the process would be inclusive.22

J>; H;=KB7JEHO :?C;DI?ED A broader approach to the development of transfer controls—one involving all stakeholders and different spheres JhWdifehjWj_ed of regulation—would facilitate the identification of existing measures that could be harnessed to attain counter- W][dji Wh[ ikX`[Yj proliferation goals. As this section of the chapter shows, transportation agents—both general and specific to air je i[l[hWb dWj_edWb transportation—are subject to several control and monitoring measures at the national and international levels. While WdZ _dj[hdWj_edWb the priorities of each control regime may vary (such as customs vs. transfer licensing authorities) and do not typi- Yedjheb c[Wikh[i$ cally prioritize arms control, these regulations could be used to better effect in tackling the problem of illicit small arms transportation. Both internationally and domestically, at least three bodies of law are relevant for the control of small arms transportation. The first is represented by arms control regimes. At the national level, these comprise both trade controls—the laws and regulations governing the export, import, and transit of military equipment by or through a country—and the rules on the domestic possession and circulation of weapons. The second body of law is represented by customs controls, which establish—among other things—the information that must be provided when arms shipments cross national borders (imports, exports, and transits). Finally, as far as transportation by air is concerned, a third relevant body of law is represented by national and international civil aviation regulations.

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The secondary attention accorded the control of transportation activities in international initiatives on small arms is reflected in the near-total neglect of the issue in international and regional small arms agreements (legally binding or not). As mentioned above, neither the UN Programme of Action nor the UN Firearms Protocol addresses the issue. Transportation standards do exist at the international level, but only in relation to dangerous goods, which include ammunition. These are contained in the Model Regulations Elaborated by the Sub-committee of Experts on the Transport of Dangerous Goods of the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC, 2007). Applicable to all modes of transportation (air, rail, road, and sea), the Model Regulations include ‘principles of classification and definition of classes, listing of the principal dangerous goods, general packing requirements, testing procedures, marking, labelling or placarding, and transport documents’ (p. 1). While technically non-mandatory, the Regulations enjoy ‘worldwide acceptance’ (Berkol and Gramizzi, 2004, sec. 2). Regionally, provisions for the control of transportation can be found in a minority of documents dealing with small arms: the Nairobi Protocol (2004), the Organization of American States’ Model Regulations on brokering (OAS, 2003), and the Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS) Convention (ECOWAS, 2006).

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The Nairobi Protocol, which commits states parties to adopt national measures to control brokering activities, includes the regulation of small arms transporters through a system of licensing (Nairobi Protocol, 2004, art. 11). In the OAS Model Regulations, the control of transportation agents is effected through the definition of ‘brokering activities’, which include: transporting, freight-forwarding, [. . .] and delivering ﬁrearms, their parts or components or ammunition or any other act performed by a person, that lies outside the scope of his regular business activities and that directly facilitates the brokering activities (OAS, 2003, art. 1). The ECOWAS Convention, which also defines brokering as including the activity of weapons transportation, contains several specific provisions on the issue (ECOWAS, 2006, art. 1.8). When applying to the ECOWAS Executive Secretariat for an exemption to the Convention’s ban on small arms imports, states parties must include information on: the number and period of shipments, the

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routes including transit locations, the type of transport to be used, all companies involved in importing, freight forwarding and handling, details of the storage and management of the weapons whilst being transferred’ (art. 5.1.c). The Convention also mandates the inclusion in national registries of transport-related information for individual transactions (art. 9.2.e); the national registration of transportation agents (art. 20.1); and the inclusion of information on shippers, routes, and shipping points in brokering licence applications (art. 20.3). J^[ dWj_edWb Z_c[di_ed

Licensing. Within national arms export regimes, the control of transportation agents can be broadly divided into direct and indirect measures. In the first case, transportation companies are required to possess a written licence in order to transport weapons—either within the national territory or abroad, or both. In the second case, transportation companies do not need a licence to transport small arms; however, those who apply for an export licence must

7?H JH7DIFEHJ +'

provide information on transportation (such as companies involved and routes). The majority of the 23 countries analysed for the study have in place one or both forms of control, although these measures vary in their details. In eight countries a licence is required before a company may transport small arms (Bulgaria, China, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States). In the United States, transportation is included in the definition of brokering activities,23 which are subject to licensing, regardless of whether they are conducted on US territory. In Bulgaria, Germany, and the United Kingdom, the licensing requirement explicitly applies to nationals or residents transporting small arms between third countries; that is, it does not cover arms being transported from or to national territory. In Bulgaria, registration is also necessary for individuals and companies wishing to transport small arms. The latter must specify what military items are to be included in the authorization (Bulgaria, 2007a, art. 10(3).13). In Germany, the licensing requirement applies to all nationally registered ships and aircraft that are to transport war weapons—which include many classes of small arms—when they are loaded and unloaded outside federal territory and do not transit German territory (Germany, 1961, sec. 4(1)). In these cases, general licences may be granted ‘in or to certain regions’ (sec. 4(2)).24 In the United Kingdom, the transportation of category B weapons—including small arms—between third countries must be licensed in ‘limited circumstances’, including when the transfer relates to a country under embargo (UK, 2008, arts. 22(2), 22(4); UK, 2009, secs. 5, 7).25 Importantly, the explanatory note annexed to the law clarifies that drivers, pilots, and other individuals who provide services to transport contractors already subject to the controls are not ‘caught in their own right’ (UK, 2008). Authorization of the transportation of category B weapons between third countries can take the form of general licences for transfers towards specified lists of countries provided certain conditions are met (UK, 2008, sec. 8). In other cases—including all transfers to embargoed destinations—individual licences are necessary.

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In the five other countries mentioned above, all transportation of military goods must be licensed. For example, in the Czech Republic, a five-year licence is needed to transport military firearms (Czech Republic, 2002, sec. 31). The competent police directorate (sec. 32(1)) issues it only to those in possession of a trade licence (sec. 33(a)) and on the basis of an application, which is to specify the categories of arms in which the business deals (sec. 32(2)). An individual transport licence is also necessary for each case of export, import, and transit. For arms falling in the categories A–C, the relevant police directorate grants the licence based on an application that must be accompanied by the export/import authorization (sec. 50(1)).26 The authorization contains information on the quantity of arms that are the object of the transfer (50.2.d) as well as on the types and means of transport, the carrier, and the dates of dispatch and takeover, unless the transfer occurs between ‘businessmen or entrepreneurs dealing in arms and/or ammunition’ (sec. 50(2)f–g). The police issues a one-off document that must contain the above information and accompany the goods (sec. 50.3). A licence is also needed to transport non-military small arms from and to EU states (Czech Republic, 2005a, art. 1(3); 2005b). The licence application must include the name, quantity or volume, and additional specifications of the product (2005a, art. 2(2)(c)); customs tariff code (art. 2(2)(d)); information on the manufacturer, the foreign partner, the end user (art. 2(2)(e–g)); and the purpose of the transport (art. 2(2)(i)). The decision to grant the licence may contain the names of the states through which the goods are authorized to transit as well as information on the international contracting partner and on the end user (art. 4(2)). In some cases, provisions regulating the transit of arms through a country’s territory 7 ceX_b[ N#hWo cWY^_d[ ki[Z \eh iYh[[d_d] YWh]e Wj Be]Wd 7_hfehj" 8eijed" EYjeX[h (&&)$ :ek]bWi CY<WZZ%=[jjo ?cW][i

have direct relevance to the control of transportation agents. For example, in Japan,

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transit licences must be obtained by transportation companies themselves—as opposed to the exporter or importer (Japan METI, n.d.). Similarly, transportation companies resident or domiciled in Switzerland may request a general authorization for the transit of war materiel to a specified list of end users (Switzerland, 1998, art. 9e.2). In other countries, transit is controlled by means of a licensing requirement, but it is unclear which party to the transaction must obtain the authorization to move the weapons. For instance, in Finland, the transit of military equipment, defined as the ‘transport through Finnish territory into a third country’, must be authorized by an export licence (Finland, 1990, sec. 2.1). As mentioned above, an indirect form of control on transportation agents takes place through the provision of I[l[hWb Yekdjh_[i information on transport in conjunction with the application for an export or transit licence. While several of the h[gk[ij _d\ehcWj_ed countries under review require such information to be submitted at the time of the export licence application, the ed jhWdifehjWj_ed requisite details and the relative stringency of these provisions vary greatly. For example, in Belgium, licensing Wj j^[ [nfehj authorities may request that information on transport modalities, customs office of clearance, and day, hour, and b_Y[di_d] ijW][$ place of exit from Belgian territory be submitted at least three days before the actual export takes place (Belgium, 1993, art. 9). In the case of transportation by air, the information includes all stopovers (art. 10.2). The wording of the law indicates that the submission of such information is not always required, but is instead subject to a case-bycase decision of the licensing authorities. Similar, non-mandatory requirements are in place in Canada, Italy, and South Africa. In Italy, the law expressly stipulates that arms export applications must contain a copy of any existing contract relating to the transportation and financing of the deal (Italy, 1990, art. 11.3.b). Nevertheless, the provision of such a contract is not a condition for the issuance of the licence.27 Generally speaking, in Italy arms exporters are responsible for the accuracy of the information provided by transportation companies and carriers and for any variation that occurs during the transfer. Exporters have the obligation to store relevant documents for ten years (art. 19.1).28 Conversely, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, France, Portugal, Spain, and the United States all require that information on transportation be included in any export licence application. This must include: details on forwarders/carriers; points of loading/unloading (also abroad); points of entry/exit in the national territory; modes of transportation; approximate date of delivery; and transit countries.29 Record-keeping. In eight of the states under review, transportation companies, exporters, or both are required to keep records of their transactions together with associated documentation (such as airway bills and transportation contracts). In Bulgaria, China, and South Africa, information kept by individuals and companies is also entered in central registers. In China and Spain, such records must be kept by exporters; however, requested details also cover transportation. In China these records specifically cover small arms transfers and include information on importing countries, end users, shippers, transporters, means of transport and number of shipments, shipping manifests, product model, quantity shipped, and label numbers. These records are consolidated and retained on a long-term basis in national registers (China, 2008, p. 11).30 In Singapore, relevant companies operating with ‘bulk permits’ may be asked to submit reports that include information on the final recipients (Singapore, 2004, art. 7). In the United States, annual reporting of brokering activities is mandatory (US, 2009, sec. 129.9).31 Safety and security measures. Six of the countries under review provide for safety measures relating either to the conditions that must be respected when transporting weapons or to secure storage. For instance, in France, safety measures apply to all transportation of weapons in specified categories—including firearms—regardless of whether

+* IC7BB 7HCI IKHL;O (&'&

their transfer is subject to a licence. The external packaging containing the weapons shipment must not identify the nature of the contents (France, 1995, art. 60.1). Firearms themselves must be transported in two separate consignments: on the one hand, the actual arms, from which security components have been removed, and, on the other, the security components, with an interval of at least 24 hours between the two shipments (France, 1995, art. 60.2).32 In the United Kingdom, transit of goods must comply with the following security rules: (a) the goods in question remain on board a vessel or aircraft for the entire period that they remain in the United Kingdom or are goods on a through bill of lading or through air waybill and in any event are exported before the end of the period of 30 days beginning with the date of their importation; (b) the destination of the goods in question following exportation from the United Kingdom has been determined in the country from which they were originally exported prior to their original exportation in connection with the transaction which has given rise to transit or transhipment and has not been changed prior to their exportation from the United Kingdom, or the goods are being returned to that country; and (c) the goods in question were exported from that country in accordance with any laws or regulations relating to the exportation of goods applying there at the time of exportation of the goods (UK, 2008, art. 17(4)).33 Criminalization. The violation of arms transfer regimes, including provisions on weapons transport, is criminalized in all of the countries reviewed in this chapter, with penalties commonly including both fines and imprisonment. States also generally distinguish between ‘serious’ violations, treated as criminal offences, and administrative violations, usually entailing fines.34

9kijeci bWmi WdZ fheY[Zkh[i 9kijeci e\\_Y_Wbi Customs laws, regulations, and procedures apply to the control of arms transportation in several ways. First, they ^Wl[ j^[ WZlWdjW][ establish the rules that must be followed when goods—including arms—cross international borders. Among these are e\ j^[ f^oi_YWb rules governing what must be declared, how, and by whom. As the analysis below shows, in the majority of states fhen_c_jo je j^[ under review customs procedures require the submission of information that—if provided in full—would allow for jhWdi\[hh[Z ]eeZi$

the complete tracing of the transportation chain. Second, all national regimes establish rules whereby customs authorities are entitled to search shipments and retain or seize goods that are transferred in violation of relevant national laws. Unlike licensing authorities, customs officials have the advantage of the physical proximity to the transferred goods, enabling them to effectively monitor and stop illicit activities. That said, in practice customs authorities tend to focus on imports, rather than exports or transits, which undermines their potential advantage compared to transfer licensing authorities. J^[ _dj[hdWj_edWb Z_c[di_ed

The World Customs Organization is the only intergovernmental organization with competence in customs issues outside the EU.35 Its areas of activity include the development of common standards, relating in particular to: the harmonization of customs procedures; ensuring the security and facilitation of trade supply chains; and building the capacity of national customs authorities. In 2002, the WCO issued two recommendations directly relating to small arms and light weapons. The first proposed the insertion, in national statistical nomenclatures, of small arms-related sub-headings. This measure, agreed following

7?H JH7DIFEHJ ++

the adoption of the UN Firearms Protocol, was aimed at facilitating monitoring and control through the creation of a more detailed classification system for firearms (WCO, 2002b). Based on the acknowledgement that ‘effective controls on the legitimate movements of firearms are essential in order to distinguish illicit movements’ (WCO, 2002b, preamble), the second recommendation listed a series of measures aimed at facilitating the implementation of the Firearms Protocol. These included: s adopting the statistical nomenclature proposed by the WCO Harmonized System Committee in order to facilitate the monitoring and control of Firearms Protocol items; s allowing customs declarations and supporting documentation to be submitted to customs authorities prior to shipment; s verifying that appropriate authorizations are available or in place at the time the items are presented for import, export, or transit; s verifying the authenticity of licensing or authorization documents for the import, export, or transit of the items; s implementing appropriate security measures for the import, export, and transit of the items (such as security checks on temporary storage, warehouses, and means of transport), and vetting persons involved in these operations;

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s considering designating specific offices or sites for processing shipments of items covered by the Firearms Protocol _d\ehcWj_ed ed Whci in order to enhance control over their transborder movement;

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s broadening information exchanges, increasing cooperation between law enforcement agencies, and promoting j^hek]^ Ykijeci the use of specialized systems and techniques in their jurisdictions (WCO, 2002a). The WCO also helps standardize customs procedures for ‘risk assessment’. The large volume of goods traded worldwide makes the physical inspection of all shipments impossible, even in countries with abundant financial, technical, and human resources. As a consequence, physical inspections are carried out based on an assessment of the potential risk that a given consignment may contain illicit goods. The WCO has developed indicators for these assessment procedures, including some for the identification of illicit small arms and light weapons.36 The WCO also has mechanisms and resources designed to facilitate the exchange of information between different national customs authorities. Potentially, these mechanisms could be used to exchange information on illicit small arms transfers although, as discussed below, member states have tended to prioritize responding to other security risks. Finally, the non-binding nature of WCO recommendations constitutes an obstacle to enforcing compliance by member states.37 J^[ dWj_edWb Z_c[di_ed

Most states have adopted customs procedures for goods entering or exiting their territory that are useful for the control of arms transportation in that they tend to require the submission of information on the physical movement of weapons. The EU has established customs procedures applicable to its members, including those contained in the Single Administrative Document (SAD). The SAD is a standard customs declaration form that is used for trade with third countries and for the movement of non-EU goods within the EU. Since 1987, it also applies to the European Free Trade Association countries Iceland, Norway, and Switzerland and to trade between these countries and the EU (EC, n.d.j). The SAD was created with several goals in mind, including the harmonization of administrative procedures and documentation, the promotion of openness in relevant national requirements, and the standardization of data submitted

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during customs procedures (EC, n.d.l). The Document, which must be filled out in eight copies, indicates the information that must be declared to customs in the context of any international transfer. A distinction is made between mandatory information, information that states may request, and information that operators may choose to provide but states cannot demand (EC, n.d.m). The following details contained in the SAD are particularly relevant to weapons transport, as they would allow for the tracking of all phases of a goods shipment, from departure to destination, and also provide information on the type of transferred goods and transit countries: 9kijeci fheY[Zkh[i s total number of packages (EC, n.d.b); _d j^[ ;K Wbbem \eh s consignee (mandatory for transits) (EC, n.d.b); j^[ jhWYa_d] e\ Wbb s country of dispatch/export (mandatory for transits) (EC, n.d.b); f^Wi[i e\ W ]eeZi s country of destination (mandatory for transits) (EC, n.d.b); i^_fc[dj$

s identity and nationality of means of transport at departure; in the case of air transportation, this may include the number and date of flight or, in their absence, the aircraft’s registration number (EC, n.d.c); s identity and nationality of active means of transport crossing the border (mandatory for exports and transits); this refers to the means of transport ‘crossing the Community’s external frontier as known at the time of completion of formalities’ (EC, n.d.d); s mode of transport at the border (‘the active means of transport which it is expected will be used on exit from the customs territory of the Community’) (EC, n.d.e); s inland mode of transport (mode of transport after clearing customs) (EC, n.d.f); s place of loading (mandatory for transits): ‘the place, as known at the time of completion of formalities, at which the goods are to be loaded onto the active means of transport on which they are to cross the Community frontier’ (EC, n.d.g); s office of exit (mandatory for exports and transits): customs office at which the goods will leave Community customs territory (EC, n.d.h); s packages and description of goods; marks, numbers (such as container numbers), quantity, and kind: information necessary to identify the goods, in conformity with EU and national classifications (EC, n.d.i); s intended offices of transit (and country) (mandatory for transits) (EC, n.d.j); s transhipments (mandatory for transits): ‘The first three lines of this box are to be completed by the carrier where, during the operation in question, the goods are transhipped from one means of transport to another or from one container to another’ (EC, n.d.k). As Table 2.2 shows, a great deal of harmonization exists among EU countries with respect to the information included in customs declarations. In non-EU countries it is also common for customs declarations to request information relating to transportation. For instance, in Canada, exported goods must be reported (declared) by exporters, carriers (i.e. transporters), and customs service providers (Canada, 2005, art.2). Normally one declaration is required per shipment. In the case of restricted goods—which include firearms—exporters may report bulk or homogeneous goods on a monthly basis as long as they receive written confirmation to that effect from the authority administering this more restrictive regime prior to the export (art. 4). While exporters can delegate the reporting to a carrier or customs service provider, they

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remain responsible for meeting reporting requirements (Canada, 2007, sec. 2). Finally, the transporter must also file a conveyance report for the export of the vessel or aircraft39 (Canada, 2005, art. 9). The customs laws and regulations of the countries under review also commonly provide for the following: s the legal basis for inspection of cargo and possible seizure; s rules for safe transit and warehousing of goods in customs zones (such as the sealing of containers); s penalties (such as for undeclared goods or the refusal to allow inspection); s specification of documentation in addition to the customs declaration (such as export permits).

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In many respects, customs authorities are best placed to identify illicit arms transfers, as they deal with the actual movement of goods. By reinforcing transfer controls through customs procedures—including the declaration of goods when they enter, exit, or transit national territory—customs authorities are in principle in a position to assess all aspects of the transfer based on a complete set of documentation, including earlier export/transit permits. Nevertheless, several factors hamper the application of current customs rules and procedures to the detection of illicit small arms transfers. In general, most—if not all—customs administrations place more of an emphasis on import controls and less on export consignments and transhipments,40 thus diminishing the likelihood of stopping an illicit consignment at its point of origin. Even in the case of import controls, however, national capacities vary greatly. A lack of capacity for effective border control is a particular problem in developing countries, where most customs administrations have few or no investigative powers, risk management strategies and techniques are lacking, and effective technical equipment is rarely available. Additional impediments to border control in developing states include weak governance (such as poor inter-agency cooperation and corruption) and porous borders featuring multiple unguarded entry points.41 Yet in all countries, only a small share of incoming shipments is physically inspected,42 the exact proportion depending on national risk assessment policies, technical capabilities, available resources, and level of training. J^[ ki[ e\ Ykijeci

Nonexistent or inadequate communication between customs and licensing authorities presents an additional

fheY[Zkh[i je problem. Information relating to a given shipment is rarely conveyed to licensing authorities. As a result, they cannot fh[l[dj _bb_Y_j icWbb know when weapons have been transferred, how many are involved, which part of the licence covers them, or Whci jhWdi\[hi _i dej whether they have reached the authorized destination. Delivery verification certificates are not requested systematiW fh_eh_jo Wj j^[ cally. Even when they are, confirmations may arrive long after a delivery has been completed; in the best cases, the ]beXWb b[l[b$

rate of response to delivery verification requests does not exceed 65 per cent of exported arms (Berkol and Moreau, 2009, p. 18ff). At a more fundamental level, the use of customs resources and procedures to stop illicit small arms transfers is obstructed by the differing priorities of customs and arms export authorities. Currently, WCO members do not consider preventing illicit small arms transfers a priority.43 Areas of priority for border checks include counter-terrorism, violations of intellectual property norms (such as counterfeit goods, especially medicine), and drug trafficking. The three regional groupings of states within the WCO emphasize different elements of this list: EU countries tend to focus on the protection of national economies and societies, thus paying greater attention to the smuggling of highly taxable goods (such as cigarettes); the United States stresses anti-terrorism measures; and the largest group (including most African and many Asian countries) is revenue-oriented. To that group, taxes levied on imported goods represent an important source of revenue, which sometimes wholly replaces weak or non-existent systems for the generation of national income. From this perspective, the nature of goods coming into a country is not as important as the value they have in the form of potential customs duties.44 Like the regimes in place to control civil aviation (see the next section), those established for customs controls offer considerable potential for the improved monitoring of arms flows and the prevention and stopping of illicit consignments. Yet the concerted use of these regulatory frameworks for such purposes is not imminent. It will require the enhanced coordination of relevant agencies—especially customs and licensing authorities—including improved information flows. Before this can happen, however, the fundamental goals pursued by the different control agencies need to be aligned, or at least coordinated, at the political level.

7?H JH7DIFEHJ +/

9_l_b Wl_Wj_ed h[]_c[i A broad set of measures established at all levels—global, regional, and national—makes civil aviation one of the most highly regulated sectors in the world (Doganis, 2002). This complex set of rules follows goals that do not directly coincide with those of an arms non-proliferation regime—as it relates mostly to the facilitation of civil aviation worldwide and to ensuring equal economic regulation across countries (such as airport landing fees). Nevertheless, this body of rules becomes relevant because the provision of small arms to illicit end users or destinations by air often, if not always, entails violations of civil aviation rules, even if these do not specifically relate to the movement of arms. UN investigative panels have highlighted this point. In violating the arms embargo on Liberia, for example, traffickers used the following ‘deceptive practices’ to avoid detection: s multiple requests filed to civil aviation authorities in different countries for flights at the same time, all relating to J^[ fhel_i_ed e\ the same aircraft;

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s use of false flight plans and routings;

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s refusal of the pilots to contact control towers or aviation authorities in the countries they overfly;

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s ‘flexible’ and sometimes fraudulent use of call-signs and flight numbers;

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s use of forged documents with respect to registration, operating licences, or airworthiness certificates of aircraft used [djW_bi l_ebWj_edi e\ in the trafficking (UNSC, 2002, para. 62).45 This list also includes the well-known practice by which irresponsible air cargo companies register their aircraft— and obtain relevant operating licences—in states where civil aviation rules are insufficiently developed, or not enforced, or both.46 The centrepiece of civil aviation regulations is represented by the Convention on International Civil Aviation, signed in 1944 in Chicago and now with virtually universal membership (190 contracting states). Implementation of the Convention is the main responsibility of the International Civil Aviation Organization, which was established with the goal of facilitating the ‘safe and orderly’ development of civil aviation worldwide (Chicago Convention, 1944, preamble). In addition to a framework treaty, the Chicago Convention comprises a set of 18 annexes that formulate standards in areas such as the nationality and registration marks of aircrafts (annex 7); customs procedures (annex 9); air traffic controls (annex 11); security (annex 17); and dangerous goods (annex 18). Since 1998, ICAO has audited all its members for compliance with the safety rules and, since 2002, for security.47 Civil aviation rules have also been adopted regionally, bilaterally, and at the domestic level. The EU Commission, an important player in aviation security, has developed an extensive set of regulations that are directly applicable to the EU’s 27 member states and that are also legally binding for members of the European Civil Aviation Conference, together with other states that have close transportation ties to the EU and consent to the application of these rules. Rounding out the picture are the standards created by air industry associations—most notably the International Air Traffic Association. Among the various measures regulating civil aviation, the following appear particularly relevant with respect to their actual or potential application to the prevention of illicit small arms transfers.48 Cargo restrictions. The provision most directly relevant to the control of small arms transportation by air is contained in article 35 of the Chicago Convention, according to which:

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No munitions of war or implements of war may be carried in or above the territory of a State in aircraft engaged in international navigation, except by permission of such State. Each State shall determine by regulations what constitutes munitions of war or implements of war for the purposes of this Article (Chicago Convention, 1944, art. 35). The translation of this provision into domestic systems is anything but uniform among European states. Even where these authorizations are required, and national civil aviation authorities are empowered to grant or deny them, available flight and cargo information typically allows only for an assessment of compliance with aviation safety rules, not broader proliferation risks (Bromley et al., 2009, p. 45).49 This, once again, points to the need for greater coordination among different control spheres and enforcing authorities. Civil aviation authorities would not normally be expected to make political decisions on whether to grant or deny a specific arms-carrying flight permission to overfly or land on national territory. Nevertheless, they have information on the transaction that is often unavailable at the time of an export licence application. Registration of aircraft. Articles 17–20 of the Chicago Convention deal with the registration of aircraft, establishing that: 9_l_b Wl_Wj_ed s an aircraft has the nationality of the country in which it is registered (art. 17); Wkj^eh_j_[i ^Wl[ s an aircraft cannot be registered in more than one state at once, although the country of registration can be changed jhWdi\[h _d\ehcWj_ed

(art. 18);

j^Wj _i e\j[d s rules on registration—including its transfer from one country to another—are to be elaborated at the national level kdWlW_bWXb[ Wj j^[

(art. 19);

[nfehj b_Y[di_d] s nationality and registration marks will be shown appropriately on any aircraft (art. 20); ijW][$

s ICAO member states will exchange, among themselves or with ICAO, on demand, information on the registration and ownership of any aircraft registered by them. For aircraft ‘habitually engaged in international air navigation’ this information is also to be submitted to ICAO (art. 21). Annex 7 of the Convention expands on these provisions by specifying the characteristics of nationality and registration marks and where they should be displayed. Customs clearance. The Chicago Convention also regulates the customs clearance of aircraft. Article 10 establishes that, with limited exceptions, aircraft should land at and depart from airports designated by an ICAO member state for the purpose of ‘customs and other examination’.50 Article 29 requires every aircraft engaged in international navigation to carry certain documents, including a certificate of airworthiness, journey log book, and, if it carries cargo, a manifest and detailed declarations of the cargo. Annex 9 of the Convention, building on these and other articles, provides a detailed set of recommended practices. Because the main goal of these provisions is to avoid delays to air navigation, while simultaneously ensuring respect for national customs laws, the practices are unsurprisingly geared towards providing ‘a frame of reference for planners and managers of international airport operations’ as well as ‘describing maximum limits on obligations of industry and minimum facilities to be provided by governments’ (Chicago Convention, 1944, annex 9). Faced with the growing volume of air traffic, the provisions of Annex 9 have been adjusted with a view to ‘reducing paperwork, standardizing documentation and simplifying procedures’. Greater emphasis has also been placed on inspection techniques based on risk assessment (secs. 1.3, 4.5).

7?H JH7DIFEHJ ,'

Security and safety measures. Measures specifically targeting the transportation of (small) arms are scarce in civil aviation regulations since—as mentioned earlier—their goals differ from those of an arms control regime. Historically, the civil aviation sector has been more concerned with the safety of passengers, crew, and airports than with the security risks associated with illicit arms deliveries.51 Nevertheless, as shown above, there are regulatory structures already in place in this sector that could be adapted to the control of small arms transportation. In addition to the measures already mentioned, one example of a security-specific aviation rule is IATA’s Recommended Practice 1630 on cargo security (IATA, 2009). The document was adopted to counter ‘acts of lawful interference’ against air carrier operations; it gives concrete expression to Annex 17 (security) and Annex 18 (safe transportation of dangerous goods by air) of the Chicago Convention, as well as related guidance material (ICAO, n.d.; 2009). In general terms, Practice 1630 states: ‘All cargo intended to be carried on passenger or all-cargo aircraft should be subjected to security controls before being uplifted on the aircraft’ (IATA, 2009, para. 3.1). As a corollary, ‘regulated agents’ should have security programmes in place.52 In support of these principles, ‘known shippers’ are required to certify in writing that: s their consignments are prepared in secure premises (para. 3.3.2.1); s they employ reliable staff in preparing the consignments (para. 3.3.2.2); s consignments are protected against unauthorized interference during preparation, storage, and transportation (para. 3.3.2.3); Bk\j^WdiW 9Wh]e [cfbeo[[i Yedjheb j^[ \h[_]^j e\ W 8e[_d] -*- Wj <hWda\khj 7_hfehj" CWo (&&($ 7b[nWdZ[h >[_cWdd%7<F

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s they accept that packages and contents of the consignment may be examined for security reasons (para. 3.3.4); and, finally, s ‘the consignment does not contain any explosives/ammunition/flammable liquids/corrosives or disabling or incapacitating items, which they are not licensed to ship in accordance with IATA Dangerous Goods Regulations, or unknown cargo’ (para. 3.3.3). If consignments are accepted from ‘unknown shippers’, they should be ‘physically searched, electronically screened or screened by other means’ (para. 3.6.3). This IATA recommendation reflects the international standard found in Annex 17 of the Chicago Convention. Regardless of whether shippers are known, air carriers are required to ‘ensure that from the time of acceptance and until completion of air transportation, cargo consignments are protected from unauthorized interference’ (para. 3.7.1).

9ED9BKI?ED Recent initiatives to control transportation agents have been predicated on two claims: on the one hand, that these actors are central in the delivery of arms to illicit destinations or end users; on the other, that despite this centrality, transportation agents are insufficiently regulated, if at all. These initiatives—most notably that led by the French and Belgian governments against small arms trafficking by air—have marked a significant turn in the debate on small arms. As the chapter has shown, attention to the importance of transportation in illicit arms deliveries has always been present in international discussions on small arms proliferation. At the same time, concrete initiatives for control have been hampered by the frequent—yet repeatedly disproven—argument that the complexity of modern trade does not lend itself to effective monitoring of transportation companies and of the increasing numbers of third-party service providers, such as freight forwarders. As a contribution to this debate, this chapter has analysed existing controls on transportation—particularly by air— at the international, regional, and national levels. Measures relevant to the control of transportation agents fall into three main bodies of law, namely, arms transfer controls, customs rules and procedures, and civil aviation regulations. As part of their arms transfer control regimes, the majority of the 23 reviewed states regulate transportation agents, either directly or indirectly. Direct controls take the form of a licensing requirement directly applicable to transportation companies—in addition to exporters—while indirect controls entail an obligation on exporters to submit information on transportation when they apply for an arms export licence. Customs laws are also relevant to transport controls, to the extent that they demand that information on transportation—means, routes, and content of the cargo—be submitted when goods cross a state’s border. Such information is commonly requested in the countries analysed in this chapter. In addition, customs regulations usually establish powers of search, inspection, and seizure of cargo, as well as measures to secure shipments transiting or warehoused in customs-controlled areas. Finally, the extensive body of rules governing civil aviation also contains measures that either directly concern the transportation of arms or could be adapted to this end. These comprise rules of aircraft registration and of customs clearance, as well as safety and security standards that, for instance, outline recommended practices when dealing with cargo coming from ‘unknown shippers’.

7?H JH7DIFEHJ ,)

The existence of these measures does not automatically translate into effective control of transportation agents. Besides the question of whether these rules are actually implemented—something that should be verified—a major impediment to effective regulation stems from the lack of coordination among the various spheres of control within a single state. Most often, this means that all the information concerning an arms transfer is not concentrated in one institution but rather scattered among many. Information on transportation means and routes will be available to customs and civil aviation authorities but not to licensing agencies; the political or security considerations affecting arms export decisions will be clear at the licensing stage but not relevant for customs clearance; and so on. Additional challenges include: huge variations in the capacity, authority, and effectiveness of civil aviation authorities across countries; overlapping or inconsistent rules; and the practice adopted by many irresponsible air companies of registering in states where transport rules are not strict or not enforced (regulatory gaps). At a more fundamental level, however, the effective application of existing customs and civil aviation measures to stem illicit small arms trafficking is prevented by the divergent goals of the various control agencies. The primary aims of export control, customs, and civil aviation authorities are quite distinct. Efforts to ensure that an arms transfer is legal (and responsible) will not always—or even routinely—line up with those aimed at avoiding tax fraud or ensuring that a consignment not jeopardize the safety of passengers and crew. In short, different agencies will focus on different aspects of the same transfer. At the end of the day, bodies that have the means to prevent illicit small arms transportation—for example, customs agencies—often will not do so because they have other priorities. This analysis suggests some promising avenues for further action. There is the option, in consultation with all relevant actors, including industry, of strengthening or adapting existing control mechanisms so that they can be used to detect and prevent illicit small arms transport. As emphasized throughout the chapter, however, any enhancements to current control strategies will depend on improved coordination and information flows between arms transfer, customs, and civil aviation authorities. That, in turn, requires action at the political level; in other words, governments must include the issue of illicit air transport among their priorities.

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Best practices

ECOWAS

Economic Community of Western African States

European Union

GGE

Group of Governmental Experts

IATA

International Air Traffic Association

ICAO

International Civil Aviation Organization

OSCE

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

SAD

Single Administrative Document

United Nations

Wassenaar Arrangement

WCO

World Customs Organization

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See Griffiths and Bromley (2009, p. 1).

The states selected for the study are: Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, China, the Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Japan, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. They are among the 27 states identified by the Small Arms Survey as ‘major exporters’ (annual exports of small arms and light weapons exceeding USD 10 million) in four out of five years, from 2004 to 2008. Four of the 27 countries were not retained for analysis in this chapter because of a lack of access to original legal texts: the Republic of Korea, Mexico, Romania, and the Russian Federation.

While transfer controls in transit and import countries are important, this chapter focuses on controls applicable in exporting states. The farther an illicit consignment of arms moves from the source of export, the more difficult it becomes to identify and stop it—mainly due to the ability of arms traffickers to break the transfer into many segments and diversions (Griffiths and Wilkinson, 2007, p. 7).

The purpose of this section is not to provide an in-depth analysis of the dynamics of arms transportation, but rather to offer a simple sketch of the multiplicity of actors involved in an arms deal and the administrative steps that are usually necessary for a legal transfer to take place. For detailed studies on the dynamics of arms transportation and the arms logistics sector, see AI and TransArms (2006) and Griffiths and Wilkinson (2007).

The terms transit and transhipment are commonly used as synonyms but define two different activities. Specifically, transhipment refers to a transit during which a given cargo is transferred from one mode of transportation to another (such as from land to air) or from one carrier to another within the same mode of transportation. AI and TransArms (2006, pp. 38–40); interview with IATA official, February 2008.

Table 2.1 provides a general indication rather than a precise breakdown of each stage of the transfer process in all countries. For instance, the requirement for a ‘negotiation licence’ (i.e. authorization to start contract negotiations) is the exception rather than the rule; similarly, an arms producer may also be an exporter for some or all shipped goods.

This observation stems from the author’s direct participation in international debates on arms brokering controls (such as the ‘UN Workshop in Preparation for the Broad-based Consultations on the Illicit Brokering in Small Arms and Light Weapons’ held in Geneva on 3 June 2005).

Interview with an official of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 13 February 2008.

Other mentions of transportation are contained in UNSC (2006, paras. 2, 15, 23, 27, 34, 46).

Interview with an official of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 13 February 2008.

This reflects the common practice whereby national arms exports controls—and specifically export licensing requirements—do not apply to operations conducted by, or on behalf of, national armed and security forces.

Interview and correspondence with an official of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, October 2009.

For details on the Situation Centre’s list and its impact to date, see Bromley et al. (2009, pp. 62–63).

Email communication with a French government official, October 2009; see also Giannella (2008).

Interview with an official of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 13 February 2008.

Email communication with an official of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, October 2009.

Email communication with an IATA official, March 2008.

For details, see Bromley et al. (2009).

This point was confirmed by IATA and WCO officials during interviews with the author, and reiterated by an official of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (interview, 13 February 2008).

IATA and WCO representatives were invited to the 2007 conference on the French–Belgian initiative at OSCE headquarters, mentioned above.

‘Financing, transportation, freight forwarding, or taking of any other action that facilitates the manufacture, export, or import of a defense article or defense service’ (US, 1976, sec. 2778(b)(1)(A)(ii)).

Contrary to individual licences, which are issued on a case-by-case basis, a general licence allows for multiple transfers of one or more weapon

As of December 2009, relevant UK authorities had not publicly specified the ‘limited circumstances’ in which such licences are necessary (UK,

In the Czech Republic, firearms are divided into four categories (A to D); category E comprises related ammunition that is not ‘banned’. For details

categories towards one or more specified destinations. The specific characteristics of a general licence vary across countries. 2009, sec. 5). of these categories, see Czech Republic (2002, ch. II). 27 28

Phone interview with an official of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 2008. Similar provisions exist in Canada, where exporters are required to ‘evaluate’ foreign clients, which includes indicating in the licence application whether the shipping routes requested by the consignee are ‘unusual’ (Canada, 2009, p. 29, box 3).

See Bulgaria (2007b, arts. 5(1).6, 5(3)); Czech Republic (1994, annex 4); France (1992); Portugal (2006, arts. 67.2.g–h, 68.4); Spain (2007, art. 4.2); US (1976, sec. 2778(g)(2)).

See also, Bulgaria (2007a, art. 19) and Spain (2007, art. 15.1).

See also relevant provisions in the Czech Republic (2002, sec. 39(1)(k.2); Germany (1961, sec. 12(2)); UK (2009, p. 10).

In Belgium, the main text regulating arms transfers provides for the adoption of transport safety measures by government decree (Belgium, 1991, art. 3). See also Portugal (2006, art. 41).

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See also, France (1995, art. 66) and the Czech Republic’s provisions on the safekeeping of weapons (2002, sec. 58). For more details on this point, see Parker (2009). Currently, 176 customs administrations in the world are members of the WCO; altogether, these process approximately 98 per cent of world trade (see WCO, n.d.). For security reasons, these indicators are not made public by the WCO. Email communication with a WCO official, November 2009. Unless otherwise indicated, the sources for this table are implementation reports submitted by EU members (EC, n.d.a). For a legend, see EC (n.d.m). This measure does not apply to scheduled flights. Email communication with a WCO official, November 2009. Email communication with a WCO official, November 2009. According to one source, only around five per cent of shipments are physically inspected to ensure that their contents match accompanying documentation. Chapter review provided by Ilhan Berkol, November 2009. Interview with a WCO official, March 2008. Interview with a WCO official, March 2008. Earlier UN Panels investigating arms embargo violations similarly underlined the link between air safety violations and illicit small arms trafficking. For more information, see Griffiths and Bromley (2009). The phenomenon of ‘offshore registration’ or use of ‘flags of convenience’ has been consistently highlighted by research on illicit arms brokering activities. See, for example, Wood and Peleman (1999); Small Arms Survey (2001, ch. 3). Interview with former ICAO official, July 2009. For more information on the impact of EU civil aviation regulations on illicit small arms flows, see Griffiths and Bromley (2009). The cited study covers EU countries as well as Belarus, Croatia, Norway, the Russian Federation, Switzerland, Turkey, and Ukraine (Bromley et al., 2009, p. 7). See also, Chicago Convention (1944, art. 13). Interview with an IATA official, February 2008.

See also Chicago Convention (1944, annex 17).

36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49

8?8B?E=H7F>O AI (Amnesty International) and TransArms. 2006. Dead on Time: Arms Transportation, Brokering and the Threat to Human Rights. London: Amnesty International. <http://www.amnesty.ca/amnestynews/upload/ACT300082006.pdf> Belgium. 1991. Loi relative à l’importation, à l’exportation[, au transit et à la lutte contre le trafic] d’armes, de munitions et de matériel devant servir spécialement [à un usage militaire ou de maintien de l’ordre] et de la technologie y afférente. (L 2003-03-25/49, art. 1, 002; ED : 17-07-2003) (L 200303-26/73, art. 4, 002; ED : 17-07-2003, avec précisions dans la disposition modificative). —. 1993. Arrêté royal réglementant l’importation, l’exportation et le transit d’armes, de munitions et de matériel devant servir spécialement [à un usage militaire ou de maintien de l’ordre] et de la technologie y afférente. AR 2003-04-02/45. 8 March. Berkol, Ilhan and Claudio Gramizzi. 2004. The Transport of Hazardous Materials: A Concrete Example of Traceability. Brussels: GRIP. <http://www.grip.org/en/siteweb/images/NOTES_ANALYSE/2004/NA_2004-06_EN_I-BERKOL_C-GRAMIZZI.pdf> — and Virginie Moreau. 2009. Post-export Controls on Arms Transfers: Delivery Verification and End-use Monitoring. Brussels: GRIP. <http://www.grip.org/en/siteweb/images/RAPPORTS/2009/2009-4.pdf> Bromley, Mark, et al. 2009. The Control of Air Transportation of Small Arms and Light Weapons and Munitions: A Comparative Study of National Systems Utilised in the European Union. Study No. EPMES 2008/012. Brussels: ISIS Europe. May. Bulgaria. 2007a. Law on Export Control of Arms and Dual-use Items and Technologies. State Gazette No. 11/2.02.2007. <http://www.mi.government.bg/eng/ind/earms.html> — . 2007b. Regulation on Implementation of the Law on Export Control of Arms and Dual-use Items and Technologies. <http://www.mi.government.bg/eng/bids.html?id=224919> Canada. 2005. Reporting of Exported Goods Regulations. Memorandum D20-1-0. Ottawa: Border Services Agency. 29 September. —. 2007. Cargo: Export Movements. Memorandum D3-1-8. Ottawa: Border Services Agency. 4 May. —. 2009. Export Controls Handbook. Ottawa: Export Control Division, Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada. May. Chicago Convention. 1944. Convention on International Civil Aviation. Chicago. 7 December. China. 2008. National Report of the People’s Republic of China on the Implementation of the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, and of the International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons. <http://disarmament2.un.org/cab/bms3/1BMS3Pages/1NationalReports/China_E.pdf>

,, IC7BB 7HCI IKHL;O (&'&

CoEU (Council of the European Union). 2006. Strategy to Combat Illicit Accumulation and Trafficking of SALW and Their Ammunition. 5319/06 of 13 January. <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/06/st05/st05319.en06.pdf> Czech Republic. 1994. 89/1994 Coll. Decree No. 84 of the Ministry of Industry and Trade, by Which Some Provisions of Act No. 38/1994 Coll., on Foreign Trade in Military Material, Amending Act No.455/1991 Coll., on Trade Licences (the Trade Licencing Act), as Amended, and Act No. 140/1961 Coll., the Criminal Code, as Amended. 12 April. —. 2002. 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Accessed June 2009. <http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/Legend_table-en.pdf> ECOSOC (United Nations Economic and Social Council). Sub-Committee of Experts on the Transport of Dangerous Goods. 2007. UN Recommendations on the Transport of Dangerous Goods: Model Regulations, 15th revised edn. <http://www.unece.org/trans/danger/publi/unrec/rev15/15files_e.html> ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States). 2006. ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and Other Related Material. Abuja, 14 June. Finland. 1990. Act No. 242/1990 on the Export and Transit of Defence Materiel. Amendments up to 900/2002 included. France. 1992. Arrêté du 2 octobre 1992 relatif à la procédure d’importation, d’exportation et de transfert des matériels de guerre, armes et munitions et des matériels assimilés. Version consolidée au 31 juillet 2009. —. 1995. Décret n°95-589 du 6 mai 1995 relatif à l’application du décret du 18 avril 1939 fixant le régime des matériels de guerre, armes et munitions. <http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do;jsessionid=5CA8DC2BCAF76FB52030EFBD34026579.tpdjo06v_1?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000736 335&dateTexte=20091103> French MFA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs). n.d. Strategies for Responding to New Threats. <http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/european-union_157/eu-in-the-world_1491/common-foreign-and-security-policy_5463/what-is-thecfsp_5466/cfsp-acquis_5469/strategies-for-responding-to-new-threats_8740.html> Germany. 1961. Act Implementing Article 26(2) of the Basic Law (‘War Weapons Control Act’). Federal Law Gazette I, p. 444. 20 April. Giannella, Annalisa. 2008. Conflict Prevention in Practice: Conflict Prevention and Fight against Illicit Trafficking of Small Arms. 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—. n.d. Annex 9 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation: Facilitation. <http://www.icao.int/icaonet/anx/info/annexes_booklet_en.pdf> Italy. 1990. Nuove norme sul controllo dell’esportazione, importazione e transito dei materiali di armamento. Legge 9 luglio 1990, n. 185. Gazzetta Ufficiale, No. 163. 14 July. Japan METI (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry). n.d. Newly Enforcement of Transshipment Regulation in Japan. <http://www.meti.go.jp/policy/anpo/kanri/top-page/top/transshipment-regulation.htm> Nairobi Protocol. 2004. Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa. Nairobi, 21 April. OAS (Organization of American States). 2003. Model Regulations for the Control of Brokers of Firearms, their Parts and Components and Ammunition (‘Model Regulations’). 1271/03. Washington, DC: OAS. November. OSCE–FSC (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe–Forum for Security Co-operation). 2007. Special FSC Meeting on Combating the Illicit Traffic of Small Arms and Light Weapons by Air. FSC.JOUR/516 of 21 March. <http://www.osce.org/item/23784.html> —. 2008. Decision No. 11/08 Introducing Best Practices to Prevent Destabilizing Transfers of Small Arms and Light Weapons through Air Transport and on an Associated Questionnaire. FSC.DEC/11/08 of 5 November. Vienna: OSCE. <http://www.osce.org/documents/fsc/2008/10/34809_en.pdf> Parker, Sarah. 2009. ‘Devils in Diversity: Export Controls for Military Small Arms.’ In Small Arms Survey 2009: Shadows of War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Portugal. 2006. Lei no. 5/2006 de 23 de Fevereiro Aprova o novo regime jurídico das armas e suas munições. Singapore. 2004. Strategic Goods (Control) Regulations. 7 January. Small Arms Survey. 2001. Small Arms Survey 2001: Profiling the Problem. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Spain. 2007. Law 53/2007 of 28 December on Control of External Trade in Defence and Dual-use Material. Switzerland. 1998. Ordinanza concernente il materiale bellico. No. 514.511 of 25 February (with amendments up to 1 January 2009). UK (United Kingdom). 2008. Export Control Order. No. 3231. —. 2009. Export Control Act 2002: Review of Export Control Legislation (2007) Supplementary Guidance Note on Trade (‘Trafficking and Brokering’) in Controlled Goods (in Effect from 6 April 2009). London: Department of Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform. UN (United Nations). 1997. Report of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms. A/52/298 of 27 August. —. 2001. Report of the Group of Governmental Experts Established Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 54/54 V of 15 December 1999. A/CONF.192/2 of 11 May. —. 2007. Report of the Group of Governmental Experts Established Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 60/81 to Consider Further Steps to Enhance International Cooperation in Preventing, Combating and Eradicating Illicit Brokering in Small Arms and Light Weapons. A/62/163 of 30 August. UNSC (United Nations Security Council). 2002. Letter Dated 24 October 2002 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1343 (2001) Concerning Liberia Addressed to the President of the Security Council. S/2002/1115 of 25 October. —. 2006. S/PV.5390 of 20 March. US (United States). 1976. Arms Export Control Act. Sec. 38, as Amended. Title 22, United States Code, Sec. 2778. —. 2009. ‘The International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR).’ <http://www.pmddtc.state.gov/regulations_laws/itar.html> WA (Wassenaar Arrangement). 2007. Best Practices to Prevent Destabilising Transfers of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) through Air Transport. <http://www.wassenaar.org/publicdocuments/2007/docs/Best_Practices_to_Prevent_Destabilising_Transfers_of.pdf> WCO (World Customs Organization). 2002a. Recommendation Concerning the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, Supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. 29 June. <http://www.un.org/sc/ctc/pdf/Firearms_Recommandation_2002.pdf> —. 2002b. Recommendation of the Customs Co-operation Council on the Insertion in National Statistical Nomenclature of Subheadings to Facilitate the Monitoring and Control of Products Specified in the Protocol Concerning Firearms Covered by the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. 29 June. <http://www.wcoomd.org/files/1.%20Public%20files/PDFandDocuments/HarmonizedSystem/HS%20Recommendations/ HS_reco_june2002_29_EN.pdf> —. n.d. ‘Our Profile.’ <http://www.wcoomd.org/home_about_us_our_profile.htm> Wood, Brian and Johan Peleman. 1999. The Arms Fixers: Controlling the Brokers and Shipping Agents. PRIO Report No. 3/99. Oslo: International Peace Research Institute, Oslo.

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=Wd]i" =hekfi" WdZ =kdi 7D EL;HL?;M ?DJHE:K9J?ED Across the globe, every day, numerous actors engage in acts of violence. These range from clashes on traditional war battlefields to limited engagements in urban environments, from disputes over land to struggles over access to natural resources such as diamonds, from armed robbery to murder, from rape to domestic violence. Some of these acts are organized, premeditated, or systematic, while others are simply crimes of opportunity. Violence—both in crime and in conflict—claims an estimated 740,000 lives each year (Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 2008, p. 1). The vast majority of these deaths (540,000) result from direct experience of violence, while some 200,000 individuals in conflict zones die from indirect causes such as malnutrition and preventable disease (pp. 2, 32). An average of at least 52,000 people died each year between 2004 and 2007 in armed conflicts (p. 9). This number is likely to be a low estimate. Many relevant studies include conflicts only if they are ‘state-based’, meaning that the government is one party to the conflict (Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 2008, p. 12; HSRP, 2007, p. 23). Yet Africa has witnessed significantly more non-state than state-based conflicts, suggesting that this estimate of conflict deaths represents only a partial count (HSRP, 2007, pp. 23–24). Current information does not provide sufficient detail to delineate the percentages of violence and death attributable to individuals, groups, and states. States and armed groups are probably responsible for the majority of conflictrelated deaths. It is much more difficult to determine the perpetrators of non-conflict violence. An estimated 490,000 non-conflict violent deaths occurred in 2004 (Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 2008, p. 67); this figure represents a low estimate in view of a range of factors that contribute to underreporting of homicides (pp. 68–70). In addition, this estimate does not distinguish between deaths caused by individuals and those caused by groups. In some countries efforts are made to identify deaths that result from gang violence, for example, but this remains an extremely difficult task.1 It is also likely that this overall homicide figure undercounts the deaths resulting from gang and other armed group activity in countries that lack strong death reporting mechanisms, where deaths may occur far from city centres, and where political actors have an interest in concealing the cause of death. Previous editions of the Small Arms Survey have focused on the role of small arms in conflict and crime; the consequences of small arms misuse on development, human rights, and humanitarian activities; and the prevalence of urban armed violence and insecurity. This thematic section concentrates on perpetrators of violence, including a wide range of armed groups, such as gangs. It shifts the focus from location, acts, and impacts to the actors themselves, covering a broad range of groups involved in violence. Thousands of non-state groups contribute to the global burden of armed violence. Some groups are widely known: the Mara Salvatrucha (commonly known as MS-13) in the United States and Central America, the Taliban in Afghanistan, the FARC in Colombia, the terrorist network al Qaeda, and the ‘janjaweed’ in Sudan, among many others

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that appear in the headlines on a daily basis. Yet these are just the tip of the iceberg. No exact figures exist, but recent estimates suggest there are at least 20,000 gangs with more than 1,000,000 gang members in the United States alone (NGIC, 2009, p. 6), and an estimated 2–10 million gang members around the globe.2 Organizations that monitor non-state armed groups engaged in organized violence list more than 1,600 around the world (Carey, Mitchell, and Lowe, 2009; IISS, 2009, pp. 465–74; UCDP, 2009). These groups differ tremendously in their composition, activities, and roles in society. Some armed groups pose a challenge to law and order by representing a significant source of violence, while others threaten to depose the government directly. In other cases, they offer a form of security to communities. In still others they seek to operate under the radar of the law and without directly challenging the state. Whatever their approach, the presence of armed groups raises concerns about violence and other negative social, economic, and political impacts resulting from their activities. Dkc[heki ]hekfi

In broad terms, the chapters of this thematic section divide along two lines: gangs and (other) armed groups.

m_j^ m_Z[#hWd]_d] Categorized by activity, the former consists of those involved in primarily criminal behaviour, while the latter includes Y^WhWYj[h_ij_Yi \Wbb mainly those engaged in conflict (either fighting with the government or in opposition to it). Gangs tend to operate kdZ[h j^[ ^[WZ_d] e\ very locally, perhaps within a city, while armed groups often operate across larger areas. Gang activities are often ÉWhc[Z ]hekfÊ$

directed at economic pursuits, gang (and sometimes community) security, and providing a familial network for members. Armed groups often pursue political, military, and security objectives. These are broad generalizations; additional defining characteristics are introduced below, and not all gangs or armed groups easily fit into a single model. Although broad generalizations can be useful in trying to separate the thousands of gangs and armed groups into manageable categories, policy-makers need to be wary of making quick conclusions based on a general label: gang or armed group. This in itself provides little information upon which to act. Instead, policy-makers should aim to understand the broad nature and characteristics of these gangs and armed groups while also identifying the features specific to the given gang or armed group of interest. Only by developing a coherent and detailed picture of the particular gang (or armed group)—who they are, whom they represent, their origins, how they function, what they aim to achieve, and why members join—can policy-makers develop strategies to address the factors that enable and encourage their organization and mobilization and reduce their negative impacts on society. This overview provides a framework for the thematic section that follows. It highlights important definitional issues: the wide variance in types of gangs and armed groups; and the blurry distinction between these two broad categories of armed groups (and the many sub-groups that fall within each). It then touches on the main findings arising from the chapters. Finally, it highlights some common themes arising in the chapters.

:;<?D?D= 7HC;: =HEKFI What is an armed group? On the surface, the answer might seem obvious. At its most basic level, an armed group is a distinct collective of individuals who possess firearms. Yet this definition does not provide much assistance in distinguishing different armed groups. For example, it could include state security forces, such as the police and military, or state-sponsored security forces such as paramilitaries and militias. It could also include a wide range of other groups, from the criminal to the legal, from gangs and criminal organizations to national hunting associations. Numerous groups with wide-ranging characteristics fall under the heading of ‘armed group’.3

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While it is important to use common definitions for comparisons across contexts, there is no general agreement on a single definition of an armed group4 or gang.5 The divergence of views is captured in the chapters that follow. Rather than impose a single definition on contributing authors, they have been given scope to define the groups studied as best suits the phenomena described in each chapter. This approach underscores both the importance of definitions as well as the wide range of armed groups, rendering universal definitions impossible. It may be more useful to think about armed groups as falling along a continuum that captures the relationship of the group to the government, the level of organization of the group, and the capacity of the group to perpetrate widescale violence (PRO-GOVERNMENT, see Figure 10.1). The use of a continuum underscores, and tries to address, the difficulty of providing clear definitions for commonly used group labels (such as militias, rebels, or warlords), the challenges involved in ranking different types of groups (such as according to levels of violence or organization), and the fact that particular armed groups may move across the spectrum over time (such as by becoming more or less violent, changing their level of organization, or shifting from supporting the government to opposing it). Armed groups go by many names. Positive labels, indicating that the group has some legitimacy in taking up arms, include: revolutionaries, liberation movements, freedom fighters, militias, community volunteer organizations, and community defence forces. More negative labels, hinting at the illegitimacy or illegality of the group, include: terrorists, rebels, insurgents, criminals, gangs, bandits, and warlords.6 Since the same group can be called both a

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‘liberation movement’ and a ‘terrorist group’, labels may say more about who applies them than about the group itself (Bhatia, 2005). Applying broad labels does little to clarify. Labels are political and can be used to misdirect. For example, the ‘terrorist’ label has become a useful tool for any government to designate a troublesome group and gain domestic and international support for suppressing it. ‘Terrorist’ also deflects attention from the goals, concerns, and membership of a group to its tactics (such as suicide bombing). Similarly, militias and civil defence forces tend to present themselves as ‘self-defence organizations’, creating a perception of legitimacy, whether earned or not. The use of the self-defence label can make it easier for some governments to arm such groups and assign them tasks normally performed by state security forces (PRO-GOVERNMENT). BWX[bi Wh[ feb_j_YWb

Labels aside, there are distinct ways in which armed groups differ from one another and from gangs. Acknowledging

WdZ YWd X[ ki[Z je such heterogeneity is important in order both to understand the groups of interest and to design and implement c_iZ_h[Yj$

effective strategies to reduce their ability to violently challenge the state as well as their harmful effects on society. The following characteristics are relevant. Relationship to the state. Some groups operate in opposition to the government, others work with either tacit or overt support from government leaders, and many simply seek to remain under the radar of law enforcement in order to pursue their economic activities (PRO-GOVERNMENT). Despite some recent efforts to portray US gangs as a challenge to the state akin to a modern insurgency (Manwaring, 2005; 2007; 2009), most gangs never reach the level of security threat this implies—nor is toppling the state generally a gang objective. Nevertheless, in certain circumstances some gangs can pose a clear threat to the ability of the government to effectively impose law and order. Relationship to the community. In some cases gangs and armed groups are protectors rather than predators, at least from the point of view of the community suffering from insecurity and violence. In such areas, the armed group may be the only source of security because state forces cannot or will not provide such services. In other cases, armed groups are a direct threat to community security, waging war and perpetrating violence against civilians. Yet sometimes the protector is also the predator. In such cases, an armed group may provide security for the community as a whole, while posing a threat to community members who fail to provide support. Relationship to the legal economy. Gangs and armed groups engage in both legal and illegal economic activities. Some may be primarily economic actors, driven by profits, and using violence as a means to maintain their competitive edge (such as organized crime or drug gangs). Some armed groups may be primarily political actors who use illicit economic activities to fund their military operations. Gangs and armed groups that function primarily as security actors fund themselves through economic activities and in some cases taxes on (or ‘donations’ from) community members. Many gangs and armed groups engage in economic crime (such as theft or armed robbery), activities in the illicit economy (such as drugs, prostitution, and money laundering), or sectors of the legal economy that have fallen outside of government control (such as natural resource trade in conflict zones). Use of violence. Whether violence is perpetrated by a gang, a militia, or a rebel group, innocent civilians are often killed and injured. Unfortunately, in many cases, the available evidence precludes a determination of intended target and measurement of impact. However, trends in existing data do suggest that gang violence tends to occur between and within gangs. It is, in other words, mainly directed at gang members, rather than non-gang members (GANG

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VIOLENCE; Shelden, Tracy, and Brown, 2004, p. 105). By contrast, over the past few decades most non-state armed groups fighting civil wars have targeted mainly non-combatants, with civilians bearing an enormous share of the burden of war.7 Territory and reach. Gangs and armed groups exhibit different patterns of territorial control and operation. Gangs, for the most part, tend to operate locally.8 By contrast, terrorist organizations that might operate locally have, in some instances, established far-reaching international networks. In these situations controlling territory is far less important than the ability to move freely and operate in numerous territories undetected. In civil wars, rebel groups tend to operate in rural areas where government control is weak and use this lack of state presence to their advantage. From their rural bases, they can control local economies, launch hit-and-run attacks, and stage operations to displace the government.

=7D=I" =HEKFI" 7D: =KDI The thematic section presents diverse chapters that draw on a range of methods and sources. While all chapters cover gangs or armed groups, or both, each has a specific focus, including: guns, gang violence, girls and gangs, gang interventions, codes of conduct, and pro-government groups. These topics are introduced briefly below.

<_h[Whci A common focus of any discussion of gangs and armed groups is their weapons. Yet gangs and armed groups pos- =Wd]i WdZ Whc[Z sess a very small percentage (0.4 to 1.3 per cent) of circulating guns when compared to other actors, such as the ]hekfi feii[ii W l[ho military, law enforcement, and the broader civilian population (FIREARMS). The focus on guns partly results from a icWbb f[hY[djW][ e\ concern about use. Whereas military and law enforcement officers are usually seen as legitimate forces possessing Y_hYkbWj_d] ]kdi$ guns for security purposesâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;and civilians are commonly granted the right to own guns for hunting, sport, and defensive purposesâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;gangs and armed groups are widely perceived as holding weapons to cause harm. Evidence suggests their impact is significant. Exact estimates of the number of guns, and other weapons, held by gangs and armed groups are difficult to determine (FIREARMS). These actors use a range of weapons, from handguns and shotguns to assault rifles and even anti-aircraft guns. They have increasingly obtained, and used, more powerful small arms (FIREARMS). The crash of a military police helicopter from gang gunfire over the favelas of Rio de Janeiro only two weeks after Rio won the bid to host the 2016 Olympics fuelled concerns over gang arsenals (Phillips, 2009). The implication is clear: a gangâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s firepower can be an important determinant of its ability to challenge the capacity of the state to enforce law and order in the gang-controlled area.

=Wd] l_eb[dY[ As the chapter on gang violence reveals, gang members are more violent than non-gang members. Gang members are the most common victims of gang violence. Gang homicide rates can be as much as 100 times greater than homicide rates for the broader population (GANG VIOLENCE). Yet the levels and intensity of gang violence vary across the globe, with the Americas at the top of the list for gang violence.

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Gang members commonly use firearms in the United States and Latin America, but this seems to be an exception. Elsewhere across the globe the use of firearms is far less prevalent. In part this discrepancy is due to the more limited availability of firearms in many countries. It may also reflect differences in cultural norms about firearm use. Although violence and criminal activity feature prominently in gang life throughout the world, most gang members spend much of their time engaging in typical, non-violent adolescent activities. In most cases, they spend far more time ‘hanging out’ than breaking the law (Klein and Maxson, 2006, p. 69). Gang members do not perpetrate the majority of crimes in most communities (Greene and Pranis, 2007, p. 61), but media portrayals obscure this fact. While the vast majority of gangs engage in some form of criminal activity, the crimes committed vary and they are not always violent in nature. Gang members rarely specialize in a particular type of crime (Klein and Maxson, 2006, pp. 73–74).

Fh_ied ]Wd]i The term ‘gang’ incorporates a wide range of groups. The first image that comes to mind in association with ‘gang’ is often a group of tattooed young men on the street. Yet a number of recognized types of gangs exist, including: street gangs, drug gangs, motorcycle gangs, skinheads,9 and prison gangs.10 Each type of gang has a set of defining characteristics. In reality gangs rarely fall neatly into any single category. Prison gangs originally represented a distinct form of gang, largely removed from broader discussions of threats to the public. Ijh[[j a_Zi \hec W ]Wd] _d A_di^WiW" @kd[ (&&'$ J_c 7$ >[j^[h_d]jed%FWdei F_Yjkh[i

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In many places, such as Brazil, El Salvador, South Africa, and the United States, prison gangs are increasingly demonstrating links between those living on the ‘inside’ and those operating on the ‘outside’ (PRISON). In some cases, prisons provide an organizing framework, a mechanism of cohesion, and even a ‘university’ for street gang members. It is no longer unusual to have gang leaders running the operations of a street gang from within a prison cell. The resulting criminal organizations are ‘networked, resourceful, and highly resilient’ (PRISON).

=_hbi WdZ ]Wd]i Historically, gangs and armed groups have been viewed as the domain of men, typically young men. As the chapter on girls suggests, there is reason to reconsider some long-standing assumptions about women and their roles in violence. Evidence reveals that girls and women play a more central role than originally thought (GIRLS). Although they join gangs and armed groups in far fewer numbers than men, some estimates of female gang membership range from 25 to 50 per cent of total members. Women and girls are less likely to engage in violent acts or to use firearms when they do engage in violent acts. In gangs, boys and men are more likely to experience gun violence, while their female counterparts are more likely to experience sexual abuse. Female members of gangs and armed groups do act in gendered roles that emphasize taking care of men: they are mothers, girlfriends, cooks, war wives, sexual objects, and housekeepers. But they also perform roles that have traditionally fallen to men. In gangs, they may hide and transport drugs

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and weapons because they are less likely to be stopped by the police or military. They also engage in theft, graffiti, carjackings, drive-by shootings, and clashes with other gangs, in particular female members of other gangs. Women and girls have also fought on the front lines with rebel groups and joined the ranks of suicide bombers.

=Wd] _dj[hl[dj_edi For years, cities such as Chicago, Kingston, Los Angeles, and Rio de Janeiro have experienced relatively high levels of crime involving large numbers of gangs. In response, political leaders have supported dozens of interventions to reduce and prevent violence. Despite a proliferation of programming aimed at stemming the tide, and some success stories, strong evidence of what works remains limited (INTERVENTIONS). In part, this is the result of poor implementation and limited monitoring and evaluation of programmes. In other cases, it reflects the difficulty of measuring the success of any single violence reduction programme, such as keeping youths out of gangs, in reducing a city’s crime rate. The programme may be successful in keeping numerous youths from joining gangs, but this may not result in an overall visible and measurable reduction in the crime rate. Moreover, given the numerous factors affecting rates of crime and violence, it is not usually possible to determine the impact of an intervention on specific crime trends, such as homicide rates.

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What is known is that it is easier to prevent an individual from becoming a perpetrator than it is to rehabilitate offenders (Small Arms Survey, 2008, p. 296). Programmes that target people early in life tend to be more effective in reducing the likelihood that an individual will commit violence. Yet here, too, many factors at the levels of the individual, family, peer group, and community play a role (Small Arms Survey, 2008, pp. 254–55, 258–59; GANG VIOLENCE). The numerous risk factors that contribute to a heightened likelihood of violence underscore the need for multi-faceted intervention programmes that target not only the symptoms of violence but also the factors that increase the risks of violence (INTERVENTIONS). In Ecuador, like in other parts of Latin America, violence is common in gang areas. Although no official figures exist, estimates of gang members in the country’s largest city, Guayaquil, range upward to 65,000. Similarly, reliable data on crimes committed by gang members is rare, yet most communities associate gangs with violence and delinquency—a view encouraged by sensationalist media coverage. Ecuador’s government has responded with a number of policies over two decades—policies that mainly adopt a criminal justice approach that emphasizes incarceration and rehabilitation. These efforts have proved largely ineffective in reducing the gang problem and associated violence (ECUADOR). They also failed to address the root causes of violence and gang formation. SER PAZ, a local organization based in Guayaquil, where the level of gang violence is particularly high, has taken a different approach to gangs. SER PAZ has sought to employ Ecuadorean gangs’ own organizational and control

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structures to convert them into more productive, even positive, social forces. This approach has empowered several gang members economically; they are now responsible for running a number of local, legitimate businesses. These achievements are encouraging, but without any systematic evaluation of the SER PAZ programmes, it is difficult to determine their exact impact on gang violence, and whether similar efforts could be successful elsewhere. Research in the United States, for example, has shown that initiatives that work with existing gang structures can increase gang solidarity and organizational capacity, making gangs stronger and more difficult to suppress if this becomes necessary (Klein and Maxson, 2006, pp. 196, 202–3). No single policy response can address all types of gangs or other armed groups, or all types of violence in a community, city, or country. Governments tend to consider all armed groups as threats, rather than understanding their various roles in communities (such as providers of protection) and the conditions that give rise to armed groups. This often leads to policies that do not fit the targeted group or the specific context of violence. For example, there De i_d]b[ feb_Yo is a growing tendency to blame urban violence on gangs. The available evidence suggests that gang violence makes a h[ifedi[ YWd disproportionate contribution to insecurity in some countries (GANG VIOLENCE), yet it is not known what percentage WZZh[ii Wbb jof[i e\ of violent incidents is perpetrated by gangs.11 Different measures of so-called ‘gang violence’ lead to widely divergent ]Wd]i eh ej^[h assessments of gang involvement. Strategies that call for a focus on ‘gang violence’ may not address all—or even Whc[Z ]hekfi$

most—of the armed violence in a community. Across the board there is a tendency to address non-state armed groups using heavy-handed, militarized responses. The first reaction is almost always to authorize police, the military, or other state-aligned armed actors to use force. Despite this tendency, there is little evidence that militarized strategies work. In fact, they may backfire and embolden groups. Heavy-handed approaches (such as Mano Dura in El Salvador) have not proven effective in reducing violence or in weakening gangs, but instead appear to have contributed to their solidification (PRISON). More nuanced strategies, based on an understanding of the group(s) in question and the context in which they operate, are clearly needed. There is some evidence of a shift in thinking. The focus on ‘suppressive’ criminal justice solutions has given way to a broader perspective on the problem and on potential solutions that incorporate prevention and treatment (INTERVENTIONS).

;d]W]_d] Whc[Z ]hekfi Despite the atrocities committed in many of today’s conflicts, rules do exist for the conduct of war, codified in law. International humanitarian and human rights law, as they pertain to armed conflict, although traditionally developed by and for states, are increasingly being applied to non-state entities. At present few mechanisms are in place to enforce such obligations, however (ENGAGEMENT). Some non-state armed groups engaged in intrastate conflicts have developed codes of conduct to regulate group behaviour (ENGAGEMENT). These codes, intended as a guide for group action, cover areas such as the indiscriminate use of violence, including violence against civilians, the recruitment of child soldiers, and the protection of civilians during conflict. Additional opportunities exist for human rights and humanitarian groups to engage armed groups on humanitarian issues (ENGAGEMENT).

Fhe#]el[hdc[dj ]hekfi Non-state groups are perceived as dangerous, a threat to stability and in some cases a threat to the viability of a state. Yet there is also the other side of the coin: groups that operate under the direction, if not the immediate control, of

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government and political leaders (PRO-GOVERNMENT). So-called pro-government non-state armed groups play an important role in state-directed violence. In some cases they provide security in areas where the government cannot operate effectively; in others, they wage war on behalf of the government or are supported by the government in their war campaigns. They have also been used by political leaders to obtain a variety of economic and political gains. Despite the widespread use of such pro-government groups and the numerous negative impacts they have on local populations, more attention is focused on the role of anti-government non-state groups. In part this results from a bias in favour of the state and the legitimacy of state actors to use force to ensure security. It may also reflect the often murky links between a government and an armed group. In many cases, such links are intentionally kept opaque to reduce the accountability of government for atrocities committed by these groups.

7hc[Z ]hekfi The Sudanese civil war, which ended with a peace agreement in 2005, is often oversimplified as a North–South conflict. The reality was much more complex, and it remains so in the current ‘post-conflict’ environment. Although the agreement officially outlawed armed groups, many former fighters, communities, and youth groups remain armed and mobilized. Five years later, an intricate patchwork of armed groups is spread across Southern Sudan; many are ethnic groups with wide-ranging loyalties and objectives. Politicized tribal clashes are on the rise, resulting in thousands of deaths and hundreds of thousands of displaced persons. The threat of future armed violence involving

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these groups is high—not just as a result of tensions between the parties to the civil war, but also resulting from longstanding intra-Southern grievances and their politicization (SUDAN).

9ED9BKI?ED The chapters in this section cover a number of topics pertaining to gangs and armed groups. Despite such diversity, several common themes emerge from the collection. In particular, the chapters call for a greater emphasis on measuring violence, obtaining better information about various gangs and groups, and conducting comparisons across groups and contexts in order to develop effective policies and programmes for reducing violence. The importance of addressing gangs and armed groups. Members in gangs and armed groups make up a mere fraction of the broader population. Gangs and armed groups hold a very small percentage of the world’s small arms—less than two per cent. Despite what could, on the surface, be considered inconsequential in terms of the

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numbers involved, the reality is that these gangs and groups have an inordinate impact on populations. There are consistent links between their presence and the perpetration of violent acts. Limited data outside the United States. Far more information is available about gangs operating in the United States than elsewhere in the world, with some exceptions, such as Brazil, El Salvador, and South Africa. Information about armed groups is similarly concentrated on a handful of notorious armed groups. While certain studies have focused on particular gangs, cities, and armed groups, there is a dearth of research on hundreds of other groups. The lack of diversity in information provides a poor basis for comparison. The result has been limited comparative work within the fields of gang and armed group research, let alone between the two. ‘What gets measured gets managed.’12 While more information about gangs and armed groups can aid in understanding these groups—their origins, actions, goals—it is not simply that more information is better. How information is measured also matters. Ongoing debates about the definitions of gang and armed group means that different definitions are used, resulting in different measurements, thereby reducing comparability across cases. Moving forward collectively will require some agreement on what is being studied. Collaborative action will also call for consensus on how information about gangs and armed groups will be used, and whether such information will inform military strategies, in general, and targeting selection, in particular. Gangs, groups, and guns. The use of small arms by gangs and armed groups varies. Gangs in the United States and Latin America more frequently use small arms than gangs elsewhere. Most armed groups use small arms of some form. Knowledge of the types of weapons used by gangs and armed groups is based on deaths and injuries of those caught in exchanges of fire. Yet knowledge of how these groups purchase, acquire, and transport small arms remains limited. The role of gangs and armed groups in violence and the broad impacts they have on communities are attracting increasing attention from researchers and policy-makers alike. Recent studies have begun to address the gaps mentioned above, but our understanding of these groups is often sketchy. As the knowledge base expands, a further challenge looms, namely, how to convert this information into effective policy.

;D:DEJ;I 1

For an example of how US statistics distinguish gang and non-gang violence, see FBI (2009). For a discussion of gang crime databases, and the

This estimate is based on gang membership in 18 countries, one of which is the United States (FIREARMS).

numerous challenges to producing reliable gang crime estimates, see ASC (2009).

For a discussion of the ‘universe’ of armed groups—from marauders, criminals, and gangs to warlords and rebel groups—and references for key sources on each type, see Schneckener (2009, pp. 8–14).

For various definitions of ‘armed group’ (and a discussion of competing definitions), see: Bruderlein (2000, p. 8); Grävingholt, Hofmann, and

For various definitions of ‘gang’ (and a discussion of competing definitions), see: Bursik and Grasmick (2006); GANG VIOLENCE; Greene and

For examples of typologies of non-state armed groups, see Krause and Milliken (2009); Schneckener (2009); Schultz, Farah, and Lochard (2004);

See Kalyvas (2003), who distinguishes between conventional wars (both inter-state and intrastate) and non-conventional wars, with the latter

Klingebiel (2007, pp. 22–28); OCHA (2004, p. 7); Petrasek (2005, pp. 8–10); Policzer (2005, pp. 6–10).

Pranis (2007, pp. 9–11); Hagedorn (2008, pp. 23–31); Klein and Maxson (2006, pp. 5–10).

Vinci (2006); Williams (2008).

involving far more violence and more violence experienced by non-combatants.

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While there is evidence to suggest that gangs are increasingly operating in rural areas in the United States, they remain a predominantly urban phenomenon (NYGC, 2007).

The term ‘skinheads’ has been used interchangeably with neo-Nazi and white supremacist groups.

For a discussion and listing of different types of gangs, see NGIC (2009, pp. 6–8, 23–31).

For example, the National Gang Threat Assessment states that ‘gang members are responsible for as much as 80 percent of the crime in some areas’ but then adds the caveat in a footnote that this figure is based on self-reporting by local law enforcement officers and is not representative (NGIC, 2009, p. 8). For a discussion of problems with identifying gang members and collecting reliable statistics on gang violence, see Spergel (2009).

The aphorism is attributed to management consultant Peter Drucker.

8?8B?E=H7F>O ASC (American Society of Criminology). 2009. Criminology & Public Policy, Vol. 8, Iss. 4, pp. 667–925. Bhatia, Michael V. 2005. ‘Fighting Words: Naming Terrorists, Bandits, Rebels and other Violence Actors.’ Third World Quarterly, Vol. 26, No.1, pp. 5–22. Bruderlein, Claude. 2000. The Role of Non-State Actors in Building Human Security: The Case of Armed Groups in Intra-State Wars. Geneva: Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. May. Bursik, Robert J., Jr., and Harold G. Grasmick. 2006. ‘Defining and Researching Gangs.’ In Arlen Egley, Jr., et al. The Modern Gang Reader. 3rd edn. Los Angeles, CA: Roxbury Publishing Company, pp. 2–13. Carey, Sabine, Neil J. Mitchell, and Will Lowe. 2009. ‘A New Database on Pro-Government Armed Groups.’ Paper presented at the Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, New York. February. FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation). 2009. Expanded Homicide Data Table 12: Murder Circumstances, 2004–2008. <http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2008/offenses/expanded_information/data/shrtable_12.html> Geneva Declaration Secretariat. 2008. Global Burden of Armed Violence. Geneva: Geneva Declaration Secretariat. Grävingholt, Jörn, Claudia Hofmann, and Stephan Klingebiel. 2007. Development Cooperation and Non-State Armed Groups. Bonn: German Development Institute. <http://www.die-gdi.de/CMS-Homepage/openwebcms3.nsf/(ynDK_contentByKey)/ENTR-7BMCTB/$FILE/Studies%2029.pdf> Greene, Judith and Kevin Pranis. 2007. Gang Wars: The Failure of Enforcement Tactics and the Need for Effective Public Safety Strategies. Washington, DC: Justice Policy Institute. July. <http://www.justicepolicy.org/content-hmID=1811&smID=1581&ssmID=22.htm> Hagedorn, John M. 2008. A World of Gangs: Armed Young Men and Gangsta Culture. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. HSRP (Human Security Report Project). 2007. Human Security Brief 2007. Vancouver: Simon Fraser University. <http://www.humansecuritybrief.info/HSRP_Brief_2007.pdf> IISS (International Institute for Strategic Studies). 2009. The Military Balance 2009: The Annual Assessment of Global Military Capabilities and Defence Economics. London: IISS. Kalyvas, Stathis N. 2003. ‘The Sociology of Civil Wars: Warfare and Armed Groups.’ Unpublished background paper. Geneva: Small Arms Survey. November. <http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/files/portal/issueareas/perpetrators/perpet_pdf/2003_Kalyvas.pdf> Klein, Malcolm W. and Cheryl L. Maxson. 2006. Street Gang Patterns and Policies. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Krause, Keith and Jennifer Milliken. 2009. ‘Introduction: The Challenge of Non-State Armed Groups.’ Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 30, No. 2, pp. 202–20. Manwaring, Max G. 2005. Street Gangs: The New Urban Insurgency. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, United States Army War College. March. —. 2007. A Contemporary Challenge to State Sovereignty: Gangs and Other Illicit Transnational Criminal Organizations in Central America, El Salvador, Mexico, Jamaica, and Brazil. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, United States Army War College. December. —. 2009. State and Nonstate Associated Gangs: Credible ‘Midwives of New Social Orders.’ Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, United States Army War College. May. NGIC (National Gang Intelligence Center). 2009. National Gang Threat Assessment 2009. Washington, DC: NGIC. January. NYGC (National Youth Gang Center). 2007. National Youth Gang Survey Analysis. Accessed 21 December 2009. <http://www.iir.com/nygc/publications/2007-survey-highlights.pdf> OCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs). 2004. Glossary of Humanitarian Terms in Relation to the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict. New York: OCHA.

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Petrasek, David. 2005. Armed Groups and Peace Processes: Pondering and Planning Engagement. Geneva: Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. November. <http://www.hdcentre.org/files/Armedgroupsandpeaceprocessponderingandplanningengagement.pdf> Phillips, Tom. 2009. ‘Twelve Dead and Helicopter Downed as Rio de Janeiro Drug Gangs go to War.’ The Guardian. 17 October. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/oct/17/rio-favela-violence-helicopter> Policzer, Pablo. 2005. Neither Terrorists nor Freedom Fighters. Armed Groups Project Working Paper 5. Calgary: University of Calgary. March. <http://www.armedgroups.org/sites/armedgroups.org/files/AGP_Working_Paper_5_-_Policzer__March_05_.pdf> Schneckener, Ulrich. 2009. Spoilers or Governance Actors? Engaging Armed Non-State Groups in Areas of Limited Statehood. SFB-Governance Working Paper No. 21. Berlin: Sonderforschungsbereich 700, Freie Universität Berlin. October. Shelden, Randall G., Sharon K. Tracy, and William B. Brown. 2004. Youth Gangs in American Society. 3rd edn. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. Shultz, Richard H., Douglas Farah, and Itamara V. Lochard. 2004. Armed Groups: A Tier-One Security Priority. INSS Occasional Paper 57. Colorado Springs, CO: United States Air Force Institute for National Security Studies. September. Small Arms Survey. 2008. Small Arms Survey 2008: Risk and Resilience. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Spergel, Irving. 2009. ‘Gang Databases: To Be or Not To Be.’ Criminology & Public Policy, Vol. 8, No. 4, pp. 667–74. UCDP (Uppsala Conflict Database Project). 2009. Accessed 12 November 2009. <http://www.pcr.uu.se/publications/UCDP_pub/UCDPNonStateActorDataset.xls> Vinci, Anthony. 2006. ‘The “Problems of Mobilization” and the Analysis of Armed Groups.’ Parameters, Vol. 36, No. 1, pp. 49–62. Williams, Phil. 2008. Violent Non-State Actors and National and International Security. Zurich: International Relations and Security Network, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology.

79ADEMB;:=;C;DJI Fh_dY_fWb Wkj^eh Jennifer M. Hazen

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;bki_l[ 7hi[dWbi =7D= 7D: =HEKF <?H;7HCI ?DJHE:K9J?ED The image of a guerrilla warrior with a gun has become a ubiquitous symbol of contemporary armed violence. The sight may be overly familiar, linking small arms and much of the worst post-modern conflict and instability, but it is not without its mysteries. How many non-state combatants—guerrillas, insurgents, militiamen, and gang members— are there in the world? And how many weapons do they actually have? It is well known what kinds of weapons such non-state actors use, the result of insights acquired through display or often-deadly confrontations. The actual numbers involved are much more obscure. Uncertainty about the quantity of small arms controlled by gangs and non-state groups has aroused bitter controversy over the effectiveness of gun policy and specific programmes such as disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) (Florquin and Berman, 2005, ch. 4).1 The passionate debate in the United States and Mexico in the first few months of 2009 over illegal civilian arms sales to Mexican gangs was another manifestation of uncertainty over how many guns these groups actually have and where they come from (Ford, 2009). This chapter, a first cut at the difficult task of estimating the small arms inventories of gangs and non-state actors, shows above all that gangs and armed groups are by far the least numerous of all major categories of firearms owners, much smaller than individuals, militaries, or law enforcement agencies. Among its findings: s Gangs in the best-understood countries and regions own between 1.2 and 1.4 million firearms. s Total gang arsenals worldwide appear to include at least two million and probably no more than ten million firearms. s Other non-state armed groups—insurgents and militias, including dormant and state-related groups—have a total of about 1.4 million small arms. s The non-state armed groups actively fighting in 2009 had roughly 350,000 small arms altogether. s Armed groups and gangs together control roughly 0.4 to 1.3 per cent of all small arms. s Indirect evidence suggests that gangs and armed groups are progressively obtaining more powerful small arms, feeding an arms race with other actors. Because the kind of information available about gangs and armed groups is far from uniform, this review uses different methods to calculate the small arms of the two categories. After discussing the general issues, the chapter examines the small arms of gangs. Gangs are too numerous to evaluate individually; there are about 27,000 gangs in the United States alone (Egley and O’Donnell, 2009). Instead, gang small arms inventories have been deduced by extrapolating from total numbers of gang members worldwide. The arms of non-state armed groups, examined next, have been estimated based on the numbers of group combatants and their total arsenals.

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;IJ?C7J?D= DED#IJ7J; =HEKF IC7BB 7HCI A decade ago, the Small Arms Survey started a project to clarify the global distribution of small arms (firearms). The research undertaken in 2000–01 concentrated exclusively on insurgencies. The concept of internationally relevant armed groups, then still emerging, had not fully embraced other actors ranging from paramilitaries to gangs. The maturation of this basic insight—stressing the need for better awareness of the diversity and importance of gangs and non-state armed groups—is a major force behind this revision. The rise of non-state groups teaches modesty. Compared to the arsenals of state agencies or even civilian societies, the small arms inventories of gangs and non-state groups are much more elusive. Both the size of gangs and groups, and the scale of their armaments, are often unclear. Their totals can usually be estimated, but not determined with certainty. Standing in the way is the natural slipperiness of group identity and armament. With the number of members or combatants and their weapons normally in flux, outside observers need to adjust their expectations. Even where firm numbers are available, such as weapons turned in through DDR programmes or police seizures, it is difficult to say much about the proportion of the total that this represents. Estimates of group small arms are less reliable than those for state actors or civilian populations, the focus of previous Small Arms Survey estimates (Small Arms Survey, 2006b, ch. 2; 2007, ch. 3). Thus, these findings must be used more cautiously. Designed to convey a sense of relative scale, these estimates show how insurgent and gang arsenals of small arms compare to those of other actors and each other. They also provide a sense of scale for group totals—revealing which are largest and smallest. Insurgent arsenals often can be estimated sufficiently to guide policy responses, be they counter-insurgency or disarmament. These figures are helpful for establishing priorities and evaluating resources needed to respond to the challenges these weapons pose. No effort was made in previous editions of the Small Arms Survey to estimate gang-owned small arms. The total for other non-state armed groups—insurgencies and militias—was previously estimated at roughly one million weapons (Small Arms Survey, 2001, p. 89). This figure should be compared to the new estimate of roughly 350,000 small arms among groups actively fighting in 2009, revealing a striking decrease in both the number of active non-state fighters and their small arms inventories. While comparisons between the figures in the Small Arms Survey 2001 and this edition show the number of non-state combatants at war has declined, the total number in existence, including inactive factions, appears to have

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grown (Small Arms Survey, 2001, p. 89). Better appreciation of the full spectrum of non-state groups, including militarily inactive or dormant groups and those with formal political power, permits a new total estimate of some 1.4 million small arms controlled by all non-state groups. This increase is partially real, due to the rise of armed factions, but also partially apparent, the result of greater research attention to previously overlooked types of groups. Compared to the small arms of other major elements of society— private citizens, law enforcement agencies, and the armed forces—

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most of the gangs and groups examined here are statistically tiny. This chapter shows that the small arms of all non-state groups— including insurgencies, militias, and gangs—amount to no more than 11.4 million weapons, or 1.3 per cent of all small arms worldwide, though probably less (see Table 4.1 and Figure 4.1). Gang

arsenals appear to make up the largest part of this category. But small arms estimates are not accurate enough to support exact comparisons between groups, to guide military or police weapons procurement, or to establish firm targets for disarmament programmes.

<hec '/// je (&&/ Previous Small Arms Survey estimates of firearms ownership among state armed forces, law enforcement agencies, and civilians were based primarily on building block methods. Whenever available, official data and country estimates by qualified observers were totalled. These cases also provided samples for statistical modelling of the remaining unknown cases. The result was a series of global and country estimates showing the distribution of 875 million military, police, and civilian firearms outlined in Table 4.1. These methods did not separate from other civilian owners some of the groups most likely to use their small arms, the very groups often of greatest concern in international and domestic policy debates, including insurgents, terrorists, youth gangs, and other organized criminal groups. An early effort to establish the number of small arms under their control, based on data from 1999, offered a useful first step (Small Arms Survey, 2001, ch. 2). But these findings were weakened by the limited data then available and by the study’s exclusive focus on insurgencies and related armed groups. Drawing upon a new wave of research on non-state groups, this chapter casts a wider net (Krause, 2009; Schlichte, 2009). It reviews the state of knowledge about insurgent armaments and examines the place of criminal gangs and non-state groups in the global distribution of firearms in 2009. Estimating the number of gang, insurgency, and other non-state group weaponry poses special problems, some unsolvable. The types of weaponry at their disposal are often well known, if from nothing else than the bloody experience of their use. But the numbers involved are highly elusive. In lieu of reliable data on the total weaponry of non-state armed groups, estimation of small arms inventories is based on numbers of armed individuals, multiplied by a weapons ratio. The method has been explained at length in previous editions of the Small Arms Survey.2 Numbers of members in non-state armed groups are, in many respects, no more difficult to estimate than those of state armed forces, law enforcement agencies, or civilians. But such estimates for gangs and groups tend to be based on less reliable foundations. In previous estimation exercises, there have always been compelling statistics on the

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number of individuals in question and enough samples of weapons inventories to facilitate straightforward extrapolation. When it comes to non-state groups, though, membership itself can be vague and evidence of weapons inventories purely anecdotal. Previously counted? Separating insurgent, gang, and other non-state weapons from civilian or state firearms for counting is a serious and unresolved issue. For effective policy-making, their armaments should be distinguished, whether because of the dangers they pose, for planning to suppress or defeat them, or to guide efforts to remove them from society. In a more fundamental sense, however, they are often indistinguishable from existing state and civilian armaments. Non-state small arms are weapons in-between. They may have been bought illicitly from former state surpluses, transferred deliberately by a sympathetic government, stolen individually from civilian owners, or even bought legally. The situation was characterized revealingly by a military lawyer, who described war in Iraq as a struggle not against a military enemy but â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;an enemy force made up entirely of civilian-belligerentsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; (Janin, 2007). In the short run, insurgent weapons constitute a separate category from civilian or state inventories, as they are not controlled by civilians or the state. Eventually, most will return either to the control of the state that captures or receives them or to civilian status once their owners abandon warfare or crime. Separating gang weapons, like any other crime gun, may be essential legally, but can be very difficult statistically.

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Nevertheless, for the most part, gang weapons, and those of other non-state armed groups, fit more comfortably in civilian stockpiles, as previously calculated. Very often, insurgent and gang firearms end up in civilian inventories when conflicts end or their owners leave gang life. Unless the weapons are captured by state armed forces or law enforcement agencies, or surrendered in a peace settlement, they remain in private hands. The clearest alternative is systematic disarmament. This does not always eliminate weaponry, but, when combined with destruction, it can eliminate large numbers of firearms. Since 1990, destruction programmes have eliminated more than 8 million stateowned firearms, more than 5 million civilian firearms, and, separately, at least 560,000 firearms from former insurgents. More have been collected and await destruction (Small Arms Survey, 2009, pp. 163, 185). Significant quantities continue to be apprehended, as illustrated by the Mexican Army’s storage of 305,424 confiscated weapons (Castillo and Roberts, 2009). Otherwise, insurgent and gang weapons tend to stay with their immediate owners, even as these leave their gangs and reintegrate into society.

=7D= 7HI;D7BI >em cWdo ]beXWb ]Wd] c[cX[hi5 The first step in estimating global gang arsenals is delineating the approximate number of global gang members. Gathering estimates of global gang membership from the published literature is far from easy. The meaning of gang membership is highly controversial, even among experts (see Box 4.1). Membership statistics are especially elusive for places without major gang problems. Consequently, this study probably over-represents the most serious cases, exaggerating global problems. Not all membership estimates, moreover, could be used here. Only when data conforms to clear geographic boundaries is it possible to establish the proportions required for wider extrapolation.

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countries, cities, and provinces surveyed have roughly 1.2 to 1.7 million gang members, based on adding known high and low estimates. The range of estimates would be wider, except for the numerical dominance of the single figure for gangs in the United States, a well-regarded estimate (Egley and O’Donnell, 2009). Global totals must be higher. But they might not be much higher, not if the 18 known countries and regions are home to the world’s largest (not merely best-understood) gangs. In lieu of comprehensive studies covering the rest of the world, the chapter uses the known rates of gang membership listed in Table 4.2 to extrapolate global gang membership in Table 4.3. The rate of gang membership (gang members as a proportion of the population) in each country, city, and province is extrapolated, for each case, to the planet as a whole. The examples here individually support an enormous spectrum of projections but lack the statistical consistency required for rigorous correlation. Instead, they support only a general impression of the scale of global gang membership. The clustering of examples in Table 4.3 is especially suggestive. The table shows many examples sticking around a lower threshold equal to roughly two million global gang members. Global gang membership is unlikely to be much lower. If gangs are as prevalent globally as they are in the high estimates for places such as Italy, Rio de Janeiro, or the Russian Federation, this would support a high estimate of almost ten million gangs members worldwide. There is no evidence to suggest that global gang membership is higher than this. Some places have much higher local membership, such as Kingston, Jamaica, Guayaquil in Ecuador, or the Western Cape of South Africa, but these seem to be exceptional. A range of two to ten million global gang members is not strictly scientific, but it corresponds to a reasonable application of known cases.

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>em cWdo ]Wd] ]kdi5 After gang membership, the second question for global projection of gang small arms is their level of gun ownership. How many guns do gangs have per member? This question has been extensively researched through studies of crime statistics, interviews, and surveys with gang members and convicts. As happens so often with gang issues, however, research on US gangs is much more extensive than cross-country comparisons. Because research has revealed so much more about gangs in the United States, it is tempting to use their example widely. The profound differences in national gun culture and crime leave no doubt, though, about the need for caution in applying findings from the United States (Esbensen and Weerman, 2005). With some 788,000 members, gangs in the United States stand out in absolute numbers, far surpassing gangs in other countries. Differences aside, US gang precedents matter a lot, largely because many US gang tropes—such as dress, behaviour, and sometimes armament—are so influential elsewhere. Gun ownership among gang members is a central question for scholars of delinquency. Interview and survey research is especially revealing. The findings may be more suggestive than definitive, but they leave no doubt that gang members are much more likely to be armed than most young people. The classic study of gun ownership among US youths and gangsters, a survey of 987 gang members and non-member youths, found that 30.9 per cent of juvenile gang members reported carrying guns for protection, compared to 14.2 per cent of non-gang youths. The same study found that, among surveyed gang members, gun ownership is reported by 77.8 per cent (Bjerregaard and Lizotte, 1995, pp. 48, 57). The rate of gun ownership appears to increase with the age of gang members. According to the widely cited J^[h[ Wh[ jme finding of Decker and Van Winkle, out of 99 gang members interviewed, 80 reported they had at least one gun; each c_bb_ed je j[d c_bb_ed member had an average of 4.5 firearms (Decker and Van Winkle, 1996, p. 176). The larger sample used by Bjerregaard ]Wd] \_h[Whci _d j^[ and Lizotte led them to conclude that gun ownership among gang members is roughly double that of non-gang mehbZ$ members, at 30.9 per cent vs. 14.2 per cent (Bjerregaard and Lizotte, 1995, p. 48). More generally, repeated surveys show some 40 per cent of prison inmates in the United States report having owned a gun at some point in their lives (Bennett and Holloway, 2004b, pp. 239–40). None of this is surprising in light of the exceptional levels of US civilian gun ownership. Surveys consistently find that some 40 per cent of US households have at least one gun (Smith, 2007, p. 11). With roughly 270 million civilian firearms in 2007, the United States’ private arsenal was equal to about 89 guns for every 100 residents (Small Arms Survey, 2007, ch. 2, annexe 3). Only Yemen approaches such levels of ownership, with roughly 55 firearms for every 100 residents (Small Arms Survey, 2007, ch. 2). The global rate of firearm ownership, by comparison, averages approximately 11 civilian firearms for every 100 people (Small Arms Survey, 2006b, p. 39). Considerably less is known about the gun habits of gang members elsewhere. Even the most incisive multinational comparisons treat gun issues gingerly (Esbensen and Weerman, 2005; Klein et al., 2006, pp. 427, 429). Although it cannot be said with scientific certainty, it appears that gang gun ownership tends to be a multiple of normal civilian ownership. But caution is in order. The most systematic surveys to examine gang gun use outside the United States focus on England and Wales. Among gang members arrested there, one study found that between 50 and 59 per cent reported having had a gun at some point during their years as members (Bennett and Holloway, 2004a, pp. 316–19). Another report found that as many as 60 per cent of British gang convicts reported using handguns (Bennett and Holloway, 2004b, p. 243). To be sure, such findings do not mean all British gang members are likely to carry guns. Convicts probably were more

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likely to carry guns than their counterparts who stayed out of jail. But this impression of widespread gang gun ownership, reinforced by the hugely disproportionate role of gangs in British gun violence, is compelling. All these findings suggest far higher gang gun ownership in England and Wales than for the civilian population as a whole. These are low- to mid-level gun-owning societies, where there are approximately six civilian firearms for every 100 people, including legally registered rifles and shotguns, as well as illegal handguns. Rates of gun ownership vary greatly between societies and individual gangs. The best general guide appears to be how rare or common guns are in civilian society. A British review cautions that ‘the actual availability of firearms appears to be overestimated’, noting a London survey that found that six per cent of all students surveyed report having carried a gun in the previous year (Marshall et al., 2005, p. 13). Intriguingly, this statistic is remarkably close to the level of English and Welsh public gun ownership, 6.2 firearms for every 100 people, suggesting a connection between general public

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ownership and gun carrying (Small Arms Survey, 2007, ch. 2, annexe 3). Another English and Welsh survey found gang membership increased the likelihood of firearm ownership by a factor of five among 17–24-year-olds (Marshall et al., 2005). Greater ownership of firearms among gang members has also been observed in the Netherlands (Decker and Weerman, 2005, p. 165; Klein, 2001, p. 312). These studies provide only a weak foundation for generalization and none for direct comparison. Rather, they speak to a connection between armament of civilians as a whole and of gangs. The shortage of cross-national comparisons severely weakens confidence in any global estimate of gang gun ownership. In lieu of a stronger foundation, this review builds on the studies noted above, which document much higher gun ownership rates among gang members than normal civilians, especially youth. The US and British surveys cited above, the most detailed on this point, show that gang ownership can be four times that of normal civilian rates. To convey a sense of the highest rates of gang gun ownership, this review presumes a rate of four times the

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rate of overall civilian ownership in each society.3 Researchers have recorded claims of higher levels of ownership, as noted above, but these are controversial. Applying these rules worldwide, with ownership averaging 11 firearms per 100 people (0.11 per person), supports an expectation of 0.44 firearms per gang member globally, or almost one gun for every two gang members worldwide. The actual rate of average gang gun ownership will vary significantly, depending on gun availability in each society (from the low gun-owning Netherlands to the high-ownership United States) and other factors, such as the ease of smuggling (for example, in Japan). If gang ownership is four times the normal civilian ownership rate in each society in the 18 countries, cities, and provinces listed in Table 4.4, there are a combined total of between 1.1 and 1.4 million guns among gang members in those places. The lower ownership estimate reflects low estimates of gang size, while the upper level is based on higher membership estimates. As highlighted above, this particular sample is dominated by a single estimate for the United States. Projecting from these best-understood cases, and overlooking the most extreme, this supports the conclusion that there probably are at least two million and probably no more than ten million gang firearms in the world (see Table 4.5). In others words, global gang firearms could be roughly equal to global gang members, although there is wide divergence among societies and gangs. In low gun ownership societies, gang ownership of guns tends to be higher than for normal civilians, but still far below a one-to-one ratio. In a society with high levels of gun ownership, such as the United States, gang ownership has already been documented to surpass a one-to-one ratio. These global estimates set the dimensions of global gang membership in broader perspective. While an estimate of at least two million and probably no more than ten million is not narrow, it clearly establishes the magnitude of gang gun ownership: the global problem is somewhere in the single millions. It may be said with confidence that gang gun ownership is neither hundreds of thousands, nor tens of millions.

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This range also establishes roughly how many guns gang members have, as opposed to the weapons of law enforcement agencies, armed forces, and other civilians. Gang weaponry appears to greatly outnumber that of other non-state armed groups, such as terrorists and insurgents, but the quantity is much less than that belonging to state forces or individual civilians. Similarly, the power of their weapons appears to be increasing as well (see Box 4.2). This perspective is useful for establishing general gun policy priorities, putting overall problems in broader perspective, and potentially guiding allocation of attention and resources. But such numbers are not reliable enough for multinational comparisons or specifying priorities for research and policy. There is no basis here for meaningful, direct comparison of gang gun ownership between most societies, such as France vs. the Philippines or Nigeria vs. Venezuela.

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FWj^ebe]_YWb iod[h]_[i Where are armed gang members most common? Some insights come from Japan, with its well-deserved reputation as one of the least armed of all societies. Licensed firearms in civilian hands number 320,000 (Katsumata, 2008). Including estimated unlicensed firearms, the country has a combined total of about 670,000 firearms, or 0.5 for every 100 residents. Even allowing for unregistered firearms, Japan ranks near the bottom of global ownership rates, 167 th among 180 countries ranked (Small Arms Survey, 2007, ch. 2, annexes 4, 5).

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The most striking exceptions to the scarcity of civilian guns in Japan are the country’s criminal syndicates. Although routinely described as gangs, the Yakuza differ by integrating adults as well as youths. They may not be youth gangs in the strictest sense, but they provide insight into the ways criminal groups can differ from the society around them. According to police, there are 84,200 Yakuza (JNPA, 2007). They reportedly own roughly 1.2 firearms per gangster (Nakamura, 2007). The latter is hardly exceptional internationally, but it means the Yakuza control a remarkable proportion of all civilian firearms in Japan, between 7 and 14 per cent. The Yakuza, in other words, are armed about 200 times more heavily than Japanese society generally. Among the examples explored here, Japan has the highest concentration of firearms among its gangsters. Japanese gangs are heavily armed by any standard, but, in comparison with the rest of Japanese society, they are extraordinary. Armed gang members appear to be most common in societies afflicted by both high membership and gun ownership. South Africa’s Western Cape province probably has the most serious gang guns problem anywhere, ranking at the top of both scales. In Western Cape, gangs appear to have roughly 51,000 out of the suspected total of 570,000 firearms in civilian hands in the region, or close to 10 per cent. These figures are similar to levels of gang gun ownership in Japan, but South African gangs are much more violent (GANG VIOLENCE). Other extreme cases included 7hc[Z ]Wd] here are the Jamaican capital of Kingston and the United States. Guatemala is a serious, but more complicated, case c[cX[hi Wh[ ceij because of uncertainty over both the number of gang members and the availability of firearms. In Guatemala, gangs Yecced _d ieY_[j_[i appear to possess as much as 10 per cent of the estimated 1.65 million civilian small arms (Small Arms Survey, 2007, m_j^ ^_]^ ]Wd] ch. 2, annexe 3). That level is reached, however, only if the highest estimates of Guatemalan gang membership are c[cX[hi^_f WdZ accepted (USAID, 2006, pp. 17, 45).

=Wd]i WdZ ]kd emd[hi^_f Are gang firearms the personal possessions of individual members or the collective property of the gang? Related to this question is the problem of whether to count gang guns as civilian. If guns are personal property, they remain essentially part of the larger civilian inventory, detouring into gang use during the time their owner is a gang member but otherwise owned much as any other civilian weapon. Anecdotal reports suggest that collective gun ownership is a feature of at least some US gangs.4 If guns are collectively owned by the gang, stored together, allocated by a higher authority within the gang, or handed down from member to member, they are not personal property. Treated as the property of the group, their ownership and control would resemble not civilian possession but that of non-state armed groups such as insurgents or terrorist cells. The question of ownership requires dedicated research. In interviews with scholars, gang members consistently describe their firearms as personal property (Decker and Van Winkle, 1996). But this may have more to do with semantics than property rights; interpreting the words of gang members describing their guns is anything but easy. In this review, gang weapons are treated as described by members, as individual property like civilian firearms. Although evidence is hardly conclusive, gang guns appear to originate as ordinary civilian guns. Gang members often have a history of owning guns prior to joining a gang (Bjerregaard and Lizotte, 1995, p. 48). They may also be borrowed from a member’s home, purchased legally or through an intermediary, or shared or stolen outright, but they appear to originate from the same stores as most other civilian weapons (Sheley and Wright, 1995). The glaring exceptions to any civilian connection are gang weapons acquired through political or military patronage. Some gangs in Guatemala, for example, are suspected of official support (Arana, 2005). When officials in leadership positions or the armed forces conspire with gangs—whether through corruption or political opportunism—the gang

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becomes something other than a traditional gang. Indeed, the provenance of their small arms is a useful test of whether a group is a gang, a militia or paramilitary organization, or something else. Patronage makes them similar to organizations such as many Afghan militias or the Colombian paramilitaries—semi-autonomous groups with connections to crime and the state (Manwaring, 2009, pp. 13–24; PRO-GOVERNMENT).

?DIKH=;DJ IC7BB 7HCI Outlining the dimensions of non-state armed groups—insurgents and militias—is much easier than doing the same for gangs, if only because the groups are fewer, the largest groups are well known, and their approximate size is somewhat better understood. As with gang guns, estimates of insurgent weapons rely on two key variables: the number of active combatants and the typical ratio of small arms per combatant. As with gangs, the size of an insurgent group’s membership generally appears to correspond fairly closely to its total arsenal. Definitional problems remain (see Box 4.3), but the largest groups can usually be identified with much greater reliability. In this analysis, 386 groups are evaluated, including some composites, such as combined Bangladeshi Islamist groups. Combatant and firearms estimates are available for 176 of these groups (see Annexes 1–3).

J^[ \bk_Z_jo fheXb[c Among the most important aspects to be addressed when evaluating the number of combatants in any insurgency or militia are problems of group fluidity and fluidity of membership. Unlike states, whose sovereignty grants them a firm identity, non-state groups are characterized by their essential ambiguity. Groups can come and go rapidly, as can their members. Categorizing groups whose roles and identity shift opportunistically is a challenge in any effort to grapple with their numbers and armament. Three problems are especially relevant here. Active or dormant? Armed groups need not be static organizations. Their goals and methods may remain unchanged for decades (as with the Colombia-based FARC or the Kurdish PKK). Others evolve through cycles from peaceful politics to increasing violence, sometimes followed by a return to peaceful politics (Hazen, 2009). DDR efforts, for example, are widely used to facilitate transi-

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tions to peaceful politics, often transform conflicts, but sometimes fail as groups relapse

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into warfare (Muggah, 2009). Because goals and methods can change,

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the spectrum of non-state groups considered

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here must be appreciated as a static simplifi-

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cation, a snapshot of an ever-changing tab-

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leau. In this review, militarily dormant

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groups, not engaged in systematic combat

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operations for the past year, are distinguished from active groups. These dormant groups have ceased active fighting but appear to remain ready for organized vio-

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lence. They represent a form of potential energy, a capability that may turn violent or dissipate peacefully. More detailed insights require multi-year tracking, stressing trends as members and weapons fluctuate. Non-state, pro-state, or part of the state? One of the biggest problems of classification is assessing whether a group is independent of the state. In contrast to gangs, which hope that public authorities will refrain from meddling in their affairs, non-state armed groups are typically understood to challenge the legitimacy and authority of governments. But many insurgents also cooperate with governments or benefit from the patronage of public officials (PRO-GOVERNMENT). This problem is not entirely new; state sponsorship of armed groups was commonplace among all sides in the >em je YbWii_\o cold war (Laqueur, 1999). But the permutations are more numerous and shift faster as groups became more adapt- ijWj[#ifedieh[Z able. The Afghan Taliban, for example, first appeared in 1994 as a state-sponsored insurgency, then ruled Afghanistan ]hekfi _i W fe_dj e\ from 1996 to 2001 as the de facto state. After November 2001, they became non-governmental insurgents again. Since Yed\ki_ed j^Wj 2006, however, they have begun to re-establish governing authority in parts of the country (Giustozzi, 2009). More typically, states sponsor groups against the interests of another state. Rashid points to the importance of state sponsorship when he describes how: [the Pakistan] army carefully calibrated the kinds of weapons and level of funds it provided the Kashmiri militants, and at times reined in the ISI [Pakistan military intelligence] so as not to provoke Indian military retaliation against Pakistan. [In 2002–05, the] ISI underwent a difﬁcult balancing act with the Kashmiri extremist groups, secretly disarming and rehabilitating several thousand militants while still keeping a few in reserve in case the peace process ﬂoundered (Rashid, 2009, p. 112, 291). Thus, Pakistan reportedly controlled militant armament. State-sponsored groups and militias can be very large. In Peru, for example, the army distributed 15,179 shotguns among village Self-Defence Committees for security against Shining Path rebels (Obando, 2007, p. 14). The practice of arming local militias has continued in the Afghan wars to this day (Morarjee, 2006a; 2006b). Calling such groups non-state probably conceals more than it reveals, but it is hard to exclude them. The greatest challenge to a simple insurgent or state taxonomy comes from groups that belong to political parties with acknowledged legitimacy and a role in government, usually through parliamentary representation, and groups that have become de facto ruling authorities themselves. As outlined below, this category includes most of the largest rebel movements. Some serve in government, such as the Moro National Liberation Front in the Philippines, or Hezbollah in Lebanon. A few are acknowledged under internationally brokered agreements, such as the South Sudanese Sudan People’s Liberation Army. Others have near-sovereign authority over large or politically important territories, such as Hamas in Gaza or the administrations of Puntland and Somaliland. For these reasons, these groups are not counted here as non-state armed groups. How to classify state-sponsored groups is a point of confusion that defies easy solution. It may always have to be resolved case-by-case. This particular problem of affiliation with or opposition to the state is resolved here by separating groups with unambiguous connection to legitimate government and labelling them ruling non-state actors. Many are being integrated into the national army or are represented in the government (such as Nepal’s Maoists). Others, often called militias, have widely accepted territorial authority (such as the Iraqi Kurdish parties). These are incomplete distinctions that do not grapple with the more complicated realities described above (PRO-GOVERNMENT).

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Even in this simplified form, the ruling/non-ruling distinction has important implications for weapons estimation; with assured safe territory and easier access to funding, most ruling non-state actors should be assumed to be much better armed. Rapid identity change: While some of the groups examined here have survived for generations, others yield rapidly to new names and organizations. Such rapid transformation breeds confusion and exaggeration of combatant numbers, as moribund groups are combined with current ones. This problem is especially troublesome when assessing non-state groups in Central and West Africa. The effects are probably most readily seen in Somalia, where the groups dominant in the early 1990s have mostly disappeared or melded into contemporary factions and the Transitional Federal Government. Although still listed in prominent reference works, these groups either do not exist or no longer can be considered fundamentally non-state.5 Careful attention is vital when tabulating non-state actors to avoid counting extinct groups or double-counting groups whose names have changed.

J^[ \e] e\ c[cX[hi^_f Although relatively solid data on non-state group membership is available, it is far from reliable. Groups routinely appear to have only a hazy appreciation of their own following. They also may have motives for exaggerating their numbers. Journalists and state security agencies, even international organizations, may be affected by similar bias as well. The haze obscuring membership is probably worst for the smallest and least active groups, but it affects all to some degree. The confusion arises from three particular problems that make up the fog of membership, or chronic uncertainty about the number of armed combatants.6 J^[ \e] e\

One aspect is simply poor information. An extremely large, but otherwise typical, example are the innumerable

c[cX[hi^_f Afghan militias. Leaving aside the Taliban, the number of militiamen in Afghanistan is often expressed as a broad Yh[Wj[i Y^hed_Y range. The Afghan DDR programmes of 2004–06 were planned for anywhere from 50,000 to 250,000 militia memkdY[hjW_djo WXekj bers; 63,000 men were actually processed (Bhatia, 2009). Other estimates arrive at similar totals (Sarwari and Crews, j^[ dkcX[h e\ Whc[Z 2008, p. 325). The problem is compounded by the inability to break down very broad categories, such as Afghan YecXWjWdji$

militia or Bangladeshi militant Islamists, which may conceal multiple groups armed in different ways. When diverging estimates of group strength cannot be resolved in favour of a consensus or preferred figure, a split-the-difference approach is used, based on averaging. The second problem is distinguishing different types of members. Many, often most, members are not combatants but unarmed sympathizers. Separating the two is crucial for estimating weapons inventories or designing counterinsurgency strategies, but very hard in practice. The most extreme case encountered here concerns the Pakistani group Lashkar-e-Taiba (‘Army of the Righteous’), widely held responsible for the November 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks that killed more than 170 people. A prominent study in 2004 concluded that the group had ‘several hundred’ active combatants (Kurth Cronin et al., 2004, p. 60). A more recent statement by an anonymous official of Pakistan’s InterServices Intelligence, though, put Lashkar-e-Taiba membership at about 150,000 (Polgreen and Mekhennet, 2009). The latter number might refer to something, but almost certainly not armed fighters. A third source of uncertainty about group numbers is outright exaggeration. For the Iraq-based Kurdish peshmerga, the standing army of the Kurdish National Assembly, figures of 270,000 to 375,000 soldiers appear in the public domain (Wikipedia, 2009). Either total would rank them among the largest armies in the world—stretching credulity; by comparison, Britain’s Royal Army has 95,780 active personnel (IISS, 2009, p. 158). More credible estimates

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maintain there are 72,000 peshmerga in two major forces (Cordesman, 2008, p. 82). Similar problems appear to affect membership totals for groups in Côte d’Ivoire, Myanmar, and the Philippines. The fog of membership compels observers to be cautious, even sceptical. The fog surrounding membership numbers is endemic in investigations of insurgencies. Careful attention can reduce these problems, such as by testing correspondences or gaps between alleged membership and actual violence. Groups that appear to be numerous, but not especially active, warrant special scrutiny. More research undoubtedly will refine our understanding of some armed groups, but even the best research runs into the inherent nebulosity of many or most non-state groups. Solving such problems is beyond this review. Instead, it relies on the best available figures, preferring the most detailed and recent accounts, preferably informed by local field research, averaging multiple sources where possible.

J^[ WhcWc[dj e\ _dikh][dY_[i Much more information is available on the kinds of weapons used by insurgents than on their quantities. This problem arises from the nature of guerrilla warfare; authorities typically learn about insurgent capabilities by receiving their lethal attacks and examining the detritus of warfare, such as spent casings and captured examples. Reports on weapon types are not numerous but suggestive of types and proportions in use.7 Even the most complete reports of group weapons that have been identified or recovered offer no way to judge reliably the quantities not recovered.

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Insurgent armament can range from the numbing sameness of endless Kalashnikovs to bizarre displays of crude eclecticism. Some groups are extremely well armed. After the defeat of the LTTE, the Sri Lankan Army reported finding almost 100,000 rifles for a force that probably never numbered more than about 11,000 (Bell, 2009; IISS, 2009, p. 474). If accurate, this would make a nearly unprecedented weapons-to-soldier ratio of nine to one. Other sources indicate that some insurgents are greatly hindered by their lack of weapons. The problem is a serious impediment for Naxalite insurgencies in India (Joseph and Srivastava, 2008, p. 125). Many African groups also appear to lack enough arms for all their combatants.8 The best-documented insights into total insurgent firearms inventories often come from DDR progammes, in which former combatants turn in their weapons as a sign of commitment to peace. Not all programmes have a formal disarmament element. Among those that do, official monitors can tabulate only weapons received, not all held (or withheld). Suspicion about weapons withheld dogs every DDR project. One review of 45 DDR programmes found 19 cases in which the total number of weapons received was known. The number of small arms received in these known cases ranged from 2.6 per combatant in the Solomon Islands to only 0.1 in several cases. From the 2,517,000 combatants demobilized this way, a total of 560,000 weapons were reported turned in, for an average of 0.2 small arms or light weapons recovered from each combatant overall (Small Arms Survey, 2009, pp. 184–85). The results of DDR, then, are inconclusive, revealing only that some groups have and submit a lot of weapons, and others turn in proportionately less. In this review, ruling non-state armed groups are usually assumed to be armed at a rate approaching the same level of poorer or less armed state forces, which they closely resemble, with armament ratios as high as 1.6 per combatant (Small Arms Survey, 2006b, pp. 50–51). This appears to accurately describe many insurgencies, apparently armed with an average of roughly 1.6 small arms per combatant, a level that has emerged as the conventional wisdom for insurgent arsenal estimation (Small Arms Survey, 2001, p. 79). In arms-rich environments, such as Europe, South America, the Middle East, and South-east Asia, reports of insurgents with both a rifle and a handgun or grenade launcher are commonplace. There are few reliable reports of non-state groups exceeding such levels. The exceptions appear to be dominated by groups that also control territory (ruling non-state armed groups, as described above). Independent observers in the field report that such levels of armament are rarely attained, except in such regions as Central and West Africa and South Asia, where insurgent armament often appears to be lower, sometimes much lower, on the order of 1.2 or even 0.5 firearms per combatant (see Annexe 2). Where evidence suggests lower levels of weapons accumulation, this has been reflected in the calculations.

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Getting worse or getting better? Whether the total number of non-state combatants in the world is rising or falling is hard to say with great accuracy. Estimates of insurgency size and armament generally do not come annually, but in intermittent dribs and drabs. Tracking the dynamics of specific groups from year to year is often impossible. Certainly, group numbers appear to be rising. In 1999, some 480,000 full-time non-state combatants could be identified, in control of some 910,000 small arms (Small Arms Survey, 2001, p. 79).

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Ten years later, in 2009, their numbers had increased to roughly one million fighters with some 1.4 million small arms, plus an unknown number of light weapons. Their ranks were divided roughly in thirds between currently violent or active insurgencies, dormant ones, and those now in power. Most immediately dangerous are currently

active insurgents, estimated here at 285,000 combatants with roughly 350,000 small arms in 2009. But even dormant and ruling groups pose major challenges to peaceful conflict resolution as well as domestic and international stability (see Table 4.6 and Figure 4.2). Much of the apparent increase is the result of more sensitive research methods and insight from related disciplines. This permits more complete appreciation of previously overlooked non-state factions, and corresponding adjustment of non-state group numbers. The numerically most important methodological change involves more inclusive counting procedures. Whereas previous reviews by the Small Arms Survey only counted insurgencies, this review also counts dormant and ruling non-state groups. The largest of all groups, for example, would not have been counted previously. The Sudan People’s Liberation Army and allied forces, with a combined total of 141,000 personnel, is by far the biggest non-state armed group, more than double the Mahdi Army of Iraq (see Annexes 2 and 3). But it has not been engaged in major combat operations since 2005 (SUDAN). The number of actively fighting combatants appears to be down markedly since 1999, except for the unintended consequences of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. In Afghanistan, intervention by the United States in October 2001 removed the Taliban from power. Illustrating the fluidity of ruling and insurgent groups, almost immediately, some 60,000 Taliban fighters ceased to be soldiers of the republic and were set to re-emerge as the largest active insurgent group in the world today (Rashid, 2009, p. 81). Much the same happened in Iraq. The basis for the insurgency was laid before the war, when Saddam Hussein and his son Uday created the Fedayeen Saddam, a Baathist–Sunni militia to strengthen the regime and lead guerrilla resistance against its enemies (Otterman, 2003). Further impetus came from the infamous Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 2, issued by the US administrator in Iraq, Paul Bremer, on 23 May 2003 (Bremer and McConnell, 2006). This directive disbanded the Iraqi Army of 400,000 soldiers, pushing many more into the uprising (Murphy, 2004). Other Iraqis quickly organized to form rival factions, above all the Shi’ite Mahdi Army. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq created rebel movements with several hundred thousand combatants. The nonstate armed groups in these two wars—active insurgents and dormant militias—constitute approximately 377,000, or more than 50 per cent, of the 735,000 active and dormant non-state soldiers identified here worldwide (see Annexes 1–3). Because they tend to be quite well armed, these groups have an even higher proportion of total insurgent and

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the number for all non-state combatants in 2009 would be below the level of 1999. This is consistent with the finding of other studies showing a decline in armed conflict since the mid-1990s (Mack, 2005). The decisive defeat of the LTTE by the Sri Lankan army in May 2009 further suppresses insurgent numbers for the year (IISS, 2009, p. 357). Table 4.7 reveals just how highly concentrated are the small arms of non-state groups. Listed here are all insurgencies and militias with 10,000 or more active or fully participating members in 2009. Listing just 24 of the 386 groups featured in the appendices to this chapter, Table 4.7 accounts for about 80 per cent of all insurgent weapons identified in this review. It also clarifies the dominance of ruling and dormant groups. Only two of the ten largest groups are militarily active.

J^[ Z_ifhefehj_edWj[ _cfWYj e\ icWbb dkcX[hi Compared to arsenals of other gun-owning groups, those of insurgents, militias, and terrorist movements can be quite small. Of some 875 million firearms worldwide, roughly 1.4 million are controlled by nonstate groups (other than gangs), few compared to the impact of guerrilla warfare and terrorism on international stability (Small Arms Survey, 2007, ch. 2). By comparison, law enforcement agencies have about 20 times more firearms, armed forces about 150 times more, and the individuals of the world more than 450 times as many. Even these comparisons tend to exaggerate insurgent numbers, inflated by groups currently dormant or militarily inactive and those that have become de facto or legitimate rulers.

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To be sure, small arms are not the whole story of insurgent armament (see Box 4.4). Small numbers, however, are not always inconsequential either. Some of the most dangerous groups number no more than a few thousand; some number just a few hundred. The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) might be expected to harbour an enormous number of guerrillas, considering the scale of carnage and destruction involving millions of dead and displaced. About 20 armed factions in the DRC have been recognized by the Kinshasa government or international agencies. The authors of some of the worst Congolese destruction numbered roughly 23,000 combatants, hardly a vast horde (Bavier, 2008; Thakur, 2008). The extraordinary disparity between the scale of rebel movements and their humanitarian and political damage is the source of their greatest significance. The attack of 11 September 2001 illustrates the potential of small groups of rebels or terrorists. Another aspect is their remarkable tenacity, fighting wars that typically take at least nine years to conclude, often much longer (Hammes, 2004). Put another way, small insurgent forces can tie down vastly larger state forces, a fact central to the strategic insights of T. E. Lawrence and Mao Zedong. Conventional wisdom holds that defeat of an insurgency requires ten-to-one military superiority of state forces (Galula, 1964, p. 7). The historical accuracy of this statement was challenged almost as soon as it was offered (Heilbrunn, 1965). Although Galula’s classic formula must be tailored to specific circumstances, its metaphorical insight is almost universally accepted (Nagl, 2005). The small number of insurgents, instead of offering reassurance, represents an enduring challenge.

9ED9BKI?ED It is no accident that the best-understood small arms and light weapons, those of states and civilians, are often most amenable to quantification, analysis, and policy-making. Nor is it any surprise that the hazier arsenals of youth gangs, criminal organizations, guerrilla fighters, and terrorist cells have often been much more difficult to deal with. The estimates in this chapter, tentative as they are, help put the number of small arms held by non-state groups in broader perspective. Gangs control at least two million and probably no more than ten million firearms in all. Non-state groups have a total of about 1.4 million small arms. Amounting to somewhere between 0.4 and 1.3 per cent of all small arms, the arsenals of gangs and groups are much smaller than might be guessed from their ubiquity in the news and entertainment, or from their humanitarian effects or political importance. Above all, this review testifies to the importance of further research on non-state small arms and the need for better supporting data. Two priorities stand out. First is the need to see through the fog of membership. If research generally responds to the worst problems, we probably know already where the largest and most serious gang problems are. But even in those instances, estimates often diverge considerably. Elsewhere, moreover, the scale of gang and group membership remains hazy, at best. Second is the need for better appreciation of group small arms acquisition and ownership. As shown by previously cited research carried out in the United States and England and Wales, careful research yields powerful insight into firearms ownership and use, even among criminal groups. As shown by the references here, diligent field research has been especially revealing about the weaponry of both gangs and groups. Policy in both fields will undoubtedly benefit from more intensive study. If there is truth in the words of management guru Peter Drucker—who said, ‘What gets measured gets managed’—then systematic efforts to deal with the small arms of gangs and non-state groups are just beginning. The estimates here demonstrate the kinds of insights that can be generated about an aspect of small arms policy often assumed to be impossibly obscure. As this chapter shows, the arsenals of gangs and insurgents, like any area of social life, will yield to careful investigation.

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Although gangs are non-state, in this chapter a gang refers to criminal groups, usually dominated by young members. The non-state actors examined here usually seek political power. More complete definitions are presented in Boxes 4.1 and 4.3. Some overlap seems unavoidable; distinctions often must be made case-by case.

2 3

For detailed explanations of the estimation method, see Small Arms Survey (2001, pp. 59–93). An exception is made for the United States, where there is near equality of the total numbers of guns and people (roughly 270 firearms for 304 million people in 2008), allowing a maximum of 1.2 firearms for each gang member in this estimate.

Interview by Eric G. Berman, Small Arms Survey, with Boston police, 2009.

The confusion becomes apparent when comparing the Somali factions still listed in the IISS Armed Conflict Database: Non-State Armed Groups

With apologies to Carl von Clausewitz (1976, p. 140).

See, for example, Small Arms Survey (2006a, p. 23).

Author interviews with researchers James Bevan and Nicolas Florquin, 2009.

(IISS, n.d.) with a recent United Nations Security Council report on Somalia (UNSC, 2008).

8?8B?E=H7F>O Anderson, W. French. 2006. Forensic Analysis of the April 11, 1986 FBI Firefight. Boulder, Colorado: Paladin Press. AP (Associated Press). 2009. ‘Use of IEDs Increased by 80 Percent.’ 5 June. Arana, Ana. 2005. ‘How the Street Gangs Took Central America.’ Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 3, pp. 98–110. Atran, Scott. 2003. ‘Genesis of Suicide Terrorism.’ Science, Vol. 299, No. 5612, pp. 1534–39. Bavier, Joe. 2008. ‘Congo Government Expands Talks to 20 Armed Groups.’ Reuters. 8 December. Bell, Stewart. 2009. ‘$20M in Tiger Weapons Seized.’ National Post (Ontario). 5 May. Bennett, Trevor and Katy Holloway. 2004a. ‘Gang Membership, Drugs and Crime in the UK.’ British Journal of Criminology, Vol. 44, No. 3, pp. 305–23. —. 2004b. ‘Possession and Use of Illegal Guns among Offenders in England and Wales.’ Howard Journal, Vol. 43, No. 3. Berkman, Heather. 2007. Social Exclusion and Violence in Latin America and the Caribbean. Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank, October. Bhatia, Michael, et al. 2009. ‘DDR in Afghanistan.’ Small Arms Survey 2009: Shadows of War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 286, 298, 310. Bird, Sheila M. and Clive B. Fairweather. 2007. ‘Military Fatality Rates (by Cause) in Afghanistan and Iraq.’ International Journal of Epidemiology, Vol. 36, No. 4, pp. 841–46. —. 2009. ‘IEDs and Military Fatalities in Iraq and Afghanistan.’ RUSI Journal, Vol. 154, No. 4, pp. 30–38.

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Bjerregaard, Beth and Alan J. Lizotte. 1995. ‘Gun Ownership and Gang Membership.’ Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, Vol. 86, No. 1, pp. 37–58. Bremer, L. Paul and Malcolm McConnell. 2006. My Year in Iraq. New York: Simon & Schuster. Brinkhoff, Thomas. n.d.a. ‘City Population: Ecuador.’ <http://www.citypopulation.de/Ecuador.html> —. n.d.b. ‘City Population: Jamaica.’ <http://www.citypopulation.de/Jamaica.html> Castillo, E. Eduardo and Michelle Roberts. 2009. ‘Mexico’s Weapons Cache Stymies Tracing.’ Associated Press. 7 May. von Clausewitz, Carl. 1976 (1831). On War. Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Cordesman, Anthony H. 2008. Iraq’s Insurgency and the Road to Civil Conflict. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies. Decker, Scott H. and Kimberly Kempf-Leonard. 1991. ‘Constructing Gangs: The Social Definition of Youth Activities.’ Criminal Justice Policy Review, Vol. 5, No. 4, pp. 271–91. — and Barrik Van Winkle. 1996. Life in the Gang: Family, Friends, and Violence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. — and Frank M. Weerman, eds. 2005. European Street Gangs and Troublesome Youth Groups. Oxford: AltaMira. DSSPA (Department of Social Services and Poverty Alleviation). n.d. Western Cape Population Profile. Cape Town: DSSPA, p. 2. Egley, Jr., Arlen and Christina E. O’Donnell. 2009. Highlights of the 2007 National Youth Gang Survey. Washington, DC: US Department of Justice. April. Esbensen, Finn-Aage, et al. 2001. ‘Youth Gangs and Definitional Issues: When Is a Gang a Gang, and Why Does It Matter?’ Crime & Delinquency, Vol. 47, No. 1. — and Frank M. Weerman. 2005. ‘Youth Gangs and Troublesome Youth Groups in the United States and the Netherlands: A Cross-National Comparison.’ European Journal of Criminology, Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 5–37. FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation). 1986. Shooting Incident Miami Florida April 11, 1986: Administrative Inquiry. Washington, DC: FBI. June. —. n.d. ‘Italian Organized Crime: Overview.’ <http://www.fbi.gov/hq/cid/orgcrime/lcnindex.htm> Florquin, Nicolas and Eric G. Berman, eds. 2005. Armed and Aimless: Armed Groups, Guns, and Human Security in the ECOWAS Region. Geneva: Small Arms Survey. Ford, Jess T. 2009. Firearms Trafficking: U.S. Efforts to Combat Arms Trafficking to Mexico Face Planning and Coordination Challenges. Washington, DC: US Government Accountability Office. 19 June. Galula, David. 1964. Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. New York: Praeger. Girard, Aurélien. 2009. ‘AK-47 Attack Takes Violence in Parisian Suburbs to New High.’ Epoch Times. 20 May. Giustozzi, Antonio. 2009. Decoding the New Taliban: Insights from the Afghan Field. New York: Columbia University Press. Hammes, T. X. 2004. The Sling and the Stone. Osceola, WI: Zenith Books. Hankins, Chris B. 2004. The New Paradigm: Police Trends toward More Powerful Handguns and the Mental Aspects of Combat Survival and Training. 8 November. <http://www.cji.edu/papers/HankinsChris.pdf> Hazen, Jennifer M. 2009. ‘From Social Movement to Armed Group: A Case Study from Nigeria.’ Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 30, No. 2, pp. 281–300. Heilbrunn, Otto. 1965. ‘How Many Men to Vietnam?’ Military Review, Vol. 45, No. 12, pp. 27–33. IISS (International Institute for Strategic Studies). 2009. Military Balance 2009. London: Routledge. —. n.d. ‘Armed Conflict Database: Non-State Armed Groups.’ <http://acd.iiss.org/armedconflict/MainPages/dsp_nsagList.asp> Janin, Albert S. 2007. ‘Engaging Civilian-Belligerents Leads to Self Defense/Protocol I Marriage.’ Army Lawyer, 1 July, p. 92. JNPA (Japanese National Police Agency). 2007. Criminal Investigation: Fight against Organized Crime. June. Joseph, Mallika and Devyani Srivastava. 2008. ‘Left Extremism: The Naxal Conflict in India.’ In D. Suba Chandran and P. R. Chari, eds. Armed Conflicts in South Asia 2008. London: Routledge. Kaempffer, William. 2009. ‘City Cops Trading up for Larger-caliber Arms.’ New Haven Register. 5 May. Karp, Aaron. 2009. ‘The Changing Ownership of War: States, Insurgencies and Technology.’ Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 30, No. 2. Katsumata, Kunio. 2008. ‘Tighter Gun Law Eyed to Deny Permits to Stalkers, Abusers.’ Asahi Shimbun. 4 April. Klein, Malcolm W., ed. 2001. The Eurogang Paradox: Street Gangs and Youth Groups in the U.S. and Europe. Dordrecht: Kluwer. — and Cheryl L. Maxson. 2006. Street Gang Patterns and Policies. Oxford: Oxford University Press. — et al. 2006. ‘Street Gang Violence in Europe.’ European Journal of Criminology, Vol. 3, No. 4, pp. 413–37. Krause, Keith, ed. 2009. Challenging the Weberian State: Armed Groups and Contemporary Conflict. Special issue of Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 30, No. 2. Kurth Cronin, Audrey, et al. 2004. Foreign Terrorist Organizations. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. Lal, Rollie. 2005. ‘South Asian Organized Crime and Terrorist Networks.’ Orbis, Vol. 49, No. 2, pp. 293–304. Laqueur, Walter. 1999. The New Terrorism. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 156–83. Mack, Andrew. 2005. ‘Why the Dramatic Decline in Armed Conflict?’ In Human Security Report Project. Human Security Report 2005: War and Peace in the 21st Century. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Manwaring, Max G. 2009. State and Nonstate Associated Gangs: Credible Midwives of New Social Orders. Carlisle, Pennsylvania: US Army War College. May. Marshall, Ben, et al. 2005. Rationalisation of Current Research on Guns, Gangs and Other Weapons: Phase 1. London: Jill Dando Institute of Crime Science. November. McLaughlin, Tim. 2009. ‘Uncertainties Help Trigger Sales for Smith & Wesson.’ Boston Business Journal. 6 July. MedellinInfo.com. n.d. ‘Current Population of Medellín, Colombia: Metropolitan Areas.’ <http://www.medellininfo.com/facts/population>

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Morarjee, Rachel. 2006a. ‘Alarm at Kabul Plan to Arm Tribes.’ Financial Times. 10–11 June. —. 2006b. ‘Afghan Donors Fear Rearming of Warlords.’ Financial Times. 10–11 June. Muggah, Robert. 2009. ‘The Emperor’s Clothes?’ In Robert Muggah, ed. Security and Post-conflict Reconstruction. London: Routledge. Murphy, Dan. 2004. ‘Shiites Taxing Thin US Forces.’ Christian Science Monitor. 8 April. Nagl, John. 2005. Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, revised edn. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Nakamura, Akemi. 2007. ‘Headline-grabbing Gun Crimes Mar Safe Image.’ Japan Times. 5 June. Obando, Enrique. 2007. Peru. Unpublished background paper. Geneva: Small Arms Survey. O’Neill, Sean. 2009. ‘2,800 Crime Gangs Ravage UK Streets.’ The Times. 25 April. oneIndia. 2007. ‘ROMF Prepares Blue Print for Police Housing.’ 18 July. <http://news.oneindia.in/2007/07/18/romf-prepares-blue-print-for-police-housing-1184766206.html> Otterman, Sharon. 2003. ‘Iraq: What Is the Fedayeen Saddam?’ Council on Foreign Relations. 31 March. <http://www.cfr.org/publication/7698/> Polgreen, Lydia and Souad Mekhennet. 2009. ‘Militant Network Is Intact Long after Mumbai Siege.’ The New York Times. 30 September. Rashid, Ahmed. 2009. Descent into Chaos: The U.S. and the Disaster in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia. London: Penguin. Reuter, Christoph. 2004. My Life Is a Weapon: A Modern History of Suicide Bombing. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Sarwari, Atiq and Robert D. Crews. 2008. ‘Epilogue.’ In Robert D. Crews and Amin Tarzi, eds. The Taliban and the Crisis of Afghanistan. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Schlichte, Klaus. 2009. In the Shadow of Violence: The Politics of Armed Groups. Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, ch. 7. Sheley, Joseph F. and James D. Wright. 1995. In the Line of Fire: Youths, Guns, and Violence in Urban America. Hawthorn, New York: de Gruyter, pp. 46–50. Slack, Donovan. 2009a. ‘Police Add Assault Rifles across the State.’ Boston Globe. 3 June. —. 2009b. ‘Even Small Localities Got Big Guns.’ Boston Globe. 15 June. Small Arms Survey. 2001. Small Arms Survey 2001: Profiling the Problem. Oxford: Oxford University Press. —. 2006a. Armed Groups in Sudan: The South Sudan Defence Forces in the Aftermath of the Juba Declaration. Geneva: Small Arms Survey. October. —. 2006b. Small Arms Survey 2006: Unfinished Business. Oxford: Oxford University Press. —. 2007. Small Arms Survey 2007: Guns and the City. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. —. 2009. Small Arms Survey 2009: Shadows of War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ch. 5. Smith, Tom W. 2007. Public Attitudes towards the Regulation of Firearms. Chicago: National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago. March. Smith & Wesson. 2009. Smith & Wesson Holding Corporation: Annual Report Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1943, for the Fiscal Year Ended April 30, 2009. Washington, DC: US Securities and Exchange Commission. Swami, Praveen. 2009. ‘No Bang in Mumbai Police’s New Guns.’ The Hindu. 8 April. Thakur, Monika. 2008. Elusive Peace in the DR Congo: Armed Groups and Militias in the Kivus and Ituri. Paper presented at the International Studies Association convention, San Francisco, 26 March. UCJFSU (Union of Councils for Jews in the Former Soviet Union). 2008. ‘Government Minister Says Youth Gang Members in Russia Number over 200,000.’ 31 December. UK (United Kingdom). n.d. ‘UK National Statistics: Population Estimates.’ Newport, South Wales: Office for National Statistics, UK Statistics Authority. <http://www.statistics.gov.uk> UNODC (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime). 2007. Crime and Development in Central America. Vienna: UNODC. May, pp. 17, 60. UNSC (United Nations Security Council). 2008. Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1811 (2008). S/2008/769 of 10 December. USAID (United States Agency for International Development). 2006. Central America and Mexico Gang Assessment. Washington, DC: USAID. <http://www.usaid.gov/locations/latin_america_caribbean/democracy/gangs_assessment.pdf> Weerman, Frank M., et al. 2009. Eurogang Program Manual. Saint Louis: Eurogang Project, University of Missouri. February. Weidacher, Reinhilde. 2005. Behind a Veil of Secrecy: Military Small Arms and Light Weapons Production in Western Europe. Geneva: Small Arms Survey. October, p. 41. Wikipedia. 2009. ‘Peshmerga.’ <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peshmerga> —. 2010. ‘Mumbai Police.’ <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mumbai_Police> World Bank. 2009. Population 2008. World Development Indicators Database. 15 September. <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/POP.pdf> Wright, Alan. 2006. Organised Crime. Cullompton: Willan Publishing, p. 149.

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7 c[cX[h e\ W É\b[n_ kd_jÊ \hec IjhWj^YboZ[ Feb_Y[" \ehc[Z je jWYab[ ]Wd] l_eb[dY[ _d j^[ ;Wij ;dZ e\ =bWi]em" i[WhY^[i \eh W ]hekf e\ Xeoi Whc[Z m_j^ W_h]kdi" I[fj[cX[h (&&,$ :Wl_Z =_bbWdZ[hi%=[jjo ?cW][i

=Wd] L_eb[dY[ MehbZm_Z[ 9EDJ;NJ" 9KBJKH;" 7D: 9EKDJHO ?DJHE:K9J?ED0 7D ?DJ;HD7J?ED7B 7FFHE79> JE =7D= L?EB;D9; Trinidad and Tobago’s reputation as a model of stability in the Caribbean, home to tourism, manufacturing, and petroleum, is now under siege. While the economy has grown strongly over the last decade in this country of 1.3 million residents, so has the murder rate. There were 98 homicides in 1998, but 550 in 2008. The attention normally reserved for sandy beaches is increasingly directed at gangs, responsible for more than half of the country’s homicides in 2008 (Townsend, 2009, p. 18). In the last 20 years, gangs and gang violence have increasingly captured the attention of the media, the general public, policy-makers, and researchers. High-profile cases of seemingly haphazard, often public gang violence—such as that experienced in Trinidad and Tobago,1 Salinas, California,2 or the 2009 spate of gang stabbings in London3— consistently make headline news. The conceptual and practical importance accorded to understanding gangs and gang behaviour largely reflects the well-known risks associated with gang involvement. Using various methodologies, research has consistently found a link between gangs and violence. For example, one study of high-risk youth in the United States found that while gang members comprised only 31 per cent of the sample, they were responsible for 82 per cent of violent acts (Thornberry et al., 2003, p. 50). Much of our knowledge about gang violence comes from research based on gangs and gang violence in the United States. This is largely due to a long-standing presence of gangs in the country and nearly nine decades of research, including the systematic collection of gang-related data. Yet the turn of the millennium ushered in a growing wave of research on the problems associated with gangs and violence around the globe, with scholars exploring the transnational and global aspects of gangs.4 Part of this interest is a result of the Eurogang research platform, a summit convened to bring together researchers to assess the problem of gangs and violence in European nations (and beyond) by systematically collecting data for comparative research. While the nature and extent of gang violence differs across countries, there are parallels in terms of how gang violence manifests itself. This chapter reviews and synthesizes scholarly contributions on gang violence from around the globe and identifies themes from the research. Recognizing the similarities and differences of gang violence from an international perspective is a key to providing responses and solutions to the problem. The chapter examines the scope and scale of gang violence around the world, including similarities and differences across countries, and considers some of the most persuasive explanations for such violence. Its key findings include: s Gangs are a key risk factor for violence and victimization. s Gang violence, including homicide, is most often directed against other gang members. Gang homicide rates are estimated at up to 100 times that of the broader population.

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s The level of gun use by gangs often appears to be related to the availability of guns in the countries where they are active. s Motives for gang violence—including racial or ethnic conflict, economic gain, and respect or power—share similarities across regions. The chapter begins by defining the problem—gangs and gang violence—in a global context. It then presents research into the scope and scale of gang violence around the globe, focusing particularly on the United States, where systematic data on gang homicide has been gathered. In its final section, the chapter examines various explanations for gang violence. The chapter puts particular emphasis on the role of gangs and gang members in small arms use.

:;<?D?D= =7D=I 7D: =7D= L?EB;D9; ?D 7 =BE87B 9EDJ;NJ Considerable variation remains in the way gangs are defined. The task of defining a gang has absorbed countless scholarly journal and book pages. Many researchers shy away from the term ‘gang’, opting for less stigmatizing terms such as ‘informal youth group’, ‘delinquent peer group’, ‘delinquent networks’, and ‘troublesome youth groups’.

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Regardless of semantic differences, it is readily understood that groupings of youthful individuals take on certain characteristics, and that the group itself takes on a specific meaning. The delinquent and criminal activity associated with gang members is what distinguishes them as a group. But defining gangs in a global context is important; the development of universally consistent definitions is essential to being able to draw comparisons across countries. Without definitional uniformity, it would be difficult to draw meaning from European gang violence research when contrasting its findings with those of the larger body of United States research. Researchers in the Eurogang programme took on this task over the last decade and concluded that gangs exhibit five defining characteristics (Klein and Maxson, 2006): s durability (with respect to the group over time), s street-oriented lifestyle (activities are oriented around places open to the public), s youthfulness (members tend to be in their teens and early 20s), s illegal activity (law-violating—delinquent or criminal—behaviour), and s identity (in that illegal activities help define the group identity). This chapter uses the Eurogang definition, which was developed by more than 100 US and European researchers J^[ gk[ij_ed e\ m^Wj over a four-year period and allows for the consistent identification of a gang across jurisdictions. Factors that are not Yedij_jkj[i W ]Wd] part of the Eurogang definition—such as the size of the gang, its structure, organization, ethnicity, symbols, gender, h[cW_di h[bWj_l[bo and cohesiveness—capture the variation and diversity of gangs, but are not necessary for defining a group as a gang. ef[d$ Notwithstanding the recent advances in defining a gang, the question of what constitutes gang violence remains relatively open. To understand the extent of gang violence in a global context, it is necessary to establish whether an act of violence was attributable to a gang. At first glance this may appear a simple task; however, law enforcement agencies have employed two differing approaches—member-based and motive-based—for determining whether acts of gang violence were the product of a gang. The more inclusive member-based approach emphasizes the participation of the individual gang member in the act. In other words, if a gang member is an offender or a victim of a violent crime, it is classified as gang-related. This method is used by the city of Los Angeles, California, as well as a number of other jurisdictions in measuring the scope of gang member crime. The more restrictive motive-based approach emphasizes the motivation behind the crime, in particular whether it furthers the goals of the gang. This approach is used by cities such as Chicago, Illinois, and requires investigators to establish whether the act of violence was driven by economic gain, retaliatory violence, territorial conflict, or other incentives furthering the interests of the gang. The implications of these definitions are substantial. Maxson and Klein (1990) pose the question ‘twice as great, or half as great?’ after comparing Los Angeles and Chicago gang homicide records. They find that the member-based definition yielded nearly twice as many gang homicides as the motive-based definition (Maxson and Klein, 1990; 1996). This is an important example of how definitions of gang-related concepts (such as gangs, gang members, gang homicides) can radically alter conclusions about gangs. Beyond sheer volume, however, there were no empirical, conceptual, or policy differences in the characteristics of these homicides that would argue in favour of employing a member- or motive-based definition (Maxson and Klein, 1990). For the purposes of this chapter, when comparing gang violence across countries, the characteristics and participation of gang members are the important markers for identifying gang violence. For this reason, the member-based definition is applied.

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J>; I9EF; 7D: I97B; E< =7D= L?EB;D9; 7HEKD: J>; =BE8; The global extent of gang violence is emerging from a variety of research platforms. Politicians and academics alike are attempting to gauge the pervasiveness of this violence, and recent anthologies have attempted to provide meaning to gangs ‘beyond America’.5 It is important to note that gang violence has both direct and indirect consequences (see Box 5.1). The direct consequences, of course, include the victims themselves. But the indirect consequences include the broader circle of family, friends, and neighbours whose lives are also affected by gang violence. This section reviews the existing literature on gang violence around the world, by region.6 While gangs and gang violence have existed outside of the United States for some time, the same cannot be said for the systematic collection of gang-related data. It is for this reason that this chapter begins by focusing on gang violence in the United States.

Kd_j[Z IjWj[i WdZ 9WdWZW Since the classical studies of US gangs from the early 20th century (Asbury, 1928; Thrasher, 1927), researchers have taken great interest in gang violence; yet it was not until the late 1970s that attempts were made to systematically collect data on gang homicides in large cities (Miller, 1982). This information revealed that in nine US cities, gang homicides comprised a sizeable portion of the overall homicides (Miller, 1982). This recognition of the gang–violence nexus gave impetus to the pursuit of a broader understanding of gangs. From 1967 to 1980, the number of gang homicides grew from 181 to 633—nearly a 250 per cent increase (Miller, 1982, as cited in Howell, 1999, p. 208). Since then, a number of researchers have collected and analysed gang homicide data in the United States. In 1995 this task was assumed by the National Youth Gang Center, which merged into the National Gang Center in October 2009. The Center collects data annually from policing agencies and publishes findings with regard to various types of gangrelated statistics, such as gang problems, homicides, and demographics (NYGC, 2007).

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Figure 5.1 presents the frequency of gang homicides in the 100 largest US cities from 2002 through 2006.8 Population sizes of these cities ranged from nearly 9 million residents in New York City to cities with some 200,000 residents. The United States recorded roughly 7,800 gang homicides in this five-year time span, averaging approximately 1,500 homicides per year. The majority of large US cities (between 51 and 76 per cent, depending on the year) reported fewer than ten gang-related homicides each, while a smaller portion (between 12 and 21 per cent) reported no gang-related homicides. During the five-year period, gang homicides comprised about 25 per cent of the total number of homicides in these cities, highlighting the central involvement of gangs in urban homicide tallies. To get a better idea of underlying trends, rates of gang homicide can also be computed, allowing for comparisons between cities and between the general population and gang members.9 The annual gang homicide rate was 2.73 per 100,000 citizens for the 100 largest cities in the United States. This figure, which does not reflect homicides committed by non-gang members in the same population sample, is greater than the homicide rates of many industrialized countries. Moreover, this rate varied between cities from 0 to over 10, with some of the larger US cities experiencing gang homicide rates much higher than others.

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Comparing gang homicide to aggregate city population only hints at the extent of the problem, however. For the same five-year period, the mean gang-related homicide rate was 893.4 per 100,000 gang members. If all law enforcement agencies employed a motive-based classification model and Maxson and Klein’s ‘half as great’ was equally true for large cities in the United States, a conservative estimate would be in the range of 450 gang-related homicides per 100,000 gang members—consistent with the figures reported by Maxson (1999, p. 244). Even this homicide rate is alarmingly high, especially when compared to the overall homicide rate in the United States (5.7 per 100,000) and to other countries such as Australia, England and Wales, or even South Africa (1.2, 1.6, and 54.0 per 100,000, respectively).10 This number acquires added significance when compared to the homicide rate of other high-risk demographic groups, such as young black men in the United States (96.1 per 100,000) or young black men in the city of Los Angeles (220.2 per 100,000). Gang-related homicides have the ability to drive overall homicide rates in cities, as shown by Maxson, Curry, and Howell (2002, pp. 125–30) regarding the 1990s and by this chapter for the following decade. Figure 5.2 illustrates the exceptionally high rates of lethal violence experienced among US gang members. In Los Angeles, the relationship between homicides and the presence of gangs in a neighbourhood is especially glaring (Robinson et al., 2009). A comparison of neighbourhoods in relation to the density of street gangs (that is, the number of gangs) reveals a stark difference in homicide rates between gang and non-gang neighbourhoods. In neighbourhoods that have no gangs within a two-mile radius, there was an average of 3.4 homicides per square mile over a nine-year period. On the other hand, if 1–10, 11–20, 21–30, and 30+ gangs were active within a two-mile radius, neighbourhoods had an average of 11.5, 29.1, 41.8, and 61.1 homicides per square mile, respectively (Robinson et al., 2009, p. 518). Even neighbourhoods with only a few gangs had about three times more homicides per square mile than gang-free neighbourhoods. The above homicide statistics have been corroborated through a number of studies examining the phenomenon of gang violence in the United States (Howell, 1999; Maxson, 1999). Qualitative research has documented the instrumental function of violence within gangs.11 Quantitative explorations have recorded the disproportionate involvement

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of gang members compared to non-gang youths in violent acts.12 In a study carried out in St. Louis, Missouri, of 99 gang members interviewed in the early 1990s, 28 lost their lives due to violence within ten years (Decker and Van Winkle, 1996; Taylor et al., 2007, p. 356). Canada also has gangs and gang violence, although not on the same scale as in the United States. A recent estimate from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police notes the presence of 7,071 gang members in Canada, most of them in the Province of Ontario (RCMP, 2006, p. 26). Gang violence is also present in Canada.13 Between 1992 and 2000, the Canadian Homicide Survey revealed that annual gang homicides had increased from 19 to 72, before declining sharply to 45 in 2002 (Savoie, 2003). Even with this decrease, however, one out of every 13 Canadian homicides was identified as gang-related (Savoie, 2003, p. 5). By 2005, the number of gang homicides had increased to 107, the highest point in the trend (Dauvergne and Li, 2006, p. 8). Gang-related homicides are more likely to occur in public places and to involve firearms than other (such as domestic or robbery-related) homicides. They also often involve young offenders and victims, much like gang homicides in the United States (Dauvergne and Li, 2006). A study of Canadian gang networks focused on two groups: the Hells Angels motorcycle gang and two streetlevel gangs associated with drug distribution in Montreal and the state of Quebec (Morselli, 2008). The conflict that raged between the Hells Angels and the rival Alliance group saw 126 murders, 135 attempted murders, as well as

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the murder of two prison guards and the death of a journalist within a seven-year period (Morselli, 2008, pp. 147–48). This violence has led to growing awareness and quicker response from Canadian authorities, comparable to the situation in the United States during the late 1980s and 1990s.

;khef[ While the levels of violence in Europe may pale in comparison to those in the United States, there is a noticeable presence of gangs across European countries. The research findings produced by members of the Eurogang network have identified gangs in 50 European cities and 16 European countries (Klein, Weerman, and Thornberry, 2006, p. 433). Nevertheless, many researchers in Europe have approached gang research with scepticism, tending to study subcultures, networks, and troublesome youths rather than ‘gangs’ because of the potential stigma, racism, and oppression associated with the term (Aldridge, Medina, and Ralphs, 2008). European gangs tend to be smaller, less organized, and less violent than their US counterparts. Two notable quantitative studies have undertaken comparative assessments of US and European gang violence levels. One fouryear longitudinal study compared youths in Denver, Colorado, to youths in Bremen, Germany, utilizing similar survey instruments (Huizinga and Schumann, 2001). Gang members comprised 14 per cent of the Denver sample and 13 per cent of the Bremen sample. In both cases, gang members contributed disproportionately to the sample’s cumulative violent delinquency, with Denver gang youths being responsible for 64 per cent and Bremen youths for 44 per cent of the violent acts reported. Despite the differences in proportions, this suggests gang youths as a whole

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are disproportionately responsible for roughly three to four times more violent delinquency than non-gang youth, regardless of country of origin (Huizinga and Schumann, 2001, p. 239). Another study replicated these findings with US and Dutch youths (Esbensen and Weerman, 2005). The US sample consisted of nearly 6,000 youths, with data collected in middle school settings across 11 cities (urban, suburban, and rural). The Dutch sample consisted of nearly 2,000 youths with data collected in comparable school settings. Gang members comprised eight per cent of the US sample and six per cent of the Dutch sample. Similar to the Denver–Bremen findings, gang youths, compared to non-gang youths, in the United States and the Netherlands were disproportionately involved in violent offences. Indeed, both US and Dutch gang youths reported nearly four times as many violent delinquent offences than non-gang youths (Esbensen and Weerman, 2005, p. 23). Other European research also found gang members to be disproportionately involved in violent offences compared to nongang respondents: among a sample of 2,725 English and Welsh arrestees (Bennett and Holloway, 2004, p. 311) and among a sample of 4,299 adolescent youths in Edinburgh, Scotland (Bradshaw, 2005, p. 210). These findings are important because they allow comparisons between countries as well as between gang and Ed[ cW`eh Z_\\[h[dY[ non-gang individuals, providing insight into the inherent problems associated with gang involvement. While these X[jm[[d j^[ KI WdZ findings may seem to undermine Klein et al.’s (2006) argument that European gangs are less violent and less delin- ;khef[Wd ]Wd] iY[d[ quent than US gangs, the qualitative research in Europe generally supports this contention.14 Whereas ‘reports of _i j^[ fh[i[dY[ e\ gang-related homicides are almost entirely absent from the Eurogang studies’ (Klein, Weerman, and Thornberry, \_h[Whci Wced] ]Wd]i 2006, p. 430), studies of US gangs report high levels of gang involvement in homicide. Most of the qualitative _d j^[ Kd_j[Z IjWj[i$ Eurogang research reports that while conflicts do indeed exist between youth gangs, the members do not use violence, and especially not gun violence, with the same frequency and consistency as their US counterparts. Clearly one major difference between the US and European gang scene is the presence of firearms among gangs in the United States. European and Canadian gangs are more alike on this measure. While homicide rates may be relatively low in European countries, research has found the threat of violence to be clearly identifiable (Van Gemert, 2001). Gangs in Manchester, UK, could represent an exception to the theories about what distinguishes US from European gangs. A study of the violent offending characteristics of four South Manchester gangs shows a series of rivalries, conflicts, and retaliatory violence between the gangs (Bullock and Tilley, 2002). Between 1997 and 2000, there were 270 shootings in Manchester, with nearly 60 per cent considered gang-related. Of the 29 shooting deaths, nearly 80 per cent involved a gang member either as an offender, victim, or both (Bullock and Tilley, 2002, pp. 15, 33, 36). In US terms, 29 shooting deaths may appear modest over 3.5 years for a city of nearly half a million residents; however, gang violence accounts for a greater proportion of all violence in Manchester than in most US cities. It is rare to find a US city where gangs are involved in violence to the same degree (relative to non-gang residents) as in Manchester.15 The Manchester violence problem is, in essence, a Manchester gang violence problem. Gang activity in the Kazan region of the Russian Federation has come to be known as the ‘Kazan phenomenon’ (Covey, 2003; Salagaev, 2001; Salagaev et al., 2005). In a 2005 survey of youths in Moscow and Kazan, researchers report that Moscow youths were more likely to be involved in gangs as well as delinquent activities (Salagaev et al., 2005). Qualitative research has shown, however, that the Kazan gangs were far more involved in more serious delinquency (such as extortion and racketeering) than the Moscow youths, with the Kazan gangs taking on the characteristics of mafia-like organizations (Salagaev, 2001). These findings have been characterized as an aberration in the European comparative literature, much like the violence in Manchester (Klein, Weerman, and Thornberry, 2006).

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The reality is that the scale, extent, and characteristics of European gang violence are still relatively unknown. As noted above, the Eurogang research platform has provided a consistent definition of gangs and has greatly bolstered our knowledge of European gangs, yet many of the existing studies are city- or country-specific. Without additional reports on gang homicide and inter-city and inter-country comparative rates of violence, a large gap in our knowledge remains. Better comparable data is needed, in particular, before evidence-based legislation and policy can be developed. Given the high public profile of gang violence in Western European countries during 2009 (especially in the UK) and the potential need for new legislation, further research is important. While Europe may be beginning to understand its gang violence problem, in much of the rest of the world a gaping research void exists on gangs and gang violence.

BWj_d 7c[h_YW WdZ j^[ 9Wh_XX[Wd In many Latin American and Caribbean countries, youth violence is widespread. However, it is difficult to obtain clear information on rates of gang homicide, despite the fact that it is readily known that many of these countries have among the highest homicide rates in the world. In 2004, homicide rates per 100,000 residents in Latin American and Caribbean countries such as Brazil (28.5), Colombia (53.3), the Dominican Republic (20.5), El Salvador (56.9), Guatemala (31.3), and Mexico (11.1) greatly exceeded those of European countries, the United States, and

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Canada (UNODC, 2006). Many of these regions are subject to considerable governmental instability or pervasive drug trafficking markets (e.g. Colombia, Honduras, Mexico). At the same time, research from these states has reported the presence of gangs and gang violence. Reports from the Central America region estimate anywhere from 69,000 (official figures) to 200,000 (academic figures) gang members (UNODC, 2007).16 The nexus of violence and gangs in Latin America and the Caribbean has become increasingly clear (see Boxes 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4). Recent essays in foreign policy journals have talked about how ‘street gangs took Central America’ (Arana, 2005) and how ‘gangs went global’ (Papachristos, 2005), with particular attention to Latin American countries. While these countries do have home-grown gangs, the United States has had a hand in this region’s gang problem as it has been governmental practice to ‘export’ undocumented residents who are gang members to their country of origin.17 A Washington Office on Latin America report quotes a Department of Homeland Security statement that of the 2,179 criminal aliens deported, ‘approximately 370 of [the] deportees were thought to be members of MS-13’ (Thale and Falkenburger, 2006, p. 4).18 While these numbers have surely fluctuated over time, it is understood that these deportations have been occurring since the 1990s. This immigration enforcement policy has been a Pandora’s box, serving to fuel gang formation (Vigil, 2006). As the number of United States ‘exports’ grew, so did the gang problems of countries such as El Salvador and Nicaragua. The response to these groups—by both the governments and vigilante groups—were ‘death squads’ and crackdown

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policies such as Mano Dura (Hume, 2007; Thale and Falkenburger, 2006). Other forces aided the institutionalization of gangs in these countries, neighbourhoods, and cities, including conflicts between gangs—such as Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) vs. Mara Dieciocho (18th Street or Mara 18)—continued deportation, and structural disadvantage (such as poverty, marginalization, and limited opportunity). It was noted more than a decade ago that the data on Latin American gangs was by and large descriptive and qualitative (Rodgers, 1999, p. 4). Despite the persistence and increase in gang activity in the region, this situation has not changed much. Nevertheless, the research has provided rich insight into gang violence across Latin American countries, including on the Hispanic gang influence on US culture. Gangs such as Mara Salvatrucha and Mara 18 have achieved mythic status. A report in Newsweek called Mara Salvatrucha ‘the most dangerous gang in America’ (Campo-Flores, 2005), bolstering their reputation domestically and abroad. Images of young Salvadoran and Honduran men with their faces covered with gang tattoos have sparked media and public interest. Films such as Sin Nombre (2009) have also contributed to popular understandings of gang violence in Central America.

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Much of the work on Latin American gangs is consistent with research from the United States. Reports that ten per cent of all homicides in Cali, Colombia, were attributable to gangs in the first six months of 1993 (Weaver and Maddaleno, 1999, p. 338) are comparable to findings in the United States (Curry, Egley, and Howell, 2004; Tita and Abrahamse, 2004). Across Central America, it has been estimated that anywhere between 10 and 60 per cent of all criminal violence can be attributed to gangs (UNODC, 2007, p. 61). Key factors in the problem of gang violence appear to include the accessibility of weapons to gang youths, especially socially marginalized youths who often view guns as a proxy for power and respect (Bevan and Florquin, 2006), along with the inability of governments to control delinquent behaviour and organized crime. These conditions are aggravated by the widespread availability of guns in many Latin American countries, especially those that are recovering from civil war, revolutions, and counterinsurgencies. Gang research in Brazil (Batista and Burgos, 2008), El Salvador (DeCesare, 2003), Guatemala (Winton, 2005), and Nicaragua (Maclure and Sotelo, 2004; Rodgers, 2006) supports these conclusions. Public displays of gang violence are rampant in many Latin American countries. Numerous news reports from San Salvador, El Salvador, document a number of grenade attacks carried out by gang members in public.19 A study that reviews 100 patients admitted to hospitals with firearm wounds in San Salvador finds that half were unintentionally caught up in gang fights and 26 per cent of them were active participants in gang fights (Paniagua et al., 2005). More than 90 per cent of the victims were wounded in public, either on the street or on public transportation. Gangs often charge ‘safety tolls’ for buses to pass through public roads (Rodriguez, 2001); armed attacks of buses are common (Winton, 2005). This type of violence—along with the killing of judges and police officials—not only compromises public safety, but can also undermine the ability of local and state-wide government to maintain order and enforce the law.

8en +$* =Wd]i" ]kdi" WdZ l_eb[dY[ _d Jh_d_ZWZ WdZ JeXW]e Ed cWdo c[Wikh[i" Jh_d_ZWZ WdZ JeXW]e dem h_lWbi @WcW_YW Wi j^[ ceij l_eb[dj Yekdjho _d j^[ 9Wh_XX[Wd" m_j^ j^[ dkcX[h e\ WddkWb ckhZ[hi h_i_d] i^Whfbo \hec /. je ++& el[h j^[ fWij j[d o[Whi >[[hWbWb" (&&/1 Jemdi[dZ" (&&/ $ =Wd]i WdZ ]kdi ^Wl[ X[Yec[ j^[ Y^_[\ ikif[Yji _d j^[ i[WhY^ \eh YWki[i$ J^[h[ m[h[ (/) ]Wd]#h[bWj[Z ckhZ[hi _d (&&." fbWY_d] j^[ dWj_edWb ]Wd] êc_Y_Z[ hWj[ Wj (( f[h '&&"&&& Y_j_p[diÆjm_Y[ j^[ ^_]^[ij KI Y_jo hWj[$ >ec_Y_Z[i Wh[ dej [l[dbo Z_ijh_Xkj[Z WYheii Jh_d_ZWZ WdZ JeXW]e$ Ceh[ j^Wd ^Wb\ e\ j^[ êc_Y_Z[i jeea fbWY[ _d edbo i[l[d e\ j^[ YekdjhoÊi -' feb_Y_d] Z_ijh_Yji X[jm[[d (&&' WdZ (&&- CW]k_h[ [j Wb$" (&&. f$ ,( $ J^[ Yekd# jhoÊi ceij fefkbeki khXWd Wh[W" Fehj e\ IfW_d" _i j^[ [f_Y[djh[ e\ ]Wd] l_eb[dY[Æ[if[Y_Wbbo _ji feeh[h [Wij[hd ikXkhXi$ J^h[[ e\ j^[i[Æ8[[j^Wc" CehlWdj" WdZ BWl[dj_bb[Æm[h[ j^[ i_j[i e\ ,& f[h Y[dj e\ j^[ dWj_edÊi êc_Y_Z[i Jemdi[dZ" (&&/" f$ (- $ ?d fWhj_YkbWh" ceh[ j^Wd (& f[h Y[dj e\ j^[ dWj_edÊi êc_Y_Z[i jeea fbWY[ _d j^[ 8[iied Ijh[[j feb_Y_d] Z_ijh_Yj _d BWl[dj_bb[ CW]k_h[ [j Wb$" (&&." f$ ,( $ D_d[j[[d ]Wd]i m[h[ h[fehj[Zbo WYj_l[ _d j^_i Z_ijh_Yj" WdZ Wi cWdo Wi ).+ ]Wd] c[cX[hi AWjp WdZ 9êWj[" (&&, $ J^[ 8[iied Ijh[[j Z_ijh_Yj êc_Y_Z[ hWj[ mWi (*/ f[h '&&"&&& _d (&&+" cWa_d] _j j^[ ceij ZWd][heki h[]_ed _d j^[ Yekdjho" _\ dej j^[ mehbZ CW]k_h[ [j Wb$" (&&." f$ ,& $ 7 fh_c[ \WYjeh _d Jh_d_ZWZ WdZ JeXW]e êc_Y_Z[i _i j^[ h[bWj_edi^_f X[jm[[d ]Wd]i WdZ ]kdi$ M^_b[ ]kd emd[hi^_f _i j_]^jbo h[]kbWj[Z WdZ j^[h[ _i de Zec[ij_Y cWdk\WYjkh[h e\ \_h[Whci" Wffhen_cWj[bo .& f[h Y[dj e\ êc_Y_Z[i _d (&&. _dlebl[Z ]kdi Jemdi[dZ" (&&/" ff$ ('" (* $ ?d W h[Y[dj ikhl[o e\ Whh[ij[[i _d Jh_d_ZWZ WdZ JeXW]e" '+ f[h Y[dj e\ j^[ iWcfb[ h[fehj[Z ^Wl_d] emd[Z W ]kd Wj iec[ j_c[1 êm[l[h" ]kd emd[hi^_f mWi YedZ_j_ed[Z Xo ]Wd] c[cX[hi^_f" Wi +) f[h Y[dj e\ j^[ ]Wd] c[cX[hi YecfWh[Z je / f[h Y[dj e\ j^[ ded#]Wd] Whh[ij[[i emd[Z ]kdi M[bbi" AWjp" WdZ A_c" (&'& $ <khj^[hceh[" W ikhl[o e\ iYêeb oekjî _d Jh_d_ZWZ WdZ JeXW]e \ekdZ j^Wj ]Wd] c[cX[hi h[fehj[Z ]h[Wj[h WlW_bWX_b_jo e\ WdZ WYY[ii je ]kdi j^Wd j^[_h ded#]Wd] f[[hi AWjp WdZ <en" \ehj^Yec_d] $ Ijhed] [Yedec_Y Z[l[befc[dj el[h j^[ bWij Z[YWZ[ ^Wi Yec[ Wj j^[ fh_Y[ e\ _dijWX_b_jo$ J^[ _d\bkn e\ ]kdi" _d YecX_dWj_ed m_j^ j^[ ]hemj^ e\ ]Wd]i" ^Wi if[bb[Z Z_iWij[h \eh Jh_d_ZWZ WdZ JeXW]e AWjp WdZ <en" \ehj^Yec_d]1 Jemdi[dZ" (&&/ $

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Some have claimed that while the problem of youth gang violence is undoubtedly present in Latin America, it has been largely overstated and sensationalized by media outlets (Reisman, 2006; Strocka, 2006). This mirrors research in Barcelona, Spain, which found that the Latin King gang issue was more a media construction than a true outbreak of gang problems (Feixa et al., 2008). This view is a double-edged sword, especially for Latin American countries without Eurogang-like research coordination. On the one hand, media stories potentially exploit the circumstances by drawing attention to the gangs and violence problems of the regions; yet, on the other hand, this ‘exploitation’ draws the attention of those who have the capability to fund the research that is needed to provide data to policy-makers seeking to assess the problem, especially when ‘transnational threats’ are part of the discussion. While it is well understood that many Latin American and Caribbean countries have a gang violence problem and high rates of violence, especially homicide, the proportion of violence that can be attributed to gangs is not fully known.

7\h_YW WdZ 7i_W#FWY_\_Y Gangs have been identified in Africa and Asia-Pacific; however, there is even less information and research about gang violence in these regions than elsewhere in the world. This dearth may be partly attributed to the fact that CkY^ e\ j^[ l_eb[dY[ gangs have not caught the attention of scholars, policy-makers, or the media as they have in the Western hemisphere. _d 7\h_YW h[bWj[i je Latin American gangs are often studied in conjunction with the violence associated with drug and human trafficking— mWh" Yekfi" WdZ subjects that command the attention government officials. European gang research is largely inspired by US empiriej^[h Y_l_b ijh_\[$

cism, bolstered by a large and generally receptive scholarly audience along with generous funding. These factors are not shared by African and Asia-Pacific countries. Nevertheless, a growing gang violence literature has concentrated on certain ‘hotspots’, such as South Africa and some Australian cities. Much of the violence in Africa relates to war, coups, and civil strife. Rather than ‘gang’ violence, military action and civil unrest often appear most prominently, although the line between gangs and armed groups is frequently blurred in countries engaged in, or emerging from, civil conflict. Researchers and journalists have documented a gang presence in African states such as Kenya, Liberia, Nigeria, South Africa, and Uganda (Covey, 2003). Nevertheless, of those countries only South Africa has accumulated a sizeable literature on gang violence. South Africa has a recognized history of gangs that stretches back to the 1920s. In the post-apartheid period, once the country was no longer internationally isolated, existing gangs morphed into larger enterprises (Kynoch, 1999). It appears that gangs are now proliferating in South Africa, and there is a direct relationship between prison and street gangs (Berg and Kinnes, 2009).20 Some of this may stem from the influence the media appears to wield in the cultural transmission of gang images, symbols, and behaviour (Maxson, 1998). Gangs such as the Russians and Bo-Tsotsi were the precursors to more common-day South African gangs.21 Youth gangs in South Africa today use violence in a wide range of contexts, including bribery, territorial disputes, robbery, extortion, assaults, and homicides.22 Anti-gang vigilante groups such as Pagad (People against Gangsterism and Drugs) have sparked waves of violence between these groups, gangs, and the police in Western Cape (Dixon and Johns, 2001). Interviews with schoolteachers in Western Cape have underlined the common nature of traumatic incidents stemming from gang violence in schoolyards and neighbourhoods surrounding schools (Reckson and Becker, 2005). Western Cape has as many as 137 gangs and 100,000 gang members who are responsible for as much as 40–60 per cent of the violent crime in that area (Reckson and Becker, 2005, p. 107).23 Asian nations are internationally known for their organized crime groups, such as the Chinese Tongs and Japanese Yakuza. But a gang presence has also been found in a number of Asian countries, including China, Hong

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Feb_Y[ jWba m_j^ j[[dW][hi _d Dehj^ 9hedkbbW" IoZd[o" Wi j^[o fWjheb ijh[[ji Wi fWhj e\ [\\ehji je h[ifedZ je W ifWj[ e\ hWY_Wb WjjWYai Xo oekj^ ]Wd]i$ M_bb 8kh][ii%H[kj[hi

Kong, India, Japan, Korea, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Taiwan (Covey, 2003).24 The extent of the gang violence in these countries is relatively unknown, as no attempts have been made to collect data. Much of the research on gangs in Asian countries is journalistic and blurs the line between gangs and organized crime groups. In one of the few attempts to study gangs in China, a survey of prison inmates revealed many similarities between US and Chinese gangs, including loose organization, core/peripheral members, and age-graded membership. However, few of the surveyed Chinese gang members had been incarcerated for violent crimes (Zhang et al., 1997). Knowledge of Australian gangs has increased considerably over the last decade. The OzGang Research Network was founded after conservative political groups and media outlets sparked public concern about gangs in Australia.25 The network collects information about the Australian gang problem, sketching out a history of gangs in the country similar to efforts in Europe. The term ‘gang’ is often used sparingly in OzGang research for fear of confounding subcultural and ethnic group activities with gang activity (White, 2006a).26

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A review of research on gangs in Adelaide, Perth, Melbourne, and Sydney concludes that gang activities in Australia are comparable to those in Europe. Australian gang violence is described as ‘highly targeted [. . .] rarely random, and occur[ing] on a frequent basis’ (White, 2006b, p. 2). Ethnic and racial conflicts have become more prominent in Australia, especially in larger cosmopolitan cities with large minority enclaves. Research in Sydney has revealed that homicides between gang members are rarely motivated by gang concerns (such as protecting turf or group respect), but that they tend to be committed over disputes involving women and petty incidents (White, 2006a, p. 168). The current state of Australian youth culture appears ripe for accelerated gang formation, with ethnic tension, marginalization, and gang-like groupings of youths present in most of the major cities. Without corrective action, gangs may soon become institutionalized in Australia.

7 h[]_edWb YecfWh_ied e\ a[o ]Wd] Y^WhWYj[h_ij_Yi Researchers have compared youth gang violence in Europe to that in the United States using four categories: weaponry, levels of violence, motives for violence, and victims of violence (Klein, Weerman, and Thornberry, 2006). A fifth category, location of violence, helps document the public nature of gang violence. Using these five categories, this section compares gang violence across different regions. M[Wfedho

Regions can be divided relatively neatly with respect to weapons use. The Small Arms Survey estimates that there are roughly 650 million civilian firearms in the world (Karp, 2007, p. 39). There are regions with significant arms use and others with virtually no such use. The dispersion of these firearms is quite widespread across the world. Indeed, North America, South America, Europe, Africa, and Asia all have multiple countries that rank in the top 30 of all nations in terms of their civilian firearms possession. But firearm holdings and use are not perfectly correlated. North, Central, and South American states (with Canada as the exception), as well as African countries, have high levels of arms use. Some European nations (such as Germany) have high levels of civilian firearms holdings, but relatively low levels of firearm violence (Karp, 2007, pp. 47, 51). Asia-Pacific states generally fall into the low arms use category.

8en +$+ =Wd] c[cX[hi^_f WdZ ]kd YWhho_d] =Wd]i WdZ ]Wd] c[cX[hi _d iec[ h[]_edi e\ j^[ mehbZ emd" YWhho" WdZ ki[ ]kdi" m^_b[ ej^[hi Ze dej$ D[Whbo .& f[h Y[dj e\ j^[ ]Wd] c[cX[hi _d ed[ iWcfb[" \eh [nWcfb[" emd[Z ]kdiÆ\ekh ed Wl[hW][ :[Ya[h WdZ LWd M_dab[" '//," f$ '-, $ H[i[WhY^ ^Wi iêmd j^Wj ]Wd] c[cX[hi Wh[ ceh[ b_a[bo j^Wd ded#]Wd] oekjî je YWhho ]kdi _d fkXb_Y B_pejj[ [j Wb$" (&&& $ J^_i Ze[i dej" êm[l[h" fhel[ W h[bWj_edi^_f X[jm[[d ]Wd]i WdZ ]kdi$ ?\ ]Wd] c[cX[hi YWhho m[Wfedi _d fkXb_Y X[\eh[ è_d_d] j^[_h ]Wd] WdZ Yedj_dk[ je YWhho j^[c W\j[h b[Wl_d] j^[_h ]Wd]" j^[d ]kd YWhho_d] _i dej W Y^WhWYj[h_ij_Y e\ j^[ ]Wd]" Xkj hWj^[h e\ j^[ _dZ_l_ZkWbi mê Yecfh_i[ j^[ ]Wd]Æ_dYb_d[Z je YWhho ]kdi _hh[if[Yj_l[ e\ ]Wd] c[cX[hi^_f$ Je h[iebl[ j^_i gk[ij_ed" h[i[WhY^[hi ^Wl[ ki[Z bed]_jkZ_dWb ikhl[oi je Yebb[Yj _d\ehcWj_ed \hec WZeb[iY[dji Zkh_d] j^[ j_c[ m^[d ]Wd] c[cX[hi^_f _i ceij b_a[bo" WdZ Wbie X[\eh[" Zkh_d]" WdZ W\j[h f[h_eZi e\ ]Wd] c[cX[hi^_f$ J^[ [l_Z[dY[ iêmi j^Wj ]Wd] c[cX[hi^_f _dYh[Wi[i j^[ b_a[b_êeZ e\ ]kd YWhho_d] ceh[ j^Wd Wdo ej^[h lWh_WXb[" m^Wj[l[h j^[ h[\[h[dY[ ]hekf \kjkh[ ]Wd] c[cX[hi" fWij ]Wd] c[cX[hi" Ykhh[dj l_eb[dj ded#]Wd] Z[b_dgk[dji" eh \ehc[h l_eb[dj ded#]Wd] Z[b_dgk[dji $ <kjkh[ eh \ehc[h ]Wd] oekjî m[h[ de ceh[ b_a[bo j^Wd ded#]Wd] oekjî je YWhho ]kdi JêhdX[hho [j Wb$" (&&) $ 9khh[dj ]Wd] c[cX[hi^_f _i" _d ej^[h mehZi" ijhed]bo WiieY_Wj[Z m_j^ ]kd YWhho_d]$ J^_i _i fheXWXbo Wd _cfehjWdj \WYjeh \eh kdZ[hijWdZ_d] ]Wd] l_eb[dY[1 _j _i iec[j^_d] WXekj ]Wd]i" hWj^[h j^Wd _dZ_l_ZkWbi" j^Wj fheZkY[i ]kd YWhho_d]$ J^_i h[i[WhY^ YekbZ X[ ki[\kbbo h[fb_# YWj[Z _d h[]_edi ekji_Z[ j^[ Kd_j[Z IjWj[i" WdZ m_j^ W \eYki ed j^[ YWhho_d] e\ ej^[h m[Wfedi ikY^ Wi ad_l[i eh XhWii adkYab[i $

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The fiercest and most uncontrolled manifestations of violence are in Latin America, where recourse to grenades and other military weapons marks much of the gang violence. These patterns leave some states, particularly in Central America, struggling to cope with relatively well-organized and highly armed groups. Gun violence is also frequent in the United States, where a majority of gang homicides in large cities are carried out with guns (Howell, 1999, pp. 214–17). The evidence from other regions reveals little or no gun usage in gang-motivated, let alone gangaffiliated, violence. As in all such comparisons, context matters; rates of gun violence among gangs are highest where governments lack authority, firearms are widely available, and a tradition of weapons use prevails (see Box 5.5). B[l[bi e\ l_eb[dY[

Levels of gang violence also appear dichotomous, with regions exhibiting low or high levels. Violence mostly seems B[l[bi e\ l_eb[dY[ to follow firearms, with North and South America (except Canada) and Africa exhibiting high levels of violence, in Wh[ Yedj_d][dj kfed contrast to Europe and Asia-Pacific, which have low levels.27 Although there are exceptions, by and large it appears j^[ fhef[di_jo e\ that levels of violence are contingent upon the propensity of gangs to employ arms during conflict, the ability of ]Wd]i je [cfbeo states to control this behaviour, and traditions of violence (Klein, Weerman, and Thornberry, 2006). Cej_l[i \eh l_eb[dY[

Motives for gang violence are remarkably similar across regions. Common themes in the literature include racial or ethnic conflict, economic gain, and respect or power. Research has highlighted the ‘spur of the moment’ and highly escalatory nature of gang violence, which can stem from turf disputes and be instigated by wrong looks (Townsend, 2009; White, 2006b, p. 2). Gang violence can stem from long-standing rivalries or contemporary conflicts, but across the regions it appears driven by ‘codes’ for violence that vary according to cultural differences (Anderson, 1999). If motives are similar across regions and gun possession is variable, then it is tempting to explain differences in levels of violence by differences in the availability of firearms as well as the ability of the state to control these weapons. L_Yj_ci e\ l_eb[dY[

One of the most consistent findings from US gang violence research is that the targets of violence are typically other gang members (Howell, 1999; Maxson, 1999). A review of the Eurogang literature also reveals that while nongang individuals (such as local business owners or youths of other ethnic origins) were often targets of gang-related crimes, victims of violent crime were most often other gang members (Klein, Weerman, and Thornberry, 2006). Most gun violence in Manchester is also gang-on-gang (Bullock and Tilley, 2002). As the violence associated with a criminal event increases—such as from property damage or theft to aggravated assault or homicide—the likelihood that the target of that act is a member of a rival group appears to increase as well. BeYWj_ed e\ l_eb[dY[

Given the street-oriented nature of gangs, it should be no surprise that gang violence largely occurs in public areas. Whether it be drive-by shootings in residential neighbourhoods, large fights in city centres, robbing buses, or grenade use on public streets, gang violence is overwhelmingly public violence. In these contexts, guns are the weapon of choice, in particular larger-calibre handguns. Fully automatic weapons are highly prized, but difficult to obtain; semiautomatic weapons are relatively easy to obtain (Legault and Lizotte, 2009). Where available, these weapons are more lethal and create greater collateral damage than other firearms, owing to their much higher rate of fire. This is one reason why they are highly prized by individuals deeply involved in gangs and violence (Thornberry et al., 2003). It is the public nature of gang violence that, for many communities, defines the ‘gang problem’, fuelling fear and intimidation in many parts of the world.

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;NFB7?D?D= =7D= L?EB;D9; Gang violence does not happen in a vacuum. Explanations for gang violence must consider factors from a variety of domains. Explanations of gang violence often fail to recognize that gangs are groups composed of individuals that exist in a broader social context. It is the intersection between individual, group, and society that is missing in most attempts to understand gangs, gang members, and gang crime (Short, 1974; 1998). A more sophisticated understanding of gang violence would account for time, space, context, process, and social factors. Equally important, it is necessary to understand why gang membership is associated with an increase in violent actions, both for offenders and for victims. Two different models can be used to explain gang violence. One focuses on the intersection between environmental and individual factors; the other emphasizes social processes. In the first approach, time, location, opportunity, and lifestyles converge in specific acts of gang violence. The social process approach stresses the importance of contagion, retaliation, threat, and group conflict. In the first model, violence is rooted in the lifestyle associated with gang membership, while in the second it is tied to processes associated with the promotion of gang activity. While the two approaches undoubtedly overlap, taken together they illustrate vividly that gang membership is a key factor in the rise in violence.

;dl_hedc[dj" _dZ_l_ZkWbi" WdZ hekj_d[ WYj_l_j[i =Wd] l_eb[dY[ Changes in the social environment can favour the emergence of gang violence. Factors such as poverty, population Ze[i dej ^Wff[d movement, race, and ethnicity, as well as the spatial concentration of gang violence, appear key. For example, in _d W lWYkkc$

the 1960s and 1970s many US cities saw their middle-class residents leave for the suburbs, creating a concentration of disadvantaged residents vying for limited resources in city centres. The migration patterns of immigrant groups appear especially important to gang formation (Decker, Van Gemert, and Pyrooz, 2009). In general terms, the gang violence literature emphasizes the relationship between gang homicide and ‘social disorganization’ factors such as relative poverty, instability, and social change. Gang homicide often conforms to classic patterns of neighbourhood social disorganization and can be distinguished from non-gang homicide according to neighbourhood context (Rosenfeld, Bray, and Egley, 1999; Curry and Spergel, 1988). These findings are echoed in a series of spatial studies in neighbourhoods in Chicago (Block and Block, 1993; Curry and Spergel, 1988; Mares, 2010), South Los Angeles (Robinson, 2009; Tita, Riley, and Greenwood, 2003), and Boston (Kennedy, Braga, and Piehl, 1998). They all report that gang homicides were geographically concentrated, with only limited areas of the city experiencing turf and drug market competition. Lower levels of social control— area abandonment and less guardianship—increase the likelihood that an area may become gang space (Tita, Cohen, and Engberg, 2005). The onset of gangs in already disadvantaged neighbourhoods exacerbates crime and makes intervention much more difficult. The ability of neighbourhoods to control the behaviour of youth, including gangs, is related to the strength of relationships that regulate conduct. Yet such relationships are weak in many disadvantaged neighbourhoods, leaving them less capable of controlling gang behaviour (Pyrooz, Fox, and Decker, 2010). Explanations of gang violence that emphasize space are not complete, however, without considering the individual. Routine activities approaches underscore the convergence of the offender and victim at a specific time and place (Cohen and Felson, 1979; Felson, 2002). One such approach, centred on gang membership lifestyle, highlights risky routine activities that appear associated with gang violence (Hindelang, Gottfredson, and Garofalo, 1978; Taylor

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et al. 2008). For example, longitudinal research has found that gang membership corresponds with a general increase in the commission of criminal offences (Thornberry et al., 2003). Some of this increase may be a product of gangpromoting activities (such as group fights or gang graffiti), while another component may stem from gang lifestyle (such as drug dealing or robbery). Gang lifestyles, in other words, seem to create more opportunities both for committing violent offences and for being victimized.

J^[ ieY_Wb fheY[ii[i WffheWY^ The social process approach to gang violence emphasizes the role of the gang itself—as opposed to the individual gang member—and provides a more contextual description of displays of such violence. In the words of one researcher, ‘neither individual characteristics nor social conditions kill people. “Youth” does not pull a trigger nor anomie strangle a victim’ (Papachristos, 2009, p. 75). In other words, environmental and individual-level explanations may be predictive and correlated with gang homicide, but they are not causal; ‘demography is not destiny’ =Wd] l_eb[dY[ e\j[d (Wright and Decker, 1996). In fact, gang violence often appears episodic, with peaks and troughs. Social process Wff[Whi [f_ieZ_Y explanations of gang violence look beyond environmental and individual factors to highlight the social processes that m_j^ f[Wai WdZ fuel the escalation of violence. Interviews with gang members in St. Louis reveal a ‘contagion’ effect that marked incidents of violence, where gang members reported that their actions were more the result of retaliation or defensive action than premeditated or offensive action (Decker, 1996; Loftin, 1984). The concept of ‘threat’ can help explain such situations. Threat— whether real or perceived—during active periods of gang membership is the enhanced awareness of victimization and disrespect. Turf, rivalries, drug markets, and graffiti all serve as critical, yet haphazard, symbols of threat that can spark bouts of violence. Yet the key determinant of threat is the belief, generally reinforced by specific action, that gun violence is real, near, and likely (Decker, 1996; Anderson, 1999). The organizational and normative structure of gangs and gang violence can be conceived in terms of a series of escalating and de-escalating stages, specifically: 1) loose bonds to the gang; 2) collective identification of threat, which increases gang cohesion; 3) a mobilizing event; 4) escalation of activity; 5) violent event; 6) rapid de-escalation; and 7) retaliation (adapted and expanded from Decker, 1996, p. 262). Figure 5.3 adapts this model, including steps that typically lead to the de-escalation of conflict, namely, intervention (such as police deterrent, arrest, involvement of influential community groups, truces) and ‘devastating violence’ (such as the loss of leader or demoralizing events). As these stages of escalation and de-escalation do not appear culture- or country-specific, they may have relevance to other regions and societies. Such processes have a general character and transcend country borders. Incidents of disrespect have been termed a ‘gift’ that has to be met with retaliation (Papachristos, 2009, p. 80). Nearly all of the gang homicides committed in Chicago in 1994 (98 per cent) were a result of expressive or symbolic

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threats (such as an argument or altercation) rather than instrumental factors (such as money or drugs), compared to 67 per cent of non-gang homicides. Furthermore, despite the transitory nature of gangs in Chicago, gang homicides appear institutionalized in that they persist over time (Papachristos, 2009, pp. 90–91, 100). In interviews conducted as part of the same study, Chicago gang members stressed the importance of pre-empting incidents of turf encroachment and disrespect in order to preserve the status of the gang (Papachristos, 2009, p. 104),28 reinforcing the conclusion that gang homicide in the city was essentially expressive or symbolic in nature. Although the ‘threat’ perspective offers a persuasive explanation of gang violence in certain contexts, it is only one piece of the puzzle. Research in the United States has uncovered a wide range of factors that seem to underpin gang-motivated and gang-affiliated violence. Threat or contagion may be the driving factor for some types of violent acts but not others. If two people are in similar situations with high-risk lifestyles, and one is in a gang while the other is not, they do not have an equal risk of being the victim of a violent confrontation. It appears other attributes of gang membership, beyond the defence of turf and reputation, contribute to higher rates of victimization. Time, space, neighbourhood, routine activities, and lifestyle work in tandem with social processes, including threat and contagion, in fuelling gang violence. This conclusion is consistent with those of research conducted on gangs, gang members, and gang violence elsewhere in the world. In general, gangs and gang violence appear strikingly similar

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across regions. Most often, it is the presence of arms, in particular firearms, that signals the greatest differences in gang violence.

9ED9BKI?ED There is great variation in the presence of gangs across the world. The likelihood of gangs emerging is conditioned primarily by criminal opportunities, the ability of the state to provide security and enforce the law, and prevailing norms and economic conditions. Gangs are less likely to arise in force in countries where a strong taboo on the use of violence exists, where criminal opportunities are rare due to a strong state apparatus, or where there are few deep motivations to engage in illicit activity. Conversely, weak state structures and a long history of societal violence contribute to the likelihood that gangs will emerge. The presence of gangs appears to be a risk factor for armed violence regardless of context. This would appear to be the case because the motivations for gang members to use violence are surprisingly similar the world over. Almost universally, gang violence is a product of racial and ethnic conflict, economic competition, and the question of respect and power. Gang violence typically breaks out over territorial disputes and rapidly escalates. When gang members kill, they almost always kill other gang members, another fact true nearly everywhere in the world. Despite these cross-regional similarities, available evidence shows a significant split in regions affected by serious gang violence. The deadliest, most heavily armed gangs in the world are found in the Western hemisphere—with the exception of Canada. Central and South America are home to the highest levels of gang-related gun violence in the world—often tied to the smuggling of drugs and human beings. Elsewhere, recorded gang violence levels pale in comparison. In Europe and Australia, gang violence is rare, though increasing. The picture in Africa and Asia-Pacific remains partly obscure because of a lack of reliable data. While gangs have been documented in both regions, armed groups may be a more serious issue in most cases. In many African countries, for example, arms and disenchanted youths abound, but they are more likely to organize around political rather than expressly criminal goals, though goals may overlap and change over time. The exception on the continent is South Africa, where gangs proliferate. This chapter has hypothesized that the dichotomy between countries with serious gang violence and those without is explicable primarily as a function of gangs’ willingness to use weapons and their level of access to guns. Further research is needed, but gangs that emerge in societies where guns are readily accessible through civilian markets— or where the state is unable to prevent illicit trafficking or is susceptible to corruption—generally possess and use significant arsenals. Where guns are widely used, gang homicide rates can reach up to 100 times the rates for society as a whole. In countries with heavily armed gangs, the death toll from intra-gang violence can represent a significant fraction of overall homicides, rendering neighbourhoods and some entire city areas off limits, with a wide range of devastating direct and indirect impacts. The current research base on gang violence remains overwhelmingly focused on US—and to some extent European—gangs, although this is changing. If our understanding of the relationship between gangs and armed violence is to come into sharper focus, however, it will require far more research on the many ‘blank areas’ where gangs are known to exist but for which data has been sparse. A more sophisticated understanding of gang violence, sensitive to context, culture, and country, is a long-term, but essential, goal if knowledge is to inform effective responses.

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Townsend, for example, discusses the murder of Sean ‘Bill’ Francis, a community activist and gang leader. Francis’s body was found riddled with 50 bullets in a suburban Port of Spain community. As Townsend states, ‘[s]uch violent deaths are not all that unusual’ (Townsend, 2009, p. 18).

Controlling gang violence has become the top priority of this agricultural city of 150,000. During a one-week span in January 2009, the community was the site of six gang-related homicides. According to news reports, the city logged a record 29 homicides for 2009—all gang-related (KSBW.com, 2009).

See, for example, recent reports on apparently gang-related stabbings: BBC (2009); Mail Online (2009).

Klein (1995); Covey (2003); Hagedorn (2007); Johnson and Muhlhausen (2005).

Decker and Weerman (2005); Hagedorn (2007); Klein et al. (2001); Van Gemert, Peterson, and Lien (2008).

The chapter separates the Western hemisphere into two regions: (1) the United States and Canada, and (2) Latin American countries. To conform

See, for example, Bursik and Grasmick (1993); Ralphs, Medina, and Aldridge (2009); Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls (1997).

The National Gang Center sends a questionnaire to law enforcement agencies. The same respondent is typically surveyed each year. The survey

The National Gang Center also collects law enforcement estimates of the number of gang members in different jurisdictions. While the number

with the existing research patterns of the Eurogang network, the findings from the Russian Federation are discussed in the Europe section.

maintains a response rate of approximately 90 per cent (NGC, 2009).

of gang members in a jurisdiction is an ‘estimate’, thus making the gang homicide rate an estimate as well, there are no better sources other than law enforcement to obtain statistics on gang-related patterns. The police are regularly interacting with gangs and gang members, as they are the sole governmental unit that consistently observes, identifies, documents, and addresses city-level gang trends. Some researchers have collected national-level data (Maxson and Klein, 1990; Miller, 1982; Needle and Stapleton, 1983); however, none of this research has been systematically collected over time. 10

Consult UNODC (2009); Eurostat (n.d.); Dearden and Jones (2008); FBI (n.d.).

See Decker and Van Winkle (1996), Fleisher (1995; 1998), Hagedorn (1988), Padilla (1992), Sanchez-Jankowski (1991), Short and Strodtbeck

See Esbensen and Huizinga (1993) and Thornberry et al. (2003).

Baron (1997); Gatti et al. (2005); Gordon (1998; 2000); Morselli (2008).

(1965), Thrasher (1927), Venkatesh (1997), and Vigil (1988).

See Dekleva (2001), Feixa et al. (2008), Gatti et al. (2005), Lien (2005), Van Gemert (2001), Van Gemert and Fleisher (2005).

For example, compare Manchester to Chicago, Illinois, a ‘traditional’ gang city—meaning one with long-standing gang activity. Papachristos (2009, p. 89) reports that over the course of a nearly a decade (1994–2002), gang homicides comprised an average of 35 per cent of Chicago’s total homicides.

These estimates should be interpreted with caution due to variation in data collection methods.

Arana (2005); DeCesare (2003); Papachristos (2005); Reisman (2006); Rodgers (1999); Thale and Falkenburger (2006).

Having identified MS-13, or Mara Salvatrucha, as among the most dangerous gangs in the United States, the Federal Bureau of Investigation has set up an MS-13 National Gang Task Force. See FBI (2005).

Escobar (2001); Maldonado (2001); Mejia (2001); Salguero (2001).

See also White et al. (1999).

Researchers have found no evidence of structured gang violence in Europe or Australia (Klein, Weerman, and Thornberry, 2006; White, 2006a).

Consider the following interview and description from Papachristos’s research (2009, p. 104): This is our ’hood, see? We got no choice but to protect it. If we back down, we ain’t shit. Everyone will think we ain’t nothin’ but a bunch of punk-ass bitches. . . . How can we call ourselves 2-6, if we don’t got this corner? We always had this spot. It’s ours, man, no matter what those fuckers [Latin Lovers] come at us with. . . .Without that, what do we got? Nothing. Might as well join the fucking Boy Scouts if you ain’t got a spot. If we back down, we look weak, man. . . . Can’t let no slobs [Latin Lovers] try and just take that spot away.

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Papachristos explains: [The interview subject’s] colorful remarks point to two important aspects of gang turf. First, that the piece of turf in question (literally, a street corner) is partially what defines the Two-Six: it is a part of their history, collective memory, and persona. Second, defense of the spot is connected not only to such identity claims but also to positions of dominance.

8?8B?E=H7F>O Aldridge, Judith, Juanjo Medina, and Robert Ralphs. 2008. ‘Dangers and Problems of Doing “Gang” Research in the UK.’ In Van Gemert, Petersen, and Lien, eds., pp. 31–46. Anderson, Elijah. 1999. Code of the Streets: Decency, Violence, and the Moral Life of the Inner City. New York: W. W. Norton and Company. Arana, Ana. 2005. ‘How the Street Gangs Took Central America.’ Foreign Affairs, May/June, pp. 98–111. Asbury, Herbert. 1928. The Gangs of New York. New York: Capricorn. Baron, Stephen W. 1997. ‘Canadian Male Street Skinheads: Street Gang or Street Terrorists?’ Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology, Vol. 34, pp. 125–54. Batista, Andre S. and Marcos D. Burgos. 2008. ‘Brazilian Gangs.’ In Louis Kontos and David Brotherton, eds. Encyclopedia of Gangs. Westport, CN: Greenwood Press, pp. 15–20. BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation). 2009. ‘Two Teenagers Killed in Stabbings.’ 20 February. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/london/7900687.stm> Bennett, Trevor and Katy Holloway. 2004. ‘Gang Membership, Drugs and Crime in the UK.’ British Journal of Criminology, Vol. 44, pp. 305–23. Berg, Julie, and Irvin Kinnes. 2009. ‘An Overview of Crime in South Africa.’ Criminologist, Vol. 34, No. 3, May/June, pp. 22–24. Bevan, James and Nicolas Florquin. 2006. ‘Few Options but the Gun: Angry Young Men.’ In Small Arms Survey. Small Arms Survey 2006: Unfinished Business. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Block, Carolyn R. and Richard Block. 1993. Street Gang Crime in Chicago. Research Brief. Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice, US Department of Justice. Bradshaw, Paul. 2005. ‘Terrors and Young Teams: Youth Gangs and Delinquency in Edinburgh.’ In Decker and Weerman, eds., pp. 193–218. Bullock, Karen and Nick Tilley. 2002. ‘Shootings, Gangs, and Violent Incidents in Manchester: Developing a Crime Reduction Strategy.’ Crime Reduction Research Series Paper 13. London: Home Office. Burnett, Cora. 1999. ‘Gang Violence as a Survival Strategy in the Context of Poverty in Davidsonville.’ Society in Transition, Vol. 30, No. 1, pp. 1–12. Bursik, Robert J. and Harold G. Grasmick. 1993. Neighborhoods and Crime: The Dimensions of Effective Community Control. New York: Macmillan. Campo-Flores, Arian. 2005. ‘The Most Dangerous Gang in America.’ Newsweek. 28 March. Cohen, Lawrence E. and Marcus Felson. 1979. ‘Social Change and Crime Rate Trends: A Routine Activities Approach.’ American Sociological Review, Vol. 44, No. 4, pp. 588–608. Cook, Philip J., Wendy Cukier, and Keith Krause. 2009. ‘The Illicit Firearms Trade in North America.’ Criminology and Criminal Justice, Vol. 9, pp. 265–86. Covey, Herbert. 2003. Street Gangs Throughout the World. Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas. Curry, G. David, Arlen Egley, Jr., and James C. Howell. 2004. Youth Gang Homicide Trends in the National Youth Gang Survey. Paper presented at the American Society of Criminology meeting. Nashville, TN. — and Irving A. Spergel. 1988. ‘Gang Homicide, Delinquency, and Community.’ Criminology, Vol. 26, pp. 381–407. Dauvergne, Mia, and Geoffrey Li. 2006. ‘Homicide in Canada, 2005.’ Juristat, Vol. 26, No. 6. Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics. Dearden, Jack and Warwick Jones. 2008. Homicide in Australia: 2006–07. Monitoring Report No. 1. Canberra: National Homicide Monitoring Program, Australian Institute of Criminology. <http://www.aic.gov.au/documents/F/F/B/%7BFFB9E49F-160F-43FC-B98D-6BC510DC2AFD%7Dmr01.pdf> DeCesare, Donna. 2003. ‘From Civil War to Gang War: The Tragedy of Edgar Bolanos.’ In Luis Kontos, David Brotherton, and Luis Barrios, eds. Gangs and Society: Alternative Perspectives. New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 283–313. Decker, Scott H. 1996. ‘Collective and Normative Features of Gang Violence.’ Justice Quarterly, Vol. 13, No. 2, pp. 243–64. —, Frank Van Gemert, and David C. Pyrooz. 2009. ‘Gangs, Migration, and Crime: The Changing Landscape in Europe and the United States.’ Journal of International Migration and Integration, Vol. 10, pp. 393–408.

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— and Barrik Van Winkle. 1996. Life in the Gang: Family, Friends, and Violence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. — and Frank Weerman, eds. 2005. European Street Gangs and Troublesome Youth Groups. Lanham, MD: AltaMira. — and Margaret Townsend. 2008. Drug Smugglers on Drug Smuggling: Lessons from the Inside. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Dekleva, Bojan. 2001. ‘Gang-like Groups in Slovenia.’ In Klein et al., eds., pp. 273–81. Dixon, Bill and Lisa-Marie Johns. 2001. ‘Gangs, Pagad, and the State: Vigilantism and Revenge Violence in the Western Cape.’ Violence and Transition Series, Vol. 2. Cape Town: Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation. Esbensen, Finn-Aage and David Huizinga. 1993. ‘Gangs, Drugs, and Delinquency in a Survey of Urban Youth.’ Criminology, Vol. 31, pp. 565–89. — and Frank M. Weerman. 2005. ‘Youth Gangs and Troublesome Youth Groups in the United States and the Netherlands: A Cross-National Comparison.’ European Journal of Criminology, Vol. 2, No. 3, pp. 5–37. Escobar, Antolin. 2001. ‘Presunto pandillero murió en explosión de granada.’ El Diario de Hoy (San Salvador). 2 May. Eurostat. n.d. Statistics: Homicide. <http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/crime/documents/homicide.pdf> FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation). 2005. Statement of Chris Swecker, Assistant Director, Criminal Investigative Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation, before the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, House International Relations Committee. 20 April. <http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress05/swecker042005.htm> —. n.d. Uniform Crime Reports. <http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/ucr.htm> Feixa, Carlos, et al. 2008. ‘Latin Kings in Barcelona.’ In Van Gemert, Petersen, and Lien, eds., pp. 63–78. Felson, Marcus. 2002. Crime and Everyday Life. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. Fleisher, Mark S. 1995. Beggars and Thieves. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. ——. 1998. Dead End Kids: Gang Girls and the Boys They Know. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. GAO (Government Accounting Office). 2009. Firearms Trafficking: U.S. Efforts to Combat Arms Trafficking to Mexico Face Planning and Coordination Challenges. GAO-09-78IT. Washington, DC: GAO. Garvey, Megan and Patrick McGreevy. 2007. ‘Racial Attacks by Gangs Rising, L.A. Officials Fear.’ 21 January. <http://www.streetgangs.com/topics/2007/012107raceharbor.html> Gatti, Uberto, et al. 2005. ‘Youth Gangs, Delinquency, and Drug Use: A Test of the Selection, Facilitation, and Enhancement Hypotheses.’ Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, Vol. 46, No. 11, pp. 1178–90. Glaser, Clive. 2000. Bo-Tsotsi: The Youth Gangs of Soweto, 1935–1976. Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann. Gordon, Robert M. 1998. ‘Street Gangs and Criminal Business Organizations: A Canadian Perspective.’ In Kayleen Hazlehurst and Cameron Hazlehurst, eds. Gangs and Youth Subcultures: International Explorations. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, pp. 165–89. ——. 2000. ‘Criminal Business Organizations, Street Gangs and “Wanna-Be” Groups: A Vancouver Perspective.’ Canadian Journal of Criminology, Vol. 42, No. 1, pp. 39–60. Hagedorn, John M. 1988. People and Folks: Gangs, Crime, and the Underclass in a Rustbelt City. Chicago, IL: Lake View. —. 2007. Gangs in the Global City: Alternatives to Traditional Criminology. Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press. Heeralal, Darryl. 2009. ‘Murders Fall in Jamaica but Rise in Trinidad and Tobago.’ Trinidad Express. 18 March. Hindelang, Michael J., Michael R. Gottfredson, and James Garofalo. 1978. Victims of Personal Crime: An Empirical Foundation for a Theory of Personal Victimization. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger. Hipp, John R., George E. Tita, and Lyndsay N. Boggess. 2009. ‘Inter- and Intra-group Interactions: The Case of Everyday Violent Crime as an Expression of Group Conflict or Social Disorganization.’ Criminology, Vol. 47, pp. 521–64. Houston, James G. and Johan Prinsloo. 1998. ‘Prison Gangs in South Africa: A Comparative Analysis.’ Journal of Gang Research, Vol. 5, No. 3, pp. 41–52. Howell, James C. 1999. ‘Youth Gang Homicides: A Literature Review.’ Crime & Delinquency, Vol. 45, No. 2, pp. 208–41. Huizinga, David and Karl F. Schumann. 2001. ‘Gang Membership in Bremen and Denver: Comparative Longitudinal Data.’ In Malcolm Klein et al., pp. 231–46. Hume, Mo. 2007. ‘Mano Dura: El Salvador Responds to Gangs.’ Development in Practice, Vol. 17, No. 6, pp. 739–51. Johnson, Stephen and David B. Muhlhausen. 2005. ‘North American Transnational Youth Gangs: Breaking the Chain of Violence.’ Trends in Organized Crime, Vol. 9, No. 1, pp. 38–54. Jütersonke, Oliver, Robert Muggah, and Dennis Rodgers. 2009. ‘Gangs, Urban Violence, and Security in Central America.’ Security Dialogue, Vol. 40, Nos. 4–5, pp. 373–97. Karp, Aaron. 2007. ‘Completing the Count: Civilian Firearms.’ In Small Arms Survey. Small Arms Survey 2007: Guns and the City. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 39–71.

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Katz, Charles M. and David Choate. 2006. Diagnosing Trinidad and Tobago’s Gang Problem. Paper presented at the 58 annual meeting of the American Society of Criminology Philadelphia. — and Andrew M. Fox. Forthcoming. ‘Risk and Protective Factors Associated with Gang-Involved Youth in a Caribbean Nation.’ Pan American Journal of Public Health. <http://journal.paho.org/index.php?a_ID=1461> Kennedy, David M., Anthony A. Braga, and Anne M. Piehl. 1998. ‘The (Un)Known Universe: Mapping Gangs and Gang Violence in Boston.’ In David Weisburd and Tom McEwen, eds. Crime Mapping and Crime Prevention. Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press, pp. 219–62. Klein, Malcolm W. 1995. The American Street Gang: Its Nature, Prevalence, and Control. New York: Oxford University Press. — and Cheryl L. Maxson. 2006. Street Gang Patterns and Policies. New York: Oxford University Press. —, Frank M. Weerman, and Terence P. Thornberry. 2006. ‘Street Gang Violence in Europe.’ European Journal of Criminology, Vol. 3, No. 4, pp. 413–37. — et al., eds. 2001. The Eurogang Paradox: Street Gangs and Youth Groups in the U.S. and Europe. Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Kluwer. KSBW.com. 2009. ‘Year in Review: Salinas Homicide Rate.’ 22 December. <http://www.ksbw.com/news/22038366/detail.html> Kynoch, Gary. 1999. ‘From the Ninevites to the Hard Livings Gang: Township Gangsters and Urban Violence in Twentieth-Century South Africa.’ African Studies, Vol. 58, No. 1, pp. 55–85. —. 2005. We are Fighting the World: A History of Marashea Gangs in South Africa. Athens, OH: Ohio University Press. Legault, Richard and Alan J. Lizotte. 2009. ‘Caught in a Crossfire: Legal and Illegal Gun Ownership in America.’ In Krohn, Lizotte, and Hall, eds. Handbook on Crime and Deviance. New York: Springer, pp. 469–91. Lien, Inger-Liese. 2005. ‘The Role of Crime Acts in Constituting the Gang’s Mentality.’ In Decker and Weerman, eds., pp. 105–28. Lizotte, Alan J., et al. 2000. ‘Factors Influencing Gun Carrying among Young Urban Males over the Adolescent–Young Adult Life Course.’ Criminology, Vol. 38, No. 3, pp. 811–34. Loftin, Colin. 1984. ‘Assaultive Violence as Contagious Process.’ Bulletin of the New York Academy of Medicine, Vol. 62, pp. 550–55. Maclure, Richard and Melvin Sotelo. 2004. ‘Youth Gangs in Nicaragua: Gang Membership as Structure Individualization.’ Journal of Youth Studies, Vol. 7, No. 4, pp. 417–32. Maguire, Edward R., et al. 2008. ‘Spatial Concentrations of Violence in Trinidad and Tobago.’ Caribbean Journal of Criminology and Public Safety, Vol. 13, pp. 48–92. Mail Online. 2009. ‘Six Gang Members Given Life Sentences for Stabbing Army Cadet, 14, to Death.’ 9 July. <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1198581/Six-gang-members-given-life-sentences-stabbing-army-cadet-14-death.html> Maldonado, Victor. 2001. ‘Muertos y heridos en explosión de granada.’ El Diario de Hoy (San Salvador). 13 February. Mares, Dennis. 2010. ‘Social Disorganization and Gang Homicides in Chicago: A Neighborhood-Level Comparison of Disaggregated Homicides.’ Youth Violence and Juvenile Justice, Vol. 8, No. 1, pp. 38–57. Maxson, Cheryl L. 1998. Gang Members on the Move. Juvenile Justice Bulletin. Washington, DC: Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Department of Justice. —. 1999. ‘Gang Homicide: A Review and Extension of the Literature.’ In M. Dwayne Smith and Margaret A. Zahn, eds. Homicide: A Sourcebook of Social Research. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, pp. 239–56. —. 2009. In Pursuit of ‘Transnational’ Gangs: The ‘Special’ Case of the Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13). Paul Tappan award address at the Western Society of Criminology. San Diego, CA. —, G. David Curry, and James C. Howell. 2002. ‘Youth Gang Homicides in the United States in the 1990s.’ In Winifred L. Reed and Scott H. Decker, eds. Responding to Gangs: Evaluation and Research, Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice, pp. 107–37. — and Malcolm W. Klein. 1990. ‘Street Gang Violence: Twice as Great, or Half as Great?’ In C. Ronald Huff, ed. Gangs in America. Newbury Park, CA: Sage, pp. 71–100. — and Malcolm W. Klein. 1996. ‘Defining Gang Homicide: An Updated Look at Member Motive Approaches.’ In C. Ronald Huff, ed. Gangs in America, 2nd edn. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, pp. 19–35. Mejia, Julio. 2001. ‘Doce damnificados heridos por granada.’ El Diario de Hoy (San Salvador). 19 May. Miller, Walter B. 1982. Crime by Youth Gangs and Groups in the United States. Washington, DC: Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, US Department of Justice. Morselli, Carlo. 2008. Inside Criminal Networks. New York: Springer. Needle, Jerome A. and W. Vaughan Stapleton. 1983. Report of the National Juvenile Justice Assessment Centers: Police Handling of Youth Gangs. Washington, DC: US Department of Justice. NGC (National Gang Center). 2009. ‘National Youth Gang Survey Analysis.’ Accessed 2 February. <http://www.nationalgangcenter.gov/Survey-Analysis>

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NYGC (National Youth Gang Center). 2007. National Youth Gang Survey Analysis. Accessed 30 June. <http://www.iir.com/nygv/nygsa/> ONDC (Office of National Drug Control Policy). 2009. National Drug Control Strategy. Washington, DC: ONDC. <http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/ndcs09/2009ndcs.pdf> Padilla, Felix M. 1992. The Gang as an American Enterprise. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. Paniagua, Ignacio, et al. 2005. ‘Wounds Caused by Firearms in El Salvador, 2003–2004: Epidemiological Issues.’ Medicine, Conflict, and Survival, Vol. 21, No. 3, pp. 191–98. Papachristos, Andrew V. 2005. ‘Gang World.’ Foreign Policy, March/April, pp. 48–55. —. 2009. ‘Murder by Structure: Dominance Relations and the Social Structure of Gang Homicide.’ American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 115, No. 1, pp. 74–128. Pinnock, Don, and Mara Douglas-Hamilton. 1998. ‘Rituals, Rights, and Tradition: Rethinking Youth Programs in South Africa.’ In Kayleen Hazlehurst and Cameron Hazlehurst, eds. Gangs and Youth Subcultures: International Explorations. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, pp. 307–42. Pyrooz, David C., Andrew M. Fox, and Scott H. Decker. 2010. ‘Racial and Ethnic Heterogeneity, Economic Disadvantage, and Gangs: A Macro-level Study of Gang Membership in Urban America.’ Justice Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 1. <http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~content=a918800781~db=all~jumptype=rss> Ralphs, Robert, Juanjo Medina, and Judith Aldridge. 2009. ‘Who Needs Enemies with Friends Like These? The Importance of Place for Young People Living in Known Gang Areas.’ Journal of Youth Studies, Vol. 12, No. 5, pp. 483–500. RCMP (Royal Canadian Mounted Police). 2006. Feature Focus: Youth Gangs and Guns. <http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/pubs/yg-ja/gangs-bandes-eng.pdf> Reckson, Batya and Lily Becker. 2005. ‘Exploration of the Narrative Accounts of South African Teachers Working in a Gang-Violent Community in the Western Cape.’ International Journal of Social Welfare, Vol. 14, No. 2, April, pp. 107–15. Reisman, Lainie. 2006. ‘Breaking the Vicious Cycle: Responding to Central American Youth Gang Violence.’ SAIS Review of International Relations, Vol. 26, No. 2, pp. 147–52. Robinson, Paul L., et al. 2009. ‘The Effect of Urban Street Gang Densities on Small Area Homicide Incidence in a Large Metropolitan County, 1994–2002.’ Journal of Urban Health, Vol. 86, No. 4, pp. 511–23. Rodgers, Dennis. 1999. Youth Gangs and Violence in Latin America and the Caribbean: A Literature Review. Latin American and Caribbean Region Sustainable Development Working Paper No. 4. <http://www.ansarilawfirm.com/docs/Youth-Gangs-and-Violence-in-Latin-America.pdf> —. 2006. ‘Living in the Shadow of Death: Gangs, Violence and Social Order in Urban Nicaragua, 1996–2002.’ Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 38, No. 2, pp. 267–92. Rodriguez, Mario. 2001. Inseguridad en las Calles y Carreteras de Guatemala. Unpublished background paper. Geneva: Small Arms Survey. Rosenfeld, Richard, Timothy Bray, and Arlen Egley. 1999. ‘Facilitating Violence: A Comparison of Gang-Motivated, Gang-Affiliated, and Non-gang Youth Homicides.’ Journal of Quantitative Criminology, Vol. 15, No. 4, pp. 495–516. Salagaev, Alexander. 2001. ‘Evolution of Delinquent Gangs in Russia.’ In Klein et al., eds., pp. 195–202. — et al. 2005. ‘Contemporary Russian Gangs: History, Membership, and Crime Involvement.’ In Decker and Weerman, eds., pp. 169–92. 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Thale, Geoff and Elsa Falkenburger. 2006. Youth Gangs in Central America: Issues in Human Rights, Effective Policing, and Prevention. Special Report. Washington, DC: Washington Office on Latin America. Thornberry, Terence P., et al. 2003. Gangs and Delinquency in Developmental Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Thrasher, Frederick M. 1927. The Gang: A Study of 1,313 Gangs in Chicago. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Tita, George and Allan Abrahamse. 2004. Gang Homicide in LA, 1981–2001. Sacramento, CA: California Attorney General’s Office. —, Jacqueline Cohen, and John Engberg. 2005. ‘An Ecological Study of the Location of Gang “Set Space.”’ Social Problems, Vol. 52, No. 2, pp. 272–99. —, Jack K. Riley, and Peter Greenwood. 2003. ‘From Boston to Boyle Heights: The Process and Prospects of a “Pulling Levers” Strategy in a Los Angeles Barrio.’ In Scott H. Decker, ed. Policing Gangs and Youth Violence. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, pp. 102–30. Townsend, Dorn. 2009. No Other Life: Gangs, Guns, and Governance in Trinidad and Tobago. Working Paper No. 8. Geneva: Small Arms Survey. UNODC (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime). 2007. Crime and Development in Central America: Caught in the Crossfire. Vienna: United Nations. —. 2009. International Homicide Statistics (IHS). <http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/IHS-rates-05012009.pdf> USAID (United States Agency for International Development). 2006. Central America and Mexico Gangs Assessment. Washington, DC: USAID. Van Gemert, Frank. 2001. ‘Crips in Orange: Gangs and Groups in the Netherlands.’ In Klein et al., eds., pp. 145–52. — and Mark Fleisher. 2005. ‘In the Grip of the Group.’ In Decker and Weerman, eds., pp. 11–30. —, Dana Peterson, and Inger-Lise Lien, eds. 2008. Street Gangs, Migration, and Ethnicity. Cullompton: Willan Publishing. Venkatesh, Sudhir A. 1997. ‘The Social Organization of Street Gang Activity in an Urban Ghetto.’ American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 103, No. 1, pp. 82–111. Vigil, James Diego. 1988. Barrio Gangs: Street Life and Identity in Southern California. Austin: University of Texas Press. —. 2006. Gangs in Global Context. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press. Weaver, Katherine and Matilde Maddaleno. 1999. ‘Youth Violence in Latin America: Current Situation and Violence Prevention Strategies.’ Pan American Journal of Public Health, Vol. 5, Nos. 4–5, pp. 338–44. Wells, William, Charles M. Katz, and Jeonglim Kim. 2010. Firearm Possession among Arrestees in Trinidad and Tobago. Working paper. Huntsville, TX: Sam Houston University. White, Rob. 2006a. ‘Youth Gang Research in Australia.’ In James F. Short, Jr., and Lorine Hughes, eds. Studying Youth Gangs. Lanham, MD: AltaMira, pp. 161–80. —. 2006b. ‘Swarming and the Social Dynamics of Group Violence.’ Trends and Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice, No. 326. — et al. 1999. Ethnic Youth Gangs in Australia: Do They Exist? Summary Report. Melbourne: Australian Multicultural Foundation. Winton, Ailsa. 2005. ‘Youth, Gangs and Violence: Analysing the Social and Spatial Mobility of Young People in Guatemala City.’ Children’s Geographies, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 167–84. Wright, Richard T. and Scott H. Decker. 1996. Burglars on the Job: Streetlife and Residential Break-ins. Boston, MA: Northeastern University Press. Zhang, Lening, et al. 1997. ‘Gang Crime and Its Punishment in China.’ Journal of Criminal Justice, Vol. 25, No. 4, pp. 289–302.

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J^[ :Wd][h e\ :kd][edi FH?IED =7D=I 7D: ?D97H9;H7J;: C?B?J7DJ =HEKFI ?DJHE:K9J?ED Prison gangs have long been recognized as a challenge for penitentiary administration1 and studied as a central factor structuring life behind bars.2 For the most part, however, they have not been analysed as a primary threat to public security. And yet, as worldwide inmate populations have grown, prison gangs have expanded in size and reach, and in some places now constitute major criminal organizations, capable of instigating significant episodes of armed violence. Between 2002 and 2004, for example, prison riots sparked by clashes between jailed members of rival Central American maras (street gangs) claimed at least 216 lives (Jordan, 2004), and led governments throughout the region to adopt a policy of segregating prisons by gang affiliation. While this reduced the incidence of violence, it gave imprisoned gang leaders control over inmate life, effectively turning prisons into gang recruiting and training centres (USAID, 2006) and allowing the maras to consolidate into transnational networks (Cruz, 2007). In Rio de Janeiro, Brazil,3 de facto segregation of prisons by gang affiliation resulted from the ascension, some 25 years ago, of a group of inmates that came to be known as the Comando Vermelho (CV) to a position of absolute dominance within many of the state’s prisons, and the need to isolate dissenters and rivals in safe (non-CV) units. Control over the penitentiary system allowed the CV to expand beyond the prison walls in the mid-1980s, dominating Rio’s retail drug outposts and the favelas (slums) out of which they operate (Amorim, 2003); prison control has also been crucial in maintaining that dominion despite two decades of militarized police repression (Lessing, 2008a). Meanwhile, throughout the 1990s the techniques pioneered by the CV were copied and improved upon by the São Paulo prison gang Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC), which shocked the world in 2006 with a series of synchronized prison riots and coordinated attacks on police and civilian targets that brought the city of 15 million to a standstill (Cano and Alvadia, 2008). Prison gangs have thrived in the United States as well, in spite of a well-paid guard corps, high-tech prison installations, and extensive anti-gang efforts. In April 2009, a US District Court handed down life sentences to five members of Texas’s Barrio Azteca prison gang on federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) charges.4 Evidence presented at the trial made it clear that Barrio Azteca’s imprisoned leaders not only controlled many smaller street gangs in El Paso and elsewhere in Texas, but also had established major operational links with the Juarez drug cartel in Mexico, committing contract murders on both sides of the border and organizing the distribution of drugs once they entered US territory (Logan, 2009). Since Barrio Azteca’s locus of power is within the prison system, jailing its leaders may have little or no effect on the gang’s operational capacity (Burton and West, 2008). These examples, and others like them, make it clear that from a public security perspective, putting criminal actors in jail is in many ways the beginning, not the end, of the problem. While incarceration can neutralize individual threats to public security, at the aggregate level it provides both the means and incentives for inmate organizations

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to form, consolidate, and expand. As prison gangs grow, they take on increasing importance in the delicate equilibrium between inmates and guards by which order is maintained, and repressing them can lead to short-term eruptions of violence. Yet if left to their own devices, prison gangs can spread through the penitentiary system, simultaneously exploiting and deepening corruption within the guard corps. Crucially, gangs can also use their power within prisons to expand onto the street and exert influence over outside criminal actors, often organizing illegal activity (especially drug trafficking) in ways that increase the flow of profits to the prison-based leadership. Prisons can thus become resilient criminal headquarters, and gang leaders who are jailed can often continue to run their operations not just in spite of but in part thanks to the fact that they are incarcerated. Meanwhile, gangs’ capacity for violence increases both within and beyond the prison walls, often invisibly, in the lulls between incidents that grow ever more lethal and disruptive. While the problem admits no simple solution, government responses have been hampered by an official ‘corrections’ view of prison gangs as purely criminal and violent security threats to be eradicated or suppressed. This approach ignores important gang functions—such as identity, protection, and codes of conduct (Jacobs, 1974)—and the incentives that gang members have to band together, factors that make gang eradication a very unrealistic goal. Indeed, anti-gang measures can have a ‘hardening’ effect, solidifying group identity and focusing energy on organized =Wd] b[WZ[hi e\j[d resistance. The repressive approach also soft-pedals the interdependence of prison gangs and officials—particularly Yedj_dk[ je hkd j^[_h the guard corps—both in maintaining order and in administering a system of illicit rent extraction within prison. Finally, ef[hWj_edi j^Wdai je it obscures the fact that, in the highly circumscribed space of prisons, state policy and the actions of officials overX[_d] _dYWhY[hWj[Z$

whelmingly shape the conditions that gangs and individual inmates respond to and take advantage of. This chapter seeks to shed light on (1) the strategies and mechanisms by which prison gangs consolidate control within prison units, propagate throughout prison systems, and project power beyond the prison walls (see Box 6.1); and (2) their implications for armed violence and public security in general. Its main conclusions include: s The problem of prison gangs and prison-based criminal organizations needs to be integrated into a larger public security strategy. It is not just a ‘corrections’ question. s Many aspects of ‘state capacity’, as well as policies and initiatives designed to weaken prison gangs, have unintended, hidden, or long-term consequences that end up helping gangs thrive. s Increased incarceration can inadvertently strengthen prison gangs, which can recruit and draw political support from the inmate population as a whole. Gangs also rely on re-incarceration to make their threats over their nonimprisoned members credible. s Segregation of prisons by gang affiliation has an immediate, short-term effect of reducing prison violence, but also a hidden, long-term effect of increasing gang strength, both within and beyond the prison walls. s Prison gangs can help outside criminal actors and groups coordinate their actions and strategies, settle disputes, and weather the loss of leaders. The resulting prison-based criminal organizations are networked, resourceful, and highly resilient. s There is no simple relationship between the strength of prison gangs and levels of armed violence. Rather, prison gangs organize and focus the means to commit violence. As they grow, conflict, when it does break out, tends to be extreme. The first section of this chapter surveys the diversity of prison gangs and the problems they engender for prison administrators and society as a whole. The second section presents a case study of Brazil’s prison gangs—some of

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8en ,$' 9edY[fjkWb \hWc[meha0 a[o ZodWc_Yi e\ fh_ied ]Wd] [nfWdi_ed J^_i Y^Wfj[h Z_ij_d]k_i^[i j^h[[ a[o ZodWc_Yi e\ fh_ied ]Wd] ]hemj^0 consolidation, propagation, WdZ projection e\ fem[h X[oedZ j^[ fh_ied mWbbi$ Consolidation Z[dej[i W ]Wd]Êi Z[]h[[ e\ Yedjheb el[h j^[ fh_ied kd_ji m^[h[ _j _i WYj_l[" WdZ j^[ h[i_b_[dY[ e\ j^Wj Yedjheb$ 7 a[o Yecfed[dj _i j^[ [nj[dj je m^_Y^ j^[ ]Wd] YWd Z_ijh_Xkj[ X[d[\_ji ikY^ Wi Y[bb Wii_]dc[dji" èXi" WdZ YedjhWXWdZ WdZ fkd_i^c[dji Wced] _dcWj[i$ =_l[d Yecf[j_j_ed Wced] ]Wd]i" ijhed] Yedieb_ZWj_ed kikWbbo h[gk_h[i [b_c_dWj_d] eh Zec_dWj_d] h_lWbi WdZ d[kjhWb_p_d] j^h[Wji$ M^[d [dj_h[ kd_ji Wh[ i[]h[]Wj[Z Xo ]Wd] W\\_b_Wj_ed" Yedieb_ZWj_ed kikWbbo eYYkhi Xo Z[\Wkbj i[[ 8en ,$) $ Propagation _i j^[ ifh[WZ e\ W fh_ied ]Wd] je ckbj_fb[ fh_iedi m_j^_d W f[d_j[dj_Who ioij[c$ J^[ ceij Yecced Y^Wdd[b e\ fhefW]Wj_ed _i j^[ jhWdi\[h e\ ]Wd] c[cX[hi \hec j^[_h Éêc[Ê kd_j je ej^[h fh_iedi" Xkj _j YWd Wbie eYYkh j^hek]^ fh_ied[h h[b[Wi[ WdZ h[#_cfh_iedc[dj" Wi m[bb Wi Éc[h][hiÊ WdZ É\hWdY^_i_d]Ê _dlebl_d] _d_j_Wbbo kdW\\_b_Wj[Z ]hekfi$ Projection e\ fem[h h[\[hi je W fh_ied ]Wd]Êi WX_b_jo je Yedjheb" YeehZ_dWj[" eh _d\bk[dY[ WYjehi X[oedZ j^[ fh_ied mWbbi jemWhZi j^[ ]Wd]Êi emd [dZi$ ?j YWd jWa[ j^[ \ehc e\ Wd WYj_l[ [nfWdi_ed Xo \h[[Z c[cX[hi _dje ekji_Z[ WYj_l_jo" eh j^[ eh]Wd_p_d] e\ ekji_Z[ WYjehi dej d[Y[iiWh_bo c[cX[hi \hec _di_Z[ fh_ied$ ?j _i fh[Y_i[bo j^_i WX_b_jo je fhe`[Yj fem[h j^Wj jhWdi\ehci fh_ied ]Wd]i \hec W ÉYehh[Yj_ediÊ fheXb[c _dje W j^h[Wj je fkXb_Y i[Ykh_jo _d ][d[hWb$ J^[i[ ZodWc_Yi YWd X[ ckjkWbbo h[_d\ehY_d]" _d j^Wj [WY^ fhel_Z[i h[iekhY[i m_j^ m^_Y^ je fkhik[ j^[ ej^[h jme" Xkj [cf_h_YWb h[i[WhY^ iêmi j^Wj ]Wd]i fkhik[ j^[i[ ijhWj[]_[i _d Z_\\[h[dj YecX_dWj_edi WdZ m_j^ Z_\\[h_d] Z[]h[[i e\ ikYY[ii$ Ded[ e\ j^[c _i ik\\_Y_[dj eh d[Y[iiWho je WY^_[l[ Wdej^[h$

the most powerful in the world—to develop the consolidation/propagation/projection framework. The third section explores the implications of prison gang activity for armed violence both inside and outside prison. The chapter concludes with implications of the principal findings.

FH?IED =7D=I 7D: 7HC;: =HEKFI ?D FH?IED0 7 8H?;< IKHL;O The term ‘prison gang’ suggests a somewhat informal group dedicated to self-preservation and perhaps predatory or illegal activities. Even more than the term ‘street gang’, it is inadequate to describe what in reality is a wide variety of organizations and groups, each with different strategies, membership profiles, degrees of institutionalization, and historical trajectories. This chapter considers as its topic all self-identifying associations of inmate groups that exhibit some form of collective behaviour. Notably, this includes jailed members of militant and insurgent groups, even though few would consider them ‘gangs’. It also encompasses groups that transform over time, such as São Paulo’s PCC, which has taken on a politicized, anti-state stance and grown so powerful that it resembles a full-blown insurgency in some respects. This inclusive approach provides a comparative perspective on the dynamics that underlie the birth, operation, and growth of inmate organizations, as well as the dimensions along which these groups vary: s Size. Some gangs are small, local, and essentially self-protective; others actively recruit, expand throughout prison systems, and dominate criminal markets both within and beyond the prison walls. s ‘Style’. Gangs often have distinctive cultures that shape their behaviour: some are highly predatory, others enforce ‘fair’ codes of behaviour and provide a modicum of social order for all inmates. Some tend to form alliances with other gangs; others do not.

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s Membership. Some gangs form around racial, ethnic, religious, or geographic cleavages among prisoners, while others distinguish themselves with ideological or behavioural codes, or purely symbolic identities. In general, the more ‘universal’ a gang’s membership basis, the greater its potential to consolidate control. s Strategies and paths of expansion. Gangs grow in different ways (and not all gangs grow); consolidation, propagation, and projection of power are observed to different extents and in varying combinations. s Origin. This study distinguishes prison gangs that arose within the prison system (called here ‘natives’) from those that arise as ‘prison branches’ of organizations that already existed on the outside (‘imports’). Native groups’ norms and culture—initiation rituals, rules about homosexual sex, comportment and relations with guards and non-members—tend to have a strong ‘prison character’. These traits can persist when native gangs project power beyond the prison system: even if outside operations become relatively autonomous, imprisoned elders and leaders often retain significant influence and prison remains an important locus of power. When members of outside gangs are imprisoned, they arrive already marked by a strong group identity, behavioural norms, and often their publicly known histories and reputations. While this gives imports an ‘automatic’ basis for cohesion within prison, it may also make them less well adapted to prison life, and hence less J^[ ijWj[ bWh][bo

‘successful’ at consolidation than native gangs (Jacobs, 1974, p. 405). The same holds true with projection of

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power. Imports already have outside operations, and the mechanisms that allow native prison gangs to expand

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beyond prison would permit imports, in theory, to centralize control over their outside members, formalize rules

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and rankings, routinize succession, and generally become ‘institutionalized’ (Hagedorn, 2007, p. 303). But this

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requires a restructuring of the gang, and not all imports end up making prison a locus of power. s State actions and policies. Perhaps the most crucial ‘variable’ of all is the state itself, which to a large extent determines the conditions to which prisoners and gangs respond. After all, the very notion of the prison is a space in which the state controls the minutest aspects of inmates’ lives (Foucault, 1977). States build and maintain the physical prison grounds; set sentencing standards; hire guards and arm them with weapons and directives concerning their use; formulate policies concerning prisoners’ rights, prison conditions, punitive regimes (such as solitary confinement), and family visits; and frequently take actions to contain, neutralize, pacify, or negotiate with prison gangs. And of course states engage in such actions with differing degrees of capacity and legitimacy, all of which plays into the strategies that prison gangs adopt. The comparative study of prison gangs is in its infancy. Little is known about important cases such as the Russian Federation and China (with the world’s second- and third-largest prison populations, respectively5), and even in Western countries there is a dearth of relevant statistics and reliable information. Governments, even democratic ones, are rarely forthcoming about the existence and power of criminal groups within prisons. Most of the available information comes from journalistic and ethnographic sources; the basis for comparison across cases and countries is essentially qualitative. The cases presented here are not meant to be a representative sample of prison gangs around the world. Rather, from the very limited universe of cases about which there is ample information, these were chosen to demonstrate the variety of prison gang types, strategies, and trajectories.

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The dominant characteristic of US prison gangs is their racial character. The very names of the main California prison gangs, the country’s oldest and largest, tell the tale: Mexican Mafia (MM), Aryan Brotherhood (AB), Black Guerrilla

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Family (BGF). Ethno-geographic cleavages within racial groups are also important: the MM, made up of Chicanos6 from Southern California, is the sworn enemy of the Nuestra Familia (NF), representing Northern California Chicanos. Indeed, the MM–NF rivalry is so strong that they have traditionally allied with the AB and BGF against one another (Valdez, 2009). Still, the membership basis of each group, and of virtually all US prison gangs, remains racial, and cross-racial alliances are usually born of necessity. In a process that seems self-perpetuating, many gangs form in response to perceived threats to their ‘kind’ from other gangs: the Texas Syndicate, another major California gang, formed in response to abuse of native Texan (mostly Chicano) inmates within California prisons (Fleisher and Decker, 2001); the Barrio Azteca was founded in the Texas prison system by inmates from El Paso, who were discriminated against by dominant gangs. Splintering of gangs is common, particularly across state lines, and in recent years large, ‘institutionalized’ street gangs such as the Bloods and the Crips have established prison cells, rather than be absorbed into the older, native prison gangs as was common in the past (Hagedorn, 2005, pp. 162–63; Hunt et al., 1993). The result is a proliferation of prison gangs: a 2004 survey that asked correctional officials nationwide to list the top three gangs in their facility yielded 71 different groups (Knox, 2005, p. 38). Because of this multiplicity and the narrow, cleavage-based nature of gang membership, it is virtually impossible for a US prison gang to establish hegemony within a prison unit, much less across a prison system. Instead, many

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prisons are characterized by shifting alliances among gangs and an unsteady equilibrium that frequently collapses into generalized racial violence.7 As a result, US prison gangs are generally seen by correction officers and analysts primarily as agents of violence, extortion, and illicit economic activity, a view reflected in the official term for prison gangs, Security Threat Groups. This formulation ignores, perhaps wilfully, the protective role that gangs play for members, the incentives inmates have to join, and, most of all, the crucial interaction between prison guards and gangs by which day-to-day order is maintained—including the corruption that permits illicit prison economies to function. This in turn contributes to the tendency to take a repressive, ‘zero tolerance’ approach, aimed unrealistically at eliminating gang activity, without much analysis of the efficacy of specific anti-gang measures (Forsythe, 2006, p. 4) or of their entrenched role in the ‘equilibrium’ of order provision. Discussions of prison gangs in the developing world emphasize the lack of physical prison infrastructure, poorly trained and paid guards, and dysfunctional criminal justice systems. The US case is striking in this respect because, in spite of enormous economic and institutional advantages, so many of the same dynamics persist. For example, it would be difficult to imagine a prison regime more secure than the high-tech Security Housing Units of a US ‘Supermax’ facility such as Pelican Bay in California (Weinstein and Cummins, 1996). And yet, even there, authorities are unable to prevent gang leaders from communicating with and coordinating the actions of outside members (Geniella, 2001; Montgomery, 2009). Mobile phones run rampant in US prisons (Besier, 2009), as they do throughout Fh_ied ]Wd]i YWd Latin American jails. Attempts to neutralize gangs by breaking them up and transferring leaders to different units fhe`[Yj fem[h" have inadvertently helped them propagate throughout state prison systems (Parenti, 2000, p. 196), just as happened eh]Wd_p_d] j^[ h[jW_b repeatedly in Brazil. Perhaps most ominously, the Barrio Azteca case mentioned above has demonstrated that US Zhk] jhWZ[ _d prison gangs—like São Paulo’s Primeiro Comando da Capital—can successfully project power, organizing the retail [dj_h[ Y_j_[i$

drug trade in entire cities by integrating small street gangs into a standardized system of prices, quotas, and rules. Along some dimensions, increased state capacity almost certainly makes dealing with prison gangs easier—as the successful prosecution of the Barrio Azteca on federal RICO charges demonstrates. However, some components of state capacity can inadvertently strengthen prison gangs (see Table 6.1), which may explain why it is not a decisive variable in predicting prison gang strength. Another possibility is that in the United States, increased economic resources for corrections are being outstripped by an enormous and ever-growing inmate population, by far the largest of any country in the world today.8 Prison gang formation and activity seems to be, by its nature, subject to network effects, which raises the question—and important avenue for future research—whether their growth and potential negative impact increases non-linearly with the size of the prison population. This possibility is consistent with the fact that the US states with the highest prison populations, California and Texas, also have, arguably, the worst prison gang problems.9 If, beyond a certain point, the marginal cost of repressing prison gang activity is increasing with the absolute size of the prison population, then higher per-prisoner spending may be needed to keep gang problems in check. Even the more than sevenfold increase in corrections spending since 198210 may be inadequate to manage such a large and unprecedented inmate population. Iekj^ 7\h_YW0 j^[ DkcX[hi" j^[ 7c[h_YWdi" WdZ j^[ <_hc''

South Africa’s prisons have been dominated by the presence of three related gangs, the 28s, the 27s, and the 26s—known collectively as the Numbers—since the early 20th century. The Numbers constitute a unique and highly resilient gang ‘system’. Each gang maintains a complex and rigid hierarchy with dozens of different ranks and ‘lines’ of ascension, as well as distinct rules of conduct. For example, 28s permit homosexuality while 26s do not; 27s earn membership

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through violence, 26s through cunning and theft (HRW, 1994, p. 52). Each gang also maintains its own baroque variation on a common foundation myth involving the 19th-century anti-colonialist bandit Nongoloza, inspiring complex rituals involving imaginary but meticulously remembered Boer-war era uniforms and weaponry. Unlike in US prison gangs, membership is not determined by race or ethnicity, surprising given the two countries’ similarly strong racial divisions. The Numbers are notoriously brutal, both towards their own initiates, who are often hazed to within inches of their lives, and towards the larger prison population, which the Numbers frequently exploit. Though the gangs often compete over resources and recruits, and occasionally engage in overt attacks against one another, they understand themselves to have complementary roles.12 The Numbers system has thus propagated throughout the entire South African prison system, and for nearly a century has kept all other prison gangs from making more than minor inroads (HRW, 1994, pp. 51–52). From a public security perspective, the Numbers are problematic primarily in terms of within-prison violence and human rights violations. Gang leaders can punish prisoners with executions, beatings, gang rape, and sexual enslavement; indeed, one entire ‘line’ of the 28s consists of essentially feminized sex slaves (Gear and Ngubeni, 2002). Chillingly, wilful infection with AIDS also counts among the punishments (Reuters, 2002). However, the Numbers never sought to project their power beyond the prison walls. Indeed, their long-standing traditions and harsh entrance requirements gave high-ranking Numbers a certain disdain for street gangs, whose members frequently

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claimed to have operational linkages to Numbers gangs, or to be initiates though they had never been in prison. Rather than co-opt and organize these small-scale street gangs (as, say, the Barrio Azteca has done in Texas), Numbers leaders preferred to draw a stark distinction between themselves and criminal activity outside. This began to change in the 1990s, however, with a reconfiguration of South Africa’s illicit markets in the wake of globalization and the emergence of large-scale drug-trafficking ‘supergangs’. As with the smaller gangs that preceded them, the two largest supergangs outside of prison, the Americans and the Firm, both claimed alliances with Numbers gangs. In this case, though, the economic and political resources of supergang leaders were so great, and the ageing Numbers leadership in such decline, that the latter was forced to accept the alliance in spite of the supergangs’ unfamiliarity with the Numbers traditions (Steinberg, 2004, pp. 39–44). Interestingly, a similar ‘watering down’ of gang principles to accommodate new members flush with cash from a booming drug trade occurred in the case of Rio de Janeiro’s Comando Vermelho (Coelho, 1988). 9[djhWb 7c[h_YW0 _dij_jkj_edWb_p_d] j^[ cWhWi j^hek]^ cWii _dYWhY[hWj_ed I[]h[]Wj_ed Xo In 1995, a change in US immigration law facilitated the deportation of non-citizens convicted of certain offences. ]Wd] W\\_b_Wj_ed Together with California’s anti-gang laws and ‘three strikes’ sentencing requirements, this led to a wave of deportajhWdi\ehc[Z tions of Central American criminals—46,000 between 1998 and 2005 according to one estimate (Jütersonke, Muggah, fh_iedi _dje Wd and Rodgers, 2009). Many of these deportees were members of the two largest US-based Central American street eh]Wd_pWj_edWb gangs, the Mara Salvatrucha (MS) and the Mara Dieciocho (18th Street Gang, or just 18). Gangs were not new to El h[iekhY[$

Salvador, Honduras, or Guatemala, but the arrival of deported mara members from the United States, and the larger wave of return immigration of which it was a part, resulted in the penetration of Southern California gang culture into Central America. The vast array of local, turf-based gangs soon became clikas (‘cliques’) of the MS and 18 franchises, taking on the symbols, slang, and structure of the US-based gangs, including a propensity for warfare between the two rival maras (Cruz, 2007). Gang membership expanded rapidly and crime rates rose, setting off a ‘gang crisis’ that politicians in the region responded to with repressive mano dura policies (Arana, 2005). These policies in turn led to mass incarcerations and intense overcrowding in the region’s poorly maintained prisons, some of which housed members of both MS and 18. Between 2002 and 2005, a series of deadly prison riots, assaults, and fires broke out, leaving hundreds dead. The events made clear that prisoners had access to firearms, explosives, and mobile phones, and that prison guards were complicit in providing such items. Prison authorities naturally responded by segregating the prisoners, in effect turning entire prisons or wings over to each gang. While this did reduce the level of prisoner violence, it also had the predictable effect of transforming prisons into an organizational resource. As a USAID mission to Guatemala put it, ‘prisons have evolved into graduate schools or training camps for gang members’ (USAID, 2006). The extent to which the maras’ outside activity is controlled or influenced from within the prison system is not clear, nor is the degree to which they are currently organized. Some analysts emphasize the fact that neither gang has a hierarchical command and control structure (Jütersonke, Muggah, and Rodgers, 2009, pp. 380–81), and that claims of great influence made by imprisoned gang members to reporters may well be exaggerations.13 Others argue that imprisonment in segregated facilities has provided the maras with important organizational resources—such as a physical headquarters where members from different regions can come together—and ample opportunities for leaders to reward loyalty and punish transgressions, leading to an ‘institutionalization’ of the maras (Cruz, 2007). Fears of reverse infiltration into the United States of a new breed of ultra-violent, highly disciplined maras controlled from ‘nerve centres’ ensconced in inmate-run Central American prisons (Lopez, Connell, and Kraul, 2005) may be

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overblown. Coordination of action across international boundaries would probably require a greater flow of members from the US street to Central American jails than is realistic. But some of the other prison gang experiences related in this chapter suggest a number of troubling potential developments. For example, it certainly seems plausible that the activity of Central America’s street gangs could become increasingly coordinated by the imprisoned mara leadership. Given the general lack of state capacity and the sheer number of gang members in these countries, the way might then be clear for the kind of violent confrontation with state forces that have made Brazil’s prison gangs notorious.

C_b_jWdj ]hekfi _d fh_ied Unlike criminal groups and street gangs, militant and insurgent groups are generally organized around a concrete political goal (often the overthrow of the state) through force. While some militant groups engage in illicit activity, it is generally not central to their recruiting, training, or operations. Their jailed members certainly do not fit the image of a ‘classic’ prison gang. However, many of the underlying dynamics present in the case of criminal prison gangs operate in the case of jailed members of militant groups, and the dilemmas facing the state are in many ways similar. Moreover, Brazil’s powerful prison gangs incorporated techniques gleaned from contact with militant groups in ways that profoundly shaped their strategies and directly contributed to their ‘success’ (Auler, 2008, pp. 109–11). Including militant groups in this survey is intended to offer further comparative perspective, not associate or equate these groups with purely criminal street and prison gangs. Imprisoned militants bring with them extensive human and social capital, often including norms of collectivist 8hWp_bÊi fem[h\kb behaviour, a hierarchy or command structure, organizational and guerrilla tactics, knowledge of the legal system and fh_ied ]Wd]i prisoners’ rights, and well-articulated ideological positions and strategic goals that can focus energy and maintain _dYehfehWj[Z unity during incarceration. As a result, imprisoned members tend to act collectively, providing for and protecting their j[Y^d_gk[i ]b[Wd[Z own members, negotiating as a group, engaging in organized protests such as hunger strikes, and making use of avail- \hec c_b_jWdj ]hekfi$ able legal channels to denounce mistreatment and poor prison conditions. On the other hand, imprisoned militant groups may be less likely to propagate and recruit within the prison system, for a number of reasons. First, many militant groups see themselves as political prisoners and go to great lengths to physically and symbolically separate themselves from common criminals. This is particularly true when governments have deliberately mixed them together precisely to deny the militants political status, as was the case with both the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and the leftist opponents of Brazil’s military dictatorship. Militant groups may also keep to themselves for strategic reasons: groups that pursue a vanguard-based strategy may feel that common inmates lack the technical and ideological training—or simply the trustworthiness—required to join their movement. When militant groups do recruit and propagate, it tends to be part of a larger strategy of ideological proselytizing and conversion to the cause of some marginalized ‘base’, as was the case with Peru’s Sendero Luminoso. ?h[bWdZ0 j^[ ?H7Êi Fh_ied MWh'*

In 1976, the UK government changed its policy towards captured Irish republican militants; previously, they had been afforded a quasi-political status within the prison system, but they were henceforth to be considered common criminals and mixed in with the general prison population. While the intent of this measure was surely to demoralize the IRA and delegitimize armed resistance in the public eye, the end result was almost the opposite. Imprisoned IRA members refused to wear the prison uniforms of ‘common criminals’—the only clothes available to them—and instead remained in their cells, wrapped in blankets. The ‘blanket protest’ soon transmogrified into the ‘dirty protest’ in which IRA members refused to wash and used their own excrement to sully their cells and hallways. By 1980, a

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full-scale hunger strike was under way, and the prison campaign had become a central front of the IRA’s overall struggle. Indeed, a second, larger strike in 1981 led to a surprising political victory, when a snap election was held to replace a Westminster Member of Parliament from Northern Ireland, who had died unexpectedly. One of the imprisoned strikers ran for the seat and, due to the popular support the strike had generated for the prisoners’ cause, won. Astoundingly, the British government did not cede, the strike continued, and a month later the newly minted parliamentarian died in prison, along with nine others. But the so-called ‘Prison War’ was ultimately very positive for the IRA. In the short run, the attention of the media and the public shifted from the IRA’s controversial military campaigns and terrorist tactics to the struggle—widely seen as legitimate and courageous—for fair treatment of Republican prisoners against intransigent and inhumane British captors. In the long run, the episodes taught the IRA that they could drive an agenda and win political battles through organization and internal cohesion, precisely at the same time that it created bonds of camaraderie and mutual heroism among the protesters. Many IRA leaders attribute the groups’ revitalization and the Republican movement’s later political achievements to the reinvigorating effects of the Prison War (English, 2005, p. 205). While the IRA as organization bears little resemblance to criminal prison gangs, the episode captures some of the paradoxes of incarceration.15 Jailing IRA members certainly hurt the organization in a tactical sense by removing soldiers from circulation and raising the stakes for those in active duty. But it also provided the organization with resources and incentives for collective action, and it transformed the prison system into an arena of confrontation with the British state. The case also makes clear how state capacity has ambiguous effects on prison organizations’ ;b <hedj d fh_ied strength. The problem was hardly the UK’s ability to build and staff prisons, nor the effectiveness of its criminal [\\[Yj_l[bo X[YWc[ justice institutions, but rather the way that mass imprisonment of IRA operatives as common criminals shaped and, Wd IB ijhed]^ebZ WdZ ultimately, aligned their incentives. In fact, given the political/judicial nature of the imprisoned IRA members’ actions, jhW_d_d] \WY_b_jo$

a healthy, democratic criminal justice system was probably a tactical liability for the British state in this case. F[hk0 j^[ I^_d_d] FWj^Êi ÉB_X[hWj[Z Ped[Ê

In 1982, soldiers of the Maoist Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso, SL) insurgency attacked a prison in Ayacucho, Peru, freeing 300 of their jailed comrades (Smith, 1983). Fearing further escape and rescue attempts, the Peruvian government reopened the island prison of El Frontón and moved the bulk of its SL prisoners there (Gorriti, 1999, p. 243). According to the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the substandard prison conditions of the early 1980s were ‘taken advantage of by the SL, which considered prisons as centers of political action’ (CVR, 2003, p. 738). Where guards were both indifferent and brutal, the imprisoned SL cadres maintained an efficient, militarized internal discipline and an unyielding ideological fervour that included marches, songs, and communal indoctrination sessions. Dissidents, reactionaries, and members of opposing factions were forced to seek refuge in a dilapidated cellblock, while those who stayed were coerced and cajoled into adopting the SL ideology; soon a de facto segregation was in place (Gorriti, 1999, p. 248). Through threats and negotiations with officials, the SL won a series of concessions and consolidated its control over day-to-day prison life (Christian, 1986). Prison officials were not permitted to enter the SL cellblock, which SL inmates decorated with Maoist icons, physically remodelled using their own construction materials, and declared a ‘liberated zone’. El Frontón effectively became an SL stronghold and training facility; indeed, it was in some ways the proud public face of an otherwise secret organization (Rénique, 2003). Throughout 1985, the Shining Path orchestrated synchronized prison rebellions at El Frontón and other prisons, usually taking guards as hostages and negotiating improvements to prison conditions and recognition as political

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prisoners. Finally, in 1986, after a wave of SL attacks in and around Lima, authorities responded to a riot at El Frontón with an onslaught of military force that levelled the SL cellblock and left 118 dead. Simultaneous rioting at two other prisons was also met with military repression. At Lurigancho prison, all 124 inmates were killed. The total death toll at all three prisons was at least 248, of which 244 were prisoners (Weschler and Neier, 1993). The Commission later found that some prisoners had been summarily executed, and that the Peruvian military destroyed evidence of the massacre (CVR, 2003). The massacre hardly marked the end of SL’s strategy of, in its own words, ‘transforming the black dungeons of reactionism into shining trenches of combat’ (CVR, 2003, p. 740). Indeed, the SL leadership may have intended to provoke an overreaction that would confirm in the public eye its claim that the state had adopted a policy of ‘genocide’ (CVR, 2003, p. 742). In any case, SL had soon established a new prison ‘school’ at the Castro Castro prison in Canto Grande, which would be the site of a drawn-out battle for control with state forces in 1992 (Weschler and Neier, 1993, p. 207).

9EDIEB?:7J?ED" FHEF7=7J?ED" 7D: FHE@;9J?ED E< FEM;H0 8H7P?BÊI FH?IED#87I;: 9H?C?D7B IOD:?97J;I As the previous section demonstrates, prison gangs and other incarcerated groups vary in the strategies they pursue H_e i 9L WdZ and the degrees of success they experience. US prison gangs, for example, rarely consolidate; alliances across racial I e FWkbeÊi F99 lines are tenuous and within-race schisms are common, leading to a proliferation of gangs and a constantly shifting ^Wl[ [nfWdZ[Z pecking order. The South African Numbers, on the other hand, built a cooperative system of multiracial gangs that j^[_h ef[hWj_edi has brooked no serious rival for nearly a century. Gangs that actively recruit and expand are also likely to propagate m[bb X[oedZ j^[ if conditions permit, while imprisoned members of pre-existing outside groups (such as the IRA) may prefer to fh_ied mWbbi$ hunker down in a single unit to preserve morale and unity of purpose. Finally, not all gangs project power: some try but meet with limited success, as with the Mexican Mafia’s forays into cocaine distribution in Southern California; others never pursue the strategy at all, such as South Africa’s Numbers. Rio de Janeiro’s CV and São Paulo’s PCC provide good cases for study precisely because they have been very successful in all three strategies. In particular, both entities have projected power and expanded their operations beyond the prison walls to such a degree, and with such dire consequences, that they seem to have outgrown the term ‘prison gangs’. Yet as ‘native’ groups, they retain a culture informed by the prison experience, and continue to rely in important ways on the prison system as a locus of power.

J^[ 9ecWdZe L[hc[b^e', In the early 1970s, Brazil’s military dictatorship, responding to a small but growing armed resistance movement, began incarcerating both leftist militants and common criminals at the Cândido Mendes prison under the newly passed National Security Law (Lei de Segurança Nacional, LSN). By mixing militants with common criminals, as the British later would with the IRA, the Brazilian junta sought to obscure the former’s political status and, it was hoped, delegitimize their cause. Like the IRA, the jailed militants engaged in a disciplined, collective campaign to distinguish themselves from the common criminals in the so-called LSN wing. Eventually, the campaign worked and the militants were granted amnesty, though whereas the IRA came away from their prison war strengthened, the Brazilian armed left largely petered out in the mid-1970s.

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H_ej_d] 9L c[cX[hi Z[cWdZ i[]h[]Wj_ed Xo ]Wd] W\\_b_Wj_ed Wj 8[d\_YW fh_ied" H_e Z[ @Wd[_he" )' CWo (&&*$ LWdZ[hb[_ 7bc[_ZW%7<F

The real beneficiaries of the government’s ill-conceived policy may have been the common criminals of the LSN wing. In a spectacular example of unintended consequences, these inmates learned and adopted many of the leftists’ organizational and collectivist tactics, forging a strong group identity.17 Refining and adapting these tactics over time, the group known initially as the Falange LSN (LSN Gang) would, within a decade, not only dominate Rio de Janeiro’s prison system, but wield armed control over the majority of the city’s favelas and a near-monopoly on the city’s booming retail drug market. The Comando Vermelho (Red Command), as the LSN Gang was eventually dubbed by authorities, established and consolidated control at Cândido Mendes through a combination of brute force and a novel political strategy that grew out of their contact with the leftists. At the time of their founding, the prison, on the remote side of a rugged island far from the capital, was notorious for its chaotic and violent conditions. Prisoners were subject to beatings, torture, robbery, rape, enslavement, and murder by both fellow inmates and guards. The existing prison gangs were small, predatory, and violent. By contrast, the CV prisoners lived according to a collectivist ethos which, upon their reintegration with the prison masses, they promulgated as a universal code of conduct: no theft, no rape, and no prisoner-on-prisoner violence (except when decreed by the collective as punishment for transgressions) (Lima, 1991, p. 49). They also carried on the militants’ collectivist practices, pooling resources into a central kitty and doling out ‘welfare’ to the poorest prisoners. Finally, their rhetoric urged putting aside differences in favour of a collective struggle for improvements in living conditions, respect for prisoners’ rights, and an end to abuse by authorities.

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After a bloody confrontation eliminated its remaining rivals, the CV was more than just the strongest gang left standing. By using its hegemony to enforce a cooperative social order, providing public goods like security and welfare, the gang had generated political support and loyalty among the inmates (Lima, 1991, p. 75), which in turn gave its leaders a powerful bargaining chip with prison administrators.18 The CV could credibly offer to keep order and minimize violence on the one hand, and threaten collective disruptions such as riots and hunger strikes on the other. It was thus able to extract further concessions, such as the right to conjugal visits, and an increasing degree of control over day-to-day life within the prison. The key to the CV’s unprecedented consolidation of power was its strategy of establishing a universal and rule-based social order that was less violent, arbitrary, and predatory than the status quo ante, simultaneously making both prisoners and administrators better off (Lessing, 2009). Moreover, there is a self-reinforcing, path-dependent quality to this type of consolidation, since the stronger the CV grew, the greater its ability to enforce ‘law and order’, extract concessions, and provide public goods, vindicating its rhetoric and increasing its political support. The CV’s propagation through the prison system was initially spurred by what was probably an error. State officials, threatened by the CV’s consolidation of power at Cândido Mendes, transferred its leaders to other prison units throughout Rio de Janeiro state in the early 1980s. Even though some of them were placed in solitary confinement, they were able to spread their ‘message’ and quickly established control over additional prisons. As one Director of the Rio State Department of the Penitentiary System put it—in official testimony—‘the Comando Vermelho controls four prisons and the administration has difficulty taking any new measures without their consent’.19 The CV also used its power to facilitate prison breaks and escapes. Freed members were obliged to contribute J^[ 9L Yedieb_ZWj[Z money and resources to the prison collective, and to participate in rescue attempts, under penalty of death. At this fem[h Xo [ijWXb_i^_d] early stage of expansion beyond the prison walls, the challenge from an organizational perspective was how to induce W kd_l[hiWb" hkb[# the loyalty and sacrifice of freed members at a time when the CV’s capacity for action on the outside was still weak XWi[Z ieY_Wb ehZ[h$ and its members were not joined by familial or ethnic ties. Member accounts emphasize how their shared prison experience left them committed to the CV’s code of cooperative behaviour. But such behaviour was sustainable precisely because of the CV’s consolidated control over the prison system, and hence its ability to make credible promises to reward or punish freed members upon recapture. Paradoxically, this implies that improvements in law enforcement, especially policies of mass incarceration, can increase prison gangs’ leverage over outside members and affiliates (Lessing, 2009). The original members of the CV were almost all bank robbers and thieves, and so continued to practice armed assaults to raise money to fund jailbreaks. But armed robbery was a risky and unpredictable trade, and after the recapture and death of many founding members, the CV shifted to a new strategy: cornering the retail drug market, especially the booming domestic cocaine trade. By lending one another man- and firepower, freed CV bosses were able to systematically take over drug points of sale and the favelas in which they were located. By the mid-1980s, CV bosses controlled 70 per cent of Rio’s favelas (Amorim, 2003). This hegemony ended with the advent of several schism-born rival syndicates, but the CV remains the most powerful. By the early 1990s, both Rio’s favelas and its prison units had been divvied up among the CV and its rivals, a surprisingly stable status quo that persists today. This new modus operandi fundamentally altered the structure and meaning of the CV. Outside prison, it is essentially a loose affiliation of autonomous drug firms whose bosses engage in mutual aid and occasional coordinated actions (Misse, 2003). There is no central treasury or clear hierarchy, and the politically tinged rhetoric of the early days has mostly given way to a concern for drug profits. To many residents and even specialists, the CV is most strongly associated with its massive armed presence within the favelas.

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However, the CV’s ‘prison side’ continues to play a crucial, if hidden, role. First, when arrestees enter the prison system, they are assigned to jails based on the affiliation of the community they are from. Thus incoming prisoners from a CV-dominated favela will be sent to a CV-dominated prison, regardless of whether they have any link whatsoever to CV traffickers in their community. There they will adopt the rituals, internal discipline, and codes of behaviour that are, to those who have gone through the prison system, the true mark of the CV. Even those who enter prison as autonomous criminal actors may well leave as a respected member of the organization, with the right to a lucrative position within the drug trade.20 Second, imprisoned leaders continue to wield important influence over outside members. The clearest cases are imprisoned CV drug bosses, who usually continue to run their drug operations directly from prison, delegating only the necessary amount of authority to their right-hand men. Orders are almost always followed, since those on the outside know that sooner, or later, either the boss will be released or they will go to prison. But a more subtle form of influence is also at work. The prison system provides a forum for CV leaders to coordinate their strategies, share information, agree on mutual aid policies, plan invasions, and come to agreements. The greatly respected older CV leaders, especially those with links to the founding members, are particularly important (Barbosa, 1998). Their praise or disdain can alter the fortunes of an up-and-coming CV member, or decide the fate of a proposed course of action. They are frequently called upon to settle disputes, appoint successors, broker deals J^[ 9LÊi h[i_b_[dY[ between bosses, and evaluate alternative strategies.21 As is known from game theory, cooperation can be greatly cWo bWh][bo X[ Zk[ facilitated when the suggestions of a given actor are taken by all players to be focal (Myerson, 2004; Schelling, 1960). je _ji Yedjheb el[h Precisely because the CV as a whole does not have a rigid hierarchy, outside bosses rely crucially on the signals that j^[ fh_ied ioij[c$ the imprisoned leadership sends to coordinate on mutually beneficial courses of action.

As such, the CV’s ‘prison face’ helps the organization as a whole to survive setbacks and neutralize the centrifugal forces that, in other major Brazilian cities, tend to bring down large retail trafficking outfits, leading to far more fractured (and less violent) drug markets (Lessing, 2008b). In this sense, the CV’s longevity and resilience may ultimately be due less to massive drug profits and immense military-grade arsenals than to its continued control over the prison system (Lessing, 2008a).

J^[ Fh_c[_he 9ecWdZe ZW 9Wf_jWb In October 1992, a fight among inmates at São Paulo’s Carandiru prison escalated into general unrest. In response, military police shock troops entered the facility with assault rifles blazing and killed at least 111 prisoners. Witnesses reported that many of the victims were summarily executed in their cells after having surrendered (Varella, 1999, p. 288). The director of Carandiru at the time of the massacre was transferred to the Taubaté maximum security facility, where he presided over a highly repressive prison regime in which inmates were kept in isolation for all but a few hours a week, and where torture and beatings by officials were common (Jozino, 2004, p. 28). There, less than a year after the Carandiru massacre, a group of prisoners founded the Primeiro Comando da Capital (First Command of the Capital) around the idea of prisoner solidarity in the face of abuse and neglect by prison authorities.22 The PCC produced a written statute that, drawing heavily on the CV’s example (and copying their motto, ‘Liberty, Justice, and Peace’), forbade murder, theft, and rape, and also required freed members to contribute to a collective fund.23 The PCC had an explicitly proselytizing mission: its founding members explained the statute’s principles to other prisoners, identified promising disciples, and baptized them into the organization. The ranks of the PCC grew quickly as members were transferred out of Taubaté to less repressive units, where they could freely associate with a large inmate population (Jozino, 2004; Souza, 2007).

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Like the CV before it, the PCC used a combination of brutal violence to eliminate rivals and public goods provision—including day-to-day security—to win the support of prison masses and consolidate control. Crucially, both gangs’ political strategies had a kind of universal appeal: membership was not on the basis of race or other cleavages, and the regimes they put in place were based on inclusive, universal, and to some extent egalitarian principles that promised benefits to all inmates (Biondi, 2009). As one prisoner put it: Thanks to the PCC, the number of deaths [inside the prisons] fell, the [PCC] controls the inmates. Nobody kills anybody without authorization. There’s a steady supply of cell phones and drugs, nobody has to get them from the outside. [. . . ] And the PCC helps the guys who are hard up (Barros, 2006). PCC leaders strategically negotiated the transfer of key members to extend and maintain control over a growing share of the state’s prisons and jails (Christino, 2003). Though the PCC deliberately copied many of the CV’s tactics, it also innovated: it instituted a tax system in the form of a monthly raffle in which members and associates were obliged to participate (prizes have included new cars); it organized a private transportation and lodging system for inmates’ family members to make visits to prisons in the state’s interior; it created scholarships for freed members to obtain law degrees (Souza, 2007, p. 278); when crack addiction threatened to destabilize prison life, it successfully banned the drug (Marques, 2010). Above all, the PCC constructed, apparently with the help of an imprisoned member of a Chilean guerrilla organization, a complex communications network built around ‘switchboards’ operated by wives and sisters of PCC members (Souza, 2007). Prisoners, using smuggled mobile phones, could call a switchboard and be quickly connected to inmates in distant prison units, or patched into conference calls. This capacity for coordinating the actions of its members was brilliantly exploited in 2001, when the PCC launched synchronized rebellions in 29 detention units throughout the state. The so-called ‘mega-rebellion’ brought international attention to the PCC, and won it thousands of new members and immense prestige throughout the prison system. A period of relatively quiet consolidation followed, but in 2006 the PCC struck again. In May of that year, it launched Ed j^[ j^_hZ ZWo e\ an even larger mega-rebellion, involving more than 80 penitentiaries and jails in São Paulo state (Folha de S. Paulo, j^[ CWo (&&, F9 2006a) and another ten correctional facilities in neighbouring Paraná and Mato Grosso do Sul (Agência Folha, 2006). WjjWYai" ceij e\ j^[ More importantly, the PCC went on the offensive, attacking the state on its own turf. Once police units had been called Y_jo mWi fhWYj_YWbbo off the streets to quell the rebellions in the prisons, hundreds of PCC affiliates, organized into discrete operational WXWdZed[Z$ cells (Christino et al., 2006), attacked police stations, public buildings, banks, and the public transport infrastructure. On the third, and worst, day of the attacks, most of the city’s bus fleet was recalled, schools were closed, businesses shuttered, and the city practically abandoned. On the fourth day, subsequent to a secret meeting between government officials and the PCC’s leadership, the attacks abruptly stopped (Penteado, Caramante, and Machado, 2006). Police went on to kill as many as 170 people in the following days in what they claimed were armed confrontations with resisting PCC members (Folha Online, 2009). However, researchers24 and journalists25 have shown that many if not most of these cases were summary executions of individuals whose participation in the PCC attacks was never established. The PCC launched two additional attacks of similar proportions later that year (Carvalho, 2006), and also kidnapped a reporter from Brazil’s largest television network, negotiating the nationwide airing of a videotaped manifesto in exchange for his release (Folha de S. Paulo, 2006b). The 2006 attacks are thought to have been, in a general sense, a response to the creation of a highly repressive ‘disciplinary’ prison regime that deprived prisoners of almost any human contact. There have been no major attacks

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since, which some see as a kind of stalemate in which the state and the PCC can hurt but not destroy or impede one another (Dias, 2008). Others argue that politicians’ fear of setting off another mega-rebellion has given the PCC a virtual veto over public security policy.26 In any case, the PCC now controls 90 per cent of São Paulo’s prisons (Dias, 2008). Unlike the CV, the PCC has not established overt territorial control over the urban periphery, cornered the retail drug market, or engaged in further armed confrontations with state forces. Rather, researchers believe, the PCC has monopolized the wholesale distribution of illicit drugs and imposed on the retail markets a conflict-minimizing, profit-maximizing code of behaviour (Feltran, 2008). Local drug dealers are not only obliged to buy their supplies from the PCC, but must consult with the PCC leadership before committing reprisals, attacking rival gangs, or taking any other action that might generate further violence or attract police attention. In some cases, multiple PCC leaders in different prisons will sit in jury, via mobile phone conference calls, and hand down decisions over disputes (Caramante, 2008). The goal, it seems, is to increase the profits from the drug trade by avoiding unnecessary spirals of conflict and the resulting crackdowns by police. Some researchers and government investigators believe that the strong downward trend in violent crime in São 7i ]Wd]i Paulo over the last decade is at least partly attributable to the intervention of the PCC.27 This parallels an episode YedY[djhWj[ j^[ from the United States: the Mexican Mafia imposed rules on its outside members and affiliates against the killing of c[Wdi e\ l_eb[dY[" bystanders, resulting in a drop in East Los Angeles’s homicide rate between 1993 and 1994 (Parenti, 2000, p. 198). These _dY_Z[dji j[dZ je X[ are powerful examples of the complex relationship between prison gangs and armed violence, which are explored ceh[ Z[ijhkYj_l[$

in the next section.

FH?IED =7D=I" IC7BB 7HCI" 7D: 7HC;: L?EB;D9; The connection between prison gangs and armed violence is far less straightforward than is the case with other types of armed groups. Within prisons, firearm trafficking and violence is not a first-order problem, nor does armed prison violence represent a significant fraction of worldwide small arms violence.28 Moreover, prison gangs’ strength within prison often reflects their ability to reduce violence and establish a stable social order, while projection of power beyond the prison walls can have a similar organizing effect on outside criminal actors. The threat of violence is crucial to such coordination, but effective threats are precisely those on which it is not necessary to act. Thus there is no direct relationship between the size or strength of prison gangs and armed violence, either inside or outside prison. Unfortunately, this may lead officials to believe that mass incarceration and anti-gang policies are reducing levels of armed violence. In fact, such policies strengthen prison gangs and extend their reach. As gangs accumulate and concentrate the means of violence, incidents, when they do occur, tend to be more extensive, strategic, and destructive. In general, firearms are rarely found within prisons; most inmate violence is committed with home-made cutting, stabbing, and bludgeoning weapons.29 The reasons for this include the fact that guns are hard to smuggle in and even harder to keep secret; they make excellent targets for cell searches, as well as prisoner-on-prisoner theft. Smuggling in a gun almost always requires the help of corrupt guards, who are likely to charge expensive bribes. Above all, firearms have a destabilizing effect: exactly because they are rare, their mere presence can upset the delicate equilibrium of prison life—in particular the unspoken pact between inmates and guards30—and lead to lockdowns, cell sweeps, and eruptions of lethal prison violence. All of this shapes the incentives of prisoners: a firearm is likely to be desirable only as a desperate defensive measure, or when a group or individual deliberately wants to create a chaotic or violent situation.

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Nonetheless, firearms do make their way into prison, even in the United States (see Box 6.2). The relatively large number of prison riots and murders in Latin America involving firearms suggests that guns in prison are more common, and more consequential, in this region. Since the press rarely reports on firearms in prison except when they are used during major violent events, the examples cited cannot reveal whether firearm possession causes unrest and fighting or vice versa, nor do they shed light on the prevalence of firearms that remain hidden and unused. But they are consistent with the idea that firearms in prisons have a destabilizing effect and can be used to help initiate a prison riot or carry out an assassination or massacre.

'-* IC7BB 7HCI IKHL;O (&'&

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This suggests that, on the margin, prison gangs’ access to and use of firearms is likely to grow with their size and strength. On the supply side, a stronger, larger, richer gang is likely to have more extensive contacts—and standing bribery relations—among corrupt guards; more economic resources to pay bribes; and more associates on the outside who can obtain weapons. On the demand side, while both gangs and individuals may seek out guns for defensive purposes, gangs are far more likely to find advantageous the kind of prison-wide disturbances that firearms can help provoke. Riots offer opportunities for escape and score-settling; instigating lockdowns can provide protection or buy time; hostage-taking can lead to negotiations and improved prison conditions. As a gang’s resources grow, it is more likely to be able to employ violence and disorder in strategic ways. On the outside, prison gangs rely on firearms and armed violence in ways similar to other gangs and criminal organizations: to settle scores, establish turf, and intimidate potential challengers. They may also use armed force and the promise of ‘prison insurance’ to induce cooperation among outside gang members and sympathizers. By coordinating the actions of dozens or even hundreds of outside gang members, such as when CV drug lords pool their soldiers and weapons to carry out an invasion of a rival’s territory, the destructive power of a given arsenal is magnified dramatically. In terms of procurement, prison gangs able to project power beyond the prison walls are likely to have developed strong links to networks of corrupt officials and other suppliers of illicit small arms. As is the case with much gun violence, though, the issue is often not the absolute number of weapons available, but the ways in which those weapons are used. Prison gangs illustrate how the potential impact of a given stock of small arms depends crucially on the way in which the actors who control that stock are organized. Consider the power of a firearm that has been smuggled into prison. An armed individual might be capable of inflicting lethal

FH?IED '-+

violence or defending himself from it, but he is also vulnerable to being ratted out, overpowered by a group, or simply caught sleeping. A gang could use that same firearm to quickly dominate and even massacre members of a rival gang that possesses only bladed weapons, or make strategic use of a prison-wide disturbance that even a single firearm may be sufficient to set off.

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FH?IED '--

However, there is no direct relationship between the size or strength of prison gangs and the level of armed violence observed. When multiple gangs compete for control or hegemony, conflict is usually the order of the day, but prison can foment truces: in the 1970s, leaders from Chicago’s Latino gangs came to Stateville prison to sign a peace treaty whose terms had been worked out by inmate members (Jacobs, 1974, p. 407). When one gang is dominant, it may rule in a predatory and violent way, but it may also use its power to minimize conflict (see Box 6.3). The ascension of the CV and the PCC in their respective prison systems brought a reduction in prison violence; CV takeover of favelas reduced within-community crime (Penglase, 2005, p. 4), just as the PCC’s expansion seems to be doing in the periphery of São Paulo, and Nuestra Familia’s did in Los Angeles. Conflict, after all, can be thought of as a breakdown of bargaining and coordination (Powell, 2004), and prison gangs—powerful, centralized, and wellinformed—can have an organizing, conflict-minimizing effect on the criminal world. When conflict does occur, though, prison gangs’ ability to organize and concentrate the means of violence can contribute to extreme outcomes. The CV’s resilience over time and in the face of militarized police repression, and the rise of similarly configured rival syndicates, has supported the escalation of armed conflict in Rio’s favelas to levels that match or surpass civil wars. Perhaps even more startling is the PCC’s use of strategically coordinated armed attacks against state forces and civilian targets. It demonstrates that prison gangs can use armed violence inside and outside prison strategically and to political ends, taking advantage of a state’s weaknesses to force concessions that leave the state even weaker and the group stronger. The resulting violence can be severe—nearly 500 were killed with firearms during the May 2006 attacks and their immediate aftermath (Folha Online, 2009)—but of equal or greater importance is the fact that São Paulo’s elected leaders are now essentially paralysed: they cannot take action against the PCC without risking another politically fatal wave of attacks.

9ED9BKI?ED Prison gangs are an adaptive response by inmates to perceived threats from other prisoners and guards, as well as a means to cope with unliveable prison conditions, or simply establish a positive group identity. They are ubiquitous and not amenable to eradication. They play a role in aggravating violence and crime within prisons, and may contribute to the ‘anti-social’ effects of incarceration on prisoners in general (Lerman, 2009); as such they constitute a key issue for prison management. Prison gangs can also, in ways that are only beginning to be understood, consolidate and project power beyond the prison walls, becoming a potential threat to society as a whole. As such, the problem of prison gangs needs to be better understood and integrated into the larger public security debate. They are not just an administrative, ‘corrections’ question. The prison gang problem appears especially relevant to anti-crime policy. Hard-line, mano dura approaches, especially those that swell the prison population, feed prison gang recruitment and are almost certain to fuel their growth. Calls to ‘lock up more criminals’ should be understood to imply more serious prison gang problems down the road. Moreover, mass incarceration policies usually outpace the construction of new facilities, leading to overcrowding and inadequate supervision, conditions which also favour prison gang emergence and growth. Brazil’s prison gangs achieved an astounding degree of political power among inmates by making their organizing principle the fight for better conditions and an end to mistreatment by officials. Allowing prisons to become overcrowded, inhumane dungeons is not just a problem from a human rights perspective; in the long run, it can be a threat to public, and even national, security.

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At a deeper level, the role of incarceration in dealing with social ills requires rethinking. Putting criminals, gang members, rebels, paramilitaries, and other armed actors in jail does not neutralize them. On the contrary, for incarcerated groups, prisons can become tactical headquarters, organizational assets that expand their range of action and make them more resilient. In this context, crackdowns and mass arrests can become counter-productive. Of course, dangerous elements will always need to be physically detained and isolated from the rest of society. But governments facing organized armed violence should be aware that increased incarceration rates cannot substitute for addressing the root causes of civil strife and rampant crime. For civil society, it is important to continue to shine the light of public scrutiny on the inner workings of prison systems. Governments, particularly elected ones, have short time horizons. Because the negative consequences of prison gang growth may remain (for a time) contained within the prison system, far from the public eye, it is all too easy for politicians to ignore them when formulating policy.

B?IJ E< 788H;L?7J?EDI AB

Aryan Brotherhood

BGF

Black Guerilla Family

Comando Vermelho

IRA

Irish Republican Army

LSN

Lei de Segurança Nacional

Mexican Mafia

Mara Salvatrucha

Nuestra Familia

PCC

Primeiro Comando da Capital

RICO

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act

Sendero Luminoso

;D:DEJ;I 1

See Fleisher and Decker (2001); Knox (2005).

See Hunt et al. (1993); Jacobs (1978).

This chapter presents results from the author’s fieldwork on Brazilian prison gangs between 2005 and 2009. This fieldwork was generously supported by the Small Arms Survey; the University of California–Berkeley Graduate Division Summer Research Grant; the National Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellowship; and the National Center for Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorism Events under grant number 2007-ST-061-000001. All opinions, findings, recommendations, and/or errors are entirely the author’s own.

RICO was originally designed as an anti-mafia measure; from a law-enforcement perspective, its use indicates that prison gangs have become significant examples of organized crime.

Data from ICPS (n.d.).

Chicanos are US-born Latinos, usually of Mexican descent.

FH?IED '-/

Parenti (2000) notes that when fighting breaks out, even non-gang members are expected to ‘put in time’ on the prison yard fighting for their

Data from ICPS (n.d.).

For example, of the seven major prison gangs listed in ‘Appendix C: Prison Gangs’ of the 2009 National Gang Threat Assessment (USDOJ, 2009),

racial group.

all but one originated and are most active in California and Texas. 10

Data from the USBJS (n.d.). As of 28 January 2010, the last year for which data was available was 2006.

Where not otherwise noted, this section is based on Steinberg (2004).

In particular, the 27s, characterized by their propensity to employ violence, have the role of defenders of the Numbers system, its shared oral tradition, and rules.

Author communication with Dennis Rodgers, 11 August 2009.

This section is based on an interview with IRA scholar Richard English, 26 June 2009, and on English (2005).

In the early 1990s, faced with the difficult task of jailing drug kingpins who had recently turned themselves in to avoid extradition, Colombia’s then justice minister Rafael Pardo visited Northern Ireland’s prisons and met with UK officials to learn from the IRA case (Balcázar Salamanca and Gómez Garzón, 2003).

16 17

This section draws on Amorim (2003) and Lima (1991). It remains controversial how complicit leftist militants were in passing on such volatile human capital to the other LSN inmates. When the CV first attracted public attention, the media and the military government assumed that its members had been deliberately indoctrinated and trained by the leftists as part of a long-term strategy to re-ignite armed resistance to the regime (Amorim, 2003). But both leftists and CV members concur that the former minimized contact with the common criminals, and successfully mobilized to have their wing physically divided (Lima, 1991, p. 45).

This support was neither universal nor always freely given: those who disagreed openly with the CV’s rule faced reprisals or banishment to solitary confinement. Interview with Julita Lemgruber, former Director of the Rio State Department of the Penitentiary System, 8 July 2009.

Testimony before the Rio state government’s Council of Justice, Security and Human Rights, quoted in Amorim (2003, p. 188).

Author interview with non-trafficking ex-CV member and prison capo, 14 August 2009.

Author interview with ex-CV drug boss and inmate, 14 August 2009.

Biondi (2009) notes that for years multiple, contradictory versions of the PCC’s origin were heard from prisoners and officials. After Jozino’s (2004) history of the PCC was published and widely circulated within the prison system; its version became universally accepted (as it is in this chapter), and even the memory of the controversy seems to have been lost.

The PCC’s statute has appeared repeatedly in the Brazilian press since 2001. The Portuguese version is available at Folha Online (2001); an English version can be found at Wikisource (n.d.).

See, for example, Cano and Alvadia (2008).

See, for example, Penteado and Leite (2006).

Interview with Marcio Christino, São Paulo State Attorney, 4 September 2009.

This section does not address firearm possession and use by guards and police, which cause many prison deaths, particularly during riots. In California’s prisons, between 1989 and 1994, guards shot 175 prisoners, killing 27 (Parenti, 2000).

Author communication with US federal penitentiary official, 23 November 2009, and corrections specialist at the US Bureau of Justice Statistics, 19 November 2009. Author interviews with research specialist, US National Criminal Justice Reference Service, 23 November 2009, and research specialist, American Corrections Association, 23 November 2009. Official data from the US, UK, and Canadian prison systems does not specifically report injuries and mortalities from firearms. The fact that it does mention other types of weapons strongly suggests that firearms are not a primary means of prison violence.

Author communication with John Hagedorn, 9 October 2009.

Author communication with John Hagedorn, 9 October 2009; US federal penitentiary official, 23 November 2009; corrections specialist at the US Bureau of Justice Statistics, 19 November 2009. Author interviews with research specialist, US National Criminal Justice Reference Service, 23 November 2009, and research specialist, American Corrections Association, 23 November 2009.

‘Zip gun’ is a common term among inmates for a craft (home-made) gun.

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8?8B?E=H7F>O AFP (Agence France Presse). 2005. ‘31 Dead in Guatemala Prison Clashes.’ 15 August. Agencia Folha. 2006. ‘Presos encerram rebeliões “solidárias” ao PCC no MS e no PR.’ 15 May. Amorim, Carlos. 2003. CV-PCC: a Irmandade do Crime. São Paulo: Record. AP (Associated Press). 1999. ‘Colombia Prison Riot Leaves 11 Dead, Eight Injured.’ 9 December. —. 2000. ‘At Least 26 Killed in Colombia Prison Riot.’ 28 April. —. 2004. ‘Second Inmate Charged in Shooting at Allendale Prison.’ 8 September. —. 2005. ‘Peru Prison Riot Leaves 5 Dead, 18 Hurt.’ 8 February. —. 2007. ‘Venezuela Prison Riot Kills 16 Inmates.’ 2 January. —. 2008. ‘Venezuela Prison Riot Kills 9 Inmates, Injures 20.’ 22 March. Arana, Ana. 2005. ‘How the Street Gangs Took Central America.’ Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 3, pp. 98–110. Auler, Marcelo. 2008. ‘Organizações Criminosas no Rio de Janeiro.’ In P. P. Negrini, ed. Enjaulados: Presídios, Prisioneiros, Gangues e Comandos. Rio de Janeiro: Gryphus. Balcázar Salamanca, Alejandra and Fernando Gómez Garzón. 2003. La Horrible Noche: La Fuga de Pablo Escobar. Bogotá: Ediciones B. Barbosa, Antonio Rafael. 1998. Um Abraço para Todos os Amigos: algumas considerações sobre o tráfico de drogas no Rio de Janeiro. Niterói: EDUFF. Barros, Joao de. 2006. ‘A Construção do PCC.’ Caros Amigos. May, pp. 3–13. Besier, Vince. 2009. ‘Prisoners Run Gangs, Plan Escapes and Even Order Hits with Smuggled Cellphones.’ Wired. 22 May. <http://www.wired.com/politics/law/magazine/17-06/ff_prisonphones> Biondi, Karina. 2009. Juntos e Misturados: Imanência e Transcendência no PCC. São Carlos: Universidad Federal de São Carlos. Borges, Mariana and Marcelo Daniel. 2009. ‘Revistar Mais e Melhor.’ Revista SAP. July. Bravo, Tomas. 2008. ‘At Least 21 Dead in Mexico Jail Riot.’ Reuters. 20 October. <http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE49J67K20081020> Brownsville Herald. 2009. ‘2 Dead, 36 Injured in Matamoros Prison Riot.’ 22 January. Burton, Fred and Ben West. 2008. ‘The Barrio Azteca Trial and the Prison Gang-Cartel Interface.’ Stratfor. 19 November. <http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20081119_barrio_azteca_trial_and_prison_gang_cartel_interface> Cano, Ignacio and Alberto Alvadia. 2008. Análise dos impactos dos ataques do PCC em São Paulo em maio de 2006. Rio de Janeiro: Laboratório de Análise da Violência. <http://www.observatoriodeseguranca.org/files/AtaquesPCC_IgCano.pdf> Caramante, André. 2008. ‘“Tribunal do Crime” é Negócio, Diz Promotor.’ Folha de S. Paulo. 4 October. Carvalho, Cleide. 2006. ‘Este ano, SP sofreu três ondas de terror e teve 998 alvos atacados.’ O Globo Online (Rio de Janeiro). 28 December. Christian, Shirley. 1986. ‘Inside a Peruvian Jail, Where Rebels Held Sway.’ The New York Times. 28 June. Christino, Márcio. 2003. Por Dentro do Crime: corrupção, tráfico, PCC. São Paulo: Escrituras. — et al. 2006. Inquérito Policial no. 050.06.057.864-5. Ministério Público de São Paulo. 4 August. Coelho, Edmundo Campos. 1988. ‘Da Falange Vermelha a Escadinha: o poder nas prisões.’ Presença, Vol. 11, pp. 106–14. Cruz, José Miguel. 2007. ‘El barrio transnacional: las maras centroamericanas como red.’ In Francis Pisani et al., eds. Redes transnacionales en la Cuenca de los Huracanes. Mexico City: Miguel Ángel Porrúa. —. 2010. ‘Government Responses and the Dark Side of Suppression of Gangs in Central America.’ In Thomas C. Bruneau, Lucía Dammert, and Jeanne Giraldo, eds. The Maras and Security Challenges in Central America and the U.S. Austin: University of Texas Press. Cummins, Eric. 1995. California Prison Gang Project: Final Report. Chicago: Spencer Foundation. CVR (Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación). 2003. ‘Las Ejecuciones Extrajudiciales del Penal de El Frontón y El Lurigancho.’ In Informe Final. Lima: CVR. <http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/peru/libros/cv/vii/267.pdf> Davis, Mike. 1995. ‘Hell Factories in the Field: A Prison–Industrial Complex.’ The Nation, Vol. 260, No.7, pp. 229–34. Dias, Camila. 2008. Práticas Punitivas na Prisão: institucionalização do ilegal e legalização do arbitrário. Paper presented at XXXII Encontro Anual da ANPOCS. Caxambú, Brazil. El Siglo de Torreón. 2005. ‘Descubren Portación de Armas Dentro de La Palma.’ 3 January. <http://www.elsiglodetorreon.com.mx/noticia/127005.descubren-portacion-de-armas-dentro-de-la-pal.html#> English, Richard. 2005. Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA. New York: Oxford University Press.

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Lopez, Robert, Rich Connell, and Chris Kraul. 2005. ‘MS-13: An International Franchise: Gang Uses Deportation to Its Advantage to Flourish in U.S.’ Los Angeles Times. 30 October. <http://www.latimes.com/news/local/la-me-gang30oct30,1,5492282.story> Marques, Adalton. 2010. ‘“Liderança”, “proceder” e “igualdade”: uma etnografia das relações políticas no Primeiro Comando da Capital.’ Etnográfica (Lisbon). Misse, Michel. 2003. ‘O Movimento: A constituição e reprodução das redes do mercado informal ilegal de drogas a varejo no Rio de Janeiro e seus efeitos de violência.’ In M. Baptista, ed. Drogas e Pós-modernidade. Rio de Janeiro: EdUERJ. Monken, Mario Hugo, Talita Figueiredo, and Sergio Torres. 2004. ‘Guerra de facções causa matança no Rio.’ Folha de S. Paulo. 2 June. <http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/cotidian/ff0206200401.htm> Montgomery, Michael. 2009. ‘Locked Down: Gangs in the Supermax.’ American RadioWorks. <http://americanradioworks.publicradio.org/features/prisongangs/index.html> Myerson, Roger. 2004. ‘Justice, Institutions, and Multiple Equilibria.’ Chicago Journal of International Law, Vol. 5, p. 91. NYT (The New York Times). 1993. ‘When Inmates Carry Guns.’ 20 January. <http://www.nytimes.com/1993/01/20/opinion/when-inmates-carry-guns.html?pagewanted=1> —. 1994. ‘100 Reportedly Killed in Venezuela Jail Riot.’ 4 January. <http://www.nytimes.com/1994/01/04/world/100-reportedly-killed-in-venezuela-jail-riot.html?pagewanted=1> —. 2001. ‘Deadly End to a Prison Fight.’ 4 July, p. 7. <http://www.nytimes.com/2001/07/04/world/deadly-end-to-a-prison-fight.html?pagewanted=1> Parenti, Christian. 2000. Lockdown America: Police and Prisons in the Age of Crisis. New York: Verso Books. Penglase, R. Ben. 2005. ‘The Shutdown of Rio de Janeiro: The Poetics of Drug Trafficker Violence.’ Anthropology Today, Vol. 21, No. 5, pp. 3–6. Penteado, Gilmar, André Caramante, and Cristiano Machado. 2006. ‘Cúpula do PCC ordena fim dos ataques em SP.’ Folha de S. Paulo. 16 May. <http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha/cotidiano/ult95u121590.shtml> Penteado, Gilmar and Fabiane Leite. 2006. ‘Polícia de SP matou 22 civis com tiros de cima para baixo.’ Folha de S. Paulo. 29 May. <http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha/cotidiano/ult95u122133.shtml> Pettit, Becky and Bruce Western. 2004. ‘Mass Imprisonment and the Life Course: Race and Class Inequality in US Incarceration.’ American Sociological Review, Vol. 69, No. 2, pp. 151–69. Powell, Robert. 2004. ‘The Inefficient Use of Power: Costly Conflict with Complete Information.’ American Political Science Review, Vol. 98, No. 2, pp. 231–41. Rénique, José Luis. 2003. La voluntad encarcelada: Las ‘luminosas trincheras de combate’ de Sendero Luminoso del Perú. Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos. Reuters. 2002. ‘South Africa Prison Gangs Use AIDS Rape as Punishment.’ 22 November. —. 2008. ‘Five Killed in Mexican Prison Riot—Media.’ 7 November. <http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/N07412609.htm> Schelling, Thomas C. 1960. The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. SFBG (San Francisco Bay Guardian Online). 2009. Prison Report: Special Edition. 14 July. <http://www.sfbg.com/blogs/politics/2009/07/prison_report_special_edition.html> Smith, Michael. 1983. ‘Peruvian Town Whispers in Fear of “1,000 Eyes.”’ The Globe and Mail (Toronto). 20 March. Souza, Fátima. 2007. PCC, a Facção. São Paulo: Editora Record. Steinberg, Jonny. 2004. Nongoloza’s Children: Western Cape Prison Gangs during and after Apartheid. Johannesburg: Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation. <http://www.csvr.org.za/docs/correctional/nongolozaschildren.pdf> Sykes, Gresham M. 1958. The Society of Captives. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Thompson, Don. 2009. ‘California Struggles to Desegregate Prison Inmates.’ Associated Press. 20 August. USAID (United States Agency for International Development). 2006. Central America and Mexico Gang Assessment. Washington, DC: Bureau for Latin American and Caribbean Affairs, Office of Regional Sustainable Development, USAID. April. <http://www.usaid.gov/locations/latin_america_caribbean/democracy/gangs_assessment.pdf> USBJS (United States Bureau of Justice Statistics). n.d. ‘Key Facts at a Glance: Direct Expenditures by Criminal Justice Function, 1982–2006.’ Accessed 28 January 2010. <http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/glance/tables/exptyptab.cfm>

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79ADEMB;:=;C;DJI Fh_dY_fWb Wkj^eh Benjamin Lessing

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J^[ Ej^[h >Wb\ =?HBI ?D =7D=I ?DJHE:K9J?ED The gang phenomenon has traditionally been understood as quintessentially ‘male’. Historically and culturally women have been considered the peaceful and nurturing sex, while men are seen as more violent. Debates and research on gang violence have tended to focus on male-on-male crime, with less attention paid to young women who are involved as victims, supporters, or active participants (Fukuyama, 1998; Goldstein, 2001). In recent years, researchers in the United States and Europe have increasingly undertaken studies on female gangs, paying greater attention to ‘girl soldiering’ and other forms of female involvement in armed conflict. An emerging international body of evidence is beginning to shed light on the range of roles that girls and women play in gangs and armed groups—though these two categories are rarely reviewed jointly. While focusing on gangs, this chapter notes parallels with armed groups, pointing to similarities and differences that merit further attention and research (see Box 7.1). The chapter presents an up-to-date literature review, along with primary research on female involvement in gangs in Haiti, for purposes of exploring the intersection between gender, race, and ethnicity. It concludes that a full and nuanced understanding of gang formation and violence needs to take account of the roles and experiences of girls and women. Such knowledge is a prerequisite for the development of programmes aimed at preventing and responding to gang violence among both sexes. The main findings are: s Estimates of the female proportion of the gang population vary greatly. National youth survey data from the United States and the UK suggest that girls and women account for 25 and 50 per cent of all gang members, respectively, whereas US law enforcement data puts the figure at seven per cent. s A conservative estimate of the global female gang population is 132,000–660,000. s Although male gang members make up the majority of gun violence victims, girls and women appear to be more likely to suffer sexual abuse both within gangs and in the home. s Sex composition may be a good proxy for a gang’s engagement in violence. Evidence suggests that girls in all- or majority-female gangs may be less engaged in violence than male or female members of sex-balanced or all- or majority-male gangs. s Girls and women tend to use weapons and engage in acts of violence less frequently and with lesser intensity than their male counterparts. They often opt for knives, stones, or tools over firearms as their weapon of choice. s There are parallels between ‘gangs’ and ‘groups’ in terms of female involvement. Girls and women are motivated to join gangs and groups for similar reasons (often ‘protection’) and play comparable types of roles within them (mainly supportive but sometimes fighting roles).

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s Programming for girls is highly insufficient and rarely evidence-based. Much more research is needed to understand why they join gangs and engage in violence and to inform gender-sensitive approaches designed to effectively prevent and respond to the problem. The chapter begins by describing the nature and extent of female gang membership. The next section explores girls and women’s motivations for joining gangs, the types of gangs and activities in which they are involved, their experience in perpetrating and falling victim to acts of violence, and their use of weapons. The chapter ends by presenting a more nuanced understanding of female agency, drawing out key lessons for research and programming.

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=?HBI 7D: =7D=I This section describes trends and patterns in

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female gang involvement. It provides a global

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estimate of the female gang population and

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shows that girls have long participated in gangs and violence.

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Girls are present in gangs, sometimes in sig-

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nificant numbers. The observed degree of

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female involvement varies not only by

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research site but also according to the applied methodology (see Box 7.2). Ethnographic field studies, while producing detailed information about the nature of their involvement, are usually small and non-representative.

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National surveys of at-risk youth, on the

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other hand, provide generalizable results but

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rarely employ detailed gender analysis. For national estimates, the two most com-

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mon sources are survey data and law enforce-

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ment data. The National Longitudinal Survey

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of Youth (NLSY) is the only source of survey

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data on youth gang membership that is

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nationally representative in the United States

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(Greene and Pranis, 2007, p. 35). According to the 2006 survey, 3 per cent of boys and

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1 per cent of girls aged 12–16 years identi-

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fied themselves as gang members, which

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means that girls accounted for about one-

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quarter of the adolescent gang population

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(Greene and Pranis, 2007, p. 36). Data from the Offending, Crime and Justice Survey in

cej^[h^eeZ$ H[i[WhY^ ^Wi i^emd j^Wj \_hij fh[]dWdYo b[WZi je W h[ZkYj_ed _d l_eb[dY[ Wced] \[cWb[ ]Wd] c[cX[hi >kdj" @e[#BW_Zb[h" WdZ CWYA[dp_[" (&&+" f$ )),1 CekhW" (&&-" f$ )& $ ;cfbeoc[dj _i Wbie

England and Wales found that 6 per cent of

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both male and female 10–19-year-olds were

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classified as belonging to a ‘delinquent youth

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members were female (Sharp, Aldridge, and

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Medina, 2006, p. 3). Smaller, non-representative studies have shown similar findings.

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For example, a multi-site survey in the United States found girl membership to vary from 25 per cent of the total in Philadelphia to 45 per cent in Torrance, California (Esbensen and Piper Deschenes, 1998, p. 811). National surveys of law enforcement agencies produce estimates of female gang participation that are much lower than those emerging from the above-mentioned surveys (see Figure 7.1). According to the latest data from the US National Youth Gang Center, the female proportion of all reported gang members is low and stable, ranging between 7.7 per cent in 1998 and 6.6 per cent in 2007 (NYGC, n.d.a). Although widely used, data derived from national surveys of law enforcement agencies (largely police departments relying on arrest data) is thought to underestimate girlsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; involvement in gangs substantially. Police have tended to be more systematic about documenting male gang members than female ones, and some US jurisdictions have not, as a matter of policy, identified girls as gang members at all (Moore and Hagedorn, 2001, p. 4). This means that while girls may see themselves as gang members, police officers may not. It is possible to extrapolate from existing data to provide an assessment of the global population of female gang members. The Small Arms Survey estimates that the global gang population is between two and ten million (STOCKPILES) and the US National Youth Gang Center places the proportion of females in gangs at 6.6 per cent; taken together, these estimates suggest a figure of 132,000â&#x20AC;&#x201C;660,000 female gang members worldwide. Methodological caveats are considerable, however, including underreporting and the absence of standardized and representative data for many countries. It is therefore difficult to say whether these figures under- or overestimate the phenomenon. More precisely, 6.6 per cent is likely to be a conservative estimate in developed countries, yet it may be representative of other parts of the world where girls are probably less involved in gangs for cultural reasons. A more accurate global estimate will require extensive and rigorous data gathering and analysis (see Box 7.2).

=?HBI 7D: =7D=I './

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9edj_dk_jo WdZ Y^Wd][ Girls’ involvement in gangs and related violence has long existed, with accounts dating back to Thrasher’s seminal 1927 work, The Gang: A Study of 1,313 Gangs in Chicago. Early descriptions focused on girls’ sexuality and promiscuity and tended to portray them as mere auxiliaries of boy gangs. They were often likened to ‘sexual objects’ to be controlled by the male gang members (Moore and Hagedorn, 2001, p. 3). Still today, female gang member sexuality continues to attract scrutiny from academics and the media, disproportionately more so than male sexuality (see Box 7.3). Careful assessments of the experiences of female gang members only began to feature prominently in the 1980s and 1990s. Contributions came from multiple disciplines, principally criminology—especially feminist criminology— but also anthropology, sociology, economics, and public health.6 The lack of reliable historical data has made it difficult to determine the accuracy of early descriptions of the roles that girls and women played in gangs (Moore and Hagedorn, 2001, pp. 2, 8). Today, however, experts tend to concur that girls and women have long played important roles within gang structures but that their experiences were largely overlooked until recently. It is plausible that their roles have evolved since the early–mid-20th century, with girls becoming more central and active, although change appears to have been slow in recent decades. According to a historical review published in 2002, the proportion of female gang members and the nature of their involvement did not change significantly during the 1980s or 1990s, which suggests a continuity in girl gang involvement (Miller, 2002a, p. 176).

=Wd] jof[i WdZ \[cWb[ heb[i Although most evidence on girls in gangs comes from the United States, literature is also emerging from elsewhere regarding girls’ involvement in various types of gang (see Table 7.1). This includes studies from the UK, Germany, and Norway (Batchelor, 2009b; Bruhns and Wittman, 2002; Natland, 2006), Central America, including Nicaragua and Guatemala (Rodgers, 2006; Winton, 2007), as well as Hong Kong and New Zealand (Dennehy and Newbold, 2001; Li and Joe-Laidler, 2009).

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Most female gang members are part of ‘mixed-sex gangs’ that are male-dominated in structure, status hierarchies, and activities (Campbell, 1984; Miller, 2001; Moore, 1991). The extent and nature of male control varies, and there is some evidence of girls gaining independence in mixed gang structures over time (Gover et al., 2009; Nurge, 2003). Girls in mixed gangs generally appear to be more engaged in the social aspects of gang life than defence of the gang or turf, or drug dealing. The ‘sister’ or auxiliary gangs are usually formed after the creation of a male gang and take on the feminized version of the male gang name, such as the Latin Queens of New York (Chesney-Lind and Shelden, 2004, p. 70). These all-female gangs often create a unique sub-culture, becoming less and less attached to their male counterparts over time. Independent all-female gangs, although fewer in number, are reportedly on the rise in the United States (Delaney, 2005, p. 211). Sex composition is related to gang type and affects the dynamics and relations between the members, which in turn conditions the use of violence. There is some evidence to suggest that girls in all- and majority-female gangs commit fewer ‘person offences’7 than male or female members of sex-balanced or all- or majority-male gangs (Peterson, Miller, and Esbensen, 2006, pp. 423, 427–31). Within and outside the gang structure, girls and women—as mothers, sisters, daughters, wives, girlfriends, or members of the community—provide emotional and practical support to male gang members (see Box 7.4). They can also act as active instigators of conflict, urging men and boys to use violence. For example, in East Timor, women supported local gang members as they battled UN riot police during the second half of 2007 (Myrttinen, 2009, p. 6). Acceptance or ‘buy-in’ by women and girls enables many gangs to continue their operations (p. 7). Such support also acts as a source of attraction, with boys often citing access to girls or impressing girls as a motivating factor for joining gangs.

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=?HBI 7D: =7D=I '/'

A comparison of female roles in ‘gangs’ vs. ‘groups’ reveals both similarities and differences. In both contexts, girls are combatants, supporters, and wives, girlfriends, or dependents. Some, but not many, are leaders or strategists (Emmott, 2007). In armed groups, girls and women are also ‘abductees’, having joined under duress, though this phenomenon is relatively rare in gangs. In both gangs and groups, girls and women are often ‘unofficial’ members because they do not figure prominently in direct combat; consequently, they are rarely recognized in post-conflict demobilization and reintegration efforts or initiatives to disband gangs.

CEJ?L7J?EDI <EH @E?D?D= =7D=I This section explores why girls and women join gangs, the role of ethnicity, and how gangs—while initially liberating—are often socially harmful for female members in the long run.

H[Wiedi \eh `e_d_d] ]Wd]i A complex set of factors determines why girls—and boys—join gangs. Common ‘push’ factors for both sexes include 8ej^ i[n[i `e_d \eh neighbourhood disadvantage, existing gang-involved family or friends, and problems within the family, such as Éfhej[Yj_edÊ W]W_dij neglect, physical and sexual abuse, lack of supervision, and drug or alcohol addiction. A multi-state survey of ado- WXki_l[ \Wc_b_[i eh lescents in the United States shows that—with the exception of boys being more likely to join a gang to acquire ej^[h oekj^$ money—there were no differences between girls’ and boys’ reasons for joining a gang (Esbensen, Piper Deschenes, and Winfree, 1999, p. 43). Both sexes join gangs for ‘protection’ against abusive families or other youth.8 They run away from home, spend time on the streets, and, in order to survive, end up selling drugs and associating with delinquent peers. Some girls resort to trading sex for money or favours. ‘Street socialization’—as opposed to conventional socialization experienced in homes and schools—appears to encourage gang membership among both girls and boys (Vigil, 2008, p. 50). Problems facing girls and women include sexual abuse, battering, teenage pregnancy, single parenthood, and disparity in educational, vocational, and employment opportunities. Smaller quantitative studies suggest that violence in the family is a strong factor motivating girls to join gangs, possibly more so than for boys. Female gang members are more likely to have witnessed physical violence between adults in their homes and to have been abused by family members than non-gang girls (Brotherton and Salazar-Atias, 2003); they also tend to have low self-esteem (Esbensen, Piper Deschenes, and Winfree, 1999, p. 48). While abuse in the home is known to impel both boys and girls to join gangs, anecdotal evidence suggests that sexual violence against girls is especially significant. These issues also apply to girls and women in armed groups. A workshop that brought together 32 women from 18 armed opposition groups with peace and human rights activists, humanitarian actors, and scholars in Addis Ababa showed that nearly all had joined the groups to try to shield themselves from ‘further violations of their physical and mental integrity by state actors’ (Mazurana, 2004, p. 6). Similarly, girl soldiers in Angola, Colombia, and the Philippines reported that they joined armed groups to escape physical and sexual abuse at home by a member of their family (Keairns, 2002, p. 2). The gang provides an escape from abusive and dysfunctional families for both girls and boys, and, perhaps for girls in particular, it provides the means to ‘fight back’. Yet since boys also experience sexual and physical violence in the home—much of which goes unreported—more comparative analysis is necessary to identify gender differences regarding the role of domestic violence in prompting youths to join gangs.

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J^[ Éb_X[hWj_edÊ WdZ ÉieY_Wb _d`khoÊ ^ofej^[i[i A substantial amount of research on gang girls explores the extent to which gang involvement is liberating or socially harmful to women. The landmark study by Campbell (1984), The Girls in the Gang, examines the lives of African-American and Latina gang members in New York. She argues that gang membership is liberating for girls looking for ‘respect’—self-affirmation, a sense of belonging, and a sense of position in a social network. Others emphasize that by joining gangs, girls and young women become more likely to enter the world of crime and become victims of violence at the hands of rival gangs or peers. They argue that gang involvement may initially be liberating or empowering, but over the longer term the negative effects outweigh the positive, affecting not only female gang members’ future opportunities but potentially those of their children as well (Moore, 1991). Indeed, girls who turn to gangs to flee problems and pursue respect and opportunity usually find that, while offering some promising solutions, gangs also generate a new set of concerns (Curry, 1998, p. 108). More longitudinal studies are needed to explore the nature of positive and negative impacts over time.

J^[ i_]d_\_YWdY[ e\ [j^d_Y_jo" hWY[" WdZ Ykbjkh[ Gang members grow up in communities racked by racism and crime, where ethnic marginalization goes hand in hand with poverty and social exclusion (Bell, 2009; Joe and Chesney-Lind, 1995; Walker-Barnes and Mason, 2001).

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Ethnicity and cultural heritage are prime determinants of young people’s attitudes to masculinity and femininity (Schalet, Hunt, and Joe-Laidler, 2003, p. 117). In the United States, for example, African-American and white female gang members might be expected to be more autonomous and Latinas more subordinate to men. ‘They usually are, but not always’ (Moore and Hagedorn, 2001, p. 6). Other intervening factors, such as immigration status, may complicate the picture. Hispanic women have been shown to be more involved in gangs than Hispanic men, except among first-generation immigrants, arguably because the girls may be under greater parental control and therefore less likely to join gangs (Bell, 2009, p. 379). Cultural expectations of what it means to ‘be a woman’ are dominant not only among ethnic minority groups but also in mainstream culture, with implications for how girls choose to succumb to or rebel against gender identity, expectations, and norms. In Hong Kong, for example, surveyed female gang members appear to want to free themselves from traditional female roles, yet they conform to cultural expectations of femininity, such as being passive, following the lead of male peers, and avoiding public displays of aggression (see Box 7.5). Ethnicity, race, and culture are important, not only because they inform gender roles and power relations within gangs, but also because they influence public perceptions of female violence. In the United States, where the image of a female juvenile delinquent as ‘black’ persists, there has been a greater public outcry over middle-class white girls being violent because they challenge mainstream cultural norms. The anxiety over girls’ violence and delinquency is perhaps therefore ‘not solely an anxiety about blurring and shifting gender norms. It is also an anxiety about blurring and shifting racial norms’ (Luke, 2008, p. 45).

=?HBI 7I F;HF;JH7JEHI E< L?EB;D9; Girls’ aggressive behaviour contradicts conventional views of women being the peaceful sex. This section examines the interplay of guns, gangs, and gender and draws parallels between girls and women in gangs and armed groups.

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inal offences, with recent increases more a

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reflection of changes in police practices than

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a rise in the rate of violent acts committed

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by girls and women (see Box 7.6). Within

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gangs, girls generally commit fewer violent

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crimes than boys and are more inclined to commit property crimes and status offences.9

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Nevertheless, young women in gangs appear

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to have higher offence rates than both male

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and female non-gang members.10

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The nature and extent of female gang

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violence varies from place to place. For

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example, in a sample of 380 male and 237

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female gang members in the United States,

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83 per cent of the boys and 65 per cent of

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the girls reported having carried a hidden

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weapon at some point, and 34 per cent of

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boys and 21 per cent of girls reported having shot someone at some stage in their lives (Esbensen, Piper Deschenes, and Winfree,

m_j^ ej^[h \ehci e\ ZWjWÆWj b[Wij _d j^[ Kd_j[Z IjWj[i" m^[h[ j^[ _iik[ ^Wi X[[d h_]ehekibo ijkZ_[Z$ I[b\#h[fehj ijkZ_[i" l_Yj_c h[fehji" dWj_edWb WdZ h[]_edWb ikhl[oi" WdZ ^eif_jWb WdZ ^[Wbj^ Z[fWhjc[dj ijWj_ij_Yi Ze dej YehheXehWj[ jh[dZi _d e\\_Y_Wb ijWj_ij_Yi deh YbW_ci j^Wj l_eb[dY[

1999, p. 41). During a study carried out in

Wced] ]_hbi _i _dYh[Wi_d]$ J^[i[ iekhY[i ik]][ij j^Wj _dlebl[c[dj _d

Scotland, on the other hand, only a small

l_eb[dj WYj_l_j_[i ^Wi h[cW_d[Z h[bWj_l[bo bem WdZ ijWXb[ 9^[id[o#

number of girls reported using physical vio-

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lence frequently, specifying that they did so

LWh_Wj_edi _d Whh[ij ZWjW cWo j^[h[\eh[ ^Wl[ ceh[ je Ze m_j^ j^[

mainly against other female members of the same gang in defence of ‘respect’ (Batchelor,

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2005, p. 369). Girls engage in ‘horizontal violence’ directed at other girls for reasons including respect and jealousy (Hagedorn and Devitt, 1999, p. 273). Girl-on-girl violence is a form of ‘othering’ to cement the dichotomy between ‘good girls’ and ‘bad girls’. The process is supported by both boys and girls who insist that girls be subservient, respectful, dependent, sexually accessible, and faithful to their male peers (Artz, 1998, p. 179; Irwin and Chesney-Lind, 2008). Through violence and gossiping, girls cast suspicion on peers’ behaviour in order to consolidate their own reputations as true gang members and preserve the status quo, including their own continued oppression (Schalet, Hunt, and Joe-Lailder, 2003, p. 116). Ironically, girl-on-girl violence therefore becomes the means of upholding patriarchal values and men’s control over women (Irwin and Chesney-Lind, 2008, p. 843). ‘Pretty’ girls may be targeted if they ‘don’t know their place’, while ‘ugly’ or

=?HBI 7D: =7D=I '/+

‘dirty’ girls may be picked on because they ‘deserve it’. Male gang members may encourage girl-on-girl fights for their own amusement: sometimes the boys encourage girls to ﬁght to see who is stronger. The winner of the ﬁght gets money from the boss [. . . ]. It is something like entertainment for the boys, especially when they have been smoking (Lazarevic, 2009).11 Girls may also choose to overlook or ‘ignore’ male violence against other girls. Sometimes they even participate in setting up rapes as part of ongoing rivalries among female members and to gain respect by ‘pleasing the males’ (Dennehy and Newbold, 2001, pp. 113, 153). It should be noted that gang girls who engage in violence tend to display higher rates of victimization and abuse than their non-violent counterparts; they also report greater fear of sexual assault, especially from their boyfriends (Artz, 1998, p. 44). Female gang violence can be compared to female violence in the context of armed groups in conflict settings (see Box 7.7). While the two contexts vary enormously, as do the nature and purpose of the violence, the international body of research shows that— although less frequent than for men—female aggression and brutality in conflict or nonconflict settings is universal and has existed throughout history. Often it is the outcome of violent victimization. In particularly hostile environments, women join gangs or groups and perpetrate acts of violence to ensure that people will not disrespect them (or their families) and to signal that they can defend themselves.

8en -$- <[cWb[ YecXWjWdji _d Whc[Z ]hekfi >_ijeho ^Wi iêmd j^Wj mec[d ^Wl[ bed] fWhj_Y_fWj[Z _d _dikh][dYo" h[lebkj_ed" WdZ mWh$ ;l_Z[dY[ \hec i[l[hWb h[Y[dj Yed\b_Yji iêmi mec[d i[hl_d] _d YecXWj WdZ _cfb_YWj[Z _d j^[ Yecc_ii_ed e\ WYji e\ XhkjWb" WdZ iec[j_c[i i[nkWb" l_eb[dY[" _dYbkZ_d] _d >W_j_" Dehj^[hd ?h[bWdZ" j^[ Hkii_Wd <[Z[hWj_ed" HmWdZW" I_[hhW B[ed[" IkZWd" WdZ Wi KI jheefi _d ?hWg$'( =_hbi WdZ mec[d è_d Whc_[i eh Whc[Z ]hekfi [_j^[h lebkdjWh_bo eh kdZ[h Zkh[ii WdZ j[dZ je ^Wl[ Z_\\[h[dj" fej[dj_Wbbo el[hbWff_d] heb[i ikY^ Wi YecXWjWdj" ikffehj meha[h" eh m_\[%Z[f[dZWdj$ ?d IkZWd" mec[d WdZ ]_hbi \ehc[Z W i_]d_\_YWdj Yedj_d][dj e\ j^[ IkZWd F[efb[Êi B_X[hW# j_ed 7hco IFB7 WdZ ej^[h Whc[Z ]hekfi Zkh_d] j^[ \_hij WdZ i[YedZ IkZWd[i[ Y_l_b mWhi '/++Å-( WdZ '/.)Å(&&+ $ Iec[ \ek]^j ed j^[ \hedj b_d[i" m^_b[ ej^[hi fbWo[Z W ceh[ ikffehj_l[ heb[" YWhho_d] Wcckd_# j_ed WdZ \eeZ WdZ fhel_Z_d] i[nkWb i[hl_Y[i WdZ c[Z_YWb ikffehj je j^[ c[d$ J^[_h heb[i m[h[ Yecfb[n WdZ ckbj_fb[" WdZ m^_b[ iec[ i[hl[Z m_bb_d]bo" ej^[hi m[h[ \ehY[Z$ CWdo f[hY[_l[Z j^[_h WYj_edi Wi j^[ edbo l_WXb[ c[Wdi e\ b_l[b_êeZ IcWbb 7hci Ikhl[o" (&&." f$ ' $ Mec[d e\j[d è_d Whc[Z ]hekfi Wi Y^_bZh[d$ B_a[ WZkbji" Y^_bZ ieb# Z_[hi') fbWo Xej^ ikffehj_l[ heb[i WdZ WYj_l[ YecXWj heb[i$ =_hb iebZ_[hi \WY[ WZZ_j_edWb ^WhZi^_f" m_j^ iec[ X[_d] Wii_]d[Z Wi Ém_l[iÊ e\ j^[_h YeccWdZ[hi$ KdmWdj[Z fh[]dWdY_[i WdZ i[nkWbbo jhWdic_jj[Z Z_i[Wi[i Wh[ dej kdYecced IcWbb 7hci Ikhl[o" (&&/" f$ '/- $ 8[jm[[d '//& WdZ (&&)" ]_hbi m[h[ _d \_]^j_d] \ehY[i _d ++ Yekdjh_[i WdZ _dlebl[Z _d Whc[Z Yed\b_Yj _d ). e\ j^[i[ Yekdjh_[i CYAWo WdZ CWpkhWdW" (&&*" f$ (' $ 9edjhWho je fefkbWh X[b_[\" mec[d f[hf[jhWj[ i[nkWb l_eb[dY[ W]W_dij ej^[h mec[d$ ;nWcfb[i _dYbkZ[ mec[d Wi [dWYjehi e\ jehjkh[ _d j^[ KI \ehY[i _d 7Xk =^hW_X WdZ =kWdj|dWce" eh _d HmWdZW" m^[h[ iec[ >kjk mec[d [dYekhW][Z j^[ hWf[ e\ Jkji_ mec[d IèX[h] WdZ =[djho" (&&-1 MeeZ" (&&/ $ ?d I_[hhW B[ed[ d[Whbo ed[ _d \_l[ _dY_Z[dji e\ Wbb h[fehj[Z hWf[ YWi[i Zkh_d] j^[ Y_l_b mWh mWi f[hf[jhWj[Z Xo ]hekfi j^Wj _dYbkZ[Z mec[d 9e^[d" (&&/" f$ ' $ Mec[d _d j^[ Whc[Z h[X[b H[lebkj_edWho Kd_j[Z <hedj WYj[Z dej edbo Wi b_W_iedi je \_dZ fej[dj_Wb l_Yj_ci" Xkj Wbie i[hl[Z je fôi_YWbbo êbZ Zemd l_Yj_ci m^_b[ j^[o m[h[ X[_d] hWf[Z f$ () $ I_[hhW B[ed[ cWo dej X[ Wd WdecWbo1 mec[d fWhj_Y_fWj[ _d i[nkWb l_eb[dY[ ceh[ e\j[d j^Wd _i Ykhh[djbo X[b_[l[Z 7b_ied" (&&-1 <W[Z_" (&&. $ H[fehji e\ \[cWb[ Éik_Y_Z[ XecX[hiÊ ^Wl[ cWZ[ j^[ ^[WZb_d[i _d h[Y[dj o[Whi$ Mec[d m[h[ WYj_l[ Wi ik_Y_Z[ XecX[hi _d Ih_ BWdaW Wi fWhj e\ j^[ BJJ; WdZ _d j^[ Hkii_Wd <[Z[hWj_ed Wi fWhj e\ j^[ 9^[Y^[d shahidkas ÉXbWYa m_ZemiÊ " mê m[h[ h[ifedi_Xb[ \eh j^[ CeiYem j^[Wjh[ êijW][ Yh_i_i _d (&&( IèX[h] WdZ =[djho" (&&-1 If[Ya^WhZ WdZ 7a^c[ZelW" (&&+1 P[ZWb_i" (&&*" f$ ( $ IjWj_ij_Yi iêm j^Wj mec[d Wh[ _dYh[Wi_d]bo Xbem_d] j^[ci[bl[i kf _d ehZ[h je WjjWYa f[efb[ eh fhef[hjo" _dYbkZ_d] Xej^ c_b_jWho WdZ Y_l_b_Wd jWh][ji$ 8[jm[[d '/.+ WdZ (&&," j^[h[ m[h[ ceh[ j^Wd ((& \[cWb[ ik_Y_Z[ XecX[hi" WYYekdj# _d] \eh Wffhen_cWj[bo '+ f[h Y[dj e\ j^[ jejWb IY^m[_jp[h" (&&," f$ . $ 7 h_i[ _d j^[ dkcX[h e\ \[cWb[ ik_Y_Z[ XecX[hi ^Wi X[[d eXi[hl[Z m_j^_d Xej^ i[YkbWh WdZ h[b_]_eki eh]Wd_pWj_edi" [l[d jêk]^ h[b_]_eki ]hekfi _d_j_Wbbo h[i_ij[Z ki_d] mec[d 8beec" (&&-" f$ /+ $ ?d ?hWg" \eh [nWcfb[" m^_b[ el[hWbb l_eb[dY[ \[bb _d (&&. je b[l[bi kdi[[d i_dY[ [Whbo (&&*" j^[h[ mWi W ZhWcWj_Y h_i[ _d j^[ dkcX[h e\ WjjWYai Xo mec[d Z[fbeo[Z Xo Ikdd_ 7hWX c_b_jWdji Wi ik_Y_Z[ XecX[hi H[kj[hi" (&&. $

'/, IC7BB 7HCI IKHL;O (&'&

=kdi" ad_l[i" WdZ \_iji With a few exceptions, little attention has been paid to the interplay between guns and gender (Farr, 2005; Farr, Myrttinen, and Schnabel, 2009; Harcourt, 2006). The following assessment of general social trends suggests that females are generally less likely to carry and use weapons. During a study carried out in schools in six European countries and the United States, 2 to 5 per cent of girls compared with 10 to 21 per cent of boys reported carrying a weapon within the last 30 days. Among weapon carriers, 3 to 11 per cent of girls and 7 to 22 per cent of boys opted for a firearm (Pickett et al., 2005, p. e855). Among convicted offenders, weapons use is also lower among women than men. In the United States, 15 per cent of female offenders vs. 28 per cent of male offenders used weapons during the offence for which they were convicted, including a firearm, knife, or a blunt object (Greenfield and Snell, 1999, p. 3). A prison survey of more than 160,000 inmates showed that 7 per cent of women vs. 19 per cent of men had used a firearm during the offence (Harlow, 2001, pp. 4, 9).14 Gang girls use weapons less frequently than boys—and in different ways. Of 70 female gang members interviewed in Milwaukee, only 6 per cent of African-American gang girls and 2 per cent of Latinas reported using weapons ‘most of the time’ whereas many more—50 and 36 per cent, respectively—said they ‘never’ did (Hagedorn and Devitt, 1999, p. 274). Although girls are involved in confrontations with rival gangs, these altercations rarely escalate to violence, and even more rarely to serious fights involving weapons (Miller and Decker, 2001, p. 126).

7 (-#o[Wh#ebZ \[cWb[ WiiWii_d i^emi j^[ ad_\[ i^[ YWhh_[i m_j^ ^[h [l[hom^[h[" C[Z[bb d" 9ebecX_W" @kd[ (&&.$ L hed_gk[ Z[ L_]k[h_[%=[jjo ?cW][i

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When girls do use weapons, they tend to report a higher level of ‘guilt’ for doing so than boys (Piper Deschenes and Esbensen, 1999, p. 85). Females tend to choose knives or blunt instruments over firearms (Piper Deschenes and Esbensen, 1999; Nurge, 2003, p. 171) (see Box 7.8). Members of the all-female Gulabi Gang in North India, which consists of several thousand vigilante women campaigning for justice and protection of powerless women, use the lathi (a traditional Indian stick) to intimidate others or for self-defence (Pal, 2008, pp. 184–86). In addition to direct combat, weapons are also used to ‘mark’ rivals. In Philadelphia, it was commonly known that gang girls would attempt to cut the faces of other girls with knives, because, as one girl describes: ‘This way she gonna see herself in the mirror every day and remember what I did to her’ (Ness, 2004, p. 43). Scarring can serve as a constant reminder of the victim’s defeat and limit her attractiveness to other men. Cross-country studies often highlight similarities and differences in patterns and determinants of weapon carrying and use. A survey of more than 500 ‘high-risk’ adolescent girls in Amsterdam, Montreal, Philadelphia, and Toronto shows that Toronto had the highest rates of violence perpetrated by armed girls (33 per cent of the sample ‘threatened or tried to hurt someone with a gun’ compared to 12–20 per cent in the other cities). The study revealed that the degree to which access to firearms was legally restricted in each country was not necessarily reflected in weapons use (Erickson et al., 2006, pp. 795, 799). In addition to carrying and using weapons for themselves, girls and women help facilitate men’s violence by smuggling, transporting, and hiding weapons. A former gang member who was deported from Brooklyn, New York, to Haiti explains how girls may be more mobile than boys, which can facilitate gun violence: Girls are sometimes sent into enemy areas to shoot people. They are paid for their mission. The amount they are paid varies from mission to mission. These girls can be more dangerous than boys, because the police let them move. For example, when a shooting happens in a club and the police comes in, boys lie down on the ﬂoor, but the girls take the weapons and run out (Lazarevic, 2009). Guns are a symbol of power over life and death, and they are often ascribed overt or hidden masculine and sexual meanings (Myrttinen, 2003; Bevan and Florquin, 2006). Even if they do not carry or use weapons themselves, girls may have attitudes that endorse gun ownership by boys and men. In dangerous environments, girls and women may support the idea that access to guns increases their protection. Many women also report a certain amount of prestige in being associated with men who carry weapons (Page, 2009, p. 5).

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L?9J?C?P7J?ED E< =?HBI 7D: MEC;D Many gang girls are victimized by boys and men in the same gang, rival gangs, and other groups. While male gang members make up the majority of gun violence victims, female members appear more likely to suffer sexual abuse.

L_Yj_c_pWj_ed Xo \[bbem ]Wd] c[cX[hi Girls in gangs report having been victimized more often than do girls outside gangs. For example, in the US state of South Carolina, 28 per cent of female gang members had experienced sexual assault in their lifetime—be it at home or in the gang—compared to 12 per cent of the 2,451 non-gang girls surveyed (Gover et al., 2009, p. 109). Sexual exploitation of girls within gang structures has received special attention by researchers, leading to a categorization of girls into two groups: those who are ‘as tough as the boys’ and fight to defend themselves, and those who become involved with gangs and are sexually exploited, sometimes on the premise of being ‘initiated’ (Batchelor, 2009a, p. 3). Gang initiation rites and internal rules may require individuals to be exposed and submitted to gang violence. ‘Jumping in’ is a beating issued by gang members to test a member’s ability to endure punches and blows, while ‘sexing in’ refers to initiation by way of sexual intercourse with multiple gang members. While it is not clear how regularly or systematically such initiation rituals are practised, the sexual abuse undoubtedly reproduces a sense of hierarchy and status, not only between the sexes but also among girls themselves (Dorais and Corriveau, 2009; Miller, 2004, p. 308). <[Wh e\ fkd_i^c[dj

The type of gang and its sex composition may predict risk of victimization. The ‘sisterhood’ of all- or majority-

b[WZi ]_hbi je h[cW_d female gangs is found to be associated with less intra-gang violence, although these young women may have to protect i_b[dj$

themselves against attacks by external actors (Joe-Laidler and Hunt, 1997). In contrast, girls in mixed-sex gangs or in female gangs with close affiliations with male gangs face stricter rules about their behaviour, especially by boyfriends, and risk being beaten or abused if they do not obey. Fear of punishment leads girls to remain silent about gang activities, including violence (Dennehy and Newbold, 2001; Lacey, 2008). It may also prevent them from trying to leave the gang. A girl affiliated with a gang in New Zealand provides an example: [T]he girl was really being put on the block [being gang-raped] because she was seen mucking around with a couple of people who associated with a rival gang, and that she had told them vital information about her mob’s plan for a fight they may develop within the near future. After finding that she had opened her mouth, it was planned to put her on the block to teach her a lesson. Not all the members would block her, only something like five or six (Dennehy and Newbold, 2001, p. 115).

L_Yj_c_pWj_ed Xo h_lWb ]Wd]i WdZ ej^[hi Like their male counterparts, female gang members are at risk of violence by rival gangs. Girls are seen as weak and ‘safe targets’ with poor means of defence, or ‘easy targets’ who cannot retaliate (Miller, 2004, p. 299). While both boys and girls are exposed to physical attacks, threats with weapons, stabbings, or shootings, girls are especially vulnerable to sexual violence by rival gangs (Delaney, 2005; Molidor, 1996). A multi-site survey in the United States found that 64 per cent of female members had been hit and 27 per cent had been attacked by ‘someone trying to seriously hurt them’ (Esbensen, Piper Deschenes, and Winfree, 1999). In Haiti, members of an independent all-female gang reported that during fighting with rival gangs, girls got hit, stabbed with knives, and also killed. Several girls also reported ‘offering themselves’ to enemy groups in order to save their boyfriends, which frequently involved being raped (Lazarevic, 2009). In some countries, gang girls also become implicated in prostitution, sex slavery, and sex trafficking (Schmidt, 2006, pp. 5–6).

=?HBI 7D: =7D=I '//

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Female gang members who have ‘masculine attributes’ and who are actively involved in risky behaviour and committing offences are more vulnerable to attacks by rival gangs, including sexual violence, than females who do not partake in such behaviour (Miller, 1998, pp. 433–34). Operating on the front line, these girls may gain status within the gang but risk being victimized as a result and getting into conflict with the law. At the same time, however, these girls might be more protected from sexual abuse within the gang (Miller, 2002b, p. 93). Once victimized, girls may be blamed and labelled, which in turn increases the risk of repeat victimization within the gang—physical, sexual, emotional—by male and female members alike.

JEM7H:I 7 CEH; DK7D9;: KD:;HIJ7D:?D= E< <;C7B; 7=;D9O 7D: L?EB;D9; So far this chapter has demonstrated that gangs are not a male-only phenomenon that operates in a male-only vacuum where women have no influence. On the contrary: girls and women play important roles within gang structures and even engage in violence. This section draws out key themes of the chapter and examines knowledge gaps and next steps for programming.

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J^[ fheXb[c e\ \[cWb[ l_eb[dY[ _d WdZ ekji_Z[ j^[ ]Wd] The notion of a ‘female fighter’ or ‘female combatant’ remains troublesome for many observers. Some feminist researchers present female violence as emerging from the nexus of victimization, resistance, and agency. They argue that women primarily use violence as a ‘protective measure’ to control risks to their security. Women’s aggression may be viewed as ‘a temporary loss of control caused by overwhelming pressure and resulting in guilt’; in contrast, men use violence as ‘a means of exerting control over other people when they feel the need to reclaim power or self-esteem’ (Campbell, 1993, p. viii). Others argue that women and men perpetrate violence for similar reasons: ‘women, like men, are capable of violence. As women’s freedoms increase, so will their violence’ (Sjoberg and Gentry, 2007, p. 4). There are no simple explanations for why girls and women join gangs and engage in violent behaviour. Often girls’ own viewpoints contrast with those of outsiders who see violent women in opposition to idealized gender stereotypes. Media coverage suggests that female aggression is more shocking to the public than similar violence committed by men. Intersecting with attitudes towards race and ethnicity, gender stereotypes about femininity and masculinity fuel public attention to ‘bad girls’, often leading to the reporting of distorted or ‘misrepresented’ statistics. Researchers, practitioners, activists, and policy-makers in this field need to be aware of the methodological challenges in quantifying female gang membership and violence; they must also be sensitive to the complex dichotomy between girls’ ‘victimization and exposure to risk’ on the hand and ‘resilience and agency’ on the other. Evidence shows that girls and women who engage in violence often do so in response to victimization, as a means of protection, or as retaliation. At the same time, they often take on ‘countercultural’ roles such as gang members or combatants because they are purposely seeking alternatives to untenable domestic situations. Seen in this light, they are not passive victims but active agents who make choices and organize collectively in response to difficult situations.

Ademb[Z][ ]Wfi Despite the accumulation of accounts of female agency and violence within gang <h_[dZi YWhho j^[ XeZo e\ W \[cWb[ c[cX[h e\ FWdZ_bbW#'-" a_bb[Z Zkh_d] YbWi^[i m_j^ h_lWb ]Wd] c[cX[hi" IWd IWblWZeh" <[XhkWho (&&-$ ;Z]Wh Hec[he%7F F^eje

=?HBI 7D: =7D=I (&'

research, many practical questions remain unanswered. For example, does female aggression and the commission of offences challenge the argument that violence and weapons are symbolic of heterosexual masculinity? In practice, how can research be used to identify important variations in young women’s experiences while simultaneously identifying parallels and connections that could usefully inform the design of gender-sensitive interventions of general applicability? Female gang research stagnated following a flurry of studies in the early 1990s. Kick-starting the research agenda would involve undertaking more multi-site surveys that generate comparable and generalizable data on girls in gangs and the needs of at-risk youth. Such surveys should be complemented by longitudinal studies to examine longerterm impacts. Comparative analysis of boys and girls is needed to shed light on the causal links between domestic abuse and gang membership, which would also inform prevention strategies. In addition, qualitative studies are required to explore context-specific meanings given to ‘girls’, ‘women’, ‘boys’, and ‘men’; research should also be undertaken to increase awareness about experiences of violence and the use of weapons, essential for a full understanding of the causes and impacts of gang violence. As an example, and given that gender is fundamentally linked to other forms of oppression and privilege, such studies in the United States should focus on the lives and experiences of the ‘young women of color on the economic and political margins’ (Joe and ChesneyLind, 1995, p. 428). The field of female gang research may also benefit from cross-fertilization with the field of ‘armed groups’ because—as this chapter demonstrates—there are stark parallels in women’s motivations to join these groups, the type of roles they play, and the risks they face. Certain themes may be relevant to both gang and group contexts, for example the role of ‘sex composition’ in predicting girls’ risk of victimization. If that causal link can be established, it would support a call for systematic collection of data on sex composition as a key gang or group characteristic. Recognizing overlaps is necessary in dynamic post-conflict and urban warfare contexts, where distinguishing between gangs and groups is difficult, if not impossible, and where demobilization and rehabilitation efforts will share many features and challenges.

(&( IC7BB 7HCI IKHL;O (&'&

?cfb_YWj_edi \eh fhe]hWcc_d] Programming for girls is insufficient and rarely evidence-based. The specific needs of girls and women are not being addressed at the various levels of intervention and there is a dearth of evaluations (Chesney-Lind, Morash, and Stevens, 2008, p. 169). At present, many prevention efforts miss the critical ‘at-risk’ years for girls, which in the United States is thought to be earlier than for boys at around 9–15 years (Chesney-Lind, Morash, and Stevens, 2008, p. 169; Hawkins et al., 2009). Girl gang members sometimes participate in secondary prevention measures designed for boys, but invariably find themselves outnumbered and often ‘either short-changed or simply ignored’ in such programmes (ChesneyLind, Morash, and Stevens, 2008, p. 169). Because girls and women in some countries are not deemed to be ‘fighters’ or own weapons, they are not considered to be official gang members and may, as a consequence, be excluded from programmes altogether (Coulter, Persson, and Utas, 2008, p. 22; Schwitalla and Dietrich, 2007, p. 58). Not enough is known about what works in programming for girls. Carefully designed and targeted gender-specific interventions can be effective and have the advantage of being less costly than broader multi-component approaches that focus on prevention. Evidence suggests, however, that the latter strategy is most valuable (US DoJ, 2000, pp. 34, 55; Williams, Curry, and Cohen, 2002, p. 256). A comprehensive prevention programme in Colorado successfully reduced five of seven delinquency measures by intervening across risk factors and domains, and by providing services to the individual, families, peer groups, and communities, as well as specific measures targeted at gang members or gang-involved girls (William, Curry, and Cohen, 2002, pp. 255–56). These results suggest that the provision of opportunities for girls at the margins of society offers an important means of addressing girl gang membership and violence. Fhe]hWcc[i j^Wj

The increasing number of girls and women being incarcerated signals a lack of appropriate alternative commu-

YWij \[cWb[i ieb[bo nity-based responses and effective measures to tackle underlying structural problems of inequality and poverty (ABA Wi l_Yj_ci cWo and NBA, 2001; Chesney-Lind, Morash, and Stevens, 2008). Some argue that punitive responses are legitimized by kd_dj[dj_edWbbo the dominant ‘masculinization perspective’, the belief that girls and women are ‘acting male’ when involved in gangs h[_d\ehY[ fWii_l_jo$

and violence.15 Because most criminal justice systems are oriented towards boys and men, girls and women are unable to access services that address their unique needs, such as counselling for abuse and education about sex and sexuality (Chesney-Lind, Morash, and Stevens, 2008, p. 175). In some countries, the lack of basic facilities for girls exposes them to the risk of victimization after they have entered the justice system, particularly when detained in mixed-sex facilities or when children are not separated from adult inmates. In the absence of trained female staff, male staff have been reported to engage in ‘sanctioned sexual harassment’ and may even perpetrate sexual violence themselves (Pinheiro, 2006, p. 196). It is important to stress that young women enmeshed with the justice system represent a high-risk group. They tend to lack permanent and supportive families, they have usually experienced considerable trauma, and they often suffer from a range of physical, sexual, and mental health problems. Rehabilitation and reintegration services must recognize the specific needs of girls and women according to their age, ethnic and cultural background, experience within the gang, and local dynamics and needs. For example, girls who have been raped or ‘passed around’ within a gang have an especially difficult time reintegrating in society after leaving a gang and need special attention (Miller, 2004, p. 308). At the same time, programmes that cast females solely as victims may unintentionally reinforce passivity and acceptance, rather than harness inherent energy, capacity, and creativity. After all, the future health and opportunities of young women—the main caregivers in most societies—will not only affect them as individuals, but will also have implications for their children and, as a consequence, the rest of society.

=?HBI 7D: =7D=I (&)

9ED9BKI?ED Girls and women are not necessarily pitiable or powerless victims of gang or armed group presence or violence, but often committed supporters and members. Like men, they are active agents who make choices in response to difficult situations. Gang membership can empower girls to resist traditional gender role expectations while providing protection and a refuge from violence and oppression at home. Yet at the same time gangs and armed groups tend to put girls at heightened risk of violence, while also increasing their social marginalization through involvement in crime. Therefore, though potentially rewarding in the short run, gangs are often socially harmful for girls and women (and potentially their children and society at large) in the longer term. Female violence in the gang context—and generally—remains poorly understood. Despite media attention that might suggest otherwise, girls and women engage in less frequent and severe violence than boys and men, and rarely use firearms. Public and professional concern with female violence appears to be more indicative of cultural anxiety over changing social norms than any significant change in female behaviour. Some parallels between female involvement in gangs and armed groups warrant further attention. Many become members after they or their families have been victimized. In both gangs and groups, female members fight, spy, and transport weapons and messages. Some play leadership roles. They support violence perpetrated by men, and sometimes perpetrate violence themselves, including against other women. Programming for girls is insufficient and rarely evidence-based. Much more research on girls’ needs in difficult circumstances is required to inform prevention and policy responses, along with evaluations of existing initiatives. Available evidence points clearly to the need for programming to recognize the specific risks facing girls while building on their resilience.

B?IJ E< 788H;L?7J?EDI GREAT

Gang Resistance Education and Training (US)

NLSY

National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (US)

NYGS

National Youth Gang Survey (US)

;D:DEJ;I 1

This definition was developed by the Eurogang Network with reference to street gangs (Weerman et al., 2009, p. 20).

Bjerregaard and Smith (1993); Esbensen and Huizinga (1993); Esbensen, Piper Deschenes, and Winfree (1999); Sharp, Aldridge, and Medina (2006).

The NYGS is based on a nationally representative sample of 2,551 law enforcement agencies, largely police departments (Egley, 2008). It asks respondents to report information solely for youth gangs, defined as ‘a group of youths or young adults in your jurisdiction that you or other responsible persons in your agency or community are willing to identify as a “gang”’ (NYGC, n.d.b). The NLSY covers nearly 9,000 youths (aged 12–16) using cross-sectional and supplemental samples to ensure adequate representation across both geographic and race/ethnic lines (Greene and Pranis, 2007, p. 35). Sample size data is not available for the GREAT study.

See Chesney-Lind and Eliason (2006); Herrington and Nee (2005); Joe-Laidler and Hunt (2001); Kehily (2008); Miller (2004).

See the section on ‘Victimization of girls and women’, below.

(&* IC7BB 7HCI IKHL;O (&'&

See Bjerregaard and Smith (1993); Chesney-Lind and Hagedorn (1999); Joe and Chesney-Lind (1995); Joe-Laidler and Hunt (1997); Moore (1991).

Person offences include threatening to hurt a person, attacking someone with a weapon, robbing someone, and shooting at someone.

See Joe and Chesney-Lind (1995); Batchelor (2005); Campbell (1984); Fleisher and Krienert (2004); Moore (1991).

In relation to children, a status offence is a type of misbehaviour that is best described as conduct illegal only for children, including violations of parental authority, truancy, and running away. See ABA and NBA (2001); Piper Deschenes and Esbensen (1999); Moore and Hagedorn (2001); Zahn et al. (2008).

See Bjerregaard and Smith (1993); Delaney (2005); Piper Deschenes and Esbensen (1999); Esbensen and Winfree (1998).

Author interview with a former male gang member who was deported from Brooklyn, New York, to Haiti, May 2009.

Alison (2004); Cohen (2009); Faedi (2008); Myers (2003); Small Arms Survey (2008); Sjoberg and Gentry (2007).

Child soldiers are generally defined as any person under the age of 18 years who is a member of or attached to government armed forces or

Similar patterns have been observed in Canada (Kong and AuCoin, 2008, pp. 5, 17).

any other regular or irregular armed group, regardless of whether an armed conflict exists (Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, 2008, p. 411). 15

This perspective—which emphasizes women’s deviance and perversity when they engage in violence—emerged during the 1970s women’s liberation movement; it has since dominated accounts by the media, academia, and criminal justice practice (Irwin and Chesney-Lind, 2008).

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Susan A. Batchelor, Karen Joe-Laidler, Leona Li, and Henri Myrttinen

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7d ;YkWZeh_Wd 7bj[hdWj_l[ =7D= H;?DJ;=H7J?ED ?DJHE:K9J?ED ' In one of the most dangerous neighbourhoods in Guayaquil, Ecuador’s largest and most violent city, a dozen youths are busy working in the Paz Urbana Print Shop. By the entrance, a young man designs a T-shirt logo with graffiti paint. In the back, amid the hip-hop music and paint fumes, tattooed young men with baggy pants and baseball caps compile an order of worksheets for schools. The print shop is part of an organization of small businesses, including a bakery, a beauty parlour, and a dance school, with a surprising business model—they are entirely run by Ecuadorian street gang members, many of whom were once rivals. Over the past two decades, Latin America has reported record-high levels of crime and violence that are often attributed to the proliferation of youth gangs (Strocka, 2006, p. 133). According to the Latin American Technological Information Network, the region has the highest murder rate in the world for young people between the ages of 15 and 24 (Waiselfisz, 2008, p. 12). Ecuador is no exception. Though the vast majority of gang violence is intra-gang, local television news and mainstream newspapers contribute to a sense of insecurity among citizens by regularly reporting on the latest gang crimes. Conventional policy approaches to gang violence have tended to emphasize strict punishment, rehabilitation, and isolation of members from their groups; yet these methods have been criticized in many quarters as ineffective over the long term (Cerbino, 2004, p. 16). For the past decade, the non-governmental organization SER PAZ, founded by Nelsa Curbelo, has been a major player in public discourse about gangs in Ecuador, and particularly in Guayaquil, the home base of its operations and the city with the highest gang population (Santillán and Varea, 2008, p. 9). SER PAZ’s main mission is to help gangs reintegrate into society by providing professional training and education, as well as outlets for creative expression. The chapter reviews the SER PAZ approach to gang violence prevention in depth and considers the extent to which it could be applied more broadly. Its main conclusions include the following: s Estimates of the number of gangs in Ecuador vary widely, partly as a result of different definitions, but two sources put the number of unique groups in Guayaquil, the country’s largest city, at around 1,050. s The majority of Ecuadorians fear being a victim of a violent crime and many say that fights between gangs or groups have affected them. s SER PAZ programmes led directly to a ceasefire between two of Ecuador’s largest gangs—a major achievement— and appear to have been associated with a reduction in homicides in Guayaquil, though evaluation data is incomplete. s The many SER PAZ successes appear grounded in the limited economic means of most Ecuadorian gangs, the absence of the threat of police action, and the commitment of a wide spectrum of public and private stakeholders. s By recognizing the positive potential of gangs, and by working with—rather than breaking apart—existing gang structures, the SER PAZ programmes have yielded encouraging changes while avoiding the negative side-effects common with suppression approaches.

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The chapter begins by examining the current state of gangs and youth violence in Ecuador, especially Guayaquil, and then proceeds to review many of the initiatives undertaken by SER PAZ during the past decade. The chapter concludes with a consideration of the policy implications of the SER PAZ approach, including potential constraints on its broader application, with brief reference to similar initiatives elsewhere in the Americas.

M>7J ?I 7 =7D=5 It is difficult to ascertain exactly how many gangs there are in Ecuador. Figures vary widely, partly due to differing definitions of the term ‘gang’. For example, SER PAZ officials estimate that the majority reside in Guayaquil, with roughly 1,050 unique groups and 65,000 youth gang members (Loor, Aldas, and López, 2004, p. 7).2 But the National

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Gangs by province

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Specialized Police for Children and

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Adolescents (Dirección Nacional de Policía Especializada en Niños, Niñas y Adolescentes, DINAPEN) puts the total number of gangs in Ecuador at a more modest 712, with 404

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gangs and 6,285 members in the province of

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Guayas—where Guayaquil is located—and

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178 gangs and 1,408 members in the prov-

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ince of Pichincha, home to the country’s

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capital, Quito (see Map 8.1). The discrepancy is partly due to definitions; SER PAZ includes groups that are not formally linked

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to armed violence, while DINAPEN defines

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gangs solely as groups that participate in

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criminal activity (Torres, 2006, p. 4).

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Despite the irrefutable link between gangs and violence (GANG VIOLENCE), there has been much debate among researchers as to whether the definition of ‘gang’ should associate the groups with delinquency and

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violence. Is it fair to say that all gangs are

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violent? Do all gangs commit crimes? Is crim-

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inal activity their primary objective?

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Ecuador-based researcher Torres Chávez defines a gang as ‘a group of three or more

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individuals with a common interest, a link

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or activity characterized by criminal conduct

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or delinquency’ while the mainstream

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Ecuadorian newspaper Diario la Hora says

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it is ‘an organization of delinquent youths’ (Torres, 2006, p. 4). When a new type of gang, called nación, emerged on the scene

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in the 1990s, an article in the Ecuadorian

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news magazine Vistazo reported that these

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groups ‘win over hundreds of children in

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Guayaquil, whose lives are then reduced to

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sex, drugs, alcohol, and a lot of dancing’

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(Vistazo, 1997). While researchers define gangs in terms of collective and illegal behaviour, it is the

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use of violence that is most associated with gangs in the public mind. The media has played a fundamental role in generating this perception. Mainstream media outlets in Ecuador often attribute murders to gangs even when there is no proof. A 2006 study on gangs and murders in Guayaquil found that 40 per cent of incidents were attributed to gangs even though the name of the perpetrators could not be identified. The Latin Kings were deemed responsible for the largest portion of the murders—27 per cent of the total record.3 How the terms ‘gang’ and ‘youth’ are defined is a sensitive issue with serious implications for the public’s perception of these groups and how policy towards them is determined. Among the most frequently cited adjectives used to define youths in Quito’s El Comercio newspaper were pandillero (gang member), ‘violent’, ‘delinquent’, and ‘at J^[ dkcX[h e\ risk’. In reference to the activities of gangs, the most common descriptions were ‘delinquency’, ‘violence’, ‘assassinaoekj^i `e_d_d] ]Wd]i tion’, and ‘drug addiction’ (Cerbino, 2004, p. 29). According to SER PAZ, which includes neither ‘violence’ nor _d ;YkWZeh Wff[Whi ‘delinquency’ in its definition of a gang, this has led the general population to a narrow understanding of the gang je X[ ed j^[ h_i[$

phenomenon in Ecuador.4 More broadly, research finds that the: [d]ominant discourse [in Ecuador] tends to focus and attribute violence to youths as if they were implicitly— biologically or psychologically—violent’ (Cerbino, 2004, p. 12 author translation). According to George Asanza, a reformed leader of the Iron Nation gang who now works with SER PAZ, the reason gangs exist is: to have a brotherhood, to have friends forever, and to try to support each other through the good and the bad. We are friends that get along like brothers, and the way we manage the group is through a set of rules, and we conform to a different culture (Ciudad Segura, 2006, author translation).

>?IJEHO E< =7D=I ?D ;9K7:EH There is little information on the history of the youth gang phenomenon in Ecuador, but its origin is thought to date back to the 1980s, primarily in Guayaquil (Torres, 2006, p. 5). Some researchers believe that these groups were initially formed by youths who shared a common interest in creating art together, but became violent over time as competition for territory and recognition intensified (Loor, Aldas, and López, 2006, p. 4). By the 1990s, partly due to increasing media coverage, youth gangs started to become more visible in society, and thus began to be regarded as a major problem and source of insecurity for citizens of Ecuador. Today the number of youths joining gangs in Ecuador, as in other parts of Latin America, appears to be on the rise (Santillán and Varea, 2008, p. 2).5 Ecuador, which borders Colombia to the north and Peru to the east and south, is one of the poorest countries in South America, with a wide gap between rich and poor. Today, the wealthiest 10 per cent of the population earns 3 times more income than the poorest 50 per cent and 60 times more than the poorest 10 per cent (World Bank, 2008). In 2009, Ecuador’s Gini coefficient climbed to 0.544 (World Bank, 2009; see Figure 8.1).6 The country is composed of four major ethnic groups: Mestizo (55 per cent), Afro-Ecuadorian (10 per cent), indigenous (25 per cent), and Spanish descendents (10 per cent) (USAID, 2006, p. 3). Although social indicators improved between 2000 and 2008, poverty continues to be a major problem.7 Indeed, the United Nations’ 2009 Human Development Report finds that 46 per cent of the population lives below the poverty line (UNDP, 2009).

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Ecuador’s recent history has been marked by chronic political and economic instability, a succession of ineffective and short-serving populist rulers, and a devastating economic crisis in the late 1990s. Despite a period of growth earlier in that decade, political turmoil combined with a drop in oil prices, on which Ecuador’s economy is largely dependent, mishandling of the economy, failure of banks, and natural disasters to put an abrupt halt to the upturn (Reid, 2007, p. 139). In an effort to stabilize the economy after the crash, Ecuador’s government under President Gustavo Noboa switched its currency to the US dollar in mid-2000. Practically overnight, Ecuadorians saw the prices of goods rise dramatically. Between 1990 and 2001, consumption-based poverty rose from 40 to 45 per cent and the number of poor people increased from 3.5 million to 5.2 million (Sánchez-Páramo, 2005, p. 1).8 In Guayaquil, the economic hub of Ecuador, where gangs are the most prevalent, the wide gap between rich and poor is startlingly evident. Alongside an urban sprawl of shantytowns, crumbling buildings and roads, and military police officers on patrol are gated communities equipped with Western-style shopping malls, expansive mansions, high-end restaurants, and newly built schools. As a port city, located in the south-west on the river Guayas, Guayaquil is a key trade route through which 70 per cent of all cargo ships to and from Ecuador pass (Gonzalez, 2007, p. 1). In the past two decades, the city has experienced a surge in economic growth that has attracted workers from across Ecuador. It is believed that the densification of poor districts of the city that accompanied economic development has contributed to the rise in youth gangs by intensifying the competition for dominance over territory (Loor, Aldas, and López, 2006, p. 2). The city contains 12 relatively poor districts, 3 of which are considered especially destitute: El Guasmo in the southeastern zone, Isla Trinitaria in the south-western zone, and Bastión Popular in the northern zone. Together they have a population of around 900,000, with a large proportion of their inhabitants identifying themselves with a gang (Loor, Aldas, and López, p. 3). In December 2000, a SER PAZ survey of 1,688 students across Guayaquil found that one in every two young people had either a direct or an indirect connection to a pandilla or nación (SER PAZ, 2000). The poorer areas of Guayaquil are marked by high unemployment and a lack of even the most basic public services, including healthcare, sanitation, and education. These districts have also seen a sharp increase in levels of violence, which has mainly been blamed on easy access to firearms, a factor discussed in the next section (Comunidad

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Segura, 2005). Of the 914 children and adolescents arrested for breaking the law and put in detention at the Hogar de Tránsito de Varones No. 2 (Transit Home for Boys No. 2) in Guayaquil, between January and July of 2009, 498 were armed, according to the DINAPEN unit in Guayas (El Telégrafo, 2009). In interviews conducted as part of a country-wide study in 2005, youth gang members said firearms were cheap and that they knew exactly where to buy them. Most gang members reported that they first picked up a firearm at age 14, and a high number admitted to having killed people. Though some gangs do not start out being violent, the gang members reported that fierce competition between gangs required them to become armed, or more armed, and constantly recruit new members.9

=7D= L?EB;D9; ?D ;9K7:EH Since the early 1990s, violence has become one of the most serious issues in Ecuador. Though it is not a new phenomenon, it has become more urbanized and more diverse in its expressions (Carrión and Vega, 2006, p. 41). According to a report by the Inter-American Development Bank, the country’s homicide rate was 10 per 100,000 inhabitants in 1990 (IADB, n.d.). By 1999, it had risen to 14.8, climbing to 17.6 per 100,000 inhabitants by 2006 (PDBA, 2008). In 2007, the Latinobarómetro survey found that 77 per cent of Ecuadorians feared being the victim of a violent crime either ‘some of the time’ or ‘all of the time’. In 2008, 33 per cent said that either they or at least one family member had been the victim of an assault, attack, or other crime, and 17 per cent said that fights between gangs or groups had affected them (Latinobarómetro, 2007; 2008). Ceij ]Wd]i _d

Levels of violence and engagement in criminal activity vary from gang to gang, ranging from petty theft to murder.

;YkWZeh [d]W][ _d Violent crimes committed by gangs include murdering rival gang members, committing murders as an initiation ritiec[ \ehc e\ ual or during a robbery, and the accidental killing of innocent bystanders during gang warfare. Violence is, in fact, Yh_c_dWb WYj_l_jo$

a persistent feature in the lives of many gang youths. Curbelo explains: They’ve lived it—the violence of exclusion, of insults and of punches. And to resolve problems within their group and with other groups, they use punches, kicks and guns—and they do it well. And they have an organization that they respect a lot. There’s a very clear hierarchy in most organized groups, and they respect it. And punishment is applied both within the groups and outside, too, with other groups.10 Observers find that most gangs in Ecuador engage in some form of criminal activity and possess firearms, mainly for defence purposes (Dowdney, 2006, p. 200). Firearms cost relatively little, and all that is required to buy one at a hardware shop is the presence of an adult (p. 204). In order to fund weapons purchases, or their drug addictions, many gangs steal, traffic drugs, and charge membership fees of USD 5–20 per month (Loor, Aldas, and López, 2004, 10). There are an estimated 370,000 small arms and firearms in the hands of civilians in Ecuador: 117,000 legal and 250,000 illegal (Karp, 2009, p. 41). The types of weapons gangs use have changed over time. In the 1980s, gangs used sticks and stones and various sharp weapons to fight each other. Eventually, they graduated to 16-calibre cartucheras (home-made guns that fire one bullet at a time) and bazookas. Other modern-day weapons of choice include 4–10-calibre cartucheras that cost as little as USD 10 (Loor, Aldas, and López, 2004, p. 24), foreign-made firearms such as Smith & Wesson revolvers that cost between USD 200 and USD 250, and repeating rifles such as Mossberg models that run to about USD 600

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(Dowdney, 2006, p. 204). Material to construct home-made firearms is easily accessible and gangs can build up their arsenals for next to nothing by carrying out robberies or assaults on other gun-wielding citizens, such as security guards (Dowdney, 2006, p. 204; Loor, Aldas, and López, 2004, p. 4). The director of DINAPEN, Milton Barrero, reports that the number of youths carrying arms is growing rapidly, as gang leaders equip their members so that they can commit theft and acquire more arms (PDBA, 2008). In 2005, in an effort to combat the high number of crimes committed with firearms—often attributed to gang warfare—the Ecuadorian government decided to implement stricter punishment for those caught armed and without a permit. The new penalty carries a prison sentence of one to five years and a fine of USD 9–44 (DINAPEN, 2005). Many gangs in Ecuador have also been found to consume or traffic drugs, which they typically sell within their communities. One study found that about 20 per cent of gang members consume and sell drugs (Loor, Aldas, and López, 2004, p. 8), including crack, cocaine, hashish, and plomo (a mixture of drugs) (Dowdney, 2006, p.208). Pandillas and naciones, however, are not typically at the forefront of organized crime; rather, they work as accomplices to organized crime gangs known as bandas, which are mainly composed of adult members, in exchange for drugs and money. Many members of pandillas or naciones eventually become part of bandas (Loor, Aldas, and López, 2004, p. 6). In Ecuador, gangs do not openly display their weapons in their communities unless they are engaged in battle. Their guns are usually only revealed in front of rival gangs, as a way to instil fear and demonstrate their power. They typically do not steal from their neighbours, yet nor do they provide security. Gangs will leave neighbourhood residents alone as long as they do not mention their criminal activities to the police; in addition, residents who are Ikffh[ii_l[ jWYj_Yi not involved in a pandilla or nación are generally free to move between gang territories without incident. je Z_icWdjb[ oekj^ Nevertheless, there have been some reports of gangs threatening local residents if they know too much about a crime ]Wd]i _d ;YkWZeh a gang has committed (Dowdney, 2006, p. 202).

=7D=I 7D: J>; IJ7J; The government has repeatedly and ineffectively tried to dismantle gangs through curfews, rehabilitation, and strict punishment since gangs first appeared in the 1980s and fuelled a rise in petty crime. In 1986, a ‘flying squad’ was created to go after and arrest youths loitering on street corners or pavements in poor neighbourhoods (Dowdney, 2006, p. 200). By 1987, the Anti-pandilla Special Unit was formed under the government of President León Febres Cordero to try to dismantle gangs, mainly by pursuing the leaders. The government also imposed a curfew of 10 p.m. for minors to try to keep them off the streets and out of trouble. Although generally considered ineffective, this same measure was reapplied in 2001 and 2002 (Torres, 2006, p. 8). The prevailing government position has been that these youth gangs are a wholly negative phenomenon and exist only to cause trouble; therefore, methods for handling them have emphasized breaking up groups by imprisoning the leaders, or by isolating individual members and ‘rehabilitating’ them. The intense bond gang members share and the important role their groups play in their lives, however, has led many of those initiatives to backfire. Indeed, SER PAZ states that government suppression actually led to the formation of naciones, for as officials intensified their crackdown, gangs responded by becoming larger, more organized, and more clandestine (Torres, 2006, p. 8). Meanwhile, gang leaders were still able to control their group from jail (PRISON). Instead of reforming gang members, suppression appears to have reinforced the stigmatization of young people who belong to gangs and their status as outsiders, strengthening the allure of gangs for these same people (Cerbino, 2004, p. 16).

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In 1997, the federal government established DINAPEN, which was the first public department designed to tackle youth issues exclusively (Torres, 2006). The initiative was supposed to provide better protection and treatment of youths by the police, but police suppression continued. By the end of 2002, the Guayas provincial government, the sub-secretaries of Social Welfare, Education, and Health, and DINAPEN approached civil society organizations to take part in a new anti-gang initiative that would seek to address the ‘employment, educational, and recreational needs of youth’. The initiative failed, however, due to high administrative costs and a lack of resources (Dowdney, 2006, p. 203). Meanwhile, between 1999 and 2005, the number of youths being apprehended rose sharply, by 115 per cent. The most common known crime committed by minors in 2005 was robbery (36 per cent), followed by assaults and robbery (13.7 per cent), and the possession of firearms (7 per cent) (Torres, 2006). Besides adopting suppressive methods that proved ineffective to combat gang crime, government efforts were also hampered by the corruption of police officials. Many gang members in Ecuador have reported paying police bribes in exchange for freedom, especially those who were caught with drugs (Dowdney, 2006, p. 203).

J>; I;H F7P ?D?J?7J?L;I '' [Nelsa Curbelo] supports us a lot, she gives us advice and we are very grateful. We are here because of her. Before I was always getting into trouble. If we weren’t throwing rocks at each other, we were shooting each other, but now, thank God, we’ve changed. —Daniel, reformed gang member12 7YYehZ_d] je This section reviews the initiatives undertaken by SER PAZ to combat gang violence during the past 10 years. 9khX[be" oekd]

Nelsa Curbelo, a 68-year-old former nun and school teacher originally from Uruguay, began her work in Ecuador

f[efb[ `e_d ]Wd]i as a researcher for a non-governmental organization (NGO) that probed abuse in the military and police forces. Her \eh [cej_edWbÆdej focus subsequently shifted to the prevention of violence among Ecuadorian youths. Before she officially established [Yedec_YÆh[Wiedi$

SER PAZ in 1999, she spent two years becoming acquainted with the neighbourhood that would be the testing ground of her first initiatives, getting to know the young people there and trying to understand why they were in gangs and the kinds of activities in which they engaged (Hart, 2008). Curbelo found that youths typically join gangs in the early stages of adolescence, sometimes as young as 11, in disadvantaged areas characterized by poverty, high levels of unemployment and underemployment, broken families, social exclusion, and criminality.13 She concluded that young people are not lured into gangs for the thrill of committing crimes or for the accumulation of material wealth. ‘It’s not an economic need, it’s the need to have a group where they feel like equals, where there’s protection, where there’s solidarity.’14 In Curbelo’s view, the extreme violence carried out by many gang youths is a reaction to the society around them and life circumstances that they did not choose. ‘Youngsters are the mirror of the kind of society they live in. They reflect their problems and bring back an image that we often do not want to see’ (Curbelo, 2004, p. 3). In this paradigm, gang youths are, at some level, victims—trapped in a situation created by adults—who then become victimizers. Gang youths live in an unjust and unequal society; they are most often poor with little chance of becoming productive members of society, and adults make easily accessible to them the firearms and drugs that destroy their lives. In essence, Curbelo sees gangs as a survival mechanism for young people living within a society that rejects and fears them.

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In formulating her approach to gang violence prevention, Curbelo identified positive forces that had brought these youths together and that she felt could help reintegrate them into society, reversing their disappearance from public life.15 For example, gang-members worked well as a team, could develop their own language, flags, and symbols, and adhered to a strict chain of command. They also exhibited creative talents in graffiti painting, dance, and music. While the government, other NGOs, and the Church have conducted initiatives to combat gang violence by isolating members or breaking up groups, SER PAZ has allowed gangs to stay together, while giving them a new purpose that does not include violence. Underpinning the SER PAZ approach is the belief that, to be effective, any policy designed to combat youth violence needs to recognize as a starting point the validity of the gang organizations.

=[jj_d] Zemd je Xki_d[ii SER PAZ has implemented myriad initiatives over the years, reaching more than 4,000 gang youths across the coun- I;H F7P fhe`[Yji try, its largest project being the financing of small businesses through micro-loans in the neighbourhood now known W_c je ][j oekj^i as the Barrio de Paz, discussed in the next section. This chapter presents a selection of typical SER PAZ projects, all _d Yed\b_Yj je meha of which emphasize legitimizing youth gang sub-culture; securing access to education and training for gang youths je][j^[h ed W to create an alternate mission for their groups; fostering peace (gang youths are required to give up violence in order fhe`[Yj e\ j^[_h to receive support for their projects); and promoting dialogue between gang youths and the public. The peace process began with creating â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;peace muralsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; in the city (El Universo, 2009c). In the early stages of the organization, after establishing trust with a number of groups, Curbelo arranged a meeting with the provincial governor in Guayaquil to negotiate an agreement between the two factions, with each side outlining what they wanted from the other. They met in a neutral area with no police and no media present. The leaders asked the governor to cease discriminatory measures, in particular the policy of arresting them for merely being on the streets. They also requested an area to paint graffiti and practice break-dancing, as well as financial assistance to produce an album of songs in the style of hip-hop, rap, and reggae that promoted peace. In exchange, gangs said they would stop the violence on the streets and keep the parks where they congregated clean (Curbelo, 2004, p. 13). As a result of the meeting, the local police offered the gangs wall space on police station grounds and at a hospital to paint graffiti. Several private businesses and embassies donated paint supplies and other equipment to the project. Twelve days later, the gangs presented their first graffiti mural to the public in the presence of the police music band, provincial authorities, and the media (Curbelo, 2004, p. 13). A second mural was soon put up, a collaborative effort between 20 gang youths, with financial support from private businesses that donated airbrushes, ten gallons of paint, and 100 spray cans (El Comercio, 2002). These initial projects by SER PAZ were defined by several key achievements. First, gang members from different groups managed to work together on the wall. Second, the mural was in a highly visible, public space and therefore brought the gangs public recognition. Finally, instead of competing for turf, gangs competed to have the best artwork (Curbelo, 2004, pp. 13â&#x20AC;&#x201C;14). Subsequent projects also aimed at getting youths in conflict to work together on a project of their choosing, in addition to bringing them together with other members of the community. For example, four participating gangs managed to secure enough funding to produce a rap album. The launch party was held in the Central Bank where the youths were met with applause by the attendees, including political dignitaries and military authorities (El Universo, 2002b). As word spread in the media of SER PAZ,16 increasing numbers of people expressed their desire to assist the initiative. For example, several private banks offered to meet with gang members who needed a loan to start a small

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business. Gang members attended a meeting at the bank with its manager and credit officers. For SER PAZ, this represented a significant step in the reintegration of gangs as a positive force in society, for they were invited to a place where they would normally be shunned to discuss terms of legitimate business with respected members of society (Curbelo, 2004, p. 14). A local university also allowed SER PAZ usage of one of their rooms to hold meetings between leaders of various gangs. In addition, 16 leaders attended a leadership training course that required 20 hours of class time. They were required to pass an examination in order to receive their diplomas, which they were awarded in a ceremony in front of the members of their groups. Several youth gang members were also asked to appear on local television programmes or to talk with journalists (Curbelo, 2004, p. 14). Finally, university students and business people helped gangs create their own magazine, which included comics, articles on music, graffiti art, and sexual education. It also included a history of a different nación in each issue. The launch party was attended by approximately 1,000 people, including rival gangs and university students (Curbelo, 2004, pp. 14–15).

J^[ 8Whh_e Z[ FWp [nf[h_c[dj We were enemies [with the other gangs] and now we talk to each other, and we no longer talk about problems, but about work. —Daniel, reformed gang member17 The neighbourhood in central Guayaquil where Curbelo established SER PAZ encompasses 49 blocks and around 1,000 families. Today it is known as Barrio de Paz, or ‘neighbourhood of peace’. Curbelo recalls that several charac-

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teristics of this area made it ideal for her social experiment. For example, people in the community knew each other well; levels of violence were extremely high; and adults vigorously defended their youths, even when police were involved, and could be expected to take an active interest in working with SER PAZ to improve the security situation. As of late 2008, the organization worked with five gangs numbering around 200 members in the Barrio de Paz (Santillán and Varea, 2008, p. 9.). Curbelo wanted to see if youth gangs could make agreements together, work peacefully side by side, and acquire job training. She also wanted to assess whether the level of violent criminal activity would decrease if gangs were given the tools to earn a living and an alternative, more positive form of social recognition. Today, gangs run ten different businesses, including a print shop, a pizzeria, a salon, a dance school, and a bakery. The gangs are entirely responsible for the businesses, which serve the neighbourhood and, in some cases, the greater Guayaquil community. In order to obtain funding for businesses, gangs had to submit to two conditions: to cease all criminal activity and to agree to work with rival gang members. While new members continue to join, not all who originally signed up to the project have stayed on board. For example, in August 2009, the Latin Kings announced that the group would break ties with SER PAZ following a dispute over obtaining funds for their microbusiness; the gang said it was in direct talks with the government to receive financial support for their projects (El Universo, 2009b). In addition to SER PAZ, the Barrio de Paz projects received support from several other organizations, including the Inter-American Foundation, the Civilian Security Corporation of the Guayaquil Municipality, the Ministry of Labour, the Ecuadorian Occupational Training Service, and the University of Cataluña (Salazar, 2008, p. 19). SER PAZ also established a relationship with the Colegio Virtual Iberoamericano, paving the way for 30 gang members to obtain a college degree online. Another SER PAZ initiative enabled more than 4,000 gang youths to obtain scholarships from the Ministry of Labour to study in the Ecuadorian Vocational Training Service (Santillán and Varea, 2008, p. 9). In 2008, SER PAZ joined forces with the Campus por la Paz (Campus for Peace) in Spain for the pilot project Universidad Barrio de Paz, which equips classrooms with the resources for gang youths to be able to study online and to develop their digital literacy and graphic design skills (Rovira, 2008).

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Curbelo has claimed that neighbourhood crime decreased by 60 per cent in the first six months of the Barrio de Paz project and that this reduction encouraged those working for SER PAZ to continue with the project. Due to the absence of neighbourhood-specific data, however, this statistic could not be verified, nor could the specific relationship between the project and violence rates. What is known is that the number of homicides dropped in the years after the project’s launch in 2006, from 331 to 224 and 259 in 2007 and 2008, respectively (see Figure 8.2). In 2007, the project also helped bring about peace between two of Ecuador’s largest gangs, the Latin Kings and Los Ñetas, which were formerly involved in a bloody turf war. Interviews with individual gang members in the Barrio de Paz also reveal the positive impact of the project on gang members’ lives.18 The Latin Kings gained legal recognition on 1 November 2009, after a meeting with President Rafael Correa. Group leaders now negotiate directly with government authorities to solicit financial support for their projects (El Universo, 2009d).

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=Wd] Z_iWhcWc[dj Along with the small businesses run by reformed gangs, conflict resolution has been a core component of the SER PAZ experiment, including the facilitation or mediation of peace agreements between groups. One such process involved the leaders of ten gangs and was witnessed by the police chief and the governor of Guayas as well as the rector of the University of Guayaquil at a ceremony in 2002 (El Universo, 2002a). SER PAZ did not, however, oblige gangs participating in its projects to give up their weapons. Experts warned Curbelo that when young people in gang territories give up their guns, they are often killed soon after. ‘A gun is more than what we think it is; it’s a passport to walk down the street in peace. Relinquishing it is similar to relinquishing your family.’19 Nevertheless, youths working with SER PAZ approached Curbelo, expressing their desire to relinquish their weapons, and ultimately developed their own means of doing so. They decided to surrender their guns to the authorities, and—to ensure that they wouldn’t return to the streets—arrange for them to be publically destroyed. Before the gangs surrendered their weapons to the military officers in accordance with Ecuadorian law, both sides met in an upmarket hotel in Guayaquil to work out an agreement. Interestingly, these discussions were eased by the parties’ shared perceptions of guns.20 The surrendered weapons were crushed by a steamroller at a public ceremony with the media in attendance. At the first gun surrender in 2006, 60 guns—including machine guns and sub-machine guns—were destroyed. There have been four similar rounds of weapons collection (and corresponding amnesties) since then. SER PAZ reported that, despite initial fears, three years after the first destruction ceremony there had been no attempt on the life of a gang member who had relinquished his or her weapon.21 In response to the Barrio de Paz projects and the pact by gangs to give up their guns, the municipal government Oekj^i meha_d] m_j^ has stepped in to repair several run-down buildings and roads in the neighbourhood.22 In 2007, the Ministry of I;H F7P Z[Y_Z[Z je Labour promised youths who were involved in SER PAZ projects and had completed their vocational training a ikhh[dZ[h j^[_h ]kdi credit of USD 5,000 for a five-year period at an interest rate of five per cent (El Universo, 2007).23

FEB?9O ?CFB?97J?EDI Youth gang violence arises out of the complex interaction of individual, group, and social characteristics (GANG VIOLENCE). Essential characteristics of gangs vary significantly from place to place and from group to group. There are no blanket formulas for preventing or reducing youth gang violence (INTERVENTIONS). The SER PAZ approach, with its strengths and weaknesses, does, however, offer important food for thought for policy-makers.

J^[ I;H F7P WffheWY^ The SER PAZ approach to gang violence prevention and reduction has three core components: (1) replacing suppressive (law enforcement) strategies with the strategic use of gang attributes for positive social ends; (2) involving the broader community, including state institutions, in the development and implementation of gang programmes; and (3) providing gangs with alternative ways to earn a livelihood and social recognition. Working with the gang. Given the violent nature of many gangs, it is hardly surprising that suppression tends to be the default response. For SER PAZ, however, the gang is a logical consequence of an unequal and unjust society. In this paradigm, gangs are not inherently delinquent or violent; they can become negative social forces, but can also contribute positively to their communities.

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Curbelo concludes from her research that stigmatizing gang members or imprisoning their leaders is likely to backfire, reinforcing the isolation of gangs from society, and causing them to strengthen their criminal inclinations. Instead of focusing on gang violence, Curbelo emphasizes the demonstration of teamwork, mutual respect, support, and protection that many gangs exhibit. By allowing gangs to stay together, and by promoting their positive traits, SER PAZ has achieved some important successes. Community involvement. Curbelo treats the issue of gang violence as a problem whose solution required the involvement of the entire community. When Curbelo arranged for gang youths to meet with provincial authorities, police officers, and business people, and for them to present their work at widely publicized public forums, she began the process of reintegrating these youths in society and changing public attitudes towards them. In her view, it is not only gang members who need reform; Ecuadorian society also needs to develop a more nuanced understanding of youth gangs in the country. Alternative livelihoods. Many of the SER PAZ programmes offered gang members alternative ways of developing their skills and, most importantly, supporting themselves and their families. SER PAZ incorporated the skills and interests gang members already expressed—in graffiti art, music, and dance—into projects that earned them money and gave them confidence in the transition from a violent to a non-violent lifestyle.

;d]W]_d] ]Wd]i [bi[m^[h[ _d j^[ 7c[h_YWi ?d F[hk" <Wj^[h Approaches similar to the one taken by SER PAZ in Ecuador have been applied in other communities plagued by Ê9^_gk_É dkhjkh[i j^[ gang violence in South America. In El Agustino, Peru, for example, José Ignacio Mantecón Sancho (Father ‘Chiqui’) fei_j_l[ Wif[Yji e\ of the Martin Luther King Association24 has been working with youth gangs for more than 12 years. Like Nelsa ]Wd] Ykbjkh[$

Curbelo, he decided early on to nurture the positive aspects of gang culture in order to displace the negative ones (Dominguez, 2009). In a neighbourhood plagued by poverty and high unemployment, Father Chiqui has focused on improving the lives of gang youths in four major areas. He has enlisted the help of local teachers who voluntarily teach classes and train youths, outside of the conventional school environment. He has also collaborated with the municipal government in El Agustino to help youths obtain micro-loans to start their own small businesses. Recognizing that sport is a great passion for the youths, Father Chiqui formed a sports club, which, under the direction of trainers, not only encouraged physical and technical achievement, but also academic education. In addition, the Martin Luther King Association has promoted community service initiatives that allowed gang youths to take responsibility for some of the damage they had caused. For example, they cleaned up the streets and participated in city Christmas festivities, during which they presented gifts to members of the community who had been negatively affected by their actions (Rospigliosi, 2008, p. 7). The organization has involved 36 gangs and hundreds of youths in its programmes, with many remaining committed to a peaceful, drug-free, and productive existence (Dominguez, 2009). Nevertheless, some have not stayed involved with the project for reasons that include failure to fight their drug addictions (Rospigliosi, 2008). In a 2009 interview, Father Chiqui said another major challenge is that public and private institutions often get involved with gang initiatives and then abandon them after a brief period. ‘This creates enormous frustration and afterwards it’s very difficult to regain confidence’ (Dominguez, 2009). Another organization that has opted to engage gangs in combating street violence, rather than suppress them, is Homies Unidos, founded in 1996, and with projects in El Salvador and Los Angeles in the United States. Homies

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Unidos began by bringing gangs in conflict together for meetings to thrash out non-violent alternatives to gang warfare. The organization makes extensive use of peer educators on the assumption that gang members will respond better to people who have shared their experiences, such as having their families torn apart by immigration and growing up in poverty. As with the SER PAZ ‘White Helmets’ example, gangs involved with Homies Unidos take the lead in finding positive alternatives to violence (Rose-Avila, 2009).

Fej[dj_Wb b_c_jWj_edi While SER PAZ and the other organizations presented in this chapter have developed innovative and often successful responses to gang violence, there are potential limitations to their effectiveness and broader applicability. For example, the issue of trust is critical to working with gang youths, and it takes an enormous amount of individual and collective dedication to attain their trust. Curbelo spent two years acquainting herself with the gang members before she started her organization. Once established, the programme relied on the participation and financial commitment of a wide range of state and community stakeholders, which can be difficult to maintain over the long term. Curbelo’s organization worked with youth gangs of very limited means; they operated without the revenues brought by significant drug or other lucrative illicit businesses. The gangs in the Barrio de Paz formed for a variety of reasons, but financial gain was not a dominant factor. It is plausible that more profitable organizations would not react as well to the methods employed by SER PAZ in the Barrio de Paz. Youth gangs with stronger connections to international drug smuggling and related operations have financial incentives that microbusinesses can hardly supplant. And there is always the risk that micro-businesses fail or supporters back out, leaving the old life of crime the obvious default option for many participants. It is also difficult for the state and its judicial institutions to abandon gang suppression strategies if that means gang members guilty of serious crime go unpunished. Moreover, although many SER PAZ initiatives owe their success to the involvement of various actors, including the government and police, the conflicting imperatives of these organizations can generate trouble. For example, the arrest of a Los Ñetas leader during peace negotiations caused J^[ _iik[ e\ jhkij _i ‘grave problems’ for SER PAZ; youths lost trust in the organization and decided not to disarm (Paredes, 2006). Curbelo Yh_j_YWb je meha_d] has also reported numerous threats against the organization by disgruntled gang members.25

9ED9BKI?ED Chronic political and economic instability, urban poverty, and widening income inequality appear to be among the key drivers in the rise of youth gangs in Ecuador over the last 30 years, exacerbated by increasing access to firearms. Successive attempts to rein in gangs using street corner sweeps, curfews, the incarceration of gang leaders, and other suppressive law enforcement measures have produced little long-term benefit. A fresh approach came in an unlikely form. Reintegration is a well-established approach to dealing with armed groups in post-conflict contexts; it is largely unheard of in the realm of gang interventions. By radically reinterpreting the youth gang phenomenon as embodying valuable qualities that can be catalysed for social change, SER PAZ set about trying to re-establish and strengthen the bonds between gang members and their communities based on trust, mutual recognition, and respect. While other interventions have reached out to gang members with the offer of various services, the absence of the threat of police action is notable in the Barrio de Paz experiment.

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Some significant, verifiable gains resulted. The organization provided gang members with the means to support themselves and their families, gave them access to education and outlets for artistic expression, and fostered a stable environment where gangs can settle conflict peacefully. Available data indicates that the programme was accompanied by a reduction in youth gang homicides. The gang phenomenon is increasingly a global one; more and more cities are being forced to develop strategic plans, or are trying to come to terms with the limitations and failures of previous intervention approaches. While context-specific factors may be responsible for some of the successes in Guayaquil, the SER PAZ experience offers a new and innovative case study for consideration.

B?IJ E< 788H;L?7J?EDI DINAPEN

Dirección Nacional de Policía Especializada en Niños, Niñas y Adolescentes (National Specialized Police for Children and Adolescents)

NGO

Non-governmental organization

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This introduction is based on Johnston (2009).

See also Berkman (2007).

Sources include data obtained from the newspapers El Universo and El Comercio and cited in in Torres (2006).

Author interview with Nelsa Curbelo, Guayaquil, Ecuador, October 2008; translated from the Spanish by Sara Benet.

According to DINAPEN, the number of gangs in Ecuador rose by 7.58 per cent between 2005 and 2008 (DINAPEN, 2009).

The Gini Index assigns values between 0 and 1 to each country, with 0 representing absolute equality and 1 representing absolute inequality.

Ecuador was ranked 72 out of 179 countries in the 2008 Human Development Index produced by the UN Development Programme. The ranking rose 17 places from 2007 and is now classified in the ‘high human development’ category. Ecuador is ranked ahead of its neighbours, Peru and Colombia (EIU, 2009).

Consumption-based poverty is a measure of household expenditure on selected goods relative to the prices of those goods (Aguirregabiria, 2006).

Interview with SER PAZ researcher Kleber Loor by Carola Mittrany of Children and Youth in Organized Armed Violence, 13 June 2005.

Author interview with Nelsa Curbelo, Guayaquil, Ecuador, October 2008; translated from the Spanish by Sara Benet.

This section is partly based on an author interview with Nelsa Curbelo and gang youths working with SER PAZ, Guayaquil, Ecuador, October

Author interview with Daniel Legovia, Guayaquil, Ecuador, October 2008; translated from the Spanish by Sara Benet.

Curbelo emphasizes that most gang members come from the poorest sector of society.

Author interview with Nelsa Curbelo, Guayaquil, October 2008; translated from the Spanish by Sara Benet.

‘[Society acts] to create non-people, individuals we do not care about, individuals who must be avoided, even eliminated, individuals in whom

2008; translated from the Spanish by Sara Benet.

others are not interested and from whom nothing is expected’ (Curbelo, 2004, p. 3). 16

In commenting on SER PAZ projects, including the mural project and rap album launch party, El Universo (2002b) reported: ‘The response to these youths organized by their own initiative into naciones has been positive. Not only have they revealed that they’re not as bad as we consider them to be, but that they are trained to serve their city in numerous fields.’

Author interview with Daniel Legovia, Guayaquil, Ecuador, October 2008; translated from the Spanish by Sara Benet.

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Eva, a reformed gang member, who works in the beauty salon, said: ‘We now have work and a way to provide for our families, which is the most important. I have many dreams. One is to open a large branch, well, a number of branches of the salon.’ Adrian, a reformed gang member and workshop promoter, reported: ‘Before, my life consisted of only three things: sleeping, doing drugs and eating. [SER PAZ] gave me a second chance in my life, and now I have the opportunity to help many young people who, like me, were caught up in drugs and street life.’ Author interviews with reformed gang members, Guayaquil, Ecuador, October 2008: Sara Benet.

Author interview with Nelsa Curbelo, Guayaquil, Ecuador, October 2008; translated from the Spanish by Sara Benet.

Curbelo recalled: ‘Both groups valued this instrument. They knew that it was important, and relevant in their lives, and they knew that surrendering it would be like surrendering their mothers—almost like that. And the military said that they called their guns ‘mamita’ and that they had a special ritual during which they would guard it for eight days and not use it.’ Author interview with Nelsa Curbelo, Guayaquil, Ecuador, October 2008; translated from the Spanish by Sara Benet.

Author interview with Nelsa Curbelo, Guayaquil, Ecuador, October 2008; translated from the Spanish by Sara Benet.

In August 2009, SER PAZ announced that it would close due to a lack of funds. According to Ricardo Koenig, sub-director of SER PAZ, the organization received funding from the Ministry of Labour, but this funding stopped for ‘political reasons’. In an email he wrote: ‘SER PAZ was born without the financing that would allow it to build a centralized organization, and the projects we carried out were done with the sporadic help of [various] institutions (Rotary Club, FIA, City of Guayaquil, etc.). Almost 100% of the donations were used for these projects and we didn’t keep any money to cover the operating costs of SER PAZ.’ Projects in the Barrio de Paz will continue as the businesses have become self-sustaining. Several reformed youth gangs that worked with the organization have also begun negotiating directly with the government to obtain support for their projects. El Universo (2009a); author interview with Ricardo Koenig, 26 January 2010 (author translation).

Father Chiqui named his organization after Martin Luther King as he was inspired by the Nobel Peace Prize winner’s non-violent fight for civil

The police later performed their own peace negotiations between the groups (El Comercio, 2006).

rights (Dominguez, 2009).

8?8B?E=H7F>O Aguirregabiria, Victor. 2006. ‘Consumption Based Measures of Poverty Cost of Living.’ In Encyclopedia of World Poverty. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. Berkman, Heather. 2007. ‘Social Exclusion and Violence in Latin America and the Caribbean.’ Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank. Carrión, Fernando M. and Jorge-Núñez Vega. 2006. ‘(In)seguridad ciudadana en Ecuador.’ Entre Voces. Quito: Instituto de Estudios Ecuatorianos. September–October, pp. 41–44. Cerbino, Mauro. 2004. Pandillas juveniles: cultura y conflicto de la calle. Quito: Editorial El Conejo/Abya-Yala. Ciudad Segura. 2006. ‘Hay valores que se pueden rescatar.’ No. 3, p. 10. Comunidad Segura. 2005. ‘Easy Access to Guns Increases Juvenile Violence in Ecuador.’ 8 November. <http://www.comunidadesegura.org.br/en/node/11731> Curbelo, Nelsa. 2004. ‘Cultural Expressions as Change Agents in Violent Youth Gangs.’ <http://www.gencat.cat/interior/dialegs2004/ponencias/Nelsa_Curbelo_eng.pdf> —. 2008. ‘Cascos Blancos Pandis.’ El Universo (Guayaquil). 24 September. <http://www.eluniverso.com/2008/09/24/0001/21/694996FB30904FC1835E8389443A5836.html> DINAPEN (Dirección Nacional de Policía Especializada de Niños, Niñas y Adolescentes). 2005. ‘Policía Nacional del Ecuador.’ <http://www.oas.org/dsp/documentos/pandillas/presentacionpandillas-policiaEcuador.pdf> —. 2009. ‘Pandillas crecen en un 7,58%.’ Hoy (Quito). 6 April. <http://www.hoy.com.ec/noticias-ecuador/pandillas-crecen-en-un-758-342089.html> Dominguez, Andrea. 2009. ‘Cambio de camiseta.’ Comunidad Segura, 17 April. <http://www.comunidadesegura.org/es/node/42222> Dowdney, Luke. 2006. Neither War nor Peace: International Comparisons of Children and Youth in Organized Armed Violence. Rio de Janeiro: Children and Youth in Organised Armed Violence.

((, IC7BB 7HCI IKHL;O (&'&

ECLAC (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean). 2009. Social Panorama of Latin America: 2008. Santiago: United Nations. June. EIU (Economist Intelligence Unit). 2009. ‘Country Briefings: Ecuador.’ El Comercio (Lima). 2002. ‘Ex pandilleros pintan un segundo mural en la ciudad.’ 12 May. —. 2006. ‘Los Latin Kings y los Ñetas sellan un pacto de paz.’ 18 August. El Telégrafo (Guayaquil). 2009. ‘El uso de armas es el principal delito de los menores infractores.’ 10 August. El Universo (Guayaquil). 2002a. ‘Jóvenes firmaron compromiso de paz entre pandillas.’ 10 July. —. 2002b. ‘Los más pobres.’ 14 April. —. 2007. ‘Ser Paz inauguró plan de capacitación laboral.’ 15 July. —. 2009a. ‘Fundación Ser Paz dejaría de funcionar.’ 25 August. —. 2009b. ‘Ex integrantes que dicen estar con el Gobierno critican a la fundación.’ 26 August. —. 2009c. ‘Tras abandonar los conflictos se convirtieron en productivos.’ 30 August. —. 2009d. ‘Unos 21 mil miembros Latin King celebran legalización de su grupo.’ 9 November. ESPOL (Escuela Superior Politécnica del Litoral). n.d. ‘Estadísticas de Delitos en Guayaquil: Reportes por Año.’ <http://www.icm.espol.edu.ec/delitos/reportes_anuales.htm> Gonzalez, Andres. 2007. ‘Ecuador Market Overview: Port Equipment.’ Washington, DC: United States Department of Commerce. May. Hart, Hilary. 2008. ‘Join My Gang.’ Ode Magazine (California). June. <http://www.odemagazine.com/doc/54/join-my-gang/> IADB (Inter-American Development Bank). n.d. ‘Magnitud y tendencias de la violencia en el Ecuador, 1990–1999.’ <http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=908545> Johnston, Vanessa. 2009. ‘In Ecuador, Gang Members Trade Guns for Scissors and Nail Polish.’ Christian Science Monitor. 22 January. Karp, Aaron. 2009. Surplus Arms in South America: A Survey. Working Paper 7. Geneva: Small Arms Survey. June. Latinobarómetro. 2007. 2007 Report. <http://www.latinobarometro.org> —. 2008. 2008 Report. <http://www.latinobarometro.org> Loor, Kleber, Lidice Aldas, and Fernando López. 2004. ‘Pandillas y naciones de Ecuador: alarmante realidad, tarea desafiante: de víctimas a victimarios.’ Children and Youth in Organized Armed Violence. <http://www.coav.org.br/publique/media/Report%20Equador.pdf> Paredes, Aurelio. 2006. ‘El desarme por la paz.’ Vistazo (Quito). Issue 922. 19 January, pp. 22-24. PDBA (Political Database of the Americas). 2008. ‘República de Ecuador Democracia y Seguridad Ciudadana: Panorama General de la Seguridad Ciudadana.’ Washington, DC: Georgetown University. 19 May. <http://www12.georgetown.edu/sfs/clas/pdba/Security/citizensecurity/ecuador/ecuador_1.html> Reid, Michael. 2007. Forgotten Continent: The Battle for Latin America’s Soul. New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press. Rose-Avila, Magdaleno. 2009. ‘Homies Unidos, El Salvador—Peer Education with Gang Members: Protecting Life and Health.’ Research Triangle Park, NC: Family Health International. <http://www.fhi.org/en/Youth/YouthNet/Publications/FOCUS/ProjectHighlights/homiesunidoselsalvador.htm> Rospigliosi, Fernando. 2008. ‘El Padre Chiqui y las pandillas.’ Justicia Para Crecer (Lima). No. 12. October–December, pp. 5–7. Rovira, Jordi. 2008. ‘Universidad Barrio de Paz: Education as an Alternative to Violence.’ Campus for Peace. Barcelona: Open University of Catalonia, p. 29. <http://campusforpeace.uoc.edu/portal/_resources/EN/documents/campus_pau/memoria_0708_eng.pdf> Salazar, Daniel Solórzano. 2008. ‘Los jóvenes cambian la fama de su barrio.’ El Telégrafo (Guayaquil). 8 June. Sánchez-Páramo, Carolina. 2005. ‘Poverty in Ecuador.’ En Breve. No. 71. May. <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTENBREVE/Newsletters/20608425/May05_71_EC_Poverty_Ass.pdf> Santillán, Alfredo and Soledad Varea. 2008. ‘Strategies and Policies of Inclusion (Assimilation?) of Gangster Groups in Ecuador: Two City Models, Two Visions about the Potential of Young Gangsters.’ Revista Latinoamericana de Seguridad Ciudadana, No. 4, pp. 81–99. SER PAZ. 2000. Survey of Youth Violence in 11 Public Schools in Guayaquil. Guayaquil: SER PAZ. Strocka, Cordula. 2006. ‘Youth Gangs in Latin America.’ SAIS Review, Vol. 26, No. 2, pp. 133–46. Torres, Andreina. 2006. ‘Pandillas y naciones en Ecuador: diagnóstico de situación.’ Ciudad Segura, No. 3, pp. 4–9. UNDP (United Nations Development Programme). 2009. ‘Human Development Report 2009: I-1 Human and Income Poverty—Population Living below the National Poverty Line (%).’ <http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/indicators/104.html> USAID (United States Agency for International Development). 2006. Anti-Trafficking Technical Assistance: Ecuador Anti-trafficking Assessment. August. <pdf.usaid.gov.pdf_docs/PNADH204.pdf>

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Vistazo (Quito). 1997. ‘Vandalos Colegiales.’ Iss. 725. 6 November. Waiselfisz, Julio. 2008. Mapa de la violencia: Los jóvenes de América Latina 2008. Brasília: Red de Información Tecnológica Latino Americana. <http://www.ritla.net/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid=541> World Bank. 2008. Ecuador Country Brief. <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/LACEXT/ECUADOREXTN/0,,contentMDK: 21984300~pagePK:141137~piPK:141127~theSitePK:325116,00.html> World Bank. 2009. World Development Indicators 2009. Washington, DC: World Bank.

79ADEMB;:=;C;DJI Fh_dY_fWb Wkj^eh Vanessa Johnston

7 \ehc[h c[cX[h e\ j^[ CWhW IWblWjhkY^W mehai _d W ^WdZ_YhW\j mehai^ef Wi fWhj e\ W h[^WX_b_jWj_ed fhe]hWcc[ hkd Xo j^[ ]el[hdc[dj Wj j^[ IediedWj[ F[d_j[dj_Who" ;b IWblWZeh" 7fh_b (&&.$ @ei[ 9WX[pWi%7<F%=[jjo ?cW][i

=[jj_d] FWij Ikffh[ii_ed IJH;;J =7D= ?DJ;HL;DJ?EDI ?DJHE:K9J?ED Youth street gangs can be found in communities in the Americas, Europe, Asia, and beyond—along with the criminality and violence that, with important regional variations, tends to characterize gang life (GANG VIOLENCE). Solutions are neither obvious nor easy, however. While street gangs across the world share many features, they differ in important ways (Morales, 2004, pp. 395–96, 399–413). States and municipal authorities typically struggle to apply a growing, but uneven, knowledge base to their ‘gang problem’. Interventions targeting both the gang and gang behaviour are now widespread. Many find their origin in efforts first promoted in the United States, but as youth street gangs emerge in new settings, earlier models are being modified. This chapter describes some of the driving theories and practices in the prevention, treatment, and suppression of youth gangs. It presents common examples of each type of programme, drawn from different regions, and, where it exists, evidence of programme effectiveness and efficiency. The main conclusions of this chapter include: s Youth gang members stand on a continuum of youth that also includes troublesome and delinquent youths who are at risk of joining gangs. The needs of these different populations are distinct and require separate interventions. s Youth street gang interventions are more often guided by conventional wisdom than by evidence; many large-scale programmes continue despite few or no positive documented outcomes. s Partly due to cost considerations, and notwithstanding their limitations, short-term suppressive interventions remain more common than preventive or treatment-oriented ones. s Rigorous evaluations of youth street gang interventions are infrequent and typically measure self-reported change in behaviour and attitudes rather than levels of gang membership or violence. s A wide range of factors across many domains contributes to youth gang membership and activity; no intervention focusing on one specific factor is likely to show significant overall impacts. s Interventions that combine suppression with prevention and treatment, are long-term, involve the community, and are tailored to specific contexts (cultural, socio-economic, developmental, gender) are the most promising. This chapter is composed of five main sections. The first describes the approaches to youth gang interventions presented in the chapter and some important contextual factors for the study of youth gangs. A section on prevention strategies follows, covering both youth-oriented approaches that target individuals at risk for gang affiliation and environment-oriented strategies that focus on group processes and collective and communal change. Treatmentoriented programmes are reviewed in the next section, which distinguishes between youth-oriented and environmentoriented approaches. The penultimate section highlights suppression strategies, including coercive and alternative approaches. The chapter conclusion reviews the main findings and notes areas where further research is needed.

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7D7BOJ?9 9EDI?:;H7J?EDI J^h[[ WffheWY^[i0 fh[l[dj_ed" _dj[hl[dj_ed" WdZ ikffh[ii_ed Historically, in the domain of the criminology and criminal justice community, the study of youth street gangs has expanded significantly in recent years. In part due to the growth of public health-based efforts to address social problems—especially armed violence—youth street gangs are now increasingly studied in terms of risk factors (Sanders and Lankenau, 2006). The race, socio-economic level, employment status, gender, substance abuse, and school performance of gang members, among many other factors, has taken a much more prominent place in efforts to understand and address gangs. Latter sections of this chapter explore the extent to which interventions have correspondingly applied this new wealth of information and analysis. In the language of criminology, youth gang planning and policies that aim to improve public safety are classified broadly into prevention, intervention, and suppression approaches (Spergel, 1995, pp. 171–296; Klein and Maxson, 2006, pp. 246–63). In this chapter, ‘treatment’ is substituted for ‘intervention’, which is used here in its wider sense as any measure designed to control or reduce the presence of youth gangs. Prevention efforts aim at reducing the risk that vulnerable youths will join gangs and increasing the general youth population’s resistance to gang membership. Treatment emphasizes changing the attitudes and behaviour of youths already affiliated with gangs and the social conditions and processes that support youth gang organization. Youth gang suppression involves activities used to punish, pressure, or divert gangs and their members in order to reduce their anti-social behaviour. Some initiatives may combine two or more of these types of approaches in a broader strategy. =Wd] _dj[hl[dj_ed

A hallmark of the public health approach that has influenced the study of youth gangs is a preference for scien-

fhefeiWbi Wh[ tific evidence in the design, implementation, and evaluation of interventions. ‘Evidence’ here includes not only the ^_]^bo feb_j_Y_p[Z$ existing research base but also monitoring of violence trends (health surveillance), locations of violent incidents,

weapons use, and evaluations of relevant laws, among other data sources. Nevertheless, in many contexts youth gang intervention proposals—such as the issue of civilian access to firearms—are highly politicized and other factors often override the evidence base. Attention to the relationships between individuals and community environments, the interplay of foreground and background factors, and the ecological model are also distinctive features of current approaches informed by the public health model (Valdez and Kaplan, 2007; WHO, 1996). The ecological model places importance on the social environment, the modification of group behaviour, and individual change (Klein and Maxson, 2006, pp. 209–27).

IeY_Wb" feb_j_YWb" WdZ YkbjkhWb Z_c[di_edi While there are broad commonalities between youth gangs, they can also diverge in their organization, reach, goals, intensity of the violence employed, economic activity, and hierarchy (OVERVIEW). Ideally, these differences should influence intervention planning. For example, Salvadoran youth gangs have developed their characteristic use of violence due to the specific socio-political background of civil war and circular migration. The civil war provided young Salvadoran gang members the experience of widespread violent conflict, combat at close quarters, and familiarity with a variety of weapons of war. Settling in disadvantaged Latino neighbourhoods in the United States, they found role models for acculturation into society in the existing Mexican-American gangs (Menijivar, 2000, p. 148). But the socio-political factors that shaped their experience were different from those of their Mexican-American counterparts, though they resided in the same neighbourhoods. Traditional Mexican-American barrio (neighbourhood)

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youth gangs, in existence for generations, have developed distinctive characteristics that are now deeply rooted in their communities (Klein and Maxson, 2006, pp. 176–77).1 Culture as well as community play a critical role in the lives of gang members. Some aspects of gang culture are now global. US-derived ‘gangsta rap’ culture has become a reference in many regions, fitting well with the identity that the gang offers youths (Hagedorn, 2008, pp. 85–91). Local cultures often interact with the globalized gangsta culture to create a complex system of meanings, with each society generating specific gang cultures and intervention ‘styles’. Far East Asian gangs and interventions typically ritualize conformity to strict norms and values. US gangs and interventions reflect the individualism of the wider society, while European ones appear influenced by the welfare state (Klein and Maxson, 2006, p. 256; Carlsson and Decker, 2005, pp. 262–63). Gender dynamics can also play an important role. Youth gangs are predominantly male and interventions are likely to assume a male target group (GIRLS). Yet research has indicated that gang-affiliated girls have specific risk factors that are distinct from those of their male counterparts (Klein and Maxson, 2006, pp. 150–52). Female-specific risk factors include risk-seeking behaviours, lower school commitment, fewer prosocial peers, lower involvement in community sports activities, and less attachment to teachers (Esbensen and Deschenes, 1998; Maxson and Whitlock, 7 \ehc_ZWXb[ 2002). Girls who join gangs have been documented to have more severe family problems than their male delinquent Y^Wbb[d][ _d counterparts, including a higher prevalence of child abuse and neglect (Miller, 2006, p. 57). Approaches to youth Z[i_]d_d] gangs that assume risk factors are the same for boys and girls may therefore miss a significant proportion of the at-risk _dj[hl[dj_edi _i population. A major, often overlooked problem for girls living in communities with gangs is non-gang girls’ informal Z[l[bef_d] W association with male gang members that place them at high risk for behaviours such as violence, sexual risks, and Z[\_d_j_ed \eh drug use (Valdez, 2007, pp. 109–33).

J^[ oekj^ ]hekf Yedj_dkkc One of the most formidable challenges in designing interventions for youth gangs is the development of an appropriate definition of such groups. Youth is a stage in the life course of human development characterized by profound physical and psychosocial changes occurring from early adolescence to young adulthood (Elder, 1998, pp. 954–56; Rindfuss, Swicegood, and Rosenfeld, 1987). An awareness of this is needed when designing interventions for youth gangs, as are sufficiently nuanced definitions of the target groups. This chapter applies the Eurogang definition of youth street gangs as being durable over time, street-oriented, composed of youths, engaged in and oriented towards illegal or criminal behaviour, and with an identity based on street codes and illegal acts (Klein and Maxson, 2006; see Box 9.1). This definition encompasses not only violent drug gangs but also criminal youth gangs that are oriented towards protection rackets/extortion, human trafficking, or other illicit activities. Analytically, youth gangs lie on a continuum of youth groups (see Figure 9.1). On one end are normal youths who, because of the physical and psychosocial stress of adolescent development, may engage in sporadic deviant behaviour, but who are for the most part well integrated in the institutions of society (family, school, community).2 Troublesome youths have become alienated to a noticeable degree from these institutions and have developed a pattern of deviant behaviour. They tend to be loosely organized in cliques much like normal youths, do not engage in serious criminal activity, and are rarely armed (Weerman and Decker, 2005, pp. 288–91). While delinquent youths are also loosely organized, their criminal activity and possession of arms is more common than among troublesome youths. Delinquent youths are likely to come to the attention of juvenile justice authorities and comprise a significant

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sub-group at risk for joining the gang population (Thornberry et al., 2003). At the other end of the continuum are various types of street and drug gangs that are highly organized, engage in high levels of crime, and are collectively armed (Klein and Maxson, 2006, pp. 167–88). While interventions for gang youths may resemble those targeting troublesome or delinquent youths, their design and implementation can be very different. For example, structural variations in the hierarchy of leaders, core members, periphery members, and ‘wannabees’

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social resources (Venkatesh, 1997; Venkatesh and Levitt, 2000). In contrast, delinquents and troublesome youths may simply ‘drift’ into anti-social behaviour through a relative weakening of informal social control (Matza, 1990). The flexible form of many gangs complicates the development of simple interventions. Observing the emergence of Turkish street gangs in Berlin, Spergel likens the process of gang formation to a street variation on Newtonian physics. The group process of these gangs was closely related to the protection of Turkish youths from neo-Nazi youth gangs. For every neo-Nazi gang attack, a Turkish street gang would respond in kind (Spergel, 1995, p. 5). This cycle can lead to the youth gang, or similar groups, becoming institutionalized to fill vacuums in public safety and other social services (PRO-GOVERNMENT). In South Africa, after the fall of apartheid in 1994, gangs became an integral part of broader social processes and Ckbj_#Yecfed[dj" were often a source of both social predation and social protection in the same community (Marais, 2001). The youth bed]#j[hc ijhWj[]_[i gang is protean in ‘its ability to shift gears, to grow up from a wild peer group into an illicit business, working for Wh[ ceij b_a[bo je political spoils or acting as thugs for ruling powers’ (Hagedorn, 2008, p. 33). Interventions need to be constantly WY^_[l[ ikijW_d[Z adjusted to reflect changes that inevitably occur in target populations.

7d [nf[di_l[ h[Y_f[0 bed]#j[hc" ckbj_#Yecfed[dj" _dj[]hWj[Z WffheWY^[i Much of the modern gang research relevant for intervention planning grows out of the work of the Chicago School.3 This school saw youth gangs as an effect of the ‘social disorganization’ that occurs as cities experience rapid urbanization and growth. The response of the Chicago School to the extensive urbanization of Chicago at the beginning of the 20th century, including sweeping change to its social structures, is applicable to many countries around the world in the 21st century. According to the model, gangs form spontaneously out of child play and street corner interaction in circumstances of social disorganization (Bursik and Grasmick, 2006, pp. 5–6) and as a result of the inability of primary and secondary institutions to exert social control in urban conditions. The Chicago School posited that, because of community disorganization and the complex interaction between child development and psychosocial conflict, there can be no single strategy or ‘silver bullet’ for gang-related problems. Instead, strategies should apply multiple interventions combined in creative, coherent, and meaningful ways to reach well-defined outcomes—for example, violence reduction, delinquency reduction, job placement, community mobilization, and sports involvement. These outcomes do not entail the complete dissolution of a gang, but involve redirecting and reframing group processes for positive impacts in the community. The literature and policy history bear out that those multi-component, long-term strategies are most likely to achieve sustained impacts (Klein and Maxson, 2006, p. 263). The costs of sustained, multi-component strategies can be considerable, however. For example, Los Angeles is investing USD 20 million per year for at least four years in its comprehensive gang intervention programme with an additional USD 900,000 per year for an independent evaluation (Klein, 2009, p. 720; see Box 9.4). This will be out of reach for many cities. Partly for this reason—and for political reasons or because of conventional wisdom—shortterm interventions tend to be more common. Available research suggests that incarcerating youth gang members to reduce gang-related crime continues to be popular around the world. These policies often proceed without any evidence of positive sustained impact—or even in the face of negative consequences. In some contexts, the removal of gang members from the streets can act as a drain on a community’s human resources; it may also strengthen street–prison linkages. Gangs institutionalized in prison have emerged as new and potent political forces in Africa and Latin America (Amorim, 1993; Arana, 2005; Steinberg, 2004; PRISON).

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An important aspect of gang policy development is the need for scientific evaluation. Evaluations provide a scientific basis for describing the process of implementation of a programme, its fidelity to the programme protocol, as well as an assessment of its outcomes and wider impacts on the society. Evaluations routinely measure a wide range of outcomes and impacts—including self-reported and collaterally observed behavioural change, perceptions of safety in the community, levels of violence, crime rates, and employment levels of at-risk youth—but are ideally tied directly to the programme objectives and assumptions. Without scientific evaluations of specific programmes, there is no way of judging their benefits (or any unintended harm they may be doing) and conventional wisdom remains the guide. The costs involved can be prohibitive, however, and some gang researchers remain sceptical about the utility of evaluations. Thorough evaluations are still the exception rather than the rule. In the long term, the lack of science-based evaluations of gang policy will hinder the development of a more J^[ fh[l[dj_ed e\ nuanced understanding of both the process and the impact of the many well-intentioned interventions launched ]Wd] _dlebl[c[dj every year. Yet there is evidence that this may be changing. In the United States, funding for new intervention prockij X[ fbWY[Z grammes is typically contingent on the inclusion of an evaluation component that provides objective indicators of _d j^[ Yedj[nj e\ programme outcomes and wider impacts (OJJDP, 2008a, pp. 6–8). An important challenge for the future is to integrate oekj^ jhekXb[i$

culturally relevant evaluative components into all youth gang policy and programming interventions.

=7D= FH;L;DJ?ED IJH7J;=?;I The process by which a young person becomes a gang member is a gradual one. Youths typically hang out with gang members for up to one year before making a commitment to join (Miller, 2006, p. 43). Prevention strategies recognize the importance of this acclimation period, targeting both the general population of youths and at-risk (delinquent) youths at this stage. Approaches applicable to the general population involve information dissemination, education, and skills training to build resistance to cultural and peer-group pressure to join a gang. Programmes specifically targeting at-risk youths often involve the provision of educational and other alternatives to joining a street gang. Most gang members were already involved in delinquent activities prior to joining; the prevention of gang involvement therefore needs to be placed in the broader context of youth troubles (Battin et al., 1998; Esbensen, 2000; Thornberry et al., 2003). Gang prevention is driven by the theory that it is more cost-effective and less difficult to prevent youths from joining a gang than it is to try to extricate them from gang structures later. Numerous scientific, political, and religious–spiritual theories have guided and supported the design and implementation of prevention strategies. They can be divided into youth-oriented and environment-oriented efforts, although projected outcomes often include both individual and environmental changes.

Oekj^#eh_[dj[Z fh[l[dj_ed Youth-oriented prevention strategies target individual youths and typically build on risk and resiliency theory (Hawkins, Catalano, and Arthur, 2002; Hazen et al., 2008, pp. 229–30). Specific combinations and interactions of risk and resilience factors are believed to influence the likelihood that an individual will join a gang. Risk factors, defined as ‘individual or environmental hazards that increase an individual’s vulnerability to negative developmental outcomes’ (Small and Luster, 1994, p. 182; Wyrick and Howell, 2004), can be contrasted with protective factors that

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decrease the likelihood that the individual will opt for gang membership, notwithstanding the presence of one or more risk factors (Klein and Maxson, 2006, pp. 154–56). Multiple risk and protective factors appear to be involved in the developmental process associated with youth involvement with gangs (Wyrick and Howell, 2004, pp. 22–25). The likelihood of gang membership increases in proportion to the accumulation of risk factors as it does with other problem behaviours (Hill et al., 1999). Analytically, these risk factors encompass individual characteristics, family structures and processes, peer group influences, school commitments and performance, and the wider community context (Howell, 1998). Assessing such risk factors helps identify the youths who would benefit from a particular intervention (Klein and Maxson, 2006). The European experience suggests that community protective factors can hamper the long-term sustainability of street gangs (Weerman and Decker, 2005, pp. 290–92; Klein and Maxson, 2006, pp. 47–48). These factors include the relatively recent emergence of gangs (compared to the United States), a significant social safety net, and low levels of civilian access to firearms.4 Strong family involvement and open family communication may also contribute to resistance to gang membership (Li et al., 2002). In fact, consistent family discipline inhibits gang membership even when parental monitoring is low (Klein and Maxson, 1987). An understanding of risk and protective factors remains incomplete, however, without knowledge of how these factors interact. Future research on the family dynamics of highrisk youths should provide further insight into why youths join gangs or not; additional analysis of the community

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context and the processes that prevent gangs from growing and having access to firearms can enhance efforts to reduce the propensity of individual gang members to use firearms. Table 9.1 summarizes risk and protective factors that appear especially relevant for youth-oriented prevention strategies that focus on gangs. The risk factors far outnumber the protective factors, reflecting current research; our understanding of protective factors is less well developed. Youth-oriented prevention programmes can encompass classroom instruction, summer programmes, after-school programmes, parenting classes, substance abuse treatment, and youth mentoring. Schools have become a fertile ground for gang prevention in many places in the world. In the United States, the average middle school (covering roughly ages 11–14) has 14 different drug, violence, and other social problem programmes (Esbensen, 2000, p. 7). The national Gang Resistance Education and Training (GREAT) programme exposes US middle-school students to an integrated curriculum delivered by specially trained police officers (Esbensen, 2006, p. 369). Modelled on the Drug Abuse Resistance Education (DARE) programme, also implemented in US schools, GREAT is primarily a nine-week course incorporated into the general school curriculum. It introduces students to conflict resolution skills, cultural sensitivity, and the negative consequences of gang involvement. Individual school counselling is also provided to students. The course thus seeks to address individual, peer, and community (culture) risk factors. A comprehensive five-year (1995–99) longitudinal evaluation of the initial phase of the programme looked at several specific indicators of implementation; the study placed emphasis on parent, teacher, and law enforcement officer satisfaction and perceptions of programme effectiveness as well as measurable changes in youth attitudes and

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behaviour. After four years of programme exposure, researchers found that participating youths reported lower rates of delinquency and gang affiliation, more positive attitudes towards police, more negative attitudes about gangs, higher levels of perceived guilt at committing deviant acts, and more communication with parents about their activities (Esbensen and Osgood, 1999). These outcomes did not last, however. In follow-up surveys one and two years after completing the curriculum, there were no significant statistical differences in attitudes and behaviours between the GREAT experimental group and the student control group.5 This discouraging result for school-based prevention had been foreshadowed in earlier reviews (Sherman et al., 1997, ch. 10). While the self-reported components of the GREAT study showed mixed results, there was no evidence that the programme had led to actual decreases in gang affiliation or delinquency (Sherman et al., 1997, ch. 10). The widespread commitment in the United States to school-based prevention is such that state officials and advocates responded to these disappointing results by expanding and redesigning the programme. The traditional (lecture-based) eight-lesson curriculum was replaced with 13 interactive facilitation-style lessons specifically designed for 10–13-year-olds. Six facilitator-guided family–child relationship-building sessions were included to add a protective factor in the family domain. An elementary school component was also added, then expanded. By 2005, 3.9 million children had gone through GREAT (BJA, 2006, p. 2). A preliminary pre-test/post-test evaluation showed positive results in a number of areas—including lower self-reported gang membership—but the programme’s long-term effects remain unclear.6 KI e\\_Y_Wbi

Community-based gang prevention curricula have also been widely implemented in the United States. These

h[ifedZ[Z je curricula, typically designed to be culturally relevant, target individual risk factors such as street toughness, a fatalZ_iWffe_dj_d] h[ikbji istic view of the world, and locura (crazy, wild behaviour) through the presentation of culturally inspired, prosocial Xo h[Z[i_]d_d] alternatives. A good example is the El Joven Noble (The Noble Young Man) Male Responsibility Project delivered to j^[ iY^eeb#XWi[Z high-risk youths in East Los Angeles by the National Latino Fatherhood and Family Institute. The programme aims at fhe]hWcc[$

enhancing the capability of Hispanic males to act in a responsible and respectful way in all their relationships and to confront behaviours that are leading them to gang violence. The programme, like many others, does not necessarily have the primary goal of reducing gang violence; rather, it targets related behaviours such as high-risk sexual behaviour that affects reproductive health (teenage pregnancy) and HIV infection. The strategy involves the mobilization of an adult male compadre to provide a positive role model, extended kinship support, and positive youth development ‘rites of passage’. The rationale is that changing the underlying adolescent, culturally specific causes of high-risk sexual behaviour and substance abuse will also affect gang-related activities. Evaluations have shown significant reductions in sexual activity in general and sexual activity under the influence of drugs or alcohol in post-tests using the El Joven Noble curriculum (Lopez et al., 2006). This suggests that youth-oriented gang prevention strategies can successfully target problem behaviours that are antecedents and correlates of gang membership in at-risk groups.

;dl_hedc[dj#eh_[dj[Z fh[l[dj_ed Environment-oriented prevention approaches typically seek to change gang structure and processes by influencing key social (environmental) factors such as the gang itself, peer groups, families, churches, schools, youth groups, and neighbourhood resident organizations. This approach derives from the Chicago Area Project (see below); founded in 1934, the Project emphasizes community mobilization and organization as the primary means of preventing gang problems (Shaw and McKay, 1942; Sorrentino and Whittaker, 1994).

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nity conditions that often precede a transition from normal adolescent groups to established youth gangs and around which many environment-oriented strategies are structured (Moore, 1978; 1998, p. 67):

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of conventional adult supervision and

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informal social control;

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s adolescents have a large amount of free time that is not taken up with prosocial roles; s gang members have limited access to

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a high concentration of at-risk youths and, at the same time, to provide a positive structured and adult-supervised activity. ‘Strengthening of family’ programmes seek to teach parents of at-risk youths skills that

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improve family interaction and increase

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parental capacity for supervision and infor-

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mal social control. Multisystemic Therapy

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has been proposed as a promising parenting

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skills programme and has been applied, both in the United States and in Norway, to the parents of gang members; meanwhile, fathers’ groups have emerged in Denmark

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to increase the capacity of informal social

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control in immigrant families with at-risk

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children (Howell, 1998; Carlsson and Decker, 2005, pp. 275–77).

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Environment-oriented strategies typically focus on security promotion and preventing gang influences from entering or taking root in the school, as exemplified in South Africa (see Box 9.2). The Safe Schools/Healthy Students Initiative funded by the US Department of Education follows a similar line, linking public health and safety issues together to promote environments where children can learn and grow without the disturbances of gang violence and substance abuse. As part of the initiative, school districts develop strategic plans to help schools resist gangs. These plans usually involve multiple components. Substance abuse prevention is a critical part of the planning since the level of violence in gangs is associated with the level of individual drug use and selling (Howell and Decker, 1999; Martinez, 1992; Valdez, Kaplan, and Cepeda, 2006). Prior substance abuse is an individual risk factor for joining a gang and drug dealing is often one of the primary ways gangs get a foothold in schools. Training in life skills, expanding the screening and diagnosis of students for mental health problems, and increasing treatment resources to students are common components of these programmes. Multi-disciplinary teams of professionals are deployed in the school to support students, teachers, and parents. The need for prevention strategies that change the environment of schools is highlighted by the problem of school drop-outs. Dropping out of school may stem from the student’s lack of commitment, but its deeper cause often lies in the conflicts that vulnerable students experience in a traumatized school environment. Students who are weakly affiliated with youth gangs may be exposed to extreme internal (psychological) conflict arising from the differences between the norms of the school and those of the street. =Wd] c[cX[hi^_f

The resulting ‘normlessness’ of the individual has been documented as a significant risk factor both for joining

YWd fhel_Z[ W gangs and for decreased school safety. A student who drops out as a result of this type of internal conflict is likely i[di[ e\ fhej[Yj_ed to have excessive time during the day in unsupervised environments that encourage gang membership (Fagan, 1990, WdZ _Z[dj_jo$

pp. 188–89, 212–13).

=7D= JH;7JC;DJ IJH7J;=?;I Treatment strategies, directed at active gang members, aim to change their behaviour and divert them from crime to alternatives such as after-school programmes, sports, and job training. They also aim to influence gang processes, including patterns of interaction and leadership. Like prevention strategies, treatment can be youth- or environmentoriented.

Oekj^#eh_[dj[Z jh[Wjc[dj Youth-oriented strategies tend to recruit individual gang members into specially designed counselling or individual, group, or family therapy programmes. Youth gang membership is thought to derive from a rational choice among available opportunities in a specific community that is often reinforced by emotional (longing for prestige and status) and deep-seated individual traits (Baccaglini, 1993; Pennell et al., 1994; Sanchez-Jankowski, 1991). One of the reasons to choose gang membership is that it will provide a sense of protection and identity.7 At the same time, emotional reinforcement for joining a gang often resides in anger and unresolved aggression. The attractiveness of the acquisition, possession, and use of firearms and other weapons can be one expression of these feelings (Lizotte et al., 2000; Stretesky and Pogrebin, 2007).

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Treatment interventions deliver therapeutic rehabilitative services to gang-affiliated individuals, families, and communities, such as psychotherapy, job training, recreational services, and arts and culture, along with re-entry, relocation, and transition services. Individual and family therapy interventions attempt to mould individual gang member personality and character traits and relieve emotional and cognitive distress. Many of these therapies are provided in specialized criminal justice institutions following screening for the degree of gang affiliation as well as the psychosocial need for services. This type of screening has also been introduced in community settings as an integral part of a comprehensive gang intervention strategy (Casey, 2009; Hoag, 2009; Los Angeles News, 2009). Treatment strategies can include medication and behavioural therapies to tackle underlying psychological problems such as depression, anxiety, and post-traumatic stress disorder. Family therapeutic approaches attempt to change the perception parents have of children and improve family communication (see Box 9.3). Many such programmes provide educational support to re-establish connection to schools, emergency housing (since many gang members have periods of residential instability), spiritual and moral guidance by clergy and ex-gang members, and employment and leadership skills training. Recreational opportunities are also included, as well as re-entry services for leaving gang and prison. Tattoo removal has also become an important component, since tattoos are physical signs of gang bonds (Valentine, 2000, pp. viiâ&#x20AC;&#x201C;viii, 20, 26, 112).

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;dl_hedc[dj#eh_[dj[Z jh[Wjc[dj Environment-oriented treatment strategies identify specific gangs in a given neighbourhood and employ ‘detached workers’ who develop gang member contacts. Simultaneously, community residents and organizations are mobilized. Detached street work was a hallmark of the Chicago Area Project and involved problem-oriented group or community work that was tailored to the social structure of the community (Decker and Van Winkle, 2006, p. 17; Klein, 1971). Detached street gang workers create bridges for gang members to schools, youth clubs, and jobs. They were the pivotal element in the comprehensive integrated community approach that came to be called the ‘Spergel Model’ after its University of Chicago developer (Spergel, 1995). Significantly, the model broadened the perspective on youth gangs, considering social disorganization as only one element of an underlying set of forces in the community (Spergel, 2007, pp. 27–29). The model was based on a set of five interrelated strategies: community mobilization; social intervention; provision of social opportunities; suppression or socialized control; and organizational change and development (Spergel and Curry, 1993). Variations of the model have been actively promoted by the US Department of Justice’s Office for Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention and widely implemented in cities such as Miami, with extensive immigrant Haitian drug youth gangs, and Los Angeles, with third-generation Mexican-American street youth gangs (OJJDP, 2008b). In parallel with the Spergel Model, European strategies developed largely in Scandinavia emphasized not the comprehensiveness of services, but rather the coordination of existing welfare state institutions responsible for services (Carlsson and Decker, 2005, p 265). For example, the Social Services, School, and Police Model of gang intervention in Denmark and Norway delivers many services similar to those of the Spergel Model, but from within the existing welfare state institutional system (Carlsson and Decker, 2005). A Spergel Model initiative has also been utilized in Guatemala, among other places.8

=7D= IKFFH;II?ED IJH7J;=?;I Gang suppression strategies use the police, courts, and prisons to identify, isolate, divert, and punish gang members engaging 7 Xen_d] jhW_d[h j[WY^[i W fkf_b Wj A[[boÊi 8en_d] =oc Wi fWhj e\ W fhe]hWcc[ je a[[f Y^_bZh[d ekj e\ ]Wd]i" 7k]kij (&&*$ CWhl_d @ei[f^%J^[ MWi^_d]jed Feij%=[jjo ?cW][i

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in overt criminal behaviour. Vigilante armed groups, with varying degrees of state authorization, have also sought to suppress or control gangs (Oruwari and Owei, 2006; PRO-GOVERNMENT). A survey of 58 well-known gang programmes in the United States has shown that gang suppression represents 39 per cent of the total, followed by gang prevention (34 per cent), and gang intervention or treatment (27 per cent) (Klein and Maxson, 2006, pp. 254–55). A similar distribution has been observed in Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, where the police, schools, and social services provide the institutional base for gang control (Carlsson and Decker, 2005, pp. 279–82). Other institutions and organizations—such as churches, charities, and schools—also cooperate with the police in gang suppression. For example, in Cambodia, a consortium of ten gender-focused non-governmental organizations initiated a survey of youths that included questions on gang attitudes and involvement (GDC, 2003). The consortium launched the initiative because their gender-oriented intervention programmes were being compromised by Cambodian street drug gangs with links to the prostitution of young girls. The report, Paupers and Princelings, helped to document the attitudes and behaviours towards gangs among Cambodia’s general youth population and provided an invaluable information resource for gang suppression as well as other strategies. As the title of the report indicates, gang members were drawn from both the highest and the lowest strata of society, providing novel problems for gang suppression. Youth ‘princeling’ gang members received protection for their activities because of their high social status and gang suppression involved this added complication (GDC, 2003). Gang suppression strategies can be classified as coercive or alternative, though many programmes incorporate elements of both. Coercive strategies emphasize arrest, punishment, and incarceration to isolate and reduce gangs and gang members in the community. The conceptual foundation for this approach is deterrence theory, with its principles of the swiftness, severity, and certainty of punishment (Edmund and Thomas, 1996). Alternative youth gang suppression strategies include community policing, as well as peacemaking negotiations and voluntary disarmament. The theoretical base of these strategies can be traced to the gang transformation concepts that advocate close collaboration with the police and the detached social worker (Klein and Maxson, 2006, pp. 91–92).

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9e[hY_l[ ]Wd] ikffh[ii_ed ijhWj[]_[i Coercive gang suppression strategies include a wide range of activities organized not only by the police and the criminal justice systems, but also by spontaneous, informal armed community members. Coercive gang suppression strategies intensify conventional coercive police tactics. They are often accompanied by government media campaigns highlighting the negative social impacts of gangs. A good example of coercive gang suppression is the series of Mano Dura (Hard Hand) campaigns initiated by successive presidents of El Salvador in response to escalating ‘immigrant gang’ violence (Holland, 2009). A major campaign launched in July 2003 led to 8,000 arrests, but most suspects were released because of lack of evidence. Despite prosecution difficulties, the next Salvadoran president continued with this policy. The police were given broad new arrest powers under Plan Super Mano Dura (Operation Super Hard Hand). The incarceration of 70 gang leaders was deemed a success despite the unintended long-term consequence of strengthening prison gangs in the country (Borden, 2005; PRISON). In many large US cities the police have special units of varying size and degree of specialization to implement coercive gang suppression strategies. For instance, Los Angeles has had a highly specialized police gang unit since 1977. The Los Angeles gang suppression strategy combines street surveillance with investigation and follow-through arrests (Klein, 1995). Periodically, as in many cities throughout the world, the Los Angeles gang unit carries out elaborate campaigns, such as Operation Hammer, in which large numbers of police sweep an area and make numerous arrests for even minor offences (Klein and Maxson, 2006, p. 94). J^[ feb_Y[ m[h[ ]_l[d

Sometimes these tactics are supplemented by civil gang injunctions and legal instruments that prohibit the asso-

XheWZ d[m Whh[ij ciation and congregation of gang members in a given community (Allan, 2004). The injunction provides legal fem[hi kdZ[h FbWd grounds for police to detain and arrest suspected gang members not known to have committed any crime. Injunctions Ikf[h CWde :khW$

include curfews, a ban on mobile phones, and the use of other measures to control gang suspects in a targeted neighbourhood. These efforts have proven modestly effective in the short term, but not in the longer term. It has been argued that coupling civil gang injunction with efforts to improve neighbourhood social organization and provide positive alternatives for gang members may lead to longer-term effectiveness (Maxson, Hennigan, and Sloane, 2005). Indeed, a growing consensus among advocates of coercive gang suppression is that, in order to be effective, programmes need to integrate some broader community-level participation (Howell, 2000, pp. 45–46, 53–55; Spergel, 2007, pp. 113–31). The Boston Gun Project is one gang suppression programme to do so (Braga, Kennedy, and Tita, 2006, pp. 338–40). The project began in 1995 and quickly transformed into Operation Ceasefire. A working group of police, youth workers, and researchers first analysed the nature of youth homicides in Boston as a prelude to a joint undertaking. Their gang suppression strategy began with a message to gangs that gun violence would no longer be tolerated. At formal meetings gang members were told that any violence would meet with a swift, severe, and certain response from the police. Simultaneously, youth workers and parole and probation officers offered services to the gang members, with churches and community-based organizations subsequently contributing to this effort. The formal evaluation of the Boston Gun Project found the programme was associated with a 63 per cent decrease in the number of youth homicides, a 32 per cent decrease in monthly ‘shots-fired’ calls, and a monthly 25 per cent decrease in the number of youth gun assaults. These trends were only conclusively observed in Boston, not elsewhere in the United States where similar gun violence prevention projects were implemented. In the context of other gang suppression efforts, these are among the most significant successes documented. For this reason, the programme has been widely emulated and adapted. Nevertheless, none of these other programmes has been fully

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evaluated, nor, apparently, has any achieved the level of success witnessed in Boston (Braga, Kennedy, and Tita, 2006, pp. 338–40).

7bj[hdWj_l[ ]Wd] ikffh[ii_ed ijhWj[]_[i The positive outcomes of some suppression strategies that have integrated community-based participation have stimulated further interest in alternative techniques. These include community policing strategies that are multidimensional, pragmatic, and encourage citizen participation. Community policing emphasizes intensive analysis of gang activity to create innovative control strategies (Goldstein, 1990). Gang suppression then involves not only the criminal justice system, but also other governmental and non-governmental organizations and community residents. ?d Wbj[hdWj_l[ Typically, community gatekeepers provide outreach and community-based organizations provide treatment to indi- ijhWj[]_[i" ]Wd] vidual gang members. Simultaneously, the threat of arrest and incarceration is selectively applied to gang leaders feb_Y[ kd_ji Wh[ and to especially violent cliques in a targeted gang. In many ways, these alternative strategies resemble Operation je ^[bf Xh_d] f[WY[ Ceasefire-style programmes, although they are not based on deterrence, but rather on gang transformation through je jhekXb[Z the mobilization of change agents, peacemaking, mediation, and negotiation (ECUADOR). In these alternative strategies, gang police units are mandated not only to enforce the law, but also to help bring peace to troubled neighbourhoods. Such units include peacekeeping ‘mediator’ teams, which are composed of exgang members, social workers, street workers, and gang unit police. An example of this strategy is the Aasha Gang Conflict Mediation Project in London, part of an innovative community policing initiative, London Against Gun and Knife Crime. The Aasha project works to reduce violence associated with gangs through partnerships with schools, police, and community-based organizations. The project aims to ‘de-glamorize the gang culture and prevent gang conflict by using an extensive community network’ in which the police play a key role (LAGKC, n.d.). Similarly, in Scandinavia, the ‘Night Owls’—civilian night-time security patrols—work closely with the police, projecting a form of community control in neighbourhoods with a significant gang presence. Night Owl interventions in Norway have had demonstrable success in moving neo-Nazi youth gangs out of a neighbourhood in an Oslo suburb and controlling immigrant youths using parent patrols in Kristiansand (Carlsson and Decker, 2005, pp. 273–74). The court system is another source of alternative or innovative gang suppression strategies. Vertical prosecution has become widespread among district (state) attorneys in the United States to manage gang cases (Reiner, 1992). Prosecutors with special expertise in gangs take cases forward from start to finish, through all hearings, trials, and sentencing steps, in contrast with normal practice, where this process can involve multiple prosecutors. This strategy allows for continuity and the retention of detailed information useful in current and future gang-related cases. The prosecutor gets to know the accused, the community context, and the witnesses in a much deeper way than if gang cases were managed using a standard prosecution rotation (Carlie, 2002, ch. 15). Another innovation in gang prosecution is alternative sentencing. Taking cues from guidelines implemented in the so-called ‘drug courts’ for youth drug offences, alternative sentencing allows the district attorney to argue for education, job training, or a specialized therapeutic clinic instead of a prison sentence. The National Youth Offender Demonstration Project, a collaboration between the US Departments of Labour and Justice, has supported a large-scale alternative sentencing intervention. This programme includes job training and placement for gang members who are not receiving alternative sentencing and who have already been incarcerated (Miller and MacGillivray, 2002).

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9ED9BKI?ED This chapter has surveyed youth gang interventions from a variety of settings. While much of the research base comes from the United States, knowledge from other contexts is growing. Still, there are large gaps in our understanding of the factors that contribute to youths joining gangs and the likely pressure points for prevention. Although gangs are a global phenomenon and in many cases appear to be influenced by a US-style gang (‘gangsta’) culture, they are ultimately context-specific, a fact that gang interventions need to reflect. According to the available evidence, suppressive approaches, including incarceration and police actions, remain the dominant means of dealing with gangs. Mass arrests may temporarily lower violence, but they generally fail to address the underlying motivations for gangs and gang membership. They may also generate unintended consequences, such as sparking new competition from ambitious gang members for control, or firming up links between street gangs and prison gangs. Suppressive tactics often provide only short-term solutions. More promising are efforts that have combined classical law enforcement approaches with community outreach, social services, and other treatment and prevention components. These programmes have demonstrated that the threat of suppression can be as effective—and longer-lasting—than its actual application, if accompanied by the offer of help. Such hybrid strategies deserve to be tested in other settings, with careful consideration of the cultural and social differences that may require some degree of programme adjustment. While gang intervention strategies are increasingly evidence-based, it appears that factors other than evidence often determine which programmes are implemented. Rising gang violence may spark a highly politicized and emotional debate that touches on other broader, sensitive issues that influence policy-making, such as immigration, gun control, or civil liberties. Yet in many contexts basic economic factors are the ultimate determinant of the kinds of programmes implemented. Long-term programmes—especially those that are institutionalized and state-run—are costly and out of reach for many communities. The same can be said for the evaluation of interventions. Though it is a core component of evidence-based programming, evaluation can add considerably to overall programme cost. Furthermore, preferences for certain types of interventions—school-based curricula in the United States, Mano Dura in Central America—appear to be culturally entrenched, regardless of the evidence. Yet evaluations only make sense if they influence gang intervention programming. Ultimately, states and communities need to understand that the gang phenomenon is the product of a wide range of individual, family, and societal risk and protective factors. The available evidence suggests that the most effective gang interventions touch many bases in a coordinated way, drawing upon both state and community resources. It also appears that long-term success requires long-term commitment. There are no short-cut solutions to the world’s gang problems.

B?IJ E< 788H;L?7J?EDI BSFT

Brief Strategic Family Therapy

DARE

Drug Abuse Resistance Education

GREAT

Gang Resistance Education and Training

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Beginning in 1993, coercive gang suppression interventions resulted in large-scale deportations from the United States, leading to a profusion

What constitutes ‘normal’ is contextual, socially constructed, and somewhat flexible but can usually be determined with some degree of

The Chicago School was a group of social scientists and social workers who were associated with the University of Chicago in the 1920s (Bursik,

of gangs with distinctive US features in El Salvador (DeCesare, 1998, p. 23). specificity for a given society. 2003; Park, 1967; Smith, 1988; Thomas, 1983). Its influence is still strong in social science throughout the world. The Chicago School developed a unique mixture of methods emphasizing ecological research for social problem solving. Its seminal studies of gangs and juvenile delinquency still have theoretical and practical relevance in innovations such as the notion of social disorganization and approaches emphasizing outreach by street gang social workers (Shaw and McKay, 1942; Thrasher, 1963). 4

The European approach to the suppression of firearms includes normative constraints, vigorous governmental efforts such as European-wide gun ‘tracking and tracing’ databases (e.g. IBIS), and coordinated voluntary, administrative, and legal removal activities (Klein et al., 2001, pp. 3–4, 11; Weitekamp, 2001, p. 314; IOOV, 2008, pp. 25, 31).

The DARE programme, on which GREAT drew, was not proven to be effective in national follow-up evaluation either; nevertheless, it continues to be implemented with modifications and enhancements. This is yet another illustration of how well-meaning interventions are often sustained even if the scientific data is negative or mixed. Carlsson and Decker (2005, p. 280) observe that it is often more difficult to dismantle stateadministered gang interventions in Denmark, Norway, and Sweden because of political reasons than it is to start new ones; this argument may also apply to government-funded programmes administered by universities and non-governmental organizations in the United States.

For a preliminary evaluation, see Esbensen (2008).

Decker and Van Winkle (1996); Hagedorn (1988); Moore (1978); Vigil (1988).

In 2001, Creative Associates International, Inc. (CAII) obtained a cooperative agreement contract to implement a civil society programme in Guatemala; funded by the US Agency for International Development, the programme was designed to tackle accelerating gang growth and related advserse effects. Creative Associates International partnered with the Alliance for Crime Prevention (Asociación para la Prevención del Delito, APREDE), a Guatemalan non-governmental organization that has sought to prevent crime and violence associated with vulnerable youths in Guatemalan neighbourhoods. Implemented by the Alliance, the project involves an environment-oriented treatment strategy. More information is available in CAII (n.d.).

8?8B?E=H7F>O Allan, Edward L. 2004. Civil Gang Abatement: The Effectiveness and Implications of Policing by Injunction. New York: LFB Scholarly Publishers. Amorim, Carlos. 1993. Comando vermelho: a historia secreta do crime organizado. Rio de Janeiro: Editora Record. Arana, A. 2005. ‘How the Street Gangs Took Central America.’ Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 3, pp. 98–110. Baccaglini, W. F. 1993. Project Youth Gang–Drug Prevention: A Statewide Research Study. New York: New York State Division for Youth. Battin, Sara R., et al. 1998. ‘The Contribution of Gang Membership to Delinquency beyond Delinquent Friends.’ Criminology, Vol. 36, No. 1, pp. 93–115. BJA (Bureau of Justice Assistance). 2006. G.R.E.A.T. (Gang Resistance Education and Training) Strategic Plan 2010. Washington, DC: Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs. Braga, Anthony A., David M. Kennedy, and George E. Tita. 2006. ‘New Approaches to the Strategic Prevention of Gang and Group-involved Violence.’ In Arlen Egley, Jr., et al., eds. The Modern Gang Reader, 3rd edn. Los Angeles: Roxbury, pp. 338–48. Borden, Teresa. 2005. ‘El Salvador Racked by Gangs.’ Cox News Service. <http://www.knowgangs.com/gangs_news/extra/news_articles_038.htm> Bursik, Robert J. 2003. Rethinking the Chicago School of Criminology in a New Era of Immigration. St. Louis: University of Missouri. — and Harold G. Grasmick. 2006. ‘Defining and Researching Gangs.’ In Arlen Egley, Jr., et al., eds. The Modern Gang Reader. Third edn. Los Angeles: Roxbury, pp. 2–13. CAII (Creative Associates International, Inc.). n.d. ‘Guatemala Youth Alliance Program.’ <http://www.caii.com/CAIIStaff/Dashboard_GIROAdmin CAIIStaff/Dashboard_CAIIAdminDatabase/CAIIAdminProjectDetails.aspx?PDDSurveyID=1146> Carlie, Mike. 2002. Into the Abyss: A Personal Journey into the World of Street Gangs. <http://faculty.missouristate.edu/M/MichaelCarlie/default.htm> Carlsson, Yngve and Scott Decker. 2005. ‘Gang Youth Violence Prevention and Intervention: Contrasting the Experience of the Scandinavian Welfare State with the United States.’ In Scott H. Decker and Frank M. Weerman, eds. European Street Gangs and Troublesome Youth Groups. Lanham, MD: Rowman-Altamira, pp. 259–86. Casey, Nicholas. 2009. ‘A New Approach to Gang Violence Includes a Multiple-Choice Test.’ Wall Street Journal. 20 May.

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City of Los Angeles. 2008. Healing Our Neighborhoods: A Citywide Partnership to Combat Gang Crime. Gang Reduction and Youth Development Action Plans for the City of Los Angeles. <http://www.ci.la.ca.us/Mayor/stellent/groups/electedofficials/@myr_ch_contributor/documents/contributor_web_content/lacity_004760.pdf> —. 2009. Gang Reduction: Investing in Our Youth. City of Los Angeles Mayor’s Office Fact Sheet. <http://mayor.lacity.org/Issues/GangReduction/index.htm> DeCesare, Donna. 1998. ‘The Children of War: Street Gangs in El Salvador.’ NACLA Report on the Americas, Vol. 32, No. 1, pp. 21–43. Decker, Scott H. and Barrik Van Winkle. 1996. Life in the Gang: Family, Friends, and Violence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. —. 2006. ‘The History of Gang Research.’ In Arlen Egley, Jr., et al., eds. The Modern Gang Reader, 3rd edn. Los Angeles: Roxbury, pp. 14–19. Edmund, S. Howe and C. 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Rosenfeld. 1987. ‘Disorder in the Life Course: How Common and Does It Matter?’ American Sociological Review, Vol. 52, pp. 785–801. Sanchez-Jankowski, Martin. 1991. Islands in the Street: Gangs and American Urban Society. Berkeley, CA: University of California at Berkeley. Sanders, Bill and Stephen E. Lankenau. 2006. ‘A Public Health Model for Studying Youth Gangs.’ In James F. Short and Lorine A. Hughes, eds. Studying Youth Gangs. Latham, MD: Altamira Press, pp. 117–28. Santisteban, Daniel A., et al. 2003. ‘Efficacy of Brief Strategic Family Therapy in Modifying Hispanic Adolescent Behavior Problems and Substance Use.’ Journal of Family Psychology, Vol. 17, No. 1, pp. 121–33. Shaw, Clifford R. and Henry McKay. 1942. Juvenile Delinquency and Urban Areas: A Study of Rates of Delinquency in Relation to Differential Characteristics of Local Communities in American Cities. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

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Sherman, Lawrence W., et al. 1997. ‘Preventing Crime: What Works, What Doesn’t, What’s Promising.’ Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice. Small, Stephen A. and Tom Luster. 1994. ‘Adolescent Sexual Activity: An Ecological Risk-factor Approach.’ Journal of Marriage and the Family, Vol. 56, pp. 181–92. Smith, Dennis. 1988. The Chicago School: A Liberal Critique of Capitalism. London: Macmillian Education. Sorrentino, Anthony and David Whittaker. 1994. ‘The Chicago Area Project: Addressing the Gang Problem.’ FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, Vol. 63, No. 5, pp. 8–12. Spergel, Irving A. 1995. The Youth Gang Problem: A Community Approach. New York: Oxford University Press. —. 2007. Reducing Youth Gang Violence: The Little Village Gang Project in Chicago. New York: Altamira Press. — and G. David Curry. 1993. ‘The National Youth Gang Survey: A Research and Development Process.’ In Arnold Goldstein and Ronald C. Huff, eds. Gang Intervention Handbook. Champaign-Urbana, IL: Research Press, pp. 359–400. Steinberg, Jonny. 2004. Nongoloza’s Children: Western Cape Prison Gangs during and after Apartheid. Braamfontein: Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation. Stretesky, Paul B. and Mark R. Pogrebin. 2007. ‘Gang-Related Gun Violence: Socialization, Identity, and Self.’ Journal of Contemporary Ethnography, Vol. 36, No. 1, pp. 85–114. Szapocznik, José and Robert A. Williams. 2000. ‘Brief Strategic Family Therapy: Twenty-five Years of Interplay among Theory, Research and Practice in Adolescent Behavior Problems and Drug Abuse.’ Clinical Child and Family Psychology Review, Vol. 3, No. 2. Thomas, Jim. 1983. ‘Toward a Critical Ethnography: A Reexamination of the Chicago Legacy.’ Journal of Contemporary Ethnography, Vol. 11, No. 4, pp. 477–90. Thornberry, Terence P., et al. 2003. Gangs and Delinquency in Developmental Perspective. Cambridge: Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge. Thrasher, Frederic Milton. 1963. The Gang: A Study of 1,313 Gangs in Chicago. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Valdez, Avelardo. 2004. ‘Drug Treatment for Gang-Affiliated Hispanic Adolescents.’ Houston, TX: University of Houston, Office for Drug and Social Policy Research. —. 2005. ‘Mexican American Youth and Adult Prison Gangs in a Changing Heroin Market.’ Journal of Drug Issues, Fall 2005, pp. 841–66. —. 2007. Mexican American Girls and Gang Violence: Beyond Risk. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. — and Charles Kaplan. 2007. ‘Conditions that Increase Drug Market Involvement: The Invitational Edge and the Case of Mexicans in South Texas.’ Journal of Drug Issues, Vol. 37, No. 4, pp. 893–917. —, Charles Kaplan, and Alice Cepeda. 2006. ‘The Drugs–Violence Nexus among Mexican American Gang Members.’ Journal of Psychoactive Drugs, Vol. 38, No. 2, pp. 109–22. Valentine, Bill. 2000. Gangs and Their Tattoos: Identifying Gangbangers on the Street and in Prison. Boulder, CO: Palidin Press. Vega, W. A., et al. 1995. ‘Cultural Conflicts and Problem Behaviors of Latino Adolescents in Home and School Environments.’ Journal of Community Psychology, Vol. 23, No. 2, pp. 167–79. Venkatesh, Sudhir Alladi. 1997. ‘The Social Organization of a Street Gang Activity in an Urban Ghetto.’ American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 103, No. 1, pp. 82–111. — and Steven D. Levitt. 2000. ‘“Are We a Family or a Business?” History and Disjuncture in the Urban American Street Gang.’ Theory and Society, Vol. 29, pp. 427–62. Vigil, J. D. 1988. Barrio Gangs: Street Life and Identity in Southern California. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press. Weerman, Frank M. and Scott Decker. 2005. ‘European Street Gangs and Troublesome Youth Groups: Findings from the Eurogang Research Program.’ In Scott H. Decker and Frank M. Weerman, eds. European Street Gangs and Troublesome Youth Groups. Lanham, MD: Rowman-Altamira, pp. 287–310. Weitekamp, Elmar G. M. 2001. ‘Gangs in Europe: Assessments at the Millennium.’ In Malcolm W. Klein, et al., eds. The Eurogang Paradox: Street Gangs and Youth Groups in the U.S. and Europe. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp. 309–22. Werdmölder, Hans. 1997. A Generation Adrift: An Ethnography of a Criminal Moroccan Gang in the Netherlands. London: Kluwer Law International. WHO (World Health Organization). 1996. Prevention of Violence: A Public Health Priority. 49th World Health Assembly. WHA49.25. Wyrick, Phelan A. and James C. Howell. 2004. ‘Strategic Risk-based Response to Youth Gangs.’ Juvenile Justice Journal, Vol. 9, No. 1, pp. 20–29.

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<ehY[ Ckbj_fb_[h FHE#=EL;HDC;DJ 7HC;: =HEKFI ?DJHE:K9J?ED Numerous non-state armed groups exist across the globe. There is no exact figure. Depending on how one defines a non-state armed group, the numbers could reach into the thousands.1 They are not a new phenomenon; they have engaged in warfare and formed an important part of state political and military strategy for centuries. One tends to think of non-state armed groups as those that act in opposition to the government. Groups engaged in civil wars—insurgents, freedom fighters, terrorists, rebels—are the stereotypical non-state armed groups, yet several more fall under the same heading. These include gangs in Los Angeles, maras in El Salvador, and skinheads in Germany, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine. Civil defence forces and militias are common in Africa and Asia. Clans, tribes, youth movements, and political parties have been involved in armed clashes in numerous countries. Less frequently considered when thinking about non-state armed groups are those with links to the government— whether these ties are visible or covert—and that operate in support of government strategies. This chapter focuses on precisely this type of group, called here ‘pro-government non-state armed group’ (PGAG). These groups run the gamut from youth movements to street gangs, political thugs to militias, and community defence organizations to paramilitaries. The term ‘pro-government’ can be misleading in some instances. While many groups included under this label do in fact assist in defending government policies, property, and personnel, this support can vary widely across groups. Some may be considered allied to the government simply because they do not actively oppose it. Others may choose to align with the government, and even fight alongside state forces, to defeat a common enemy or achieve a common goal. Some may indeed exist for the sole purpose of protecting a sitting government and defending it against any domestic threats. However, while the actions of these groups often benefit the state or a political patron, many PGAGs are not merely tools to be used by politicians, elites, or military commanders. This chapter looks at the myriad motivations that lie behind the creation, co-optation, and use of PGAGs for achieving political, economic, and security goals. Examples of pro-government non-state armed groups abound. Political candidates in Nigeria have used local armed groups, referred to locally as ‘political thugs’, to garner electoral support and to deter, often violently, supporters of opposition candidates. In the Philippines, governors use civilian volunteer organizations as their personal well-armed militias. In the Balkans in the 1990s, the Serbian government supported Croatian Serb voluntary groups to ethnically cleanse the Krajina region of Croatia. In Afghanistan, the government has allied with tribal militias in an effort to defeat the Taliban. The list goes on. Over the past two decades PGAGs have played an increasingly important role in security agendas, political campaigns, and wars. Despite their widespread use and devastating impacts on local populations, they remain an understudied phenomenon. The chapter underscores the need for more attention to be paid to how and why these groups are used and the political and security implications of their use.

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The main conclusions from this chapter include the following: s PGAGs are primarily used within the borders of a country, rather than across borders, and play an important role in the internal politics of a country and the perpetration of violence again civilians. s PGAGs pose a serious risk to civilians—one that is potentially far greater than that posed by national security forces. This is particularly true when governments outsource the worst violence to PGAGs and allow them to operate with impunity. s PGAGs provide an important source of security to some communities, thereby underscoring their positive utility and community support, and highlighting the difficulty of labelling groups ‘good’ or ‘bad’. s For many governments, PGAGs serve as useful and malleable tools to achieve their objectives in a way that absolves them of responsibility for the perpetration of abuses. s PGAGs pose significant risks to communities and governments alike when governments fail to establish or maintain control over these groups or when the groups develop new agendas. The chapter is divided into five sections. The first section introduces a spectrum of armed groups. The second focuses the discussion on non-state pro-government armed groups. The third section examines the various roles that PGAGs play. The fourth section investigates the impacts, both positive and negative, on the civilian population. The fifth section looks at what happens to PGAGs when they are no longer needed by the government or when they outgrow their government-held reins.

7 IF;9JHKC E< DED#IJ7J; 7HC;: =HEKFI Non-state armed groups come in many shapes and sizes. They vary in their purpose, composition, membership, organization, longevity, activities, and use of small arms. This makes it difficult to generalize about these groups or to provide a single definition that captures all of these important differences. There is no universal definition for ‘non-state armed group’.2 7 fhe#]el[hdc[dj É@[kd[ FWjh_ej[Ê c_b_j_W ikffehj[h ^ebZi W fbWYWhZ Wj W Z[cedijhWj_ed _d 7X_Z`Wd" 9 j[ ZÊ?le_h[" * Del[cX[h (&&*$ ;cWdk[b ;ahW%7F F^eje

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A very basic definition of an armed group is: an organized group with a clear structure, membership, and the capacity to use violence in the pursuit of its goals. Based on this definition, which includes a broad range of groups operating in varying contexts, Figure 10.1 suggests a spectrum of armed groups across a continuum. This is a simple portrayal of armed groups. A more complex depiction, one that would more accurately mirror reality, would include other factors such as the relationship of the armed group to communities and to the economy, as well as factors like strength, support, and size. Figure 10.1 suits the purposes of the discussion in this chapter; namely, to introduce a broad spectrum of armed groups from those opposed to the state and seeking to overthrow it (rebel groups) to those in clear support of the state and seeking to defend it (state military). Discussions often split armed groups into two distinct typesâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;those that support the government and those that rise up in opposition to it; the spectrum presented here challenges this simplistic division. While Figure 10.1 presents the two poles, it also incorporates a space for groups to be neutral towards the government. Most groups that fall within the neutral space are not trying to insert themselves into government affairs or change the government but instead aim to operate under the radar of law enforcement and keep the state out of their affairs (Davis, 2009, p. 232). Neutral groups leaning towards the antigovernment side of the spectrum include gangs and organized crime. While these groups do not necessarily threaten the government (that is, they have no desire to overthrow it), they do pose a challenge to law and order and can infiltrate the government and influence policy through corrupt government officials. Neutral groups leaning towards the pro-government side of the spectrum include vigilante groups and community defence groups. These groups are rarely managed or directed by the government, but instead operate to uphold law and order (as perceived by the group) and provide security to communities where state forces are unable, or unwilling, to deliver it. In so doing, these groups also present challenges to government efforts to ensure law and order. Figure 10.1 represents a snapshot view of armed groups and their general tendencies. While particular groups may be placed on the diagram at a given point in time, it is important to remember that they rarely remain in the same position on the diagram over time. Groups may shift horizontally or vertically across the spectrum. These move-

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ments result from changes in government, in economic incentives, or in the group itself (such as in terms of capacity, resources, leadership, and goals). Some of the labels noted in Figure 10.1—rebel group, gang, militia, and vigilante—are widely used in the media and have become a part of everyday language. Groups may be labelled differently by various actors or over time, leading to confusion about whether the group itself has changed or whether external parties have changed the label to influence public perceptions. Although common, the labelling of a group by a government is often a political act—intended to either demonize the group or justify the government’s support of it. Once a group is assigned a particular label, ‘a series of normative associations, motives, and characteristics are attached’ to it (Bhatia, 2005, p. 8). Such labelling narrows the scope for understanding the group and justifies particular policy responses.

FHE#=EL;HDC;DJ DED#IJ7J; 7HC;: =HEKFI The rise of the state system and the growing control over the use of violence by states through the creation of standing armies led to a drop in the use of non-state violence by individuals and groups aiming to achieve their goals (Thomson, 1994, p. 3). Yet governments, both domestic and foreign, have continued to rely upon non-state armed groups as an integral part of their political, military, and counter-insurgency strategies (see Box 10.1). In the 21st century non-state armed groups are common (Shultz, Farah, and Lochard, 2004, p. 3; Williams, 2008, p. 5). Some states employ foreigners in their standing armies, other states hire mercenary organizations to fight their wars,3 and still others use domestic groups as proxy fighters.

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Some observers regard the use of non-state armed groups to perform internal security tasks as ‘outsourcing’ security and military matters that should be the sole purview of the state. Their use is seen as a challenge to conventional assumptions about state sovereignty (Holmqvist, 2005b, p. 45; Williams, 2008, p. 5). This view is based primarily on an understanding of states as defined by their ability to maintain a monopoly on the use of force (Thomson, 1994, p. 7). Yet the use of non-state armed groups by governments could be viewed instead as an effort to expand the state’s capacity, legitimately or not, to conduct a particular war or implement a policy. In this sense, it can be argued that states are not giving up their right to a monopoly on the use of force, but rather have temporarily delegated the right to use violence to designated groups that they hope to control. In practice, such control is often difficult to establish and maintain, a reality that often confronts a government after the fact.

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This chapter is based on a review of numerous reports on a wide number of progovernment non-state armed groups. The analysis presented here is an effort to start to develop a better understanding of these groups, their relationship to government, the roles they play, and the impact their actions have on communities and civilians. As such, this chapter seeks to identify a number of patterns that can be found across PGAGs and, in this way, begin to build a foundation for future research. The term pro-government is used to indicate that the group has some form of affiliation with the government (see Box 10.2). This relationship can be described in three main ways: creation, co-optation, and alliance. The government might create the group. This would involve recruitment, arming, and (in some cases) training a group of individuals. The government might co-opt an existing group, for example a hunting society, a tribal clan, or a youth gang, and then use it for a particular security task. Or it might choose to recruit existing armed groups, for example a civil defence force or militia, to fight alongside existing state forces. A fourth relationship is more indirect and involves the government allowing non-state groups to act on their own. This raises an important distinction between privatized state violence (committed by the state) and privately organized violence (committed by private organizations) (Roessler, 2005, p. 209). In the case of the former, the government ‘supports [. . .], sponsors [. . .], or permits [. . .] the repressive activities’ of non-state armed groups for political gain (p. 209). In the case of the latter, violence is perpetrated by private organizations (such as self-defence units),

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which operate of their own volition and outside of government control. In this chapter, private organizations are considered under the label pro-government if they operate without government interference or government efforts to outlaw, disband, or otherwise indicate opposition to the group.

H[bWj_edi^_f je j^[ ]el[hdc[dj Governments use PGAGs for a variety of reasons. They offer a number of economic benefits. They are often cheaper to maintain because they do not receive the same kind of support as national troops. They receive minimal training, if any. Their supervision is often left to community or group leaders. Although paid a salary, the rate is often below normal military pay. These groups are intended to be a short-term security force, and therefore the investment is minimal and for a limited duration. PGAGs offer strategic benefits. They often possess excellent local knowledge because they operate in their own communities. This includes being able to identify strangers, tap into local networks, and operate with an understanding of the local geography, language, and culture. The group may possess a chain of command that makes it easy to deploy. PGAGs often possess a stronger commitment to defend their areas than non-indigenous forces and are therefore less likely to abandon their villages. They can act as a force multiplier for state forces in situations where the national army is insufficient in size to address the threat. Governments can also benefit from the unofficial status of many PGAGs. Although governments have taken measures to institutionalize or legalize some groups, as with the paramilitaries in Colombia in the 1960s and the Village Guards in Turkey in the 1980s (see Box 10.3), overt links between governments and the groups are not always apparent. Governments may prefer to maintain a distance from the group and its actions as a means of avoiding accountability and denying responsibility. This is especially apparent in cases where groups commit widespread human rights abuses, including executions, disappearances, and torture, as in the case of the Ikhwan-ul Muslimoon (Muslim Brotherhood), a renegade force active in Jammu and Kashmir that has received Indian

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government support (ICG, 2004, p. 5).7 The lack of a clear connection between the government and the unofficial group provides more leeway for how the government can use these groups and how these can act, facilitating the use of violence with impunity. The relationship between a government and a PGAG indicates the extent of control over the armed group, the level of support the group receives from the government, the types of activities in which the group engages, and the extent of loyalty to the government. A government that has created a PGAG will expect the group to exhibit greater loyalty and commitment to its objectives. These PGAGs are likely to receive higher levels of support (such as pay, arms, and protection from the law). However, they also require larger inputs of resources because of the need to create some control structures, provide training (even if minimal), and equip members. A government that forms and structures a PGAG for a specific purpose and acts as its primary benefactor will expect to be able to control the group more effectively. Fhe#]el[hdc[dj

Co-optation of existing non-state armed groups is likely to be both logistically easier and less costly for a govern-

Whc[Z ]hekfi ment than creating an armed group. Using existing groups also offers the luxury of tasking a group that already has Wff[Wh je fbWo cohesion, organization, and a command structure. Co-opted PGAGs are likely to receive more moderate levels of Wj b[Wij j^h[[ government support. In part this is the result of their existing capacity, but the government might also exercise a[o heb[i$

restraint in providing resources either to prevent the group from growing too strong, or to avoid links to the group that would incur responsibility. While potentially less costly, these groups are not necessarily dedicated to keeping the ruling government in power, and their loyalty might depend on the ongoing provision of incentives. These groups might also be more focused on securing their communities and defeating a common enemy than on protecting a particular governing administration. Thus they may prove more difficult to control. Where the government simply opts to ally itself with an existing armed group, it does not try to establish control over the group, as it would through co-optation, but instead coordinates activities between the group and state security forces, for example during offensives on the battlefield. This option may provide the least control over the group, but it allows the government to quickly put to use an organized armed force that probably already has some battle experience. A more extreme version of an alliance is the tasking of non-state armed groups for specific purposes, such as ethnic cleansing of lands. In such cases, the groups are often left to their own devices to determine how best to carry out these tasks. While the focus of this chapter is on the use of domestic non-state armed groups by governments, in some instances an external party may capitalize on the existence of indigenous groups to conduct security operations in a foreign country. A good example of this is the United Statesâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; use of tribal militias in Afghanistan to fight against the Taliban. Tribal militias have been used, by all sides, throughout the past three decades of war in Afghanistan. However, the new US strategy appears to try to address past mistakes that resulted in the creation of warlords and anti-government groups. The plan, the Community Defense Initiative, aims to provide checks on the militias by restricting the scope of their activities, tying the groups directly to the central government, and not providing the groups with weapons (although they already possess guns) (Filkins, 2009).

7 H7D=; E< HEB;I One way of categorizing PGAGs is according to their activities. Pro-government armed groups appear to play at least three key roles in support of a given government. They help the government to wage wars when state armed

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forces are over-stretched, insufficient, or incapable of fulfilling this role. They aid in the achievement of political goals—most often election victories but also activities such as forcing minority groups off land. They may also provide security to communities in situations of lawlessness, ineffective policing, or communal violence. The same group can play different roles over time.

MW]_d] mWh Governments use PGAGs in a number of ways when waging war. They can be used as a force multiplier, quickly and cheaply adding numbers to existing government forces. They can be used in areas that are difficult to access, or that are far from the main front-lines where government forces are engaged. PGAGs can provide security to remote villages and less strategic areas. They can also serve as a deterrent to offensives by the opposition or they can hold areas recaptured by government forces. Governments may use PGAGs to collect intelligence in communities, where they serve as the eyes and ears of the government in identifying threats. Unable to respond to the growing insurgency in Darfur with national troops, the Sudanese government developed a strategy to use, and in some cases arm, pre-existing tribal militias. This allowed the government to supplement its own forces, which were largely focused on the conflict between Northern and Southern Sudan. These militias offered a number of advantages: they knew the terrain, some already carried arms, and they allowed the government to depict the conflict as tribal, in an effort to avoid responsibility for the actions of the militias. Despite egregious human rights abuses and international demands to disarm the militias, the Sudanese government has made no effort to disarm or control them. Instead, the tribal militias have used their position and power ‘to obtain salaries, war booty, land, and revenge’ (Flint, 2009, p. 15).

Feb_j_YWb ]eWbi In addition to addressing security threats, PGAGs have assisted governments in achieving political goals. Such goals =el[hdc[dji ki[ range from winning elections and suppressing dissent to promoting ethnic divides and maintaining politicians’ posi- F=7=i _d W dkcX[h tions of power. In some cases it is the state apparatus that creates and controls these groups. In other instances they e\ mWoi m^[d fall under the direction of individual politicians or community leaders. Governments have used PGAGs to control their populations. This includes policing roles, in some cases enforcing adherence to Islamic law, and in general suppressing any form of public dissent (see Box 10.4). They provide a deterrent to opposition, demonstrate the willingness of the state to use force, and serve to coerce citizens into following regime rules and policies. Governments have deployed PGAGs to change the demographic composition of the population. In particular, armed groups have been used by governments to displace populations they perceive as ‘problematic’. In East Timor, pro-government militias used violence and intimidation to instigate mass displacement of the population in the leadup to the 1999 referendum in an effort to prevent a pro-independence outcome (AI, 1999; HRW, 1999b; Koefner, 2000). Despite widespread violence, these efforts failed to deter the population from voting in favour of independence. In Croatia, in the early 1990s, Belgrade supported and armed Croatian Serbs ostensibly to defend the Serb population in the Krajina region of Croatia (Doder, 1991). Belgrade sought to maintain this region as part of a greater Yugoslavia, rather than cede it to Croatia, which had declared independence in 1991. By committing violence against Croats and moderate Serbs, the Serbian armed groups served a singular purpose—to terrorize unwanted populations into leaving their land (Weitz, 2003, pp. 211–12).

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One of the most frequent uses of PGAGs is electoral violence, which remains extremely common across the globe despite the fact that most countries today are democracies (see Box 10.5). Many politicians and political parties use electoral violence to gain political power and to solidify the power of the regime. Elections in Africa since 2000 have been violent more often than not, with more than two dozen states holding elections during this period, and more than half of them involving serious violence (Simpson, 2009). Despite the democratic structure of most states in Africa, elections have not yet become political struggles for power, as is common in consolidated democracies. Instead, demonstrations of state power and outright violence continue to underscore the nascent nature of democracy on the continent. Electoral violence has involved bombings, burnings, attacks on opposition leaders and voters, interand intra-party clashes, extra-judicial killings, assassinations, shootings, and ethnic clashes. Politicians have co-opted PGAGs to incite inter-group violence as a way of distracting popular attention from the deficits of government and to achieve certain political and economic goals. In Kenya, the government has exploited ethnic tensions and resource scarcity to foment ethnic conflict as a way of deflecting attention from regime instability (Kahl, 1998, p. 94). Violence has been a common feature of politics since the 1990s, as seen in numerous elections. High-ranking government officials provoked ethnic violence to keep President Daniel arap Moi in power (Kahl, 1998). Vigilante groups such as the Mungiki have played a primary role in violence amid widespread allegations of support by ruling party officials (Anderson, 2002). In the 2007 elections, politicians openly advocated violence in communities (Afrobarometer, 2008). Violence has continued in the deadly aftermath of the 2007 elections involving ‘new and reactivated militias organised and/or paid by high-ranking politicians’ (Sjögren and Karlsson, 2008).

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8en '&$+ J^[ h[mWhZi e\ feb_j_YWb l_eb[dY[0 h[ceX_b_p_d] [n#YecXWjWdji _d feij # mWh I_[hhW B[ed[ M[bb _d WZlWdY[ e\ j^[ (&&- [b[Yj_edi Wbb cW_d feb_j_YWb fWhj_[i ijWhj[Z ceX_b_p_d] oekd]" fh[Zec_dWdjbo khXWd c[d je WYj Wi _d\ehcWb i[Ykh_jo \ehY[i$ J^[ jme bWh][ij feb_j_YWb fWhj_[i" I_[hhW B[ed[ F[efb[Êi FWhjo IBFF WdZ 7bb F[efb[Êi 9ed]h[ii 7F9 " ijWhj[Z je WffheWY^ ^_]^# WdZ c_Z#b[l[b YeccWdZ[hi m_j^ Whco" ]el[hdc[dj c_b_j_W" WdZ h[X[b XWYa]hekdZi _d [Whbo (&&,$ J^[i[ \ehc[h YeccWdZ[hi m[h[ WXb[ je ceX_b_p[ [n#\_]^j[hi j^hek]^ ij_bb#WYj_l[ Y^W_di e\ YeccWdZ$ 7 cWèh_jo e\ jêi[ ceX_b_p[Z m[h[ [n#YecXWjWdji" Xkj ej^[hi è_d[Z \eh j^[ [Yedec_Y effehjkd_jo" WdZ W c_deh_jo è_d[Z X[YWki[ e\ jhk[ ikf# fehj \eh W fWhjo$ J^[ IBFF WdZ 7F9 \ehc[Z _d\ehcWb jWia \ehY[i" m_j^ h[ceX_b_pWj_ed eYYkhh_d] Wbed] fWhjo WdZ \ehc[h \_]^j_d] \WYj_ed b_d[i$ J^[ IBFF h[ceX_b_p[Z Y^_[\bo \ehc[h khXWd c_b_j_W c[cX[hi \hec j^[ 7hc[Z <ehY[i H[lebkj_edWho 9ekdY_b WdZ j^[ M[ij I_Z[ 8eoi" j^[ 7F9 \hec j^[ h[X[b ]hekf j^[ H[lebkj_edWho Kd_j[Z <hedj WdZ j^[ d[mbo \ehc[Z F[efb[Êi Cel[c[dj \eh :[ceYhWj_Y 9^Wd][ \hec j^[ hWdai e\ \ehc[h hkhWb 9_l_b :[\[di[ <ehY[i _d j^[ iekj^$ J^[o eh]Wd_p[Z _d c_b_jWho \Wi^_ed m_j^ YeccWdZ[hi WdZ igkWZi WdZ ki[Z j^[_h h[if[Yj_l[ fWhjo ^[WZgkWhj[hi Wi XWi[i$ ?d fWhj j^[o h[cW_d[Z j^[h[ je fhej[Yj WdZ h[WYj _d YWi[ j^[ ej^[h fWhjo jWia \ehY[ WjjWYa[Z" Xkj j^[o Wbie YWhh_[Z ekj hW_Zi _d <h[[jemd WdZ WYheii j^[ Yekdjhoi_Z[ je iêm j^[_h ckiYb[$ 7bjêk]^ cWdo [n#YecXWjWdji ijWj[ j^Wj feb_j_Y_Wdi WdZ ej^[h b[WZ[hi Z[i[hj[Z j^[c" WdZ j^Wj j^[o Ze dej jhkij feb_j_YiÆ eh Éfeb_#jh_YaiÊ" Wi _j _i e\j[d YWbb[Z ed j^[ ijh[[jÆj^[o ij_bb è_d[Z m^[d YWbb[Z kfed Xo j^[i[ b[WZ[hi$ J^[ h[Wiedi Wh[ gk_j[ i_cfb[$ I[d_eh c[cX[hi e\ j^[ jWia \ehY[i h[Y[_l[Z bWh][ ikci e\ ced[o" m_j^ iec[ e\ _j jh_Yab_d] Zemd j^[ Y^W_d e\ Yec# cWdZ$ EhZ_dWho c[cX[hi h[Y[_l[Z \eeZ" Y_]Wh[jj[ ced[o" WdZ Wj j_c[i Zhk]i$ <eh iec[" j^[ fWhjo ^[WZgkWhj[hi fhel_Z[Z W hee\ el[h^[WZ Zkh_d] j^[ ^[Wlo i[WiedWb hW_di$ ?d WZZ_j_ed je iêhj#j[hc ]W_d" fWhj_Y_fWj_ed e\\[h[Z j^[ fheif[Yj e\ \kjkh[ èXi" [ZkYWj_ed" eh WYY[ii je Z_WcedZ c_d_d] Wh[Wi _\ j^[ fWhjo med j^[ [b[Yj_edi$ Iec[ jWia \ehY[ YeccWdZ[hi mê ^WZ X[[d _cfh_ied[Z Wj j^[ [dZ e\ j^[ mWh m[h[ h[b[Wi[Z fh_eh je j^[ [b[Yj_ed _\ j^[o fhec_i[Z je meha _d j^[ IBFF jWia \ehY[$ <_dWbbo" fWhj_Y_fWj_ed _d W ieY_Wb d[jmeha WdZ beoWbjo je i[d_eh c[cX[hi e\ j^[i[ d[jmehai h[cW_di YhkY_Wb \eh Xej^ ikhl_lWb WdZ ikYY[ii$ Feb_j_Y_Wdi h[ceX_b_p[Z [n#YecXWjWdji WdZ h[WYj_lWj[Z c_b_jWho d[jmehai _d ehZ[h je m_d [b[Yj_edi$ ;b[Yj_edi ^Wl[ WbmWoi X[[d j_c[i e\ ^[_]^j[d[Z l_eb[dY[ _d I_[hhW B[ed[$ Feb_j_Y_Wdi WdZ YecXWjWdji \hec Wbb i_Z[i ^WZ X[[d Ybei[bo b_da[Z j^hek]êkj j^[ mWhÆmWh\Wh[ mWi _dZ[[Z feb_j_Yi Xo ej^[h c[Wdi$ <hec j^[ feb_j_YWb f[hif[Yj_l[" j^[ fh_eh_jo j^_i j_c[ WhekdZ mWi je h[Yhk_j j^[ ceij [\\[Yj_l[ l_eb[dj WYjehi je j^[_h i_Z[$ J^[ Yh[Wj_ed e\ jWia \ehY[i fhel_Z[Z W c[Wdi e\ ki_d] Yedjhebb[Z l_eb[dY[ \eh feb_j_YWb ]W_di$ J^[ l_eb[dY[ e\ beoWb [n#YecXWjWdji fhel[Z ki[\kb _d iYWh_d] e\\ j^[ [d[co" Z[cedijhWj_d] fem[h je j^[ fkXb_Y" WdZ j^h[Wj[d_d] f[efb[ _dje lej_d] \eh j^[ fWhjo _d gk[ij_ed$ JWia \ehY[i jekh[Z j^[ Yekdjho fh_eh je j^[ [b[Yj_ed je W_Z beYWb fWhjo c[cX[hi j^hek]^ j^h[Wji e\ l_eb[dY[" eh Z_h[Yj l_eb[dY[" W_c[Z Wj Ém_dd_d]Ê lej[i$ J^[ IBFF beij j^[ (&&- ][d[hWb [b[Yj_edi WdZ j^[ cWèh_jo e\ j^[ IBFF jWia \ehY[ c[cX[hi m[h[ d[l[h h[mWhZ[Z _d Wdo mWo$ 8o YedjhWij c[cX[hi e\ j^[ 7F9 jWia \ehY[ h[Y[_l[Z h[mWhZi \ebbem_d] j^[_h [b[YjehWb ikYY[ii$ Iec[ YeccWdZ[hi Yeb# b[Yj[Z Xedki[i _d j^[ \ehc e\ YWi^ WdZ YWhi" WdZ _d iec[ YWi[i ]el[hdc[dj èXi$ 7 ]hekf e\ WXekj +& cW_dbo \ehc[h H[lebkj_edWho Kd_j[Z <hedj iebZ_[hi" mê ^WZ i[hl[Z Wi 7F9 jWia \ehY[ YeccWdZ[hi" jhW_d[Z _d CeheYYe WdZ Wh[ Ykhh[djbo meha_d] Wi j^[ fh[i_Z[dj_Wb ]kWhZ$ Ed[ e\ j^[ jWia \ehY[ YeccWdZ[hi ^[WZi j^Wj ekj\_j$ F[efb[ \khj^[h Zemd j^[ hWdai ]W_d[Z \[m Z_h[Yj X[d[\_ji" Xkj j^[o h[Y[_l[Z iec[j^_d] \eh j^[_h [\\ehji" jêk]^ dej Wi ckY^ Wi j^[o ^WZ êf[Z \eh m^[d j^[o [db_ij[Z$ IekhY[i0 KjWi (&&/ 1 KjWi WdZ 9^h_ij[di[d (&&.

PGAGs have at times helped further the goals of specific politicians, as opposed to the ruling regime as a whole. In Nigeria, governors in Abia and Anambra states recruited popular community forces, including the Bakassi Boys, to serve as their own private militias. Political patronage of the various factions of the Bakassi Boys proved the key to swaying these groups to act on behalf of local politicians rather than the community members they had originally protected (Meagher, 2007, pp. 100–08). In Bolivia, President Hugo Chávez created a popular militia, the Bolivarian

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Liberation Front, as his personal armed force responsible to him alone and standing outside of the institutional structures of the government or the military (Manwaring, 2009). In the Republic of the Congo in the 1990s, rival politicians created their own personal militias whose members served as bodyguards as well as combatants in efforts to secure political power (Bazenguissa-Ganga, 1999).

9ecckd_jo i[Ykh_jo PGAGs have long provided a source of protection to communities in areas where the state cannot, or will not, provide security. The inability of the state to provide law and order may stem from a lack of resources to recruit, train, and deploy effective policing forces. It can also arise from the focus of state forces, and state resources, on responding to an insurgency, thereby leaving some communities unprotected. In situations of insecurity communities employ self-help strategies that often include the creation of armed community defence forces. Governments tend to allow these groups to persist because they serve state interests and free the government to F=7=i ^Wl[ bed] use its resources elsewhere. One example is the role of vigilante groups in Nigeria (Hazen, 2007, pp. 73–75). The fhel_Z[Z W iekhY[ vigilante groups have organized to conduct patrols, deter crime, and in some cases arrest suspected criminals. These e\ fhej[Yj_ed je groups often conduct their patrols armed with rifles or shotguns. Since individuals may not legally possess these Yecckd_j_[i _d weapons, however, they are held in a communal building that provides access and storage—as well as a measure Wh[Wi m^[h[ j^[ of deniability for any single member of the community. The Nigerian government has long known of the operations ijWj[ YWddej$ of these groups and has done nothing to either terminate them or support them outright. Instead, the groups operate with the tacit approval of the government, and serve as a weak substitute for the national police force, which lacks the resources to effectively control many areas of the country (Hazen, 2007, pp. 105–06). In other cases, the government co-opts or allies with community defence forces. This provides the groups with a stronger connection to the state, which helps them to organize, train, and arm themselves. In southern Thailand, the government has supported the operations of three types of local defence forces: the Or Sor (Volunteer Defence Corps), the Or Ror Bor (Village Protection Force), and the Chor Ror Bor (Village Defence Volunteers) (ICG, 2007). Members of these forces are often recruited locally and thus have a better knowledge of the area, the population, and the insurgency than does the military. These local forces receive varying levels of training, respond to different chains of command, and in practice are given a great deal of autonomy in their activities; in addition, they can act with relative impunity. They are provided individual salaries or monthly budgets as well as small arms (mainly rifles and shotguns, although some leaders receive M-16 assault rifles). Some observers argue they have overstepped their mandate by taking offensive action against suspected perpetrators, often in retaliation for bombings of state and Buddhist targets. Some community protection groups are created by the government rather than being community-generated and co-opted. For example, the Uganda Peoples Defence Force (UPDF), the national military force, created the Arrow Boys and the Amuka militia specifically to assist in protecting communities from attacks by the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), the main rebel group operating in Uganda since 1987. The Arrow Boys proved effective in providing important intelligence and operating under UPDF command.9 The government provided training, arms, and funds to the Arrow Boys. Their knowledge of the terrain, local language skills, and support from the local population make them an effective, and therefore attractive, force multiplier for the government. The Amuka militia, by contrast, proved largely ineffective due to the lack of support and weaponry from the government.10

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FHEJ;9JEH EH FH;:7JEH5 J>; ?CF79J ED 9?L?B?7DI PGAGs are often equated with predatory tactics and indiscriminate violence. Numerous examples of such groups abound; very few operate within the bounds of the law, or with respect for international humanitarian or human rights law. Their reputations for brutality are often well earned (Holmqvist, 2005b, p. 48). However, not all groups are ‘bad’. Many have proven indispensable in protecting communities in situations where the government cannot, or will not, do so. Yet even those that protect can be dangerous and commit abuses. It is equally difficult to find groups that can be labelled ‘good’ by all communities. Although PGAGs are often viewed as a threatening force, the relationship between the group and the community in which it operates is often more complex. PGAGs can act as predators and pose a clear and present danger to certain communities, while at the same time providing a source of protection to other communities. The level of threat to any individual or community often depends on the activities of the group and the reasons for its mobilizaF=7=i Wh[ e\j[d tion, such as the suppression of popular dissent, cleansing areas of particular groups, or defending neighbourhoods WXb[ je ef[hWj[ from attack. While indiscriminate attacks do occur, most violence committed by PGAGs appears to be purposeful m_j^ W ]h[Wj Z[Wb rather than random. This section, drawing upon examples given elsewhere in the chapter, looks at why PGAGs raise e\ _cfkd_jo$

concerns about violence and human rights, and why they are sometimes regarded as providers of security.

B[ii h[ijhW_d[Z5 M^o Whc[Z ]hekfi Wh[ fheXb[cWj_Y PGAGs are invariably dangerous. They tend to be poorly trained in military matters and human rights and humanitarian law. They exhibit varying levels of discipline, from loosely organized and directed structures to hierarchical chains of command. They often possess and use small arms, ranging from shotguns and rifles to assault rifles. In some instances, governments have diverted funding and armaments away from national security forces to their progovernment groups either because the national military is inept or because it is untrustworthy. Governments have often granted PGAGs free reign to accomplish their tasks, and in some instances have outsourced the worst violence to them. In recent years there has been a decline in one-sided violence—violence committed by the state against civilians; however, this relative decline is offset by the use of proxies by the government, such as PGAGs (Stepanova, 2008, p. 44). This suggests that the overall level of violence is not declining, but rather that it is being carried out by unofficial, government-supported groups. Due to their lack of incorporation into government structures, PGAGs are often able to operate with a great deal of impunity. Observers argue that PGAGs thus tend to have a more harmful effect on the local population than do the national security forces, which are ostensibly governed by the rule of law and held accountable for their actions (Butler, Carey, and Mitchell, 2009). The level of accountability influences the decision to use force; the more accountable the government is, the more likely it is to exhibit restraint. Delegating the decision to use force to PGAGs carries the risk that competing goals may influence this choice and implies fewer constraints on the use of violence. Some groups do have codes of conduct that guide their behaviour and internal mechanisms for sanctioning insubordination (ENGAGEMENT). Yet groups do not always possess, or employ, effective sanctioning mechanisms. In fact, some groups have encouraged looting and other self-payment activities by their members when they lack sufficient resources to pay their fighters. The presence and actions of PGAGs can have a range of negative effects. They are often associated with higher rates of human rights abuses than government forces (Alvarez, 2006; Butler, Carey, and Mitchell, 2009). They have

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targeted civilians judged as disloyal. They have forced villagers to choose sides, which not only increases the risk to the village, but can also entail ‘cleansing’ villages that do not side with the government. The mere presence of armed groups has often escalated violence in communities, exacerbated tensions between ethnic groups, and contributed to higher levels of crime. PGAGs have resorted to vigilantism in order to resolve personal or inter-community problems. The arming of PGAGs increases the number of arms in circulation. The possession of arms also makes the group a target for anti-government forces because it signals their pro-government stance, and therefore their threat to the opposition forces. PGAGs also serve as a source of arms, either through capture by opposition forces or through sales by PGAG members. Finally, as explained below, there is a risk that pro-government armed groups will mutate into anti-government forces, criminal groups, or terrorist organizations.

Ceh[ h[ijhW_d[Z5 M^[d F=7=i Yedjh_Xkj[ je i[Ykh_jo The flip side of the argument about PGAGs is that they can offer a better form of protection for communities. Since they are often locally recruited and operate in their home areas, they know the terrain, the language, and the population. Arguably this knowledge makes them more effective in carrying out their tasks than regular security forces, which might possess limited local knowledge and may not be welcomed by the local population. In particular, local knowledge provides the advantage of being able to identify strangers more easily—a crucial asset in guerrilla wars, in which combatants rarely wear uniforms or other outward indications of affiliation. PGAGs may also be more committed to protecting certain geographic areas because it means protecting their F=7=i Wh[ ceij families, their homes, and their communities. This can make them more dedicated to the task, and less likely to run b_a[bo je i[hl[ Wi W in the face of danger, thus potentially reinforcing group cohesion. Given their ties to the local community, the groups iekhY[ e\ fhej[Yj_ed are expected to behave in a fashion that maintains these links and to protect community members. This entails m^[d j^[o ef[hWj[ constraining violent behaviour and using it only against legitimate targets, meaning individuals or groups posing a _d j^[_h ^ec[ threat to the community. Yet this determination of threat is often left to the group, and it is not always directed Yecckd_jo$ outwards. While PGAGs may offer protection to community members, it is often contingent on the support of the population. Those who are deemed unsupportive may find themselves being identified as the enemy and therefore considered a legitimate target by the PGAG. PGAGs are most likely to serve as a source of protection when they operate in their home community. When a group moves (or is moved) to another area of operation, the ties that encourage proper behaviour may be lost. They are less likely to be able to identify strangers within an unfamiliar community or to distinguish friend from foe. A lack of shared communal norms, relationships, and community expectations reduce the constraints on violent behaviour. Shifting areas of operation also removes the original purpose of the group—that of defending the community—and can replace it with more offensive goals.

J>; ;D: =7C; An important aspect of understanding PGAGs is the identification of the relationship between the government and the group and how this relationship can, and often does, change over time. Change may come in many forms. The government can change, either making groups unnecessary, unwanted, or anti-government. The group can change sides, either shifting to become anti-government, or in some cases an anti-government group might become pro-

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government, as happened with the one faction of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka. The direction of influence might change. Whereas PGAGs are normally under the direction of the government, even if only loosely, groups may influence government policy through their actions or their demands. Finally, groups may outgrow the reins of government and develop their own purpose and support structure. An important question remains: what happens when the PGAG is no longer needed? A group may follow one of four common paths. First, the group may disband after the task is completed. Second, the government may integrate the PGAG into official forces, legitimizing and legalizing the continued presence and operations of the group. Third, the PGAG may mutate into another type of entity, such as an anti-government group or criminal organization. Or the group may convert itself into a political party. The path chosen often depends on the circumstances of the group, the balance of economic and political incentives, and the perception of threats. In some instances, PGAGs disband once the job is finished. This does not always entail a complete dissolution of the group, but rather a return to more localized community affairs. The Civil Defence Forces in Sierra Leone is one example. The government of Sierra Leone had called upon the country’s traditional hunting organizations to fight for the government during the civil war of 1991–2002. These various organizations fell under the umbrella name of the Civil Defence Forces. They fought as a state military during the war, receiving salaries and support from the government, and then disbanded during the post-conflict disarmament process. The hunting organizations still exist but have returned to their communities; in some cases, they could be mobilized should they be needed again. F=7=i YWd kdZ[h]e

PGAGs can undergo various mutations from their original form and purpose. In some cases, the groups have

lWh_eki ckjWj_edi been absorbed by the state, a process through which the group is legitimized, formalized, and legalized. Examples \hec j^[_h eh_]_dWb include the absorption of the ‘janjaweed’ in Darfur into the Sudanese military and that of the Croatian Serb militias \ehc WdZ fkhfei[$

during the Balkan wars of the 1990s into the Serbian military. Other groups have escaped the control of their political masters and become anti-government. A number of examples abound. In India, the government sponsored militias in Punjab to defeat the Khalistan separatist movement. These grew beyond the capacity of the government to control, however; consequently, the militias acted with impunity in crimes against the rich (ICG, 2004, p. 5). In Nigeria, the Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force served as a political force for politicians running for office in the Niger Delta area in the 2003 elections (Hazen, 2007, pp. 77–79). Provided with guns and tasked with intimidating the opposition, this group enhanced the prospects of political victory for the politicians. But when the politicians won and failed to deliver on their promises, the group turned against its patrons (Hazen, 2009b). In Guatemala in the 1980s and 1990s, the government used Voluntary Civilian Self-Defence Committees and Civilian Self-Defence Patrols to wage a successful counter-insurgency strategy, but it proved incapable of controlling the forces after the war (ICG, 2004, p. 4). In other cases, groups supported by governments for internal purposes have grown into terrorist organizations posing a much larger threat, as in the cases of Jemaah Islamiyah in Indonesia and the Turkish Hezbollah (ICG, 2004, p. 5). Some PGAGs have turned to crime. In Algeria, many of the self-defence units (groupes de légitime défense, GLD) have undergone a shift of priorities and have transformed themselves into profit-driven militias that plunder and harm rather than protect the local population. The GLD militias were given considerable power and freedom to act. Armed and granted exclusive privileges to serve as enforcers of law and order, the militias undertook citizens’ arrests and committed massacres on their own initiative without being prosecuted (Sidhoum and Algeria-Watch, 2003, pp. 10–11; Garçon, 1998; 2004). In the late 1990s, reports indicate, GLD units failed to respond to calls for help from local villagers and allowed numerous massacres to take place (Sidhoum and Algeria-Watch, 2003, p. 35). GLD members

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were accused of excessive brutality in committing mass killings and murdering whole families of alleged government opposition supporters or even killing civilians to resolve personal feuds or seize their possessions. In numerous villages GLD units extorted money from the local population or stole cattle. Moreover, evidence suggests that GLD units often disguised themselves as members of the opposition or other armed groups to commit crimes and robberies, which they later blamed on the group they had been impersonating (p. 29). In Colombia, government-supported paramilitaries, such as the United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia (AUC), served as one tool in the decades-long war against insurgents, in particular the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). The governmentled disarmament of these paramilitaries began in 2002, but it progressed in fits and starts; observers argue that the process did little to dismantle these organizations. Many of those involved in the paramilitaries have since created or joined criminal gangs as a result of the lack of resources for reintegration support and a lack of alternatives. These gangs reportedly have ties to the insurgency, narco-trafficking, and other criminal activities (Manwaring, 2009, p. 18). Evidence also suggests that some of these gangs maintain political ties to high-level politicians (p. 17) while others have turned against the government and attacked political parties and government officials opposed to the drug trade (Tsvetkova, 2009e). 7d 7K9 fWhWc_b_jWho \_]^j[h a_ii[i ^_i ]kd X[\eh[ jkhd_d] _j _d Zkh_d] W Z[ceX_b_pWj_ed Y[h[cedo _d 9Wcfei :ei" 9ebecX_W$ Â&#x17E; Pe[ I[biao%7F F^eje

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PGAGs that start as community defence organizations, providing security to local communities, can grow into something stronger. In Pakistan, the government has supported the lashkars, a collective name for local tribal militias, formed in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas along the Pakistani–Afghan border to protect local villages from Taliban attacks.11 Lashkars exist independently of the government and are generated by communities as temporary security structures. They operate where the police and military prove ineffective in responding to security threats. The role of lashkars in defending against Taliban attacks has won them some government support, though not always generous. Due to the inability of the government to control the lashkars, the military has been reluctant to supply them with weapons (Perlez and Shah, 2008). The lashkars’ hostility towards the government for not fulfilling promises to provide military backup for newly established local units has fed these fears. Critics—both external and in the government—are concerned that when the Taliban threat is eliminated, the lashkars will possess enough military power to be able to refuse to disarm and instead initiate their own rebellion against the military (Amin-Khan, 2008).

9ED9BKI?ED Given their widespread use in many countries, as well as the risks they pose to civilians, greater efforts should be made to assess when and why PGAGs are used, how they operate, and their impact on civilian populations. These groups cannot simply be equated with legitimate state forces or dismissed as uncontrollable bandits. Nor can they be excused as a necessary evil because the state does not or cannot provide security in certain areas. Investigations into PGAGs need to focus on both conflict and non-conflict countries. They are not a purely warrelated phenomenon. PGAGs have operated in elections, governance, and security. In areas where the state is weak or absent, PGAGs have served as a substitute for both state administration (such as by providing basic services or arbitrating disputes) and state security forces (such as vigilantes doing the work of the police). While these groups can provide security in some instances, questions need to be posed as to why they are used in lieu of state security forces, and whether they are the best response to insecurity. In many cases they have proven to be poor solutions for achieving security. The use of PGAGs as state proxies has significant political and security implications. Political actors tend to focus on the immediate benefits of co-opting or creating their own personal militias (such as political power or security gains), but fail to consider the long-term security threat such groups could pose (to politicians, regions, or the state itself). The use of violence as an instrument of politics carries great risk. Although many countries in which PGAGs operate are ostensibly democratic, employing violence to ensure electoral victory or popular acquiescence to government policies threatens the very principles of a democratic state. The use of such groups, often prone to human rights violations and other abuses, threatens the security of the population and the stability of the government. Groups created to assist and support a government often challenge it further down the road. Very few governments have demonstrated the willingness or capacity to control these groups effectively once they are set loose or to punish them when they cross the line.

B?IJ E< 788H;L?7J?EDI APC

All People’s Congress (Sierra Leone)

GLD

Groupes de légitime défense (self-defence units, Algeria)

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IRGC

Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps

PGAG

Pro-government non-state armed group

PKK

Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Turkey)

SLPP

Sierra Leone People’s Party

UPDF

Uganda Peoples Defence Force

;D:DEJ;I 1

For examples of databases on conflicts and armed groups see: Afghanistan Conflict Monitor (n.d.); Armed Groups Project (n.d.); IISS (n.d.); RULAC (n.d.); SIPRI (n.d.); Small Arms Survey (n.d.); Transnational and Non-State Armed Groups (n.d.a).

See the following for definitions and classifications of various types of non-state armed group: Capie (2004); Florquin and Berman (2005);

This chapter does not address the use of private military companies. For a discussion of private military companies see Holmqvist (2005a);

The database can be found at PGAG (n.d.).

Policzer (2005); Shultz, Farah, and Lochard (2004); Vinci (2006); Williams (2008). Singer (2001). 5

For a discussion of these sub-groups, see Carey, Mitchell, and Lowe (2009).

For a discussion of why states use these groups, see Mitchell (2004).

For more information on these human rights abuses, see HRW (1999a).

For more on the IRGC, see GlobalSecurity.org (n.d.).

This discussion of the Arrow Boys is based on Tsvetkova (2009c). For more details on the Arrow Boys, see Transnational and Non-State Armed

For more details on the Amuka militia, see Transnational and Non-State Armed Groups (n.d.c).

Discussion of lashkars based on Tsvetkova (2009d).

Groups (n.d.b).

8?8B?E=H7F>O Afghanistan Conflict Monitor. n.d. ‘Non-State Armed Groups.’ <http://www.afghanconflictmonitor.org/armedgroups.html> Afrobarometer. 2008. Ethnicity and Violence in the 2007 Elections in Kenya. Afrobarometer Briefing Paper No. 48. February. <http://www.afrobarometer.org/papers/AfrobriefNo48.pdf> AI (Amnesty International). 1999. Indonesia/East Timor: No End to the Crisis for East Timorese Refugees. Report No. ASA 21/208/1999. London: Amnesty International. 1 December. Alvarez, Alex. 2006. ‘Militias and Genocide.’ War Crimes, Genocide, & Crimes against Humanity, Vol. 2, pp. 1–33. Amin-Khan, Tariq. 2008. ‘Pakistani Lashkars Join Fight against Taliban.’ Real News Network. 15 October. Anderson, David M. 2002. ‘Vigilantes, Violence and the Politics of Public Order in Kenya.’ African Affairs, Vol. 101, No. 405, pp. 531–55. Armed Groups Project. n.d. ‘The Armed Groups Project.’ <http://www.armedgroups.org> Bazenguissa-Ganga, Rémy. 1999. ‘The Spread of Political Violence in Congo-Brazzaville.’ African Affairs, Vol. 98, No. 390, pp. 37–54. BBC News. 2009. ‘Turkish Massacre Villagers Flee.’ 7 May. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8038346.stm> Bhatia, Michael V. 2005. ‘Fighting Words: Naming Terrorists, Bandits, Rebels and Other Violence Actors.’ Third World Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 1, pp. 5–22. Butler, Christopher K., Sabine Carey, and Neil J. Mitchell. 2009. Delegating Repression: The Effect of Pro-government Militias on Human Rights Violations. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Toronto, Canada. September. Capie, David. 2004. Armed Groups, Weapons Availability and Misuse: An Overview of the Issues and Options for Action. Background Paper. Geneva: Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. May. Carey, Sabine and Neil J. Mitchell. 2009. Pro-government Armed Groups Database. Unpublished background paper. Geneva: Small Arms Survey. —, —, and Will Lowe. 2009. ‘A New Database on Pro-government Armed Groups.’ Paper presented at the Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, New York. February.

(-* IC7BB 7HCI IKHL;O (&'&

Davis, Diane E. 2009. ‘Non-State Armed Actors, New Imagined Communities, and Shifting Patterns of Sovereignty and Insecurity in the Modern World.’ Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 30, No. 2, pp. 221–45. Doder, Dusko. 1991. ‘The “Rambo from Knin” Drills His Serb Guerrillas Thoroughly for War against Croatia.’ Baltimore Sun. 8 August. Filkins, Dexter. 2009. ‘Afghan Militias Battle Taliban with Aid of U.S.’ The New York Times. 22 November. Flint, Julie. 2009. Beyond ‘Janjaweed’: Understanding the Militias of Darfur. HSBA Working Paper 17. Geneva: Small Arms Survey. Florquin, Nicolas and Eric G. Berman, eds. 2005. Armed and Aimless: Armed Groups, Guns, and Human Security in the ECOWAS Region. Geneva: Small Arms Survey. Garçon, José. 1998. ‘La dérive sanglante des milices en Algérie : Une douzaine de “patriotes” suspectés de massacres de civils.’ Libération. 15 April. <http://www.algeria-watch.de/mrv/mrvmili/milices.htm> —. 2004. ‘Deux anciens miliciens accusés de “crimes contre l’humanité”, arrêtés à Nîmes: La “sale guerre” algérienne rebondit en France.’ Libération. 31 March. <http://www.algeria-watch.org/fr/article/just/miliciens_france.htm> GlobalSecurity.org. n.d. ‘Pasdaran: Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps.’ <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iran/pasdaran.htm> Hazen, Jennifer M. 2007. Small Arms, Armed Violence, and Insecurity in Nigeria: The Niger Delta in Perspective. Occasional Paper No. 20. Geneva: Small Arms Survey. —. 2009a. ‘Armed Groups: Situating Gangs within the Spectrum of Violence.’ Paper presented at the Centre on Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding conference on ‘Global Gangs’, Geneva, Switzerland. May. —. 2009b. ‘From Social Movement to Armed Group: A Case Study from Nigeria.’ Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 30, No. 2, pp. 281–300. Holmqvist, Caroline. 2005a. Private Security Companies: The Case for Regulation. SIPRI Policy Paper No. 9. Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. January. —. 2005b. ‘Engaging Armed Non-State Actors in Post-Conflict Settings.’ In Alan Bryden and Heiner Hänggi, eds. Security Governance in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding. Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, pp. 45–68. HRW (Human Rights Watch). 1999a. Behind the Conflict in Kashmir: Abuses by Indian Security Forces and Militant Groups Continue. New York: HRW. July. <http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/1999/07/01/behind-kashmir-conflict/> —. 1999b. East Timor: Forced Expulsions to West Timor and the Refugee Crisis. New York: HRW. December. <http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1999/wtimor/> ICG (International Crisis Group). 2004. Nepal: Dangerous Plans for Village Militias. Asia Briefing Paper. Brussels: ICG. 17 February. —. 2007. Southern Thailand: The Problem with Paramilitaries. Asia Report No. 140. Brussels: ICG. 23 October. IISS (International Institute for Strategic Studies). n.d. ‘Armed Conflict Database.’ <http://www.iiss.org/publications/armed-conflict-database> Kahl, Colin H. 1998. ‘Population Growth, Environmental Degradation, and State-sponsored Violence: The Case of Kenya, 1991–93.’ International Security, Vol. 23, No. 2, pp. 80–119. Koefner, Gottfried. 2000. ‘Displacement in East Timor.’ Refugee Survey Quarterly, Vol. 19, No. 2, pp. 77–88. Manwaring, Max G. 2009. State and Nonstate Associated Gangs: Credible ‘Midwives of New Social Orders.’ Working paper. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, United States Army War College. May. <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?PubID=876> Meagher, Kate. 2007. ‘Hijacking Civil Society: The Inside Story of the Bakassi Boys Vigilante Group of South-eastern Nigeria.’ Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 45, No. 1, pp. 89–115. Mitchell, Neil J. 2004. Agents of Atrocity: Leaders, Followers and the Violation of Human Rights in Civil War. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Perlez, Jane. 2003. ‘Indonesian General Is Charged.’ The New York Times. 26 February. — and Pir Zubair Shah. 2008. ‘Pakistan Uses Tribal Militias in Taliban War.’ The New York Times. 24 October. PGAG (Pro-Government Armed Groups: Militias and Violent Non-State Actors Around the World). n.d. ‘Pro-Government Armed Groups.’ <http://www.abdn.ac.uk/militias/> Policzer, Pablo. 2005. Neither Terrorists nor Freedom Fighters. Working Paper No. 5. Calgary, Canada: Armed Groups Project. February. Roessler, Philip G. 2005. ‘Donor-induced Democratization and the Privatization of State Violence in Kenya and Rwanda.’ Comparative Politics, Vol. 37, No. 2, pp. 207–26. RULAC (Rule of Law in Armed Conflicts Project). n.d. ‘The Rule of Law in Armed Conflicts Project.’ <http://www.adh-geneva.ch/RULAC> Ryter, Loren. 2002. Youth, Gangs, and the State in Indonesia. Doctoral thesis. Department of Political Science, University of Washington, Seattle. —. 2009. Militias and Gangs in Indonesia. Unpublished background paper. Geneva: Small Arms Survey. Schuman, Michael. 2002. ‘A Failed State?’ Time. 21 October. Shultz, Richard H., Douglas Farah, and Itamara V. Lochard. 2004. Armed Groups: A Tier-One Security Priority. INSS Occasional Paper 57. Colorado Springs: United States Air Force Institute for National Security Studies. September.

FHE#=EL;HDC;DJ (-+

Sidhoum, Salah-Eddine and Algeria-Watch. 2003. Les milices dans la nouvelle guerre d’Algérie. <http://www.algeria-watch.org/fr/mrv/mrvmili/aw_ses_milices_1.htm> Sihaloho, Markus Junianto and Amir Tejo. 2009. ‘Ethnic Chinese Said to Blame Prabowo for 1998.’ Jakarta Globe. 24 June. Simpson, Elisabeth. 2009. Election Violence in Africa. Unpublished background paper. Geneva: Small Arms Survey. Singer, P. W. 2001. ‘Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry and Its Ramifications for International Security.’ International Security, Vol. 26, No. 3, pp. 186–220. SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute). n.d. ‘Trends in Armed Conflict.’ <http://www.sipri.org/research/conflict/trends> Sjögren, Anders and Per Karlsson. 2008. From Dream to Nightmare: The Kenyan 2007 Elections. Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute. 18 January. <http://www.nai.uu.se/policy_activities/articles/sjogren_and_karlsson/> Small Arms Survey. n.d. ‘Armed Groups.’ <http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/files/portal/issueareas/perpetrators/armgroup.html> Stepanova, Ekaterina. 2008. ‘Trends in Armed Conflicts.’ In Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). SIPRI Yearbook 2008: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 43–71. TAPOL. 2003. ‘Kopassus and the Maluku Crisis.’ Tapol Bulletin. January/February, pp. 169–70. Thomson, Janice E. 1994. Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns: State-building and Extraterritorial Violence in Early Modern Europe. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Transnational and Non-State Armed Groups. n.d.a. ‘Transnational and Non-State Armed Groups.’ <http://www.armed-groups.org> —. n.d.b. ‘The “Arrow Boys.”’ <http://www.armed-groups.org/6/section.aspx/ViewGroup?id=76> —. n.d.c. ‘The Amuka Boys (or Rhino).’ <http://www.armed-groups.org/6/section.aspx/ViewGroup?id=75> Tsvetkova, Bilyana. 2009a. Pro-government Armed Groups in Turkey. Unpublished background paper. Geneva: Small Arms Survey. —. 2009b. Pro-government Armed Groups in Iran. Unpublished background paper. Geneva: Small Arms Survey. —. 2009c. Pro-government Armed Groups in Uganda. Unpublished background paper. Geneva: Small Arms Survey. —. 2009d. Pro-government Armed Groups in Pakistan. Unpublished background paper. Geneva: Small Arms Survey. —. 2009e. Pro-government Armed Groups in Colombia. Unpublished background paper. Geneva: Small Arms Survey. Utas, Mats. 2009. Sierra Leone: Election Violence and Armed Groups. Unpublished background paper. Geneva: Small Arms Survey. — and Maya M. Christensen. 2008. ‘Mercenaries of Democracy.’ African Affairs, Vol. 107, No. 429, pp. 515–39. Vinci, Anthony. 2006. ‘The “Problems of Mobilization” and the Analysis of Armed Groups.’ Parameters, Vol. 36, No. 1, pp. 49–62. Wanandi, Jusuf. 2002. ‘Indonesia: A Failed State?’ The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 3, pp. 135–46. Weitz, Eric D. 2003. A Century of Genocide: Utopias of Race and Nation. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Williams, Phil. 2008. Violent Non-state Actors and National and International Security. Zurich: International Relations and Security Network, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology. Worth, Robert F. and Nazila Fathi. 2009. ‘Iranian Students Clash with Police.’ The New York Times. 7 December. <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/08/world/middleeast/08iran.html>

79ADEMB;:=;C;DJI Fh_dY_fWb Wkj^eh Jennifer M. Hazen 9edjh_Xkjehi

Sabine Carey, Neil Mitchell, Loren Ryter, Bilyana Tsvetkova, Mats Utas

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8WYa je j^[ 8h_da 7HC;: L?EB;D9; ?D IEKJ>;HD IK:7D ?DJHE:K9J?ED The optimism that followed the 2005 peace agreement between Sudan’s governing National Congress Party (NCP) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A)1 has long faded. As the six-year ‘interim period’ following the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) winds down, implementation of several key provisions has effectively stalled and trust between the parties is extremely low. Both sides have upgraded their military capabilities in advance of the referendum on self-determination for the South, scheduled for January 2011 (Lewis, 2009, p. 16). As of late 2009 many Sudan watchers viewed the CPA as little more than a temporary—and faltering—ceasefire (Ashworth, 2009, p. 5). Indications are that the NCP will continue to resist full implementation of the deal for as long as it can and that the SPLM/A will fight to defend it if necessary, in particular the referendum.2 Dogged by allegations of corruption and poor performance, the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS)—which was formed in 2005 with an SPLM majority—views the referendum as one of the few ways to re-establish its waning legitimacy.3 Meanwhile, security in the South deteriorated markedly in 2009 and is understood by the GoSS as an extension of the second civil war (Small Arms Survey, 2009, p. 1).4 An array of armed ethnic or tribal groups with numerous grievances against the GoSS was involved, some manipulated by powerbrokers jockeying for influence, control, and wealth. In September, the SPLA chief of staff estimated that there was a 50 per cent chance of a ‘return to war with the NCP’,5 yet the likelihood of intensified (and related) inter-ethnic Southern fighting before and after 2011 appears even higher. Despite these tensions, as of the end of 2009 the peace process continued to lurch forward.6 But both sides were keeping their military options open. Key findings of the chapter are the following: s The upsurge in intra-Southern violence in 2009 was directly linked to the conduct of the civil war and the history of Southern fragmentation. s With the approach of the 2010 elections and January 2011 referendum,7 Southern violence has become increasingly politicized, jeopardizing the fragile CPA. s Powerbrokers appear to be actively stoking conflict in the South. s The GoSS has been unable to stem the rising violence; its preferred approach—forcible disarmament—may actually exacerbate insecurity. s As 2011 nears, the possibility of further politicized armed conflict in Sudan is significant. This chapter reviews the history of proxy fighting in the South and the fragmentation of Southern Sudan’s armed groups during the 1990s. It highlights key sources of insecurity as of late 2009, identifying the actors involved and

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setting these against the historical backdrop of the South’s numerous ‘interlocking’ wars (Johnson, 2003, p. 13). It places the rising levels of violence involving tribal groups in the wider context of NCP–GoSS relations, the CPA stalemate, and the inability of the GoSS to provide meaningful governance and security. Finally, it highlights Sudan’s lack of cohesion and uncertain, even bleak, future if the necessary steps are not taken to stabilize it.8 This chapter draws on more than three years’ worth of qualitative and quantitative research on Sudan’s security dynamics by a range of consultants for the Small Arms Survey’s Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) project.9 Between August 2009 and January 2010, the authors undertook a series of additional interviews for this chapter with Sudanese officials and members of civil society as well as international staff working in Southern Sudan.10

J>; B;=79O E< IK:7DÊI 9?L?B M7HI0 J>; II:< 7D: ?DJH7#IEKJ>;HD L?EB;D9; Sudan’s national governments have a long history of using proxies in Southern Sudan, the North–South border areas, and, more recently, Darfur to fight their wars and preserve their regular forces. These militias, recruited locally, and with covert ties to the national government, have engaged in mass murder, displacement, sexual violence, and looting at little expense to Khartoum.11 IkZWdÊi dWj_edWb

In Southern Sudan, the national Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) employed these tactics predominantly following the

]el[hdc[dji ^Wl[ disastrous 1991 split in the SPLA rebel group.12 A group of senior commanders in the Upper Nile region13 defected in W bed] ^_ijeho e\ protest at the autocratic leadership style of the SPLA’s founder, John Garang, a Dinka; Garang’s support for a united ki_d] fhen_[i _d ‘New Sudan’;14 and SPLA abuses against civilians. This split led to multiple intra-Southern civil wars that ‘fed into, Iekj^[hd IkZWd$

and intensified, the fighting of the overall “North–South” war’ (Johnson, 2003, p. 127). Khartoum successfully exploited ethnic and political divisions in the South and border areas, buying loyalty with material goods, arms, and ammunition. Dozens of competing Southern armed groups and government-backed militias proliferated, just as Garang’s SPLA faction15 was weakened by the loss of support from its patron, Ethiopia.16 Many of the Khartoum-aligned groups were created and then armed by the National Islamic Front (NIF)—the precursor to the ruling NCP—in a deliberate strategy of ‘divide and rule’. By 1997, seven groups in the government camp signed the Khartoum Peace Agreement with the NIF, thereby forming the largely symbolic South Sudan Defence Forces (SSDF) umbrella.17 Its members were directed and supplied by the SAF’s Military Intelligence branch (Young, 2007, p. 17; Arnold, 2007, pp. 17–18).18 Crucially, the peace deal recognized the SSDF as the sole security force ‘representing’ Southern Sudan, established a ‘Coordinating Council’ with devolved powers for the South, and stipulated the right to a referendum on self-determination (Khartoum Peace Agreement, 1997, art. 10). The SSDF viewed the referendum as a much-desired opportunity for the South to secede.19 The SPLM/A–United faction, led by Lam Akol, signed a separate agreement with the NIF in 1997—the Fashoda Peace Agreement—which also promised a referendum on self-determination20 (Fashoda Peace Agreement, 1997, art. 2). The NIF did not honour its promises, however,21 and the 1990s saw intensified intra-Southern, inter-ethnic fighting as the SPLA factions continued to split, and Khartoum persisted in its search for discontented groups to arm and support. This led to some of the worst atrocities of the civil war, including the ‘Bor massacre’ of Dinka civilians by Riek Machar’s Nuer forces in John Garang’s home district in Jonglei starting in 1991. Further examples include the war fought between forces loyal to Riek Machar and Paulino Matiep (both Nuer) over control of the oil fields in Unity State, the mass displacement of Southerners, and the misappropriation of food aid and resulting starvation caused

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by government-backed militias. The original SPLA split, which was driven by widely felt dissatisfaction with Garang, was essentially ‘diverted and obscured by the resurrection of a tribal idiom’ (Johnson, 2003, p. 115). Indeed, atrocities exacerbated inter-communal bitterness, leading Dinka–Nuer and Nuer–Nuer wars to unfold. These were fought parallel to wars against the NIF in other marginalized areas of (Northern) Sudan, including in the Nuba Mountains, Blue Nile, Eastern Sudan, and eventually Darfur. Over time the numbers within the SSDF camp fighting proxy wars on Khartoum’s behalf grew significantly. An April 2001 conference added a large number of armed tribal groups to the umbrella; many of them had started out as village defence protection units against marauding SPLA. This significantly increased the SSDF’s size, areas of control, and ability to disrupt the SPLA. The new groups included armed ethnic forces, mostly former SPLA members, from the Bari, Didinga, Dinka, Fertit, Mundari, Murle, Nuer, and Toposa communities. Foreign armed groups such as the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) from Uganda were also used by Khartoum as proxy forces in the South, a relationship that was facilitated by SSDF members, including Riek Machar.22 The various elements of the SSDF were deliberately kept divided and in a constant state of flux. They were vari- 8o j^[ j_c[ e\ j^[ ably loyal to Khartoum; ultimately, however, the complex tapestry of alliances proved both strategically and tactically 9F7 _d (&&+" j^[ useful to the SAF. By the time of the signing of the CPA in 2005, they posed a significant threat to the SPLA, not least II:< fei[Z W because they had the ability to recruit large numbers within their local communities (Arnold, 2007, p. 494). They i_]d_\_YWdj j^h[Wj controlled swathes of Upper Nile, parts of Northern and Western Bahr el Ghazal, and parts of Eastern Equatoria (Young, je j^[ IFB7$ 2006, p. 19), provided ‘protection’ for the SAF garrison towns in the South, and permitted the movement of SAF troops through their territory. Crucially, they also facilitated Khartoum’s development of the oil industry in central Southern Sudan by ‘clearing’ the oil-fields of local inhabitants in tandem with SAF helicopter gunships and government-backed Arab militias known as the Murahil. Never amounting to a coherent political or military movement, however, groups engaged in routine and pragmatic flip-flopping of allegiances, including to obtain ammunition and weapons from different sources: ‘Tribal, clan, or regional loyalties and the pursuit of personal interest regularly trumped ideology’ (Young, 2006, p. 19). Ironically, the mainstream SPLM/A won both the propaganda and the military wars, in spite of Garang’s unpopular vision of a united New Sudan. The SSDF acquired a pariah status (dubbed ‘government stooges’ by the SPLM/A), and received no international support for either the Khartoum or Fashoda agreements. Ultimately, the NCP—under intense pressure from the international community—and the SPLM/A signed the CPA, the latter on the South’s behalf. Having deliberately excluded the SSDF from the peace negotiations, the CPA then outlawed all other armed forces (apart from the SPLA) operating in Southern Sudan. This forced SSDF members, as well as armed groups that fell outside the umbrella, to join either the SPLA or the SAF (or their respective security forces) or return to civilian life to join ‘the civil service or civil society institutions’ (CPA, 2005, Agreement on Security Arrangements, para. 7b). The CPA therefore cemented the SPLM/A’s power base and, at the same time, sought to ensure that all ‘Other Armed Groups‘ (mostly Southern pro-government militias) would not be able to destabilize the region in the post-CPA period. Isolated, and wishing to remain in the South, the disparate members of the SSDF were forced to adapt. Even before the CPA was signed, a number of key militia commanders had returned to the SPLA fold, among them Riek Machar (Southern People’s Defence Forces, among other groups); James Leah and Tito Biel (South Sudan Independence Movement); Lam Akol (SPLM/A–United); and Martin Kenyi (Equatoria Defence Force). Following Garang’s unexpected death in August 2005, his deputy Salva Kiir inherited the role of GoSS president with a number of long-lasting repercussions. A ‘power-centre’ emerged around Salva, while supporters of Garang’s united New Sudan

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project were isolated, and the SPLM–NCP political partnership deteriorated and became severely asymmetrical (Nyaba, 2009, pp. 4–5).23 Crucially, however, Salva broke almost immediately with Garang’s policy of ostracizing the Southern militias, leading to the signing of the Juba Declaration in January 2006,24 as part of which the SSDF and various Other Armed Groups officially aligned with the SPLA. By 2009, approximately 30 militias, officially numbering 32,000 fighters, had ‘joined’ the SPLA.25 The deal was sweetened with food, cash, free accommodation during the official integration period, and the promise of regular salaries once the forces were ‘integrated’ (Arnold, 2007, p. 497). Paulino Matiep, former SSDF chief of staff, was rewarded with the position of deputy commander in chief of the SPLA (and has since been promoted to the rank of lieutenant-general), nominally taking second place after Salva in the SPLA hierarchy.26 Similarly encouraged by cash, arms and ammunition, a barracks in Khartoum, and positions in the CPA-mandated Joint Integrated Units (JIUs), approximately 10,400 Southern fighters officially ‘aligned’ with the SAF (Arnold, 2007, p. 505; Small Arms Survey, 2007a, pp. 340–44). Most of these came from forces that split, with the majority joining the SPLA and much smaller numbers remaining in the SAF camp. The ‘bidding war’ between the NCP and SPLA for force loyalty was especially intense in strategic locations such as oil concession areas.27 The Juba Declaration was a significant diplomatic victory, therefore, in that it won over large numbers of key Southern commanders. But integration into the SPLA—a force numbering an estimated 125,000, about a quarter of which may be former SSDF—has been fraught with logistical difficulties and tensions between the former enemies (Small Arms Survey, 2009, p. 8). As a result, the fledgling Southern army has suffered defections and persistent command and control weaknesses. 7i e\ bWj[ (&&/" j^[

As of late 2009, the impact of the intra-Southern fighting during the civil war was still deeply felt. Among the

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Khartoum-backed militia members who subsequently declared allegiance to the SPLA, long-standing grievances

Iekj^[hd \_]^j_d] against the Southern army and the GoSS remain. These range from fears of the SPLA and GoSS being dominated by Zkh_d] j^[ Y_l_b mWh the Dinka ethnic group, personal animosities arising from wartime atrocities, concerns about the 2011 referendum,28 mWi ij_bb Z[[fbo \[bj$

and resentment at their marginalization within the army. As the Juba Declaration offered a blanket amnesty for all war-related activities, many influential commanders who fought one another during the civil war, and have long and brutal war records, have also become part of the GoSS and SPLA elites. These individuals continue to feud and compete for status, influence, and access to resources in their new positions, rendering both the GoSS and the SPLA profoundly factionalized and unstable. Meanwhile, deep war-related ethnic divisions are aggravated and exploited by politicians, military elites, and intellectuals alike.29 Just as there has been no attempt to promote national reconciliation since the CPA, despite its explicit inclusion in the Protocol on Power Sharing (CPA, 2005, art. 1.7), there has been little effort to advance sustainable Southern reconciliation in the aftermath of the Juba Declaration.30 The continuing deep divisions weigh heavily on Southern Sudan’s future.

:OD7C?9I E< ?DI;9KH?JO ?D IEKJ>;HD IK:7D In 2009, Southern Sudan experienced a major spike in armed violence, causing some 2,500 deaths and displacing 350,000 (Oxfam, 2010, p. 1; see Map 11.1). The violence took place as implementation of the CPA reached crisis point,31 with the GoSS almost exclusively preoccupied with countering perceived Northern aggression, at the expense of security and governance issues closer to home (Small Arms Survey, 2009, pp. 3–4). This section notes the numerous

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structural factors that have underpinned and exacerbated the recent violence and then identifies key armed actors who are or may become involved in armed violence in the run-up to 2011 and beyond. Structural factors are grouped under the broad headings of ‘governance’, ‘ethnicity’, ‘economy’, and ‘society’. =el[hdWdY[

s Five years after the signing of the CPA, the GoSS is struggling to develop accountable, democratic state institutions and to provide basic services such as health and education. There are many reasons for this, including a profound lack of capacity, but anger at what is seen as an exploitative, corrupt, unrepresentative, and ill-performing Juba government is widespread and growing. s Disenfranchised communities are competing fiercely over the most basic resources and are unable to appeal to legitimate institutions to resolve their disputes. Increasingly, they are taking matters into their own hands, as growing food insecurity exacerbates existing tensions.

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s Post-CPA violence is largely attributable to the inability of the GoSS to maintain law and order. The fledgling Southern Sudan Police Service, mandated to provide internal security and respond to tribal violence, numbers about 28,000, but most of its members are untrained, irregularly paid, and have little or no equipment, vehicles, facilities, or infrastructure to aid their work.32 s Southern Sudan’s long-standing culture of impunity is aggravated by the absence of a functioning legal system and the unwillingness of the GoSS to identify and hold the instigators of recent violence to account. s Land policy and administration is extremely weak or non-existent. Contested land, property, water, and migration rights exacerbate problems at the local level.33 The demarcation of electoral constituencies, seen as a key means of obtaining resources and funding for communities, has become an additional source of inter-communal tension. ;j^d_Y_jo

s Communities’ mistrust of the GoSS is rooted in a perception of tribal bias within the Southern government. It is widely accused of being dominated by the Dinka and of favouring clansmen and others loyal to it through a discriminatory patronage system.

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s The GoSS faces significant budgetary problems—the treasury remains wholly dependent on volatile oil prices.34 s There is an almost complete absence of livelihoods and infrastructure combined with a hugely disempowered male population with little formal education and few marketable skills. Many of these men are willing recruits of armed ethnic groups and raiding parties. s Cattle, central to pastoralist culture, are at the centre of numerous inter-communal conflicts. Large-scale cattle raiding is deeply engrained for both cultural and economic reasons. IeY_[jo

s The widespread availability of firearms within communities and beliefs surrounding the ‘power of the gun’ fuel conflict. s The erosion of traditional authority and practices concerning reconciliation and customary law has rendered communities unable to control their heavily armed youths. Not surprisingly, the GoSS is overwhelmed by the complexity of building up Southern Sudan literally from scratch after the devastation of the civil war. It has little or no presence outside of many cities and towns and finds itself lurching from crisis to crisis. Adding to the problem is the well-entrenched mentality among many of the political and military elites that objectives are best achieved by using, or at least threatening the use of, force—including forcible disarmament (see Box 11.1). The result is a zero-sum game of competition between powerbrokers amid a patchwork of interrelated conflicts.

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A wide range of actors drives insecurity in Southern Sudan. Since the CPA was signed there have been a number of open clashes between the parties, involving the SPLA on one side and Khartoumaligned forces on the other.40 In addition, there has been a dramatic spike in so-called ‘tribal violence’ or clashes, with many observers believing that these are increasingly fuelled by powerbrokers for political gain.41

7hc[Z jh_XWb ]hekfi Tribal violence was particularly pronounced in Jonglei and Upper Nile states in 2009, and to a lesser degree in Lakes and Eastern and Central Equatoria. The violence is both inter-tribal—such as between the Murle and the Lou Nuer—and intra-tribal, such as between the Lou Nuer and the Jikany Nuer (see below). Many of these conflicts are long-standing and stem from the civil war, but they are being exacerbated by drought and food shortages, and related migration conflicts among pastoralist communities and between pastoralists and agriculturalists. The United Nations estimates that the ongoing food crisis and absence of rains in 2009 will force pastoralists to move their animals farther in search of water and pasture, increasing the likelihood of continued clashes in 2010 (UNOCHA, 2009, p. 1). Striking features of the wave of violence in 2009 were the increased frequency of the attacks, the deliberate targeting of villages (as opposed to cattle camps for raiding purposes), and the fact that women and children made up the majority of the targeted victims (MSF, 2009, pp. 14–15; see Table 11.1). A typical attack of this kind— on Kalthok village in Lakes State in November 2009—saw 41 people killed, 10,000 displaced, and about 80 per cent of dwellings burnt to the ground. The fighting can involve hundreds of well-armed youths engaging in coordinated, militarized attacks. Increasing numbers of SPLA, police, and local officials have also been killed (UNSC, 2009b, p. 1). Much of the worst violence occurred in remote and inaccessible areas, where the GoSS has little or no presence. Consistent with civil war-era violence, political factors are exacerbating the insecurity. There are widespread allegations of arms and ammunition being supplied within Southern Sudan by elements of the NCP/SAF in an effort to destabilize the South. Based on the North’s conduct during the civil war, these seem plausible; they hold wide currency in Southern Sudan, although neither the GoSS/SPLA nor the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) has produced any documented evidence to date.42

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In a region where tribal identities carry over into the political realm, there is also the widespread perception that Southern politicians are using and provoking tribal conflicts to consolidate their support bases.43 In the incendiary environment prevailing in Southern Sudan, perceptions alone—whether justified or not—are sufficient to instigate local violence. Given the retaliatory nature of many of the conflicts, the struggle over natural resources, the structural weaknesses discussed above, and the lack of a security framework to address them, ‘tribal’ political violence appears set to continue. The following sections examine two of the ongoing feuds in Jonglei and Upper Nile States in more detail. Ckhb[ÅBek Dk[h Yed\b_Yj

The Murle–Lou Nuer conflict in Jonglei State is indicative of how tribal and political dynamics are intertwined in the post-CPA period. Long-standing conflict exploded into a series of massacres and retaliatory attacks in 2009. Following Murle attacks in January, a massive Lou Nuer retaliation caused around 450 Murle and 300 Nuer deaths. A Murle reprisal in April killed another 250 and displaced some 15,000 (Sudan Tribune, 2009b; MSF, 2009, p. 15). Further clashes in August and September killed hundreds more, with SPLA, local police, and state officials also targeted. Village huts have been routinely burned to the ground in the attacks, along with police stations and state offices. Political divisions between the communities stretch back decades to the first civil war (1956–72), when the government armed the Murle against the mainly Nuer Anyanya rebels. In the second civil war, SAF-supported traditional leader Sultan Ismael Konyi created a Murle ‘self-defence’ militia, the Pibor Defence Forces, to protect Murle assets and territory from the SPLA. He then changed tack in the post-CPA period, officially aligning with the SPLA in 2006 and becoming a GoSS presidential adviser on peace and reconciliation. His GoSS badge may not be a true reflection of his loyalties, however. He spends considerable time in Khartoum and remains close to some of his officers who joined the SAF. It remains unclear to what extent he may be involved in the ongoing Murle attacks against the Lou Nuer and other groups.44

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The Lou Nuer received weapons from both the SAF—via the SSDF—and the SPLA at different times during the civil war. But in contrast to most tribal ‘defence groups’, the Nuer so-called ‘white army‘ (a loose coalition of armed groups comprising mostly youths from local cattle camps) was largely independent, often offensive in nature, and extremely violent (Young, 2007, pp. 9, 26). A GoSS post-war disarmament effort, in 2006, was supposed to put an end to the force, but instead led to heavy fighting, at least 1,600 deaths,45 and only the temporary suppression of the Nuer ‘army’ (Small Arms Survey, 2007b).46 Since then this army has re-emerged for a number of reasons, including a widespread perception among the Lou that the state-level government is unwilling to protect them from ongoing raids47 and the kidnapping of their children despite repeated pleas. Key grievances include an attack in January 2009 on a convoy delivering salaries (some USD 35,000) to Lou-dominated Nyirol county state employees as well as the reported theft of more than 20,000 cattle in May 2007 by Dinka of Duk county (ICG, 2009b, p. 3). Analysts had predicted that the army would re-emerge unless former SSDF commanders were effectively integrated into the SPLA and the GoSS established functioning local government structures (Young, 2006, p. 10). Neither of these conditions has been met. Since the earlier incidents tensions with neighbouring Dinka, Jikany Nuer, Gawaar Nuer, and Murle have escalated over grazing rights. The youths have rearmed, with supplies coming from a number of sources.48

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There is little evidence to suggest that former SSDF leaders are in direct command of this resurgent Nuer ‘protection’ force, but it is clear that key leaders can mobilize hundreds (some say thousands) of fighters from local cattle camps and that the violence has now become politicized. During the war, ‘white army’ fighters were known to follow former SSDF high command member Simon Gatwich, a Lou Nuer and now a senior SPLA officer, into battle. A Lou Nuer attack on 20 September 2009 in which 1,000 Lou Nuer youths killed some 160 people (Dinka Bor) in Duk Padiet, Jonglei, as well as an earlier attack in Wernyol in Twic East county killing at least 40 were reportedly led by ‘Chibetek’ ?j _i Yb[Wh j^Wj Mabil Thiep, who was formerly under Simon. Chibetek remained unaligned following the Juba Declaration and was Bek Dk[hÅCkhb[ involved in a raid on an arms cache in Khorfulus (Sudan Tribune, 2009a).49 The victims of the attack, which occurred l_eb[dY[ ^Wi shortly after the Dinka-led state government blockaded a key trade route for the Nuer, included 11 SPLA fighters and X[Yec[ feb_j_Y_p[Z$

five Southern police. This dealt a serious blow to the state’s authority (Sudan Tribune, 2009a). Bek Dk[hÅ@_aWdo Dk[h Yed\b_Yj

A second significant tribal conflict with political overtones rages on and off between the Lou Nuer and Jikany Nuer of Nasir county, Upper Nile State. The Lou and Jikany were in open conflict in 1993–2004 in the wake of the SPLA split, but violent clashes were infrequent in the post-CPA period until 2009. A number of factors have led to a deterioration in relations, including the displacement of Jikany by Lou during the war and resulting land disputes, and a series of cattle thefts and abductions targeting Lou in mid-2009 (ICG, 2009b, p. 7). On 8 May 2009, armed Lou (many in uniforms) killed 71 Jikany, primarily women and children, in a military-style retaliatory attack. Subsequently, on 12 June, the Jikany intercepted a UN World Food Programme (WFP) convoy travelling along the Sobat River corridor to deliver food to 19,000 displaced Lou (UNMIS, 2009a, p. 1). Reports indicate that three additional boats had been added at Nasir;50 local Jikany suspected that these contained ammunition or arms.51 They were also unhappy about food aid being delivered to their Lou enemies. The boats were attacked by an armed Jikany force as they proceeded South to Akobo, sparking three days of fighting with the SPLA.52 As many as 119 may have been killed, including 89 SPLA (ICG, 2009b, p. 8). Sixteen of the boats were reportedly looted and five destroyed.53 The WFP boats had been chartered by Riek Gai Kok, a Jikany Nuer with a long background in intra-Southern conflict.54 Following the end of the war he split with SSDF leader Gordon Kong and took some of his men with him into the SPLA.55 It appears that some of them subsequently defected from the SPLA and participated in the attack on the WFP convoy.56 Many questions about the attack remain unanswered, including why the extra barges were added to the convoy and why the SPLA was accompanying a UN food convoy. The resulting closure of the Sobat River corridor—used to transport food and goods—for two months placed severe pressure on local communities, exacerbating local conflict (ICG, 2009b, p. 7).

J^[ BehZÊi H[i_ijWdY[ 7hco The LRA, led by Joseph Kony, remains a serious threat to security and stability, both in Southern Sudan and regionally. While the LRA was originally a northern Ugandan rebel group of ethnic Acholi with grievances against the Kampala government, more recently it has recruited an unknown number of Sudanese Acholi and Congolese and maintained an itinerant existence in border areas with Southern Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and the Central African Republic (CAR). It has long engaged in opportunistic violence in Southern Sudan, terrorizing communities and maintaining its numbers through kidnapping and the theft of ammunition and food. Khartoum supported the LRA against the SPLA during the civil war—countering support of the Uganda People’s Defence Force

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(UPDF) for the SPLA—and though its forces in Southern Sudan reportedly numbered fewer than 50 out of a total of 250–300 as of late 2009, the group is still widely feared.57 While the early post-CPA period saw a gradual move towards a Juba-mediated peace process between the Government of Uganda and the LRA, Kony failed on a number of occasions to turn up to the signing of the so-called Final Peace Agreement. In response, the UPDF, the SPLA, and the forces of the DRC, with the strategic support of the United States Africa Command,58 reverted to using military tactics by launching ‘Operation Lightning Thunder’ in December 2008, a military offensive that began with the bombing of the main LRA camp in Garamba National Park (DRC) (Schomerus and Tumutegyereize, 2009, p. 1). The attack damaged the rebel group and led to the recovery of numerous abductees, though Kony, who may have been warned in advance, escaped. More significantly, however, it scattered the LRA into small groups throughout Southern Sudan, the DRC, and CAR, creating a regional conflict zone and resulting in a series of vicious reprisal attacks from the LRA and mass displacement in late 2008. By November 2009, more than 220 people had been killed, at least 157 abducted, and more than 80,000 displaced (of which 17,000 were Congolese) by the LRA in attacks in Sudan’s Western and Central Equatoria states (IRIN, 2009). By late 2009 Kony had reportedly fled to CAR, just as a second US-supported joint SPLA–UPDF military operation got under-way. Initial reports suggested that the second campaign showed a stronger resolve to eliminate the group once and for all. By the end of the year, 400 LRA, including a number of commanders, had been killed or captured, or had defected, according to the Ugandan army chief. There were, however, also unconfirmed reports of the LRA regrouping and gaining training in camps in South Darfur with the support of the SAF (Ruati, 2009; 2010). The LRA’s ability to survive and regroup should not be underestimated. Military tactics alone are unlikely to defeat C_b_jWho jWYj_Yi the group. Previously poor coordination between the SPLA and the UPDF,59 as well as the SPLA’s lack of capacity, Wbed[ Wh[ kdb_a[bo also suggest that the group may remain a serious security threat in Southern Sudan and regionally.60 SAF support— je Z[\[Wj j^[ BH7$ which is reportedly ongoing—would also enhance its chances of long-term survival.

J^[ @e_dj ?dj[]hWj[Z Kd_ji The CPA-mandated JIUs, conceived as a joint SAF–SPLA force during the interim period and the nucleus of a national army in the event of future North–South unity, have not developed as intended. They are currently composed of some 32,700 troops, roughly 83 per cent of their mandated force strength. In most, if not all, locations throughout Southern Sudan and the three border areas of Abyei, South Kordofan, and Blue Nile, the SAF and SPLA components of these forces remain under the control of their respective armies. They have been almost completely ineffective in providing security and have in some cases generated considerable insecurity, including by reportedly distributing arms to local communities. Twice in Malakal, in 2006 and 2009, the JIUs were at the centre of orchestrated and politically motivated violence that resulted in major ceasefire violations. Both SAF and SPLA components of the Malakal JIU are made up of the largely Nuer Fangak Forces, a civil war-era SSDF militia that was led by Maj.-Gen. Gabriel Tang Gatwich Chan, popularly known as ‘Tang-Ginye’ or ‘Tang’. After the war, Tang became a SAF major-general, while his second in command, John Both, aligned with the SPLA. The two commanders split acrimoniously, and their divided supporters now make up a significant proportion of the SAF and SPLA components of the Malakal unit.61 The two forces clashed first in 2006 when the SPLA tried to woo Tang with the governorship of Upper Nile. When the GoSS balked at his demand to keep his ‘personal’ SAF forces while acting as GoSS governor, tensions led to an

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exchange of fire with the SPLA, during which an UNMIS soldier was killed. Subsequent violence led to 150 deaths

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before his former deputy’s forces blockaded Tang, forcing him to retreat to Khartoum. In February 2009, violence erupted again when Tang insisted on visiting Malakal to see relatives. This inspired his former militiamen in the SAF component of the JIU (at least 50 per cent of the SAF JIU component) to go on a rampage against the SPLA and local civilians, leaving 57 dead—one of the most significant violations of the ceasefire since the signing of the CPA. In the melee, a SAF tank was reportedly used to fire indiscriminately into a civilian area (HRW, 2009). The violence took place shortly after the announcement of the International Criminal Court arrest warrant for President Omar alBashir for alleged crimes committed in Darfur, leading observers to believe that Tang was sent to Malakal by elements within the NCP/Military Intelligence as a warning to the GoSS not to support the warrant.62 After the violence the SPLA reinforced its capabilities by bringing ten new tanks to Malakal, facing the SAF’s eight tanks on the other side of the town. The Malakal JIU is not the only holding place for former SSDF militiamen. UNMIS estimates that there are 983 SAF-aligned former SSDF in the SAF JIU components in Upper Nile and Jonglei. Though the SPLA denies it, SPLA-aligned SSDF elements have also reportedly been transferred to the JIUs. This appears to have been motivated by the desire to keep the main body of the SPLA free from armed group influence and infighting.63 Crucially, in each of the three most significant ceasefire violations since the CPA (twice in Malakal and once in Abyei in May 2008), the JIU components split and fought against one another. Their near-total lack of integration remains a huge concern. They also pose a risk in the likely event of a vote for Southern secession, since the SAF will have more than 15,000 JIU members stationed in Southern Sudan and strategic border areas.64 These disgruntled (and probably unpaid) soldiers could easily become entangled in fighting.

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J^[ IFB7 The Southern army is not a unitary actor but rather a heterogeneous collection of soldiers from a wide range of ethnic groups with different histories, experiences, and understandings of the civil war. The SPLA today includes many former enemies who were absorbed following the Juba Declaration, as well as fighters with vastly different levels of experience. Although the leadership has sought to modernize and professionalize the army, this process is in its infancy, jeopardizing security in the South in the meantime.65 Crucially, SPLA leaders reportedly admit that they may control as little as 30 per cent of the force and are unsure what the other 70 per cent would do should they be called upon to fight in the future.66 One major security concern is the overall organization of the army, which is increasingly top-heavy after the promotion of the numerous militia and armed group commanders to maintain their loyalty. A widening command and communication gap is apparent between the higher-level commanders and the rank and file. Due in part to the Southern policeâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s capacity problems, the army remains the de facto principal security provider in Southern Sudan. In practice it responds to localized violence in an ad hoc and militarized manner and without civilian oversight, creating confusion within communities about its mandate and leaving it open to accusations of bias (ICG, 2009b, p. 21). Indeed, in many cases, local SPLA are semi-autonomous, responding to these conflicts as members of their own tribes rather than as members of a professional, unified force. Perhaps more crucially in the context of Northâ&#x20AC;&#x201C;South tensions, the decentralization of the SPLA puts the organization at risk of at least partial collapse in the event of future intra-Southern armed conflict, or for more mundane reasons such as the failure to provide salaries.67 The SPLA is also unable to respond to insecurity like a conventional army because it lacks mobility and logistical support. This lack of capacity makes the long-distance movement, feeding, and housing of large numbers of troops

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extremely difficult. While the army is fully committed to professionalizing itself, it cannot remedy these weaknesses without money to buy essential assets, the development of operational systems, and sustained training (not to mention roads). Since most of its budget is spent on salaries, and the remainder on food and fuel, it will be impossible to do this in the short term.68 F[hiedWb \ehY[i%Éfh_lWj[ Whc_[iÊ

Within the SPLA, the personal forces or ‘private armies’ that remain loyal to former SSDF commanders also present a threat. Although the commanders and their men are officially SPLA, personal and historical lines of authority often trump loyalty to the army. To take one example, the late John Garang appointed Clement Wani, former commander of the Mundari Forces component of the SSDF, governor of Central Equatoria State. The Juba area had been under SAF control for most of the war and the local population was considered hostile to the Dinka and the SPLA. Clement, once aligned with the SPLM/A, has been able to facilitate the stationing of SPLA troops in Central Equatoria and provide security for the fledgling GoSS (Young, 2006, p. 34). In exchange, the GoSS has allowed him to retain his personal forces, which have since become an official state police force and continue to be controlled by him.69 Former SSDF commander Paulino Matiep also retains his former (now formally SPLA) forces in Bentiu and Central Equatoria. As of late 2009, Paulino and Vice-President Riek Machar were seeking to oust the governor of oil-rich Unity State, Taban Deng Gai—Riek’s brother-in-law who has his own personal force, reportedly supported by SPLA tanks, and is a long-time enemy from their SSDF days.70 GoSS president Salva Kiir has signalled his support for Taban, and Paulino’s agitation is seen as a direct challenge to SPLA authority in the state. This power struggle erupted into violence between men loyal to Paulino and Taban in early October 2009, killing 13 and wounding 19 (Sudan Tribune, 2009d). IWblW A__h ^Wi jh_[Z

Salva has tried to disarm these ‘private armies’, issuing a special directive in early 2008, but with no success to

je Z_iWhc Éfh_lWj[ date. Besides Clement and Paulino, Riek Machar, Ismael Konyi, and Abdel Bagi (GoSS presidential adviser for border Whc_[iÊ m_j^ de demarcation) have all openly defied the order.71 A second similar edict was reportedly issued in 2009 with no conikYY[ii je ZWj[$ crete results.72

These forces could be mobilized by their leaders in the event they decide to become political spoilers. Although officially part of the SPLA, many of the personal forces maintain links to former SSDF colleagues in the SAF, or could renew these ties easily. These wartime alliances can also be exploited—and may already have been—to facilitate arms flows and build up the military capacity of community youths. The long-term aspirations of these players remained unclear as of late 2009, but the possibility that some of them may mobilize their private armies for political gain remains high.73

IEKJ>;HD IK:7DÊI I;9KH?JO FH;# 7D: FEIJ#(&'' With multiple sources of insecurity—both actual and potential—the outlook for Southern Sudan is not positive. Mutual economic interests, as well as diplomatic carrots and sticks, may yet prevent the collapse of the CPA, but Southern Sudan will remain profoundly fragile. The common enemy in the ‘North’ and the desire to secede from Northern Sudan are still holding Southerners together—just—but this may change in the future. The root causes that led to the South’s fragmentation have not been meaningfully addressed, while the structural weaknesses underpinning the violence will take decades to remedy. In this precarious environment, any number of issues, or a combination thereof, could spark localized or large-scale political violence before, during, or after the referenda.

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Key CPA milestones that could underpin future conflict are the following: s a failure to reach agreement on the 2008 census results; s a failure to hold ‘fair’ elections, contested election results, or obvious rigging (see Box 11.2); 74 s contested North–South border demarcation;

s a failure to hold the referenda on self-determination for the South (or Abyei), obvious rigging, or a unilateral declaration of independence by the South in protest;75 s a failure to respect or faithfully implement the referenda results; 76 s a failure to hold meaningful CPA-mandated ‘popular consultations’ on the CPA in South Kordofan and Blue Nile;

s a failure to reach agreement on the sharing of Sudan’s resources in the likely event of secession. Other matches in the tinderbox could include forcible, ethnically targeted disarmament campaigns in the South, or the GoSS’s continued inability to provide basic services. Any of the armed entities reviewed in the chapter could be exploited by local, national, or regional powerbrokers in a return to full-scale armed conflict. The list is long and includes armed groups backed by Southern politicians, the SAF, SAF proxy forces, the SPLA, ‘private armies’, ex-SSDF factions within the SPLA, JIU components, and armed tribal groups and communities.

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Areas along the 2,000-km North–South border are most likely to be immediately affected by any renewed armed conflict. Rizeigat, Misseriya, Dinka, and Nuer communities compete and clash regularly over water, grazing areas, and cross-border migration rights, tensions that have historically been manipulated by Khartoum. Land rights are disputed in many areas and borders are unclear, leading to regular friction, including at Kharasana (on the border between Unity State and South Kordofan), in the Magenis area (bordering Upper Nile, White Nile, and South Kordofan), in the greater Malakal area, and around Abyei, where some 85 per cent of the Ngok Dinka community was displaced in the May 2008 fighting. Without clarity on who qualifies as a ‘resident’ of Abyei and is therefore entitled to vote in the Abyei referendum, the area is likely to see escalating tensions and violence. Meanwhile, the Technical Ad Hoc Border Committee, which officially started mapping the border in 2007, has recently made progress, despite being deadlocked for part of 2009 over accusations of political interference.83 Wherever there are strategic or economic assets, disputes may be expected. Oil is the most significant of these border resources and the stakes are extremely high. The parties are currently wrangling over the location of the Heglig and Bamboo oil fields,84 with the GoSS claiming they are in Unity State (Southern Sudan) and the NCP saying they are in South Kordofan (Northern Sudan) (Hemmer, 2009, p. 12). An estimated 82 per cent of Sudan’s oil fields are deemed to be located in Southern Sudan,

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excluding these two. If the North–South boundary is determined in the future to run north of Heglig/Bamboo, Southern Sudan will possess about 95 per cent of total current production.85 Any future military confrontations between the parties to the CPA are highly likely to be around the oil fields, despite the risks to oil production. There is a strong possibility of attempted annexations by the SAF and NCP-controlled oil police (which are already present around Heglig in violation of the CPA) if a border demarcation deal is not struck. The cross-border annual migration of Misseriya Arabs is also extremely tense and politicized.86 Local authorities insist that Misseriya migrating from South Kordofan into Southern Sudan must come unarmed, lest the SAF use the migration to foment violence or transport arms. Indeed, the entire border area has become heavily militarized and unstable, as both sides compete for strategic resources. In 2008 the SAF and SPLA established bases in Tishwin (on the South Kordofan–Unity border, controlling a main road from Khartoum to the South), within 300 m of each other.87 Some observers estimate that as much as 70 per cent of the SPLA is deployed in border areas.88 Oil-rich Unity and Upper Nile states on the southern side of the border are particularly volatile, with both forces maintaining a strong presence around key oil fields such as Heglig. A further potential complication in Unity State is the leasing in 2009 of a reported 400,000 hectares of land by Paulino Matiep’s son (CEO of Leac for Agriculture and Investment Company Limited) to Jarch Management Group, a company registered in the British Virgin Islands and run by a US businessman. Jarch purchased a 70 per cent share in Leac in return for the land lease, which is ostensibly for a joint agricultural venture, but appears to be about oil.89 The legal basis under which Paulino’s son is leasing the land, which Paulino himself controlled during the war as part of his ‘protection’ of the oil fields for the NCP, remains opaque. What is clear, however, is that large amounts of money and foreign businessmen banking on Southern secession will almost certainly complicate Southern Sudan’s fragile political and security landscape.

9ED9BKI?ED As the referenda approach, Southern Sudan sits at a crossroads. The GoSS and the SPLA are ill-equipped to meet the security challenges they face, and the 2010 elections and 2011 referenda bring further, serious risks of destabilization and violence. It is clear that the CPA has done little to address the many causes of the protracted civil war, yet the international community is only now waking up to this fact—with the CPA soon to expire, and few plans in place for the post-CPA period. The next 12 months are crucial to the future of Southern Sudan and the wider region. While UNMIS’s capacity problems and the risk-averse demands of contributing states have so far hampered implementation of its Chapter VII mandate ‘to protect civilians under imminent threat of violence’ (UNSC, 2005, para. 16(i)), a more dynamic approach could help to prevent or contain future violence.90 The mission has on occasion responded decisively to localized violence. Following fighting in late August 2009 in Mereng, Jonglei, for example, it provided low-altitude flyovers, flew in fully armed and operational SPLA, and conducted dynamic long-range foot patrols in the area.91 A range of other measures needs to be applied by the GoSS. Of particular importance is internal security. Expanded SPLA deployment in areas affected by violence appears essential in the short term but must be accompanied by clear and transparent rules of engagement, better civilian oversight (accountability), and improved training

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(including on law enforcement). A more visible and non-partisan security presence could dramatically ease tensions. Identifying the instigators of localized conflicts and holding them to account for their actions (including the incitement of violence) is also key, alongside renewed attention to inter-communal reconciliation. In the long term, a much greater focus on police reform is needed, with special attention to training and recruitment of qualified personnel. In addition, thoughtful, practical planning is urgently needed for post-2011 given that Southerners will almost certainly vote for secession.92 Aside from resolving remaining CPA-related disputes, cooperation is required on a host of other issues, including: North–South debt- and asset-sharing, including the oil pipeline and other infrastructure;93 citizenship rights (in particular the status and rights of Southerners living in the North and Northerners in the South); the status of the JIUs; future currency; the status of international treaties signed by Sudan; and future relations between the two ‘new’ states. The two parties desperately need to identify areas of common interest and to plan ahead to allow for a ‘peaceful divorce’ (Bure, 2009, p. 14). As of late 2009, distracted by the upcoming elections, the parties appeared unprepared for the future and in need of targeted international support. The needs are many, ranging from a continued focus on providing aid to the building of infrastructure and sustained training and logistical support for the GoSS’s struggling security forces. As the parties begin to discuss the mechanics of separation behind closed doors, the international community also has a role to play in continuing to push them to plan ahead. This needs to be undertaken in conjunction with coordinated international pressure, using the numerous financial and diplomatic incentives at donors’ disposal. Sudan’s willingness to respond to such pressure led to the signing of the CPA. It is now urgent that it be reapplied to prevent the agreement’s collapse and the South’s implosion.

B?IJ E< 788H;L?7J?EDI CAR

Central African Republic

CPA

Comprehensive Peace Agreement

DRC

Democratic Republic of the Congo

GoSS

Government of Southern Sudan

HSBA

Human Security Baseline Assessment

JIU

Joint Integrated Unit

LRA

Lord’s Resistance Army

NCP

National Congress Party

NIF

National Islamic Front

SAF

Sudan Armed Forces

SPLM/A

Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army

SSDF

South Sudan Defence Forces

UNMIS

United Nations Mission in Sudan

UPDF

Uganda People’s Defence Force

WFP

World Food Programme

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;D:DEJ;I 1

The SPLA, the Southern army, is the military wing of the SPLM political party; collectively, they are sometimes referred to as SPLM/A. Practically all senior SPLM members are former SPLA leaders.

See the Machakos Protocol (CPA, 2005, art. 2.5).

Interview with Sudan peacebuilding adviser, Nairobi, November 2009.

The civil wars took place in 1956–72 and 1983–2005.

Author interview with SPLA Chief of General Staff Lt.-Gen. James Hoth Mai, Juba, September 2009.

In December 2009, the parties reached agreement on several key laws, including one governing the Southern referendum.

A second referendum on whether Abyei will join Northern or Southern Sudan in the event of secession will take place at the same time as the Southern referendum. See the Protocol between the Government of Sudan and the SPLM/A on the Resolution of the Abyei Conflict (CPA, 2005, art. 1.3).

See de Waal (2009) on the need for a mutually advantageous agreement—either on unity or ‘consensual separation’—among Sudanese elites by 2011 to avoid a disastrous new war.

For reports and information on the HSBA project, see HSBA (n.d.).

The chapter takes account of developments up to the end of 2009, prior to planned national elections. The extremely fluid security situation may well have changed in the interim.

‘Each time they sought out a local militia, provided it with supplies and armaments, and declared the area of operations an ethics-free zone’ (de Waal, 2004, pp. 25–27). See also, African Rights (1995) on the jihad in the Nuba Mountains.

The SPLA was formed in 1983.

The group was led by Riek Machar (a Dok Nuer, who has since become Vice-President of the GoSS), Lam Akol (a Shilluk), and Gordon Kong (a Jikany Nuer).

The vision of a New Sudan entailed an autonomous Southern government within a greater republic of Sudan.

Garang’s faction was first called SPLA–Torit or SPLA–Mainstream; hereafter it is referred to simply as the SPLA.

The SPLA lost support from Ethiopia after the fall of Mengistu Haile Mariam in 1991. See Johnson (2003, p. 88).

The signatories of the Khartoum Peace Agreement were the South Sudan Independence Movement/Army (Riek Machar); the SPLM/A faction led by Kerubino Kawanyn Bol; the South Sudan Independents Group (Kawac Makwei); the Equatoria Defence Forces (Thiopholus Ochang Loti); the Union of Sudanese African Parties (Samuel Aru Bol); and the Bor Group (Arok Thon Arok). See Khartoum Peace Agreement (1997).

The origins of some of these SSDF members lie in Anyanya II, which took up arms against Khartoum in 1978, before the formation of the SPLA. (The Anyanya guerrilla army, also known as Anyanya I, fought the first civil war.)

The referendum was supposed to have taken place within an interim period of four years after the signing of the Khartoum Peace Agreement.

The right to self-determination for the South has long been cherished by Southern Sudanese. See the Declaration of Principles (IGAD, 1994), the Asmara Declaration (1995), the Khartoum Peace Agreement (1997), and the CPA’s Machakos Protocol (CPA, 2005).

This was not without historical precedent. See Alier (1999).

See Schomerus (2007) on the history of the LRA operating in Southern Sudan with Khartoum’s backing.

Note that this chapter follows Southern Sudanese convention by referring to individuals by first name. The exception is John Garang.

See Juba Declaration (2006).

Interview with SPLA Chief of Military Intelligence Brig.-Gen. Mac Paul, Juba, September 2009. The SPLA claims an additional 34,000 armed group members were integrated into the police, wildlife, and prison services. This figure updates the estimate of 47,440 reported in Small Arms Survey (2008).

While Paulino is nominally Salva’s second in command, their relationship is reportedly poor.

Internal United Nations reports reviewed by the authors, November 2009.

Many of the Khartoum-backed militias are separatists. For the first time, in late October 2009, Salva effectively called for Southern secession. Until then he had stuck to the official SPLM position of favouring a united Sudan, in keeping with the vision of the SPLM/A founder, the late John Garang (Reuters, 2009).

Author interview with a Sudan peacebuilding adviser, Nairobi, November 2009.

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Author interviews with Mary Nyaulang, chairperson, Peace and Reconciliation Committee, Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly, and Louis

As of late 2009, the parties continued to wrangle over key issues, including CPA-mandated border delineation and demarcation, the disputed

Lobong, chairperson, GoSS Peace Commission, Juba, August and September 2009.

findings of the 2008 census, and key reforms necessary for fair and transparent elections to take place in April 2010. 32

Most members are ex-SPLA who were rejected by the army in the post-CPA period, resulting in a severe lack of capacity and morale (ICG, 2009b, p. 19).

These conflicts involve agriculturalists and pastoralists, as well as returnees (former refugees and internally displaced persons) and ‘residents’.

The GoSS was 98 per cent dependent on oil revenues in 2009. Oil prices fluctuated between more than USD 140 to less than USD 50 per barrel in 2008, resulting in a massive reduction in projected revenues (Mawien, 2008, para. 13). The projected price per barrel in the 2009 budget was USD 50.

Author interview with Minister for Regional Cooperation Oyai Deng Ajak, Juba, September 2009.

‘It is better to kill ten, to save 100.’ Author interview with SPLA Chief of General Staff Lt.-Gen. James Hoth Mai, Juba, September 2009.

For example, it is unclear under what circumstances it is legal to possess a firearm, used by some communities for hunting (or gathering food) as well as protecting their cattle and livelihoods.

In the absence of salaries or provisions, the SPLA lived off and brutalized Southern populations during the war. Levels of war-related trauma

Author interview with a Sudan conflict analyst, Juba, November 2009.

are ‘absolute’ (author interview with a long-time humanitarian worker in Sudan, Nairobi, July 2009).

The Khartoum-aligned forces included the SAF, the National Intelligence and Security Service, the Popular Defence Forces (a paramilitary group), and the Petroleum Police (Grawert, 2009, p. 3).

Author interviews, Juba and Nairobi, August 2009–January 2010.

UNMIS is tasked with monitoring arms flows into the ceasefire zone.

Author interview with a Southern Sudan conflict analyst, Juba, November 2009.

Internal UN documents reviewed by the authors, November 2009.

Two SSDF commanders—Thomas Maboir and Samuel Wijiong—’influenced’ the resistance that led to the fighting. See Arnold (2007, fn. 46).

The SPLA claims it was forced to halt its campaign because of an outcry from the international community over its forcible disarmament tactics (author interview with SPLA Chief of General Staff Lt.-Gen. James Hoth Mai, Juba, August 2009).

47 48

For example, in May 2007 Dinka of Duk county reportedly stole more than 20,000 cattle from the Lou Nuer community. See ICG (2009b, p. 3). The sources include: looted SAF stocks following fighting between the SPLA and SAF in Malakal in November 2006; Akobo Commissioner Doyak Chol opening stores of collected weapons in late 2006 to allow his people to ‘defend’ themselves; and an April 2008 raid on an SPLA weapons cache in Khorfulus following fighting between the SPLA and local police (ICG, 2009b, p. 3).

Chibetek was reportedly to be integrated into the SPLA or go through disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration, but he refused because his rank would have been reduced (author interview with a UN official, Juba, September 2009).

Some reports indicate that there were four—not three—additional suspect boats.

According to WFP’s head of security in Sudan, proof of weapons or ammunition on the barges was never established (author interview with

See ICG (2009b, pp. 7–8) for a detailed description of the attack.

Some 735 metric tons of food aid was stolen or lost in the raid.

Riek Gai Kok is former chairman of Khartoum’s Southern Coordinating Council and an NCP member.

Internal UN documents reviewed by the authors, November 2009.

Author interview with a military source, November 2009.

Created in 2007, the US Africa Command ‘conducts sustained security engagement through military-to-military programs, military-sponsored

WFP’s head of security, London, October 2009).

activities, and other military operations as directed to promote a stable and secure African environment in support of US foreign policy.’ See AFRICOM (n.d.). 59

See Schomerus and Tumutegyereize (2009).

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During Operation Lightning Thunder the SPLA presence was thin and the force lacked basic communications equipment and vehicles (author

Internal UN documents reviewed by the authors, November 2009.

Author interview with a UN official, November 2009.

Internal UN documents reviewed by the authors, November 2009.

interview with Sudan security analyst II, Juba, September 2009).

As of December 2009, there were 16,641 (verified) SAF deployed to the JIUs, including 1,500 in Khartoum (UNMIS, 2010, p. 29).

Although professionalization has lagged, the SPLA has continued to acquire light and heavy weapons in the post-CPA period. See Lewis (2009).

Author interview with a UN official, November 2009.

Author interview with Sudan security analyst II, Juba, September 2009.

In 2009 there was a significant increase in international support for SPLA training and development programmes, with more planned for 2010 (author interview with Sudan security analyst II, September 2009).

Author interview with a Sudan security analyst, October 2009.

The dispute between Taban and Paulino over the governorship of Unity goes back to the late 1990s. See Johnson (2003, p. 123).

Clement Wani’s brown-uniformed ‘state police’—in effect his personal army—maintain a visible presence in Juba (author interview with a Sudan security analyst, Juba, October 2009).

Author interview with a UN source, Nairobi, October 2009.

Internal UN report reviewed by authors, November 2009.

The CPA-mandated Technical Ad Hoc Border Committee started work in January 2007, but by August 2009 it had yet to reach agreement on twothirds of the border. See UNMIS (2009b, para. 45). Progress accelerated in the last part of 2009, with more than 80 per cent reportedly delimited by year’s end. Significant disagreement remained, however.

There are strong voices in the Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly calling for a Unilateral Declaration of Independence if necessary. See Nyaba (2009, p. 7).

The Three Areas of Abyei, South Kordofan, and Blue Nile are part of Northern Sudan but were central battlegrounds during the civil war. In contrast to Abyei, which was granted a referendum on whether to be part of Northern or Southern Sudan, the two other border areas were granted the right to vaguely defined ‘popular consultations’ on the CPA, which will allow elected representatives to effectively renegotiate the terms of the CPA protocol that relate to their areas. See the Protocol between the Government of Sudan and the SPLM on the resolution of the conflict in South Kordofan/Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile states (CPA, 2005, s. 3).

On 2 October 2009, 28 political parties in Sudan, including the SPLM, threatened to boycott the elections if the National Security Law, Criminal Procedures Law, Trade Unions Law, Immunities Law, Personal Status Law, Press and Publications Law, and Public Order Laws were not amended. See Sudan Tribune (2009c).

78 79

See USIP (n.d.) for background on the elections. The three ‘systems’ to be used are first-past-the-post ballots, proportional representation, and women’s lists elected on a proportional basis at state level (Willis, 2009, p. 4).

Ninety-two per cent of women in Southern Sudan cannot read or write, compared to 62 per cent in Darfur and 54 per cent nationwide (UN, 2008, p. 2).

Author interview with John Andruga Duku, head of GoSS Mission, Nairobi, January 2010.

In particular, the SPLM was demanding that it keep 28 per cent of the seats in the National Assembly, as per the CPA formula for power-sharing. It needs at least 25 per cent of these seats to be able to block any changes to the constitution (Thomas, 2010, p. 8).

The political interference includes accusations that key documents were ‘forged’ by the chairperson and that minutes of meetings had been manipulated to erase the views of Southerners, resulting in the committee stopping work entirely for two months prior to September 2009 (author interview with a GoSS member, Nairobi, October 2009).

Since the CPA, the status and administration of the Abyei area has remained a significant bone of contention. In July 2009, the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague ruled that Abyei’s borders had to be redrawn, thereby overruling an earlier decision by the CPA-mandated Abyei Boundaries Commission. Both parties initially welcomed the ruling but the debate then shifted to the crux of the matter: the locations of neighbouring oil fields.

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Only around five per cent of Sudan’s oil fields (Block 6) are located squarely in the North (author interview with Luke Patey, Ph.D. candidate,

Author interview with a UN worker, Nairobi, December 2009.

Internal UN documents reviewed by the authors, November 2009.

Author interview with a UN worker, Nairobi, December 2009.

Danish Institute for International Studies, Copenhagen, September 2009).

A Jarch press release declares: ‘We expect to lift the light, sweet crude from areas in the state once South Sudan secedes from Khartoum’ (Jarch Management Group, 2008).

See also UNSC (2009a, paras. 3, 7, 14–15).

Author interview with a senior UNMIS official, Juba, September 2009.

Author interview with John Andruga Duku, head of GoSS Mission, Nairobi, January 2010.

The oil pipeline currently pumps north to Port Sudan. Possible solutions include exchanging pipeline access for oil rights.

8?8B?E=H7F>O African Rights. 1995. Facing Genocide: The Nuba of Sudan. London: African Rights. AFRICOM (United States Africa Command). n.d. ‘U.S. Africa Command.’ <http://www.africom.mil/AboutAFRICOM.asp> Alier, Abel. 1999. Too Many Agreements Dishonoured, 2nd revised edn. Reading: Ithaca Press. Arnold, Matthew. 2007. ‘The South Sudan Defence Force: Patriots, Collaborators or Spoilers?’ Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 45, No. 4, pp. 489–516. Ashworth, John. 2009. CPA Alert: The State of Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Alert No. 1. Utrecht: IKV Pax Christi. September. Asmara Declaration. 1995. Signed by the National Democratic Alliance, Asmara. June. Bure, Benaiah Yongo. 2009. ‘The Comprehensive Peace Agreement: From Its Conception to the Endgame.’ Unpublished paper presented at the International Sudan Studies Conference, Pretoria. 25–28 November. Carter Center. 2009. Statement on Sudan’s Voter Registration, Nov. 1–Dec. 7, 2009. Atlanta: Carter Center. 17 December. CPA (Comprehensive Peace Agreement). 2005. Signed by the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army, Nairobi. 9 January. Fashoda Peace Agreement. 1997. Signed by the Government of Sudan and the SPLM/A-United, Fashoda. 20 September. Grawert, Elke. 2009. ‘Power and Wealth Sharing versus Contested Governance.’ Unpublished paper presented at the International Sudan Studies Conference, Pretoria. 25–28 November. Hemmer, Jort. 2009. Ticking the Box: Elections in Sudan. The Hague: Netherlands Institute for International Relations Clingendael. September. HRW (Human Rights Watch). 2009. Letter to the Presidency of the Sudanese Government of National Unity Concerning the Situation in Malakal. 21 May. <http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/05/21/letter-presidency-sudanese-government-national-unity-concerning-situation-malakal> HSBA (Human Security Baseline Assessment). n.d. ‘The Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) Project.’ <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org> ICG (International Crisis Group). 2009a. Sudan: Preventing Implosion. Nairobi/Brussels: ICG. 17 December. —. 2009b. Jonglei’s Tribal Conflicts: Countering Insecurity in South Sudan. Juba/Nairobi/Brussels: ICG. 23 December. IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on Development). 1994. Declaration of Principles. Signed by the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army, Nairobi. 20 July. IRIN. 2009. ‘Southerners Still Besieged by Suspected LRA Fighters.’ 24 November. Jarch Management Group. 2008. ‘Jarch Oil Group Congratulates New Governor of Unity State.’ Sudan Tribune. 30 May 2008. Johnson, Douglas Hamilton. 2003. The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars. Oxford: James Currey. Juba Declaration (Juba Declaration on Unity and Integration between the Sudan People’s Liberation Army and the South Sudan Defence Forces). 2006. Signed by the Sudan People’s Liberation Army and the South Sudan Defence Forces, Juba. 8 January.

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Khartoum Peace Agreement. 1997. Signed by the Government of Sudan and representatives from the United Democratic Salvation Front and South Sudan Independence Movement/Army, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, South Sudan Independents Group, Equatoria Defence Force, Union of Sudanese African Parties and Bor Group, Khartoum. 21 April. Kings, Chiefs, and Traditional Leaders. 2009. The Kings, Chiefs and Traditional Leaders Conference Resolutions and Recommendations. Unpublished document. Bentiu, Unity State. 18–24 May. Lewis, Mike. 2009. Skirting the Law: Post-CPA Arms Flows to Sudan. HSBA Working Paper 18. Geneva: Small Arms Survey. September. Mawien, Kuol Athian. 2008. Government of Southern Sudan 2009 Budget. Unpublished speech presented to the Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly by the Minister of Finance and Economic Planning. 10 December. MSF (Médecins Sans Frontières). 2009. Facing up to Reality: Health Crisis Deepens as Violence Escalates in Southern Sudan. December. Nyaba, Peter Adwok. 2009. ‘SPLM-NCP Asymmetrical Power Relations Jeopardize Implementation of the CPA and the Future of Sudan.’ Unpublished paper submitted to the International Sudan Studies Conference, Pretoria. 25–28 November. Oxfam. 2010. Rescuing the Peace in Southern Sudan. Joint NGO Briefing Paper. Oxford: Oxfam International. January. Reuters. 2009. ‘Southern Sudan President Makes First Call for Independence.’ 31 October. Ruati, Richard. 2009. ‘Ugandan Security Forces Kill Senior LRA Commander in CAR.’ Sudan Tribune. 22 November. —. 2010. ‘Ugandan Army Outlines OLT Achievements on LRA Rebels in 2009.’ Sudan Tribune. 11 January. Schomerus, Mareike. 2007. The Lord’s Resistance Army in Sudan: A History and Overview. HSBA Working Paper No. 8. Geneva: Small Arms Survey. September. — and Tumutegyereize, Kennedy. 2009. After Operation Lightening Thunder: Protecting Communities and Building Peace. London: Conciliation Resources. April. Small Arms Survey. 2007a. Small Arms Survey 2007: Guns and the City. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. —. 2007b. Anatomy of Civilian Disarmament in Jonglei State: Recent Experiences and Implications. HSBA Issue Brief No. 3, 2nd edn. February. —. 2008. Allies and Defectors: An Update on Armed Group Integration and Proxy Force Activities. HSBA Issue Brief No. 11. Geneva: Small Arms Survey. May. —. 2009. Conflicting Priorities: GoSS Security Challenges and Recent Responses. HSBA Issue Brief No. 14. Geneva: Small Arms Survey. May. Sudan Tribune. 2009a ‘Militiamen Kill 76 in South Sudan’s Jonglei.’ 22 September. —. 2009b. ‘Sudanese Parties Trade Accusations over Jonglei Attacks.’ 23 September. —. 2009c. ‘Juba conference threatens to boycott Sudan’s election.’ 1 October. —. 2009d. ‘Fresh Clashes Erupt in Sudan’s Unity State: Sources.’ 3 October. Thomas, Edward. 2010. Decisions and Deadlines: A Critical Year for Sudan. London: Chatham House. January. UN (United Nations). 2008. Scary Statistics: Southern Sudan. Khartoum: Office of the UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator in the Sudan. UNMIS (United Nations Mission in Sudan). 2009a. Near-verbatim Transcript of the Press Conference by UN Deputy Resident Humanitarian Coordinator for Southern Sudan Lise Grande. Khartoum: UNMIS. 12 August. —. 2009b. CPA Monitor, Vol. 5, No. 45. Khartoum: UNMIS. August. —. 2010. CPA Monitor, Vol. 6, No. 50. Khartoum: UNMIS. January. UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs). 2009. Humanitarian Action in Southern Sudan Report. No. 38. 6–20 November. UNSC (United Nations Security Council). 2005. Resolution 1590. S/RES/1590 of 24 March. —. 2009a. Resolution 1870. S/RES/1870 of 30 April. <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N09/320/46/PDF/N0932046.pdf?OpenElement>” —. 2009b. Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in the Sudan. S/2009/545 of 21 October. USIP (United States Institute of Peace). n.d. ‘Sudan’s 2009 Elections: Critical Issues and Timelines.’ <http://www.usip.org/resources/sudan-s-2009-elections-critical-issues-and-timelines> de Waal, Alex. 2004. ‘Counter-insurgency on the Cheap.’ London Review of Books. Vol. 26, No. 15. 5 August. —. 2009. ‘Peace in Sudan: Priorities and Constraints.’ Making Sense of Darfur Blog. 14 June. <http://blogs.ssrc.org/darfur/2009/06/14/peace-in-sudan-priorities-and-constraints>

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Willis, Justin. 2009. ‘Elections in Sudan: Between a Rock and a Hard Place.’ Submission on behalf of the Rift Valley Institute to the UK Associate Parliamentary Group on Sudan. London: Rift Valley Institute. October. —, Atta el-Battahani, and Peter Woodward. 2009. Elections in Sudan: Learning from Experience. London: Rift Valley Institute. May. Young, John. 2006. The South Sudan Defence Forces in the Wake of the Juba Declaration. HSBA Working Paper No. 1. Geneva: Small Arms Survey. November. —. 2007. Emerging North–South Tensions and Prospects for a Return to War. HSBA Working Paper No. 7. Geneva: Small Arms Survey. July.

79ADEMB;:=;C;DJI Fh_dY_fWb Wkj^ehi Claire Mc Evoy and Emile LeBrun

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Efj_edi \eh ;d]W][c[dj 7HC;: =HEKFI 7D: >KC7D?J7H?7D DEHCI ?DJHE:K9J?ED In order to spare civilians the effects of hostilities, obtain access to those in need and ensure that aid workers can operate safely, humanitarian actors must have consistent and sustained dialogue with all parties to conﬂict, State and non-State (UNSC, 2009b, para. 40). The United Nations Secretary-General’s May 2009 report on the protection of civilians provides strong support for dialogue with armed groups aimed at achieving humanitarian objectives. It acknowledges the experiences of a growing number of actors that have been engaging armed groups on issues of international concern, including general respect for international humanitarian law (IHL), the anti-personnel mine ban, and the protection of children in armed conflict. In comparison, dialogue with armed groups on the specific issue of small arms is mostly confined to peace talks and disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programmes. Such focus on the post-conflict phase misses a big part of the picture: armed groups are key actors in most contemporary armed conflicts,1 many of which are of a protracted nature. As such, the way they regulate—or fail to regulate—the use and management of small arms by their fighters can diminish or exacerbate violence against civilians. Regulation can also affect the incidence of casualties caused by accidental small arms use, and condition the likelihood of ammunition depot explosions. In other words, dialogue with armed groups on the small arms issue during the conflict phase can help save civilian lives. This chapter reviews progress achieved to date in the engagement of armed groups on humanitarian norms and reflects on the utility of engaging groups on the small arms issue. Principal conclusions include: s Diverse armed groups have taken measures to address humanitarian concerns, including by facilitating access to populations affected by armed conflict, banning anti-personnel mines, and renouncing the recruitment and use of children. s Humanitarian actors play an important role in making humanitarian commitments by armed groups effective in practice, notably by providing support for implementation and monitoring compliance. s Prohibiting indiscriminate use and unsafe handling of small arms are among the measures armed groups can take to reduce the impact of these weapons on civilians. s Engaging armed groups on their use of weapons of specific concern—such as surface-to-air missiles and indirect fire weapons—is especially important. s Keeping armed groups’ ammunition depots away from civilian dwellings and secure from theft can reduce the safety threats posed by unstable ammunition and limit the risk of further arms proliferation.

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In this chapter, the term ‘armed group’2 refers to armed ‘insurgency’ movements,3 as well as de facto authorities or governments that seek statehood but have yet to receive full recognition from the international community.4 The chapter begins by introducing the concept of humanitarian engagement of armed groups and key experiences to date. It then reviews some of the main lessons learned by humanitarian actors active in this field, with a particular focus on their use of written measures adopted by armed groups as a tool for engagement. The chapter concludes by identifying potential areas of engagement with armed groups to reduce the negative consequences of the proliferation and use of small arms. This analysis draws largely from a review of more than 50 unilateral declarations, bilateral agreements, peace accords, humanitarian agreements, and internal regulations adopted by historical and active armed groups, as compiled in Bangerter (2009a), Geneva Call (2009), and other sources.

J>; >KC7D?J7H?7D ;D=7=;C;DJ E< 7HC;: =HEKFI J^[ YWi[ \eh [d]W][c[dj International law providing for the protection of civilians in situations of armed conflict— namely IHL and international human rights law (IHRL)—is shaped by states. While IHL binds both state and non-state parties to a conflict, IHRL has traditionally created obligations only on states, although there is currently a movement towards making IHRL applicable to armed groups (see Box 12.1). Furthermore, the development of these rules is even more centred around states. Armed groups cannot negotiate or become parties to international treaties,5 and there is no consensus on whether they contribute to the formation of customary IHL. This leaves armed groups with little incentive to express their adherence to or feel bound by international law.

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Human rights groups and, more recently, the UN have sought to respond to the threats armed groups pose to civilians by exercising public pressure on the groups responsible for human rights abuses (Policzer, 2005, p. 2; UNSC, 2005, paras. 2, 3). This ‘naming and shaming’ may have a significant impact on the behaviour of groups that are dependent on international (including diaspora) support for their war effort (Bruderlein, 2000, p. 15). It may be less effective, however, with groups that rely on local constituencies and are not responsive to international pressure. Humanitarian actors have developed complementary initiatives to engage armed groups more inclusively towards compliance with humanitarian norms.11 Engagement consists of non-coercive interaction with, or participation in, processes involving armed groups.12 Humanitarian actors practice engagement to achieve one or several of three main humanitarian objectives: securing access to populations affected by armed conflict, enhancing the security of humanitarian workers, and promoting compliance with international law (Mc Hugh and Bessler, 2006, p. 5). Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions provides a legal basis for engagement: ‘An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross [ICRC], may offer its services to the Parties to the conflict.’13 While not all armed groups are responsive to engagement efforts, a number of them have agreed to collaborate with humanitarian actors. Their motivations for such dialogue include facilitating the deployment of humanitarian projects in their areas of operation, demonstrating a ‘high moral ground’, and responding to pressure from their supporters.

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;d]W][c[dj [nf[h_[dY[i This section provides an overview of engagement efforts in three areas: respect for general IHL, the anti-personnel mine ban, and the protection of children in armed conflict. While the humanitarian engagement of armed groups is by no means limited to these issues,14 these processes are currently the most advanced and systematic.15 Fhecej_d] h[if[Yj \eh ][d[hWb ?>B

In the area of IHL and armed groups, the ICRC promotes ‘the faithful application of international humanitarian law,’ along with its ‘understanding and dissemination’ (ICRC, 2008, p. 3). While the organization works primarily in situations of armed conflict, it has initiated dialogue with urban gangs in some contexts (see Box 12.2). The ICRC conducted IHL initiatives with some 75 armed groups in about 30 countries in 2009.16 Such engagement primarily consists of a confidential dialogue with armed groups to discuss core ‘protection’ issues: the group’s conduct of hostilities, its attitude towards the civilian population, and its treatment of the people it captures (ICRC, 2008,

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pp. 30–31). The ICRC also informs armed groups of the rules of IHL through dissemi-

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nation sessions targeting commanders and fighters (Bangerter, 2008, p. 80). Lastly, the ICRC promotes the integration of IHL provisions into armed groups’ policies and regulations, providing expert advice towards that end (ICRC, 2008, pp. 16–29; Bangerter, 2008, pp. 82–83). J^[ Wdj_#f[hiedd[b c_d[ XWd'.

Following the adoption of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (hereafter the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention) in 1997, members of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines voiced concern that anti-personnel mines would not be successfully eradicated unless armed groups, a number of which continued to deploy this weapon, also renounced their use. In response, the Swiss-based nongovernmental organization (NGO) Geneva Call has engaged armed groups in signing a Deed of Commitment for Adherence to a Total Ban on Anti-personnel Mines and for Cooperation in Mine Action (hereafter Deed of Commitment). As of March 2010, 39 armed groups from ten countries and territories19 had signed the Deed of Commitment. Signatory groups have by and large complied with their commitments. The majority of them have taken concrete steps to facilitate humanitarian demining, mine risk education, victim assistance, and the destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines (about 18,000 to date). Geneva Call monitors compliance with the Deed of Commitment and supports its implementation through training and dissemination workshops. J^[ fhej[Yj_ed e\ Y^_bZh[d _d Whc[Z Yed\b_Yj

The issue of the recruitment and use of children by armed groups has mobilized actors at various levels. Members of the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers have been active in promoting the relevant international standards since the late 1990s,20 often working in partnership with local communities (Withers, 2007, p. 231). UNICEF has also engaged in dialogue with armed groups to obtain the demobilization of children and a halt to recruitment (UNICEF, 2002). Since 2008, Geneva Call has worked with stakeholders and armed groups towards developing a deed of commitment on the protection of children in armed conflict.

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The UN Security Council, through a series of resolutions, has called on parties to conflict—both state and nonstate—that are involved in grave violations of the rights of children in armed conflict to develop and implement action plans to halt violations, in collaboration with the UN (UNSC, 2005, para. 7).21 In March 2009, the UN SecretaryGeneral reported that armed groups had signed action plans in Côte d’Ivoire, Sri Lanka, and Sudan. Other groups in the Central African Republic and the Philippines were in the process of negotiating plans. Some of these groups have begun demobilizing children from their ranks (UNSC, 2009a, pp. 30–41).

B;IIEDI B;7HD;: <HEC ;D=7=;C;DJ (( A common feature of the engagement efforts reviewed above is the integration of humanitarian commitments into formal measures adopted by armed groups—such as unilateral declarations, bilateral agreements, peace and ceasefire accords, humanitarian agreements, deeds of commitment, and internal regulations (see Table 12.1). This section begins by defining these different types of measures and reflects on their comparative advantages and shortcomings

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as tools for promoting humanitarian norms.23 It then reviews several other important lessons learned that can influence the effectiveness of engagement.

J^[ kj_b_jo e\ \ehcWb c[Wikh[i As armed groups do not participate in the formation of international norms, they will not always accept them as ‘their own’. Offering armed groups the opportunity to declare their adherence to humanitarian norms can therefore help address this lack of ownership while creating opportunities for external actors to monitor compliance (Sassòli, 2006, p. 23; Bongard, 2008b). Armed groups often commit to humanitarian norms through unilateral declarations—including declarations of adherence to the Geneva Conventions as well as resolutions and commitments to abide by specific standards. They are generally public, although, in some cases, groups address them to humanitarian actors, such as the ICRC (Bangerter, 2008, p. 83). They can be written in the group’s own words, providing a measure of ownership. Their content is not always comprehensive, however. Wording can also be broad, with no attempt to apply international norms to the local context. Unilateral declarations rarely include provisions for the enforcement, monitoring, or verification of commitments.24 B_X[hWj_ed

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Bilateral agreements can be negotiated between parties to a conflict—often an armed group and a government—specifically to address humanitarian norms. Among them, ‘special agreements’ focus exclusively on the implementation of the relevant provisions of the Geneva Conventions.26 Some can also address human rights issues. Bilateral agreements are based on mutual consent, which can facilitate access and monitoring. They have been particularly difficult to achieve in practice, however, as governments are often reluctant to enter into any kind of agreement with their enemy when there are no clear prospects for peace (ICRC, 2008, p. 17). Humanitarian commitments have also been included in a number of peace or ceasefire accords. Parties are more open to discussing humanitarian issues when they are already sitting at the negotiating table. If the peace agreement collapses, however, parties may no longer feel bound by the relevant humanitarian commitments. Moreover, the ability of humanitarian organizations to influence the development and content of peace agreements is limited in some cases, resulting in weak provisions on IHL or IHRL (Bongard, 2008b). In some contexts, parties to conflict have signed humanitarian agreements, such as action plans or memorandums of understanding, with humanitarian actors. These agreements usually aim to facilitate humanitarian access to vulnerable populations and protect humanitarian personnel. They have helped clarify the framework of cooperation between humanitarian actors and armed groups and have at times included commitments to respect IHL and IHRL in conflict areas. A difficulty, however, has been a perception by critics—primarily concerned governments—that the signing of humanitarian agreements can confer legitimacy on armed groups.27 The Deed of Commitment banning anti-personnel mines is co-signed by the armed group, a humanitarian organization (Geneva Call), and a sub-state entity (the Republic and Canton of Geneva). It is a standard, ‘treaty-like’ document, meaning that all signatory armed groups commit to the same, internationally recognized and comprehensive, norms of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention. Importantly, it provides for monitoring by Geneva Call and other external actors. The fact that it is a standard document open for armed groups’ signature also comes with limitations: some de facto authorities—despite not being able to adhere to international treaties—have expressed reluctance to sign a document designed for ‘non-state’ armed groups, preferring instead to adopt corresponding legislation.28

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Armed groups’ internal regulations include codes of conduct,29 penal or disciplinary codes,30 and rules of engagement.31 They define to a great extent an armed group’s identity, structure, and procedures; respect for them is often critical to a group’s survival. Humanitarian provisions contained within such regulations therefore have a fair chance of being taken seriously by commanders and the rank and file. These texts are also tailored to the particularities of the local situation (Clapham, 2006a, p. 512). The difficulty for humanitarian actors is that written regulations do not exist for all armed groups. Furthermore, groups often consider them confidential and are not necessarily willing to discuss their content with outsiders. These different types of measures are not mutually exclusive and can actually complement one another. Measures of a public nature can create credible monitoring mechanisms involving external actors, while integrating humanitarian commitments into armed groups’ internal regulations is also important for dissemination among and application by the troops.

Ikffehj_d] _cfb[c[djWj_ed Although written commitments made by armed groups represent the most visible part of engagement, they are not 7hc[Z ]hekfi e\j[d always implemented. Armed groups often lack the capacity to implement everything they have agreed to. The bWYa j^[ YWfWY_jo je Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers contends that practical assistance for the demobilization and reintegration _cfb[c[dj j^[_h of former child soldiers, including educational and vocational options, should be part of any approach aimed at Yecc_jc[dji$ engaging armed groups on the issue (Becker, 2003, pp. 2–3; Withers, 2007, p. 238). Implementation of the Deed of Commitment banning anti-personnel mines has generally accelerated when Geneva Call has been able to mobilize specialized agencies to support armed groups in carrying out technical obligations, such as stockpile destruction (Bongard, 2008b). If armed groups are serious about implementation, it is important that they follow through by, for example, educating and training members on the decisions taken, giving orders to enforce them, and imposing sanctions on offenders (Bangerter, forthcoming).

Ced_jeh_d] Yecfb_WdY[ Monitoring, in particular external monitoring, is crucial for ensuring that any organization’s policies are carried out by subordinates (Policzer and Yankey-Wayne, 2009, p. 13). While monitoring armed groups’ behaviour is challenging, humanitarian actors have made encouraging progress in this area. Geneva Call, for instance, relies on a threepronged monitoring strategy. Armed groups are asked to report regularly on their implementation of and compliance with the Deed of Commitment banning anti-personnel mines. Geneva Call also relies on a network of partner organizations to follow developments on the ground. Lastly, Article 3 of the Deed of Commitment requires signatory groups to facilitate field missions deployed by Geneva Call. Significantly, no signatory armed group has ever refused to host a Geneva Call field mission, even following allegations of non-compliance (Geneva Call, 2007, pp. 25–31). UNICEF and the ICRC also stress the importance of monitoring, notably through follow-up visits (UNICEF, 2002, p. 14; ICRC, 2008, p. 13).

J^[ d[[Z \eh fhW]cWj_Y WffheWY^[i Humanitarian actors generally warn against ‘one size fits all’ approaches and insist on the importance of gaining a thorough understanding of the armed groups and the context in which they operate prior to any engagement.32 Armed groups differ greatly in terms of their size, objectives, structure, leadership, command capabilities, mode of

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operation, resources, and constituencies, all of which can influence group behaviour. It is easier to engage groups with effective command and control structures, for instance, as any commitment made by leaders has a better chance of being transmitted to foot soldiers. For less structured armed groups, different approaches may be required, focusing on wider dissemination of humanitarian norms targeting as many factions or units as possible.33 Practitioners also argue for a pragmatic approach to ‘hard cases’ (Mc Hugh and Bessler, 2006, pp. 54–56). Not pursuing dialogue with an armed group because it does not immediately agree to abide to the highest international standards does not help advance the humanitarian agenda (Bangerter, 2008, p. 84). In the case of landmines, this has meant continuing to work with armed groups that refused to ban anti-personnel mines to identify ways to reduce the impact on civilians, including by restricting mine use and facilitating the clearance of areas of particular importance for the local population (Bongard, 2008b). Mobilizing armed groups’ constituencies, such as local communities or diasporas, can also help put additional pressure on group leaders to change their policies (Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, 2006, pp. 13–14; UNICEF, 2002, p. 7).

8k_bZ_d] ikffehj Wced] ijWj[i The attitude of concerned states towards engagement is particularly important. Concerned states can block access to armed <ehc[h Y^_bZ iebZ_[hi" Z[ceX_b_p[Z kdZ[h Wd W]h[[c[dj m_j^ j^[ ]el[hdc[dj" b[Wl[ W CWe_ij YWcf _d D[fWb" @WdkWho (&'&$ =efWb 9^_jhWaWh%H[kj[hi

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groups by imposing travel restrictions on their territory, obstructing humanitarian assistance in areas controlled by armed groups, and imposing sanctions on actors engaging armed groups (Thorne, 2007; Florquin and Decrey Warner, 2008). The Government of Ethiopia, for instance, expelled the ICRC from the Somali Regional State in July 2007 after accusing it of supporting the Ogaden National Liberation Front, despite ICRC assurances of independence and neutrality (ICRC, 2007). It is therefore important for humanitarian actors engaging armed groups to inform concerned states and seek their cooperation whenever possible. Pursuant to common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, humanitarian engagement does not alter the legal status of armed groups, addressing a concern some states have with such interventions.34 Furthermore, the UN Secretary-General has called on states to: support, or at least [. . .] not impede, efforts by humanitarian organizations to engage armed groups in order to seek improved protection for civilians—even those groups that are proscribed in some national legislation (UNSC, 2009b, para. 45).

J^[ YecfWhWj_l[ WZlWdjW][i e\ Z_\\[h[dj WYjehi States and international organizations may exercise strong leverage on armed groups, notably through their ability 7hc[Z ]hekfi j[dZ je to provide needed assistance or impose sanctions. Concerned states may fear that such high-level engagement con- WYY[fj _dj[hdWj_edWb tributes to legitimizing the group’s cause, however, and seek to place conditions that constrain such initiatives D=Ei Wi d[kjhWb (Hofmann, 2006, pp. 397–98). As Security Council Resolution 1612 stresses: any dialogue [. . .] by United Nations entities with non-State armed groups in order to ensure protection for and access to children must be conducted in the context of peace processes where they exist and the cooperation framework between the United Nations and the concerned Government (UNSC, 2005, para. 2d). Although they have fewer ‘carrots and sticks’ to deploy, international NGOs may have more flexibility with the concerned government, partly because they can adopt a much lower (unpoliticized) profile (Hofmann, 2006, pp. 399–400). They generally have no stake in the situation apart from humanitarian concerns, increasing chances that armed groups will accept them as a neutral interlocutor. Local NGOs can also play a crucial role in engagement, notably due to their permanent presence in the field, access to armed groups, knowledge of the local context, and understanding of armed groups’ internal dynamics. On the other hand, they may be perceived as partisan by the armed group or the concerned government and find their security endangered as a result.

7HC;: =HEKFI" IC7BB 7HCI#H;B7J;: J>H;7JI" 7D: FH;L;DJ?L; C;7IKH;I Recent progress achieved in the humanitarian engagement of armed groups has prompted analysts and practitioners to call for a greater examination of the feasibility of engaging armed groups on small arms issues.35 Such dialogue would aim at ensuring that armed groups use, store, and manage small arms in ways that are consistent with IHL, IHRL, and other applicable standards. This section outlines the different ways in which small arms held and used by armed groups can harm civilians living in situations of armed conflict. Relevant threats include the misuse of small arms by group members, safety

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concerns linked with groups’ arsenals, and the diversion of groups’ weapons to other entities that can be expected to misuse them. Based on a review of small arms measures adopted by armed groups (see Table 12.2), the section also discusses promising areas of engagement that can be pursued with armed groups towards preventing such indiscriminate effects and unnecessary harm. The majority of relevant commitments were found within armed groups’ internal regulations, as opposed to measures or agreements adopted jointly with external actors. Most of the measures reviewed here were adopted by armed groups on their own engagement, reflecting the dearth of humanitarian initiatives in the small arms arena.

IcWbb Whci c_iki[ Fhe^_X_j[Z m[Wfedi WdZ Wcckd_j_ed D[]b_][dj ki[ e\ Small arms are not generally banned under international law. IHL only prohibits weapons that cannot distinguish _dZ_h[Yj \_h[ between civilian and military targets, meaning that they are ‘by nature indiscriminate’ (Henckaerts and Doswaldm[Wfedi fkji Beck, 2005, p. 244). Anti-personnel mines are the only category of small arms36 that fit this definition, however, with Y_l_b_Wdi Wj h_ia$

engagement in this area well under-way. Customary IHL also prohibits the use of weapons that are intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term, and severe damage to the natural environment (Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, 2005, p. 153). Groups such as the Chin National Front in Myanmar have included a ban on arms with long-term environmental effects in their codes of conduct (see Table 12.2), but small arms do not fit within this category. Cases of armed groups using banned types of ammunition37 are rare.38 Some armed groups may nevertheless be willing to renounce the use of specific types of small arms of particular concern, regardless of whether they are banned under international law. A Somali armed group, for instance, has indicated that it earlier renounced the use of surface-to-air missiles and surrendered such equipment to the international community for destruction in 2002.39 Although not prohibited under IHL, surface-to-air missiles have generated international concern due to the threats they pose to civilian aviation (Small Arms Survey, 2004, ch. 3). Similarly, armed groups could be engaged on the use of other categories of small arms that pose significant threats to civilian populations, including certain types of improvised explosive devices40 and anti-vehicle mines.41 Ki[ W]W_dij Y_l_b_Wdi

Documentation on armed groups’ use of small arms against civilians has sparked the greatest concern in the humanitarian community (AI, 2001). For some groups, ‘targeting, terrorizing and displacing innocent civilians are their way of exerting pressure on the adverse party’ (Policzer and Yankey-Wayne, 2009, p. 18). In other cases, negligent use of certain types of weapons leads to a failure to discriminate between civilian and military targets. Indirect fire weapons, such as mortars, and rocket-propelled grenades fired at high arc trajectory tend to harm civilians because the firer is often unable to see the fall of shot and anticipate its consequences.42 Such practice violates the rule of IHL that requires the parties to a conflict to distinguish between military and civilian targets and that ‘prohibits making the civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, the object of attack’ (Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, 2005, p. 5). Terrorizing civilians is also explicitly prohibited under IHL: ‘Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population are prohibited’ (p. 8). Furthermore, ‘[a]ll feasible precautions must be taken to avoid, and in any event to minimize, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects’ (p. 51).

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While it may appear unrealistic to expect groups that consistently engage in deliberate attacks against civilians to change their behaviour, some armed groups have taken measures towards that end. They include the African National Congress/Umkhonto We Sizwe (ANC/MK), the National Democratic Front of the Philippines, and the Zomi Re-Unification Organization (ZRO) (see Table 12.2). A number of armed groups have also made general commitments to discriminate between civilian and military targets without specific references to the use of arms (Bangerter, 2009a; Geneva Call, 2009). Due to the strong legal basis provided by IHL, measures to prevent indiscriminate use of small arms should not be more controversial among armed groups than those related to general respect for IHL. Focusing on indiscriminate small arms use, in addition to general engagement on the principle of distinction, may also help armed groups better conceptualize IHL in the local context, as discussions on weapon-related matters are likely to resonate more concretely with fighters. The principal challenge therefore lies in persuading ‘hard case’ groups to renounce deliberate attacks on civilians. Groups that have weak command structures or are fragmented in various factions pose another challenge, although heightened attention to dissemination can ease implementation of agreed commitments in such cases.

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While the desirability or legality of the assumption of policing, justice, or other state-like functions by non-state entities—such as armed groups—is controversial, such situations do arise in practice (Sivakumaran, 2006; 2009; Somer, 2007). This is the case in areas where de facto authorities, such as the self-declared Republic of Somaliland, assume effective control over territory and civilian populations. In the Philippines, a 2002 agreement between the government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) even provided for collaboration and coordination between the two parties in pursuing criminal groups in Mindanao, the region where the MILF operates (GRP and MILF, 2002). In situations of active armed conflict, armed groups sometimes seek to respond to the emergence of armed bandits who are not associated with the conflict but take advantage of the surrounding chaos to loot and accumulate wealth through theft and harassment of civilians.43 In such contexts, international law enforcement instruments, such as the UN’s Basic Principles for the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials,44 could prove useful in ensuring that armed groups respect basic human rights standards when performing policing functions. Engagement on this issue can find traction with armed groups that have taken measures to police and protect civilians living within areas under their control or operations. Somaliland, for instance, has had its own police force since 1991 and received police training from Western agencies (NPIA, 2009). Somaliland authorities also collaborate with international NGOs in promoting the safer management of civilian-held arms stocks (see Box 12.3). Yet, some concerned governments have strongly opposed the provision of policing or human rights training to Iec[ ]hekfi XWdd[Z armed group ‘police’ units. The government of Sri Lanka’s harsh reaction to Western agencies providing training to j^[ ^WdZb_d] e\ Whci members of the LTTE’s ‘Eelam police’, even following the conclusion of a ceasefire agreement, is a case in point Xo \_]^j[hi kdZ[h j^[ (DSRSL, 2007).

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Another category of threats and possible preventive measures relates to armed groups’ accidental—that is, unintended— use of small arms against civilians. Such accidental use of small arms may be the result of a lack of basic training and a lack of capacity in the handling of small arms,45 or the use of small arms under the influence of drugs or alcohol. Assuming armed groups are bound, like states, by IHRL, it can be argued that accidental use constitutes a threat to the basic human right to life (UNGA, 1948, art. 3) and that armed groups should take necessary precautions against inflicting such harm. As Table 12.2 illustrates, some armed groups have taken measures to prevent the accidental misuse of small arms. They include prohibiting the handling of firearms by ‘unauthorized’ persons who do not possess the necessary training. Measures taken by Malian rebels in the early 1990s, such as placing their assault rifles on single-shot mode while operating in civilian areas, can also contribute to safer use (Florquin and Pézard, 2005, pp. 55–57). Moreover, armed groups, such as the ANC/MK, KNLA, and SPLM/A, as well as armed communities in Somaliland, have banned the handling of weapons by fighters who are under the influence of drugs or alcohol (see Table 12.2 and Box 12.3). Such measures can be effective with groups that have the capacity to train fighters in basic firearms safety principles. In other cases, however, implementation will be more difficult. External actors will generally not be able to train armed groups on such safe practices, as they risk being accused of offering assistance with military utility.

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Although arms and ammunition ‘depots’ held by armed groups are insignificant in size on a global scale (FIREARMS), explosions do occur and therefore pose a significant risk to civilians living in their vicinity (see Table 12.3). While the circumstances surrounding such explosions are rarely clear, reports suggest they can occur as a result of enemy attack or sabotage.52 IHL recognizes the risks that the proximity of military objectives, such as arms depots, can pose to civilians: ‘Each party to the conflict must, to the extent feasible, avoid locating military objectives within or near densely populated areas’ and ‘[e]ach party to the conflict must, to the extent feasible, remove civilian persons and objects under its control from the vicinity of military objectives’ (Henckaerts and Dosweld-Beck, 2005, pp. 71–76). Measures aimed at separating arms depots from civilian areas resonate with a number of armed groups, provided they have the physical space to implement such a separation. The JEM and SLM–Unity in Sudan, for instance, have committed to keeping their forces and arms stockpiles away from civilians in an effort to protect them from enemy attacks (see Table 12.2). The Polisario Front (Western Sahara) and the Movement of Nigeriens for Justice adopted similar policies.53 The ANC/MK’s boxes of arms and ammunition were stored under the ground or in military camps located away from civilian dwellings.54 Some groups that formed to protect particular communities can be less enthusiastic about the removal of weapons from civilian areas. The People’s Army for the Restoration of Democracy (Armée Populaire pour la Restauration de la République et la Démocratie), for instance, is an alliance of self-defence militias created to protect villages from attacks by Central African state forces and road bandits.55 Like many state defence and security forces that choose to store their weapons and ammunition in urban areas, such groups are likely to oppose separating their military material from civilian communities, arguing that arms actually represent a source of security and protection for civilians.

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In recent years, accidental explosions of armed groups’ ammunition depots have reportedly occurred in countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, and Sudan, causing civilian casualties (see Table 12.3). Many more cases probably go unreported, especially in conflict settings that do not receive as much media attention. Accidental explosions also constitute a threat to the basic human right to life. From a human rights perspective, it can therefore be argued that armed groups should take appropriate precautions to prevent such explosions from occurring. The Principles on the Prevention of Human Rights Violations Committed with Small Arms, adopted by the UN Human Rights Council Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, cast the ‘proper storage and management of small arms, including ammunition’ in human rights terms (UNHRC, 2006, p. 8, para. 4). International technical standards for the safe management and storage of small arms ammunition provide technical guidance that can also help reduce the dangers posed by armed groups’ weapon depots (SEESAC,

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2007; UNGA, 2008, p. 2). A number of armed groups have referred to aspects of stockpile management in formal measures, including the ANC/MK, KNLA, Taliban, Viet Cong, and ZRO (see Table 12.2). While such measures seem to be primarily motivated by military efficiency and the need to protect valuable weaponry, evidence indicates that armed groups care about arms management. DDG’s experience in Somaliland also shows that when armed communities are reluctant to disarm, they may nevertheless be willing to collaborate with NGOs in safeguarding their weapons to improve community safety (see Box 12.3). Promoting basic safety measures, such as respecting a minimum safety distance between depots and civilian dwellings, can reduce the risk of civilian casualties caused by the presence of arms depots or caches. Taking such engagement further by providing armed groups with training on safe weapons and ammunition stockpile management is politically sensitive in most contexts, however. There is, in fact, a real risk that some groups would use such

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training to increase military efficiency rather than meet humanitarian objectives. For groups such as the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda, for instance, strict arms and ammunition management procedures56 were instrumental to the perpetration of well-documented IHL and human rights abuses (Bevan, 2005, pp. 36–42; HRW, 2005, pp. 15–23). Engagement of armed groups on safe arms management and use would therefore need to be linked with broader commitments to humanitarian principles, such as a ban on the indiscriminate use of small arms. Humanitarian actors’ ability to monitor safety measures taken by armed groups may appear limited at first sight, but recent experience reveals that armed groups can sometimes show unexpected transparency with respect to their arms holdings. The UN Group of Experts monitoring the arms embargo on Côte d’Ivoire, for instance, recently reported being able to inspect arms stockpiles held by the rebel Forces Nouvelles coalition—in some cases more easily than government facilities (UNSC, 2009c, paras. 46–58). Meanwhile, the Mines Advisory Group reported 7hc[Z ]hekfi facilitating the destruction of 12 tonnes of unstable ammunition in Galcaio, a city controlled by the semi-autonomous iec[j_c[i i^em region of Puntland in northern Somalia (MAG, 2009). The 2006 agreement between the CPN–Maoist and the Nepalese kd[nf[Yj[Z army also illustrates how armed groups can agree to international organizations monitoring their stocks of weapons jhWdifWh[dYo ed (see Table 12.2). Additional examples can be drawn from the anti-personnel mine ban experience, with some armed Whci ^ebZ_d]i$

groups giving humanitarian actors unprecedented access to their arms depots.57

IcWbb Whci jhWdi\[hi WdZ Z_l[hi_ed Measures to prevent the indiscriminate effects and unnecessary harm caused by small arms will be of limited use if the armed groups implementing them actively transfer weapons to other entities or individuals who do not adhere to humanitarian standards. Furthermore, if groups’ arsenals are not properly accounted for and safeguarded, they become vulnerable to theft by, or diversion to, such actors. In the same way that states must not encourage violations of IHL and exert their influence, to the degree possible, to stop violations of IHL (Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, 2005, p. 509), armed groups could be encouraged to take measures to ensure that they do not, deliberately or inadvertently, provide arms to other entities or groups if there is a significant risk that they will use them to commit violations of IHL. The same measures could be encouraged in relation to respect for human rights. :[b_X[hWj[ jhWdi\[hi je Éc_iki[hiÊ

Armed groups place great value on their weaponry. Their very survival depends to a great extent on the arms they are able to procure and maintain, in often challenging situations. As a result, armed groups’ internal regulations, such as the Viet Cong’s ‘Oath of Honour’, often make references to the combatant’s duty to maintain and keep weapons away from enemy hands (see Table 12.2). Another example is the Movement of Central African Liberators (Mouvement des Libérateurs Centrafricains pour la Justice, MLCJ), whose members are required to make an oral oath on the Koran or Bible to refrain from carrying out three prohibited activities: raping, looting, and selling the group’s weapons.58 Armed groups such as the ANC/MK, KNLA, SPLM/A, Taliban, and ZRO (see Table 12.2) have also adopted measures restricting or prohibiting the transfer of arms by their members. Such measures generally do not make references to IHL or human rights principles, however. A significant challenge for those seeking to engage armed groups on this issue lies, therefore, in persuading these groups of the impact that unrestrained arms transfers and proliferation can have on civilians and in convincing them to articulate related commitments towards that end.

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As is the case with state and civilian-held stocks (Small Arms Survey, 2008, pp. 43–75), armed groups’ small arms and ammunition require comprehensive controls, regardless of where they are used or stored, if the unintended diversion of their arms stocks to external actors is to be prevented. Diversion of armed groups’ stocks can be the result of their unauthorized sale by corrupt members or theft by outsiders. Although it is difficult to ascertain the specific procedures adopted by armed groups to safeguard their stockpiles or depots, testimonies by former commanders sometimes point to stricter controls than what is often commonly assumed. The ANC/MK’s military camps, for instance, comprised an armoury that was locked, inventoried, and managed by a commander in charge. Fighters returning from duty systematically had to account for the ammunition they consumed or face punishment.59 Similar procedures were reported by former group commanders in Mali (Florquin and Pézard, 2005, p. 54) and Senegal.60 Engaging armed groups on this issue is particularly challenging, as groups do not always have the means and =hekfi Ze dej technical expertise to safeguard arms and ammunition stocks according to international standards. Assisting armed WbmWoi ^Wl[ j^[ groups in doing so would be extremely difficult politically, as such support may be perceived by states as the provision [nf[hj_i[ je of military assistance, while armed groups may reject it as espionage. Engagement opportunities in this area therefore iW\[]kWhZ ijeYai seem limited to raising awareness among armed groups of the negative humanitarian impacts of unchecked—and WYYehZ_d] je potentially proliferating—arms stocks.

9ED9BKI?ED The small arms held by armed groups pose real and diverse threats to civilians living in situations of armed conflict. These include the use by armed groups of small arms against civilians, safety concerns linked with groups’ arsenals, and the diversion of group weapons to other entities that can be expected to misuse them. Drawing upon lessons learned as a result of efforts to engage armed groups in other areas, such as anti-personnel mines and the protection of children, the chapter has sketched out several areas for potential engagement in the small arms domain. These include measures to prohibit small arms misuse by group members, safety precautions to prevent weapons-related accidents, and commitments to refrain from transferring arms to criminals and other ‘misusers’. Among the most promising opportunities for engagement are prohibitions, and other precautionary measures, to curb the indiscriminate use of small arms by group members. Prohibitions and restrictions on the use of specific weapons of concern—such as surface-to-air missiles and indirect fire weapons—also have potential. Equally relevant are basic measures to reduce the threats to civilians caused by armed groups’ arms depots. Keeping a minimum distance between depots and civilian dwellings can help reduce both the risks of explosion caused by enemy attack as well as those triggered accidentally by unstable ammunition. Recent experience shows that external monitoring of such measures is possible. Other engagement opportunities may only be appropriate, and feasible, in exceptional circumstances. Promoting respect for international policing standards by armed groups, although implemented with de facto authorities such as Somaliland, can draw severe objection from concerned states. Providing technical training to armed groups to promote safe firearm handling and secure storage practices, although useful in reducing accidents and further arms

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proliferation, is likely to be opposed by concerned states on the grounds that it amounts to military training. In addition, armed groups are most often secretive about their arms management procedures, given the potential military utility of such information for the enemy. It appears, therefore, that engagement on these issues will have to be limited to raising awareness of relevant technical and human rights standards, with little opportunity for follow-up. As experience has shown, humanitarian actors can play an important role in influencing armed groups’ behaviour during conflict. These efforts, however, have thus far largely ignored the threats posed by armed groups’ small arms and ammunition arsenals. The UN Secretary-General’s May 2009 report on the protection of civilians in armed conflict created strong international momentum in favour of the humanitarian engagement of armed groups. The time seems ripe, therefore, for the international community to seek greater engagement with armed groups on the small arms issue.

B?IJ E< 788H;L?7J?EDI ANC/MK

African National Congress/Umkhonto We Sizwe

CNF

Chin National Front

CPN–Maoist

Communist Party of Nepal–Maoist

DDG

Danish Demining Group

HRC

Haitian Red Cross

ICRC

International Committee of the Red Cross

IHL

International humanitarian law

IHRL

International human rights law

JEM

Justice and Equality Movement

KNLA

Karen National Liberation Army

MILF

Moro Islamic Liberation Front

MFDC

Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de Casamance

MLCJ

Mouvement des Libérateurs Centrafricains pour la Justice

MNJ

Mouvement des Nigériens pour la Justice

NGO

Non-governmental organization

PKK

Kurdistan Workers’ Party

SLM–Unity

Sudan Liberation Movement–Unity

SPLM/A

Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army

ZRO

Zomi Re-Unification Organization

;D:DEJ;I 1

In its 2009 Yearbook, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute reports that, of the 16 major armed conflicts that were waged in 2008, all were intra-state, meaning they involved one or more non-state armed groups. For the fifth year running, no major inter-state conflict was active in 2008 (SIPRI, 2009, app. 2A).

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The chapter recognizes that organizations and experts working on or with armed groups prefer to refer to such entities as ‘armed non-state actors’, ‘non-state armed groups’, or ‘organized armed groups’ (see Bruderlein, 2000, p. 8; Geneva Call and PSIO, 2005, p. 10; ICHRP, 2000, p. 5; Sivakumaran, 2006, p. 369; and Zegveld, 2002, p. 1).

For purposes of this chapter, armed insurgency movements are organizations with basic command and control structures that use force to achieve political or quasi-political objectives and are not under state control. This definition is adapted from Geneva Call and PSIO (2005, p. 10).

4 5

For instance, the self-declared Republics of Abkhazia and Somaliland. A partial, and to date unrepeated, exception was the participation of 11 national liberation movements as observers in the diplomatic conference convened by Switzerland in 1974–77, which adopted the 1977 Protocols to the Geneva Conventions (Sassòli, 2003, p. 7).

See Somer (2007, pp. 660–61).

Opinio juris refers to the belief that an action was required or permitted by law.

See, for example, Security Council Resolution 1479, in which the Council ‘emphasizes again the need to bring to justice those responsible for the serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law that have taken place in Côte d’Ivoire since 19 September 2002, and reiterates its demand that all Ivorian parties take all the necessary measures to prevent further violations of human rights and international humanitarian law’ (UNSC, 2003, para. 8).

9 10

See, for instance, Fleck (2003, p. 79); Tomushat (2004, p. 586); and Clapham (2006b, pp. 271–316). These include the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNECOSOC, 2006a, paras. 45–58) and the UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions (UNECOSOC, 2006b, paras. 25–27). The human rights organizations Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch regularly report on abuses committed by armed groups and demand that they respect human rights. See, for instance, AI (2002) and HRW (2009).

In this chapter, the term ‘humanitarian norm’ is used broadly to refer to the norms of IHL and IHRL.

Adapted from Ricigliano (2005, p. 3).

See Article 3 common to all four of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 at ICRC (2009).

Calls for more systematic engagement of armed groups on issues such as forced displacement (Zeender, 2008, pp. 104–06) and torture

As highlighted by the UN Secretary-General (UNSC, 2009b, paras. 41–43).

Author correspondence with Olivier Bangerter, ICRC, 25 January 2010.

The author of this box works for the ICRC as adviser for dialogue with armed groups. Sources for this box are a number of unpublished ICRC

Information taken from Geneva Call (2007) and Bongard (2008a; 2008b), with updated figures provided by Geneva Call as of March 2010.

Burundi, India, Iran, Iraq, Myanmar, the Philippines, Somalia, Sudan, Turkey, and Western Sahara.

Both IHL and IHRL provide special protection for children in situations of armed conflict, including a prohibition on the recruitment of children

(REDRESS, 2006) should be noted here.

reports and evaluations.

and their use in hostilities and children’s right and access to education. See ICRC (n.d.). 21

In contrast with humanitarian engagement as defined in this chapter, the UN Security Council approach is coercive in nature. Resolution 1612 created a monitoring and reporting system for the naming and listing of armed groups responsible for violations of children’s rights (UNSC, 2005, para. 3). In addition, the Security Council threatened to impose targeted sanctions—such as arms embargoes—on parties to conflicts that violate the rights and protection of children in armed conflict (para. 9).

This section draws heavily from Bongard (2008b).

For further analysis on these different tools, see Bangerter (2008, pp. 82–83); Bongard (2008b); and ICRC (2008, pp. 16–31).

See Bangerter (2008, pp. 82–83); Bongard (2008b); Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers (2006, p. 5); Becker (2003, p. 2); and Withers (2007, p. 235).

25 26

For the list of signatory armed groups, see Geneva Call (n.d.b). Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions encourages the conclusion of such agreements between parties to non-international armed conflicts.

See, for instance, the analysis of the 1995 Agreement on Ground Rules by the SPLM and the Operation Lifeline Sudan consortium of humanitarian

Such was the case with the self-declared Republic of Somaliland, for instance. See Bongard (2008b).

actors in Sudan (Bradbury, Leader, and Mackintosh, 2007, p. 7).

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Codes of conduct can be defined as the core set of rules an organization expects its members to respect under all circumstances. Definition provided by Olivier Bangerter.

Penal or disciplinary codes are usually lengthier than codes of conduct and include more detailed definitions of prohibited conduct and associated punishments.

Rules of engagement aim to ‘assist in the delineation of the circumstances and limitations within which military forces may be employed to achieve

See Bongard (2008b); ICRC (2008, p. 13); Mc Hugh and Bessler (2006, pp. 16–21); UNICEF (2002, pp. 10–11).

their objectives’ (IIHL, 2009, p. 1). They are usually considered highly confidential, including those adopted by governmental armed forces.

This has been Geneva Call’s approach towards different factions of the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de Casamance, MFDC) in Senegal, for instance (Geneva Call, 2008, p. 14).

See Article 3 common to all four of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 at ICRC (2009).

See Capie (2004, pp. 11–12); Florquin and Decrey Warner (2008, pp. 21–22); Florquin, Lynge, and Ljørring Pedersen (2009); Policzer and Yankey-

Anti-personnel mines are included in the 1997 UN Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms definition—or list—of small arms and light

Wayne (2009, pp. 18–19); and Small Arms Survey (2009, p. 182, box 5.4).

weapons (UNGA, 1997, para. 26). 37

IHL prohibits the use of expanding (‘dum-dum’) bullets as well as the anti-personnel use of exploding bullets due to the superfluous injury and

Reports suggest that warring parties used exploding bullets during the 2004 conflict in Haiti, for instance (Doctors without Borders, 2005).

Response to Geneva Call questionnaire from Hussein Farah Aideed, United Somali Congress/Somali National Alliance, 18 June 2009.

unnecessary suffering they cause to victims (Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, 2005, pp. 268, 272).

The use of ‘socket bombs’ by the Communist Party of Nepal–Maoist in Nepal, for instance, had significant humanitarian impacts. Socket bombs are improvised hand grenades made out of galvanized pipe sockets. They have a high failure rate and therefore pose significant risks to civilians after combat as unexploded ordnance (ICBL, 2006, p. 1024).

In discussions with Geneva Call in 2003 in New Site, Southern Sudan, some Sudan People’s Liberation Army officials expressed interest in banning anti-vehicle mines.

A documented case of indiscriminate mortar attack is the 2003 shelling of Monrovia by the group Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (HRW, 2003).

Although the Movement of Nigeriens for Justice (Mouvement des Nigériens pour la Justice, MNJ) did not possess its own police force, it committed publicly to fighting ‘bandits who try to take advantage of the conflict to attack civilians’ (MNJ, 2008).

See Control Arms (2004).

One documented example is the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy’s July 2003 shelling of Monrovia. Analysts have argued that the fighters’ lack of training in mortar use was partially responsible for the heavy toll on civilians (Small Arms Survey, 2006, p. 257).

46 47

DDG is the humanitarian mine action unit of the Danish Refugee Council. In a nationwide household survey on community safety and small arms conducted by DDG from September 2008 to April 2009, 74 per cent of 2,846 respondents indicated that someone in their household owned at least one firearm. The actual number may be higher, however, as certain respondents in such surveys are typically afraid of admitting to firearms ownership. Seventy-nine per cent of DDG survey respondents indicated that disputes occurred in their communities (DDG and Small Arms Survey, 2009).

Fifty-eight per cent of the respondents in the abovementioned survey cited protection-related reasons (protection against other clans, gangs/ criminals/mentally ill people or wildlife, and protection of property and village) as the main reasons for firearm ownership (DDG and Small Arms Survey, 2009).

Sheikh district is located in the region of Sahil, about 135 km east-north-east of Somaliland’s capital, Hargeisa. Sheikh town has an estimated population of 1,100 households divided between the clans of Muse Abdalle and Esse Muse.

50 51

Khat, or qat, is a plant whose leaves are chewed fresh for a stimulant effect. Preliminary feedback received from community members suggests DDG’s assistance has contributed to improved community safety in Sheikh (DDG interview with the vice-chairman of the Sheikh management committee, Sheikh town, Somaliland, 2 August 2009).

52 53

See, for instance, Nation (1995); ABC News (2004); and Sudan Tribune (2006). Response to Geneva Call questionnaire by a representative of the Polisario Front, 17 June 2009; response to Geneva Call questionnaire by Ahmed Akoli, Secretary General, MNJ Political Cell, 16 July 2009.

;D=7=;C;DJ )(/

Confidential Geneva Call interview with former ANC/MK commander, Pretoria, 15 January 2010.

Confidential Geneva Call interviews with knowledgeable sources, Bangui, 28 May and 4 June 2009.

Measures included limits on the amount of ammunition fighters could carry and tight controls over the group’s arms caches.

Following allegations by the UN Monitoring Group of a transfer of 180 anti-personnel mines from Ethiopia to the Puntland authorities, for instance, the latter—having signed the Deed of Commitment—provided Geneva Call with unprecedented access to arms stockpiles in several military camps cited in the accusations. No anti-personnel mines were found and, significantly, Puntland proceeded with the destruction of anti-personnel mines and other dangerous items it had declared to be in its possession prior to the publication of the UN allegations (Geneva Call, 2007, p. 28; Geneva Call, MAG, and PMAC, 2008). In contrast, attempts to obtain clarification on the same allegations from the Ethiopian government, which is a party to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, were unsuccessful (ICBL, 2008, p. 1005).

Geneva Call interview with Abakar Sabone, president, MLCJ, Bangui, 4 June 2009.

Interview by Noel Stott of two former ANC/MK combatants, Cape Town, August and September 2009.

Geneva Call interview with a former base commander of the MFDC, Ziguinchor, 28 October 2009.

8?8B?E=H7F>O ABC News (United States). 2004. ‘Kufa Mosque Explosion Kills 2.’ 8 June. AI (Amnesty International). 2001. Human Rights Abuses with Small Arms: Illustrative Cases from Amnesty International Reports 2000–2001. London: AI. —. 2002. Israel and the Occupied Territories and the Palestinian Authority: Without Distinction—Attacks on Civilians by Palestinian Armed Groups. AI index MDE 02/003/2002. ANC/MK (African National Congress/Umkhonto We Sizwe). 1985. Report of Commission on National Structures, Constitutional Guidelines and Codes of Conduct Adopted at the Second National Consultative Conference of the African National Congress. June. In Bangerter (2009a). <http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/conf/kabcode.htm> Bangerter, Olivier. 2008. ‘The ICRC and Non-state Armed Groups’. In Geneva Call, PSIO, and UNIDIR (2008), pp. 74–84. —. 2009a. Compilation of Publicly Available Armed Groups’ Codes of Conducts, Unilateral Declarations, Penal/Disciplinary Codes, and Special Agreements. Unpublished document. March. —. 2009b. Dealing with Territorial Gangs: The ICRC’s Experience in Haiti (2004–07). Unpublished background paper. Geneva: Small Arms Survey. —. Forthcoming. ‘Measures Armed Groups Can Take to Improve Respect for IHL.’ Sanremo: International Institute of Humanitarian Law. BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation) News. 2000. ‘Blast at Kabul Ammo Dump.’ 26 May. —. 2001. ‘Kabul Ammunition Depot Blast.’ 11 July. —. 2002. ‘Bodies Recovered from Afghan Blast.’ 29 June. Becker, Jo. 2003. ‘Child Soldiers and Armed Groups.’ Notes for a presentation to the Conference on Curbing Human Rights Violations by Non-State Armed Groups, Vancouver. 14–15 November. Bevan, James. 2005. ‘Small Arms and the Strategic Use of Fear: A Study of the Lord’s Resistance Army and the Conflict in Northern Uganda.’ Unpublished background paper. Geneva: Small Arms Survey. Bongard, Pascal. 2008a. ‘Engaging Armed non-State Actors on Humanitarian Norms: The Experience of Geneva Call and the Landmine Ban.’ In Geneva Call, PSIO, and UNIDIR (2008), pp. 108–24. —. 2008b. ‘Humanitarian Engagement with Non-State Armed Groups: Lessons Learned from Geneva Call’s Experience on the Landmine Ban.’ Unpublished paper presented at the conference Transnational and Non-State Armed Groups: Legal and Policy Responses, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva. 24–25 April. Bradbury, Mark, Nicholas Leader, and Kate Mackintosh. 2007. The ‘Agreement on Ground Rules’ in South Sudan. HPG Report 4. London: Overseas Development Institute. March. Bruderlein, Claude. 2000. The Role of Non-State Actors in Building Human Security. Geneva: Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. May. Capie, David. 2004. Armed Groups, Weapons Availability and Misuse: An Overview of the Issues and Options for Action. Working Paper 4. Calgary: Armed Groups Project. May.

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79ADEMB;:=;C;DJI Fh_dY_fWb Wkj^ehi Nicolas Florquin (Geneva Call), with Pascal Bongard (Geneva Call) and Emilia Richard 9edjh_Xkjehi

Olivier Bangerter, Karina Lynge (DDG), and Geneva Call

334 Small Arms Survey 2010

Index

gang violence 143–4

transfers

imports, small-calibre cartridges and

analysis 20–32

parts 24

estimated values 17–20

A Aasha Gang Conflict Mediation Project (United Kingdom) 247 AB see Aryan Brotherhood accidental use of firearms 319 AEY Inc., ammunition procurement 14 Afghanistan see also Taliban ammunition procurement 14 undocumented transfers 27 explosions at arms depots 322 improvised explosive devices (IEDs) 123 militias 118, 122, 262 non-state armed groups, firearms 122 Africa, gang violence 142–4 African National Congress/Umkhonto We Sizwe, weapon-related commitments 317, 318 air transport

global trade 7–35

Austria

transparency 10–13

ammunition, transfers, transparency 11

undocumented 18, 27

exports, transparency 16 transportation, customs regulations 57

Amuka militia (Uganda) 267 ANC/MK see African National Congress/ Umkhonto We Sizwe

authorized transfers, definition 9 Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia) (AUC)

Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention see

criminalization 271

Convention on the Prohibition of the

firearms 122

Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and

automatic rifles, police arming 114

on Their Destruction

Awakening Councils (Iraq), firearms 122

anti-personnel mines, banning campaign 309 Argentina, exports, transparency 16 armed groups see also gangs; non-state armed groups accidental use of firearms 319 civilian targeting 316–18 definitions 86–9, 186 engagement 94, 305–26

B Badr Organization, firearms 122 Bakassi Boys (Nigeria) 266 Bangladesh, non-state armed groups, firearms 122 Barrio Azteca gang (Texas) 157, 161, 162

civil aviation regulations 59–62

female members 191, 195, 201

control measures 44–9

humanitarian commitments 310–11

customs regulations 54–8, 62

humanitarian engagement 306–15

Basij militia (Iran) 264

international regulation 49–50

internal regulations 313

Belarus, ammunition, transfers, transparency

national regulation 50–4

policing 319

aircraft, registration 60

pro-government groups 94–5, 255–72

al-Qaeda, armed violence 85

small arms 305–6

Barrio de Paz (Guayaquil, Ecuador) 218–20, 223

11 Belgium ammunition, transfers, transparency 11

Albania, ammunition, stockpiles 13, 14

misuse 316–18

exports, transparency 15

Algeria, non-state armed groups 270–1

safety 319–24

French–Belgian initiative on air

Alliant Techsystems (United States),

transfers and diversion 324–5

transport control 46–7, 48–9, 62

stockpile management 322–4

imports, shotgun shells 25

Americans gang (South Africa) 164

Sudan 95–6, 285–8

transportation

ammunition

violence 85–6

ammunition production 22

definition 8–9 light weapons ammunition definition 9

customs regulations 57

arms control regimes international 49–50 national 50–4

technological developments 33–4

arms depots, explosions 322–4

transfers 7–8, 18–20, 27–32, 34–5

Arrow Boys (Uganda) 267

licensing 53 Belize gangs gun ownership 112, 113 membership 106, 107

production, major producers 22

Aryan Brotherhood (AB) (United States) 160

Berlin (Germany), Turkish gangs 233

shotgun shells, transfers 18, 22–3,

Asia–Pacific, gang violence 142–4

BGF see Black Guerilla Family

25–7, 30

ATK see Alliant Techsystems

bilateral agreements, humanitarian norms

small arms ammunition

AUC see Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia

definition 8–9 transfers 7–8, 18, 20–7, 34–5 small-calibre cartridges, transfers 18, 21–4, 30 stockpiles 13, 14

Australia ammunition procurement 31 transfers, transparency 11, 12 exports, transparency 16

312 Black Guerilla Family (BGF) (United States) 160–1 Bolivia, pro-government armed groups 266–7 Bolivian Liberation Front 266–7

INDEX 335

Bosnia and Herzegovina

prison gangs 164–5

ammunition, transfers, transparency 11

Chicago Area Project 238, 244

exports, transparency 15

Chicago Convention see Convention on

Boston Gun Project (United States) 246

International Civil Aviation

community security 267 Comprehensive Peace Agreement 2005 (CPA) (Sudan) 277, 279–80, 292–6 Comtrade see United Nations (UN),

Chicago School, gang research 233

Brazil exports

child soldiers, girls 195

shotgun shells 25

children, protection against conflict 309–10

small-calibre cartridges and parts 24

Chin National Front (CNF) (Myanmar)

transparency 16 prison gangs 167–72 firearms 173 Bremen (Germany), gang violence 136–7 brokering

weapon-related commitments 317

Stockpiling, Production and Transfer

exports

small-calibre cartridges and parts 23

Destruction (Ottawa Convention) (1997) 309, 312 Costa Rica

transparency 16

ammunition, transfers, transparency 11

gang violence 143

exports

light weapons ammunition, exports 32

transportation

of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their

shotgun shell parts 26

control measures 44–6

transparency 13, 16

(Chicago Convention) (1944) 59–60 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use,

China

shotgun shells 25

shotgun shell parts 26

(RCD–Goma), firearms 122 Convention on International Civil Aviation

humanitarian commitments 310, 316

arms transfers 42 Bulgaria

Commodity Trade Statistics Database Congolese Rally for Democracy–Goma

transportation, record-keeping 53

gangs gun ownership 112, 113 membership 106, 107 Côte d’Ivoire

civil aviation

non-state armed groups

cargo restrictions 59–60

firearms 122

customs regulations 57

customs clearance 60

licensing 51, 53

registration of aircraft 60

CPA see Comprehensive Peace Agreement

record-keeping 53

regulations 59–62

criminalization, transportation 54

safety and security measures 61–2

Croatia

stockpiles 324

civilian firearms

exports, transparency 16

gangs 144–5

ownership 110–11, 114–15

Cambodia, gangs, suppression 245 Canada

pro-government armed groups 263 Curbelo, Nelsa 209, 216, 219, 220, 221,

civilians humanitarian and human rights law

222, 223 customs

ammunition, transfers, transparency 11

306–10

customs regulations 56–7

ammunition data 10

and pro-government armed groups

exports

civil aviation 60

268–9

international regulations 54–5

small-calibre cartridges and parts 24 transparency 15 gang violence 135–6 imports shotgun shells 25 small-calibre cartridges and parts 24

targeting by armed groups 316–18 CNF see Chin National Front Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers 309, 313 Colombia non-state armed groups, firearms 122

cargo restrictions, civil aviation 59–60

prison gangs, firearms 173

cartridges, small-calibre, transfers 18, 21–4 CASE see Community Action Towards a Safer Environment Central African Republic (CAR), Lord’s Resistance Army 288–9 Central America gangs 138

Cyprus, exports, transparency 16 Czech Republic ammunition, transfers, transparency 11

imports, shotgun shells 25

CAR see Central African Republic Caribbean, gang violence 138–42

national regulations 55–8 CV see Comando Vermelho

exports, transparency 15 transportation, licensing 52, 53

pro-government armed groups 271 Comando Vermelho (CV) gang (Rio de Janeiro) 157, 167–70, 177 Communist Party of Nepal firearms 122 weapon-related commitments 317 Community Action Towards a Safer Environment (CASE) (South Africa) 239

D Danish Demining Group (DDG), Somaliland 320 Darfur (Sudan), elections 294 Dawood Gang (Mumbai) 106, 107 DDG see Danish Demining Group

336 Small Arms Survey 2010

DDR see disarmament, demobilization,

El Joven Noble (The Noble Young Man)

and reintegration deaths, violent 85

Finland ammunition, transfers, transparency 11

Male Responsibility Project 238

exports, transparency 15

El Salvador

Deed of Commitment for Adherence to a

transportation

gangs

Total Ban on Anti-personnel Mines

gun ownership 112, 113

and for Cooperation in Mine Action

membership 69, 106, 107

licensing 53

309, 312, 313

socio-political factors 230

the Firm (South Africa) 164

suppression strategies 246

FMLN see Frente Farabundo Marti para la

Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) Lord’s Resistance Army 288–9

elections, violence 265

non-state armed groups, firearms

engagement

122, 124

humanitarian approach 306–15

gun ownership 109–10, 112, 113

Denver (United States), gang violence

ammunition, transfers, transparency 11

membership 106, 107

exports shotgun shell parts 26, 27

en Niños, Niñas y Adolescentes

EU see European Union

(DINAPEN) (Ecuador) 211, 216

Eurogang project 129, 131, 137, 145, 232

shotgun shells 25 transparency 15

Europe, gang violence 136–8

French–Belgian initiative on air transport

European Defence Agency (EDA)

control 46–7, 48–9, 62

groups 120

imports

Code of Conduct on Defence

diversions, armed groups 325

Procurement 12

DRC see Democratic Republic of the Congo

Defence Contracts Opportunities

drug trafficking

bulletin board 12

Ecuador 215

Republic of France

Estonia, ammunition, transfers, transparency

Dirección Nacional de Policía Especializada

reintegration (DDR), non-state armed

see Macedonia, Former Yugoslav

gangs

exports, transparency 15

disarmament, demobilization, and

122 Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

England and Wales

ammunition, transfers, transparency 11

136–7

Liberación Nacional Forces Nouvelles (Côte d’Ivoire), firearms

armed groups 94, 305–26

Denel (South Africa), contracts 29 Denmark

customs regulations 57

shotgun shell parts 26 shotgun shells 25 police weapons 114 transportation

European Union (EU)

Mexico 140

licensing 53

Annual Report, ammunition 10, 12

safety and security measures 53–4

civil aviation regulations 59

55–7

French–Belgian initiative, air transport

and Trafficking of SALW and Their

Economic Community of West African Arms and Light Weapons (2006) 49–50

freight forwarders 43

humanitarian commitments 310

ammunition shotgun shells 25–6

Colombia (FARC), armed violence 85 FYROM see Macedonia, Former Yugoslav Republic of

small-calibre cartridges and parts

African States

23–4

Ecuador gang violence 93–4, 214–15

firearms 214–15

Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de

shotgun shell parts 25–6

ECOWAS see Economic Community of West

disarmament 221

Nacional (FMLN) (El Salvador),

Ammunition 47–9

Social Council

gangs 209–24

Frente Farabundo Marti para la Liberación

exports

ECOSOC see United Nations Economic and

prevention measures 215–21

control 46–7, 48, 62

Strategy to Combat Illicit Accumulation

East Timor, gangs, girl members 190 States (ECOWAS), Convention on Small

Single Administrative Document (SAD)

G F

Gang Resistance Education and Training

FARC see Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia

(GREAT) programme 237–8 gang violence

history 212–14

Fashoda Peace Agreement (1997) 278

Africa and Asia-Pacific 142–4

mediation 220

FBI see Federal Bureau of Investigation

definitions 131

membership 210–11

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

direct and indirect consequences 132

EDA see European Defence Agency

(United States), weaponry 114

drug-related 140, 215

INDEX 337

Ecuador 93–4, 214–15

supression strategies 230, 244–8

Europe 136–8

tattoos 69, 241

explanations for 146–9

treatment strategies 230

non-state armed groups 270 prison gangs, firearms 173 Guayaquil (Ecuador)

firearms use 69, 89–90, 214–15

environment-oriented 244

Barrio de Paz 218–20, 223

girls as perpetrators 193–7, 199–201

youth-oriented 240–2

gangs 93, 209–24

girls as victims 197–8

Garang, John 278, 279

Latin America and the Caribbean

Gaza, non-state armed groups, firearms 122

138–42 levels of violence 145 location 145 motives 145 prevention programmes 93–4, 209,

312, 313

exports

United States and Canada 132–6 weaponry 144–5

girl members 91–2, 185–203, 231 ethnicity 192–3 programming 202 reasons for joining 191–3 roles 189–91 sexual stereotypes 189

Hamas, firearms 122

transparency 8, 13, 15

handguns, gang violence 145 explosions at arms depots 322

small-calibre cartridges and parts 24

firearms 122

customs regulations 57 licensing 51

Trinidad and Tobago 129, 141 Homies Unidos 222–3

victimization 198–9

Honduras gangs

violence by 193–7, 199–201

gun ownership 112, 113

weapon use 196–7

membership 106, 107

GoSS see Government of Southern Sudan Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS)

weapons 196–7

relations with National Congress Party 277–8

gun ownership 69, 89, 101–5, 109–16,

graffiti, gangs 69, 147, 217

144–5, 214–15

GREAT see Gang Resistance Education and Training

initiation rituals 69, 198

Greece, exports, shotgun shell parts 26

interventions 92–4, 229–49

grenades

membership 105–8

production 31

prevention strategies 230

technological developments 33

youth-oriented 234–8

United States 132–5, 146

gang membership 91–2, 185–203, 231

violence by 193–7, 199–201

reasons for joining 191, 216

gang violence 129

child soldiers 195

disarmament policy 283

environment-oriented 238–40

relations with state 117 homicides

girls

conflicts 281–3

humanitarian engagement 308

Hezbollah

shotgun shell parts 26

victimization 198–9

graffiti 69, 147, 217

girl members 190, 197 urban conflict 197

transportation

231

family treatment strategies 242

gangs 308

small-calibre cartridges and parts 24 imports

criminal activities 90, 214–15

Ecuador 209–24

Haiti

shotgun shells 25

gangs

disarmament 221

shotgun shell parts 26

victims 69, 145

definitions 86, 105, 130–1, 186, 211–12,

Gulabi Gang (India), weapons 197

306, 307 Germany

sexual assault 198–9

cultures of 231

rehabilitation programmes 216–21 homicides 219, 220

Geneva Conventions, and armed groups

ammunition, transfers, transparency 11

prison gangs

membership 106, 107, 210–11

Geneva Call, anti-personnel mine ban 309,

216–24