On Ideology, Language, and Identity: Language Politics in the Soviet and PostSoviet Lithuania Rasa Baločkaitė
Language Policy ISSN 1568-4555 Lang Policy DOI 10.1007/s10993-013-9301-z
1 23
Your article is protected by copyright and all rights are held exclusively by Springer Science +Business Media Dordrecht. This e-offprint is for personal use only and shall not be selfarchived in electronic repositories. If you wish to self-archive your article, please use the accepted manuscript version for posting on your own website. You may further deposit the accepted manuscript version in any repository, provided it is only made publicly available 12 months after official publication or later and provided acknowledgement is given to the original source of publication and a link is inserted to the published article on Springer's website. The link must be accompanied by the following text: "The final publication is available at link.springer.com�.
1 23
Author's personal copy Lang Policy DOI 10.1007/s10993-013-9301-z ORIGINAL PAPER
On Ideology, Language, and Identity: Language Politics in the Soviet and Post-Soviet Lithuania Rasa Balocˇkait_e
Received: 22 September 2012 / Accepted: 16 October 2013 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013
Abstract The paper illuminates links between state politics and language politics in Lithuania during different historical periods: (a) the thaw period, (b) the stagnation period, (c) the liberalization periods of Soviet socialism, and (d) the two postSoviet decades characterized by both nationalism and liberalization. Based on analysis of the texts by leading Lithuanian linguists published in the main language and culture journals during the period of 1960–2010, the paper argues that the concept of a good, proper language is a purely political idea, produced for the sake of governance by both the Soviet authorities as well as the pro-nationalist governments. The nationalist version of a ‘‘good language’’ is sanitized from foreign effects; the socialist version is sanitized from bourgeois remnants and capitalist influence. In both cases, the proper language is assigned a moral value, but the ideological construct masks inequalities of power. During the post-Soviet years, due to democratization, liberalization, and growing diversity, the idea of one ‘‘good, proper language’’ forfeited its social significance; it remained purely a linguistic ideal. With the development of multiple language cultures and subcultures, it stands increasingly as a metaphor for the totalitarian Soviet period for its omnipresent uniformity and homogeneity. Keywords
Language policy Language ideology Socialism Nationalism
This paper is part of the research project ‘‘Lithuanian language: ideals, ideologies and identities’’ (Institute of Lithuanian Language). The project was funded by a grant (No. Nr. VAT-14/2010) from the Research Council of Lithuania. R. Balocˇkait_e (&) Department of Social and Political Theory, Faculty of Political Sciences and Diplomacy, Vytautas Magnus University, Gedimino 44, 44240 Kaunas, Lithuania e-mail: Rasa15@gmail.com
123
Author's personal copy R. Balocˇkait_e
Introduction In most societies, language is controlled through a variety of unstated rules, regulations and taboos. Linguistic relations originate from social relations and also reflect them. Language ideologies expose power relations between speakers, different social groups and the state. According to Woolard, language ideologies are not primarily about language; rather ‘‘they are in the service of other, more basic, ideological systems—concerning race, ethnicity, gender, sexuality, class, nationality, and other aspects of the social world—which they cloak in linguistic terms’’ (1994, p. 57). Accordingly, Irvine defines linguistic ideologies as ‘‘the cultural system of ideas about social and linguistic relationships, together with their loading of moral and political interests’’ (1989, p. 249). The standardization of language typically goes hand in hand with the development of the centralized states and restructuring of social and linguistic relations among speaking subjects within certain territory. Since the fifteenth century, political elites of France, Italy, and other European countries have engaged increasingly in language planning, practicing purposeful influence on language development and shaping procedural rules of communication. The aim of the early language planning was to establish a standard language of the state and authority within the given territory; to regulate and to codify social and linguistic relations both between state and its citizens and, to certain extent, among citizens themselves. In this paper, language ideologies in Soviet and post-Soviet Lithuania are analyzed in terms of relations between language, power, ideology, and politics. As language ideologies and language planning in Soviet Russia are quite well investigated (Gorham 1996; Emerson 1996; Kelly 2002), Lithuania constitutes an important but understudied case for several reasons. First, Lithuania became part of the Soviet Union relatively late, in 1940 only, and the language politics had to catch up with the linguistic developments in the rest of the Soviet Union, where language development had already been orchestrated by the Soviet authorities for a few decades. Then, language was (and still remains) at the core of Lithuanian ethnic identity and modern Lithuanian statehood. The national rebirth movement of the late nineteenth century in Lithuania originated as a response to the ban of the Latin alphabet imposed by Russian authorities from 1864 to 1904. It led to the phenomenon of knygnesˇyst_e (which refers to book smugglers), illegal transportation of Lithuanian books printed in Latin alphabet, into the Lithuanian speaking areas of the Russian empire; the other phenomenon was the appearance of the first Lithuanian newspapers Ausˇra (1883) and Varpas (1889), published also in East Prussia and distributed illegally in Lithuania. The national rebirth movement resulted in the declaration of Independence of Lithuania in 1918. As Miłosz (1992) pointed out, modern Lithuania emerged out of philology and language. The modern Lithuanian nation and Lithuanian state appeared as an Andersonian imagined community, as a community of language. Thus, historical developments led to the widespread notion of language as sacred essence, as exclusive and singular phenomenon that characterizes the nation. Intense processes of linguistic standardization and language planning and development of Lithuanian as the language of state, politics, science, culture, politics, and
123
Author's personal copy Language politics in the Soviet and post-Soviet Lithuania
bureaucracy during the independence period of 1918–1940 were interrupted in 1940 with Lithuania’s incorporation into the USSR. The institutional structure of the Soviet Union led to the situation characterized as linguistic imperialism, i.e. continuous reconstitution of structural and cultural inequalities between the Russian and Lithuanian languages, to rephrase the definition by Phillipson (1992:47). Due to the highly centralized political and economic life, local languages were pushed out and marginalized. Russian was declared as the state language in Lithuania. Lithuanian suffered from an inferior position vis-a`-vis Russian but remained a significant instrument for shaping national and socialist identities. However, the unique feature of the Soviet language politics was not the bilingualism but the ideological functions of language planning. Webb (2006) makes a distinction between normative and ideological language planning. The normative language planning is based ‘‘on a set of values and norms which have the consent and support of the population to which they apply’’ (2006, p. 152), while ideological language planning is directed at establishing a specific set of views, beliefs, patterns of behavior, with the aim of ‘‘serving the interests of the dominant ruling class, maintaining a particular social order, control and domination, or reproducing relations of inequality and keeping ‘the Other subordinated, or representing ‘the Other’ as secondary, inferior and subservient’’ (Webb 2006, p. 152). The language planning of the Soviet period was in service of the ruling Communist party, it was directed at reproducing social and linguistic relations both between state and its citizens and among citizens themselves. Turbin (1994) argues that totalitarianism constitutes interesting philological phenomena, i.e. logophobia, or fear to speak; yet, post totalitarianism constitutes equally interesting philological phenomena. Political liberalization and rapid transformation of social and economic relations lead towards linguistic diversification and intense, but poorly coordinated change of linguistic practices. The aim of this paper is to examine the development of language ideologies and language planning both in Soviet and post-Soviet Lithuania, as a tool for reproducing social and linguistic relations, imposing specific worldviews and shaping new political subjectivities in Soviet and post-Soviet Lithuania. Particular attention is being paid to the employment of language ideologies for mobilization of the speaking community both on political or on ethnic basis, modeling social and linguistic relations between state and the citizens and among citizens themselves, and eliminating unwanted content from the linguistic repertoire of the speaking subjects. The paper will also reveal the gradual development of linguistic ideologies and language control patters in relation to the change of political climate and illuminate language as a site of hegemonic struggle between Soviet ideologies, nationalist imaginations and everyday linguistic practices and linguistic needs of regular citizens.
Methodology The research presented here is based on the analysis of significant papers by leading Lithuanian linguists published in the main language journals in Lithuania from 1961
123
Author's personal copy R. Balocˇkait_e
to 2010.1 The period is divided into five decades.2 The first is the thaw period which covers a part of the Khrushchev and part of the Brezhnev periods. The second covers the late Brezhnev era, or the stagnation era, whereas the third covers very late socialism and the national rebirth period. The fourth and the fifth periods are classified as the early and late post-Soviet period. The texts are written by the leading Lithuanian linguists: long time researchers at the Institute of Lithuanian language (before 1990, Institute of Lithuanian Language and Culture), professors, authors of multiple books, and editors of the journals Our Language, Native Language, Language Culture.3 The total number of texts is 1,084, 49 of them are directly quoted in this paper. Lithuania has significant number of historical Russian and Polish minorities, especially in the capital area, and it results in tensions as to the use of minority languages. However, the texts published in language culture journals and analyzed in this research target primarily Lithuanian language (both in home country and in exile) rather than all languages spoken and used in Lithuania, so the minority issues are not covered in this paper. The texts chosen for the analysis are defined by several criteria. These are the texts that focus on the main linguistic problems (e.g., development of the Soviet newspeak, struggle against Russification, creolization of language, development of sociolects) rather than on single particular cases (e.g., analysis of a certain book or driving instruction) or specific linguistic issues (e.g., a certain case of pronunciation). The texts address social and political aspects of language use, they reflect dominant sets of beliefs about the role of language and rationalization or justification of language structure and the use and the attitudes towards linguistic negligence. The analysis illuminates primary aims of language politics, the main areas under linguistic regulation, the definition of ‘‘good language’’, the main linguistic threats, and ideological justification of language control of each corresponding period.
1
Lietuviu˛ kalbos sekcijos sa˛siuvinis (Notes of the Lithuanian Language Section), 1968–1970; Mu¯su˛ kalba (Our Language) 1971–1989; Gimtoji kalba (Native Language), since 1990; Kalbos kultu¯ra (Language Culture), since 1961. The journals were published by different institutional bodies. The institutional structure was changing during ongoing reforms, yet they were subordinated to the Ministry of Culture and Education.
2
The typical periodization of the Khrushchev era (1953–1964), the Brezhnev era (1964–1982) and the era of reforms (1982–1990) was cancelled for several reasons: first, the change in the Soviet leadership typically have had belated effects in the Lithuanian SSR, then, the language journals were published in Lithuania only since 1961.
3
Ambrazas Vytautas, Gaivenis Kazimieras, Slizˇien_e Nijol_e, Klimavicˇius Jonas, Keinys Stasys, Vitkauskas Vytautas, Ulvydas Kazys are long term research fellows at the Institute of Lithuanian language and Culture (Institute of Lithuanian Language since 1990), Kniu¯ksˇta Pranas—long term research fellow at the Institute of Lithuanian Language, editor of ‘‘Language Culture’’; Pupkis Aldonas— editor of ‘‘Our Language’’ (1968–1989), editor of ‘‘Native language’’ (1989–2000), leader of regular TV and Radio talks on language culture, professor at Vilnius University; Drotvinas Vincentas—professor, head of the Department of Lithuanian language at Vilnius University.
123
Author's personal copy Language politics in the Soviet and post-Soviet Lithuania
How to speak Soviet: from peasants into proletarians (1960–1969) Following the short period of independence, Lithuania became part of the USSR in 1940 and the Russian language was declared as a state language. The Lithuanian language remained widely used in the media, education, economics, local bureaucracies, and everyday life, but it was subjected to radical reforms. The state of affairs in post-war Lithuania replicated the situation in Russia after the revolution of 1917—it was the workers’ state without workers. One of the first tasks of the Soviet state was to create—both physically and discursively—the socialist working class in predominantly agricultural regions (Gorham 1996; Koenker 1985; Crowley and Siegelbaum 1995; Brunnbauer 2008, etc). The making of socialist working class encompassed a broad range of state programs such as industrialization, urbanization, and education, all designed to create a new proletarian habitus, new language, taste, and morality. The Soviet authorities attempted to create ‘‘a new, authoritative language befitting the state and citizens of the future, and the need for a semiliterate population to understand and identify with the message of that discourse, posed a profound political, social and cultural dilemma’’ (Gorham 1996, p. 413). Emerson refers to these attempts of reforming language as a ‘‘language substitution project’’ (1996, p. 358). The Soviet campaigns against illiteracy, orchestrated by the Commissariat of Enlightenment, provided opportunities to develop new linguistic competences of the population and thus to overcome the communication gap between the center and the periphery, between the revolutionary vanguard and ‘‘muzhiks’’. Literacy meant not the simple ability to read and write, but to write properly (Gorham 1996). The language politics in Lithuania in the 1960s followed the same pattern. After the post WWII turmoil was over in Lithuania, the Commission of the Lithuanian Language was established in 1961. The language policies of 1960s were focusing on introducing new socialist vocabulary, both in terms of naming new socialist realities (social, economic, political) and new socialist subjectivities (e.g., socialist morality, socialist work ethics). The linguists focused on developing proper linguistic competences of the population, teaching them how to ‘speak Soviet’: The highest index in implementing the socialist obligations was achieved by Latvian industrial collectives (Ulvydas 1964, p. 10); Once everyone cares about the kolchos property, the losses will decrease (Ulvydas 1964, p. 15). The language politics were also directed at shaping new shared perceptions of space and time. The space was reorganized into the new categories of the Soviet bloc and the capitalist West. Thus, the categories were introduced into popular imagination, and citizens were taught how to speak properly by providing readymade linguistic structures or linguistic patterns such as ‘‘celebration of the fortieth anniversary of the Udmurt Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic’’ (Ulvydas 1964, p. 20) or ‘‘the poet could hardly see any positive prospects of life under the rule of the bourgeoisie and has passed towards symbolic interpretation of reality’’ (Ulvydas 1964, p. 13). A new shared perception of historical time was established, based on a distinctively socialist periodization, categorization and chronological points of
123
Author's personal copy R. Balocˇkait_e
reference: ‘‘Institute of History at the Academy of Sciences of Lithuanian SSR seeking for a Head of the Lithuanian post-October history division’’ (Ulvydas 1964, p. 17). It contributed to the development of an imagined Soviet community, based on the recognizable and universal linguistic structures, covering the general organization of space, time, and personal morality. The vocabulary was sanitized from unwanted meanings. The terms related to social, political and economic relations of the pre-Soviet past were eliminated and pushed into a passive vocabulary. These were names of former authorities (chaplain, master, landlord, policeman, virsˇaitis (=chief of a rural district), auction, bailiff), economically unprivileged (sharecropper, lodger, beggar), disappearing traditional shoe wear or work tools of the poor (plough, bast-shoes, nagin_es =a kind of sandals made of a single piece of leather) (Ulvydas 1967, p. 4). For some other concepts, there was a heteronymous shift of the meaning from derogative towards empowering and progressive. For example ‘‘Liaudis (=narod4) a few decades ago was understood as ‘ignorant, backward people from rural areas’ (…). Now, it is understood in the following way: in Soviet countries, it refers to all people, whereas in the countries ruled by the bourgeoisie it means ‘working class people’’ (Ulvydas 1967, p. 4). Thus, Gorham noted that the literacy campaigns in Soviet Russia ‘‘provided additional opportunities for the Bolsheviks to mold citizens to shape their ideas’’ (Gorham 1996: 414), both about the social realities and about themselves. The language politics in Lithuania shaped not only the way of speaking but the way of thinking too. Most of the texts were of the propagandist nature: ‘‘Education of society is enormously important in the late stage of building communism’’; ‘‘services (speaking about the USA) extremely increase the prices of drinks and food products’’(Ulvydas 1964, p. 16). Writing of kharacteristika (meaning a recommendation letter providing the main character features and the social background of the person) was given particular attention. Here, the ideal image of the socialist subjectivities was articulated, desirable features were approved and inappropriate ones were condemned, people were being taught how to speak about their co-workers and about themselves as the Soviet citizens: Maryte is an active and dutiful worker; the teacher is actively involved in organizing of mass events; She is known for her precise implementation of all official and social tasks assigned to her (Zinkevicˇius 1968, p. 29) In the Soviet system, the Communist party had the ultimate monopole of power and decision making in virtually all spheres of life, including all kinds of media. The centralized ‘‘are for language’’ served as a tool of censorship in the Soviet bloc; it was opposed to the chaotic, incidental and disorganized publishing practices in the capitalist countries: ‘‘Amateurish and incidental publishing practices, typical for the capitalist countries, disappeared in Lithuania during the very first years of the Soviet life. The Party and the Soviet government are taking care of the language quality of published books’’ (Ulvydas 1963, p. 4). The language reform was legitimized by the 4
‘Narod’ is a term used loosely and subjectively by contemporaries to refer to a preconceived notion of nonintellectual, rank-and-file members of the peasantry and the working class (Gorham 1996).
123
Author's personal copy Language politics in the Soviet and post-Soviet Lithuania
socialist ideology of progress. A ‘‘clear and logical language’’ was necessary for building a new Communist society: ‘‘Language quality of the media has an enormous political significance (…) Soviet society, while it is building the communist future, deserves high quality newspapers and journals, where political, ideological and scientific content goes in hand with the high language culture’’ (Ulvydas 1964, p. 8). Linguistic negligence was attributed to the pre-Soviet or capitalist societies, who failed to provide means of education for their citizens. Linguistic purity was considered as a moral duty of a socialist, and linguistic negligence was seen as a form of backwardness, as a residue of pre-socialist developments, or ‘‘vestige of the past’’: ‘‘The author condemns the linguistic negligence; it is a shame, he argues, and it is totally incomprehensible under current conditions (of socialism), when everyone is given all opportunities to learn how to speak and write properly’’ (Ambrazas 1967, p. 104). The dominance of the Russian language and a continuous reconstitution of structural and cultural inequalities between Russian and Lithuanian were advocated by allegedly ‘‘enriching effects’’ of the Russian language (Ulvydas 1967, p. 9). According to the Soviet ideology, the primitive, brutal Russification in the nineteenth century was condemned and replaced by a progressive interaction between the two languages, where the Lithuanian language was not only a passive recipient of Russian loanwords, but an active participant in the process: ‘‘Even the concepts, that are known worldwide in their Russian form (Soviet, kolchos, komsomol, etc.) have been translated into Lithuanian into a creative way (Tarybos /= Soviets, Kolu¯kis /=kolchos, Komjaunimas /=komsomol)’’ (see Ulvydas 1967, p. 4). During the 1960s, the Soviet language policies aimed to close the communication gap between the Soviet elites and the rest of the population, to establish a new language of politics and bureaucracy, and to regulate social and linguistic relations between citizens and the state authorities. The new language articulated the socialist economic realities, introduced new concepts of time and space and defined new socialist identities. Language policies were used as tools for eliminating politically unwanted content; linguistic negligence was attributed to the pre-Soviet and the capitalist states and language quality was declared as a moral duty of a socialist.
The years of ‘‘Kul’turnost’’’ (1970–1979): proletarians go to the theatre The period of 1970–1979 covers the so-called late Brezhnev era, an era of relative political and economic stability. In Lithuania, active political resistance was over, new pro Soviet elites were already shaped and the desirable class structure was established. The Soviet regime, after achieving its primary goals, shifted towards a new mode of governance. Since 1970, the development was oriented towards the improvement of material and social standards of living, the development of consumer goods and services, and increased care for individual morals and personal responsibilities. Economically, the Soviet authorities compromised with the citizens by permitting a certain level of consumerism or turning a blind eye on ‘‘shadow
123
Author's personal copy R. Balocˇkait_e
economy’’; politically, the regime turned from the use of sheer violence towards propaganda and education.5 The campaign for kul’turnost’,6 (translated in English as ‘culturedness’, referring to the ideal type of the Soviet subjectivity) was revived from 1930s as an instrument of governance. The cultured person (kul’turnyi chelovek), according to Kelly, was ‘‘efficient, hard-working, punctual, au fait with important political events, a responsible member of the kollektiv, scrupulous in his or her hygienic habits, fit and tough (zakalennyi), disciplined (in the sense of obedient to party or workplace superiors) and committed to intellectual self-improvement, though never to an extent that threatened the stability of the kollektiv to which he or she belonged’’ (Kelly 2002, p. 575). Kul’turnost’ became a new moral imperative and also a tool for controlling the citizens beyond the form of the state. As Cohn argues, regime was ‘‘becoming less repressive, but more intrusive: it was devoting less time to the political loyalty and ideological orthodoxy of its members and more to the minutiae of their private lives’’ (2009:430). Language politics shifted also from the public sphere, party meetings, ideology, propaganda and political commemorations towards new spheres of life as consumption, culture, recreation and regular everyday activities. The linguistic regulations extended to new spaces (shopping and recreation areas, public transportation, private everyday life) and targeted new subjects as youth, children, artists, regular workers, retired persons, etc. Language reviews of theatre plays (Vitkauskas 1972, 1973), poetry books (Keinys 1972, 1976; Gaivenis 1976), art catalogues (Kniu¯ksˇta 1975; Slizˇien_e 1977), literature works (Keinys 1977a, b, 1978) were continuously being published. The language politics increasingly targeted the language of youth and children journals such as School Youth / Moksleivis, Lithuanian Pioneer / Lietuvos pionierius (Klimavicˇius 1970, 1975; Keinys 1976, Keinys 1977a, b); the linguists reviewed and analyzed pupils’ essays (Bu¯da 1975), characteristics of the school graduates (Drotvinas 1972), etc. Control of youth language was declared as a priority task: The linguists devote proper attention to the school books language quality, yet, if we keep in mind the importance of improving pupils’ language, the relevance of improving their language culture – these tasks were accentuated during the 17th Congress of the (Lithuanian) Communist Party7 – their support and attention should be stronger (Keinys 1977b, p. 43).
5
Rus. vospitanie—the term that is rather difficult to translate, yet can be rendered as ‘‘education’’ or ‘‘upbringing’’ (Cohn 2009: 435).
6
Kul’turnost’ became a strategy of the Soviet regime in the 1930s, when a large number of peasants poured into the cities, and their misbehavior endangered the public order. The cultural policy aimed to transform them into disciplined citizens by propagandizing kul’turnost’, i.e. good manners, personal hygiene, proper dress, literacy and knowledge of communist ideology, which was later revived during the Khrushchev years.
7
The Report by the Central Committee of Lithuanian Communist Party presented during the 17th Congress (Speech by P.Griskevicius, the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Lithuanian Communist Party, Tiesa, 1976 01 21).
123
Author's personal copy Language politics in the Soviet and post-Soviet Lithuania
Repair shops for watches, shoes, furniture, electric appliances, dry cleaning services, photo services were continuously being checked and criticized for language mistakes in their price lists, warranties, announcements of the working hours, etc.: The proper spelling of ‘crimplene’ (‘‘Krimplinas’’ instead of ‘‘ kremplenas’’); the proper spelling of ‘platform shoes’ (‘‘Ne batai ant platformos, o batai su platforma’’) (Gaivenis 1975, p. 21). Even in the shopping centre ‘‘Vilnius’’, located in the very centre of the city, Lenin Ave. 24, the labels for ice cream, prawns, fruit cake, whipped cream, as well as the title of the Customer feedback book are misspelled (Slizˇien_e 1979, p. 5). After the written forms of language were standardized, the politics of language turned towards the spoken language: diction of radio journalists (Vitkauskas 1979); accentuation of international words such as directive (direktyva), factory (gamykla), institute (institutas), microdistrict (mikrorajonas), committee (komitetas), university (universitetas), semester (semestras), etc. (Keinys 1972, 1974). Since the regime began controlling people via means of self-surveillance, shaming and social pressures, the aim of language policies was to regulate relations not between state authorities and the citizens, but among citizens themselves. The language policy shifted from politics and bureaucracy to the spheres of everyday life (consumption, culture, recreation, spoken language of everyday life) and started targeting new subjects (youth, children, regular workers, artists, etc). Language policy became a part of campaigning for kul’turnost’ - good language was considered as part of civilized behavior in general, and linguistic negligence was explained as a result of personal irresponsibility or indifference.
The stagnation of language (1980–1989): alienation from the ideology Totalitarianism, according to Turbin (1994), constitutes an interesting philological problem. In totalitarian societies, where freedom of speech and thought is limited, people develop ‘‘pathological logophobia’’, i.e. fear of speaking, or fear of words. Attemps to use language control as an instrument of power for political purposes led to paradoxical developments. People learned to ‘speak Soviet’ and successfully performed their public social and linguistic roles, but in order to keep fear at bay and avoid incriminations they eschewed improvisation. In the process of communication the precise reproduction of the ideological representation was more important than the actual semantic meaning of the text. It gave birth to the so-called ‘‘dead language’’, or frozen ideological representations, when entire blocks of texts were mechanically transferred from one context to another and speakers cared less about the actual meaning than about a proper ideological representation8 (Yurchak 2003). 8
The process affected not only textual production, but also visual discourse (posters, movies, monuments), ritualized practices (meetings, public speeches), and other formalized structures of everyday life (see Yurchak 2003:481).
123
Author's personal copy R. Balocˇkait_e
This frozen language characterized the person’s relation towards the ideology— obligatory, enforced, formal, and emotionless. The alienated language consisted of text blocks that everyone already knew and ‘‘in practice (…) the chance of being surprised by such messages was close to zero’’ (Yurchak 1997, p. 167). By 1980s, the linguists started to express concerns about the stagnation of the public, official language: Some articles (…) are written in a dead language; they don’t reach the readers’ heart. (…) The leading article is written in an especially heavy language. How can one speak in such an indifferent, unexpressive way about such a significant event of our Soviet life: elections of the Supreme Council of the USSR? (Bu¯da 1981, p. 78). Probably, they believe that the text of socialist obligations will be more solid, if put in this way: To assure high quality services to our patients, to assure the timely and high quality performance of assigned medical procedures. Yet, patients are interested in who will provide services and who will perform procedures; and they don’t care who will ‘‘assure’’ (Bu¯da 1980, p. 21). During the late Socialist period, linguists observed that frozen structures of public language began gradually affecting spoken everyday language, mortifying the spontaneous expressions and contaminating the regional dialects: An old village woman wrote a letter to her son. She told in a beautiful and simple language about everyday things. And then, unexpectedly, at the end she wrote: ‘No changes at your relatives’ (‘Pas gimines be pakitimu˛’). Where does ‘‘no changes’’ come from? People used to say: ‘There are no news’ or ‘Everything is the same there’ (Sˇukys 1983, p. 53). Don’t call a horse a ‘horse’, but a ‘‘living traction force instead’’, (…) say ‘‘achieving milk yield’’, say the ‘‘fact of alcohol abuse’’ instead of ‘‘harddrinking’’ (Pikcˇilingis 1982, p. 4). It was an important point in the development of linguistic relations between state and its subjects—here, the cultural hegemony of the Soviet authorities failed and commons were given linguistic superiority. No longer was official language contaminated by impurities of everyday talk, but everyday language is contaminated by hazardous elements of official discourse. By late 1980s, Russian cultural supremacy failed as well. ‘‘Enriching effects’’ of the Russian language were denounced, and linguists began referring to the damaging effects of bilingualism. The linguists were addressing cultural and structural inequalities between the Lithuanian and Russian language, centralized planning of cultural and economic life and centralized management of print production. Large quantities of texts, the linguists observed, were translated from Russian in a mechanical way, reproducing the Russian language structure covered with Lithuanian vocabulary and resulting in series of loanwords and neologisms. The extensive use of the locative case: in a result (Lith. rezultate from Rus. v rezultate), in reality (Lith. tikrumoje from Rus. v deistvitelnosti), in the form (the use of the locative case instead of the instrumental case) (Ulvydas 1981,
123
Author's personal copy Language politics in the Soviet and post-Soviet Lithuania
p. 12); also the extensive use of the Russian prefix ‘da’ (as a reference to ‘reaching’) in Lithuanian word making (reaching. da- (reaching) ? pilti (to pour) = dapilti, meaning -to pour up to a certain level) (Pupkis 1980, p. 32). In the mid 1980s, the stagnation of the Soviet system reached the critical level. When a new leader M. Gorbachev ascended to power in 1985, he initiated series of reforms known as perestroika which promised partial decentralization and political and economic liberalization. Facing the possibilities, different ethnic groups through the USSR requested larger political autonomy. In Lithuania, the National Rebirth Movement took a full swing starting from 1987 and led to the declaration of Lithuanian’s independence in 1990. The language politics took a new turn onwards from 1987 and became a tool in struggle for political autonomy. Lithuanian regained the status of the state language in November 1988, the linguists started claiming the linguistic damage done by the uncontrolled bilingualism, centralized publishing of the Russian language based bureaucratic forms and textbooks, and gradual pushing out of the Lithuanian language from the political, economic, and academic life. The linguistic negligence was explained now not in terms of personal ignorance and passivity, but it was seen as the outcomes of unregulated bilingualism and structural inequalities between Russian and Lithuanian language: Due to narrowing functions of the Lithuanian language and the unregulated bilingualism, the prestige of the (Lithuanian) language decreased. The official language of the state institutions was being modeled according to the Russian language; code mixing is often present in the everyday language (Ambrazas 1989, p. 6). In Lithuania, academic literature published in the Russian language composes 60%, in physics, mathematics, biology and some other technical subjects it reaches almost 75% in 1985. (…) Scholars in physics, mathematics, also in biology and economics increasingly refused to write in Lithuanian (…) writing in Russian is more convenient: there is a terminology, there are stable linguistic expressions (…)(Algimantas Liekis, Literatu¯ra ir menas. Dec 12, 1987; cited in Tautinis atgimimas ir gimtoji kalba 1989, p. 6). After losing its status as the state language, Lithuanian started to retreat from the public use; today it has practically been pushed out from all-union enterprises9 (the percentage of such enterprises in Lithuania is 38%), from transport sector, military, top level governmental conferences and dissertations. It does not occupy a significant place on Lithuanian TV (…), many state institutions use Russian even for internal correspondence. Many forms, receipts and other documents are published in a centralized way in the Russian language (Tautinis atgimimas ir gimtoji kalba 1989, p. 7). Thus, as was argued above, during the 1980s, there was a significant shift in language politics in the Soviet Lithuania towards appreciation of everyday language as a course of linguistic soundness. Previously the everyday language was considered 9
Enterprises governed directly from Moscow, i.e. being not subordinated to the authorities of the Lithuanian SSR.
123
Author's personal copy R. Balocˇkait_e
deficient, and in need of continuously being controlled and improved. In the mid 1980s, the regular citizens were given linguistic superiority, which indicated change of power dynamics in the USSR. The main function of language policy was to protect natural everyday language from damaging effects of formalized, codified public language. The linguistic negligence was considered to be an outcome of centralized governance and widespread bilingualism. In late 1980s, language policy became a tool in quest for Lithuania’s political autonomy.
The early post-Soviet period (1990–1999): the birth of Babel The early post-Soviet years evoked both linguistic nationalism and care for the purity of language. The linguists were rethinking the effects of the Russian language and reframing it from ‘‘enriching effects’’ towards the damaging influences of ‘‘linguistic imperialism’’. The main linguistic concerns were focused on the revival and protection of language, ‘‘contaminated’’ with impurities and suffering effects of creolisation. (S)ince 1940, the creolized language, or the semi-language, started to develop, it deteriorated the fundaments of our standard language and, like cancer, it destroyed the healthy language (Rosinas 1993, p. 1). During post-Soviet years, Russian linguistic imperialism was replaced by cultural hegemony of the English language (Balocˇkait_e 2006; Gorham 2000). Some linguists call it ‘‘double creolisation’’, i.e. heavy influences both of the Russian and English languages leading towards creolized language based on borrowed English terminology, Russian sentence structures and Lithuanian words: (…) during the years of the Soviet) occupation, almost all technical scientists (‘‘technocrats’’) used Russian as their primary language (…) it is rather an impressive crowd who thinks in Russian and speaks in Lithuanian. After the declaration of Lithuanian’s independence, these people now jumped to the English language, but in order to express themselves in Lithuanian they translate from English into Russian and then from Russian into Lithuanian. An Anglicized-Russified Lithuanian text is a typical case of the creolised language (Pupkis 1997, p. 2). During the period of rapid social change, both economic and linguistic practices were poorly regulated, linguistic regulations were lagging behind the actual developments. Due to the opening of political borders and intensified relations with the English speaking world, certain elements of pidgin language began to develop. The English language found rich soil due to the lack of Lithuanian terminology in different spheres of life. Within business sector, people started adopting the English language where the proper Lithuanian concepts were lacking. The unregulated developments became primarily a concern of linguists: In the media, unnecessary international words—different kinds of ‘‘kredencialai, prezentacijos, ofisai, bestseleriai’’ (credentials, presentations, offices,
123
Author's personal copy Language politics in the Soviet and post-Soviet Lithuania
bestsellers) or simple loanwords from English such as ‘‘impicˇmentai, imidzˇai, skryningai, daidzˇestai’’ (impeachment, image, screening, digest)—are increasingly employed instead of regular Lithuanian words. (Kniu¯ksˇta 1993, p. 64); Obvious new barbarisms such as ‘‘imidzˇai, hepiendai, seisˇenai, dileriai, topai, sˇopai, pleiofai’’ (images, happy ends, sessions, dealers, tops, shops, play offs) are to be rejected without consideration (…) (Kniu¯ksˇta 1994, p. 4). The Lithuanian banking language has been quite neglected. During the independence period,10 linguists laid some fundaments, but achievements were rather modest. (…) Yet today, we are forgetting everything what has been done and are creating everything anew: we translate, we borrow from other languages, from Russian, and now increasingly from English and we forget things that have been already done (Pupkis 1993, p. 5). Rapid social and economic differentiation of the previously homogenous Soviet society led to linguistic diversification and development of sociolects. With the rise of new economic and cultural elites, linguistic prestige was increasingly associated with their particular sociolects while the standard language was losing its social value and prestige. Grumadien_e (1994) argued that ‘‘the social research has revealed that today in Lithuania businessmen, bankers and rich people in general have the highest status and enjoy public respect and admiration. Consequently, it is their language, but not the language of intellectuals that has the largest effect on the development and use of everyday language’’.11 The linguist V. Labutis responded: Language authorities are sometimes found in the most unexpected places. A few years ago nobody would had even considered that (…) I can still believe that some social groups might be impressed by the language of businessmen, bankers and other rich men, and follow it as a role model. Yet it is totally unbelievable that the language of these people, which contains frequent violations of language norms, would be the highest linguistic authority for the large part of the educated society or even for the everyday use of language (Labutis 1996, p. 27). In the Soviet Union, ‘‘proper’’ linguistic competences, i.e. ability ‘‘to speak Soviet’’, was a necessary precondition for getting access to the state controlled recourses such as housing, employment etc. During post-Soviet years, these relations between language, politics, and economics were uncoupled. Confronting the growing plurality of language cultures, the linguists reassert their elitist notion of the language culture: The concept of language culture derives directly from the concept of culture, which is characterized, to our opinion, as ‘‘education, erudition, achieved degree of the perfections’’12 (Labutis 1996, p. 24). 10
1918–1940.
11
Grumadien_e L. 1994. Linguistic Market / J.Jablonskis conference ‘‘Language Norms and Language Usage’’ (konferencija ‘‘Kalbos normos ir vartosena’’). Conference papers. Vilnius, 1994. P.6. 12 See ‘‘Dictionary of the Contemporary Lithuanian Language’’ (Dabartin_es lietuviu˛ kalbos zˇodynas). V., 1993. P.340.
123
Author's personal copy R. Balocˇkait_e
While linguists were trying to preserve the homogeneity of linguistic practices, other social groups, business sector and youth subcultures in particular, welcomed the linguistic change and developed new vocabularies. Here, linguistic innovations and adoption of English words signified novelty, pro-Western attitudes and break up with the largely unwanted Soviet past: (…) music groups are with bad names: ‘‘Coda’’, ‘‘Combo’’, ‘‘Alibi’’, ‘‘Medium’’, ‘‘Bix’’, ‘‘Non stop’’, ‘‘Ad Libidum’’, ‘‘Plius minus’’(…) Or the names of business companies such as ‘‘Eks’’, ‘‘Foks’’, ‘‘Zet’’, ‘‘Artas’’, ‘‘Gantas’’, ‘‘Galarg’’, ‘‘Lithun’’ and so forth. It is a shame that the registration of names has been started in a hurry, without preparing a set of recommendations, without consulting language specialists (Kniu¯ksˇta 1991, p. 17). The new language registers such as the business language, the church language, the Diaspora language, previously absent or marginalized, appeared in public and became an object of attempted control and standardization. However, uncoupling of the relations between political regime and language control led to the liberalization of linguistic practices. The new registers of language were often outside direct subordination and the speaking subjects were not accountable, in any way, to any language control institution: Nobody controls our Parliament members, leaders of the state and of the Church, who speak to our people - tevine, visomene, bendromene, Letuva (i.e homeland, society, community, Lithuania – with extremely bad accentuation and bad pronunciation of diphthongs) – even our most precious words are distorted, not saying anything about other ‘‘ordinary’’ words. (Pupkis, 1999, p. 2); If only someone had listened to the speech of elites during the prestigious Vienna ball… (a list of most rude language mistakes is provided) (Pupkis 1999, p. 1). When during the final sermon of the grand Siluva feast you hear something like this: (…) Vilniaus katedroje grabas randasi (=yra) sklepe (=ru¯siuose) [i.e. ‘‘The coffin founds itself in the cellars of the Vilnius Cathedral’’ - there is a Russian loanword for ‘coffin’ and a predominantly Russian sentence structure]; Words as ‘suffragan’, ‘diocese’, ‘contemplate’, ‘contemplation’ and many others make the language unexpressive and difficult to understand for believers (Vitkauskas 1998, p. 15). The idea of universal subordination of the speaking subject to linguistic authorities and the quest for the total homogeneity of the ethnic community was further fueled by reviving nationalist imagination. With the motto ‘‘one nation - one language’’, the regulatory practices were expanding beyond territorial borders and targeting the Diasporas abroad: What is the language quality of ‘‘Voice of America13’’? (…) The most obvious and the most significant language mistake is that of syntax, e.g. ‘that’ is used with the object in purpose clauses (…) We wish that the certain differences 13 ‘‘Voice of America’’, an official external broadcasting institution of the United States established during the WWII (in 1942) and broadcasting on the radio in 27–43 languages, including Lithuanian.
123
Author's personal copy Language politics in the Soviet and post-Soviet Lithuania
between Lithuanian radio journalists and Lithuanian broadcasts from foreign countries should disappear as soon as possible because the Lithuanian language as well as Lithuanian culture is one and indivisible (Pupkis 1991, p. 8). The language politics of post-Soviet period were based on two premises— language was a singular phenomenon that characterized the nation; and all speaking bodies and agencies were subjects to linguistic control. These premises were continuously challenged by linguistic diversification and development of new sociolects and by rise of new agencies questioning dominant language ideologies and promoting agenda of their own. The linguists complained: Our activities are burdened (…) due to the unregulated relations with small enterprises working on patents: businessmen continuously find new, unknown ways and get the approval for their inhuman business names or other things that openly contradict the directives of the State Commission of the Lithuanian Language (Pupkis 1997, p. 3). In his article ‘‘Marketingas ar rinkodara?’’14 (1994), the marketing specialist Vytautas Dikcˇius argued: ‘‘the competences (of the linguists) lead to and result into absurd and nonsense; that’s why we have all this mess in the Lithuanian language’’ (…) Responding to his letter, A.Pupkis argued that ‘‘linguists are pushed into the ghetto (…) The State Commission of the Lithuanian Language must enforce strict requirements so that all its decisions are implemented without any excuse, and that those who fail to implement them will be punished according to the Administrative Code’’(Pupkis 1994, pp. 3–4). Our cities increasingly resemble Babylon due to frequent language violations (…) (Pupkis 1997, p. 3). During the 1990s, Lithuanian society experienced rapid liberalization of social, economic and political relations between state and citizens, and between citizens themselves. It led to intense linguistic diversification and uncontrollable developments of linguistic practices. The main aim of language policies was to maintain linguistic stability during the intense social transformations. The language ideology is based on the premises ‘‘one nation–one language’’, and linguistic negligence is explained by lack of institutionalized language control.
The late post-Soviet period (2000–2009): Homo Vulgaris During the second post-Soviet decade, linguistic liberalization was continuing, new genres of politainment and infotainment were increasingly paving their way into the media; binary dichotomies between the home space and the public sphere were blurred, the public space was saturated with elements of personal lives as well as with a highly personalized, individualized everyday language:
14
V.Dikcˇius, Marketingas ar rinkodara? ‘‘Savininkas’’ 1996, March 15.
123
Author's personal copy R. Balocˇkait_e
Another manifestation of bad linguistic practices is the transfer of everyday conversations into the public sphere. Previously, it has occurred as separate cases or individual episodes, but now there are entire shows where this regular everyday language is employed, the language that is not appropriate for public use, unless it is some humor show (Pupkis 2006, p. 7). In contrast to the Soviet period, when individuals’ indifference towards the state resulted in mechanical replication of frozen ideological representations, the postSoviet period was characterized by new relations towards the ideology and the state. Live broadcast shows prevailed over the planned and pre-orchestrated speeches; frozen ideological representations were replaced by spontaneous everyday language, ‘‘contaminated’’ with emotional utterances and informalities. The journalists increasingly used slang to convey their first-hand impressions and experiences: Yet what to do if a journalist insists on writing ‘‘a roof is driving’’(‘‘stogas vazˇiuoja15’’) or ‘‘the liberals fooled the conservatives?’’(‘‘liberalai isˇdu¯r_e konservatorius?’’) – Asta Stirbyt_e (cit in Urn_ezˇiu¯t_e 2001, p. 27). Blurring boundaries between public and private speech increased the presence of spontaneous, unplanned, uncensored, unregulated everyday language in public and evoked discontent among linguistics. As linguist A. Pupkis observed: I, for example, totally dislike it, when some unfamiliar person is approaching me on the street or responding to me in a very informal way or interrupting me in the middle of a sentence. But on TV it is rather a norm: it sounds like a beer drinking company at a table. It is awkward when during an interview a journalist is expressing his approval with some bedroom-style onomatopoeic interjections like ‘‘aha, uhu¯, jo, nu, vat’’ (yeaa, uh-huh, fo’ sho’, aight, so); frequently failing to express themselves, they are just doing with ‘‘I mean’’. A leader of a solid TV show should not use informal ‘bye’ or ‘ciao’: it is a form of self-depreciation, to use the child talk (Pupkis 2006, p. 8). Market economy and the business sector influenced strongly the linguistic developments by questioning the official language ideologies and asserted agenda of their own. The representatives of business companies openly debated and criticized official decisions regarding company and product names, translations of business and computer terminology, and questioned competences of Lithuanian linguists. For example, the linguist J. Klimavicˇius has faced and responded to such criticism: Mindaugas Glodas, the leader of ‘‘Microsoft Lietuva’’, is speaking up like some authority of linguistics: ‘I hope we will be able to find some acceptable computer terminology and won’t make people laugh at such terms as ‘‘tinkinti’’16 (Klimavicˇius 2005, p. 15). The consumption-based, post-Fordist market economies reinvented and exaggerated social and linguistic differences in attempts to define their particular group 15
‘‘The roof is departing‘‘, i.e. idiomatic expression for ‘going crazy’.
16
A neologism offered by Lithuanian linguists for the English word ‘customize’.
123
Author's personal copy Language politics in the Soviet and post-Soviet Lithuania
of customers. Commercials employed the subcultural slang in order to establish a better contact with their prospective audiences: On their internet portal ‘‘Takas’’, AB ‘‘Lietuvos telekomas’’ (Lithuanian Telecom) created a website http://chebra.takas.lt; in the brochure, they explained their choice of the (slang) term ‘‘chebra’’ (informal reference to the group of friends): this type of jargon is popular among youth and was chosen consciously as it conveys the familiar youthful atmosphere which is suitable for an online acquaintance club (Miliu¯nait_e 2003, pp. 48–49). In 2003, the Ministry of Education and Science, the National Exam Center, the Lithuania Pupils’ Parliament, and the Lithuanian Pupils’ Union organized a project for high school graduates who were stressed before their final exams. The project was called ‘‘Exams? Cool Off’’ (Egzaminai? Nesiparink)!17 A representative of the Pupils’ Parliament commented on the use of slang: ‘‘We are glad that schoolchildren were included into organizing this action from the very beginning. Our participation means that we will speak to the schoolchildren in their own language’’ (cited in Miliu¯nait_e 2003, p. 49). Since the Ministry of Education was involved, the case was considered highly controversial: it elevated the use of slang to another level, i.e. the language of state institutions. The leading linguists responded with resentment: ‘‘Threatening phenomena legitimization of jargon in everyday language’’, says Aldonas Pupkis (see Urn_ezˇiu¯t_e 2001, p. 26); ‘‘How can one allow this: even school pupils are graded for native language mistakes, but the same language mistakes are allowed on the national broadcaster and nobody cares? (Klimavicˇius 2002, p. 32)’’, etc. The linguists were actually ignoring the distinction between bare linguistic incompetence and the conscious use of slang. Intentional use of slang does not indicate linguistic negligence in general; contrary, it indicates extra linguistic capacities, ability to use other than standard registers of language and communicate with audiences in their particular way. In the Soviet Union, the language control institutions existed as a part of the repressive structures designed for eliminating unwanted content and unwanted speakers. After fall of the Soviet regime in Lithuania, the role of censorship, both political and linguistic, declined. The linguists experienced change of status and felt as being pushed out of their former role: Where the (proper) language is an official obligation, its enforcement should be guaranteed by official means. Language editors should be returned all their previous rights according to their duties and competences. They need to get out from the ghetto. (…) Language specialists cannot take the role of a pariah and a marginal pawn (Klimavicˇius 2008, p. 21). With the uncoupling of relations between political regime and language control and state’s disengagement from active control of language, the language ideology was underpinning linguistic regulation with moral interests. The language policy was following 1970s concept of kul’turnost’, where any deviation from permitted 17
The website: www.nesiparink.lt
123
Author's personal copy R. Balocˇkait_e
life style, dress code, manners, or language were considered anti-Soviet, immoral, and delinquent. In post Soviet years, improper language was again related to antisocial behavior, delinquency, mental disabilities, low ‘‘language morality’’ and ‘‘language hooliganism’’, and perceived as a threat to the public order: During the last years, there are more and more cretins who communicate in a signal language, learned at low profile school (Lith. amatusˇk_eje), in a shelter for juvenile delinquents, international work troops, army18 (…) I do not know any other country with such a low language morality and there is a mob-slang in the public and nobody cares. Here we cannot do anything with examples of a good language nor with open morals; here we need strict legal measures against language hooliganism as this hooliganism has demoralizing effects on our society (M. Martinaitis, ‘‘Mintys apie gimta˛ja˛ kalba˛’’, pp. 15–16, cit. in Urn_ezˇiu¯t_e 2002, p. 22). Decline of political control over language and both social and linguistic differentiation of previously homogenous society led to greater linguistic diversity and freedom of linguistic expression. The linguists interpreted it as ‘‘deterioration of the standard Lithuanian language’’: Even a superficial, fragmented gaze into the language culture of Lithuanian television reveals rather a sad picture and leads to the conclusion: systemic ties of the standard language are breaking down, sometimes balancing on the verge of language degeneration (Pupkis 2006, p. 8). Immense presence of sociolects, slangs, jargons, and unregulated everyday speech in public discourse, resulting from political liberalization and social diversification, were seen as the main threat to the Lithuanian language. The language policy model of post-Soviet years remained based on two premises, i.e. linguistic homogeneity of speaking community and universal subjugation of the speaking subjects to linguistic authorities. After decoupling of relations between political regime and language institution, the linguists started underpinning linguistic regulations with moral arguments, and linguistic negligence was conceptualized in moral terms as ‘‘low morality’’ or ‘‘hooliganism’’.
Conclusion Both during the Soviet and post-Soviet periods in Lithuania, language ideologies were in the service of political ideologies. Language policies were employed both by political and linguistic authorities for mobilization of population on the basis of either class or ethnicity. Linguistic ideals were loaded with political and moral values and instrumentalized for reproducing social and linguistic relations. 18
International Work Troops were formed of youth labour in the USSR, it gained an exclusively negative connotation after the fall of the Soviet system; in this context ‘army’ refers to non-statutory power relations and related jargon predominant in the Soviet army; so here is a certain indirect accusation of the Soviet system for contaminating the alleged purity of the Lithuanian language.
123
Author's personal copy Language politics in the Soviet and post-Soviet Lithuania
The language ideologies during the Soviet period were employed by Soviet authorities for creating a new socialist culture and socialist working class. During the 1960s, language policies were designed to regulate social and linguistic relations between state and its citizens. During 1970s, with the shift from open violence towards social control, the language policies shifted towards regulation of social and linguistic relations among citizens themselves. Totalitarianism produced several linguistic phenomena: first, the development of highly formalized, ‘‘frozen’’ public language as a safe way to speak in the totalitarian environment; second, reappraisal of everyday language as an antithesis of degrading public language and as a source of linguistic soundness. In Lithuania, the reevaluation of everyday language happened in 1980s, it meant not only linguistic supremacy of the commoners and failure of state hegemony, but also indicated profound changes of political relations. The post-Soviet period witnessed both liberalization and revival of nationalism. The language policies were employed to assure community’s linguistic homogeneity and universal subjugation to linguistic authorities. However, liberalization of social, economic and political relations led to liberalization of linguistic relations as well. Increased linguistic diversity, public presence of sociolects and informal everyday talk, intentional use of slang were misinterpreted for linguistic illiteracy and perceived as threats to the standard language. With uncoupling relations between state and linguistic authorities, the linguistic homogeneity forfeited its political significance. With the loss of institutionalized control, the linguists relied increasingly on moral arguments. Whereas during the Soviet years, linguistic negligence was perceived as a threat to political stability, during the post-Soviet period, diversification of linguistic practices was interpreted as a challenge to moral order and ethnic homogeneity. The research presented here illuminates several critical aspects regarding relations between language, power and politics. The first might be called as linguistic paradox of totalitarianism: degradation of public language, resulting from totalitarian language planning, led towards granting linguistic supremacy to the commoners and acknowledging failure of the state hegemony; on a larger scale, the linguistic change indicated tacit yet profound changes of political regime. Language planning was the first area where the Soviet authorities acknowledged their failure and the commoners’ supremacy, preceded in further transformations of power relations between state and citizens on behalf of the latter, which has led finally towards the dismantling of the system itself. The second one might be called linguistic paradox of democratization: whereas standardization of language is always linked to the centralization of political powers, in cases of rising nation states or totalitarian regimes, the decentralization of political power and democratization leads to diversification of linguistic practices and fragmentation of standard language. Linguistic homogeneity becomes largely incompatible with socio-cultural, political, and economic diversity. Slangs and sociolects, previously seen as linguistic impurities and deviations, have to be reconsidered as constitutive part of plural linguistic cultures and significant part of linguistic repertoires of the population. The research sheds new light on links between language ideologies and power relations in totalitarian regime, connections between linguistic homogeneity and
123
Author's personal copy R. Balocˇkait_e
political homogeneity, and relations between political and linguistic democratization. These insights open the floor for further discussion on relations between language, power and politics in general and on language politics as an instrument of governance in particular.
References Balocˇkait_e, R. (2006) Lithuania in Europe, Europe in Lithuania: Between Mimesis and Non Being. Eurozine. Retrieved from http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2008-05-08-balockaite-en.html. Brunnbauer, U. (2008). Making Bulgarians socialist: the Fatherland front in communist Bulgaria, 1944–1989. East European Politics and Societies, 22(1), 44–79. Cohn, E. D. (2009). Sex and the married communist: family troubles, marital infidelity, and party discipline in the postwar USSR, 1945–1964. The Russian Review, 68(3), 429–450. Crowley, St., & Siegelbaum, L. (1995). Survival strategies: the miners of donetsk in the post-Soviet Era. In L. Siegelbaum & D. Walkowitz (Eds.), Workers of the Donbass speak (pp. 61–96). New York: SUNY Press. Emerson, C. (1996). New words, new epochs, old thoughts. The Russian Review, 55(3), 355–364. Gorham, M. S. (1996). Tongue-tied writers: the Rabsel‘kor movement and the voice of the new ‘‘Intelligentsia’’ in early Soviet Russia. The Russian Review, 55, 412–429. Gorham, M. S. (2000). Natsiia ili snikerizatsiia? Identity and perversion in the language debates of late and post soviet Russia. The Russian Review, 59, 614–629. Irvine, J. (1989). When talk isn’t cheap: language and political economy. American Ethnologist, 16(2), 248–267. Kelly, C. (2002). ‘A laboratory for the manufacture of proletarian writers’: the Stengazeta (Wall Newspaper), Kul’turnost’ and the language of politics in the early Soviet period. Europe–Asia Studies, 54(4), 573–602. Kniu¯ksˇta, P. (1993). Naujos sa˛lygos ir nauji ru¯pescˇiai. Kalbos kultu¯ra, 65, 63–66 Koenker, D. (1985). Urbanization and deurbanization in the Russian revolution and civil war. Journal of Modern History, 57(3), 424–450. Miłosz, C. (1992). Szukanie ojczyzny (In search of a homeland). Krako´w: Społeczny Instytut Wydawniczy Znak. Phillipson, R. (1992). Linguistic imperialism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Turbin, V. N. (1994). Nezadolgo za Vodoleia. Moscow: Radiks. Webb, V. (2006). On a normative approach to language planning in South Africa. In V. Webb & T. Du Plessis (Eds.), The politics of language in South Africa (pp. 147–163). Pretoria, SA: Van Schaik Publishers. Woolard, K. A., & Schieffelin, B. B. (1994). Language ideology. Annual Review of Anthropology, 23, 55–82. Yurchak, A. (1997). The Cynical reason of late socialism: power, pretense, and the anekdot. Public Culture, 9(2), 161–188. Yurchak, A. (2003). Soviet hegemony of form: everything was forever, until it was no more. Society for comparative study of society and history. Comparative Studies in Society and History, 45(3), 480–510.
Analised texts Ambrazas, V. (1967). Spaudos puslapiuose. Kalbos kultu¯ra, 13, 103–105. Ambrazas, V. (1989). Lietuviu˛ kalba—valstybin_e. Kalbos kultu¯ra, 56, 3–7. Bu¯da, V. (1975). Ko tru¯ksta stojamu˛ju˛ egzaminu˛ rasˇiniams. Kalbos kultu¯ra, 28, 79–83. Bu¯da, V. (1980). Kurortiniu˛ ˛istaigu˛ viesˇu˛ju˛ rasˇtu˛ kalba. Mu¯su˛ kalba, 1, 17–26. Bu¯da, V. (1981). Kalba ir rajono laikrasˇtis. Kalbos kultu¯ra, 41, 77–80. Drotvinas, V. (1972). Abiturientu˛ charakteristiku˛ kalbos negerov_es. Kalbos kultu¯ra, 23, 3–11.
123
Author's personal copy Language politics in the Soviet and post-Soviet Lithuania Gaivenis, K. (1976). D_el naujadaru˛ vartojimo poezijoje. Kalbos kultu¯ra, 31, 33–39. Gaivenis, K. (1975). Kelios naujov_es ir ju˛ pavadinimai. Kalbos kultu¯ra, 29, 21–26. Keinys, S. (1972). Dazˇnos kircˇiavimo klaidos. Kalbos kultu¯ra, 23, 68–70. Keinys, S. (1974). Isˇ inteligentu˛ tarties ir kircˇiavimo. Kalbos kultu¯ra, 26, 43–47. Keinys, S. (1976). Poezijos zˇodzˇiai vaikams. Kalbos kultu¯ra, 31, 53–59. Keinys, S. (1977a). Keletas vieno vertimo kalbos klaidu˛. Kalbos kultu¯ra, 33, 53–54. Keinys, S. (1977b). Leidinio mokiniams kalba. Kalbos kultu¯ra, 33, 42–47. Keinys, S. (1978). Pastabos apie vertimo kalba˛. Kalbos kultu¯ra, 34, 31–36. Klimavicˇius, J. (1970). Rec. Moksleivis. Lietuviu˛ kalbos sekcijos sa˛siuvinis, 21, 22–27. Klimavicˇius, J. (1975). Tausokime ir zˇodi˛. Kalbos kultu¯ra, 28, 77–79. Klimavicˇius, J. (2002). Nuo vieno karto iki kito. Gimtoji kalba, 1, 32. Klimavicˇius, J. (2005). Kas lengviau - kompiuteris ar kalba? Gimtoji kalba, 11, 14–19. Klimavicˇius, J. (2008). Rec. Veidas. Gimtoji kalba, 3, 16–21. Kniu¯ksˇta, P. (1975). Triju˛ katalogu˛ kalba. Kalbos kultu¯ra, 28, 70–74. Kniu¯ksˇta, P. (1991). Lietuvoje sugalvoti, bet nelietuvisˇki. Gimtoji kalba, 5, 16–19. Kniu¯ksˇta, P. (1994). Nauji svetimybiu˛ pavojai. Gimtoji kalba, 6, 1–8. Labutis, V. (1996). Apie kalbos kultu¯ra˛ ir norminama˛ji˛ darba˛. Kalbos kultu¯ra, 68, 23–28. Miliu¯nait_e, R. (2003). Kalba kaip zˇmogaus ˛ivaizdzˇio dalis. Kalbos kultu¯ra, 78, 32–55. Pikcˇilingis, J. (1982). Kad kalba bu¯tu˛ grazˇi. Mu¯su˛ kalba, 4, 3–7. Pupkis, A. (1980). Kurortiniu˛ miestu˛ viesˇoji kalba. Mu¯su˛ kalba, 1, 31–35. Pupkis, A. (1991). ‘‘Kalba Amerikos balsas isˇ Vasˇingtono…’’ Gimtoji kalba, (6), 5-8. Pupkis, A. (1993). Bankininkyst_es kalba - svarbi profesin_es kalbos atmaina. Gimtoji kalba, 12, 4–9. Pupkis, A. (1994). Reklamos kalbos stilius ir taisyklingumas. Gimtoji kalba, 11, 1–4. Pupkis, A. (1997). Ar taisosi sunkus ligonis? Gimtoji kalba, 9, 1–5. Pupkis, A. (1999). Ar turime prestizˇine˛ tarti˛? Gimtoji kalba, 6, 1–7. Pupkis, A. (2006). Ka˛ parod_e Kalbos sˇvaros dienos? (3). Gimtoji kalba, 7, 3–11. Rosinas, A. (1993). Technikos kalbos bu¯kl_e. Gimtoji kalba, 6, 1–5. Slizˇien_e, N. (1977). D_el veikalu˛ apie daile˛ kalbos. Kalbos kultu¯ra, 33, 47–52. Slizˇien_e, N. (1979). Nelietuvisˇku˛ pavadinimu˛ rasˇymas. Kalbos kultu¯ra, 36, 59–64. Sˇukys, J. (1983). Kuo ‘‘turtiname’’ kaimo kalba˛. Mu¯su˛ kalba, 1, 53–54. Tautinis atgimimas ir gimtoji kalba. 1989. Gimtoji kalba, (9), 3- 12. Ulvydas, K. (1963). Disertaciju˛ kalbos kultu¯ros klausimu. Kalbos kultu¯ra, 4, 3–12. Ulvydas, K. (1964). Daugiau d_emesio spaudos kalbos kultu¯rai. Kalbos kultu¯ra, 7, 8–21. Ulvydas, K. (1967). Keletas sˇiuolaikin_es lietuviu˛ literatu¯rin_es kalbos raidos bruozˇu˛. Kalbos kultu¯ra, 13, 3–11. Ulvydas, K. (1981). Gerinkime spaudos kalba˛. Kalbos kultu¯ra, 41, 11–20. Urn_ezˇiu¯t_e, R. (2001). Dienrasˇcˇiu˛ kalbos reikalai. Gimtoji kalba, 10, 25–28. Urn_ezˇiu¯t_e, R. (2002). Lietuvos rasˇtingumas: nerimas ir viltys. Gimtoji kalba, 6, 19–25. Vitkauskas, V. (1972). Nepateisinami dalykai teatre. Kalbos kultu¯ra, 22, 50–52. Vitkauskas, V. (1973). S_ekm_es, jaunieji aktoriai! Kalbos kultu¯ra, 24, 47–49. Vitkauskas, V. (1979). D_el radijo pranesˇe_ ju˛ tarties bei kircˇiavimo. Kalbos kultu¯ra, 36, 56–59. Vitkauskas, V. (1998). Sˇnekamoji bazˇnycˇios kalba ir dar sˇis tas. Gimtoji kalba, 10, 15–16. Zinkevicˇius, Z. (1968). Apie charakteristiku˛ kalba˛. Kalbos kultu¯ra, 14, 27–29.
Author Biography Rasa Balocˇkait_e is an associate professor in sociology in the Department of Social and Political Theory, Vytautas Magnus University, Lithuania. She has published papers on Soviet and post-Soviet societies in Problems of Post Communism (2009), Journal of Baltic Studies (2011) and Slovo (2012), among others.
123