D-Day Deception: A Web of Winning Lies (by Alan Spence)

General Bernard Law Montgomery (coloured by Jecinci).

General Montgomery (“Monty”) was famously a staunch non-drinker and non-smoker, but he’d had quite a few swigs from a bottle of gin he’d managed to smuggle onto Churchill’s private plane at RAF Northolt on his way to Gibraltar to meet with the Governor Sir Ralph Eastwood.

Not wanting him to make a bad impression on arrival, Monty’s staff insisted the pilot circle for an hour or so whilst they coaxed their man into better shape before landing. Later, at a reception hosted by the Governor, Monty was again less than discreet when some other guests heard him mention a forthcoming amphibious invasion of France from the Mediterranean – and then there was talk of him being spotted secretly drinking. His handlers decided to take no more chances, bundling him on to a plane to Cairo where he was hidden safely away until well after D-Day.

Yes, you’ve got it (probably from the beginning, even if you’ve never heard the story before!) – it wasn’t the real Monty. But the jury remains out on whether the Germans thought that at the time.

The would-be Monty was a prewar actor born in Australia named Meyrick Edward Clifton James and now of the Army Pay Corps - with an extraordinary physical likeness to Monty. He didn’t, though, share his drinking habits which potentially could have blown the plot.

Meyrick Edward Clifton James, in the guise of General Montgomery (coloured by Jecinci).

The Monty “Double” operation, code-named Copperhead, was one of the more entertaining deception plans which came under Operation Bodyguard, the over-arching plan established in 1943 and authorised on Christmas Day that year to develop and perpetrate the ultimate Allied deception of the war to conceal the timing, location and thrust of the invasion now planned for Normandy.

The big advantage for the architects of Bodyguard - and the big disadvantage for the Germans - was the huge length of European coastline along which one or more invasions could take place from the Arctic Circle down the North Sea, through the Channel and along France’s Atlantic Coast – as well as along France’s Mediterranean Coast from Spain across to Italy.

The Allies also enjoyed other massive advantages, principal amongst them being the Ultra intelligence which poured out of Bletchley Park, a forerunner of GCHQ (this year marking its centenary) as a result of the British cracking Germany’s Enigma codes early in the war. This provided vital intelligence on what the enemy was doing and thinking – including how much they were buying into deception operations. Further, Germany’s spy network in the UK had been wiped out with many of its operators turned into double agents skilled and adept at passing false intelligence back to their former masters – an ideal conduit for Allied deception. In contrast, the Allies had a very active intelligence network operating in France, partly drawing off the activities of the French Resistance and also linking into sabotage and other daring operations by Britain’s Special Operations Executive – SOE.

In order to achieve its objectives, the perpetrators of Bodyguard established a number of narratives which they sought to sell to the Germans. In 1944 the Strategic Air Offensive – the intensive bombing of Germany by day and night, by the USAAF and the RAF – was at its height and there was a genuine belief in some circles that the Allies could bomb their way to victory by reducing German cities and economic infrastructure to rubble, negating the need for the biggest amphibious invasion in history – with all its attendant risks. Bodyguard amplified the narrative and fed it to the Germans accompanied by figures showing the vast current and forthcoming availability of bombers to do the job.

The main deception narratives though focused on location – and in this, as mentioned, the planners were spoilt for choice – and took full advantage, drawing up invasion plans for the length of the European coastline including Norway and France, as well as France’s Mediterranean Coast. The main focus was on Scandinavia and the Pas de Calais. To develop and administer the deception programme, a major subsidiary operation, Fortitude, was created – which itself was broken down to Fortitude North to target Scandinavia and Fortitude South directed at the Pas de Calais.

Troops of 50th Division wade ashore on Gold Beach, 6 June 1944.

The modus operandi of both was similar – and was based on creating two new fictional armies - the British Fourth Army (BFA) based in Scotland to threaten Scandinavia and the First US Army Group (FUSAG) based in southern England to threaten the Pas de Calais. BFA’s creation was founded on huge volumes of false radio traffic and was made to come alive in the minds of the enemy by the persuasive powers of double agents. Its main thrust was to keep German troops locked down in Norway.

FUSAG had the honour of being commanded by General Patton – deliberately so as he was the aggressive, buccaneering US General the Germans feared and respected most. Again false radio traffic and leaks through double agents were fundamental to validating its existence, although this was supplemented with fake equipment, including mocked-up landing craft. Such deception wasn’t new – it was used for example in the run up to the Battle of El Alamein in North Africa where model tanks were built from various materials, including cardboard and wood. But the vast, concentrated and intensive work which went into creating them, coupled with the credibility of the story tellers – the double agents – made them “come to life”. FUSAG’s life had to be especially vivid in the minds of the enemy as it had two roles. Firstly, it had to appear to be a sufficiently large threat for it to be the main invasion force even after the Normandy landings in order to keep the Germans locked down in the Pas de Calais whilst the Normandy beach head was broadened and consolidated.

FUSAG commander, US General George S. Patton.

IWM

The plan was to provide the Allies with 14 days to do this: but in the end the Germans waited seven weeks to shift a large body of the forces in the Pas de Calais region and launch them into the Battle of Normandy. This was due in no small part to the work of a Spanish double-agent Juan Pujol Garcia alias “Garbo”, totally trusted by the Germans as one of their agents whilst working all the time for the British – indeed he was awarded the Iron Cross by the Germans, and an MBE by the British!

Finally, as for Meyrick Edward Clifton James – last seen heading for a bout of enforced obscurity in Cairo – he soon returned to Britain and his Army Pay Corps job which he played out for the rest of the war. De-mobbed in 1946, he couldn’t find work and had to sign on for employment benefit to help provide for his wife and two children.

That, though, wasn’t the end of the story. In 1954, James published an account of his adventure entitled “I was Monty’s Double” which was made into a film in 1958 starring John Mills and Cecil Parker – and James as Montgomery, as well as himself! He died in 1963 aged 65 in the south coast town of Worthing.

Promotional poster from the 1958 film, 'I was Monty's Double', starring Meyrick Edward Clifton James.

Alan Spence is a writer and publisher with a specialism in military history. His latest project is SSAFA D-DAY 75, the military charity’s publication marking the 75th anniversary of the Normandy landings. He is a Director Emeritus of the Royal Air Force American Foundation, a former Trustee of the Royal Air Force Museum and served for eight years as a Director of the Atlantic Council in Washington DC.