국제학술대회 프로시딩(김계중) (1) by Gye-joong Kim

International Conference 2010

The Interchange of Civilizations in the Mediterranean Area

Date : April 29 ď˝&#x17E; May 1, 2010 Venue : Nurimaru APEC House & Westin Chosun Hotel, Busan Host & Organizer : Institute for Mediterranean Studies (IMS) Sponsors :

*1)

International Conference 2010

The Interchange of Civilizations in the Mediterranean Area

▶ Welcoming Reception

- Date & Time: Thursday, April 29, 18:00～20:00 - Venue: Yeyije, Haeundae, Busan (for foreign participants)

▶ Official Ceremony

- Date & Time: Friday, April 30, 10:30～12:00 - Venue : Nurimaru APEC House, Haeundae, Busan - Chair: Che, Ja Young (IMS) Opening Remark - Woo, Duck Chan (Organizing Committee Chairperson) Congratulatory Addresses - You, Sun Gyu (President, Pusan University of Foreign Studies) - Hong, Soon Nam (Ex. Dean, Graduate School of International & Area Studies, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies)

Keynote Speeches - Tanaka, Koji (Program Manager & Professor Emeritus, The Young Researcher Development Center, Kyoto University)

- Mohammed Selim - Kato, Hiroshi

(Director, The Center for Asian Suties, College of Social Science, Kuwait University)

(Leader,

Mediterranean

Studies

Group,

Hitotsubashi

University)

Signing Ceremony for MOU IMS and The Center for Asian Suties, College of Social Science in Kuwait University IMS and Mediterranean Studies Group in Hitotsubashi University

1) This program may be changed.

12:00～13:40 Luncheon

(Westin Chosun Hotel)

13:00～13:30 Special Council of the Institutions for Humanities Korea Project (Peony Room) Hah, Byoung Joo (Dean, IMS, Pusan University of Foreign Studies) Chang, Byung Ock (Dean, The Institute of The Middle East Studies,

Hankuk

University of Foreign Studies)

Choi, Chang Mo

(Dean,

The

Center

For

Middle

Eastern

Studies,

Konkuk

University,)

Lee, Jong Hwa (Dean, Institute of Middle Eastern Affairs, Myongji University,) *This council is for the related participants.

▶ Academic Sessions

Date & Time: Friday, April 30, 13:40～19:00 Venue : Westin Chosun Hotel, Haeundae, Busan

▶ Cultural Event(Tour in Busan)

Date & Time: Saturday, May 1, 10:00～17:00 (pre-registration required)

* Questions concerning the cultural event should be directed to Dr. Che, Ja Young (010-5595-3284/jayoung@pufs.ac.kr)

Academic Sessions - Date & Time: Friday, April 30, 13:40～19:00. - Venue : Westin Chosun Hotel, Haeundae, Busan 13:40～15:40 Session Ⅰ

Panel 1. Human Sciences (Language/Education) (Rose Room) Chair : Oh, Myung Keun (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies)

1. “Globalization of Higher Education in the Arab World between Local Commercialization and International Development Aid” Ala Al-Hamarneh (Jordan, Centre for Research on the Arab World, Institute of Geography, University of Mainz-Germany) Discussant : Chang, Se Won (Dankook University) 2. “The Interchange of civilizations in the Mediterranean Area : The Case of Italy” Valerie Joelle Kouam (Cameron, Institut de Culture et de Langues Yaoundé) Discussant:

Huh, Yoo Hyae (Pusan University of Foreign Studies)

3. “A Linguistic Approach to the Question of the Priest Source(P) in the Old Testament” Shin, Seoung Yun (IMS) Discussant : Choi, Jung Hwa (Busan Presbyterian University) 4. “College Students Motivation for Learning Arabic and Their Perception on Arab People and Arab Culture” Kong, Ji Hyun (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies) Discussant : Moamen Hasan Al-Doraydi (Pusan University of Foreign Studies)

Panel 2. Human Sciences (Literature/Philosophy) (Lilac Room) Chair : Ahn, Jae Won (Seoul National University)

1. “What Place Does the “Hymns to the Gods” Occupy in the Plato’s Republic?” Kim, Heon (Seoul National University) Discussant : Lee, Wang Joo (Pusan National University) 2. "How important are Hymns to the Gods on behalf of the City in Plato’s Laws?" Thierry Grandjean (CARRA Research) Discussant : Lee, Wang Joo (Pusan National University) 3. “Dimitris Dimitriadis/Michael Marmarinos : Dying as a Country”

Kyriaki Frantzi (Macquarie University) Discussant : Andreas Katonis (University of Aristotle (Thessaloniki)) 4. “Trieste’s Literature as the Literature of Identity Crisis” Kim, Hee Jung (IMS) Discussant : Yun, Jong Te (Pusan University of Foreign Studies) 5. “Distorted Infancy and War” Lim, Ju In (IMS) Discussant : Park Hyo Young (Pusan University of Foreign Studies)

Panel 3. Social Sciences(Cultural Interrelations) (Tulip Room) Chair : Choi, Chang Mo (Konkuk University)

1. “Continuity and Change in French Foreign Policy towards Africa in the 1990s” Shin, Won Yong (Youngsan University) Discussant : Jung, Sang Ryul (Sejong Institute) 2. “Interchanges as well as Conflicts between the Carthage-Phoenicians and the Greeks” Che, Ja Young (IMS) Discussant : Song, Do Young (Hanyang University) 3. “The Agriculture in Egypt during the Medieval Ages : A Focus on Mamluk Period” Wan Kamal Mujani (National University of Malaysia) Discussant : Mohammed Selim (Kuwait University) 4. “Morocco, the EU and the Mediterranean Solar Plan : A Driver for the Development of Whom?” Gonzalo Escribano (Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia) Discussant : Park, Yun Joo (Keimyung University)

Panel 4. Social Sciences (Society / Politics) (Cosmos Room) Chair : Hwang, Byung Ha (Chosun University) 1. “Algerian Women in the Civil War” Byeon, Ki Chan (Pusan University of Foreign Studies) Discussant : Jang, Hyeon Ja (Chosun University) 2. “Marriage and Politics among Orthodox Christians in Syria” Sato, Noriko (Pukyong National University) Discussant : Lee, Hyo Bun (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies) 3. “The Relationship between the State and the Citizen reflected on the Archival

Tradition in Southern Europe” Kim, Jung Ha (DaeJin University) Discussant : Lee, Jung Yeon (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies) 4. “A Study on Global Responses to Terrorism : In Case of Mediterranean Area” Choi, Jae Hoon (IMS) Discussant : Kum, Sang Moon (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies)

15:40～16:00 Coffee Break 16:00～18:00 Session Ⅱ

Panel 1. Human Sciences (Cinema/Culture) (Rose Room) Chair : Nam, In Young (Dong Seo University)

1. “The expanded theater : Spanish meta-theatre and space” Seo, Hyun Suk (Yunsei University) Discussant : Kim, Seon Uk (Korea University) 2. “Cruel yet Childish : Representations of Childhood in Dario Argento” Philippe Met (University of Pennsylvania) Discussant : Cho, Young Jung (Pusan International Film Festival) 3. “Representations of the Stranger in the French-Italian cinema : Lo Straniero(The Stranger) by Visconti” Antoine Coppola (Sungkyunkwan University) Discussant : Song, Byung Joon (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies) 4. “The Image of Arabs represented in the Korean Media” Lee, In Seop (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies) Discussant : Kim, Gye Joong (Sungkyul University)

Panel 2. Human Sciences (History/Religion) (Lilac Room) Chair : Park, Sang Jin (Pusan University of Foreign Studies) 1. “A Study of Armenian Orthodox” Hwang, Eui Gab (IMS) Discussant : Ahn, Jung Kook (Myongji University) 2. “Divorce in Roman Law” Cho, Eun Rae (Pusan University of Foreign Studies)

Discussant : Jeong, Seong Suk (Youngsan University) 3. “The Advance of Ottoman Empire to the Mediterranean and Cultural Influence in the 15-17C” Lee, Hee Soo (Hanyang University) Discussant : Oh, Eun Kyung (Dongduk Women’s University) 4. “What was the Crusading Movement between Christians and Muslims?” Song, Kyung Keun (Chosun University) Discussant : Kato, Hiroshi (Hitotsubashi University)

Panel 3. Social Sciences (International Relations) (Tulip Room) Chair : Chang, Byong Ock (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies)

1. “Evaluation on the Business Climate and Investment Opportunities of Tunisia” Kim, Joong Kwan (Dongkuk University) Discussant : Kim, Hyo Jung (Myongji University) 2. “Turkic Muslim Communities in Korea” Kim, Dae Sung/Oh, Chong Jin (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies) Discussant : Lee, Ji Eun(Hankuk University of Foreign Studies) 3. “Study on the Korean Attitude and Perception toward Koslim (1.5 and 2nd generation Muslim immigrant of Korea) : based on the survey research” Cho, Hee Sun (Myongji University) Discussant : Park, Jae Won (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies) 4. “Wolf-warriors, the Argonauts, and the Foundation of Trebizond” Andreas Katonis (University of Aristotle (Thessaloniki)) Discussant : Choi, Hae Young (Chonnam National University)

Panel 4. Special Session(Graduate Student) (Cosmos Room) Chair : Woo, Duck Chan (Pusan University of Foreign Studies) st

1. “Turkey’s Europe Adventure in the 21

Century”

Erhan Atay (Ph.D candidate, Kyunghee University) Discussant : Kim, Hyo Joung (Pusan University of Foreign Studies) 2. “The Dowry in the East Mediterranean Area : Ancient Greece, Rome, Arab-Islam Society” Kim, Su Jung (Ph.D candidate, Pusan University of Foreign Studies) Discussant : Youn, Yong Su (IMS) 3. “The Theatres of Politicization of Sadallah Wannus(1941-1997) in the 1960s-70s”

Koo, Mi Ran (Ph.D candidate, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies) Discussant : Lee, Jong Hwa (Myongji University)

18:00～19:00 General Discussion (Rose Room)

Chair : Lee, Hee Soo (Hanyang University) Discussant : Alok Kumar Roy (Pusan University of Foreign Studies) Chang, Byoung Ock (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies) Chun, Wan Kyung (Pusan University of Foreign Studies) Choi, Chang Mo (Konkuk University) Hong, Soon Nam (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies) Kato, Hiroshi (Hitotsubashi University) Mohammed Selim (Kuwait University) Philippe Met (University of Pennsylvania) Tanaka, Koji (Kyoto University) Yi, Kyu Cheol (Pusan University of Foreign Studies)

19:00～19:10 Closing Ceremony (Rose Room) 19:20～21:00 Dinner (Rose Room)

국제학술대회*2) “지중해지역의 문명간 교류”

- 일시: 2010. 4. 30(금) 13:40～19:00 - 장소: 부산 해운대 웨스틴 조선 호텔 13:40～15:40 Session Ⅰ

Panel 1 인문 과학 (언어/교육) (Rose Room) 사회: 오명근 (한국외국어대학교) 1. “지역의

상업화와 국제적 발전 원조 사이의 아랍 교육의 세계화”

Ala Al-Hamarneh (요르단,

독일

Mainz

대학교 아랍세계 연구 센터, 지리학 센터)

토론: 장세원 (단국대학교) 2. “지중해

지역 문화 교류: 이탈리아의 사례”

Valerie Joelle Kouam (카메론, Institut de Culture et de Langues Yaoundé)

토론: 허유회 (부산외국어대학교) 3. “구약성서의

신성윤

제사장 문서(P)에 대한 언어학적 접근” (IMS)

토론: 최중화 (부산장신대학교) 4. “아랍인과

아랍 문화에 대한 인식과 아랍어 학습을 위한 동기”

공지현 (한국외국어대학교) 토론:

Moamen Hasan Al-Doraydi (부산외국어대학교)

Panel 2 인문 과학 (문학/철학) (Lilac Room) 사회: 안재원 (서울대학교) 1. “플라톤의

국가에서 “신에 대한 예찬”의 위상은 어떠한가?”

김헌 (서울대학교) 토론: 이왕주 (부산대학교) 2. "플라톤의

법률편에서 도시 국가를 위해 신에게 보내는 찬가는 얼마나 중요한가?“

Thierry Grandjean (CARRA연구소)

토론: 이왕주 (부산대학교) *

이 프로그램은 변경될 수 있음.

3. “디미트리스

디미트리아디스/미카엘 마르마리노스: Dying as a Country

Kyriaki Frantzi (호주

토론: 4. “정체성

“

매쿼리대학교)

Andreas Katonis (그리스

아리스토텔레스(테살로니키)대학)

위기 문학으로서의 트리에스테 문학”

김희정

(IMS)

토론: 윤종태 (부산외국어대학교) 5. “왜곡된

동심과 전쟁”

임주인

(IMS)

토론: 박효영 (부산외국어대학교)

Panel 3 사회과학(문화교류) (Tulip Room) 사회: 최창모 (건국대학교) 1. “1990년대

아프리카에 대한 프랑스의 대외정책: 지속성과 변화”

신원용 (영산대학교) 토론: 정상률 (세종연구소) 2. “카르타고-페니키아인과

그리스인 사이의 교류와 갈등”

최자영(IMS) 토론: 송도영 (한양대학교) 3. “맘룩

시대에 초점을 둔 중세시대의 이집트 농업” Wan Kamal Mujani (말레이시아국립대학교)

토론:

Mohammed Selim (쿠웨이트대학교)

4. “모로코, EU와

지중해의 태양열 계획”

Gonzalo Escribano (Universidad Nacional de Educacion a Distancia)

토론: 박윤주 (계명대학교)

Panel 4 사회 과학 (사회/정치) (Cosmos Room) 사회: 황병하 (조선대학교) 1. “시민전쟁에서

알제리 여성”

변기찬 (부산외국어대학교) 토론: 장현자 (조선대학교) 2. “시리아,

정교 기독교의 결혼과 정치”

Sato, Noriko (부경대학교)

토론: 이효분 (한국외국어대학교) 3. “남유럽의

기록물 관리 전통에 반영된 ‘국가-시민의 관계’”

김정하 (대진대학교)

토론: 이정연 (한국외국어대학교) 4. “테러리즘에

대한 국제적 반응: 지중해 지역”

최재훈

(IMS)

토론: 금상문 (한국외국어대학교)

15:40～16:00 휴식 16:00～18:00 Session Ⅱ

Panel 1 인문 과학(영화/문화) (Rose Room) 사회: 남인영 (동서대학교) 1. “확장된

무대

스페인 메타연극과 공간”

서현석 (연세대학교) 토론: 김선욱 (고려대학교) 2. “ “잔인하면서도

유치한”

다리오 알젠토의 유년기의 재현”

Philippe Met (펜실베니아

대학교)

토론: 조영정 (부산국제영화제) 3. “프랑스/이태리

영화에서의 이방인”

Antoine Coppola (성균관대학교)

토론: 송병준 (한국외국어대학교) 4. “한국

방송 매체에서 보여지는 아랍인들의 모습에 대한 묘사” 이인섭 (한국외국어대학교) 토론: 김계중 (성결대학교)

Panel 2 인문과학 (역사/종교) (Lilac Room) 사회: 박상진 (부산외국어대학교) 1. “아르메니안

황의갑

정교 연구” (IMS)

토론: 안정국 (명지대학교) 2. “로마법에서의

이혼”

조은래 (부산외국어대학교) 토론: 정성숙 (영산대학교) 3. “15-17C

오스만 제국의 지중해로의 진출과 문화적 영향”

이희수 (한양대학교) 토론: 오은경 (동덕여자대학교) 4. “기독교인과

무슬림 사이에서 십자군 전쟁은 무엇이었는가?”

송경근 (조선대학교) 토론:

Kato, Hiroshi (히토추바시대학교)

Panel 3 사회 과학(국제 관계) (Tulip Room) 사회: 장병옥 (한국외국어대학교) 1. “튀니지의

사업 환경 평가와 투자 기회”

김중관 (동국대학교) 토론: 김효정 (명지대학교) 2. “한국의

터키 무슬림 공동체”

김대성, 오종진 (한국외국어대학교) 토론: 이지은 (한국외국어대학교) 3. “코슬림에

대한 한국인들의 태도와 인식에 대한 연구

조희선 (명지대학교) 토론: 박재원 (한국외국어대학교) 4. “늑대-전사,

아르고나오테스와 트레비존드시의 건설”

Andreas Katonis (그리스

아리스토텔레스(테살로니키)대학)

토론: 최혜영 (전남대학교)

Panel 4 특별 발표(박사과정) (Cosmos Room) 사회: 우덕찬 (부산외국어대학교) 1. “21세기의

터키의 유럽 진출”

Erhan Atay (경희대학교

대학원 박사과정)

토론: 김효정 (부산외국어대학교) 2. “동지중해권의

결혼 지참금 제도

고대 그리스, 로마, 아랍ㆍ이슬람 사회를 중심으로”

김수정 (부산외국어대학교 대학원 박사과정) 토론: 윤용수 3. “1960년대～70년대

(IMS)

사아다 알라 완누스(1941-1997) 극작품의 정치연극”

구미란 (한국외국어대학교 대학원 박사과정) 토론: 이종화 (명지대학교)

18:00～19:00 종합 토론 (Rose Room) 사회: 이희수 (한양대학교) 토론: 이규철 (부산외국어대학교) 장병옥 (한국외국어대학교) 전완경 (부산외국어대학교)

최창모 (건국대학교) 홍순남 (한국외국어대학교) Alok Kumar Roy (부산외국어대학교) Kato, Hiroshi (Hitotsubashi University) Mohammed Selim (Kuwait University) Philippe Met (University of Pennsylvania) Tanaka, Koji (Kyoto University)

19:00～19:10 폐회식 (Rose Room) 19:20～21:00 만찬 (Rose Room)

International Conference 2010

<Organizing Committee> Chairperson Woo, Duck Chan (Pusan University of Foreign Studies) Members Byun, Ki Chan (Pusan University of Foreign Studies) Che, Ja Young (IMS) Kweon, Mi Ran (Pusan University of Foreign Studies) Park, Sang Jin (Pusan University of Foreign Studies) Youn, Yong Su (IMS) <Executive Committee> Chairperson Che, Ja Young (IMS) Members Chang, Ni Na (IMS) Choi, Jae Hoon (IMS) Hwang, Eui Gab (IMS) Lim, Ju In (IMS) Kim, Hee Jung (IMS) Shin, Seoung Yun (IMS) Youn, Yong Su (IMS) Executive Committee for International Conference 2010 Institute for Mediterranean Studies 15 Seokporo, Nam-gu, Busan, 608-738, South Korea Tel. 82-51-640-3618/Fax. 82-51-640-3588 e-mail: imsic@pufs.ac.kr

<The Member of the Institute for Mediterranean Studies> Dean Hah, Byoung Joo (Arab) HK Professor Che, Ja Young (Greek) Youn, Yong Su (Arab) HK Research Professor Chang, Ni Na (France) Choi, Jae Hoon (Arab) Hwang, Eui Gab (Arab) Lim, Ju In (Spain) Kim, Hee Jung (Italy) Shin, Seoung Yun (Israel) Staff Song, Young Eun Kim, Min Kyung Institute for Mediterranean Studies Pusan University of Foreign Studies 15 Seokporo, Nam-gu, Busan, 608-738, South Korea Tel. 82-51-640-3587/Fax. 82-51-640-3588 e-mail: meditstudies@pufs.ac.kr

Keynote Speeches

Tanaka, Koji (Program Manager & Professor Emeritus, The Young Researcher Development Center, Kyoto University)

Mohammed Selim (Director, The Center for Asian Suties, College of Social Science, Kuwait University)

Kato, Hiroshi (Leader, Mediterranean Studies Group, Hitotsubashi University)

100430

IMS International Conference

Pusan University of Foreign Studies

Interdisciplinary Approach to Understanding Southeast Asia: Kyoto Universityâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Tradition of Area Studies

Tanaka, Koji (Young Researcher Development Center, Kyoto University)

Introduction: Southeast Asian Studies in Japan Let me start my presentation with introducing institutional formation in Japan for promoting Southeast Asian Studies, which began to develop during the 1960s. The Center for Southeast Asian Studies (CSEAS), Kyoto University, was founded in 1963 and

officially

inaugurated

1965.

comparison

with

institutions

conducting

Southeast Asian studies in the world, a distinctive feature of CSEAS can be seen in the

inclusion

natural

scientists

such

agronomists,

forest

ecologists

and

biomedical specialists. The Institute for Asian and African Language and Culture of Tokyo University of Foreign Studies was founded in 1964. While most of studies on Southeast Asia conducted in the pre-war period were based on written literatures, area studies based on fieldworks began to be carried out in the period when these institutions were established. It was also in this period that the fund-providing system for overseas research began to be implemented by the Ministry of Education (in 1963) and that the program for sending graduate students to Asian countries started (in 1968). The CSEAS launched its research activities in combination of interdisciplinary, fieldwork-based,

and

contemporary-issue-oriented

approaches.

particular,

the

distinctive agro-ecological approach in collaboration between natural scientists and social

scientists

(including

humanities)

could

contribute

the

development

Southeast Asian Studies in Japan especially from the 1970s to the 1980s. The area studies tradition in Japan, taking account of Western concepts and ideas into its approaches,

added

new perspectives

which

primarily

emerged

observation and/or from exploring vernacular source-materials.

from the

on-site

For its geographical proximity and historical involvement, as well as economic and political relationship with the region, Southeast Asian studies in Japan has developed to a great extent in a mode different from the American or European scholarship. The strength of Japanese scholarship might be in the pursuit of research with conceptual frameworks that were closer to the reality in the field, based on empirical research grounded in local language source material and in fieldworks (Hayami, 2006).

New Tendency in Southeast Asian Studies and Need for Comparative Approach The tradition in Southeast Asian studies in Japan requires the researchers to obtain enough language ability in order to practice fieldworks and deal with vernacular material, and as a result, this has made them inevitable to be specialized in a specific nation state as a unit of study, such as Thailand specialist, Indonesian specialist, and so on. Another specialization has also taken place in area studies. That is the driving energy of academic professionalism. In other words, this tendency can be summarized as a shift from the interdisciplinary approach to the discipline-oriented approach to a certain discipline such as anthropology, sociology, economics, etc. Scholars tend to group themselves with colleagues who work in the same country and/or in the same discipline

that

the

themes

and

topics

interest

can

practically

different

academic

(global)

economic

concentrated. Furthermore, circumstance

current because

Southeast of

the

Asian

emergence

studies of

face

expanded

relationship in the region. For example, political scientists and economists more increasingly share the common tendency of taking â&#x20AC;&#x153;East Asiaâ&#x20AC;? as a viable region, which includes Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia. On the other hand, scholars in the field of humanities still keep a strong tendency of seeking the essential Southeast Asia, and they insist on carrying out research in the frame of nation state or local regions in the nation state. Such circumstances urged conventional area studies to reform themselves by introducing

comparative

perspectives.

For

example,

various

types

trans-boundary issues such as global environment change, need for inter-regional resource

management,

trans-border

human

traffic

and

cross-boundary

flows

commodities are taking place, and these changes call for cross-disciplinary and cross-regional approaches in area studies, through which scholars from various disciplines are expected to develop more collaborative approaches. In response to such changes,

CSEAS

recently

began

conduct

various

researches

dealing

with

cross-boundary issues both in maritime and in continental Southeast Asia, and came

to establish a new institution in Kyoto University, which deals with comparative area studies.

A New Research Center for Developing Comparative Area Studies Such change as mentioned above is not the case observed just in Southeast Asian, but it can be found commonly in any areas or regions in the world. In Japan, however, despite the enough number of research institutes and centers attached to universities, inter-institutional collaboration for tackling the problems is still weak. This is the reason why a new research center, the Center for Integrated Area Studies (CIAS), was established in Kyoto University. It was inaugurated in April 2006 as the third area-studies research institution at Kyoto University, following the CSEAS and the ASAFAS (Graduate School of Asian and African Area Studies, founded in 1998). The primary objectives of CIAS are to promote and conduct â&#x20AC;&#x153;integrated area studiesâ&#x20AC;? and to integrate and share information resources on area studies to make them available to other universities and institutions nationwide. As a national joint-use facility, it pursues these objectives in collaboration with its two sister institutions at Kyoto University and by serving as the secretariat of the Japan Consortium for Area Studies (JCAS), which was established in 2004; the members of the consortium accounts for 89 institutions as of April 2010. The CIAS history predates its official establishment. From the late 1970s, the need was felt for a national institution devoted to networking the existing Japanese institutions engaged in area studies. After the tireless efforts of too many people to name, the Japan Center for Area Studies was established in 1994 at the National Museum of Ethnology. Though a tiny organization, the Japan Center carried out a pivotal role in promoting networking among area studies researchers and research institutions, both domestically and internationally. From the early 2000s, globalization and the latest developments in informatics demanded the further development of area studies in Japan. The next step began to be explored seriously by the Advisory Committee for the Promotion of Area Studies at the National Institutes for the Humanities. The Committee submitted its final report in June 2005, proposing that the Japan Center for Area Studies be reorganized into the CIAS at Kyoto University in order to strengthen its role in the field of area informatics

and

promote

area

studies

the

global

era.

All

the

necessary

procedures, including the transfer of faculties and library collections from the Japan Center for Area Studies to Kyoto University, were completed by the end of March 2006. The CIAS now has 12 faculty members specializing in Southeast Asia, South Asia,

Central Asia, East Europe, and Latin America. Their disciplines range from the humanities and social sciences to the natural sciences and informatics. Aiming at going beyond traditional area-studies approaches, which concentrate on geographically distinct regions, the CIAS attempts to examine phenomena that cut across regional boundaries with cross-regional perspectives. Throughout the world, inter-regional relationships are becoming more complex. In the 21st century, an “area” is not primarily demarcated by geographical boundaries, but by sets of local and non-local variables

that

Therefore,

are

transformed,

understanding

interconnected,

today’s

“areas”

and

requires

influenced analysis

one

another.

inter-regional

relationships and variables as well as depiction of the characteristics of each region. An approach of integrated area studies is an attempt to understand the dynamics using innovative approaches in which “comparison” is the key analytical framework.

A New Research Center for Developing “Area Informatics” Both historical and contemporary information constitute resources for area studies. Written documents (in print or manuscript form), films, pictures, satellite imageries, recorded voices, music, and digital data can all be utilized. Because they are stored at scattered

institutions,

CIAS

aims

integrate

these

resources

using

the

latest

informatics tools and to build systems to share them with researchers and others concerned with the contemporary world. To pursue this objective, CIAS attempts to promote the collaboration between area studies

specialists

and

informatics

experts.

The

project,

“Area

Informatics

and

Information Sharing,” builds on a number of joint researches that have been organized with

external

financial

supports

and

internal

funds

for

supporting

nationwide

joint-researches, such as “A New Development in Area Studies: Participatory Sharing Systems of Multi-media Information on Afro-Asia,” “Studies on Humanities-GIS,” and “Development of Sharing System Combining Temporal and Spatial Dimensions.” Through these research projects, CIAS has built a variety of databases and publicized a

test

version

(http://area.net.cias.kyoto-u.ac.jp/GlobalFinder/cgi/Start.exe)

information sharing system called “Resource Sharing Database for Area Studies”.

Structure of CIAS and Its Activities Since its inauguration, CIAS has organized many kinds of nationwide joint-studies, more or less twenty research subjects, every fiscal year through the open selection system

calling

for

application

the

line

common

themes

such

“Transformation of States in the 21st Century” and “Area Informatics and Information Sharing.” Although the scale of the Center is limited in terms of staffing and budget

background, it has paid great efforts to explore a new horizon of area studies in Japan. To pursue this purpose, CIAS is organized with five Research Divisions, a Library, and a branch office of the administration. Three Research Divisions are organized topically such as Division of Integrated Area Studies, Division of Information and Knowledge, and Division of Area Informatics; two Research Divisions are for visiting researchers, domestic and foreign researchers, respectively. To promote and manage the national joint-use facilities, CIAS has a consultation committee including five members from Kyoto University and ten members from research institutions out of Kyoto University. It is significant

that

a new research center such as CIAS was additionally

established in Kyoto University where two area-studies institutions, CSEAS and ASAFAS, had existed. The two institutions focused their activities on particular geographical units, Southeast Asia for CSEAS and Asia and Africa for ASAFAS. However, it is peculiar characteristics that the CIAS was established without any distinct names of regions as the name of the institution. The “area” may be an operational concept and elastic being in terms of space and perception, reflecting the rapidly changing circumstances under the globalized economic and political situations. On the other hand, the “area” has its own peculiar social and cultural characteristics, and these have attracted the area studies specialists to study on their specific “area(s).” In addition to the official missions of CIAS, it is our endeavor to provide an “arena” for discussion and collaboration among area studies specialists and other scientists concerned, so that area studies approaches will be more useful tools for training ourselves.

Reference Hayami,

Yoko,

2006,

Perspectives

“Towards

from

Japan.”

Multi-Laterality In

Cynthia

Chou

Southeast and

Vincent

Asian

Studies:

Houben

(eds.)

Southeast Asian Studies: Debates and New Directions, pp. 65-85, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

The Interchange of Civilizations in the Mediterranean Area

Mohammad Selim (The Center for Asian Suties, College of Social Science, Kuwait University)

Perhaps there is no region that embodies the interchange of civilizations than the Mediterranean region. Since the dawn of civilizations and throughout its recorded history, the Mediterranean has been an arena, if not the arena, for inter-civilizational exchanges and clashes which turned it into a unique geo-cultural space in all accounts. It acted as a central super highway of transport, and cultural exchange between various nations, which made it a focus of communication and interactions between physical, cultural, and social and economic geographies, and different cultural identities, and the uniting element and center of world history. However, and despite the rise of globalization, Mediterranean countries have not been able yet to come up with a common understanding of the root causes of the issues and a strategy to deal with them. That is why I was pleased to learn that the topic of my keynote address will be by the Mediterranean as a forum for the exchange of civilizations, as it reflected an understanding on the part of the staff of the Institute for Mediterranean Studies of the centrality of this issue in deciding the future of Mediterranean security and economy. Today there are common challenges in the Mediterranean, however, the region

still

divided

one

and

without

addressing

the

question

intra-Mediterranean communications and rules of cooperation, it is highly unlikely that Mediterranean actors will be able to deal with these challenges. In this address, I will deal with four main issues, the geopolitical advantages of the Mediterranean Mediterranean

forum

identity,

the

for

interchange

historical

record

civilizations, of

the

question

Mediterranean

civilizational

communications and the lessons to be learnt from it, the models of dialogues among civilizations

the

Mediterranean,

and

finally

the

strategies

re-vitalize

Mediterranean cooperation.

(1) Geopolitical Features of the Mediterranean as Forum for Interchange of Civilizations

The Mediterranean is a relatively small sea, almost 2.5 million sq, representing only .7% of the global water surface. However,

there is no consensus on the definition of

its geographical space. Three main geographical definitions of the Mediterranean have been

put

forward.

The

narrow

definition

the

Mediterranean

restricts

its

geographical space to the land units with a Mediterranean coastline. According to this definition, twenty one countries have a coastline on the Mediterranean Sea, eleven of them are European states, and the rest are located in Asia (five), and Africa (five).If you add to these land units, Portugal and Jordan, who have no access to the Sea, but are quite adjacent to its shores, then you would be using the medium definition. The wider geographical definition, advocated by Fernand Braudel adds to that list the Black sea, the Red Sea, and the Arabian Gulf. Each of these definitions would entail a different narrative of the history of the interchange of civilizations in the Sea.

No matter how you define the Mediterranean geographically, the Sea enjoyed major advantages which made it possible to speak of its region as the arena of global civilizational exchange. The most important of these advantages are, (i) First of all the smallness of the area of the Sea, made it possible for nations with coast lines to interact with each other even with limited maritime technology. The result is that cultural exchanges among Mediterranean peoples have begun with the dawn of recorded civilizations, and before the advent of the age of technology (ii) Secondly, the shores of the Mediterranean combine the continents of Europe, Africa, and Asia, which made it

the center of world trade, communications, and interactions between

peoples from different continents and backgrounds. Because of this major advantage, almost one third of world merchant shipping cross the Mediterranean each year, which, in turn, has facilitated intra-regional and inter-regional communications. This advantage has been reinforced by its connections with the open seas and oceans, especially to the Atlantic Ocean through Gibraltar, and the Indian Ocean through the Suez Canal and the Red Sea. In addition, it is connected through the Sea of Marmara to the Black Sea. These connecting routes made it possible for the Mediterranean nations to interact not only with each other, but also with other nations and civilizations, (iii), The Mediterranean also has lots of islands such as Cyprus, Crete, Rhodes, Corfu, Sardinia, Corsica, Sicily, Malta, which served as connecting points between peoples of the region, (iv) By virtue of its pleasant climate, beautiful coastlines, and rich history, the Mediterranean region is the most popular tourist destination in the world attracting approximately one third of worldâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s international tourists which has reinforced the process of cultural exchanges in the region, (v)

Some of the Mediterranean coastline states are trans-continental states, such as Turkey and Egypt. These countries have served as communications bridges between different cultures and civilizations. For example, Turkey still views itself as a bridge between

Europe

and

the

Muslim

world,

and

Egypt

has

oscillated

between

Mediterranean identity and an Arab Mashrek identity, (VI) The multiplicity of nations with different cultural backgrounds, and access to the Mediterranean has also created â&#x20AC;&#x153;occasionsâ&#x20AC;? for cultural interactions. Throughout its history no single cultural or civilization dominated the region, perhaps with the exception of Roman era. As a result, at certain points of its history, the Mediterranean was fiercely contested: Greece against Persia, Rome against Cartage, Byzantium, and Spain against the Ottoman Empire. These contests also extended to include non-Mediterranean powers such as the Anglo-French and Anglo-German rivalries in the region in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, (vii) the Mediterranean has been the cradle of the three monotheistic religions of Jews, Christians, and Muslims, and civilizations of ancient Egypt,

Greece,

and

Rome,

which

has

served

invigorate

the

processes

interactions among these religions and cultures. Sometimes, these interactions were characterized by periods of cooperation and conflict, by intensive cultural exchanges and clashes. These advantages were highly influenced by technology. As modern maritime technological advances developed, Mediterranean interactions were highly influenced. For example, the development of oceanic shipping in the fifteenth century allowed Europe to trade with the Far East directly through the Atlantic Ocean and to trade with the Americas thereby reducing the centrality of the Mediterranean as a trade route and as a forum for regional exchanges.

(2) A Mediterranean Identity? However, throughout the ages, Mediterranean interactions served to provide the region

with

distinct

identity

unmatched

other

seas

and

regions.

The

Mediterranean identity has been labeled by some scholars as Mediterraneanism. According to Russell King in his Essay on Mediterraneanism in 1997, such identity refers to the close interaction between the physical and human realms influenced by the climate, the sea, the land, the vegetation, the long traditions of urban life and the resources

offered

the

Mediterranean

environment.

prefers

view

the

Mediterranean as a geographical stage, whose spotlight is the Mediterranean sun, and whose architecture is made up of the coasts, mountains, peninsulas, and islands of the basin. Sometimes the stage is a theatre of war, more often it is a setting for peace,

trade, and creative human movement. This view is shared by other scholars, and civil society groups in the Mediterranean. For example, in his 1938 book, The Future of

Culture in Egypt, Taha Hussain, the Dean of Arab Arts, contended that there is a Euro-Mediterranean identity, which was mainly based on the Greco-Roman traditions, and that Egypt belongs, or should belong, to that identity. In the proceedings of the 1997

conference

the

“Mediterranean

Cultural

Identity

and

Prospects

for

Intercultural Dialogue” Geffroy defined the Mediterranean identity as “awareness of diversity and a search for intercultural dialogue. The key words to designate such identity are heritage and mediation.” For Ada Lonni in her 2003 article entitled “Mediterranean

identity”

argues

that

even

under

conditions

globalization,

Mediterranean identity exists and that such identity entails patriarchal family, the sense of honor, the procreative women role, the solidarity of the family, clan and tribe. Further, the drafters of the “|Charter of the Mediterranean”

adopted by the

Parliamentary Assembly of the Mediterranean in 2008 argued that by virtue of its geography as an Inner Sea bathing the shores of three continents and being a part of the very matrix of Europe, the Maghreb, and the Mashrek, the Mediterranean has “given us an identity.” The Charter

eloquently added that there is a common

heritage in the Mediterranean according to which “the alphabet was Phoenician, notions were Greek, the law was Roman, monotheism Semitic, ingenuity Punic, science Arabic, power Ottoman, co-existence Andalusian, sensitivity Italian, adventure Catalan, liberty French, and eternity Egyptian.” However, others take a different view. They argue that a Mediterranean identity does not exist, and if it existed at all, it an artificially-invented one. Virtually, all Arab nationalists and Islamists do not subscribe to the notion of a Mediterranean identity. Al-Hosary, the Dean of Arab nationalists in the twentieth century, has vehemently rejected Hussain’s argument on the existence of a Mediterranean identity and argued that there are multiple and contending identities in the region. These views were also shared by many other scholars. Paradoxically, most Israeli scholars subscribe to the Arab nationalist version of Mediterranean identity.

Mark Heller, an

Israeli scholar, contended that “the Mediterranean does not embody a common identity and that the only thing Mediterranean societies and states have in common is geography,

or more precisely the stereotypical

rhythms of life emanating from

climate.” In this field exists what he labeled “the Mediterranean of the imagination” by which he meant the notions of sunshine and red tile, roofs, of wine and olive oil, of afternoon siestas and late dinners, of warmth and vitality and a touch of hedonism.” He went on to argue that members of the Mediterranean

do not share a

cultural tradition, language, religion or recent history of administrative unity, and

today,

even

geography

longer

imparts

basis

for

Mediterraneanism

technological advances in communications and air transport reduced the relative importance of the Sea as a medium of economic and cultural interaction or power projection. The end result is that geographical proximity in the Mediterranean lost its relevance. Other European scholars, such as the Italian scholar Aliboni subscribed to the same view although at lesser degree of rejection. Aliboni argued that the Mediterranean concept was a Cold War invention which resulted from the interplay between anti-American trends in southern Europe and Cold War alignments, and the French quest to reduce the role of the United States in the region. The debate around the notion of a Mediterranean identity reflects the diversity, and richness of cultures in the region, the impact of technological advances, globalization,

and

finally

the

North-South

divide

the

the rise of

Mediterranean

between

southern Europe, and North Africa. It is also an articulation of the quest of many Mediterranean powers to find ways and means to create areas and frameworks of cooperation which could transcend regional conflicts, mainly the Arab-Israeli conflict, and reinforce interdependence with of view of dealing with the emerging challenges in the region, such as environmental degradation, and immigration from south to north. As result, although Aliboni argued that Mediterraeanism was an invention, he went on to say that this was not a reason to reject it, but to use it to deal with the emerging challenges. It is our argument that a Mediterranean identity is best reflected in the area of common

life-styles

resulting

from

the

â&#x20AC;&#x153;Mediterranean

climateâ&#x20AC;?,

and

intensive

interactions resulting from immigration in both directions. Such interactions have inculcated

sense

understanding

the

other

based

long

history

communications. Arab countries perceive Europe as more capable of understanding their dilemmas than the United States. In assessing interchange of civilizations in the Mediterranean, one may distinguish among two main levels of analysis, (i) the history of the interactions among civilizations; and (ii) the contemporary models of the dialogues among Mediterranean countries. We will review these two levels with a view of identifying the main challenges which confront inter-civilizational exchanges in the region and how to deal with them.

(3) Historical Interactions among Mediterranean Civilizations Encounters between the early civilizations of the Mediterranean were either lacking. This

was

mainly

because

the

lack

ships

sturdy

enough

cross

the

Mediterranean. Two main civilizations emerged in the region in the 4th millennium. These were the Sumer and Pharonic civilizations in Mesopotamia and the Nile Valley respectively. They rarely interacted with each other. However, Egyptian Pharonic civilization was an inward-oriented and defensive civilization. It was subjected to invasions by the Hyksos and the Hittites, but managed to defeat them. Interactions and exchanges were soon to increase with the rise of the Greeks and the Phoenicians, two of the most notable Mediterranean civilizations in classical antiquity. These were mainly out-warded oriented and extended their influence and ideas throughout the Mediterranean. From about 750 BC and throughout the following 250 years, Greece extended its influence throughout the Mediterranean, especially under Alexander the Great. The Greeks settled in Egypt and Libya and most of the Mediterranean islands. In fact, they ended the Egyptian Pharonic civilization and fought a series of wars with the Persia during 499 BC and 449 BC known as the Greco-Persian Wars. Alexander’s

conquests

spread

Greek

knowledge

and

ideas

throughout

the

Mediterranean, and at the same time benefited from the knowledge of ancient oriental Mediterranean empires. Similarly, the Phoenicians established a civilization with its heartland along the coastal regions of modern day Lebanon, Syria. The Phoenician civilization was an enterprising maritime trading culture that spread across the Mediterranean during the period 1550 BC to 300 BC, and established the colony of Carthage in North Africa. Emperor Augustus (63 BC-19 AD) founded the Roman Empire, which came to dominate the entire Mediterranean at the expense of Greece and Carthage.

The

Mediterranean Sea was called “Mare Nostrum” (Out Sea) by the Romans, and for several centuries the Mediterranean was a Roman Lake. This continued until the fall of the empire in 476 AD. The Roman Empire was characterized by the unity of culture based on the integration of Greek and Roman thinking, life styles, education, architecture,

and religion.

The Empire embraced Christianity in 391 AD which

originated in the Eastern Mediterranean. The Empire was succeeded by the Byzantine Empire formed in the Eastern half of the Roman one. The Byzantines fought prolonged wars with the Sassanid Persian Empire which weakened both of them and th

prepared the ground for the march of Arab Muslims with the rise of Islam in the 7 century.

Arab Muslims, motivated by Islam, swept through most of what is now known as the Middle East reducing the Byzantine lands by more than half and completely dominating the Persian lands. They controlled 75% of the Mediterranean region extending

the

Iberian

Peninsula

and

the

borders

Anatolia.

But

most

importantly, they introduced the religious factor in Mediterranean interactions, and

were able to spread Islam and the Arabic language to a most of the peoples of the Eastern and southern Mediterranean.

In the 12

century, Europe launched a counter-attack to restore the holy lands from

the Muslims, under the name of the Crusades. Although, Europe was not successful in achieving its objective, the Crusaders remained in the holy lands and in other parts of the Orient for almost two centuries during which they accessed the Greek and Roman literature which was available in the Abbasside Empire. This process was also facilitated by the European merchants who transported this literature to Europe, especially to the Mediterranean islands where they were translated into Latin. In the later middle Ages, the Maritime Republics of Venice, Genoa, and Pisa developed their own empires in the Mediterranean and controlled trade between the East and Europe through Egypt and the Red Sea, which had created new â&#x20AC;&#x153;occasionsâ&#x20AC;? for direct interactions between them and the Muslims. However, the religious factor maintained its dominant role. The rise of the Ottomans in Anatolia in 1299 and their control of most central and southern |Europe by 1396 reinforced

this trend especially

with the fall of Constantinople in 1453 to the Muslim Ottomans, and fall of

the

Muslim states in Andalusia in 1492 to the Kings of Spain and the fall. European powers also tried to avoid trade routes via the Muslim world through finding out new trade routes. This brought the Portuguese explorer Vasco da Jama to the Malabar Coast in India in 1498 where he and his compatriots launched attacks on Muslim trade routes. By the mid-sixteenth century, the Ottomans controlled most of Arab Orient and North Africa, including the Island of Cyprus in addition to their control of most of central and southern Europe including Greece. Consequently, they controlled most of the Mediterranean region and were successful in rolling back the Western onslaught on Muslim North Africa after the fall of Andalusia. Despite the mostly conflictual interactions in the Mediterranean, there were also major cultural exchanges. For example, until the eleventh century, the island of Sicily became a major center for Islamic culture, and after it was controlled by the Normans, it developed its own distinct culture which combined elements of the Arab-Muslim and Western and Byzantine cultural influences. The island of Palermo also remained a leading commercial and artistic center in the Mediterranean through most of the middle Ages. Further, classic Greek literature was translated into Arabic by the Abbasside Empire in Baghdad and that literature had a major influence on Muslim thinker such as Al-Farabi, Ibn Sina (Avicenna), and Ibn-Rushd (Averroes). In fact, Europe learned about classic Greek literature from the writings of these Muslim thinkers.

the

mid-eighteenth

century,

the

balance

power

the

Mediterranean

witnessed a major shift. The rise of Europe and the decline of the Ottoman Empire led to the gradual rolling back of Ottoman presence in the Mediterranean and the extension of European imperial influence in the Southern and Eastern parts of the Sea, a process which began with the campaign launched by Napoleon Bonaparte on Egypt in 1798. Various European powers competed to occupy parts of the Ottoman Empire in the region, and after its formation in 1860, Italy joined the onslaught trying to revive the traditions of the Roman Empire. The Mediterranean witnessed various imperial wars which culminated with the outbreak of the First World War which led to the fall of the Ottoman Empire. The War ended with France and Italy controlling most of the eastern and southern Mediterranean region. After the Second World War, the Mediterranean became an arena of superpower competition in the context of the Cold War, as both powers maintained a naval presence in the Sea, and fiercely competed for influence in eastern and southern Mediterranean states. Further, the region witnessed the rise of national liberation struggles and wars against European, mainly French, powers, and the establishment of Israel in main parts of Palestine, which has, in turn, reinforced the status of the Mediterranean as an arena for superpower rivalry and became a source of regional wars, especially as Europe played a major role in the establishment of Israel. During the Cold War,

the Mediterranean seemed to be

divided between the

superpowers with Europe getting mainly engaged in its integration projects. However, there has been some attempt to create new forums of co-operative interactions among northern and southern Mediterranean actors, the most important of which has been the Euro-Arab Dialogue in the 1970s. The results of these attempts were quite meager as Cold War politics was quite dominant. Although the end of the Cold War meant the end of superpower rivalry in the Mediterranean, it led to the emergence of the rise of a new form of confrontation as the theories of the “Green Peril” and the “Clash of Civilizations” emerged. Some Western powers and actors argued that a new Islamic threat has emerged and that such threat would be the defining element of interactions in the future. Interestingly enough, well before the rise of these theories, Mediterranean countries suggested

launching

Dialogues

among

Civilizations

and

these

suggestions

were

operationalized in the form of various models of dialogue. In fact, of one reviews models of dialogues among civilizations after the end of the Cold War, one would discover that most of them are based in the Mediterranean.

(4) Contemporary Models of Dialogue among Mediterranean Civilizations The concept of the dialogue among civilizations emerged in the post Cold War era in the context of Mediterranean politics in 1992, not as widely believed as a response to Huntington’s thesis on the Clash of Civilizations articulated in 1993. The concept first emerged in the literature of the first Inter-Parliamentary Conference on Security and

Cooperation

Parliamentarians

the

from

Mediterranean

various

(ICSCM)

Mediterranean

held

countries,

Malaga Arabs

in and

June

1992.

Europeans,

participated in that conference. The Conference’s Final Document referred to the concept of the Dialogue among Civilizations and Human Rights. It referred to the common values of civilizations, the norms of mutual understanding and tolerance, and cooperation in the fields of culture and human rights. It also resolved that the dialogue was essential to bridge the gap between the Arab and European peoples, and that such dialogue should be based on “common values such as respect for human life,

the

need

for

spiritual

values,

and

human

solidarity.”

From

this

point,

Mediterranean powers launched various dialogue models. Four models were singled out, the Dialogue of Old Civilizations, the Euro-Mediterranean Dialogue, the European Union and the Organization of the Islamic Conference Dialogue, the World Public Forum of Dialogue of Civilizations, and the Alliance of Civilizations Dialogue. The Dialogue of Old Civilizations comprised four countries, Egypt, Greece, Iran, and Italy as representatives of “Old Civilizations,” a term which became the official title of the dialogue, with the four countries representing the Pharonic, Greek, Persian, and Roman civilizations respectively. The first meeting was held in Athens in 1998. In that meeting the participants agreed on the basic principles of the dialogue and the action plan and agreed to call for a plenary meeting in which other actors will also participate. The quadruple meeting issued the “Athens Declaration” which outlined main guidelines of future action. For example, it resolved o focus on the legacies of the

four

civilizations

contributions

which

the

contemporary

participating

civilizations,

countries addition

represent to

the

and

their

questions

globalization, and informatics. It also reiterated a number of principles which will serve as guidelines for admitting other countries in the dialogue. However, these objectives were never achieved and the dialogue itself was quietly discontinued. It seemed that the Egyptian-Iranian tension played a role in the collapse of the dialogue. The Dialogue of Old Civilizations was a purely governmental activity in which only government

officials

participated.

Each

one

them

spoke

behalf

his

government, rather than his civilization. Governments also decided the agenda and the rules of the dialogue and never invited non-governmental organizations to take part

with the exception of the parliamentary meeting held in Tehran in 2000, in which official views were also dominant.

Further, the dialogue was mostly past-oriented. It

focused mainly of historical legacies rather than contemporary themes. The

second

main

forum

dialogue

the

Mediterranean

was

the

Euro-Mediterranean Dialogue established within the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) launched in 1995. The Barcelona Declaration issued in November 1995 by member states in the EMP referred to cultural cooperation and dialogue among civilizations as a “basket of co-operation.” Within that framework the Euromed Civil Forum was established. It held its first meeting in conjunction with the Barcelona Ministerial meeting of 1995. It issued the Civil Declaration of Barcelona, which referred to projects of “cultural dialogue.”The Forum held a number of subsequent meetings most of which were in conjunction with the EMP ministerial conferences, and the last of which was held in Naples in November 2003 in which the emphasis was on re-conceptualizing the role of the Forum, as the participants felt that they have

little

input

in the

policy making

process,

and that

the

Forum lacks

institutional framework. After September 11, 2001, the EU decided to re-conceptualize the Euro-Med cultural dialogue and expand its scope. It sponsored a conference entitled “Dialogue among Cultures” in Brussels in March 2002 to which participants from Arab and European countries were invited. The workings of this conference were the basis of a new document entitled the “Action Program for Dialogue between Cultures and Civilizations.” cultural

The

respect,

Program advocated

equality,

specificity,

a and

Euro-Mediterranean multi-culturalism,

dialogue

based

avoiding

bias

on and

stereotypes. It is in this spirit that Euro-Mediterranean Foundation to Promote Dialogue between Cultures and Civilizations” was established. It was later on called the Anna Lindh Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for the Dialogue between Cultures” and was based in Alexandria, Egypt. The Anna Lindh Foundation is devoted to the question of dialogue among Euro-Mediterranean cultures and civilizations. Since its establishment networking

the

initiated

Euro-Mediterranean

various

cultural,

individuals

and

academic, entities

and

artistic

held

programs number

conferences and projects on the various aspects of the cultural and civilizational dialogues in the Euro-Mediterranean world. The end result is that the Euro-Mediterranean Dialogue has been institutionalized. The main problem is that the European side controls virtually all its processes including agenda-setting and implementation. The Dialogue has also been criticized as being a platform for the EU to promote it values rather than to find common grounds. Using its control of the finances of the Dialogue, the EU is a strong position

to promote the notion that the EU core values should be viewed as the common values which the Dialogue aspires to promote in Arab countries. Further, in 2008, “the Union for the Mediterranean” was established comprising all EU states and the non-European

powers

the

Mediterranean.

The

Union

did

not

contain

any

component related to the dialogue among civilization, which was considered as a setback for the notion of the Mediterranean dialogue. The third forum is the European Union-Organization of the Islamic Conference (EU-OIC)

Dialogue.

The

Dialogue

was single

show exercise.

Turkey took

the

initiative to invite the member states of the OIC and the EU to meet in order to engage in a dialogue at the ministerial level, with a view of bridging the gap between the Muslim world and Europe, as the former organization includes 57 states that define themselves as Muslim states.” The Forum was held in Istanbul on 12-13 February

2002.

Seventy

six

countries

attended.

one

examines

the

various

presentations in the conference, one can identity two approaches, the first was presented

the

Europeans

represented

Solana,

the

former

High

Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, who emphasized the need for dialogue among civilizations on the basis of “universal values,”. In that conference, Islam seemed to be on trial as most European speakers questioned Islamic views on women, capital punishments. Conversely, Belkeziz, the then Secretary General of the OIC, emphasized the need to base the dialogue on respect for the specificity of the values of each nation, and religion. The OIC representative also suggested turning the Forum into a permanent one. However, the Europeans were not interested, and the exercise was never repeated. Finally, the Forum of the Alliance of Civilizations was established in 2008 as a joint Spanish-Turkish initiative endorsed by the United Nations. The objective of the Alliance was defined as to “correct the reciprocal negative perceptions that seem to exist between the Western world and the Arab-Muslim world, an atmosphere that has been exploited and aggravated by extremists from all societies”. The Spanish Government provided the secretarial facilities for the Alliance and appointed a High Commissioner for the Alliance, thereby serving the cause of institutionalizing dialogue. The Forum held its first meeting in Madrid in January 2008 and its second meeting in Istanbul in 2009. The first meeting of the Alliance of Civilizations decided to initiate a mechanism for rapid response in case a crisis erupted in Western relations with Muslim countries. The models just outlined made some contribution in the area of raising awareness among elites and policy makers in the West and the Mediterranean of the threats inherent in a potential collision between the two worlds, and the need to engage in a

dialogue to deal with them. However, they have not contributed to achieving their objectives, mainly to reduce misperceptions and create common grounds for future collaboration. In fact, Islamophobia in the West is on the rise. The First Report of the OIC Observatory on Islamophobia submitted to the 11th OIC summit held in Dakar in March 2008 documented the rise of anti-Muslim feelings in the West, and the perception

concern

about

Muslim

identity.

Most

Muslims

today

are

apprehensive about Western strategies than ever before, especially after American invasion and occupation of some Muslim countries, and the open support given to that invasion by most European countries. The limited achievements of the Mediterranean dialogues can be attributed to two types of variables, contexualist and instrumentalist. Whereas the first set of variables refers to the context within which the dialogues are taking place, the second deals mainly the structures and processes or the dialogue. The first set deals with the structural

problematics of the dialogues, and the second refers to the missing

dimensions in the dialogues. The first main problematic is that structural relations between northern (European) and southern Mediterranean (Arab) states are characterized by northern strategic dominance. Since the mid-eighteenth century, the balance of power between the two shores of the Mediterranean has been overwhelmingly in favor of the European shores. Under these conditions, Europe is in a better position to steer the dialogues in directions which maximize its gains at the expense of the other side, and insist that these dialogues should be based on the assumption of the superiority of Western values. The second main problematic is the negative historical legacies of interaction between the two shores of the Mediterranean.

For centuries, interactions between the

two sides have been plagued by various conflicts including the post Second World War liberation wars in the Muslim world against the European imperial powers.

The

influences of such historical legacies are still haunting Mediterranean interactions, as they have been reinforced by the military onslaught of the USA on some Muslim states in the post September 11, 2001 era.

By and large, Europe endorsed most

American militaristic actions in the Muslim world and participated in most of them, which implanted in the Muslim world the image of the West out to destroy the Muslim world. These interactions have produced negative mirror-images of the other side. Marlene Nasr has documented the anti-Arab and anti-Muslim bias in French textbooks. She found that these textbooks portray the Arabs and Muslims as always aggressors in all encounters with the West and Israel. The third

problematic which constrain the dialogues between Western and Muslim

civilizations

that

such dialogues

are

being

launched

under

conditions

emerging conflict between the forces of cultural globalization and forces of cultural specificity.

Western victory in the Cold War had created in the West a sense of

confidence in the universality of its cultural values. Meanwhile, forces of nationalism and religious fundamentalism have been gaining momentum over the last few years. This

process has

been occurring

across

various societies

and

religions in the

Mediterranean. However, the articulation and impact of such forces is being mostly felt in the Muslim world. These forces tend to subscribe to notions of cultural particularism, and are mostly suspicious of the themes of dialogue among civilizations.

This leads us to the main contextualist requirements for the effectiveness of Mediterranean dialogues. The effectiveness of dialogues hinges upon the presence of certain dimensions, norms, structures, and processes. Whereas some analysts focus on instrumental rules of the dialogues, others prefer to point out to their philosophical dimensions. Perusal of the dialogue models to which I have referred earlier, shows that what have

been

missing

was

the

agreement

the

norms

and

philosophical

and

instrumental foundations of the dialogues and their expected outcomes. In order for Mediterranean dialogues to prosper there has to be a wider representation of the dialoguing partners through which civil society groups from all trends, should take part. I am referring in particular to the Arab nationalist and Islamist elements who are ostracized from these dialogues although they are at their roots. One way to deal with this question is to establish an independent foundation which supervises the dialogues in terms of setting the agenda and inviting civil society groups from all the dialoguing countries. The model of the Asia-Europe Foundation based in Singapore and formed within the framework of the Asia-Europe Meeting should be carefully examined.

Further,

Mediterranean

dialogues

should

establish

linkages

between

political, economic and cultural issues debated in the dialogues. It is our argument that dialogue among Mediterranean civilizations would be enhanced if it was placed in a general framework of political and economic cooperation. Mediterranean dialogues should also be explicitly based on a multi-cultural paradigm through which the values of all dialoguing cultures should be respected. Finally, Mediterranean dialogues should pursue a new knowledge -producing approach through which they will focus on contemporary issues of concern to all parties. A viable dialogue among civilizations must address itself to the issues which are on the agenda of the global system and on their own mutual agenda as well, with a view of identifying the visions and approaches of each civilization to the issues on these agendas. Perhaps the most

important issues on the global agenda are the issues of globalization, democracy, human rights, development, genetic engineering and cloning, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, and national self-determination. In all cases, the dialogue must produce

â&#x20AC;&#x153;new knowledgeâ&#x20AC;?

rather

than

recycle

old

ones.

Further,

Mediterranean

dialogues should pursue a paradigm of the universal application of mutually accepted norms and the approach the dialogue from a strategic and long term perspective which focuses on the roots of misunderstanding rather than their manifestations. Finally, dialogues involve certain costs. It is crucial that the dialoguing partners share these costs; otherwise, the party who shoulders all the costs will control of the processes of agenda-setting and agenda-implementation of the dialogue. This is the problem which plague the Euro-Mediterranean dialogue, whereby the European side controls the entire dialogue, partly because itâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s the sole financier all its activities. The critical issue for the Mediterranean exchanges is not the creation of new institutions, but to adhere to a new paradigm of thinking based on mutually-accepted norms. Under the present conditions all possibilities are open in the Mediterranean, being a long term viable Mediterranean partnership or new clashes of civilizations.

Congratulation Speech by the Mediterranean Studies Group at Hitotsubashi University in Japan

Kato, Hiroshi (Mediterranean Studies Group, Hitotsubashi University)

This

the

congratulation

speech

from

the

Mediterranean

Studies

Group

Hitotsubashi University in Japan to the Institute for Mediterranean Studies at Pusan University

Foreign

Studies

Korea

for

the

establishment

the

Institute

concerned.

The Mediterranean Studies Group at Hitotsubashi University was established in 1973, when Japanese universities lay in ruins following the big wave of student political

movements.

that

time,

two

eminent

scholars,

who

were

staffs

Hitotsubashi University, Prof. Kin-ichi Watanabe, historian of Byzantine Empire, and Prof. Keiichi Takeuchi, social geographer, established the Studies Group after deciding to do “something fun and interesting.”

They were influenced by the interdisciplinary way of thinking to combine time and space, which was put forward by the famous French school on historical science, named “annals”.

was called the happy marriage

between historiography and

geography. So, they began to engage in this research plan in the study of the Mediterranean world, with which both of them were concerned.

As well known, the

Mediterranean is a maritime area in which a lot of cultures, civilizations, nations and religions have met together.

In those days, any research was barely being carried

out in Japan on the Mediterranean world.

The Studies Group can be said to have the following characteristic. It is that its members consciously try to consider the Mediterranean world as more than a historical reality, rather as a regional concept for research that can be analyzed as one entity.

In other words, they have made efforts to be unrestrained and free from

any discipline, political and cultural inclination, when we discuss on the Mediterranean world. According to this viewpoint, the Mediterranean world is not a geographical

existence, but rather a symbol of open arena for the exchange of opinions that make it

possible

through

frank

discussion

provoke

new

imagination

and

produce

interesting idea, which are the sources of original academic research. In discussion, they have not used the academic jargons such as “interdisciplinary” or

“trans-regional,”

instead;

they

have

managed

overcome

the

divisions

academia of specialty and region through relaxed debate and dialogue. Therefore, the direct asking, such as what the Mediterranean world is, has been rarely questioned. They have different disciplines and research fields, and have great pride in their own works. But, they also possess the common critical feeling that the Japanese academic system is lacking in some way. The target of their criticism is the research, taking a nation into consideration as a unit of analysis.

The Studies Group entered its 38th year in 2010. For so many years, it has been assisted in its operations by scientific research grants from the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology in Japan. Since its foundation, the Studies Group has held regular study meetings, hosted special lectures by internal and external speakers, and organized field researchs in the Mediterranean world.

And

also it has published the results of researches in the Journal “Mediterranean World” every two or three years.

Since coming into existence, the Studies Group has seen changes in its personnel and atmosphere. The changes reflect the general trends of academic environment of research in Japan. After the 1980s, academic researches have become increasingly specialized, and a lot of domestic and international research meetings have been held. This has led researchers, especially younger ones, to join a number of research meetings related to their own fields of specialty, making it difficult for researchers of different disciplines to come and discuss together. These numerous research meetings have been held by the name of the interdisciplinary or trans-regional project. All this has meant that the Studies Group has moved away from its intended role.

However, for all that, it could be said that it is necessary, especially now, in a different sense from in the past, to have a research group for networking the researchers

different

disciplines.

So,

the

Mediterranean

Studies

Group

Hitotsubashi University deeply appreciates if the Institute for Mediterranean Studies at Pusan University of Foreign Studies will join the plan to make an international arena for the exchange of opinions among researchers on the Mediterranean studies.

Session Ⅰ

～

(13:40

15:40)

Panel 1 Human Sciences (Language/Education) (Rose Room) Chair : Oh, Myung Keun (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies)

1. Globalization of Higher Education in the Arab World between Local Commercialization and International Development Aid Ala Al-hamarneh (Jordan, University of Mainz-Germany) Discussant : Chang, Se Won (Dankook University) 2. The interchange of civilization in Mediterranean area : The case of Italy Valerie Joelle Kouam (Cameron, Institut de Culture et de Langues YaoundĂŠ) Discussant : Huh, Yoo Hyae (Pusan University of Foreign Studies) 3. A Linguistic Approach to the Question of the Priest Source (P) in the Old Testament Shin, Seoung Yun (IMS) Discussant : Choi, Jung Hwa (Busan Presbyterian University) 4. College Students' Motivation for Learning Arabic and Their Perception on Arab People and Arab Culture Kong, Ji Hyun (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies) Discussant : Maomen Hasan Al-Doraydi (Pusan University of Foreign Studies)

Globalization of Higher Education in the Arab World between Local Commercialization and International Development Aid

Ala Al-hamarneh (Jordan, Centre for Research on the Arab World,

)

Institute of Geography, University of Mainz-Germany

Discussion Globalization of Higher Education in the Arab World between Local Commercialization and International Development Aid

Discussant : Chang, Se Won (Dankook University)

I am discussing the paper based on the following three points: subject, contents and arguments of the paper.

First, the subject of the paper could be highly estimated. Even though it has been almost 10 years since the 9.11, the subject of the 9.11 and its impact on the global changes still attracts many scholarsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; interest from such various fields from politics, economics, religion, and culture. However, little attention has been paid on the field of education. The subject fills the gap that exists in the scholarly field of research, and could be regarded as very important and well timed.

Second, I am afraid to say that there is little room for discussion of the paper as I had received only one page of an abstract. However I wonder, from the method point of view of the paper, what is the background to choose Jordan, Oman, UAE, Egypt, Qatar as a case study? If we divide the Arab world into three blocks(North Africa, Gulf Area and Levant), how about choosing two countries from each block?

My last point is related to e-learning. The presenter suggests e-learning as a new model for globalizing higher education in the Arab world. It would be very helpful for us to understand your argument if you introduce more concrete plan about e-learning and any case studies that succeed e-learning.

Thank you.

The interchange of civilization in Mediterranean area : The case of Italy

Valerie Joelle Kouam (Cameron, Institut de Culture et de Langues Yaoundé)

Since its very origin, the civilizations appeared in Italy (the Greek, the Etruscan, the Latin, the Byzantine, and naturally the Italian), have given an unprecedented importance to this European country. In no other place they are such a popular and widespread heritage. The Italians are unbelievably varied. You find 21 regions, with different history, different regional idioms called "dialects". They have different cuisines, different patron saints, and contrasting political orientations. All the regions actually form practically

three

different

countries:

North,

Centre

and

South,

each

claiming

supremacy over something, and actually having remarkably different societies and economies. Moreover, you find also regions with completely different languages. This paper will take into consideration how and why the Italian culture has its foundations not only in a very important and fruitful religion, but also in a great secular humanistic culture. Italian civilization has been influenced by many elements. As Robert Royal says, «A

civilization is not something generation,

individually and

simply inherit or

collectively,

needs

ever make

finally possess. Each a

continual

effort

appropriate it anew because a civilization is not passed along to us at birth. A civilization is an elaborate structure of ideas and institutions, slowly built up over time by the intelligence and effort of countless individuals working alone and th

together»1) . First of all, in the late 8

century BC, Greek colonizers arrived in Sicily

and in the south. Then we have to mention the presence in the central Italy and the th

Po Valley of the Etruscans. Little time after, by the end of the 7

century BC, the

rule of the Etruscan was expanded to Latium and also a part of Campania. On the other hand, many cities were founded by the Italians. So, the city of Rome, founded in c. 753, was at the beginning rules by Etruscan kings from 616 BC. Finally in 509, the Roman republic was found and the Etruscan sent away. Romans began to fight for themselves. They want to reach their unification2). They made it and extended 1) ROYAL Robert, ‘Who put the west in western civilization’, The Intercollegiate Review, spring 1998. pp 1-15

their institutions, their culture and their language (latin) from the Alps to Sicily. In 330, Emperor Constantine transferred his capital from Rome to Constantinople built on the site of Byzantium. Another influence on Italian civilization is the Christianity. Many bishoprics were founded in addition of the one of Rome just at the nd

beginning of 2

century AD: Milan, Naples, Benevento, ecc. Then Italy passed into

the hands of Ostrogothic, so not more with the Byzantine Empire, but with the West. We have also to mention the Lombards which success was temporary. The Franks invaded Italy. This instability has prompted the city to be independent and the formed city-states. They had their autonomy and contributed to the wealth of the entire country3). Italian civilization looks with gratitude and pride to its roots in the Mediterranean. The emancipation of philosophy and statecraft in Greece was translated by the Romans into an effective system. This enabled peoples to live together throughout the Mediterranean basin in the pax romana. This essay will examine the concept of civilization and the marks of the Italian civilization in the entire world. Since we are treating of a civilization which has its own importance in the Mediterranean area, and whose influence is undeniable, we are conscious that different way and direction to study it are possible.

Addressing the Italian civilization requires looking back to the beginnings, that’s means, the ancient world, when the story begins. It took place between 800 BC (BCE) and 500 AD 500 (CE) and can be divided in the Hellenic Age (ancient) Greece (800 BC - 336 BC), the Hellenistic Age (336 BC - 100's BC) and Roman civilization (rise and fall of the empire - 250 BC - 500 AD). The geographical situation of Italy near the Mediterranean Sea is something important, because this sea was necessary for the business with Egypt, Mesopotamia, the East and Phoenicians. The ancient Greece civilization didn’t last for ever, but it left a great legacy to Roman civilization. This civilization is well known. The roman civilization

took

many

Greek

models

different

areas

such

art,

and

also

architecture, religion, philosophy and scientific inquiry. It’s obvious that they also added

their

own

knowledge

and

intelligence.

Thanks

the

Roman

emperors

(Augustus Caesar), Rome was able to capture and control all of modern day France, Spain, Greece, Asia Minor, Palestine, North Africa and Great Britain. The term ‘civilization’ has been used in a variety of ways. For Toynbee each 2) The process of unification reached is final stage in 89 BC. And after that the extended the Roman citizenship in all the country. 3) The case of the Kingdom of Sicily has also to be mention. It was conquered by the Normans in the 11th century

civilization is «the smallest unit of historical study at which one arrives when one

tries to understand the history»4) . This definition can be apply to Italian civilization when we say that Italy can be consider the model, the mother and mistress of the arts, and why not the fountain head of literature, the foster-mother of education. For Burckhardt5), Renaissance Italy did represent a distinctive epoch in the history of civilization though it is a gross misconception to claim, as has been done, that he was unaware of the importance of the Middle Ages. For him, the Italian of the Renaissance was "the first-born among the sons of modern Europe ,"6)

different from

those who had lived before him. His character had been formed not solely by the influence of the classics, but by the combination of "the revival of antiquity" and "the

genius of the Italian people." This new man was above all an individual, according to Burckhardt, no longer, as in the Middle Ages, identified by his membership in some corporate group. He also says that politics in Renaissance Italy was governed by rational calculation, the conscious adaptation of means to ends. He also found in the Renaissance a heightened interest in the world of nature and of man, including both the outer and inner aspects of human character. Italy's modern state traces its mythological roots to the founding of the city of Rome in 753 B.C. The Romans engaged in territorial expansion and conquest of neighbouring lands, devising effective colonization policies that ultimately sustained a widespread realm. By 172 B.C., Rome controlled the entire Italian peninsula and began moving outward into the Mediterranean basin. At its peak, the Roman Empire extended from the British Isles to the Euphrates River. The Pax Romana began to crumble, however, by the end of the first century A.D. The sack of Rome by the Visigoths in 410 A.D. presaged the more complete disintegration of the empire in the later fifth and sixth centuries. With its political integration shattered, the country remained fragmented until the late nineteenth century. Christian influences can be spotted in Roman law, and particularly all that referred to the place of the ruler in matters of law. The modern history Italy combines intellectual and spiritual tendency, and carries them on to highest expression. It’s evident that during the Renaissance, Italy was well known for all intellectual matters. In fact, the Greek ideas and ideals first came to Italy in the time of Renaissance and they took advantage of that. The Greek influence is obvious also in the art. But this leadership didn’t last for ever: long time before the Renaissance, Italy had been the leader of European civilization in many 4) Arnold Joseph Toynbee (1889-1975) was a British historian. 5) BURCKHARDT Jacob, The civilization of the Renaissance in Italy, The Phaidon Press, Oxford University Press, New York, 1860 6) Idem

department of intellectual effort and for long after the Renaissance she continued to hold her premiership. Italy achieves full unification very late (from 1860-1870, during the Risorgimento). Before this period, kingdoms, duchies, city-states, principalities often fight. Some of these regions were under periodic control of foreign powers as a result of recurrent wars and shifting political alliances. So, regional loyalties emerged and remain after unification. The most visible is the contrast between south and north. Roman influence can’t be denied in the construction of bridges, roads, aqueducts. The language of Rome (latin) took deep root during Roman imperial control. Another legacy left by Roman control is the fact that the religion of Christianity spread from its origins since now to the Entire world. To conclude, we can say that Italian civilization stressed the importance of cities. Italy has so many towns, so different, so rich in art. The interchange between civilization that occurs in and from Italy contributes to shape the values of many countries.

fact

Italy

you

can

count

many

monuments

and

masterpieces

(especially in Rome). There are work of art which are result and expression of various historical eras, covering more than 2,000 years. They are also the result of different societies and political realities. It’s possible to say that the Italian art and literature are still living forces in the entire world.

REFERENCES -

ABULAFIA

David,

Italy,

Sicily and

the

Mediterranean

1100-1400,

London,

Variorum Reprints, 1987 - ARNALDI Girolamo, Italy and its invaders, London, Harvard University Press, 2005 - HINGLEY Richard, Globalizing Roman culture. Unity, diversity and empire, New York, Routledge, 2005 - LOWENTHAL, D., ‘Classical antiquities as national and global heritage’ Antiquity 62, 726-35 - KEAY Simon, TERRENATO Nicola, Italy and the West. Comparative Issues in

Romanization, Oxford, Oxbow books, 2001 - ROYAL Robert, ‘Who put the west in western civilization’, The Intercollegiate

Review, spring 1998 - BURCKHARDT Jacob, The civilization of

the Renaissance in Italy, The Phaidon

Press, Oxford University Press, New York, 1860

Discussion The interchange of civilization in Mediterranean area : The case of Italy

Discussant : Huh, Yoo Hyae (Pusan University of Foreign Studies)

The article offers a general view of Italian civilization and the elements which influenced it during the centuries. The research method adopted by the author is based on a synthetic exposition of several aspects of Italian civilization in relation to Mediterranean culture through the history from the pre-Roman age to the Renaissance. This kind of perspective should include not only specific references to Etruscans (whose influence for example was fundamental for the development of Latin alphabet) but also a complete description of Italic people and the role that they played not only for the Italian culture but also for other Mediterranean civilizations (an example is given by the case of Albania). Even if this work focuses on various fields concerning Italian and Mediterranean culture such as art, philosophy and religion there are not detailed references to any specific topic in particular; at the same time, the research method doesn't highlight any element of originality but it appears restricted to a list of dates and facts which in some passages don't seem very clear. Particular attention, for example, must be paid to the difference of two terms:

Roman and Italian. If the aim of the author is to describe the role of Romans and Roman culture in the Mediterranean, an important point to remark is that any reference to Italy as defined historical and cultural subject can be done only after the Renaissance. If the author mentions Constantine and the moving of the capital from Rome to Byzantium, he should try to explain the importance of this historical event also according a philological point of view: any serious scholar of Mediterranean area know that Byzantine people considered themselves as Romans (romanoi) so the influence of Roman culture on this culture is fundamental beyond any political implication. In

some

passages

the

author

mentions

also

Christianity

and

particular

consideration concerns Robert Royal's quote: "A civilization is an elaborate structure

of ideas and institutions, slowly built up over time by the intelligence and effort of

countless individuals working alone and together". This

passage

shows

perfectly

the

essence

Mediterranean

civilization

(in

particular the western area) whose origin is fundamentally based on the synthesis of three important cultures: Roman, Greek and Christiano-Judaic (which is not only the expression of two religious doctrines but also represents a defined cultural element). Considering Royal's theory, a question that the author should ask himself would be how the Roman element worked in relation with the Greek and the Christiano-Judaic one.

Only

after

critical

analysis

the

different

phenomena

concerning

this

synthesis, he can get finally a clear answer about the real role of Roman civilization on the Mediterranean area.

A Linguistic Approach to the Question of the Priest Source (P) in the Old Testament

Shin, Seoung Yun

(IMS)

The Priestly Source (P) which was named ‘Elohistic’ in the beginning and later ‘Q’ by Wellhausen, has been one of the main topics of discussion since the rise of

Documentry

Hipothesis

the

modern

Biblical

scholarship.

suggestions on P originated by Jean Astruc and de Wette

–

The

contradicting

pre-exilic vs. post-exilic

created two competing camps in the study of P in Biblical Criticism. However the

prolonged studies on P in different approaches

–

historical, theological and literary

–

have not given clear answers concerning the date of P. In fact one may confront several

suggestions;

roughly

three

positions

are

given:

the

popular

position

‘post-exilic’ (e.g. Wellhausen 1957: 38), ‘early’ (Kaufmann 1960: 175-208) and ‘an unbroken history reaching back to early Israelite times, and continuing until the Exile and beyond’ (Speiser 1964: XXVI).1) The Wellhausen’s suggestion of chronological order, i.e., D Hurvitz

1982:

–

late pre-exlic; Ezekiel

11),

seems

have

–

exilic; P

enjoyed

–

exilic and post-exilic (cf.

unchallenged

status

the

Biblical

scholorship until the renewed linguistic approach on P in the framework of LBH study. The linguistic approach to P and its conclusions, thus, become a typical case of linguistic study’s contribution in the study of Biblical Criticism.2) A short survey of linguistic approach to P may deserve here. C.V. Ryssel is known to be one of the first scholars who approached the problem of the P’s relative date among the Pentateuchal sources with the linguistic criteria (De Elohistae P entateuchi Sermone, 1878). First he delineates elements of post-exilic Hebrew and then examines its occurrences in P. With his linguistic analysis Ryssel comes to a conclusion that P belongs to the origins of Israel’s literary efforts, viz. the major portion of P does not belong to the post-exilic period (cf. Polzin 1976:16). F. Giesebrecht’s article on the language of P appears in the first volume of ZAW (1881)

establish

cortradictroy

conclusions

Ryssel.

concludes

that

the

1) Cf. Rendsburg 1980, p. 65. 2) Hurvitz 1988, p. 89: “It is our firm belief that the linguistic discipline can contribute much towards the solution of the crucial problem of dating P, provided that we respect the limitations of our critical tools and do not read more into the bliblical texts than they actually contain”.

linguistic affinity between P and Ezekiel should mean that both literatures stemmed in the same period: exilic (ibid. 276). S. R. Driver in his detailed critique of Giesebrecht’s study (“On Some Alleged Linguistic Affinities of the Elohist”, 1882) points out Giesebrecht’s inadequate handling of material and concludes regarding Giesebrecht’s dating:

“The positive argument to be derived from the language or style of Q in favour of its late date, is much more weaker than the reader of the article might imagine” (ibid. 231-232)

Welhausen, however, in his monumental work Prolegomena goes in line with Giesebrecht:

“[F]or the Priestly Code generally I am now able to refer to F. Giesebrecht’s essay on the criticism of the Hexateuch. Such words as are each, by itself, strong arguments for assuming a late date for the production of the Priestly Code” (Wellhausen 1957: 389-390).

Similar statements are found among the contemporary leading sholars such as A. Kuenen and W.R. Smith:3)

“Lingiustic comparisons… do furnish

a very strong presumption against the

theory that the priestly laws were written in the golden age of Israelitisch literature” (Kuenen 1886: 291).

“[T]he priestly style is… deficient, as compared with the older narratives… its peculiarities, whether of grammar or of lexicon, forbid us to assign the priestly writings to an early date” (Smith 1892: 408).

The linguistic approach to P is resumed in its full scale by two prominent scholars: R. Polzin and A. Hurvitz. Polzin seems to begin his pure linguistic approach to the problem of P’s date with a prevailing presupposition that P is exilic or post-exilic. He unfolds his study upon basic principles: 1) existence of LBH; 2) the language of Chronicles as best presenting LBH; 3) grammatical and syntactic observation as more objective and reliable basis of linguistic analysis than lexicographic one; and 4) the influence of Aramaic of the Persian period upon LBH (Polzin 1976: 1-2). One of the 3) Cf. Hurvitz 1988, p. 89.

materials utilized in Polzin’s analysis of Chnonicles’ language was the work of Kropat (1909). Polzin expresses, however, his reservations in three points: 1) Kropat’s unwise decision to include paralleling texts between Chr. and Sam/Kg in his analysis; 2) overweighing of Aramaic influence; and 3) a number of errors vitiating some specific conclusions.4) After extracting the 19 LBH features,5) Polzin examines the occurrences of these features in P. Polzin summarizes his study as follows: 1) “the influence of Aramaic on the late language was not so pervasive as some scholars, such as Kropat, had proposed”;6)

2) the language of Chr./Ezr./N2 is a category of LBH which

is relatively free of extensive archarism whereas N1 (which is intrusive to the Chronicler’s archaisms;

corpus), and

Esther g

is s

Chronicler’s language; P

and

Daniel

typologically

another

later

than

one

replete

classical

with but

deliberate before

the

is later that Pg but earlier than the Chronicler’s language.

Polzin thus concludes actually that P is not pre-exilic. He suggests here that the language of P is a bridge between SBH and LBH. Hurvitz’s study of P on a purely linguistic basis begins with a couple of test-cases on

certain

lexemes:

(Hurvitz

1967),

(Hurvitz

1970-71).

With

his

subsequent investigation on the language of P with additional cases (Hurvitz 1974b), Hurvitz reaches an overturning conclusion:

“[F]rom a chronological-lingustic point of view, what there is in P is early (= pre-exilic) and what is missing is distinctively late (= exile and post-exilic).

The evidenc of language thus demonstrates that P does not reflect nor anticipate the situations and conditions which characterize the exile and post-exilic period… P’s “historical horizon” (Kaufmann) and its “Sitz im Leben” (Gunkel) are definitely indicative of the pre-exilic period” (Hurvitz 1974b: 54). 4) Concerning the first point of Polzin’s criticism, Rendsburg expresses his support: “In describing the language of Chronicles, Polzin rightly omitted those passages which are duplicates of Samuel/Kings” (Rendsburg 1980: 66). It seems to me, however, that Kropat’s decision to include paralleling texts as material for investigation was rather right in the light of the basic understang that “Late Biblical Hebrew prose (=LBH) differs from classical prose in very many lexicographic, grammatical and syntactic features” (Polzin 1976: 1). Practically it is from these paralleling texts that one finds the clear differences between LBH and the classical prose. Hurvitz sharpens later this point: “A most important methodological principle dictates that the collecting of similarities is insufficient whether two similar texts are to be ascribed to the same author(s). One should look instesd for possible differences in the texts under discussion; for it is the distinguishing features which best define, in the final analysis, the individual character of each literay composition” (Hurvitz 1982: 144). 5) See above p. 4, n. 7. 6) This conclusion of Polzin is mainly due to his priority to grammatical/syntactic approach. One may confront in general much more Aramaisms when investigating lexicographic aspect in LBH study.

Hurvitz’s comprehensive work in the linguistic study on P appears in A Linguistic

Study of the Relationship between the P riestly Source and the Book of Ezekiel (1982). This comes after Polzin’s conclusion that the language of P represents the transitional stage from the classical to the late language (Polzin 1976: 96). Compared to

Polzin,

Hurvitz’s

study

differs

methodology,

material

for

analysis

and

conclusions. Hurvitz’s analysis includes both lexical and grammatical aspects whereas Polzin concentrates his analysis on grammatical and syntactic aspects.7) Another methodological difference between them is Hurvitz’s emphasis in the analysis of

linguistic difference rather than the study of stylistic similarities (Hurvitz 1982: 146). Most significant difference between the two scholars in their linguistic approach on P is selection of material for analysis. Polzin takes so-called LBH prose to compare with P but Hurvitz chooses Ezekiel which has been well known to be deeply related to P in contents (topics) and style (phraseology) and which most importantly provides a clear historical setting

–

exilic. Hurvitz’s choice of Ezekiel as comparing material

for analysis turns out to be very hitting. Through his observation Hurvitz finds a wide linguistic gap distinguishing P form Ezekiel and comes to a conclusion:

“The Presence in Ez. of late linguistic elements betrays the late background of this Book, while the absence of such late elements from P reflects the early background of the Prielstly Source. A further conclusion would be that those

common

elements

shared

and

Ez.

represent

their

common

inheritance from the ancient Priestly literature. Apparently it was from the P document as we have it, that Ezekiel drew

–

directly

–

the material

included in both of these compositions” (Hurvitz 1982: 150).

As Hurvitz himself says both his and Polzin’s positions share the common view that P should be dated earlier than LBH (Hurvitz 1982: 9) but their final words differ profoundly: Hurvitz difines the date of P as pre-exilic on the basis of linguistic investigation. Rooker shows later that the language of Ezekiel which was virtually ignored in Polzin’s study serves the transitional stage between SBH and LBH. Rooker’s analysis which is based upon corrected Polzin’s list reaveals that Ezekiel demonstrates seven g

among fifteen LBH features while P (P

plus P ) shows five. Rooker thus suggests

7) Polzin says “what the following study shows is that style and vocabulary (lexicographic analysis) is almost useless in establishing the chronological status of P. Only the broad spectrum of grammar and syntax provide a sufficient basis…” (Polzin 1976: 16). However Hurtivz’s successful analysis which has more emphasis in lexicographic aspect may refute Polzin’s position. Rendsburg also points out “Nevertheless, an important conclusion for the dating of P may be drawn from lexicographic study” (Rendsburg 1980: 80).

that it is not P but Ezekiel which represents for the link between the stages of the pre-exilic and post-exilic BH (Rooker 1990: 52-53). Rooker proves with his study that it is the case (ibid. 185-186). While the publication of Hurvitz’s work is delayed (1982), Rendsburg reinvestigates g

Polzin’s study and comes to a conclusion that both P

and P

are classical BH.

Rendsburg even argues with phenomena in P of the use of third person common dual suffix

–

(h)m and the use of the 3.m.s. independent pronoun

that P is antique of

the whole pentateuch (Rendsburg 1980: 76-80). With regrard to the time of P, Hurvitz adds to demonstrate the antiquity of P thorugh the lexical examples of

and

(“Dating the Priestly Source in

Light of the Historical Study of Biblical Hebew A Century after Wellhausen”, 1988) He articulates in the conclusion that “if we wish to investigates properly the linguistic profile of P, our efforts must confirm to sound philological principles and procedures in order to avoid the methodological shortcomings of the work of our scholarly predecessors” (ibid. 99). The importance of the proper method in determining the age of P’s language is raised again by Hurvitz in his response to J. Blenkinsopp’s admirably intensive and detailed article (“An Assessment of the Alleged Pre-Exilic Date of the Priestly Material in the Pentateuch”, 1996). Hurvitz concretely points out that the total neglect of

extra-Biblical

sources

the

Blenkinsopp’s

linguistic

study

methodologiacally inadequate (“Once Again: The Linguistic Profile of the Priestly Material in the Pentateuch and its Historical Age”

–

Hurvitz 2000b:191).8)

8) “Disregard of this basic groud-rule, commonly adopted by Hebraists and Semitists dealing with the history of Hebrew, makes Blenkinsopp’s linguistic discussion unsuited to dating purposes” (ibid.).

Discussion A Linguistic Approach to the Question of the Priest Source(P) in the Old Testament

Discussant : Choi, Jung Hwa (Busan Presbyterian University)

Terse and clear in his writing style, Shin provides us with a valuable survey on linguistic approaches to the question of the priestly source(P) in the Old Testament. Anyone interested in performing a serious research on the History of the Pentateuch, the Documentary Hypothesis, or the history of the Hebrew language may well benefit from this article, which provides an easy access to an overview of various hypothesis accumulated by more than a hundred years of research. Survey of this sort could only be written by an expert who is competent both in biblical criticism and also in linguistic aspect of Hebrew language. Three comments on the article comes as follow. First and most of all, the title of Shin’s article may be changed. The current title, “A Linguistic Approach to the Question of the Priest Source (P) in the Old Testament”,

could give a false

impression that Shin is trying to introduce a new approach to the old question. Rather, the content clearly shows that he surveys various linguistic approaches (in plural) to the question of the priestly source (P). Therefore, I suggest the title may be changed into “A Survey on Linguistic Approaches to the Question of the Priestly Source(P) in the Old Testament”. Second, given the fact that the issue of Priestly source(P) stemmed from the

Documentary Hypothesis, more focus could be given on how each scholar linguist or not

–

whether

treated linguistic aspect of Priestly Source. Confirming that he/she

did not take linguistic approach seriously could well be a contribution as well as a survey. Third, the latest work cited in Shin’s article is A. Hurvitz’s in 2001. If there is any development on the subject during the last decade, it is worth mentioning.

College Students' Motivation for Learning Arabic and Their Perception on Arab People and Arab Culture

Kong, Ji Hyun (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies)

â&#x2026; . Introduction The recent few years have seen the dramatic increase of interests in the studies of the Arab and Islam area here in Korea. This may be attributed to the increasing interests and concerns of Koreans for the relevant region, which goes along with the political and economic importance which Arab and Islam countries take in the international society. In the meantime, the Arabic education scholarship has conducted considerable researches to find a better methodology to teach students of Arabic major. However, almost none has been done for those students who learn Arabic as a liberal arts subject. The two groups of students, one for major and the other for liberal arts, will possess differences in terms of learning motivation, method and outcome. Accordingly, the

teachers

are

required

have

different

preparations

and

take

different

approaches towards the latter group. The present study conducted a survey on those students who take Arabic as a liberal arts subject at local universities. Based on the survey findings, the study accounts for those students' motivation to learn Arabic as well as their perception on Arabs and Arab culture. Then it moves on to find out ways in which Arabic teachers can guide students to pursue with their learning of Arabic language.

â&#x2026;Ą. Research Background 1. Purpose

The present research aims to draw out data on those students who take Arabic lessons

liberal

arts

subject

terms

their

learning

motivation,

linguisticÂˇcommunicative needs and cultural interests, so as to be used and applied on the teaching sites. This kind of data collection and analysis will be able to suggest ways for Arabic teachers to maintain and enhance learning motivation of students

and strengthen their learning achievement, as well as leading students to stay on Arabic courses. Thereby it will ultimately make a contribution to provide learner oriented teaching on the site of Arabic education. The questions raised here is 1) what motivates students to take an Arabic lesson as liberal arts course?; 2) how students perceive Arabic native speakers and their culture?; 3) how different motivations produce different perceptions on the part of students regarding Arabs and their culture?; 4) which factors they consider as a crucial way of learning Arabic; 5) what sort of cultural aspects and factors they want to learn about: 6) is there any relationship between students' motivation and their future study plan?

2. Methodology 1) Survey objects and duration The present survey is a complete enumeration of 299 students who, as of the second semester 2009, took Arabic lessons as liberal art course, at 11 university nationwide.(Refer to table 1.) It was conducted from November 20 to December 4, 2009. During this period the students present in the Arabic lessons were examined at one time.

Table 1) Surveyed Universities Univ.

Number of Students

KKU(건국대)

KWU(경원대)

KU(고려대)

DKU(단국대)

MJU(명지대)

PUFS(부산외대)

SNU(서울대)

SMU(선문대)

YSU(연세대)

CAU(중앙대)

HUFS(한국외대)

total

299

2) Research Tool and Analysis The

questionnaire

for

the

survey

was

formulated

taking

into

account

Gardner's‘Attitude/Motivation Test Battery(AMTB)(1985)’; Horwitz's ‘Beliefs About

Language Learning Inventory(BALLI)(1988)’; Oh Myung Geun and Gong Ji Hyun's ‘Survey on Arabic learners' motivation and Attitude towards Arab Culture’(2000); Husssenali's

‘Arabic

Language

Survey’(2006):

Hernandez's

‘Spanish

Language

Questionnaire’(2006). Following the Hernandez model(2006), the motivation is classified into the following three; integrative motivation; instrumental motivation; and lastly foreign language requirements. It was examined how these three motivations were distributed amongst the students. Each question will be scored on the 5 point scale. That is to say that the higher score one student gets, the higher motivation he or she has. A total of 299 questionnaires were analyzed in the five phases. The first stage is the Frequency Analysis to grasp the general features of the surveyed. The second is the

Regression

Analysis.

This

done

order

understand

what

kind

relationship Part B(three motivations) has respectively in its relation to Part C(image on the Arabic people) and Part D(perception on Arabic culture). Third is the median value analysis which will reveal how different motivations in Part B bring about different outcomes in relation to

Part C and Part D. The fourth is the median value

analysis of Part C and Part D, in order to examine the perceptional difference between those students who had a plan to study Arabic and those who had not. Lastly, the fifth will, following Genmod's method, determine how much influence motivations give on the future study plan on the part of surveyed students. For this analysis, computer software programs such as MICROSOFT EXCEL, SPSS 14,0K and SAS(statistics package) are used.

Ⅲ. Research Findings and Discussion 1. Frequency Analysis

Part A of the questionnaire was designed to examine the general features of the surveyed students and comprised a total of 9 questions. Examination of A1 shows that a total of 299 students took part, with male students numbering 121(40.5%) and female students 178(59.5%).

Question A2 shows the number of students by grade,

with

sophomore

freshmen

101(33.8%),

69(23.1%),

junior

67(22.4%),

and

senior

62(20.7%). Answers for Question A3 is a statement and excluded from the analysis. Question A4 asks prior Arabic learning experience before students took the current course. 240(80.3%) of the surveyed answered 0 month, followed by 49(16.4%) who answered 3～6 months, 6(2.0%)

who said 6～12 months and lastly 4(1.3%) 1 year or more.

Question A5 asked whether a student chose Arabic for the university entrance exam. 28 of the answered (9.4%) said yes while 271(90.6%) said no.

Question A6 questioned whether the surveyed had ever been to any of Arab countries. 16 of the students(5.4%) said yes while 283(94.6%) answered no. Question A7 asked whether they have any family member who has ever stayed in Arab countries. 15 students (5.0%) said yes while 284(95.0%) said no. Question A8 concerned about the surveyed intention for plan to study on Arabic. 204 of the students(68.2%) said yes while 94(31.4%) said no. And one student(0.3%) did not answer at all. Question A9 asked whether they studies foreign languages other than Arabic. Various answers were given in statement and not included in the analysis. Part

was

formulated

gauge

study

motivation.

Score

means

strong

disagreement, 2 disagreement, 3 not sure, 4 agreement and 5 strong agreement. The higher a median is, the stronger agreement it means. Question B3 asked whether they learned a foreign language to learn the other parts of the world and their culture. To this, 93.8% agreed and ranked first. Question B12 questioned if they wanted to speak Arabic to help them to travel to Arab countries. This scored second highest with 77.6% giving positive answer. Question B4 (personal interest in the Arabic culture) is the third highest

drawing 75.3% of the answer. All of these three questions are concerned about the integrative motivation and their total median is 4 or higher, respectively. From these findings it can be said that those student who take Arabic as a liberal art course do so because of their personal interests in other cultures including the Arab one and their desire to speak the language upon their travel to the region. By contrast, to the Question B14(easier to get credit than other subjects) 11.0% agreed while to Question B13(requirement for graduation credit) These turn out to be the two lowest questions.

31.1% said yes.

This shows that the surveyed

students do not take the course just to get the required credits(Table 2).

Table 2) Study Motivations Item

1.00

2.00

3.00

4.00

5.00

Total

B.1

139

298

(%)

(2.0)

(8.7)

(21.1)

(46.4)

(21.4)

(99.7)

B.2

128

298

(%)

(0.3)

(6.0)

(25.4)

(42.8)

(25.1)

(99.7)

B.3

122

157

298

(%)

(0.0)

(1.0)

(5.4)

(40.8)

(52.5)

(99.7)

B.4

116

109

298

(%)

(0.7)

(4.0)

(19.7)

(38.8)

(36.5)

(99.7)

B.5

114

101

298

(%)

(2.7)

(11.7)

(38.1)

(33.8)

(13.4)

(99.7)

B.6

113

101

298

(%)

(4.3)

(11.0)

(37.8)

(33.8)

(12.7)

(99.7)

Mean

Variance

3.77

0.906

3.87

0.763

4.45

0.417

4.07

0.783

3.44

0.913

3.40

0.981

B.7

115

298

(%)

(2.3)

(8.0)

(30.8)

(38.5)

(20.1)

(99.7)

B.8

113

298

(%)

(1.7)

(11.4)

(28.8)

(37.8)

(20.1)

(99.7)

B.9

115

298

(%)

(3.0)

(9.0)

(32.4)

(5.0)

(16.7)

(99.7)

B.10

104

298

(%)

(5.4)

(17.1)

(34.8)

(30.8)

(11.7)

(99.7)

B.11

102

298

(%)

(4.7)

(11.4)

(27.1)

(34.1)

(22.4)

(99.7)

B.12

131

101

298

(%)

(1.7)

(6.0)

(14.4)

(43.8)

(33.8)

(99.7)

B.13

298

(%)

(17.7)

(29.4)

(21.4)

(22.4)

(8.7)

(99.7)

B.14

113

298

(%)

(26.4)

(37.8)

(23.4)

(9.0)

(3.0)

(99.7)

3.66

0.932

3.63

0.967

3.57

0.946

3.27

1.098

3.58

1.207

4.02

0.878

2.75

1.522

2.24

1.079

Part C is designed by means of differential vocabulary and gauged on the 5 point scale. If 3 or higher, it means that the answer is positive. In overall, the answers appeared to be 3 or higher, except for Questions C1 and C6. This

shows

that

the

students

had

rather

positive

perception

the

Arabic

people(Table 3).

Table 3) Students' perception on Arab people Item

1.00

2.00

3.00

4.00

5.00

Total

C.1

100

298

(%)

(3.3)

(31.1)

(33.4)

(29.1)

(2.7)

(99.7)

C.2

103

297

(%)

(3.0)

(30.1)

(27.1)

(34.4)

(4.7)

(99.3)

C.3

172

297

(%)

(0.7)

(5.7)

(14.7)

(57.5)

(20.7)

(99.3)

C.4

101

144

297

(%)

(0.7)

(6.0)

(33.8)

(48.2)

(10.7)

(99.3)

C.5

228

297

(%)

(1.7)

(18.1)

(76.3)

(99.3)

C.6

103

111

297

(%)

(2.7)

(34.4)

(37.1)

(24.1)

(1.0)

(99.3)

C.7

124

115

296

(%)

(0.7)

(14.0)

(41.5)

(38.5)

(4.3)

(99.0)

C.8

125

296

(%)

(0.7)

(14.7)

(32.1)

(41.8)

(9.7)

(99.0)

C.9

140

103

297

(%)

(0.7)

(14.0)

(46.8)

(34.4)

(3.3)

(99.3)

C.10

144

130

297

(%)

(0.7)

(2.3)

(4.7)

(48.2)

(43.5)

(99.3)

Mean

Variance

2.97

0.847

3.08

0.967

3.93

0.643

3.63

0.613

4.67

0.561

2.86

0.721

3.32

0.632

3,46

0.785

3.26

0.585

4.32

0.537

Part D was designed to study the cultural perception on the part of the surveyed. On the 5 point scale, the median lower than 3 would mean higher negative perception.

The analysis demonstrates that all 9 questions had the median point lower than 3. That

say

that

the

students

had

rather

negative

attitude

towards

Arab

culture(Table 4).

Table 4) Students' Attitude towards Arab culture Item

1.00

2.00

3.00

4.00

5.00

Total

D.1

110

298

(%)

(3.0)

(27.4)

(36.8)

(28.4)

(4.0)

(99.7)

D.2

135

298

(%)

(5.0)

(45.2)

(25.8)

(22.7)

(1.0)

(99.7)

D.3

121

298

(%)

(8.0)

(40.5)

(27.4)

(21.1)

(2.7)

(99.7)

D.4

139

298

(%)

(8.7)

(46.5)

(26.4)

(16.4)

(1.7)

(99.7)

D.5

106

298

(%)

(19.7)

(35.5)

(28.8)

(19.1)

(0.7)

(99.7)

D.6

146

298

(%)

(9.7)

(19.1)

(48.8)

(17.7)

(4.3)

(99.7)

D.7

126

298

(%)

(10.0)

(42.1)

(32.4)

(14.4)

(0.7)

(99.7)

D.8

102

104

298

(%)

(8.0)

(34.1)

(34.8)

(19.1)

(3.7)

(99.7)

D.9

127

298

(%)

(5.0)

(23.1)

(42.5)

(27.1)

(2.0)

(99.7)

Mean

Variance

2.97

0.844

2.69

0.832

2.70

0.959

2.56

0.854

2.53

0.990

2.88

0.921

2.53

0.782

2.76

0.950

2.98

0.787

Part E asked what kind of acts they would consider important in learning Arabic language. On the 5 point scale, the higher a score is the more important the student think it is. The students ranked the following as important part of learning; speaking, (4.24); culture(4.15);

listening(3.97);

vocabularies(3.76);

writing

(3.59);

reading(3.24):

grammar(3.12)(Table 5). Table 5) Importance of learning skills Skills

1.00

2.00

3.00

4.00

5.00

Total

Culture

139

296

(%)

(2.0)

(3.0)

(19.7)

(27.8)

(46.5)

(99.0)

Grammar

107

296

(%)

(7.4)

(21.4)

(35.8)

(21.1)

(13.4)

(99.0)

Reading

107

296

(%)

(5.7)

(17.4)

(35.8)

(27.8)

(12.4)

(99.0)

Speaking

102

146

296

(%)

(3.0)

(10.0)

(34.1)

(48.8)

(99.0)

Writing

103

296

(%)

(4.3)

(12.4)

(25.1)

(34.4)

(22.7)

(99.0)

Listening

112

109

296

(%)

(4.0)

(6.0)

(15.1)

(37.5)

(36.5)

(99.0)

Vocabulary

112

296

(%)

(3.0)

(9.4)

(22.4)

(37.5)

(26.8)

(99.0)

Mean

Variance

4.15

0.954

3.12

1.257

3.24

1.132

4.24

0.935

3.59

1.218

3.97

1.131

3.76

1.096

Part F was formulated to find out cultural materials which the students would like to study. It presents a total of 26 items and asks the surveyed to choose three materials from the given. The total frequency of the answers is 897 times but 14 times of no comment took place, thus reducing the total to 883 times. The

findings indicate

that

the

students would

study first

‘the

Isam

Civilization (105 times)’. It was followed by ‘tourist sites(95 times), ‘Arab countries and their relations to Korea(83 times)’, ‘politics and history(79 times)’, 'cuisine(74 times)’ and lastly by ‘Islam as religion(53 times)’.

2. Different Perceptions of Arab People and Arab Culture by Motivational Type The Regression Analysis was conducted to examine different types of motivation in their relation to different perception on Arab people and Arab culture. Herein Variable x1

refers

the

median

the

sum

integrative

motivation(B1,B2,B3,B4,B5,B6,B11,B12). Variable x2 signifies the median of the sum of instrumental motivation(B7,B8,B9,B10). Variable x3 means the median of the sum of foreign language requirement motivation(B13,B14). The findings from the analysis shows that all of the 9 questions gained P value higher

than

0.05,

which

means

different

types

motivation

not

produce

statistically significant differences in the students' perception on Arab people(Table 6).

Table 6) Students' perception and presumed equations by Motives Item C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9 C10

The

presumed equation

P value

                               

0.8267

                            

0.0518

                              

0.8550

                              

0.6438

                            

0.1149

analysis

the

relationship

between

motivational

0.4943

0.6738

0.1504

0.0991

0.1401

types

and

different

perceptions on Arab culture demonstrate that at the 0.05 significance level motivation was interconnected with Questions D7(P=0.0103), D8(P=0.0217), and D9(P=0.0004).

Concerning D7(Arab countries have dictators), the higher a specific motivation is, the higher

agreement

draws.

Regarding

D8(Arabs

are

extremist),

the

higher

integrative motivation is, the stronger disagreement it gains. By contrast the higher an instrument or a foreign language requirement motivation is, the higher agreement it draws.

About D9(Arabs and Koreans have few common points), higher integrative

or instrumental motivation means higher disagreement. Conversely a high motivation of foreign language requirement signifies high agreement(Table 7).

Table 7) Students' attitude and presumed equations by Motives Item D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9

Presumed equation

P value

                                               

0.0894

                           

0.9980

                               

0.0801

0.3443 0.5287

0.0986

0.0103**

                               

0.0217** 0.0004**

To examine whether a different type of motivation produced significant differences in terms of image perception of Arabs, the surveyed are divided into two groups, one with a given motivation and the other without a given motivation. Then the average images that they on Arabs were compared and put into a regression analysis. The findings show that the students with integrative motivation had higher median points than those students without. Those students with instrumental motivation showed higher median points that those without. On the contrary, those with foreign language requirement motivation showed lower median points that those without. However, in all these cases, P Value appeared to be higher than 0.05, which means statistically not significant(Table 8).

Table 8) Difference in students' preception of Arabs by motives

Integrative motivation

Mean

Frequency

3.4318182

0.3329327

Yes

3.5569343

274

0.4334537

3.4791667

0.4356254

Yes

3.5608871

248

0.4256484

Foreign language

3.5039683

126

0.4267835

requirement

Yes

3.5800000

170

0.4265730

Instrumental motivation

P value 0.1872 0.2261 0.1306

An analysis was also conducted on the relationship between motivational types and different perceptions on Arab culture. The surveyed were divided into two groups, one with a given motivation and the other without a given motivation. The findings show that those with integrative motivation had higher median values than those without. By contrast those with instrumental motivation showed lower median points than those without. Those with foreign language requirement motivation had lower median values than those without. P value of integrative and instrumental motivation turned out to be higher than 0.05 and not statistically significant. Yet, P Value of foreign language requirement reaches 0.0009, meaning that those with this motivation had more negative perception about Arab culture.(Table 9).

Table 9) Difference in students' attitude towards Arab culture by motives Mean

Frequency

2.6313131

1.7777778

Yes

2.7423510

276

2.6363131

Instrumental

2.7592593

0.4580273

Motivation

Yes

2.7293333

250

0.5253963

Foreign language

2.6202975

127

0.4948175

requirement

Yes

2.8187135

171

0.5139866

Integrative Motivation

P value 0.3308 0.7127 0.0009**

3. Relationship between future study plan, perception of Arab people and culture, and study motivation A regression analysis was done over those surveyed students who were grouped into the ones with a future plan to study on Arabs and those without. The analysis shows that those with a plan had more positive image about Arab people than those without. However, P value is a little bit higher than 0.05 and it does not mean statistically significant difference(Table 10).

Table 10) Students' perception of Arabs by future study plan Mean

Frequency

future plan to study

3.4784946

0.4432708

Arabic

Yes

3.5811881

202

0.4176963

P value 0.0553

It turns out to be the case that those with a future plan to study on Arabic showed higher median point than those without in terms of their perception on Arab culture. P value of the two groups's median stood at

0.0121, which means that those with a

plan had more positive understanding about Arab culture than those without(Table 11).

Table 11) Students' attitude towards Arab culture by future study plan Mean

Frequency

future plan to study

2.6224612

0.5396614

Arabic

Yes

2.7837691

204

0.4968065

P value 0.0121**

For this analysis of logistic regression, the Genmod methodology is chosen.

The Genmod analysis produces the following equation.

    : log                     





In this equation, x1 signifies the value of integrated motivation while x2 is that of the

instrumental

motivation

and

x3,

that

the

foreign

language

requirement

motivation. In this regression equation, with the integrative motivation set at “3”, P Value turned out to be 0.29711. Set at “4”, P Value went up to 0.66608. These figures can be taken to say that those students with integrative motivation had 2.24 times higher intention to study Arabic language on continuos basis than those without. All in all, these findings indicate that integrative motivation was important in leading students's plan to study Arabic. Therefore it can be said that Arab language teachers should be required to make persistent efforts to enhance the integrative motivation on the part of Arabic learners.

Ⅳ. Conclusion This research was conducted over the students who took Arabic language as a part

of liberal art course in the second semester of 2009. The students were surveyed concerning their study motivation and their perception on Arab people and Arab culture. A total of 299 students took part in the survey from 11 local universities, with 121 male students(40.5%) and 178 female students (59.5%). 204 of the surveyed students (68.2%) replied that 'they would have a plan to study Arabic language in the future'. The two of major motivations which drove the students to study Arabic are listed as follows; interests in other cultures including Arabic culture: to be able to speak Arabic upon their travel to the region. Motivations such as 'easy way to get credit' or 'to fulfill the graduation requirement' turned out to be relatively lower. The images that the surveyed had about Arab people were 'they are religious, traditional, not so clean and not so hard working’. On the five point scale, the vocabulary differential shows that the median of Arab people reaches 3.495, which means the students had relatively positive image about Arab people. In the meantime, 50% of the surveyed students are shown to think that ‘Arab houses are not more modern than those of Koreans; Arabs very much different from Koreans; most Arab countries have dictators. On the five point scale, the median proves to be 2.69, lower than 3, which shows relatively negative perception on the part of the students. The students list the following as crucial part of learning activities; speaking, (4.24); culture(4.15); listening(3.97); vocabularies(3.76); writing (3.59); reading(3.24): grammar(3.12). Also the student would like to study first ‘the Islam Civilization (105 times)’. It is followed by ‘tourist sites(95 times), ‘Arab countries and their relations to Korea(83 times)’, ‘politics and history(79 times)’, 'cuisine(74 times)’ and lastly by ‘Islam as religion(53 times)’ In terms of motivational types and their influence of producing different perceptions on Arab culture, the higher motivations, whether it be integrative, instrumental or foreign language requirement, meant the higher agreement. For example, to the question of 'Arab countries have dictators', P value was shown to be 0.0103. To the statement of 'Arabs are politically extremist', the higher integrative motivation meant the

higher

disagreement,

while

the

higher

instrumental

motivation

and

foreign

language requirement motivation meant the higher agreement(P value of 0.0217). To the statement of Arabs and Koreans have few common points, the higher integrative and instrumental motivation signified higher disagreement while the higher foreign language requirement means higher agreement(P value of0004). The analysis was also done on the motivational type and their influence upon image formation on Arab people and Arab culture. The surveyed were grouped into

those who had any motivation at all and those who had not. The median value was compared between the two and put into a regression analysis. The motivation type which

shows

statistically

significant

difference

foreign

language

requirement

motivation (P value of 0.0009). Those who had this type of motivation had more negative understanding towards Arab culture. The same analysis is done regarding the surveyed students' future plan to study Arabic language. It turns out that those with a plan took more positive attitude towards Arab culture than those without, in statistically significant sense. Lastly, for logistic regression, the Genmod method was chosen and applied in order to examine how different motivation types have on-going effect upon their plan to study Arabic on continuos basis. The regression equation which comes out from the analysis is; x1 referring to the median of the sum of integrative motivation; x2 the value of

instrumental motivation; and x3 that of foreign language requirement

motivation. All in all, the research outcome shows that the most crucial factor in leading the students to study on Arabic is integrative motivation whereas instrumental motivation also plays a certain role. On the contrary, foreign language requirement motivation is shown to have negative impact. This research is taken to confirm that the integrative motivation is the most crucial factor in letting students to stay on Arabic courses. This much having been said, it will

take

another

research

find

out

specific

ways

enhancing

integrative

motivation on the part of students.

References Oh,

Myung Geun,

Kong Ji-Hyun(2000),

Arabic Learners' Motivation and Their

Attitude toward Arab people and Arab cultures, Foreign Education J ournals. Ely, C. M.(1986), Language learning motivation: A descriptive and casual analysis. Modern Language Journal, 70, 1-27. Gardner, R. C. & Lambert, W. E.(1959). Motivational variables in second language acquisition, Canadian Journal of Psychology, 13, 266-272. Gardner, R. C. & Lambert, W. E.(1972). Attitudes and motivation in second language learning. Rowley, MA: Newbury. Hern?ndez,

T.(2006),

intermediate

Integrative

foreign

motivation

language

classroom,

predictor

Foreign

Language

sucess Annals,

the

39(4),

603-618. Horwitz, E. K.(1988), The Beliefs about language learning of beginning university

foreign language students. Modern Language Journal, 72, 283-294. Husseinali G.(2006), Who is studying Arabic and shy? a survey of Arabic students' orientations at a major University, Foreign Language Annals, 39(3), 395-412. Wen, X.(1997), Motivation and language learning with students of Chinese, Foreign Language Annals, 30(2), 235-251. Gardner R. C.(1985), â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;Attitude/Motivation Test Battery(AMTB)' http://publish.uwo.ca /ď˝&#x17E;gardner/docs/englishamtb.pdf

APPENDIX

Questionnaire

Part A: Student Background Information 1. Gender: a. Male

b. Female

2. Academic status: a. Freshman

b. Sophomore

c. Junior

d. Senior

3. Academic major: 5. TOTAL duration of Arabic studying before this course: a. 0 month c. 6months +1year

b. 3months +to 6months d. more than 1 year

6. Have you been to any Arab countries? a. Yes

b. No

7.Do you have any family member been to any Arab Country? a. Yes

b. No

8. Do you plan to continue to pursue Arabic study in the future? a. Yes

b. No

9. Write foreign languages other than Arabic you've learned until now.

Part B: Motivation Index I am taking Arabic courses: ( Put â&#x2C6;¨ in a proper blank.) stron

strong -ly agree 1 2 3

So I will be able to understand and appreciate Arabic art and literature. So I will be able to meet and converse with more various backgrounds. Because I want to learn more about other cultures to understand the world better.

Because of interests in Arab culture.

Because of interests in Islamic heritage.

Because of interests in Islam as a world religion.

7 8 9

people with

Because I feel Arabic is an important language in the economic development of the world. Because I feel Arabic will help me better understand the Middle East politics. Because it will help me better understand the problems that Arabs face.

10 Because I think it will be useful in getting me a good job. 11

Because I want to be able to use Arabic with Arabic-speaking friends.

agree

not

disag

gly

sure

ree

disag ree

Because I want to use Arabic when I travel to an Arabic

country. Because I need to study a foreign language as a requirement for

my degree.

14 Because I feel the class is less demanding than other courses.

C. Images of Arab people

( Put

Arabs are...

â&#x2C6;¨

in a proper blank.)

Arabs are...

not working hard

hardworking

violate

peaceful

materialistic

spiritual

polite

impolite

atheistic

religious

unclean

clean

dishonest

honest

not emotional

emotional

untrustworthy

trustworthy

modern

traditional

D. Perception towards Arab culture

( Put

â&#x2C6;¨

in a proper blank.) strongly agree

Arabs are poorer than Koreans.

Most of Arab peoples live in undeveloped areas.

Arab cities are less developed than Korean ones.

agree

not

dis-

strongly

sure

agree

dis-agree

Houses in Arab countries are not more modern than Korean houses.

Arabs are very much different from Koreans.

Koreans are more punctual than Arab people.

Most Arab countries have dictators.

Arabs are politically extremists.

Arabs and Koreans share few common points.

E. Important Ingredients in Learning Score the importance of every item in term of Arabic language learning, on the 5 point scale (1 = the least important, 5 = 1

most important). 2

Culture Grammar Reading Speaking Writing Listening Vocabulary

F. Culture Themes on desire Check just the three of the following cultural themes that you would like to study.

Themes

tourist spots

legends

traditional dance

leisure

family life

educational system

festivals

proverbs and maxims

how to write letters

table manners

the great men in history

food

literary works meanings

films body

languages

and

gestures

music and arts

politics and history

architecture

economy and geology

sports

Islam as a religion

Islam civilization

dating among youth marital customs relations between Arab countries and Korea

troubles and worries among the youth others

Discussion College Students' Motivation for Learning Arabic and Their Perception on Arab People and Arab Culture

Discussant : Moamen Hasan Al-Doraydi (Pusan University of Foreign Studies)

The author has excellently addressed crucial and important educational issue by addressing the studentsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; motivation for learning Arabic language and their perception on the Arab people and their culture, so as to find better ways to enhance learning motivation among students who study Arabic language as a liberal art subject. She successfully presented her study in an excellent way by carrying her survey through careful systematic and thorough skilful analysis of the data , reaching to a genius conclusion that integrative motivation is the most crucial factor that leads students to study Arabic language. Although this paper is not in the scope of my major , I found it very interseted full of useful informations , i would like to have the following suggestions : 1. The paper lacks historical background of similar or related studies if available , the paper

would have been more

interesting if

the

author

has mentioned some

differences and similarities between her survey and previously published related papers . 2. The questions No. 1, 2, 3 and 4 in the questionnaire in the appendex tabulated in table D page 15 , looks to me as repetition of one question in different forms. 3. 3. The items No. 10 & 20 & 21 in questionnaire in the appendex tabulated in table F page 16 , would look better if changed to economy & trade , and Q 10 & 20 are made one question i.e food and table manner. With my appreciations and best wishes to the author. Dr. Moamen Hasan 2010. 4. 26

Panel 2 Human Sciences (Literature/Philosophy) (Lilac Room) Chair : Ahn, Jae Won (Seoul National University)

1. What Place Does the "Hymns to the Gods" Occupy in the Plato's Republic? Kim, Heon (Seoul National Univeristy) Discussant : Lee, Wang Joo (Pusan National University) 2. How important are Hymns to the Gods on behalf of the City in Platoâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Laws? Thierry Grandjean (CARRA Research) Discussant : Lee, Wang Joo (Pusan National University) 3. Dimitris Dimitriadis / Michael Marmarinos : Dying as a Country Kyriaki Frantzi (Macquarie University) Discussant : Andreas Katonis (University of Aristotle[Thessaloniki]) 4. Triesteâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Literature as the Literature of Identity Crisis Kim, Hee Jung (IMS) Discussant : Yun, Jong Te (Pusan University of Foreign Studies) 5. Distorted Infancy and War Lim, Ju In (IMS) Discussant : Park, Hyo Young (Pusan University of Foreign Studies)

What Place Does the “Hymns to the Gods” Occupy in the Plato's Republic?

Kim, Heon (Seoul National University)

[1] This presentation is a part of the initial problem-posing for the cooperative study planned within the frame of international collaboration supported by HK Civilization Research Project. This collaboration is being headed by myself and Dr. Thierry Grandjean,

research

member

CARRA

(Centre

d'Analyse

des

Rhétoriques

Religieuses de l'Antiquité) at Strasbourg University in France. Our principal theme is what place Plato gives to the “Hymns to the Gods” in his two major works, Republic (Politeia) and Laws (Nomoi) including Epinomis which is regarded as the Laws' sequel but is not admitted as a genuine work of Plato. (The official title of our research is “A Study on the ‘Hymns to the Gods’ in Plato's Republic and Laws : Une Étude sur les hymnes aux dieux dans la République et les Lois de Platon) The

Republic is my principal text for this research, while the Laws is covered by Dr. Grandjean's.

Today's presentation is not the result, but rather the starting point, of our cooperative research, which began only recently on the first of March, 2009 and will continue over the next two years. Therefore, today we aim simply to announce our basic problems and to receive your advice about the direction and scope of our research. First, I will present the issues I have formulated about our subject and then Dr. Grandjean will present his own. [Finally, the students who assist the seminar on Plato's Republic in the department of Classical Studies will present their own.] It is my hope that we will receive many productive suggestions.

[2] Plato's Republic begins by inquiring about the nature of justice. In Book 1, Cephalos believes that justice is the discharging of all obligations (327c-331d). His son, Polemarchos, believes that justice is giving to each what is owed to friends and harm to enemies (331e-335e).

–

doing good

Finally, the sophist Thrasymachos

believes that justice is the advantage of the stronger (336b-354c). Socrates is critical in his refutation of all these definitions of justice. In Book 2, Plato's two brothers, Glaucon and Adeimantos question Socrates on the basis of the Thrasymachean

position.1) Socrates proposes to explore the nature of justice and injustice in the polis (city-state) and then in the individual. According to his proposition, their discussion is extended to the scale of the polis. My presentation today will be restricted to Book 2 of the Republic. In particular, I will focus on the brothers’ question and the first part of Socrates' response.

[3] In the beginning of Book 2, on the basis of Thrasymachos' opinion, Glaucon asks Socrates what kind of a good thing is justice. In fact, Glaucon wants to defend just lives and acts, and to believe that just lives and acts are good and profitable, but he needs a logical and theoretical base for confirming and realizing his hope. He expects a satisfactory answer from Socrates. Glaucon first separates good into three classes: a thing can be 1) good in itself, 2) good in itself and for its consequences, and 3) laborious and tiresome in itself but good only for its consequence. Socrates insists that justice is good in the second sense, while Glaucon believes that if justice is regarded as good, it is only in the third sense. From Glaucon’s position, the best thing is to do injustice and not be punished or retaliated against. On the contrary, the worst thing is to suffer injustice without being able to retaliate for the injustice. Generally, men are not able to remain in the best scenario while avoiding the worst one. Since they think it is better to avoid the two extreme situations than to find themselves in the worst situation, they agree to establish laws in order to prevent men from doing injustice and to punish the unjust. So what is called justice is effective only as a social contract or convention established

social

situations

through

agreement

among

society’s

members.

Therefore, when the social contract loses its constraining power, society’s members do not feel any need to do justice. As such, the reason why society’s members do justice is not for justice in itself. Since they are not able to do injustice without suffering punishment and retaliation inflicted by the power of social constraint, they cannot help doing justice even though justice in itself is no more than laborious. If there is one who could do injustice without suffering punishment and retaliation, then he would do injustice, when possible, instead of doing justice. In this case, if he practices justice, then he would be an object of mockery. If others praise him, it is not because they believe he is good and just, but because they fear that mockery will incite his anger and motivate him to new acts of injustice toward them. The perfectly unjust man is one who can practice injustice without being noticed

1) They may be the ideal persons for Socrates to talk to in comparison with Thrasymachos. Cf. Nickolas Pappas, Plato and the Republic, Routledge, London and New York, 1995, pp. 50-52.

by anyone. He can enjoy all the profits of injustice and the appearance of being just. Even if his unjust acts come to light, the perfectly unjust man would use his excellent rhetorical capacity to defend his acts and recover from the accusation. Others wouldn't believe he committed injustice, and he could either force his way by means of his courage and strength, or make use of his money and friends to maneuver out of danger. In a word, the perfectly unjust man is able to act above the law and other social conventions and constraints. In this case, he would be the true object of envy. On the contrary, imagine at his side a man who wants to be just but does not seem just. Let him only commit justice and, in truth, be just. Despite his just nature, this man appears to be unjust until the moment of his death. Because he appears to be unjust and suffers punishment, no one envies his life. Therefore, the most important distinction is not if he is actually just, but if he seems just. In reality, being regarded as a just and good man is far more important than being a just and good man. Where reputation in a given social condition is paramount, the problem of justice may be transferred from the ethical and philosophical dimension to the political and rhetorical dimension, for it would be related not to one's nature and character but to one's appearance and reputation in a social context. Lastly, Glaucon adds an interesting point. According to him, the unjust man profits from committing injustices. Since he is able to help his friends and harm his enemies, people prefer to befriend him and receive his aid, rather than be his enemies and suffer from his injustice. For fear of suffering his injustice, even his enemies may be motivated to become his friends. Moreover, his riches allow him to offer sacrifices and dedicate magnificent gifts to the gods in abundance. Therefore, he is likely to be dear to the gods, far dearer than the just are to the gods. And thus, both gods and men are said to unite in making the life of the unjust better than the life of the just. If this is the case in human life, how can we say that justice is good in itself and for the sake of its consequences? In this way Socrates has been challenged to provide an argument as to why justice is good in itself and can bring happiness to the one who has justice in his soul. He must also outline why justice is a good virtue in itself independent of any social condition, as opposed to a conventional virtue dependant on social reward and punishment

â&#x20AC;&#x201C;

fame and blame.

[4] Adeimantos, following Glaucon's questioning, asks Socrates to prove that justice is good in itself. He repeats Glaucon's argument that justice in itself is neither fundamentally good nor laudable. It can be good, he believes, only for the sake of social reputation. In other word, his position is that justice is respected only according

to social conventions and through the fear of social punishment, retaliation and censure, but never in itself. Justice can be praised only in social conditions in which men follow a social contract and establish laws in order to avoid harms caused by injustice. But what if the social conditions respecting justice are not valid? What if nobody praises justice and the just?

In such cases, there is no reason to do justice. Justice is not attractive if it cannot guarantee any social rewards, and far less attractive, in fact, if it is not good but only laborious in itself. According to Adeimantos, in order to fortify the power of social constraints against injustice, and to encourage men to support and exercise justice, parents and teachers are always telling the younger generation as well as the public that they are to be just and guaranteeing the appropriate reward and social reputation. Even if they do not enjoy such profits in this world, the just will certainly be

happy

the

world

below,

thanks

their

justice,

their

posterity

will

undoubtedly prosper. Parents and tutors add that the unjust, though prospering in this world, will be met with infamy and punishments after death in the next world. But such declarations and threats paradoxically reveal the tragic situation that justice is, in fact, dependent on social rewards and is not good in itself. Furthermore, some priests, mendicant prophets and poets attempt to persuade the public that anyone can be forgiven by the gods, for his own sins or his ancestor's sins, by sacrifices or charms to the gods and with rejoicings and feasts in honor of the gods. On the other hand, one who neglects sacrifices to the gods will inevitably meet with misfortune, because the gods will not like him. So for one who is just in reality but is not thought to be just, and who is not rich enough to give sacrifices to the gods, there is no profit but only pain and loss. However, one who is not in reality just but is thought to be just can acquire the reputation of justice by enjoying the profits produced by secret injustice. He can also avoid the gods' punishment by giving abundant sacrifices to them. Heavenly life is also promised to him, since the gods look favorably upon his sacrifices, charms, and feasts. If such is the case in this world, then who would want to be just? In reality, everyone would prefer to appear just while doing injustice rather than suffer the pain and loss involved in living a just life without recognition for it. Further, if there is one who chooses to do justice and to be just, it will be because he lacks the courage to commit injustice as he fears punishment. The man who chooses to be just does so because he feels helpless that he cannot commit injustice without being punished and retaliated against. The worst case is realized in that he would not gain a good reputation even though he practices justice. In such a situation, the most important course is not doing justice or being

just, but only being thought to be just and to act justly. Adeimantos’ reasoning raises a number of questions. If the gods love the unjust because they are rich and able to offer sacrifices, how can justice be accepted as good? Is it right to offer sacrifices to the gods and to glorify them for the sake of their tolerance and forgiveness of unjust acts? If the gods forgive injustice and love the unjust, and if they don't love the just who are poor and cannot offer sacrifices to the gods, are such gods worthy of being respected and praised?

[5] In response to the brothers' questions, Socrates must show that justice is good in itself. Without regard to social conditions, the just man must be good in himself, whereas the unjust man must be both bad in himself and harmed by his injustice. For Socrates, the point is not if one can be thought of as just or not, but if he can really be just or not without regard to any consequence. Therefore, justice is the object of ethics and philosophy related to reality and truth rather than an object to be considered merely from a rhetorical and socio-political dimension, for philosophy is the pursuit of the essence of a given object and ethical inquiries are related to the permanent character of a person. Rhetoric, on the other hand, is concerned with how to establish the opinion of a given object and the appearance of a person as an orator or speaker and how to persuade by means of verbal expression that such orator’s statements are true, real and credible. Even though rhetoric does not absolutely neglect truth and facts, and persuasion can be effectively achieved on the basis of truth, its principal function is nevertheless to make a credible and persuasive opinion and to present it effectively in the socio-political dimension. In response to Glaucon and Adeimantos, Socrates proposes: "Perhaps, then, there is more justice in the larger thing, and it will be easier to learn what justice is. So, if you're willing, let's first find out what sort of thing justice is in a polis, and, afterwards, look for it in the individual, observing the ways in which the smaller is similar

the

larger"(368e-369a).2)

After

this

proposition

accepted,

Socrates

explains why and how a polis can be established. His point is that "more plentiful and better-quality goods are more easily produced if each person does one thing for which he is naturally suited, does it at the right time, and is released from having to do any of the others."(370c) In this context, he insists upon the need of a systematic education program for raising guardians whose nature is suited to guard the polis. According to his argument, the education for the guardians need to be divided into two: physical training (gymnastikê) for their bodies, and music and poetry (mousikê)

2) J. M. Cooper’s translation (Complete Works, P lato, edited, with Introduction and notes, associate editor, D. S. Hutchison, Indianapolis, Hackett Pub., 1997).

for their souls. Within music and poetry stories (logoi) are included which are classified into two kinds, true and false. Guardians should be educated first in false stories (pseudos), or fabulous stories (mythos), so to speak. Since the children should not be allowed to hear just any old story, told by anyone, thereby internalizing any belief into their souls, it is necessary to supervise the storytellers (mythopoiois), and to select their stories whenever they are fine or beautiful and to reject them when they aren't. Socrates makes certain points specially bout gods. â&#x20AC;&#x153;It is appropriate for the founders to know the patterns on which poets must base their stories and from which they must not deviate.â&#x20AC;?(378e-379a)

1) Poets should not paint a bad image of a god. Instead, they must pass over any bad aspect of a god in silence, even if it were true, as far as they can. 2) They should not tell a falsehood about a god. But the gods must always be represented as they are.

It seems there is a contradiction between the two points suggested by Socrates. But since any bad image of a god is not true and is falsehood, when a poet tells the truth about a god, he cannot represent the god with a bad image. So the two points can be synthesized into one pattern. In Socratic concept,

a) Gods are always good and are not harmful, and therefore can neither harm nor anything bad, so they cannot be the cause of anything bad. b) On the contrary, Gods are beneficial and the cause of doing well. So any bad image of the gods is always meant as a falsehood, while any good image of the gods is regarded as truth. c) A god and what belongs to him are in every way the best condition. d) Since gods are the most beautiful and best possible beings, it seems that each god always and unconditionally retains his own shape.

Thus all

the

stories

telling of

metamorphoses

the

gods

are

regarded as

blasphemes against them. Socrates concludes: "You agree, then, that this is our second pattern for speaking of composing poems about the gods: They are not sorcerers who change themselves, nor do they mislead us by falsehoods in words or deeds."(383a) With this concept of the gods, Socrates claims to eliminate considerable parts of

Homer's epics, as well as nearly all Greek literary works on the grounds that they could affect the children's soul. To such a claim, a question would be immediately raised: is a society without any literary works such as Homer’s, truly desirable? Couldn't we respect the value of Homeric works without refusing the platonic philosophy? And in relation to ancient Greek mythology and religion, we can find a serious distinction between the images of the gods described by Glaucon and Adeimantos and the concept of the gods as defined by Socrates.3) Despite this difference, how can the two brothers accept the Socratic concept of the gods? Furthermore, according to the Socratic concept of the gods, it seems irrational in the ideal polis either to celebrate in glorious hymns or to make painful but magnificent sacrifices to the gods, for they are self-sufficient in the best conditions and are not susceptible to influence by human sacrifices and hymns. Hymns and Praise consist in positively interpreting and expressing a negative aspect of a given object, and magnifying and embellishing its ordinary or good aspects to a heightened degree. So the gods are meaningful for human beings and other things in this world in that each has its own faults and negative aspects. But what is the significance of human praise and hymns to the gods, in the condition that the gods are perfect without any fault, and in the best conditions without any negative aspect? Men's greatest and best praises and hymns to the gods aren't more than a description of the facts and reality regarding the gods. But in most cases, because of human being’s epistemological and verbal imperfection, it is more probable for men to imperfectly describe the gods instead of depicting the gods in their perfection. Therefore, most praises to the gods could be proven blasphemies rather than hymns. So is it conceptually possible to praise and compose hymns for the gods? Even though Socrates insists that poets should describe the gods as they are, how can his demand be realized by the human poets, and how can founders of a polis know whether the poets describe the gods as they are or not? What human verbal performance can be praise to the gods? Could a prayer to the gods expressing thanks and hope and asking forgiveness be regarded as praise to the gods? Could a confession in the presence of the gods about one's weakness and sinfulness

communication

considered possible

kind

between

the

praise

gods

and

the

gods?

human

Further,

beings?

how

such

communication can be possible by priests or poets, how can they obtain and keep this divine ability to communicate with the gods? From the rhetorical point of view, what sort of influences can their praises to the gods have on the public? Especially in the

Cf.

Macé,

La République

Platon, Bréal, 2000, pp. 11-12. “Socrate est accuse devant

l’assemblée des citoyens d’introduire de nouveaux dieux et de corrompre la jeunesse.”

frame of the just polis designed by Socrates, what sort of role can their praises to the gods play to all the social classes in the polis?

[6] Now our collaborative research has just begun. In the course of examining other scholars' findings, we will elaborate on todayâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s questions more precisely. Some questions may become redundant, as appropriate answers have already been provided. Other questions may become invalid by nature, as fitting solutions to them are given in Plato's Dialogues themselves. Other questions may be anachronistic ones that need not be answered in Plato's works and his philosophy. Instead, in the course of our collaboration, we will find radically new questions rife with significance. We also expect to contribute to the research on Plato's philosophy and his idea on rhetoric, and furthermore to provide research on Greek literature and history that constitute the background for Plato's thought. At least, we hope that this collaborative research will help us to extend the horizon of our thought and life, and to develop the scientific quality demanded of classical scholars.

Discussion What Place Does the â&#x20AC;&#x153;Hymns to the Godsâ&#x20AC;? Occupy in the Plato's Republic?

Discussant : Lee, Wang Joo (Pusan National University)

I would summarize some points described in this paper and then ask the speaker two questions. Firstly, the speaker follows up Glaucon's logic that the justice is regarded as good for its consequences, and the point is not to be just but to seem to be just. The unjust would be the winner in the end, because he gets the love of gods by sacrifices and magnificent gifts and the heart of people by his richness. Secondly, this paper traces the questions of Adeimantos advances and deepens those of Glaucon in the dimension of the sociology. His question could be condensed as "If the gods forgive injustice and love the unjust, and if they don't love the just who are poor and can't offer sacrifices to the gods, are such gods worthy of being respected and praised?" Thirdly, the speaker treats Socrates' answers and responses to these questions and opinions. But his way is not direct, and seems to be deviated at the first sight, for he leaps into arguing the system and foundations of polis abruptly. His question is 'what is the justice in polis?' or 'what is the justice of polis?' He insists the importance of education and training children, especially prospective guardians in the process of discussion.

Socrates

argues

the

conditions

constraining

the

contents

and

curriculums in the educations. In this context, the stories and works of the poets should be under supervising of polis because it is impossible for the human being to describe the reality of the gods.

As a reviewer, I would ask two questions. 1. Without sufficient reason, the discussions about the definition of justice leap to discourses on the education of guardians, praise and hymn of gods.

There seems

to be a logical gap between two needs some explanations. Is there any reason for this?

2. According to this essay, the praise and hymn for something are equal to the describing of something (p. 6) From this presupposition, it concludes "Therefore, most praises to the gods could be proven blasphemies rather than hymns."(p.6). Is a description of an art the same as a representation

of a fact? Could this kind of

assertion be justified? If so, on what grounds?

I want to add some relevant remarks on this topic. This essay remind me of the longest war between the poet and the philosopher since Plato's old Geek. Of course, Aristotle had tried to conciliate philosophy and literature in two strategies. Firstly, he discussed the role of the poet and the function of catharsis in purifying the soul of man in the context of the philosophy. Secondly, he diverted conflicts, from between the philosophy and the literature to between the history and the literature. But to use his language, as one swallow can not make spring, one philosopher can not stop the longest fight I believe these dynamic tensions stem from this situation have done good for two camps in the long history of humanities.

I would add another point. I learned many things from this fine paper and was happy during reading and writing. The reviewer thanks the speaker for this.

“How important are Hymns to the Gods on behalf of the City in Plato’s Laws ?”

Thierry Grandjean (CARRA Research)

In Plato’s Laws, three speakers talk about the superior constitution (politeia) during their pilgrimage on the island of Crete. As they live in cities celebrated for their constitutions and laws, they are all specialists in politics: first of all the Athenian Stranger, whose name isn’t given, but who can’t be Socrates himself, since the great philosopher always used to live in Athens; another speaker is Megillus, an ordinary citizen of Sparta, and the third is a Cretan lawgiver from Knossos, named Clinias. They intend to found a city not only theoretically, but actually: Clinias says that he has to lay down laws on a new Cretan colony, which will be called Magnesia (the city of the Magnetes). Therefore Clinias needs the Stranger’s help. They propose laws for this new city. Their plans are different from those presented in the Republic: they want to be altogether founders, lawgivers, citizens and the governing class. Hence their visions for Magnesia look more ambitious and concrete. In this new foundation for Magnesia, the issue at stake is the part which will be allowed to the hymns to gods. Because the goal of the legislation is complete virtue, the lawgivers seem to be very strict about the hymns to the gods in every respect. After defining education (paideia) in Book 1, the three speakers discuss in Book 2 the importance of choirs in education, and particularly the importance of the Dionysiac choir of old men: the Athenian Stranger decrees that old men sing hymns to Dionysus (666). Thus the old citizens of the new city of Magnesia have no choice and have to participate in the Dionysiac cult. In

Book

the

speakers

review

the

history

mankind

and

the

different

constitutions of Greek cities in order to discover the origin of constitutions. Poets are presented as a poetic tribe, “divinely inspired in its chanting” and thus, hymns are related to divine inspiration. After stigmatizing the different constitutions of Troy, Dorians

and

Persia,

the

Athenian

Stranger

criticizes

government of Athens, which Plato calls a theatrocracy.

the

chaotic

grassroots

The reason he gives is that

from the very beginning, music was divided among Athenians into various styles: one class of songs included the prayers to the gods which bore the name of hymns (700b), contrasted with the class called dirges (threnoi). Since licentiousness was

growing and progressed throughout Athens, its poets mixed dirges with hymns (700d). It was then that lawlessness appeared. Hence, the Athenian constitution cannot be considered as the best possible model for their new city. The first part of Laws concludes at this point. According to Luc Brisson and Jean-François Pradeau’s commentary, the first part, composed of the first three books, deals with the purpose of the legislation and the different constitutions. The second part, composed of the last nine books, is concerned with the constitution of the virtuous city. In Book 7, the lawgivers propose to imitate the Egyptians, who “ordain what hymn is to be sung at each of the religious sacrifices” (799a), in order to avoid the intrusion of new hymns. Thus, all the citizens of Magnesia will have to “dedicate each of the hymns to their respective gods. And if anyone suggests other hymns besides these for any gods, the priests and priestesses (tous hiereas te kai tas

hiereias)” will expel them from the feast, according to religion and law. Consequently, Plato’s laws are very strict and the new city is like a totalitarian state, according to the philosopher Karl Popper’s thesis on open society. Moreover, the Athenian Stranger wants to supervise the hymns of the poets, because they can’t “discern very well what is good and what is not” (800b). That’s why he forbids the poets to compose illegal hymns or “to show their compositions to any

private

person

until

they

have

been

shown

the

judges

and

the

Law-wardens (nomophulakes). Next to these, it will be most proper to sing hymns and praise to the gods” (801d). Further, the use of hymns in education is strictly supervised. Children have to sing the good hymns, and are not allowed to sing the bad ones (812). In Plato’s Laws, the problem concerning hymns to the gods is how to create the best constitution in order to found a virtuous city for the citizens of Magnesia. What kind of rules and regulations will the lawgivers define to allow or forbid the hymns to the gods? We will demonstrate how the hymns of the poets are supervised in order to protect and save the new city. In a first part, we will study the reasons why religious choirs and hymns to the gods have become a necessity for Greek education in all cities and in Magnesia as well. Then we’ll consider how to define the best conception of the hymns to the gods for the new city, in order to avoid the bad ones and to imitate the good ones. In a third part, we will survey the rules and regulations the lawgivers of Magnesia decree in order to impose the best conception of hymns to the gods.

Why Choirs and Hymns to the Gods have become a Paradigm in Greek Paideia The three lawgivers’ purpose is to found a concrete city based on moral values. Whereas Clinias and Megillus think that lawgivers enact laws with an eye on some fraction of virtue (like courage), the Athenian Stranger exhorts them to lay down laws with a view to virtue as a whole (630e), including temperance. But enacting laws to make people temperate is difficult. In order to control pleasures, lawgivers must establish a proper education. The Athenian Stranger defines education (paideia) generally as “the goodness that first comes to children” (653b), then more accurately as “the part of [goodness] that is rightly trained in respect of pleasures and pains, so as to hate what ought to be hated, right from the beginning up to the very end, and to

love

what

ought

loved”

(653b-c).

Unfortunately,

“these

forms

child-training, which consist in right discipline in pleasures and pains, grow slack and weakened to a great extent in the course of men's lives; so the gods, in pity for the human race thus born to misery, have ordained the feasts of thanksgiving as periods of respite from their troubles; and they have granted them as companions in their feasts the Muses and Apollo the master of music, and Dionysus, that they may at least set right again their modes of discipline by associating in their feasts with gods” (653c-d). The Athenian’s argument is clear: religious feasts can contribute to education because they’re organized in association with the gods devoted to the Muses (Apollo, Dionysus and the nine Mnemosyne’s daughters). But since children overwhelmingly can’t keep their bodies quiet and always move and utter noises, they need to be controlled in their movements and utterances. That’s why “to men the very gods, who were given (…) to be our fellows in the dance, have granted the pleasurable perception of rhythm and harmony, whereby they cause us to move and lead our choirs, linking us one with another by means of songs and dances; and to the choir they have given its name from the “cheer” implanted therein” (653e-654a). Thus choir-training (khoreia), which combines song (ôdê) and dance (orkhêsis), becomes the paradigm of education1) : it forms bodies by dances, as it forms souls by songs, and it makes use of music. Therefore the Athenian proves the importance of music embracing both song and dancing in moral education. He can conclude that “the uneducated man is without choir-training (apaideutos … akhoreutos), and the educated man fully choir-trained” 654a-654b): paideia is synonymous with khoreia. But “inasmuch as choric performances are representations of character, exhibited in actions and circumstances of every kind” (655d), some of these performances are 1) Brisson, in Platon, Les Lois, livres I à VI, éditions Flammarion, Paris, 2006, note 16, page 351.

excellent and can be extolled, whereas some others are bad and cannot be praised. Hence it is necessary to fix some rules and impose them on everybody. That’s why the Athenian recommends the Egyptian model for the laws of Magnesia: many thousand years ago, the Egyptians “determined on the rule of [the Muses], that the youth of a State should practise in their rehearsals postures and tunes that are good: these they prescribed in detail and posted up in the temples, and outside this official list it was, and still is, forbidden to painters and all other producers of postures and representations to introduce any innovation or invention, whether in such productions or in any other branch of music, over and above the traditional forms” (656d-e). Egyptian

lawgivers

decided

impose

every

child

only

the

performances

acknowledged as good for the State and public morals. There is no place for freedom and innovation: everybody must follow the tradition, which protects the State against immorality. Such safety is sought for the new city of Magnesia. Consequently

the

Athenian

emphasizes

the

necessity

for

the

whole

the

community to “use exactly the same language, so far as possible, about [the Muses], alike in their songs, their tales, and their discourses” (664a). Thus the best way to ensure the unity of thought amongst the citizens is to draw up an official list of authors and musical forms. Further, the Athenian decides to establish three choirs for the education of children: he maintains that the three choirs “must enchant (epaidein) the souls of the children, while still young and tender, by rehearsing all the noble [discourses]” (664b). The word epaidein means “to utter an incantation” and refers to the power of music, which is a medicine of the soul, like Apollon the Healer (P aiôn), patron of the Muses and celebrated by Peans. Here are the three choirs recommended by the Athenian: the Muses’ choir of children; the second choir, “of those under thirty, invoking Apollo Paian as witness of the truth of what is said, and praying him of grace to persuade the youth; the third choir, of those over thirty and under sixty; and lastly, there were left those who, being no longer able to uplift the song, shall handle the same moral themes in stories and by oracular speech” (664c-d). According to the Athenian’s recommendations, each choir of Magnesia will be associated with a proper god: for the children the Muses, owing to their importance for the first education, which is based on music; for the young person Apollo, probably because Apollo is the Musagetes, who leads the Muses, as the older lead the children by persuasion; for the mature ones Dionysus. These gods will be the companions of the choristers. But Clinias would like to know why Magnesia needs a Dionysiac choir of old men dancing in honor of that god (665b). Thus the Athenian relies on their

—

agreement: “That it is the duty of every man and child

bond and free, male and

female,

(epaidousan)

—

and

the

duty

the

whole

State,

charm

themselves

unceasingly with the chants we have described, constantly changing them and securing variety in every way possible, so as to inspire the singers (aidousin) with an insatiable appetite for the hymns (humnôn) and with pleasure therein” (665c). For the very first time, the speakers use the word humnos meaning “hymn”, even though they allude to the hymns, every time they tell about the songs of choristers. Now amongst all the hymns “the noblest and most useful” (665d) are the songs in honor

—

of Dionysus and the old persons are “the best element in the State,

that which by

age and judgment alike is the most influential it contains”, and “might do most good” by singing the noblest songs” (¬¬665d). Therefore, since the old men are reluctant to sing hymns owing to their age, the three lawgivers have to compel them to sing hymns to Dionysus, because Dionysus’ wine is recommended to them: wine is the best way to encourage them to take readily to singing. When they have reached the age of forty, they must invoke Dionysus during the convivial gatherings and drink wine, which is for mankind “a medicine potent against the crabbedness of old age” (666b): thus they renew their youth and become less ashamed “to sing chants and incantations” (666c). Then the old men will have to teach music to the other citizens and the poets of Magnesia. At the end of Book 2, the place of hymns in the new city is clearly exposed: hymns to the gods consist in the songs performed by the three different choirs and become very important for musical education conceived as the paradigm of moral education and as a part of Greek paideia, thus essential for political life. This place of hymns doesn’t seem quite original, even though Clinias and Megillus wonder: three choirs performing songs existed at Spartan festivals, where three choirs, of boys, young men and older men, used to sing. Neither are hymns to these gods original: amongst the thirty three Homeric Hymns Greek pepaideumenoi used to read two “Hymns to Apollo”, one “Hymn to the Muses” (and another in Hesiod’s Theogony), three “Hymns to Dionysus”2) : each of these deities was celebrated at least in one

Homeric Hymn before Plato wrote Laws. But the originality of Plato’s ideas is that the citizens of Magnesia are obliged to sing hymns to gods in a choir until the age of sixty. Another original feature of Plato’s conception is the use of incantation (epôidê) to enforce more strictly the obligation to take part in a choir. Moreover, each god devoted to a choir seems to be chosen according to a symbolic conception: the Muses personify the musical education, which the children learn at first. Apollo leads the Muses, like adults educate and command children; Apollo is the Healer, like the older use incantations to persuade children. And Dionysus seems to symbolize the eagerness which renews men’s youth, the strength of human spirit. 2) Jean Humbert, in Homère, Hymnes, ed. C.U.F., Paris, 1959.

Now that the place of hymns to the gods is exposed and their use is needed, the three lawgivers have to define more precisely the important concept of hymn. Its definition is found at the end of Book 3, where the speakers study the origin and vicissitudes of the historical constitutions. This survey of Spartan, Athenian and Persian politeiai allows them to discern the good constitutions from the bad ones and to discriminate between their successes and shortcomings. They aim at defining the best conception of hymns to the gods for the new city, in order to avoid the bad ones and to recommend the good ones.

How to define the best Conception of Hymns to the Gods for the new City The study of the Athenian constitution proves that the excessive liberty granted to the citizens of Athens is harmful to the polis. The Athenian Stranger discerns a discrepancy between the political condition at the time of the dialogue and the period when the Athenians “were, so to say, voluntary slaves to the laws” (700a). The speaker tells about the laws dealing with the music of the past, and surveys the different musical forms: “Among [the Athenians], at that time, music was divided into various classes and styles: one class of song was that of prayers to the gods, which bore the name of ‘hymns’; contrasted with this was another class, best called ‘dirges’ (threnoi); ‘paeans’ formed another; and yet another was the ‘dithyramb’, named, I fancy, after Dionysus. ‘Nomes’ also were so called as being a distinct class of song; and these were further described as ‘citharoedic nomes’. So these and other kinds being classified and fixed, it was forbidden to set one kind of words to a different class of tune” (700a-b). The dichotomy between humnos and the four other musical forms allows us to define precisely the hymn to the gods. The peculiar features of humnos are the following:

1) It’s a special genre of song (ôidês), 2) consisting in prayers to the gods (eukhai), 3) contrary to the class called ‘dirges’, which contrasts implicitly exaltation with prostration, 4) listed among four genres of songs performed to celebrate a deity or a human being, therefore included in the encomiastic genre.

According to Luc Brisson and Jean-François Pradeau3), a hymn was a poem

3) Luc Brisson and Jean-François Pradeau, in Platon, Les Lois, livres I à VI , Paris, GF, 2006, note 128, p. 377.

performed in honor of the gods, (5) accompanied by the lyre, but (6) without any choreography. Next, there are the fifth and the sixth peculiar features of the hymn to the gods. Barbara Cassin4) still adds other characteristics: “hymns are the old, religious songs in monodic form, most of the time written in dactylic hexameter, sung in former times by one singer. (…) They’re characterized by the invocation to the gods”. That precise definition provides four more features:

7) the archaic feature of that conception of the hymn to the god, 8) the monodic music, the opposite of polyphonic music, whenever there is just one melody (monophony), 9) the versification (dactylic hexameter), 10) the presence of invocation to the gods (a characteristic of the prayer)5).

That conception of the archaic hymn is corroborated by another important passage from Plato’s Laws: “Next to these, it will be most proper to sing hymns (humnoi) and praise (egkomia) to the gods, coupled with prayers (eukhais); and after the gods will come prayers (eukhai) combined with praise (egkomiôn) to daemons and heroes, as is befitting to each” (801d-e). In that rule, hymns are clearly performed first and only in honor of gods, and then only “after the gods” prayers are said to daemons and heroes, but for them no hymns are sung. Moreover, hymns are distinguished from egkomion, which is defined as “a choral song reserved for the symposion”6) ; but, even during the symposia, hymns could be sung, provided they deal with a deity, like in Plato’s Symposion, where a hymn to Eros is performed. After defining the hymns to the gods and studying their peculiar features, the three lawgivers compare the different constitutions: all of them deserve blame for their shortcomings, including the Athenian one, so that their musical performances cannot be imitated. The Athenian Stranger stigmatizes Athens because musical rules from the past are now transgressed: “later on, with the progress of time, there arose as leaders of unmusical illegality poets who, though by nature poetical, were ignorant of what was just and lawful in music; and they, being frenzied and unduly possessed by a spirit of pleasure, mixed dirges with hymns and paeans with dithyrambs, and

4) Barbara Cassin, in Encyclopaedia Universalis, thesaurus volume III, s. v. «hymne», p. 2631. We translate the quotation from French to English. 5) Laurent Pernot, « Hymne en vers ou hymne en prose ? », in L’hymne antique et son public, textes réunis et édités par Y. Lehmann, Turnhout, Brepols, 2007, p. 169, lays stress upon the technical meaning of humnos in grammatical and rhetorical treatises: it’s a “praise of God, including, with the praise, some elements of address, invocation and prayer”. 6) Luc Brisson and Jean-François Pradeau, in Platon, Les Lois, livres VII à XII, Paris, GF, 2006, note 62, p. 306.

imitated flute-tunes with harp-tunes, and blended every kind of music with every other” (700d). The musical rules of the Athenians are broken because the poets, compared with Bacchants owing to their ecstasy, combined humnoi with thrênoi: indeed, the author of the first Hymn to Aphrodite had already mixed hymn with Trôs’ dirge (v. 207-216) in the seventh century, but lamentations justify divine providence and goodness. As a matter of fact, the Athenian Stranger, as Plato’s spokesman, aims at blaming the moral and political decline, since demagogy pervaded the city of Athens, because the speaker says, “through their folly, [the poets] unwittingly bore false witness against music, as a thing without any standard of correctness, of which the best criterion is the pleasure of the auditor, be he a good man or a bad. By compositions of such a character, set to similar words, they bred in the populace a spirit of lawlessness in regard to music, and the effrontery of supposing themselves capable of passing judgment on it” (700e). According to Greek historians,

demagogy

appears

Athens

with

Cleon,

under

Pericles’

strategies.

Consequently, amongst the poets who mixed hymns with dirges to please the Athenian audience, there was Euripides: in the tragedy The Trojan Women, he makes the Chorus sing: “Sing me, Muse, a tale of Troy, a funeral dirge in strains unheard as yet, with tears; for now I will uplift for Troy a piteous chant, telling how I met my doom and fell a wretched captive to the Argives by reason of a four-footed beast that moved on wheels, when Achaea's sons left at our.gates that horse, loud rumbling to the sky, with its trappings of gold and its freight of warriors” (v. 512-521). Euripides combined the hymn to the Muse, invoked by the Chorus after the sacking of Troy, with the dirge (aeison en dakruois ôidan epikêdeion): the poet emphasizes that audacious combination by using the formula “a funeral dirge in strains unheard as yet” (kainôn humnôn): an unprecedented hymn, indeed, written in 415. Now that the Athenian demos is flattered by demagogues and the excessive liberty increases, the Athenian Stranger blames the theatrocracy of the city: “Hence the theater-goers became noisy instead of silent, as though they knew the difference between good and bad music, and in place of an aristocracy in music there sprang up a kind of base theatrocracy. For if in music, and music only, there had arisen a democracy of free men, such a result would not have been so very alarming; but as it was, the universal conceit of universal wisdom and the contempt for law originated in the music, and on the heels of these came liberty. For, thinking themselves knowing, men became fearless; and audacity begat effrontery” (700e-701a). The hapax legomenon “theatrocracy”, formed after and from “democracy”, emphasizes the power of the audience. The Athenian Stranger found the origin of the perverted constitution in the attitude toward the musical rules. That confirms the importance of

musical education and hymns to the gods. Now the three lawgivers know exactly the best conception of humnos and its peculiar

features.

They

have

understood

the

necessity

rejecting

the

bad

constitutions whereby excessive liberty is granted to people (in Athens) or excessive despotism reduces a nation to slavery (in Persia). On the contrary, they realized that the good constitutions, like Athens of the past and Egypt, impose musical rules on people, forbid any innovation in the field of the Muses and provided for penology. Therefore we have to survey the rules and regulations the lawgivers of Magnesia decree in order to impose the best conception of hymns to the gods.

Which Rules the Lawgivers fix to foster Hymns to the Gods in the City of Magnesia First of all, as we have seen, they decide that almost the whole population of the city is concerned with musical rules from childhood. They establish three choirs (of boys, of young men, of older): each chorister must sing hymns to gods (respectively to the Muses, to Apollo, to Dionysus). Then the three lawgivers consider that the Egyptian model is the best paradigm for the

musical

rules

they

have

fix

Magnesia.

That’s

why

they

decide

“consecrate all dancing and all music. First, they should ordain the sacred feasts, by drawing up an annual list of what feasts are to be held, and on what dates, and in honor of what special gods and children of gods and daemons; and they should ordain next what hymn is to be sung at each of the religious sacrifices, and with what dances each such sacrifice is to be graced; these ordinances should be first made by certain persons, and then the whole body of citizens, after making a public sacrifice to the Fates (Moirai) and all the other deities, should consecrate with a libation these

—

ordinances

dedicating each of the hymns to their respective gods and divinities. And

if any man proposes other hymns or dances besides these for any god, the priests and priestesses will be acting in accordance with both religion and law when, with the help of the Law-wardens, they expel him from the feast; and if the man resists expulsion, he shall be liable, so long as he lives, to be prosecuted for impiety by anyone who chooses” (799a-b). These rules deal with the sacred calendar (as it exists in Athens), the kind of hymn proper to each religious sacrifice (as the hymn to Dionysus before the theatrical performances of the Dionysia), and the penology in order to punish with banishment anyone for innovation in hymnology: only that last rule on hymns seems to be unknown to the Athenians in Plato’s time. The reason why Plato recommends the Egyptian model can be explained by the necessity of

preventing everyone from changing musical rules, foundation of the city. Finally, the three lawgivers fix several rules to complete their legislation on hymns: they issue a decree forbidding transgression of musical prescription (800a). Then they impose a law in order to compel all choristers to sing hymns “which are altogether in all respects auspicious (euphêmon)” (801a) but never blasphemous. Further, they fix a law forbidding poets to “request a bad thing as though it were a good thing” (801b). Therefore, the poets have to “compose nothing which goes beyond the limits of what the State holds to be legal and right, fair and good” (801c), because, according to the Athenian Stranger, the poets cannot discern exactly what is good and what not. That’s the reason why those artists must be given a model (tupos, 801c), whereby copies are made, or a mold (ekmageion, 801d), which is a seal used as model to make some form or print. The poets’ inability explains also why they mustn’t show their works “to any private person until they have first been shown to the judges appointed to deal with these matters, and to the Law-wardens, and have been approved by them” (801d). Thus the poets must be controlled by the judges and must abide by the laws fixed in the city. At last, a committee is charged to examine, among the compositions of the ancients, some fitting old pieces of music, and likewise dances, and to make a selection (802a-b). Plato’s purpose is to establish an official list of authors of hymns, and to give the citizens of Magnesia the best musical education. After all, the laws on hymns and Music as a whole are closely related. Indeed, Plato uses nomoi in different senses (“laws” and “nomes”) and plays on these words.

Nomos is a musical form: “ “Nomes” also were so called as being a distinct class of song; and these were further described as “citharoedic nomes.” (700b)”; they were solemn chants sung by the cithara or lyre. A nome, written by Timotheus of Miletus about the Battle of Salamis and entitled “The Persians”, has been preserved. In Book 4, Plato plays on these words: “yet it is only recently that we have begun, as it seems, to utter laws, and what went before was all simply preludes to laws. What is my object in saying this? It is to explain that all utterances and vocal expressions have preludes and tunings-up (as one might call them), which provide a kind of artistic preparation which assists towards the further development of the subject. Indeed, we have examples before us of preludes, admirably elaborated, in those prefixed to that class of lyric ode called the “nome,” and to musical compositions of

—

every description. But for the “nomes” (i.e. laws) which are real nomes

—

we designate “political”

and which

no one has ever yet uttered a prelude, or composed or

published one, just as though there were no such thing” (722d-e). According to the Athenian, whereas musical nomoi contain preludes (prooimia), which testify the

singer’s skills and virtuosity, the three lawgivers must conceive preludes for their political nomoi as well: songs and hymns are constantly a paradigm of paideia, including politics and legislation. Our survey proves the importance of songs and particularly hymns to the gods on behalf of the concrete city in Plato’s Laws. The three lawgivers realized that hymns to the gods constitute the foundation of the city. While Athenian poets pleased the uneducated people by combining different musical forms and allowed them to criticize theatrical performances, excessive liberty perverted Athens. Therefore the lawgivers of the new city of Magnesia have to fix some musical rules to compel the whole population from childhood until the age of sixty to sing hymns to the gods as choristers. For choral music is the paradigm of education. Even nomoi are performed by singing, as Plato often alludes to preludes. Hymns both celebrate gods and moral values. Hymns can heal by incantations and persuasion. Even though the lawgivers draw up an official list of authors of hymns, poets can be inspired and create songs, but are controlled by the judges of Magnesia, because they have to respect the Gods recommended in the city. In Plato’s Laws, the hymns to the gods reflect a conception of Gods based on goodness, benevolence and salvation: the Muses, Apollo and Dionysus provide for education, entertainment and strength. The rules on hymns are not all original: Plato takes existing legislations into consideration. Preserving virtue as a whole in the new city is uppermost in his mind.

Thierry GRANDJEAN (University of Strasbourg

–

FRANCE)

Pusan International Conference (2010)

In collaboration with Heon KIM (Seoul National University)

Dimitris Dimitriadis / Michael Marmarinos:Dying as a Country

Kyriaki Frantzi (Macquarie University)

The aim of this paper is to discuss selected aspects of Michael Marmarinos’ 2007 staging of the Greek novel Dying as a country, written by Dimitris Dimitriadis in 1978. In the process of the analysis, apart from presenting the novel and the performance in brief, I firstly reflect briefly on contemporary theatrical adaptations of literary works in Greece and elsewhere; and secondly I focus on the representation of the theme of displacement in this particular play, in situated time and space, and through the employment of creative means, mainly external to the literary prototype. Overall, the performance is approached as a composition of chronotopes, in which various forms of displacement tackled in the novel are both grounded and further contextualized.

Introduction Adaptation of literary works is a very common practice in modern experimental theatre and cinema. Although objections to unsuccessful adaptations raise issues of betrayal and infidelity to the aesthetics and message of the original works, the more convincing ones claim that they bring the novel ‘to life’, ‘lend voice’ to the mute characters or transform it in an alchemical process. A variety of terms that could apply in dramatization of literature have been used, often starting with the prefixes trans- and re-, such as rereading, rewriting, translation, transmutation, recreation, transvocalisation, to name but a few. Theory of adaptation leads inevitably to literary criticism and the discussions of genres. For the purpose of this paper, apart from drawing from studies on the theory and practice of cinematic adaptation (Stam & Raengo, 2004), I take into account the Bakhtinian concept of the chronotope as well as Genet’s types of transtextuality, such as intertextuality (the co-presence of two or more

texts),

paratextuality

(ancillary

messages

and

commentaries

the

text),

metatextuality (critical rereading of the text) and contextualization (the representation of the historical and social context in which the text was created). I also draw on theatre anthropology studies for two reasons. The first is that that both the novel

and the performance that I am discussing tackle issues of collective concern such as migration/ displacement and deconstruction of national identities, not only in the Balkans and the Mediterranean but worldwide. The second is because the making of both

the

performance

and

the

original

text

resonate

with

the

principles

preexpressivity that in theater anthropology has been defined as the scenic behaviors which lie at the base of various collective traditions, genres and artistic practices (Barba, 1995; Malekin & Yallow, 1997).

Dying as a country is considered a classical literary work in Greece today, written by an author who is also a poet, a playwright, an essayist and a translator of among others

–

Homer, Euripides, Aeschylus, Genet, Blanchot, Balzac, Shakespeare

and Tennessee Williams. It refers to a country in a prolonged period of decline and occupation, which no longer has a name, in which language has ceased to be spoken deliberately, and where the people, sunk in depravity, feel a deep contempt for the idea of patriotism and an indifference to the survival of their nation (Dimitriadis, 1978). The novel is an abstract grand narrative, fragmented and extremely violent. Its sentences are overly elongated, echoing many layers and stages of the Greek history and language, ranging from contemporary everyday expressions to quotes from religious and ancient sources such as Thucydides’ description of the famine that during the Peloponnesian civil war plagued classical Athens. It ends with a first person “shout of hatred” against a country crushed by the weight of the church and a worn out army, a parallel with the colonels’ dictatorship in Greece which fell four years before the novel was published (Dimitriadis, 1997). According to the writer (To

Vima, 2007) it is a draft novel written after his return from France to serve in the army and refers to evil powers, some external but mainly internal, that besiege the country diachronically like an ancient curse, eating up people from the inside and poisoning their creative potential. However, as Marmarinos notes, “the great virtue of the text is that, in transcribing/ transliterating the modern Greek drama, it raises collective experience up to the level of a biblical narrative” (Eleftherotypia, 2007). It is extended beyond Greek space and time, since the radical death of national and human values that characterizes the age is a situation with which many people around the globe can identify.

Performing literature in contemporary Athens Dramatization of literary works has become an increasingly common practice in Greek innovative theater and dance the last two decades. To mention some more

groundbreaking endeavors, Dimitris Papaioannou, the artistic manager of the Athens Olympic Games in 2004 launched his career as an avant-garde choreographer of Sappho, Euripides and Mallarmé poetry in the early 1990s; actress and director Anna Kokkinos performed authentic monologues of various characters drawn from a late nineteenth

century

novel

the

charismatic

yet

long

forgotten

author

George

Vizyinos; and many short stories and novels by Alexandros Papadiamantis have been staged in Athens during the last decade despite the archaic language of the literary prototype. In today’s Athens, where theatre constitutes one of the most flourishing and productive aspects of the city’s cultural life, 24 out of 76 performances promoted by a popular entertainment guide this season (Lifo, March 2010) were based on literary works by locals and foreigners such as Buchner, James, Dyras, Orwell, Laclos and an Afghan novelist. These included a multilingual adaptation of a Kazantzakis novel;

Ritsos’

poetry

(dramatized

twice);

Shakespearian

and

fairytale

characters

conversing on stage with their authors, or stepping out of the text to walk the city streets and into bars; and the tragic heroine Iphigenia changing faces and genders, from that of the sacrificed Isaac to that of a Guantanamo prisoner, to end up as an immigrant prostitute in Euripidou Street in the centre of Athens. Nevertheless, it should not be thought that the hybrid mixing of various artistic genres is something totally new in Greek culture. It can be dated back to the 1960s when prolific composers such as Theodorakis and Hadjidakis set high quality poetry, ancient and modern, to music, producing a significant corpus of work which, aided by the emerging local media industry, became very popular locally and worldwide.

Director Michael Marmarinos, who staged the novel Dying as a country in 2007, has played a mentoring role in this creative experimentation by staging, for instance, ancient Greek drama in unfamiliar spaces (Ioannidou, 2008), researching Müller, Kafka and Shakespeare on stage in ways that depart from the original extensively, and incorporating interviews with ordinary city people to discuss the theme of National Anthem on stage (Marmarinos, 2001). He has also experimented with alternative chronotopes by transferring his performances to other countries (Italy, France, Korea, Georgia, Poland, Belgium, Austria), utilizing local resources (settings, symbols, props) and employing local actors.

Bakhtin (1981) has defined the chronotope

as the spatiotemporal

matrix that

includes the protagonists and the plot in all narratives. Literary chronotopes represent particular world constructions and tend to be similar in works generated at the same historical period. In their context, space is charged and time takes on flesh and

becomes visible. On the other hand, it has been claimed that literary work puts on paper the rhythmical pulsation of silence and activity, basic to all experience, in a controlled coherence that enhances readers’ creativity (Malekin & Yallow, 1997). Taking these ideas further I would add that theatre, due to its ephemeral nature, does the same to a spectacular extent, and indeed must do so. When literature is turned into

performance

two

chronotopes,

world

views

and

rhythms

are

intertwining,

conversing or clashing on stage, that of the original literary resource and that of the actual play, generating a third entity that can be seen as a composite.

The performance as a container and shared ground The opening scene of Marmarinos’ performance is not

found in the original

Dimitriadis text. A long queue of more than two hundred Athenians, volunteer participants

the

play,

moves

snake

from

Piraeus

Street

and

its

surrounding area and crosses the stage, the interior of an old factory, whilst parts of the procession are continuously projected on a huge screen that faces the audience, featuring a variety of faces, races, details (Theseum, DVD, 2009). At the front of the stage a young and beautiful immigrant woman with an Eastern European accent delivers an awkwardly repeated monologue in front of a microphone, a confession of love to an invisible Greek partner that reveals her wish to experience something deeper and lasting in the relationship. Her speech and body posture struggle to create unity and meaning. Fragments of popular love songs of the 1960s first mass post-war Greek migration

–

the era of the

that can still heard in the disreputable

neighbourhoods of the industrial centre of Athens today provide occasional backing for her disconcerted declaration. The words of the songs clash with the content of the monologue

–

the former is about loss and abandonment, the latter about hope and

faith. When the monologue pauses, the queue comes to a halt and sings Sweet

Marata, a nostalgic urban song of the 1940s. When the monologue stops, the crowd starts moving again, its pace regulated by the sound of an invisible factory machine or airport bag checking system. An older woman breaks loose from the crowd, stands in front of the microphone, puts her suitcase carefully down and recites the first lines of Dimitriadis’ text: “In that year no woman conceived. This continued during the following years until a whole generation was completed without any new generation to break into the world”. When she returns to the queue, the mechanical sound starts again, continuing metronomically through several parts of that follow.

the theatrical narration

It is already obvious that Marmarinos is creating a commentary or metanarrative situated in multicultural 2007 Athens to draw the audience back into the complexities of a work created 30 years earlier. He introduces new characters where the original contains barely any individual characters. Throughout the play, these characters are mainly actors who read the text; foreigners who bring to it their own language; a massive chorus of Athenians serving as silent witnesses to the recited narrative, occasionally stepping out of it to sing and shout verbatim extracts as well as slogans, anecdotes, songs, everyday obscenities mixed with psalms; and finally the writer himself,

who

crosses

the

stage

fleetingly

and

walks

away.

Despite

these

extra-literary innovations the universal and archetypal elements of the prototype, its form as a mostly third person account and its power and fierceness remain intact. The actors, messengers of the tragedy like the mad newscasters mentioned in the novel, stand in front of the microphone, deliver their part and disappear in the crowd. The breath of the performance

–

acting / elongated pauses marked by the machines

in the passages to the other world of

the

fullstops

written

–

word

–

move at a parallel framework with the tempo

sentences/paragraphs/repeated

signs

suspension//rare

on both a structural and a symbolic level. The main idea is life and death

revolving in a never ending cycle. In the performance the literary text is both

contained and grounded.

Dying as a country, for instance, ends with a fiery monologue the feeling of which could be distilled in the phrase “I hate this country”. The narrator abandons his omniscient third person position maintained through the majority of the novel to address an imaginary partner

–

the reader

–

with a first person confession which

simultaneously hurls at the country a torrent of deprecatory adjectives bordering on obscenity. The word “country” (χώρα), like the words “woman” (γυναίκα) and “homeland” (πατρίδα), is feminine in the Greek language. As the last part of the novel unfolds towards a suspended catharsis, the narrator’s gender changes to feminine and in the very last sentence she and the country, the subject and object of the hatred, are merging in one entity. The story teller embodies the country.

Ah, ah, I hate you, I hate, I hate you, I hate you I’ll die, monster, and I shall go on hating you yes, the hatred is boiling inside me I want to write anthems the reverse of those that have been written for her till now word by word to shoot her and to bury her like a dog with my own hands I am no longer a woman … you are no longer a man either she has taken away everything from us… but what will be left of her without us?... Her ground has taken my shape My body already has her dimensions… I have her fate inside me I am dying like a country… (Dimitriadis, 1978)

It is interesting to note here that Marmarinos invited Beba Blans, a grand dame of

popular music, an old beauty now in her sixties whose song backed the immigrant womanâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s monologue in the opening scene, to deliver this final message on stage. This woman, like what Dimitriadisâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; name /surname signifies, has not left the country, and, unlike the ancient earth goddess Demeter from which his names draw their origin, acts out her rage albeit somehow calmly and flatly. It is equally interesting that the performance is contained between a person who strives to belong and a person who fights the very place to which she is belonging. They both personify two different aspects of displacement in the modern world which are, in fact, parts of the same cycle.

A multifaceted displacement and the displaced artist In both psychology and sociology displacement is defined as an unconscious defence mechanism whereby the psychic intensity belonging to ideas or emotions that are perceived as intimidating and harmful are transferred from their true source to something that is perceived as safer (Payne, 1997). Freud in his analysis of dreams notes that the more confused a dream appears to be, the more the process of displacement has had a hand in its construction (Freud, 1900).

Displacement in the form of migration, forced exile or self-exile due to political or financial reasons is a very familiar situation in Greek post-war society. After World War II and until the overthrow of the dictatorship (1944-1974) many people, because of their participation in the Resistance or in the Civil War, were temporarily or permanently displaced,

murdered or forced to censorship and silence.

With the

exception of short periods of democratization, Greek politics were dominated by the army, paramilitary circles, the church and western great powers, whilst education and official cultural life were characterised by a fixation on outdated institutions and ideals. The junta collapsed after the part it played in the Turkish invasion of Cyprus (which is considered Greek territory), launching a period of incessant contestation of Greek territorial waters and airspace in the Aegean Sea that continues to trigger crises to this day. Even after the restitution of the democracy and despite the trials of the colonels, the abolition of the monarchy, the newly promoted orientation towards Europe and the emergence of new political power bases, the structure of state authority remained intact; key figures of the dictatorship maintained their instrumental positions, the political parties functioned in the shadow of authoritarian personalities or influential families, whilst paramilitaries and right extremists continued threatening to impose a new dictatorial regime to save the country from communism and

insanity.

Dimitriadis’ novel refers to accumulated instances of displacement undergone as a form of self preservation in circumstances of siege and occupation that have become part of the national unconscious. It spans centuries, generates hallucinations, confusion and despair in the public psyche; undermines resistance against evil powers, turns brother against brother, and climaxes in acts of explosive violence, resignation and self destruction. There are abstract yet recognisable references to historical events before, during and after the dictatorship, such as conspiracies in the higher reaches of government; bribery of politicians to defect en masse to their opponents; fanatical nationalists who squirrel their assets away abroad; a fevered succession of fatally flawed

governments;

frenzied

supporters

dead

politicians

who

demand

the

restoration of their corpses to active political life and copulate with amputated statues, execution squads shooting their compatriots in the name of territorial integrity, national independence and racial purity; and a long list of names of people who have executed each other. Even worse, the worn-out inhabitants eventually surrender to the enemy willingly. They accept the eradication of everything in an atmosphere of cheerfulness and exultation. They pass laughing from one historical cycle to the next. At the very end of the chronicle of the Great Defeat, the Platonic dialogues disappear from the

libraries,

the

novels

only

dialogues

remain,

the

words

obtain

astonishing intensity, and deceit and narrow-mindedness reign. The cities are ruined and rebuilt from scratch and the utilisation of the earth and its resources passes into other hands. There is a constant displacement of everything to somewhere or something else, at the level either of material environment or of feelings, ideas, thoughts or languages. At the very end of the third person narrative there is an image of displacement of the entire country (Dimitriadis, 1978).

Marmarinos’ performance 30 years after Dimitriadis’ work was published takes over with crosscutting imagery that comments on, complements and expands the written narrative, pointing to displacement as a phenomenon that has been universalised. In the intervening years, Greece and surrounding countries were shaken by sweeping changes in politics, economy and society: the collapse of the bipolar system of international relations; the establishment and later the contestation of the US as sole superpower;

disintegration

borders

and

national

identities

across

central

and

western Europe, the Balkans and the eastern Mediterranean following the fall of “eastern block socialism”; the Yugoslavian wars and the intensification of moves towards European unification. Immigration to Greece, which is considered the open

eastern

gate

the

EU,

had

been

transformed

into

massive,

uncontrollable

phenomenon with legal immigrants and refugees amounting to 10 percent of the population in 2001, a level that is also found more or less in Spain, Italy, France, Russia,

Germany and Ukraine today. The quest

for sovereignty and a Greece

belonging to Greeks that dominated in the 1980s, as well as the procedures for modernisation/ secularisation of the state’s functions, were repeatedly challenged by irritants such as the conflict with Skopje over the name Macedonia, the intervention of the West in the Balkans, aggravated relations with Turkey and a polarised social debate over the far reaching consequences of the European and global reorientation of the country. The displacement of millions of people by both the Yugoslavia and Iraq wars had a shocking impact on Greek society.

Although it would take 30 years to be acknowledged as a text of deep insight and to reach the stage (twice in France and twice at home), Dimitriadis’ novel foresaw these changes at a period when they were lurking in the darkness. Today’s world accords more with the nightmarish message of this prototype. The landscape has been transformed irreversibly through the arrival of foreign tribes which, like the immigrant woman at the performance opening scene, claim their share in history, economy, language and everyday life. As in the words of the novel, violence has been generalised and after the collapse of the Eastern, South and Western fronts, the Northern one is about to collapse too, leaving people who considered it an ultimate refuge in a chaotic state of unrest and embarrassment. Concurrently, it is more than ever before apparent that the prolonged inner and outer pressures are leading the country’s signature to disappear and amalgamate with the broader cosmogram that covers the planet (Dimitriadis, 1978). A planet in which displacement has become almost a state of being: internalised, nationalised and globalised.

Epilogue What is the way to break this cycle? The author through his work gives the first answer. Departing, going away and coming back to express honestly and with a fresh eye what one sees, including the pain, the conflict and the hatred. “Whoever has lived abroad, not as a tourist,” he said in an interview, becomes an outsider and a hermit in his own country. “Upon his return he experiences a conflict that is a clash between two worlds, which is a matter of mentality, unity, culture” (To Vima, 2007). Back in the late 1970s, the author entered the literary scene as a former immigrant and a displaced artist. He portrayed a country crushed by the weight of an

illusory past identity that robs people of their creative power: “A mask that needs to be turned inside out” (Odeon theatre URL, 2009/10). At a time when Greece was emerging with euphoria from 40 years of darkness, this writing act was read as a sacrilege

and

for

years

his

work

was

marginalised

the

realm

the

incomprehensible and the disturbing. Did he commit an act of disrespect towards a country that in his eyes has become a necrophile, a gerontophile, a bawd and a murderess? According to the old myths of the East, “there is a time when, in response to a serious offence, one has to release a rage that shakes the skies” (Estes, 1996). There is a time when, like Saint George who kills the dragon mentioned in the novel, “one has to perform the forbidden and unsanctioned act in order to redeem life”.

Finally Marmarinos’ staging of the novel in 2007 gives a second answer to the question of displaced voices and writing. Creating space for displacement to be seen; allowing time to contemplate its connections to people’s individual and collective lives; and most importantly containing the silenced rage and giving it permission to be expressed in the open, in protected contexts and in the right time.

References Bakhtin, M. M. [1930s] (1981) The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays. Ed. Michael Holquist. Transl. Emerson, C. and Holquist, M. Austin and London: University of Texas Press. Barba, E. (1995). The P aper Canoe. A Guide to Theatre Anthropology transl. by Fowler, R. London, New York: Routledge.

Δημητριάδης, Δ.

(1980/978).

Πεθαίνω σαν χώρα.

Dimitriadis, D. I'm Dying Like a

Country. Athens: Agra. Dimitriádis,

(1997).

Meurs

comme

pays:

P rojet

pour

roman

(Confluences), transl. Volkovitch, M. Athens : Kauffmann. Estes, C. P. (1992/1996). Women Who Run With the Wolves: Myths and Stories of

the Wild Woman Archetype. New York: Ballantine. Freud, Sigmund (1900). The Interpretation of Dreams. New York: Macmillan. Ioannidou, E. (2008). ‘Monumental Texts in Ruins. Greek tragedy in Greece and Michael

Marmarinos’s

Postmodern

Stagings”.

New

Voices

Classical

Reception, 3:14. Malekin, P. & Yallow, R. (1997). Consciousness Literature and Theatre Theory and

beyond (Studies in Literature and Religion) St Martin Press.

Μαρμαρινός,

M(2001).

Marmarinos.

E θνικός

Ύμνος.

National

Η σκηνοθεσία ως δραματουργία.

θεώρημα για την ομαδικότητα. Αthens:

Hymn

according

Michael

Directing as play-writing.

Ένα

Koan.

Mazower, M. (1995), ‘The Cold War and the Appropriation of Memory: Greece After

‐

Liberation’. East European Politics & Societies 9(2): 272

294.

Stam, R. and Raengo, A. (eds)(2005). Literature and Film: a Guide to the Theory

and Practice of Film Adaptation, Malden, MA: Blackwell. Odeon de l’Europe Theatre (2009/10). Dimitris Dimitriadis. The season, 2009-10 shows. Available at http://www.theatre-odeon.fr/en/the_season/2009_10_shows/accueil-f-324.htm

[2 February 2010] Payne,

M.(ed.).(1997).

Displacement.

Dictionary of Cultural

and

Critical

Blackwell Publishing. Theseum (2009). Dying as a country. Athens: Theseum Ensemble (DVD).

Websites http://www.lifo.gr/ http://www.theseum.gr/queue.htm

Newspapers Eleftherotypia, 29.7.2007 To Vima, 22.7.2007

Theory.

Discussion Dimitris Dimitriadis / Michael Marmarinos :

Dying as a Country

Discussant : Andreas L. Katonis (University of Aristotle[Thessaloniki])

Kyriaki Frantzi has chosen to present a theatrical adaption by a renowned stage director, M. Marmarinos, of an influential novel by an equally renowned contemporary writer, D. Dimitriadis. The novel, Dying as a Country (an English rendering as "I Am Dying as a Country" would have been more exact) was written 30 years ago whereas the staging is recent. What has attracted the attention of the Author (Frantzi) is a contextualization (i. e. she thinks that Dimitriadis, held for unimportant three decades ago, had foreseen the problems accumulated in present day Greece), and a double play on the meanings of the word "displacement". This word means in everyday social usage a transfer in place, and figuratively, in psychology the transfer of emotions from the object that originally evoked them to a substitute, as e. g. in dreams. A displacement activity, in this way, would be another form of behaviour for what is normal or expected, typically when there is a conflict of impulses. With

regard

contextualization,

relying

Bakhtin's

and

Genet's

literary

considerations, the author thinks the Marmarinos production not only reflects what is happening in actual Greece but goes even beyond Greek space and time since what characterizes our age is a situation with which many people around the globe can identify themselves. Theatrical adaptations are not a rarity in Greece and Marmarinos, a prolific director, has a rich repertoire from antique works down to our times like "Akropolis", a Polish play, on which he is working now. Adaptations always bring also modifications. In this way, the opening scene of the Marmarinos performance is not found in the original text. There is a long queue of Athenians which moves from the street, crossing the stage, to the interior of an old factory, implying an immigrant woman's complaints. As I read in an interview, Dimitriadis, having been invited to a rehearsal in 2007, remarked that he had the feeling that his work had been taken away from

him. Yet, the problem with the immigrants has become one of the burning questions in

Greece,

mainly

Athens.

Drawing

Dimitriadis

free-tongued

text,

the

possibilities of stage-craft, and the actual situation in his city that cannot be minimized, Marmarinos creates a two-level framework, where the main idea is life and death revolving in a never ending cycle with a peak where a monologue informs the audience that this country is hateful. This is the pessimistic moral Dimitriadis conveys to his audience and Marmarinos transfers to us.

Kyriaki Frantzi, in her presentation, insightfully exploits the theoretical arsenal necessary to tackle the problems in interpreting theatrical adaptations drawing on e.g. the Bakhtinian concepts (such as the chronotope), that of the metanarrative, the archetypal elements and the many faces of displacement in time and space that can mean both a transfer from the playwright's epoch to the present and a transfer of forms

migration

which

actual

problem

not

only

Greece

but

also

world-wide.

What I would question, if I understood the solution suggested for the rather negative actual situation at all, is that peremptory radicalism which surfaces in the Epilogue summoning even mythical forces of rage to redeem life. Of course, the moral of both the staging and the original is that "one must be absolutely modern", and one of the reasons of the problems in this world, and especially of Greece, is the lack of this

quality.

Shockingly,

Greece

accused

having

become

"necrophile",

"gerontophile", and more. Does this mean, once again, that "one must look forward", and only forward, and not at all back? This already has been suggested by some thinkers. In a country like Greece, with such a prestigious cultural heritage, this advice, in my opinion, musn't be given and cannot be accepted. On the contrary, I would say, unfortunately, there already is a heavy gap in the everyday life of this country between the present and its worthy past. Past values do not do any harm, they help the present and the future, have a look at neighbouring Italy! Much more, as Marmarinos complains himself, it is education that must be upgraded.

Triesteâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Literature as the Literature of Identity Crisis

Kim, Hee Jung (IMS) Trieste is an area that accommodates relatively large acculturation or cultural change even in Italia. The area has been a venue for not only frequent ethnic migrations but also ceaseless wars and trades among various ethnic groups. When it comes to study on the cultural background of such area, Trieste within Italian culture can better be approached both synchronically and diachronically through border studies rather than statically or synchronically. The awareness of problem 'border studies' proposes, that is, the awareness of problem to newly recognize the dynamic nature of border area from the perspective of nearby as space of exchange where the cultures, daily common practices and economic life come into conflict, adapt to one another and be integrated rather than national border which is closed to other nationals serves as the framework of this paper on Trieste one of the border areas of Italia. 'Border studies' that rose prominent not long after being launched encompasses culture study, ethnic study and multi-culture study. In European languages, various terms exist that indicate such concepts as border, border and frontier of English equivalents, and among the European major languages, only German includes the vocabulary

'grenze'

common.

This

serves

premise

very

important

understanding Trieste of 'mitteleuropa' which means central Europe, for in Trieste where local culture and inland culture differ along coastline the venue of sea-borne activities and trades, such 'border area' is an unclear border. The identity problem that people from Trieste also is attributed here. Trieste has remained long as identity issue whether this area belongs to Italian history or is part of 'mitteleuropa' within Austria. Trieste, a port city nestled on an area of border with Slovenia in the north of Adriatic Sea of central Europe, is an important commercial port having central Europe as background, and a city of industry such as shipbuilding and petroleum processing. The place was originated from the colonial city that Romans built up, and in 1295, it became a free city and entered ruling by Austria since 1382. After it became a free port in 1719, the place developed as the only sea port of Austria in the 19th century, and as a result of the 1st World War, it was merged into Italia in 1919. Trieste a city thus located in Habsburg Haus empire and margin of Italian peninsula has been a cross area of culture and ethnic groups that determine the destiny of the city to

date. The unique geographical location of the city and continued influx of population by it caused ceaseless chaos and commotions of residents, and the unique traditions and natures of various ethnic groups became significant obstacles for the integration of society and culture. For such reason, Trieste remained merely as border with active culture of Italia at early stage. Oftentimes, three terms are used to define Trieste: 'Trieste as national border', 'Trieste as cross of civilization', and 'Trieste as terra irredenta the land that has not been restored yet but should be restored practically'. There stands 'Trieste the national border'. There are people from numerous nations that move ahead to fight for the name of their own nation, who desire to stop fighting, but some of them are forced to gather to the national border out of sense of obligation or out of ideology. As an intersection of civilizations', Trieste the port city that accommodates various ships is a place where numerous ethnic groups arrive with their culture and stay. The people that stay here put the culture of this area into the bags in which they brought their own culture. 'Trieste a land not restored'. This word a term that Vittorio Imbriani the writer coined is used in explaining the concept of republic by Garibaldi in the course Trentino and Friuli Venezia-Giulia are integrated to Italia after the 3rd independence war through political campaign. This campaign comes to an end with the integration of Trieste and Istria to Italia at the beginning of the 1st World War. This is also the reason that study on the identity of Trieste culture began in the repetitive course of accepting Slovenians and Jewish in Trieste and making them as outsiders while Trieste is excluded as outside with no complete national identity (the judgment whether the word 'complete' here belongs to Italian history is another issue and thus is not argued in this paper) though it is a city belonging to Italia. Just as with the word of Jean Grenier who said "Though humans cannot choose the land in which they are to be born, they by all means shall be allowed to choose where they die.", it is a natural phenomenon that nationals of other country are guaranteed of the freedom

move

back

into

their

own

country

when

their

own

nationals

are

guaranteed to move abroad. This concept became the driving force of the writers of the 19th through 20th centuries that attempted to cultivate the history of Trieste culture based on the concepts 'other people among us' and 'we among other people' by overcoming the dichotomic concept of 'others' and 'we'. In this paper, the author intends to examine the problem of national border and identity

with

the

history,

culture

and

literature

works

Trieste

Italia

background. In practice, the native culture of Trieste was born through the mixture

or influence of various jumbles of foreign culture. Thus, the meaning of native culture of Trieste may be ambiguous as its geographical location is. Such ambiguity of identity is the nativity of Trieste's culture after all. That is because the process of the forming and development of Trieste is the course of revealing the "identity" through the experience and identity of the people living near the national border or upon the border just as Pierre Vilar the historian noted "The world history may be observed best upon the borders." The migrants from mid, northern Europe and Balkan peninsula comprised important intelligentsia class of early Trieste, and owing to them, the culture of Trieste became characteristic of pan-Europe while being Italian. Such nature of such Trieste intelligentsia came to draw the attentions of Solaria the literature magazine of Firenze that disseminates Italian literature throughout the entire Europe by then. In other words, while the Trieste until 1918 was defined as a city with no culture of its own hooked up to the roots of romanticism of the 19th century, the intelligentsia of Trieste on the border of Italia between 1920 and 1930 began to prepare the jumping pad of rather 'anti-literature' Trieste culture to emerge later on. This 'anti-literature' so to speak refers to 'differing' or 'different' literature that the then literary folks aroused. More specifically, such literature reflects the will of those that makes the culture 'different. Despite the ceaseless change of styles and techniques, the literature ultimately seeks for "desperate search for the spirit of human redemption". It was assumed that no discovery nor any invention with human happiness excluded can be regarded as progress in truest sense. Such literature was out of fervent 'critical spirit' that thoroughly excludes the oppression of spirit and restraint of body. Trieste literature thus always yearned for the freedom and equality of human and sought to review how much happiness it can inspire. In this course, so called a 'new' literature that Trieste proposed was delivered to Italia. The literature that had been conducted centered around Firenze all along became the tool for internal perception of Trieste and also emerged as new critical spirit while excluding existing conservatism. Trieste literature encompasses various parts that existing Italian literature alienated and neglected by touching the deep place beyond our consciousness. Where is the 'newness' onto which this literature newly shed light attributed from? Above all, the literature accomplished to put focus on the essence that literature itself that had not been depleted carried beyond existing common practices. The Trieste writers who remained between the two worlds tradition and newness both of which in some sense cannot but contradict and crash into one another sought to integrate the newness

while preserving the traditions of Italian literature intact, and in practice, they accomplished it. A number of writers along with Italo Svevo act by connecting Trieste that symbolizes 'spirito' and 'anima'1) and Firenze one of the stronghold of traditional Italian literature. Firenze that served as the 'anima' of literature activities also needed new entity to inspire life and vitality to certain essential 'spirito' that settled at the back of the 'anima' of their literature, and Trieste literature was the subject that meets such need. In order to see Italia more macroscopically and objectively and to become a member of Italian literature, the 20th century Trieste writers assume more specific and free behaviors. They turned their eyes toward Europe. Through this opportunity, so called the 'new' literature that Trieste proposed is transferred to Italia. The Trieste writers

like Michelstaedter or Slataper had to propose something dramatic

yet new, and such situation led them to examine their understanding and thoughts on the

existence

their

own,

that

is,

the

existential

problems

their

identity

established on the national border. Their writings or literature that reflected their sense of 'existential desperation' or 'being excluded' were transferred into Italian literature. Such sense of identity is very important in that if the early situation of such Trieste literature is understood, it is neither difficult to understand why writers like Italo Svevo are not properly welcomed or recognized to early Italian literary circle or populace, and how he could be regarded as having played the frontrunner's role for Trieste literature. As

such,

Trieste

intelligentsia

along

with

Slataper

pursued

establish

the

awareness to conform to the geography, morale, ethics, ethnicity and history of Trieste. That way, Trieste knock the door of European culture ahead of Vociani who was acting via La Voce magazine of Firenze despite the tardy development of culture done under the influence of Irridentism that attempted to integrate Trieste to Italy. This is also the reason that there are active researches on "certain sticky connection of destiny spirit, language, nationality and ideology among Trieste of Svevo, Zagreb of Krleza, Vienne of Musil, Prague of Kafka, and Budapest of Lukacs." That may be counted as the reason Trieste writers affect the native literary men of Italia and open 1) In English speaking world, researches are mostly done on the difference of spirito and anima based on religious standpoint. The two terms used in this paper were classified according to the author's thought based on the essential nature the subject literature has. Once a subject is composed of spirito, anima and corpo. Corpo namely means body in the farthest margin of the subject. Anima is composed of three parts: thought, emotion and will that the body contains. A subject understands and receives thoughts by understanding. Spirito indicates mind, and anima soul. After all, anima and 'life' refer to the same thing. Anima, which represents all of our physical things, is after all 'the subject itself'. However, spirito is the mind only within soul. In the end, our spirito lives by using anima.

new horizon of literature. In particular, Slataper introduces an article on the particular culture environment of Trieste the city in which he was born by contributing it to La Voca. After returning to Trieste, he composed 『Il mio Carso』 his major work and published it in the next year. Slataper also relies on expressionism just like the literary folks of Firenze by then in practically depicting the reality he faces the way bumper-to-bumper thoughts and memories, smells of hometown lingering at nose tip, and ultimately live and realistic emotions are vividly depicted in this work, but his origin from Trieste gives birth to clear discrimination from his then colleagues. His education gained in an area under the rule of Habsburg makes connection for him with German culture by giving Slataper the status of an affiliated member rather than outsider. That is in tune with the 'awareness of risk' that Central Europe has occurring because national boundaries change severely and natural and cultural buffer zone shaped up from the 19th century end where he himself could understand so well. For such reason, there comes deeper recognition of 'risk' and 'existence'. In order to understand it across civil society and furthermore convince various new concepts to society, civil society began to be dealt with as the topic of 'writing'. The sense of linguistic segregation between intelligentsia and populace is also solved. In other words, although the logical connections in the sentences are not sufficient, they intend to talk of life the way they live candidly. At times talking in unorganized manner appear as if stammering, but what they express by stammering with passion are delivered as they are to the brain and heart of people. 『Il mio Carso』 is a "lyrical autobiography", that is, a work of diary style as Slataper himself defined. The writer depicted the traces of social culture activities that he experienced while facing problems like Trieste or restorationism (he participated personally later on) along with his days of growth. This work is composed of totally 3 chapters. First off, Karst (Trieste) and Secchieta a mountain located in Firenze described in chapter 1 and chapter carrying

3 assume symbolic meaning, contradictory

meanings

and the work contains dualistic elements 'Karst'

and

'city',

'non-uniqueness'

and

'civilization', 'freedom' and 'society'. The work 『Il mio Carso』 can be defined as a song on the land in which he was born, the death of the woman he loved, and the motherland to which he belonged. Until he voluntarily felt a sense of guiltiness to the desperate question 'why the beloved girl friend fell to suicide', the time of twenty years ceaselessly demand Slataper certain 'answer'. He perceives painful rumination of his identity as an Italian restrained under the oppression of other country, that is, Austria in a land he was born. It is a struggle to know certain identity beyond the sense of affiliation strongly

linked to Karst. Slataper rather enjoys the painfulness to this painfully subsisting question, and does not seek for correct answer. Just as a little child primitive as much

barbarous

adapt

new

environment

swiftly

while

skillful

calm

experienced old man has hard time in adapting in a new place, they put efforts to adapt in a place where they are alienated by demonstrating their particularity rather than evaluate as outsider one step behind. That is the reason Slataper is evaluated as a person with the "reason" to contain the spiritual agony and passion influential as much as he can feel physically or the symbol of 'youth' that can undertake them unlike Svevo who was often counted in comparison as 'old man when he was born and yet still old man when he died' by essayists. So far, we have gone over the 'identity' shown in the literature of Slataper with focus on the background of Trieste's historical cultural formation. The three concepts defining Trieste, that is, '', '', and '', are as good as part of the genes of those who were born and settled in Karst. Trieste handed down painful spirit to the children, but is loved on this account. As is depicted in Slataper's confession, they want pain rather than stability. While multi-culturalism is a term noted in political, cultural aspect, 'identity' is a philosophical, psychological word. It is noteworthy that Trieste was recognized as social member and laborer with no social friction relatively compared with other region of Italia. All the people of Trieste have members, friends and coworkers of family linked in surprisingly diverse kinship in the practical daily life of Trieste of multi-cultural region to date. The vitality created by diversity and interactions among mutually different culture are creating the 'identity of Trieste' that can never be found even with Italia.

Discussion Triesteâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Literature as the Literature of Identity Crisis

Discussant : Yun, Jong Te (Pusan University of Foreign Studies)

Trieste is a city and seaport in north eastern Italy. It is situated towards the end of a narrow strip of land lying between the Adriatic Sea and Italy's border with Slovenia, which lies almost immediately south, east and north of the city. Trieste is located at the head of the Gulf of Trieste and throughout history it has been influenced by its location at the crossroads of Germanic, Latin and Slavic cultures. And now it is the capital of the autonomous region Friuli-Venezia Giulia and Trieste province. Historically, Trieste was part of the Habsburg Monarchy from 1382 until 1918. In the 19th century it was the most important port of one of the Great Powers of Europe. As a prosperous seaport in the Mediterranean region Trieste became the fourth largest city of the Austro-Hungarian Empire (after Vienna, Budapest, and Prague). In the fin-de-siecle period, it emerged as an important hub for literature and music.

However,

the

collapse

the

Austro-Hungarian

Empire

and

Trieste's

annexation to Italy after World War I led to a decline of its economic and cultural importance and, throughout the Cold War, Trieste was a peripheral city. Today,

Trieste

neighbouring

regions.

border

The

town.

dominant

The local

population dialect

Trieste

ethnic is

mix

called

the

Triestine

language, a form of Venetian. This dialect and the official Italian language are spoken in the city centre, while Slovene is spoken in several of the immediate suburbs. The Triestin and the Slovene languages are considered autochthonous of the area. There are also small numbers of Serbian, Croatian, German, and Hungarian speakers. The economy depends on the port and on trade with its neighbouring regions. Trieste is a lively and cosmopolitan city, with more than 7.7% of its population being from abroad, and it is rebuilding some of its former cultural, economic and political influence.

The

shipbuilding,

city

education,

major

transport

centre and

the

commerce.

for

Trieste

trade, is

also

politics, Italy

culture, and

the

Mediterranean's leading coffee port, the hometown of "Illy CaffĂ¨" and the supplier of more than 40% of Italy's coffee. The city is part of the "Corridor 5", which aims at

ensuring a bigger transport connection between countries in Western Europe and Eastern European nations, such as Slovenia, Croatia, Hungary, Ukraine and Bosnia. This will be also a great impetus for a further boost to the economy of Trieste. Trieste is also home to some Italian mega-companies, such as Assicurazioni Generali, which was in 2005, Italy's 2nd and the world's 24th biggest company by revenue, after Hitachi and Carrefour. According to the above history of Trieste, itâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s not difficult to consider that as you said, Trieste is an area that accommodates relatively large acculturation or cultural change even in Italia. The area has been a venue for not only frequent ethnic migrations but also ceaseless wars and trades among various ethnic groups. When it comes to study on the cultural background of such area, Trieste within Italian culture can better be approached both synchronically and diachronically through border studies rather than statically or synchronically. I am very interested in the expression that the identity of Trieste stands on the basis of its ambiguity. I would ask two things about the presentation. First, could you give a more concrete example about positive interaction and conflict between different cultures? Second,

among

lots

triesteâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s

literature,

would

you

introduce

representative and typical work that contains the identity of multi-culture?

the

most

Distorted Infancy and War

Lim, Ju In (IMS) I. Introduction The Battle in P aradise (Duelo en el paraiso) is a work in which Juan Goytisolo describes, as it really happened, the tragedy of the Spanish Civil War from point of view of Spain’s children. The author realistically describes how the war makes human beings cruel, and the misery surrounding the death of a boy named Abel. The Road

to Soradan is a collection of 11 stories about the Korean War, where alumni come th

back to Soradan to celebrate the 40

anniversary of the graduates’association and

remember their childhood during the Korean War. There having been no choice but to survive during the days of tragedy, they became free of the oppressive and painful memories of the past through reconciliation with each other. The two works are similar in that they explore the effects of the civil war and that they are narrated

—

from the point of view of children

denouncing corrupted human nature through the

portrayal of boys imitating the cruelty of war. In addition, the titles are both related to a specific location. They have a concrete locality, including dialect and landscape. In The Battle in P aradise, both the road called Paradise and the boy named Abel have symbolic meanings. The name Abel leads us to think of the biblical Abel, and his brother Cain, the first fratricidal murderer. The murder of Abel symbolizes the fratricidal tragedy of the Spanish Civil War. At the same time, the road called Paradise, on which Abel is murdered, is the expression of earthly hell, wherea bloody battle within the family occurs.

The Road to Soradan, on the other hand, emphasizes the events of homecoming. It also highlights the fact that the war affected every area of the country, including Soradan, not only turning the beautiful road into ruins but also distorting the lives of the simple-hearted children. After the war ends, the alumni gather to celebrate the graduates’association in Soradan, going back to the days of their teens in the 1950s after 40 years have passed by. Through the graduates’association, the alumni are cured of guilty consciences that resulted from distorted memory. Being young at the time of the war, they did not understand what the situation really was, but they were tortured by the death or anguish of their friends. In The Battle in Paradise , we can also find the message of healing. Estanisla, who is left alone after the bankruptcy and death of her husband and two sons, is looking

forward to reconciling with her two sons, whom she believes will return in the shape of pigeons or flowers. Martin Elosegui wishes for reconciliation with her lover, and Santos, a lieutenant in the national military, expects his erratic son to return from the war orphan group called "Horror Empire." Finally, Abel desperately looks forward to making friends with his executor until he dies. The two authors also have commonalities. During the Spanish Civil War, Juan Goytisolo watched his mother die in a bombing by the national military, while Yoon Jeon Gil witnessed his younger brotherâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s death. He has adopted the hunger and poverty resulting from the war as his novelâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s theme. These authors are also interested in isolated persons such as women, immigrants, the lower classes, and people who belong to the Third World. They don't turn away from society, but criticize the social contradictions and vices of capitalism and modernization that bring about group selfishness and loss of human nature (Romero HĂŠctor, 79). They try to cross

the

boundaries

among

nations,

ethnic

groups,

and

classes.

particular,

Goytisolo criticizes Western egocentrism and dichotomy related to patriarchy. He is interested in the culture of North Africa, including its primitive religions, where human nature has not yet been corrupted by material civilization. He approaches themwith an open-minded and relative point of view. Yoon, who personally went through the hunger and sorrow of parting due to ideological conflict, is interested in the petit bourgeois alienated by modernization and industrialization. He emphasizes the recovery of human nature and reconciliation, transcending intolerant ideology and prejudice. In this thesis, I intend to uncover the cause of tragedy, using the basis of deterritorialization and the nomadology theory of Deleuze and Guattari, which turns boys into a cruel and violent military machine, committing the fratricidal murder in The Battle in Paradise and The Road to Soradan. Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari conceive of deterritorialization as the body without organs. Their nomadic ethics are based on inclusive disjunctive, which enhances the value of multiplicity, becoming and difference. Their nomadology might be discussed in terms of the ethics of the ecocentric, as opposed to those of the anthropocentric, the egocentric, and the biocentric. The ecocentric ethics inherent in deep ecology and ecofeminism release the unrestrained flow of life and enhance the recovery of non-discriminating relationships between humans and all other beings, which is described

Deleuze

and

Guattari's

nomadology.

Goytisoloand

Yoon

emphasize

dynamic, changing, and imaginative identities after the death of Franco. Deleuze and Guattari's rhizomatic idea enables us to get a glimpse of the two authors' dynamic and relative points of view.

II. Main Subject 1. Beyond the boundary between male/female Deleuze lays stress on the interrelationship of minorities, such as women, children, homosexuals and Arabs, at the same level. He defines it as deterritorialization or line of flight. The line of flight is connected with minority-becoming which stresses the interrelationship of subjects in the process of the flowing identity accepting the alienated class. Whatthe minority-becoming and line of flight mean is inter-penetrated and horizontal deterritorialization, which is in connection with the identity of nomadic tribes called "nomadology". Nomadology, which overturns the dichotomic oppression of traditional metaphysics, considers the fixed subject's dissolution, refusal of rational reason in the West, extinctionof the essential being, and the advent of alienated classes, such as immigrants and homosexuals, to be basic thinking. This results in identity confusion and change. How is the nomadic identity expressed in the novel The Road to Soradan? Uncle An Apbang is an insane person in The Road to Soradan, whom the children of the town laugh at and mistreat because he cannot perform a man's function sexually. He is recruited into the war, but soon comes back to his hometown and goes mad because of his lack of ability as a soldier. He has to suffer the humiliation of exposing

his genitals

in the

presence

others because

steals a

farmer's

knee-breeches. One day, he is wandering around the station and dies after being shot in the belly by police. Jordi in Battle of Paradise, who is similar to Uncle An, seems to be inferior to normal persons in his appearance. It is remarkable that Jordi has fluid identity.

[Jordi, placid, sexless Jordi, had declaimed to the valley in his sharpest voice:’From the summit of these pyramids, forty centuries look down upon you.’ ‘It’s better to have honour without ships, than ships without honour.’ ‘I sent my fleet to fight against men, not elements.’A tremor of panic seemed to shake the whole river-bed and Jordi had continued in this vein, looking as round as a spinning top, with his hair blown back by the wind, and liberating with his wild gestures the pent-up demons of his childhood.(37)]

Jordi has been humiliated by others for his impotence and, in the presence of Martin, he died miserably by being shot: turning pale with horror. On the contrary, Jordi who has discovered his own identity becomes full of energy in front of nature, which is overwhelmed with instinct and liveliness. Jordi who commands the thunder

and lightning in the face of nature, just like a supervisor, realizes creative potential energy andboundless creation. It is difficult to find masculinity in Jordi, who was a soldier who abandoned military outcasts in war, but he was loved by Lucia and Angela due to the fact that he does not intend to oppress women with violence. Uncle An Apbang went mad, stealing or murmuring in English, after he escaped from the battle field, but, he who was originally a docile and sincere worker, was so romantic that he used to sing to himself.

[Uncle An Apbang is also an industrious farmer, who takes charge of his sharing. His mind is tender and fragile, unsuitable to his grand body. During the busy farming season, people who live in the same town come to grips with each other to employ Uncle An, who does not evade his work, but works sincerely, without saying anything, just like an ox. He almost always used to take charge of all arduous jobs on himself. He was so happy that he was humming to himself even when he carried dung.(Yoon, 2003:127)]

Jordi and Uncle An wereno more than useless soldiers in war, but, usually, they were judged as responsible men. Having no fixed identities, but rather identities that are changeable and decodified, they are judged from an entirely different viewpoint. From the sexual point of view, they are located in the boundary between masculinity and

femininity,

far

from

oppressive

and

discriminative

dichotomies

such

civilization/ barbarity, and center/circumference. According to Jung, animus is an internal masculine energy, which EstĂŠs refers to as power to link to a force that challenges the dominant powers, such as paternal oppression (EstĂŠs, 62). We associate them with the vagabond in Makbara,which was published in 1980. In Occidental Metropolis, he is described as a "disgusting, grotesque vagabond whose genitals are so big that it seems that he is not able to have sexual intercourse without tears." On the contrary, in Alca, he is described as "feliz de hallarme[muhajir] otra vez entre ellos, verificar con orgullo que no me han olvidado(Makbara, 43)[happy to find myself among them once again, to note with pride that they havenâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;t forgotten me(Makbara, 45)" which means that in an Arabic night market, he is transformed into an idol who provokes laughter from the public with the witty laugh of sultan. The author parodies the mechanized and atomized human relationship, or anti-body, as a result of Western capitalism. The anti-body tends to criticize the Other in the name of national ideology and religious purity, and orthodoxy or legitimacy. Considering the fact that sexual purity would be a fantasy of sexuality based on Colonialism. On the contrary, bodily pleasure, which Goytisolo searches for, stands for openness on the basis of cultural

coexistence, transcending the rigid and partial misunderstanding. The two authors resist traditional Western utilization, according to which human beings are judged only by their productive value and are not able to accord with nature or physical instinct. They intend to present through characters such as Jordi, Uncle An, and a vagabond, how a human being, free from prejudice, recovers his inborn and potential nature by returning toward a primitive life close to nature. This is the vision of Goytisolo's demodernizing position and at the same time of Yoon's intention of overcoming the difficulty resultingfrom ideological conflicts and difference. Being free from languor in the road of Paraiso, Abel imitates the war orphans because of anxiety about being alienated from them, who strive for confirming their own identity not by creative and productive imagination for open minded identity, but by violence and madness resulting from the war-machine for fixed identity. Although being aware of the fact that he was hated by them, Abel tried in vain to keep company with the boys who used to make a cat's paw of him and betrayed him after that. The orphans, including Abel, all fall into being victims who obey the law of violence, shut themselves up in a horizontal and rigid relationship, and take prisoner by destructive desire disguised as heroism. In the next chapter, I intend to analyze the psychology of children who become accustomed to violence by dint of the refusal of fluid identity in the name of "war".

2. The war as machine of repression The fact that Arqueo punishes his friend Abel denotes the two-sided nature of the injurer and victim. Arqueo, who shot Abel to death, can be the injurer and victim at the same time because, by dint of the war, he was deprived of the purity which children at that age should have. Onthe contrary, he was fascinated with distorted heroism and the destructive desire, giving up his human nature. Quintana, a teacher, ascribes the death of Abel not only to their vice, but also to the "ruins, death, and bullet".

[Iâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;m less than a servant to them. They call me an old dotard and laugh in my face at everything I do. The other day, one of the smaller children threatened me with a cane. Here, in the school, they have created a real reign of terror, with its chiefs, its deputies, its spies and its tale-bearers. I know itâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s difficult to believe me when one sees their childish faces and their beardless cheeks. But itâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s true. I know perfectly well that they have a code of laws to punish "criminals" and a coercive system to enforce obedience. (52-53)]

Quintana considers the crime of the children due to the violent surroundings of the war, and the war orphans pretend to be adults without any interference. They set fire to the mill, shoot down their friends and injure their betrayers with knives, like the military in the war. As a result, they are unwilling to shut themselves in the vertical and closed power structure made by adults. In The Road to Soradan, the war orphans are permitted to be violent.

[The children are enthusiastic about cheering for the boyâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s group, of which they are fond. The boys, who have sturdy build in comparisonwith their age, insert daggers in their waists. They seem to be brave and agile, as if they were real soldiers, only they donâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;t have guns. They say that all boys arewar orphans.

The

rumors

are

circulating

that

they

have

taken

special

assignment as spies in the rear, or that they rush to the enemyâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s tank, holding the bomb. The strange rumor stirs up that they have privilege, and that the boys are permitted to kill until three men and the nation grant all of their wishes because they risk life (Yoon, 2003: 67).]

And then what influence, then, does the war have on identity development? According to the theory of Deleuze, human beings cannot help being inhumane, losing his creative power within a vertical and rigid system. Deleuze emphasizes sympathy as

the

interrelation

between

dynamic

power

and

reactive

power,

refusing

the

unchanged subject oppressed by Oedipus' patriarchal order. The imitation psychology of the war, based on destructive desire,such as death and contempt of life, originated from an Oedipal territorialized "machine of repression". This "machine of repression" produces antiproduction, which effects imaginary territorialization such as racism, regionalism, and nationalism. Especially, war is one of the principal results ofracism or

nationalism,

forbidding

the

emergence

every

subjective

group

process.

Considering that Deleuze's and Gauttari's nomadic ethics is based on inclusive disjunctive synthesis or affirmative synthetic disjunction, which enhances the value of multiplicity, and the machine of repression, such as war, forbids production of various creative becomings. In spite of the fact that in The Road to Soradan, the children are described to be more naive than the war orphans in the Battle in P aradise, the children of Soradan get apathetically used to the cruelty of war and the law of the jungle. They don't long for a concrete action, such as murder, but unconsciously find themselves to beautify violence and war.

[I would be a war orphan without fail. Cho,Manhyung, the black sheep of our

town, murmured to himself. He was looking at the boys' group named Samgundan climbing up the mountain quickly, just like wild animals, with extreme envy and emotion (Yoon, 2003: 78)]

This scene is very similar to the scenes in which the boys belonging to the "Empire of Horror," who would participate in the murder of Abel, used to commit physical outrages against weak boys. In addition, it reminds one of the scene in which Pablo decided to be violent after observing a labor boy's death. Then, why do the boys imitate war and violence in the miserable situation caused by war? It is because the two boys, Cho and Pablo, were lost in fantasy that they would be men in thetrue sense of the word if they imitated violent behavior. It

necessary

that

should

consider

the

relation

between

violence

and

masculinity from the feministic point of view. Eco-feminism takes aim at social reconstruction and transcendence of masculine power based on the feministic principle in order to resolve the dualism between masculinity and femininity and to dismantle the patriarchywith its priority given to masculinity (androcentricity). At the same time, we should not pass over the psychological point of view. Karl Jung suggests that a man has a feminine spirit named anima, and a woman has masculine one called animus. He also asserts that if a man oppresses his anima, he behaves violently, and if a woman represses her animus, she behaves extremely obedient to man or, on the contrary, she feels hatred towardman. In other words, according to Jung, if man and woman oppress the opposite sexual tendency in their spirits, it is difficult for them to reach the perfection of self. Human beings are not able to revive as an independent self until they recognize their opposite sexual tendency and refuse the dichotomy on the basis of androcentric patriarchy. As stated above, eco-feminism is in keeping with the Jung's theory in that the separation between masculinity and femininity prevents the true sense of self. According to Deleuze, there are three types of becoming,such as a becoming-woman, a becoming-child and a becoming-animal, which belong to a becoming-minority, and are

characteristic

the

anorganic

imperceptible.

Western

society,

social

codification confers privilege on the man, adult reason and the white race against the woman, child and animal(Gilles Deleuze & FĂŠlix Guattari, 1987, 275). A becoming which

contains

the

molecular

process

deterritorializing

the

dichotomy

social

codification accompanied by degenerating fixed identities, originates in the line of flight or the dissymetrical deterritorialization. Deleuze and Guattari's concept of body without organs is compatible with the molecular process of deterritorialization, which deconstructs the moralorganizations that codify or textualize the truth of the visual or

the figural. In other words, dismantles the rational, institutional, and hierarchical order. (Bogue, 9-10) Boris Buden emphasizes becomingsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; mobility. The concept of becoming seeks to articulate a political practice in which social actors escape their normalized representations and reconstitute themselves in the course of participating and changing the conditions of their material existence. Becoming is not only a force against something but also a force which enables desire and escape. Every becoming is a transformation of multiplicity to another, write Deleuze & Guattari; every becoming radicalizes desire and creates new individuations, new

affections,

becomings

new not

diversifications.

the

But,

proliferation

interestingly

diversity

and

enough,

the

end

all

its

heterogeneity,

disappearance. Becoming imperceptible is the immanent end of all becomings, it is a process of becoming everybody/everything by eliminating the use of names to describe

what

exceeds

the

moment.

will

show

how

migrants

transform

themselves and change constantly their practices and alliances in order to sustain their own subjective paths of mobility: the autonomy of migration! In this part we want to show that becoming becomes the rule when the spaces of existence cease to be pure and emerge as transit spaces of mobility. Becoming animal, becoming woman, becoming child is essential to mobility, and becoming mobile is essential to labour, and labour as their biopolitical sphere of activity is essential to the acceleration and multiplication of desire. (Boris Buden, http://translate.eipcp.net/#redir) On analyzing the boys' behavior based on the becoming-minority theory, we can consider it as the opposite situation of a becoming-child. The macho manthat Pablo wishes to be is a fruit of traditional ideas in which a woman would be considered other and the creative and free self-consciousness is prevented. This is because the creative

self-identification

isformed

condition

that

the

object,

complete

organism, is dismantled and it has sympathy with the other getting out of a closed and

permanent

stereotype.

According

Deleuze's

Becoming

theory,

why

masculinity destructive? This is because the teacher's power in school, the father's power in a family, the husband's power in a married couple,and the oppressive power of super-ego in the individual tends to be destructive. War is similar with fascism because

they

are

characteristic

self-effacement.

Fascism

and

ethnocentrism

emphasize the permanence of race, blood and nation, excluding the possibility of change. In addition, they believe that the subject, such as race and nation, should be forever and that the transcendental value of these subjects is able to be supported by sublime

death

and

self-sacrifice.

And

so,

fascists

destroy

sexual

and

creative

(productive) desire, imposing self-sacrifice to maintain the transcendence of race.

The capital mistake made by psychoanalysis in this connection is to interpret these fully social determinations of subjectivity (racial, political, religious, etc.) in terms of the Oedipus complex, when the opposite is the case: familial segregation is not only historically derivative of these other segregative forms, but these latter have never ceased to operate in the modern "public sphere" and they effectively overdetermine the reproduction of subjectivity delegated under capitalism to the nuclear family: Families are filled with gaps and transected by breaks that are not familial: the Commune, the Dreyfus Affair, religion and atheism, the Spanish Civil War, the rise of fascism, Stalinism, the Vietnam War, Mayâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; 68-all these things form complexes of the unconscious, more effective than everlasting Oedipus. (Eugene W. Holland, 1999, 40)

They appeal to firearms to bring self-effacement in order to maintain their racial unity against other nations, by fair means or foul. In this sense of the word, Deleuze and Guattari's line of flight is related tothe Taoist notion of effortless efficacy that lets

things

flow

their

purest

state,

and

with

the

ethics

ecocentrismor

ecofeminism which is opposed to the thoughts of anthropocentric, egocentric and biocentric. It is not difficult for us to witness the war's destructive character. In Battle in

P aradise, Abel's brother dies as a fetus, a death caused by the Spanish Civil War, and Dora, Martin's lover, dies during childbirth because of bombing by Nationalist soldiers. In The Road to Soradan, an insane girl throws her new-born baby, who had been conceived after rape by a soldier, into an embankment. The corpse of a baby or fetus suggests how destructive and miserable the calamity of ideological war is. It is worth noting the death of Dora, which was the incident that made the war orphans cruel. The boys, stupefied with grief, lost their humanity and committed cruelties through their "Empire of Horror." Deleuze regards the loss of creative and productive energy, or of sexual desire, as anti-production of fascism (Deleuze, 1995: 33). Of a Thousand P lateaus, a direction would consist of giving a statute to the "war machines,"a statute that would not be defined by the war, but by a certain way to occupy, to fill â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;spatiogeographic aspectâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;(Deleuze & Gauttari, 1987, 380) or to invent new spatiogeographic aspect: the revolutionary movements [] and also the artistic movements, are military machines. The system, no matter how hard it makes an effort to have everything under control, does not obtain it. Always there are orifices by which an escape takes place, a flight. Always there are flows that put in danger the stability. For that reason, for Deleuze, the way is not the confrontation between

classes, but to detect and to reinforce those lines of flight that can lead, through the military machines, to newspatiogeographic aspect.

AXIOM II. The war machine is the invention of the nomads insofar as it is exterior to the State apparatus and distinct from the military institution. As such, the war machine has three aspects, a spatiogeograhpic aspect, an arithmetic or algebraic aspect, and an affective aspect. Nomad existence necessarily effectuates the conditions of the war machine in space.(Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, 380)

Before a system that tries to block desire, to circumscribe it to the sidelines, that tries to make each individual appear "modulated"by the same frequency, to see what lines of flight appear, or which can be constructed, where one can open up to the unexpected

thing,

the

event,

"the

revolutionary

moment"

that

produces

transformation. Inthis point of view, the dead body of Abel, from which the soldier felt nausea, is the climax of the so-called anti-production of war. In addition, his

â&#x20AC;&#x201D;

death results from the absence of "new spatiogeographic aspect"

in other words, the

failure to participate in the flux of forms, relying on his creativity in order to invent and re-invent himself to accommodate the flow of changes and demands that is the process of living.

[The

soldierstaggered

backwards

and

stumbled

the

camp-bed.

The

four-legs doubled up under the pressure of his knees and, before he could stop it, the body fell on the carpet and remained there, stretched out like a puppet, the eyes miraculously open and the bunch of poppies scattered round its head in a crown of faded, wrinkled petals. Then panic seized the women, who burst into a chorus of shrieks. The soldier felt his guts turning and ran out of the room to vomit in the corridor (Goytisolo, 1955: 165)]

In addition to the death, the oppression of eros means the absence of creative history heading for thefuture. Through the family lineage of Dora's uncle, the author suggests the declined anachronism of Spain, which lost the dynamic and creative future and the solitude of repeated history. The house of Dora's uncle associates with images of a convent becauseso many old spinsters lived in that house. On seeing the portrait of spinsters wearing mourning dress, Dora was harassed by a spinster's fantasy and resigned herself to a fatalism in which she would be doomed to be a spinster. The death of a boy whose father belongs to the Communist Party proves

the tragedy resulted from a closed social structure. The boy, whose father swung to the left, was always isolated and shunned by the villagers for being communist. His only pleasure was to gain fame as the bravest boy in the town. And so he enjoys jumping from in front of an oncoming train with his friends. The winner is the one who waits for the train to come closest and barely escapes from it. One day, the boy slipped by mistake and fell down by the railway covered with blood. The boy,who was more afraid of dishonor than of death, died saying that he would never be a communist. He finally proved to be bravest at all costs, unlike his betrayer father. He appeals to his innocence by death, in the closed reality in which he is doomed to be communist, regardless of his intention, by his father's decision in the face of ideological conflict.

[I hugged with my arms the trunk of the general who is covered with blood. He cried, "The general of the opponent has not yet crossed, has he?" The boy covered with blood barely opened his eyes, supported by his friends. He uttered, breathing hard, "My father is not a communist. I have never been the son of communist, either. Never, ever." (Yoon, 2003: 110)]

Considering that the death of Abel and a communist son symbolize the absolute solitude, the solitude result from fixed identity or a firm sense of the worldâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s boundaries.

The

harder

one

tries to formulate

fixed identity of

the

worldâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s

boundaries the more isolated he or she will be from the ongoing process of life. In other words, identity is developed through a series of oppositions which fluctuate throughout

oneâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s

life,

because

thesubject

constant

state

creation,

continuously acted upon by outside systems which give him shape. Until now, we recognize how destructive the oppressive and closed stereotype would be through a comparative study of masculinity, war and fascism. It is necessary that we should free ourselves from this rigid and closed tradition and recover the relationship with others in order to escape from this fatalism. Deleuze named it "pleasure machine", which means flow of the desire toward autonomy getting out of the hierarchic identity. Supposing that Goytisolo and Yoon suggest not only the tragedy caused by war, but also the message of healing against fascism and war, it is worth noticing how the two authors present the dynamic and penetrative identity responding to deterritorialization. Especially, Goytisolo relies on the influx of other cultures that will impose their identities on Spain.

3. The road toward creation and healing Goytisolo, who rejects Christian eschatology, was fascinated with Islamic pantheism by reason of the fact that pantheism denies one's own fixed identity and stresses the becoming, or creation surpassing spatial-temporal limits. In Las virtudes del pájaro

solitario, Goytisolo borrows Sufism's pantheism, in which thirty birds, through spiritual and mysterious experience, perceive themselves to be Simurg, a legendary bird that is a symbol of God. Sufis reject the dichotomy between ego and the other, identifying all things, including themselves, with God. in this respect, Sufism’s simurg is connected with postmodern hero, who can meld with the play of difference, defining himself as a continual flow of constructs or on the other hand become lost in the wave of transitions, losing all sense of continuity with his former self.(Massey, 94) Goytisolo intends to present himself unified with the cosmos, not excluding the other separated from himself. In 1970, Alvarito, hero of La reivindicación del conde

don J ulian, meets with his alter-ego Alvaro, 20 years later. Alvaro, identified with count Julian, kills Alvarito because Alvaro,into whom count Julian reincarnates 1200 years later, longs to break off his childhood because Alvaro swears revenge on descendants of king Rodrigo, violator of count Julian's daughter. If it is important that an assailant (Alvaro) be identified with a victim (Alvarito) it is that the murder of Alvaro suggests self-effacement, and self-effacement means the extreme freedom from all the things that are connected with the past. Especially, Goytisolo, a refugee author, wants to break off everything that is related to the dictatorship of Franco. During the dictatorship, Spain was isolated from Europe, sticking

the

so-called

"purity

blood"

based

the

propaganda

The

Reconquest in the Middle Ages. The purityof blood has been myth which represents religious rigidity and an oppressive factor against human nature or instinct. In this sense, the death of Alvarito means the demythologization of purity of blood. In addition, from the Sufi point of view, self-effacement means the united state with God (Simurg) after death. To unify with Simurg, Sufis assert that they should cut the relationship with all things that are related with themselves, including their own being. Sufis believe that self-effacement is not the end, but a change from the material world into a spiritual one, which makes spiritual immortality possible. InBattle in Paradise, the confession of Estanisla, "I made my best to escape from my past," provides the opportunity for unifying her with nature in order to free herfrom the fatal tragedy. After her sons died, Estanisla believed them to reincarnate into pigeons, birds or flowers. David and Romano change their identities continuously into animals in the mind of Estanila.

[I wanted to escape and Idid everything to stop being what I was. I imagined I was a flower, a bee, a tree. I wanted to elude time and I succeeded, by forgetting myself.(…) Sometimes I felt a pain in my wings, I picked at food with my beak, I noted a feather falling. (…) The wind disheveled the pines and the grass in the fields; the world was blue and innocent; and only I was seeking. I examined every flower before I decided to give up. I said: "David, are you here? Romano, are you here?" I could hear their laughter, light and fleeting, and sometimes the echo of their footsteps.(248)]

They are dismantled, and at the same time, revive without interruption in the shape of animals or flowers, crossing the limits betweenreality and fantasy, human and animal, past and present. Deleuze calls it deterritorialization, in which the subject is dismantled and absolutely nothing to do with one another. According to Deleuze's becoming theory, in man, the animal, and the man only meet on the paths of a common, but dissymetrical deterritorialization. The area of deterritorialization is not only that of imagination, sympathy, and communication transcending sex, race, class and age, but also that of chaos and infinity in which the conflicts between present and past continuously change into possibility toward future. In The Rainy Season, the message of healing and reconciliation also appears by unifying nature and human beings. The Rainy Season describes, from the innocent child's point of view, the miserable reality resulting from ideological war through dismantling of the family. His real grandmother, whose son belongs to the Communist Party, and his maternal grandmother, whose son is a South Korean officer, take refuge together. When they hear of the officer's death, the discord between the grandmothers comes to a climax. But the maternal grandmother, who made a prediction that the officer would come back, tried to look forward to her son. When she saw a big snake being chased by children, she lost her senses considering that her son would come back as a snake's life. On observing this scene, the real grandmother helps the snake escape from the children and performs sacrificial rites for the officer.

[His maternal grandmother was about to set the table simply. On the table were a cup of cold water, a dish of seasoned bracken, and fried pumpkin. After she put down a handful of hair, which I handed her, she raised up her eyes toward an old persimmon. I don’t intend to turn you out of the house. You have to keep this in mind, O. K.? Don’t be disappointed at smelling musty and go away without the anxiety of housework.]

It is worth noticing that the belief that a human coming back as a snake becomes the motive for reconciliation between contradictory ideological positions. According to Korean Shamanism, a big snake is considered a spiritual being that is responsible for guarding humans. The maternal grandmother changes her hatred toward the real grandmother into sympathy, taking comfort from the belief that her son would be safe by saving the snake. Estanisla, who lost her two sons, and the maternal grandmother whose son died, live in agony, but the reason that they can afford to live narrowly is the belief that their sons live near them by coming back as an animal's

life.

Sufi

pantheism

and

Korean

shamanism

have

influence

Juan

Goytisolo's later work and Yoonâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s work in the case of the fact that the two ideas decodify dicotomic thought between life and death, affording the message of healing. According

Deleuze,

Estanisla

and

the

maternal

grandmother

arrive

deterritorialization in which theypass over the irreparable and ideological valley. In The Road to Soradan, the road leads to the space which is opened toward the future, reconciliation, and healing, by dialectal communication. The nearer their hometown, the

disjointed

the

dichotomy

between

center/circumference,

standard

language/dialect and metropolis/country. In the metropolis, a dialect is the other, while in the hometown, a standard language is the other. On the homecoming day in memory of their 40th anniversary of graduation, all the conversation of the graduates is spoken in dialect, turning from the present into the past innocent childhood. In addition, the hometown becomes a center of meeting which socially belongs to the suburbs. The level of rankbetween dialect and standard language is overturned when the graduates meet in their hometown. In the metropolis, the rank of standard language is higher than dialect, while in the hometown dialect is higher than standard language. In other words, onthe existing level of rank, dialect or natural, every language is inferior to a standard language or artificial language. On the contrary, in the hometown, the existing level of languages is not permitted. The existing level of rank is dismantled by vulgar and coarse conversation, and laughter caused by expressions of the lower part of the body, which are far from dignified culture.

[Fart guy, you wag your tongue, whose bad smell is similar to that of a toilet. You are as glib-tongued as ever!" They had good laughs at jokes throughout the whole meeting. That night, they burst out laughing without interruption. They all got fully prepared to burst out laughing as if they expected to tickle each otherâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s armpits.]

An expression that abases the body raises a laugh. Laughter connected with excretion makes dignified culture powerless, and binds people who belong to different classes into a cultural group of equality. And this group calls the memory connected with war ineveryday language, interpreting it from the present point of view. By using dialect oppressed by standard language, they approachchildhood's experience. When they spent one night in their hometown, an Alumnus recalled his childhood with buried memories, which remained pure of mind, returning to the past for a long time. Finally they will begin a new life. The dialect, which is a suppressed language in the linguistic educational point of view, reminds them of their childhood. As a result, it becomes a treasure, such as the magical box that saved the life of Ha In-chul at the moment of suicide (Yoon, 2003: 309). The dialects exist in the home as a repressed purity, whose naturalness in a common value has some sort of cleansing role in childhood.

[Why did you suddenly think of surviving? -I do not know. A night when you were able to dig out precious memories of your childhood made you prevent from dying of sleeping pills. As a result, reminiscences that we have exchanged to pass one bored night brought you a life. By the way, do you sense the change of atmosphere in the bus? Well, listen, upon entering the highway, our friends speak more and more in the standard language. On the contrary, they preferred to use the dialect in the hometown. Closer to Seoul, they pretend to speak more frequently in standard language. Conversely, you speak more and more in dialect on approaching Seoul. -I? Yes. You pretend to speak in the dialect, without mimicking standard language (Yoon, 2003: 309).]

The Road to Soradan is the deterritorialized place that is reconstituted by the memory of the graduates of the elementary school as a culturally homogeneous group.

Makbara, Goytisolo's novel published in 1980, is criticized as fictionization of the Carnival Theory. It is because the author does not instill his intention into the reader one-sidedly, but the reader participates on equal terms with the author in the creation of work by mutual conversation. Especially in the "Lectura de XemaĂ -el-Fna", the grade of official culture and unofficial culture is overturned, just like in The Road to

Soradan.

[freeing language, freeing all discourse opposed to the dominant, normal scheme of things: the authoritative voice of fathers, husbands, leaders, aulic councils of the tribe(â&#x20AC;Ś) pouring out what is stored up in thebrain and the belly, the heart, vagina, testicles: talking and talking, in a torrent of words, for hours and hours on end: vomiting dreams, words, stories till everything has been emptied out(267)]

This place is just like a night market in an Islamic plaza, a so-called 'Alca.' It is not only the area of sympathy and communication in which all participate in conversation with directed touch of body, slander, and shout, and where all the people laugh and weep together, but also the area of the deterritorialization where all the people surpasssex, class, race and any other differences through dynamic and creative imagination.

III. Conclusion Abraham Maslow outlines individuals in the

postmodern era: their

ability to

perceive reality more accurately, and their powerful creative spirit. In the postmodern world, a clearer perception of reality means an understanding that all of reality, including the individualâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s own sense of being, is a construct. There are no concrete forms

permanent

paradigms.

Instead,

principles,

signifiers,

and

identities

are

created, and evolve to meet ever-changing circumstances. The individual participates in this flux of forms, relying on his creativity in order to invent and to re-invent himself to accommodate the flow of changes anddemands that is the process of living. The theory of the postmodern individual may be connected with the theory of Deleuze and Gauttari. The novels that I have analyzed are related to the tragedy of fratricidal war caused by ideological conflicts between members of the same race through the distorted mind of children. We find how destructive and unproductive war and fascism, which is defined as a "cancerous organism," can be. In addition, we recognize that the dichotomy between male/female, standard language/dialect, and majority/minority oppress the free and creative imagination. Despite a long gap of time between the publications of these works, they have a great deal in common, including themes of the loss of human nature, family dissolution, and distorted heroism. The tragedy of the boys results from the rejection of the notion of the subject. Identity is developed through a series of oppositions that fluctuate throughout oneâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s life. The subject is in a constant state of creation, continuously acted uponby outside systems that give him shape. However, the two authors show some hope for

recovery, suggesting an inclination toward the future in which they hope for the healing of the scars of war and renewal. Through the two characters Jordi and Anapban,

whoare

located

the

boundary

between

male/female,

and

through

Estanisla and the maternal grandmother, who are located on the deterritorialization between human/animal, with the belief that their dead sons will come back as animal life, the authors present a deterritorialized and nomadic freedom from the spreading violence and madness caused by war. In spite of the fact that Yoon intends to water down the tragedy of fratricidal war with racial emotion, such as shamanism and nostalgic dialect, while Goytisolo depends more on the demythologization and disruption from the past than traditional beliefs, the authors have a common theme of rejection of rigid and intolerant dogma. Goytisolo actively searches for creative communication with other cultures that will impose their identities on Spain, dissociated from the history on the basis of "purity of blood."Meanwhile, Yoon recalls local and individual histories, eliminated by official history, to free himself from an ideological dogma. Despite these differences, the authors, who both experienced the death of loving family during the war, are in accord as to how the ideological conflicts and official culture, which stress differences, deform human nature.

Discussion Distorted Infancy and War

Discussant : Park, Hyo Young (Pusan University of Foreign Studies)

The investigator intends to analyze the cause of tragedy and the possibility of finding the message of healing in two different works written by two different writers in Spain and Korea: The Battle in P aradise of Juan Goytisolo and The Road

to Soradan of Yoon Jeon Gil.

In order to carry out her proposal, she takes advantage of theoretic tools like deterritorialization and the nomadology theory of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari.

According to the article, two writers mentioned above have common personal experiences

the

memory

losing

their

family

members

during

the

War.

Moreover, the authors are said to show the similar aesthetic attitude and interests towards some issues: the special attentions in isolated persons and the critical attitude to their society, and so on. In addition, it is not difficult to find some characters who have the nomadic identity like Jordi in Spanish novel and Uncle An in Korean one. It is said that they are the ideal characters who show a primitive life close to Nature going above and beyond the traditional dichotomy.

She comes to the conclusion that the two analyzed works will be a good example f the cruelty of war and fascism presenting the possibility of overcoming the traditional dichotomy between male/female, standard language/dialect and majority and minority.

In my opinion, the study is very welll oriented to approach the essence of the civil war and the its undesirable reasults relying on the cultural and philosophic theories of Deleuze and Guattari.

In spite of the excellent quality of the article, I can't but indicate some points to be desired for the better study. In the first instance, I get the impression that the theoretic tools are not intimately related to the analyzed works. In other words, the theory is one thing, and the analysis is another. In the second, some parts appear to

be superflous without taking part in the context of the article. Finally, I would like indicate some gramatical and syntatic errors throung the entire article.

Panel 3 Social Sciences(Cultural Interrelations) (Tulip Room) Chair : Choi, Chang Mo (Konkuk University)

1. Continuity and Change in French Foreign Policy towards Africa in the 1990s. Shin, Won Yong (Youngsan University) Discussant : Jung, Sang Ryul (Sejong Institute) 2. Interchanges as well as Conflicts between the Carthage-Phoenicians and the Greeks Che, Ja Young (IMS) Discussant : Song, Do Young (Hanyang University) 3. The Agriculture in Egypt during the Medieval Ages : A Focus on Mamluk Period Wan Kamal Mujani (National University of Malaysia, Professor) Discussant : Mohammed Selim (Kuwait University) 4. Morocco, the EU and the Mediterranean Solar Plan : A Driver for the Development of Whom? Gonzalo Escribano (Universidad Nacional de Educaci贸n a Distancia) Discussant : Park, Yun Joo (Keimyung University)

Continuity and Change in French Foreign Policy towards Africa in the 1990s.

Shin, Won Yong (Youngsan University)

I. Introduction The relations of France with its former colonies in Africa have been complex and intense. French influence in postcolonial francophone Africa has been based on the material, political and symbolic power of the financial chain forged by the CFA franc, and on the presence of French troops. Ever since it first stepped in to restore to power the Gabonese president Leon M'ba in 1964, France has intervened militarily more than 30 times in its former colonies. Most of these interventions, however, have been spurred by pressure from France's clients in the region. Francophone African elites have been willing to extend sovereign rights to Paris, trading certain kinds of authority

and

independence

for

enhanced

material

wealth,

security

and

other

benefits.(Kahler, 1996, 299-300) The Franco-African relationship was orchestrated by an 'African cell' in the secretariat of the French Presidency. General Charles de Gaulle had entrusted the conduct of France's policy towards Africa to one man: Facques Foccart. He remained head of the 'African cell' for almost 15 years, repeatedly bypassing normal diplomatic channels and placing his own envoys in sensitive areas to support or undermine African regimes. The Franco-African relationship seemed to resist change even in the 1980s, when the African policy of Francois Mitterrand's socialist government became indistinguishable

from

those

his

neo-Gaullist

predecessors.(

Bayart,

1984)

Mitterrand's son, Jean-Christophe, the new head of the 'African cell' of the ElysĂŠe palace, continued the Foccartiste tradition of personal contacts with African leaders. Apart from the presidency, other powerful political and financial networks were managed

the

connections

relationship

was

great

France's

French

trading

former

characterised

houses,

which

colonies.(Wauthier,

its

personal

also

1995)

aspects,

maintained

The 'the

strong

Franco-African long-established

friendships, the networks of personal trust and obligation [and] the connections formed by freemasonry and occasionally marriage'.( Clapham, 1996, 89) A few dozens key figures, the so-called 'Messieurs Afrique', facilitated or impeded decisions that

related to francophone Africa.( Smith & Glaser, 1992) Some of these Messieurs could be found in the senior civil service of France, and others in the private commercial sector; some were visible in public life and others hidden in the most opaque branches of the secret services.

The 1990s, however, seemed to have brought changes. In 1994, Paris decided to devalue the CFA franc by 50 per cent. The same year the French president announced the end of unilateral

military interventions in Africa.

French troops

stationed in the continent were reduced from 7,900 to 5,500 within a three-year period. Do these changes constitute a radical break with the past? Or are they merely tactical moves that will not alter the basic premise of France's policy towards its former colonies? This paper will analyse the external and internal causes of change in French policy vis-Ă -vis Africa, and will examine the significance of the changes for the Franco-African relationship.

II. The External Milieu: From 'Benign Neglect' to 'Active Realism' The changes in French policy towards Africa were caused, to a large extent, by external factors. At the global level, the special position enjoyed by France on the international scene has changed dramatically since the end of the Cold War. This period of super-power rivalry had certain advantages for a medium-sized power such as France. For decades, France had asserted its position in the international system through 'uniqueness': France's national perception was that of an 'independent' actor within a bipolar world. The demise of Europe's divisions and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, however, have challenged France's 'special' position in international politics. (Vernet, 1992, 656) The identity of 'uniqueness' could not be sustained, and the country felt that was becoming just another 'ordinary power'. (Hoffmann, 1993, 147) Probably more than anything else, the emergence of a more powerful neighbour undermined France's status in the international system and its feeling of grandeur. Previously, the Paris-Bonn axis had been the motor of European integration, the very bedrock of European harmony. In the 1990s, France policy-makers expressed worries that the powerful reunited Germany would not need French friendship quite as much as before. These policy-makers feared that Germany would soon start to exercise its real European weight and cease treating France as an equal partner.

In terms of French foreign relations with Africa, these changes in Europe were

important. The need to balance the power of Germany forced Paris to focus its attention on developments within the European Union. Foreign policy-makers also had to devote

energy to France's future

structures

(especially

NATO reform)

role

in the

Furthermore,

the

new European security

already

stretched

French

foreign assistance budget had to take into account the new aid recipients of Eastern Europe. The monumental events of 1989 marginalised Africa in the agenda of French foreign policy. The marginalisation trend was reinforced by Africa's weakened position in the wider international system. The end of the Cold War resulted in the United States and the USSR no longer competing with each other in Africa. Hence, the bargaining power of African states declined: regional actors could no longer play off one superpower against the other. Similarly, as the bipolar system collapsed, France could no longer present itself as a defender of western interests in Africa. Consequently the significance of francophone states for France's international status diminished. During the

Cold

War,

Franco-African

relations

helped

France

maintain

self-perception as a major power, expecially at the United Nations. For decades, France's ties with its former colonies in Africa allowed Paris to secure a significant number of votes in the UN's General Assembly. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the disintegration of Yugoslavia, however, have added more than 15 non-African members

the

total

membership

the

United

Nations.

Thus,

the

relative

importance of Africa in the General Assembly has diminished. (Mazrui, 1996, 37)

Africa's economic collapse in the 1980s and 1990s also reduced France's interests in Africa. The continent's economic growth failed to keep pace with population growth, much less provide a basis for sustainable development. Africa's GDP per head declined by 2.2 per cent annually. (World Bank, 1990, 11) Despite a significant rise in foreign aid, the external debt of the continent's states doubled, and Africa's share of world trade Consequently,

fell

from 9 per

cent

in 1960 to 1

per

cent

in the

early 1990s.

by 1993, sub-saharan Africa accounted for only 5.3 per cent

France's imports and 6.9 per cent of its exports. By comparison, the percentages for 1980 had been 10.9 and 13.5 per cent respectively. (Eurostat, 1994, 40-1) Despite this political and economic marginalisation, Africa did not totally lose its sense of importance to policy-makers in Paris. The serious identity crisis that French foreign policy confronted in the post-Cold War era made Paris particularly sensitive to developments that could further undermine France's status or influence in world politics. For years, France claimed that francophone African states belong to the French

traditional

sphere

influence.

Paris

considered

francophone

Africa

constituting a natural French preserve, a domain reserve. As this chapter will demonstrate, however, this perception of exclusivity was threatened by three specific developments in the 1990s.( Martin,1989, 103-4)

II-1. The threats to exclusivity The first and most significant development was the Great Lakes crisis. The 1994-97 events in Rwanda and Zaire were seen by many French politicians and diplomats

evidence

'American

conspiracy

oust

France

from

Africa'.(Huliaras, 1998, 593-609) The victories of the anglophone Tutsis in Rwanda and the success of Laurent Kabila's forces in Zaire, who were supported by the United States, were considered by Paris as major defeats. France viewed the collapse of its protĂŠgĂŠs in Rwanda and Zaire as part of a UN complot Anglo-Saxon to steal its sphere of influence.(Hugeux, 1997, 155-68) Although the United States did not seem to follow any particular strategy, or have any long-term policy in relation events as part of an American conspiracy against la francophonie. France continued to act defensively until the beginning of 1997. Even in March 1997, when the French must have known that Mobutu had only months to live, and just a few weeks before he fled the country, de Charette claimed that Zaire's leader was 'the only person capable of contributing to the solution of the problem'.(IRIN, 1997) The fall of Rwanda to the Tutsi rebels and the collapse of the Mobutu regime in Zaire revived France's interest for Africa.

The

second

development

that

seemed

undermine

French

exclusivity,

and

consequently strengthened France's interest for the continent, was the importance that the United States ascribed to its economic relation with post-Cold War Africa. The end of the bipolar system has promoted the economic angle within the US foreign policy agenda: a consensus has developed in Washington that American external policy should serve as the facilitator of US private enterprise.(Chrispopher, 1995, 16-8) Herman Cohen, the Assistant Secretary of State, argued in February 1995 that the United States could no longer afford to accept France's determination to maintain its privileged chasse gardĂŠe (private hunting ground) within the economic realm.

(Schraeder,

1996,

201)

diplomats

started

exert

pressure

francophone leaders to sign contracts with US telecommunication and petroleum companies, many French policy-makes expressed their fears about the possible loss of economic exclusivity.

The third development that threatened France's exclusivity in francophone Africa

was the disappearance of the colonial generation in the continent, the generation which

had

been

the

historic

root

mutual

relations.

The

death

Felix

Houphouet-Boigny, president of C么te d'lvoire in 1993, symbolised the end of an era in Franco-African relations. A new generation of leaders were beginning to emerge, less willing to accept the ties enjoyed and permitted by their predecessors. For example, Christophe Soglo of Benin and Alassance Ouattara of C么te d'lvoire were US-trained technocrats.(Adebajo, 1997, 150) Also newly elected leaders, like Pascal Lissouba of Congo-Brazzaville, have been less willing, in comparison to their predecessors, to follow instructions coming from Paris. A growing insecurity fomented by these three developments

became

increasingly

influential

French

actions

the

1990s

progressed.

II-2. The evolution of France's post-cold War Africa policy In general we can divide France's initial post-Cold War foreign policy towards Africa into two periods: the 1989-94 era of 'benign neglect' and the 1994-97 period of 'defensive reaction'. During the first era, the end of the Cold War

and the new

challenges that France confronted in Europe seemed to marginalise Africa in its foreign policy. The events in Rwanda and Zaire, and the perceived threats to exclusivity in francophone Africa (US economic influence and generational change), however, soon revived France's attention to developments on the continent. Paris behaved defensively, by choosing to support its client regimes and by accusing Americans of a 'hidden agenda'.

the

Fran莽ois Leotard, the leader of a junior coalition

partner within the French government, said in 1997 that the twist of events in Zaire had produced a 'triple failure' for France: 'tactically, because Kabila was backed by the US and anglophone African countries; morally, because France had given the impression of supporting the "discredited" Mr. Mobutu to the end; and geo-politically because

Zaire

was

essential

element

the

French

presence

the

continent.(Buchan, 1997) Not unexpectedly, this triple failure forced France to abandon its 'defensive' tactics and its foreign policy towards Africa entered a new third era that could be described as the period of 'active realism'. This 'active realism' era was characterised by France's efforts to 'normalise' its relations

with

its

former

colonies.

Responding

public

demands,

but

also

demonstrating the new Parliamentary Information Commission to investigate the role France played in Rwanda during the early 1990s. The commission marked an important step in democratising France's African policy, it was the first time that MPs were able to gain access to the working of the presidency's 'African cell'. Confidential

defence

documents

were

made

available

the

Commission,

and

two-thirds of the former hearings that took place in camera were subsequently published.(Le Monde,

17 Dec.1998)

French officials have also abandoned the anti-American rhetoric that characterised the 'defensive reaction' period. They began to talk about the 'complementary nature' of French and American interests in Africa. President Clinton's visit to Africa in the spring of 1997, and the presentation by the United States of a plan to strengthen United states trade in sub-Saharan Afica, did not provoke any negative reactions from Paris.(Smyth, 1998, 82-92) Apart from altering its defensive posture, France has also tried to extend its influence to non-francophone Africa. A demonstration of this new approach involved President Jacques Chirac visiting Namibia, South Africa, Mozambique and Angola in 1998. To a large extent, this broader African policy refleced the realities of France's economic relations with the continent. Non-francophone states accounted for more than 50 percent of France's financial exchanges with Africa.(Graham, 1998) These efforts

extend

French

influence

Lusophone

countries,

however,

were

not

welcomed by Portugal. Tensions between Lisbon and Paris became even more heightened in 1998 when Senegal and Guinea invaded Guinea Bissau to restore order after a coup d'etat.

Another 'African factor' that led French to adapt its policy and 'open up to the entire African continent' was the end of apartheid and the successful democratic transition in South Africa. During era of 'defensive reaction', Paris had tried to persuade Pretoria to adopt the principle of complementaritĂŠ, whereby South Africa's sphere of influence would be recognised in southern Africa in exchange for recognising Paris's sphere of influence francophone Africa. In the new spirit of 'realism', Paris had

pursued positive economic contacts with South Africa. Indeed,

South Africa has become France's largest market in sub-Saharan Africa (with bilateral trade rising by an impressive 20 per cent in 1997), and France now occupies the position of the sixth largest foreign investor in South Africa.(Mills, 1998)

III. The Domestic Milieu : Economic Imperatives and the New Bureaucrats Changes in France's domestic milieu have contributed significantly to Africa's marginalisation in France foreign policy. In the early 1990s, the French economy suffered a severe recession. The country's effort to comply with the criteria required by European Monetary Union exacerbated these financial problems. Inflation, interest

rates and the budget deficit had to be reduced, and the austerity programme that the French government began to implement was not without significant social costs. Above

all,

the

privatisation

programme

threatened

increase

substantially the

already high unemployment figures. This recession had four significant consequences for Franco-African relations.

The first was the implementation of a tougher anti-immigration policy. Immigration was a front-page question everywhere in the European Union, but nowhere more so than in France. In the public mind, immigration destroyed national culture and, with 'globalisation', took away jobs.(Hoagland, 1997)

Closely connected with high unemployment, the anti-immigration atmosphere that prevailed in France became apparent with the electoral successes of Jean-Marie Le Pen's National Front.(Cohen, 1997) In response to public attitudes, the France leaders tried to appease anti-immigrant feeling while, at the same time, sending a negative message to would-be immigrants. Consequently, Africans began to confront severe impediments on visiting France. The simplifications of the procedures for expelling illegal

immigrants

and

the

steeply

rising

deportations

have

disappointed

many

Africans that had hoped for a work permit. The conduct of the police against 400 illegal immigrants from Mali and Senegal, who were on hunger strike in a Paris church in March 1996, further damaged France's image in Africa. (Doyle, 1996, 410-11) The second consequence of France's economic problems was the depreciation of the CFA franc. In July 1994, Prime Minister Edouard Balladur, confronting a budget deficit that impeded France's compliance to the Masstricht criteia, announced the devaluation of the CFA franc by 50 per cent. From the economic point of view, the move was very rational. The currency that had been pegged at the same exchang rate since 1948 had become grossly overvalued. Consequently, francophone African states' exports had stagnated while their foreign exchange reserves were being exhausted. The devaluation of the CFA franc, however, dismayed the African elites whose consumer imports were no longer heavily subsidised. For decades, France sustained the lifestyles of those African urban elites that had the highest propensity to consume imports. In this sense, the CFA franc - and the French budget maintained the entire political class on which the Franco-African relationship was based.

Hence,

the

devaluation

provoked

negative

reactions

from

African

elites.

(Clapham, 1996, 93-4) The third consequence was the reduction of the levels of foreign assistance. In the

early 1990s, French Official Development Assistance (ODA) had steadily grown. After 1994, by contrast, the foreign aid budget has been significantly reduced. Although France continued to the largest EU donor volume, its ODA as a percentage of GNP was lower than ever (at 0.45 per cent in 1997). Politically, the rate of return from aid expenditure

was

always

considered

important.

Reflecting

this

attitude,

tied

aid

accounted for almost 50 per cent of total bilateral assistance. Neverthless, aid fatigue was growing and the scepticism regarding the importance of assistance for the French economy was increasing.(ICV & EUROSTEP, 1996,120)

The fourth consequence was the reform of the French Army. Due to increasing pressures to meet the budgetary requirements of the Masstricht Treaty (but also reflecting the need for modernisation in view of France's entry into NATO's military wing), the French government announced a radical reform of the army in 1996. The reform consisted of reductions in the defence budget, decreased in army personnel and a scaling down of the nuclear arsenal. As part of the programme, the number of French troops stationed in overseas bases would be reduced.(Vasset, 1997, 175) The new socialist government that gained power in July 1997 not only agreed with the decision of the previous administration to reduce France's military presence in Africa, but also declared that it would speed up this process. Soon it was confirmed that France's Bouar base in the Central African Republic would be closed, and that French forces would pull out from Gabon and Chad. Later that year, Alain Richard, the minister of defence, announced that the French military contingent in Djibouti would also be reduced from 3,200 to 2,600 troops. Similarly, the general military cooperation budget was cut, with only 513 military advisers posted to sub-Saharan Afica in 1998 (compared to 645 in 1996), and France also announced the creation of an African force that would act as a substitute for its own peace-keeping operations in the continent. Thus, rather than the French Foreign Legion being deployed, troops from Mali, Mauritania, Senegal, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, Ghana and the Gambia, supported by French logistics, undertook a large peace-keeping

exercise in Senegal

in 1998.( IISS, 1998, 236) Apart from France's economic problems, the shift in Franco-African relations also reflected changes in France's political and bureaucratic elites. In the early 1990s, a number of reformers appeared within the French elite, favouring the ending of the 'special relationship' with francophone Africa. They advocated instead a change of focus more towards Eastern Europe and Asia.(Adebayo, 1997, 149) The reformers were able to significantly modify French policies vis-a-vis Africa with the arrival, in

April 1993, of Edouard Balladur as prime minister and the devaluation of the CFA franc.

When, however, in July 1995 the newly elected President Jacques Chirac visited western Africa (his first overseas tour), he brought with him Jacques Foccart. Furthermore, Michel Dupuch, the new head of the 'African cell' in the presidency, was a Foccart protégé. For a moment, there was some speculation that the reformers had lost the bureaucratic struggle and that Gaullist views on Africa were once more prevailing. The reformers, however, now led by the new prime minister Alain Juppé (former foreign minister under Balladur), were strengthening their position in the decision-making system. Thus, in summer 1996, it was confirmed that the number of French troops in Africa would indeed be scaled down. (Marchal, 1998, 371)

The apparent transformation of French policy towards Africa has been strengthened by governmental change. In April 1997, President Chirac called for early elections. When he dissolved the National Assembly, it was clear that he aimed at solidifying his parliamentary majority so he could secure further budget cuts and firm up the government's commitment to the European Monetary Union. The move proved a major miscalculation, as the unexpected victory of Lionel Jospin's Socialist Party left Chirac at the head of a divided government. The president was forced to accept 'cohabitation' with a prime minister of a different political party.

Lionel Jospin immediately distanced himself from the style of African relations practised by Mitterrand. (Ibid, 358-9) Indeed, as early as the election campaign itself, Jospin had pledged a new approach to the continent. France's economic and military agreements with francophone African states, he argued, were outdated. Thus, there was

surprise

when,

within

few

months

gaining

power,

the

socialist

government announced that it would speed up the withdrawal of French troops from the continent; that the ‘Cooperation’ department would be downgraded to a junior ministry; and that the post of the minister of ‘la francophonie’ would be abolished. Chirac nt appeared to support the reforms. He made it clear that he no longer felt that France’s Africa policy should be a presidential reserve. The reformers’ agenda seemed to be complete when, in December 1997, on his first trip to Africa, Jospin announced the main elements of France’s new African policy: 1) troop reduction, 2) more careful monitoring of aid projects and 3) a greater control of the issuing of visas and work permits.(Webster, 1997)

Fanco-African relations were also effected by another change within Franceâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s domestic milieu. A law was enacted regulating the financing of French political parties. African heads of states had previously always been large contributors to the coffers of all the main French political parties. With one piece of legislation, however, this well-established tradition of slush funding was curtailed. French politicians no longer made trips to Africa to bolster their campaign coffers. T

A second piece of legislation that is expected to influence the Franco-African relationship relates to corruption. In December 1997, 28 OECD countries, as well as five

other

states,

signed a convention on â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;combating bribery of foreign public

officialsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;, promising to criminalise the bribery of foreign politicians and/or bureaucrats in international business transactions. The signatories promised to introduce new anti-corruption measures into their domestic legislation by the end of 1998. In France, the signing of the convention was accompanied by a reform of the financial regime for commissions paid for securing foreign contracts.

This anti-corruption reform is

already changing Franco-African economic relations. (Bray, 1998, 223)

IV. The Ambivalent Reforms During this period

France had introduced impressive reforms in its foreign policy

towards Africa. A clear distinction should be made, however, between motives for change and actual change.

Was the reform a linear process, or would this process be

hampered by setbacks? Did these changes in France's policy towards Africa, indeed, constituted a far-reaching reorientation of policy, or would elements of continuity continue to dominate?

The

first

argument

pointing to continuity was the

difference

between policy

declarations and policy implementation. Probably the best-known case of ambiguity was the French attitude towards African democratisation. The end of the Cold War and

the

rise

of pro-democracy movements in francophone

Africa

led

Paris to

announce that democratisation would become the guiding principle of French policy in the region. President Mitterrand, speaking at the 1990 Franco-African summit in La Baule, stated that France henceforth would link its aid to democratic reform. Although the

announcement

'had

catalysing

francophone Africa',(Clark & Gardinier,

effect

reform

movements

throughout

1997, 2) Political Reform in Francophone

Africa, p.2. France showed no particular enthusiasm in implementing this policy. Quite the contrary, just a couple of years later, the policy was officially abandoned. At the

following Franco-African summit, held in Libreville, the French Prime Minister, Pierre Beregevoy, stated that when confronted with the potentially conflicting goals of promoting democracy, ensuring development and maintaining security, francophone African leaders were expected to adhere to the following order of priorities: first, and above all, security; followed by development; and, finally, democratisation.

Under the

new socialist administration, the 'democratic' language had reappeared. It remained unclear, however, if Paris is willing, by using concrete measures (the suspension of aid,

for

example),

endanger

short-term

interests

order

promote

democratisation in Africa. (Glaser & Smith, 1992, 102)

Another example of the difference between words and deeds could be found in the area of French military intervention of the continent. During the crisis in Rwanda, Chirac solemnly declared that the French army would not engage in any further 'unilateral actions' in Africa. Paris soon sent troops, however, to thwart an attempted coup in the Comoros, in 1995. A few months later, Chirac's declaration proved once more unsubstantiated. When, in 1996, more than one-third of the Central African Republic's

regular

army

Assistance

Elements

mutinied,

stationed

the the

2,000 country

troops

helped

the

French

prevent

Operational

the

mutineers

reaching the presidential palace. President Ange-FĂŠlix Patasse was supplied with an unexpected reprieve.(Le Monde,20, Aug. 1997)

A second pointer in favour of continuity

was the ambivalent character of the

introduced changes. A good example was the significance of the reduction of French military forces in Africa. Was that reduction of troops mark a radical change of attitudes towards intervention? Since 1993, France has set up La Force d'Action Rapide, composed of 44,500 men capable of intervening, at short notice almost anywhere in Africa from bases in France. (Pan African News Agency, 18 Oct, 1997) Moreover, having announced cuts in the forces stationed in its former colonies, France presented plans to train an African peacekeeping force. Although many observers

considered

this

move

disengagement,

practice

the

African

peacekeeping force was run by French advisers and paid for by France. Although it was true that the French obtained a retrospective mandate from the United Nations for this force, it was clear that, with the absence of strong African leadership, the initiative may become an extension of French power in Africa. (The Economists, 22 Nov, 1997)

Another important aspect of France's current strategy in Africa lies with its efforts

to strengthen its relations with the non-francophone states of the continent. This policy is not so new as some analysts claim. A good example is the Franco-African summit brought together almost all the continent's leaders. The greatest significance of the summit lies in the fact that this was not just a francophone affairs, it was a firm indication that France is looking beyond its traditional sphere of influence. The expansion of membership, however, is not a new phenomenon. Only the 1973 and 1975 summits were restricted to France and ten of the francophone African states. In the 1976 summit several non-French speaking sub-Saharan African countries were represented as observers. As more countries came on board, the difference between member and observer status gradually began to fade, until it was eliminated entirely in 1987. By the time of the Casablanca summit of 1988, participation had risen to 38 countries, while the Ouagadougou summit held in 1996, was attended by 50 states. Thus France's interest in non-francophone Africa proved not to be a totally new policy.

Another continuity lies with the fact that the ElysĂŠe Palace remained very active in the area of Franco-African relations, despite Chirac's proclamation about 'ending the presidential reserve'. It seemed that Chirac was not ready to abandon his inclination for undertaking important foreign policy initiatives. (Le Monde, 8 Oct, 1998)

It seems as if, with the socialist victory, political authority has shifted decisively from the ElysĂŠe to the Matignon Palace. Chirac has been forced to stop interfering in domestic policy, so instead had started devoting more attention to foreign policy (where the constitution accords primacy to the head of state). Thus, in this sense, cohabitation seemed to strengthen the traditional

foreign policy decision-making

system, with the president playing a very active role. In the case of Africa, cohabitation tended to, once more, reinforce the power of the 'African cell' of the presidency.

V. Conclusion The driving forces of change in France's policy vis-Ă -vis Africa in the 1990s were collapse of the bipolar international system, the declining levels of French economic interests in Africa, and the necessities of domestic economic austerity. Other motives for change included different political personnel in both France and Africa, as well as the collapse of France's client regimes in Rwanda and Zaire. This changing political environment,

resulted in three distinct

phases of

French post-Cold

War

policy

towards Africa: the 1989-94 era of 'benign neglect', the 1994-97 era of 'defensive reaction' and the 1997 present era of 'active realism'.

A close examination of this policy, however, revealed Franco-African relations to be more characterised by changes in strategy, rather than actual changes in policy implementation. Indeed, the most apparent trend in French foreign policy towards Africa was a growing neglect, a neglect stemming from the end of the cold war and the resulting marginalisation of Africa in the agendas of all major western powers. Despite this increasing indifference towards Africa, however, France continued to maintain an interest in the continent far more than the other former colonial powers. (Clapham, 1996, 98)

Did growing neglect mean that France would disengage from sub-Saharan Africa altogether? The answer is negative. Although France has no vital interests in the region, there are a number of reasons that will keep French foreign policy interested in African affairs in the twenty-first century, First, France is concerned with the broader implications of conflicts within sub-Saharan Africa and, in particular, over their contagious effects in the strategically important region of northern Africa. Threats of terrorism of Islamic origin and uncontrolled migration from northern Africa also

concern

French

officials.(Hoagland,

1997)

France's

rapprochement

with

the

Islamic regime of Sudan was a clear policy response to these fears. Tensions between Egypt and Sudan, Libya and Chad, Mauritania and Senegal, Morocco and Algeria in relation to Western Sahara, or even future implications of the Tuareg issue for Algeria, will also not allow Paris to neglect the countries of the Sahel.

The second factor that will keep France interested in Africa is economics. More than 200 French companies continue to do business on

the continent, and France still

needs assured access to African strategic raw materials.(Martin, 1989, 10) Further, the death of Jacques Foccart in May 1997 does not mean the end of the personal networks that have characterised Franco-African relations for decades. The powerful organised networks surrounding politicians or the directors of big companies, which mix public and private interests, the famous reseaux, continue to operate moreover

the

protection

the

significant

French

communities

Africa

(les

expatries) will help keep alive French interest in Africa.

Finally, the cultural and linguistic identity of la francophonie will remain central to France's foreign policy. French support for the Habyarimana regime in Rwanda

reflected the fact that les genocidaires spoke French while the French efforts to secure Boutros Boutros-Ghali a second term as Secretary-General of the United Nation were based on the fact he was a francophone. The value of la voie française in the era of globalisation will remain important, and France's engagement in African affairs will continue to be significant.

<Biblography> Adebajo, 1997. 'France and Africa: folie de grandeur', The World Today, 53 (6) Bayart, J. F. 1984. La Politique Africaine de François Mitterrand, Karthala Bray, J. 1998. 'Companies, Corruption and Competition',The World Today. 54(8-9) 65. Wauthier, La cooperation Francaise Buchan, D. 'France Broadens African Policy Focus', Financial Times (8 September 1997). Christopher, W, 1995. 'America's Leadership, America's opportunity', Foreign Policy, 98 (Spring 1995) Clapham, S. 1996. Africa and the International system: the Politics of State Survival, Cambridge University Press Clark, J.F. &

Gardinier D.E .(eds), 1997. Political reform in Francophone Africa,

Westview Press Doyle, L. 1996. 'EU Slams the Door on Fleeing Victims', Guardian Weekly (31 March 1996); Keesing's Record of World Events. Eurostat, 1994. External Trade 1994, Eurostat Evans, G. 1997. Responding to the Crises in the African Great Lakes, Oxford University Press Glaser,

& Smith, S.

1992. L'Afrique sans Africaines: Le Reve Blanc du

Continent Noir, Editions Stock Graham,

R. 'Chirac Looks to Africa's Non-Francophone States', Financial Times (2

July 1998). Hoagland, J. 'Debating Immigration the French Way' Washington Post (2 March 1997). Hoffmann, S. 1993. 'French Dilemmas and Strategies in the New Europe', in Kahler, M. 1996. 'Empires, Neo-Empires and Political Change: The British and French Experience', in K. Dawisha and B. Parrott (eds), The End of Empires? The Transformation of the USSR in Comparative Perspective, M.E. Sharpe Hugeux, V. 1997. 'Afrique Centrale: "L'epouvantail américain', Politique Internationale, 77

Huliaras, A. 1998. 'The "Anglo-Saxon Conspiracy":French Perceptions of the Great Lakes Crisis', Journal of Modern African Studies, 36(4) ICV and EUROSTEP,

1996. The Reality of Aid 1996: An Independent Review of

International Aid, Earthscan IISS, The Military Balance 1998/99, Oxford University Press Keohane, R.O., J.S. Nye and S. Hoffmman (eds), After the Cold War, Harvard University Press Marchal,

1998.

'France

and

Africa:

The

Africa',

Emergence

Essential

Reforms',

International Affairs, 74 (2) Martin,

1989.

'France

and

Aldrich

and

Connell

(eds),

France in World Politics, Routledge Martin, G. 1995. 'Continuity and Change in Franco-African Relations', Journal of Modern African Studies, 33 (1) Mazrui, A.A.' 1996, 'The New Dynamics of Security: The United Nations and Africa', World Policy Journal, 13 (2) Mills,

G. 'Paris No Longer Calls the Shots', Weekly Mail and Guardian (26 June 1998).

Schraeder, P.J. 1996 'Removing the Shakles? US Foreign Policy toward Africa after the End of the Cold War', in E.J.keller & D. Rothchild (eds), Africa in the New International System: Rethinking State Sovereinty and Regional Security, Lynne Rienner Smith, S. & Glaser, A. 1992. Ces Messieurs Afrique: Le Paris-Village du Continent Noir, Calmann-LĂŠvy Smyth, F. 1998. 'A New Game: The Clinton Administration in Africa', World Policy Journal, 15 (2) United

Nations,

1997,

Department

Humanitarian

Affairs.

Integrated

Regional

International Network. IRIN Update, 116(3) Vasset,

1997.

'The

Myth

Military

Aid:

The

Case

French

Military

Coorperation in Africa', SAIS Review, 17 (2) Vernet, D. 1992. 'The Dilemma of French Foreign Policy', International Affairs. 68 (4) Wauthier, C. 1995 Quatre President et l' Afrique: De Gaulle, Pompidou, Giscard d'Estaing, Mitterrand, Le Seuil. Webster, P. 1997 'Leave Africa to it - Chirac', Guardian Weekly (7 September 1997). World Bank, Press

1990. World Development Research Report 1990, Oxford University

Discussion Continuity and Change in French Foreign Policy towards Africa in the 1990s.

Discussant : Jung, Sang Ryul (Sejong Institute)

First of all, I would like to tell foreign policy logic.

a basic foreign policy strategy or world role, ②an analysis of national interests, ③an interpretation of national power, and ④a perspective on morality. Every foreign policy logic has four key elements: ①a prescription of

First,

Foreign policy strategy is composed of level of engagement, priorities,

geographic scope, unilateralism-multilateralism and leadership(especially in case of U.S.), militerization, interventionism, globalization, and so on.

Second,

the enumeration of interests based on an interpretation of nature of world

politics will be understood by follow questions. Is conflict the essence of world politics or do common interests dictate substantial cooperation among countries? Are war and rumors of war and balances of power the basic stuff of world politics? or are other problems as important as war? ......

Third,

the assessment of power is the third element. In an often quoted essay,

Walter Lippmann offered what he called "the fundamental principle of foreign policy," which is that commitments and power have to be brought into balance. A statesman "must bring his ends and means into balance. If he does not, he will follow a course that leads to disaster." Key questions concerned national power are following; What is power? To what extent is power dependence on military might? What factors other than material resources determine levels of power? How much power does state(U.S., France, South Korea.....)need? How much does it have? How does state's international role enhance or degrade its power?

Fourth, analysis

the role of morality in foreign policy has been a persistent issue of political since

Thucydes

wrote

the

first

international

relations

book,

The

Peloponnesian War, 2400 years ago. The element of morality raises two sets of question: First, what role ought morality play in international affairs; second, what are the substantive international obligations of the U.S?

There is interrelationships among four elements suggested obove. Those four elements shape each other. Logics, like all belief systems, tend toward internal consistency. Their coherence is not, however, based on a hierarchical ordering of ideas. in a purely rational world, the first element, the prescribed role of strategy, would be derived from others. But in the actual world, humans are not purely rational. Quite often, we unconsciously adjust our perceptions in order to preserve our core beliefs while keeping them consistent with the full set of our ideas.

Now, I would like to talk this article. First of all,

there is some confusion of terminology.

. Francophone Africa; la francophonie . sub-saharan; South Africa . active realism; offensive realism(Bush's government); defensive reaction; . â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;ordinaryâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; power .... It is said that foreign policy of Bush government was 'offensive realism', 'moral absolutism'. We accustomed to use American terminology.

between active realism and offensive realism?

What is the difference

second, I have a question about 'the change of world system or structural change in the international system'. Professor Shin emphasized that "France had asserted its position in the international

uniqueness: France's national 'independent' actor within a bipolar system.' system

through

perception

was

that

I think that France pursued autonomy from U.S. foreign policy and communist China also pursued autonomy from that of Soviet Union within cold war era. But there was structural change not only in the European system, but also in the world system in the age of post-cold war. And there was much structural change in West Europe, East Europe, Africa, and other sub-area. Especially, there was change within

Africa. As you say, there were Africa's economic collapse in the 1980s and 1990s, diminishing of the relative importance of Africa in UN General Assembly, weakening of French exclusivity in Africa, and so on. According to these change, France leadership felt that it needed another 'ordinary power'.

"Whats's the role of the France's independent actor within a bipolar world, and then especially within the post-cold war era?" Third, Professor Shin emphasized that the domestic milieu of continuity and change of France foreign policy is economic imperatives and the new bureaucrats.

Firstly, economic recession had four significant consequences for Franco-African relations. In other words, the implementation of a tougher anti-immigration policy, depreciation of the CFA franc, reduction of the levels of foreign assistance, the reform of the French army bring to a this change.

secondly, there was change in the political and bureaucratic elites. Maybe, there was change from the conservative to the reformers. But there is the ambivalent reforms

France

foreign policy.

other

words,

there

coexistence

the

continuity and change in France foreign policy.

I have one question in this point.

Why France people selected the party pursuing reform or the conservative party since post-cold war? I think that causal relation of this choice is complex. Especially, the structural change in Europe and world system as the external milieu and economic recession as domestic milieu affected this choice.

Thanks for your good article and excellent presentation again. I learned many things about France's foreign policy to Francophone Africa.

Interchanges as well as conflicts between the Cathage-Phoenicians and the Greeks

Che, Ja Young (IMS) I. Introduction Carthage(Carcedon) was a city established in the north-western coast of Africa by the Phoenicians who came from the eastern coast of the Mediterranean Sea. It lasted from the 10th or 8th century B.C.1) to 146 B.C., being then defeated by Rome. Carthage, however, first intertwined to live with the Greeks around Sicily, before getting involved with Romans. The Punic Wars, which continued more than 100 years and resulted in the Roman victory, have been well known. The relations between the Carchedonians (the people of Carthage) and the Greeks, it seems, have rather been neglected in the history of the ancient Mediterranean Sea. Anyway, it is a matter of consequence, when Carthage was destroyed in a fire the Romans set, Polybios, the Greek from Megalopolis of Peloponnese and friend of the Roman General, Scipio, was watching the last scene of Carthage from a ship of Roman navy. He came to write a great history on the Punic Wars referring to the relations between Carthage and Romans as well as Greeks. On the other hand, the ancient Greek history tended to be described on the relation between

the

Greeks

and

the

Medians

(Persinas),

for

example,

the

Persian

Wars(between the Greeks and the Medians), Alexander's invasion to Persia. The Greeks, however, were widely spread to the western Mediterranean Sea. When Persia was destroyed by Alexander in the second half of the 4th century B.C.

and

afterwards, Sicily and the southern part of Italy, where the Carthage-Phoenicians and the Greeks dwelt, were a center of power competitions, preparing the road for the Roman hegemony. E.J.

Wolters

commented

that,

case

Carthage

had

won

over

the

Romans

subjugating a considerable part of Europe, it might have brought more unhappiness, but the eventual victory of the Romans consolidated the duty, law, order in the

1) The formation of city as well as villages in this place is regarded earlier than this, while the Phoenicians' supremacy maybe being later.

Mediterranean world and prepared the foundations for the Christianity spreading all over the world.2) On the contrary, however, this essay is to focus on the merit of the dynamics and varieties of the Mediterranean world, before the advent of Roman hegemony with the alleged virtues, I.e. order, duty, law or Christianity. It could be done with surveying the relations between the Carthage-Phoenicians and the Greeks, for which we could find in the sources. The dynamic aspects of the ancient Mediterranean Sea will show that there were no consistent conflicts between these two or among other groups ethnically divided, being intertwined with each other.

II. A short history between the Greeks and the Cathage-Phoenicians around Sicily Thucydides says that from the ancient times there were lots of ethnics living in Sicily.3) Originally there lived the Cyclopes and the Laestrygones, and later the Sicanians

coming

from

Iberia,

who

alleged

themselves

'autochthonoi

(indigenous)'. In the Eryx and Egesta lived Elimoi coming from Ilion(Troia) having been destroyed. There were also the Phocians from Greek mainland, Sicelians from Italy, and so on. The first residents among the Greeks were those from Calcis which was on the east coast of Greece, being settled in Naxos of Sicily, where the sailors used to sacrifice first, coming out of Sicily. Next year, one of Dorians, descendent of Haracles, built Syracuse, and expelled the Sicelians. Five years later, the people from Thoucles and Calcis established Leontini and Catana, expelling Sicelians, too. Lamis of Megara came to make a colony, Tapsos, and his descendents established Selinous. Gela was established by Antiphemos from Rhodos and Entimos from Crete, whose system was of Dorians. 108 years later than establishing Gela, the people of Gela send out a colony to Acragas. Zancle was made by the pirates from Kyme which were consisted of those from Calcis of Opicia, where the people from Calcis and other areas of Euboea came later to live together. Then, Most of them were banished by the Samians and other Ionians, who had been expatriated by the Medians to come to Sicily. Sooner the tyrant of Rhegion, Anaxilaos, expelled them, letting various ethnics settle together, and named the city Messene following his homeland. The people of Zancle built a colony, Himera, which was consisted of those from Calcis, and the fugitives of Syracusian civil war who were called 'Myletidae'. And Camarina was first built by Syracuse, later being taken by Gela.

2) E.J. Wolters, "Carthage and Its People," The Classical J ournal 47[1952], 191-204. 3) Thucydides VI, 2ď˝&#x17E;5.

A history of conflicts began in 540 B.C., when the Phocaeans of Iones settled down in Alaria(Aleria) of Corsica. The Tyrrhenians made an alliance with Carchedonians to fight against them in Alaria. After bitter quarrels the Phocaeans left Corsica, arriving in Elea(Velia) of the southern Italy, where the Ionian philosophy came to develop. In the 6th century B.C. the tyranny came to be established in the cities in Sicily and the southern Italy, that is, Acragas, Syracuse and Cyme. The tyranny tended to be more or less militaristic. When the Medians invaded Greece again in 480 B.C., Carthage, it seems, came into line with her mother city, Sydon-Tyros, as she attacked with a large scale of military forces Syracuse, Gela and Acragas of Sicily.4) In Greece being threatened by the Medians, the Thessalian and Boeotian alliances gave in to them. But other Greeks, however, kept standing against the Medians. The Spartan king Leonidas and the 300 Spartan

hoplites

(heavy-armed

forces)

bravely

fought

die

the

battle

Thermophyle. On the other hand, the Greek navy won victory in the naval battle of Salamis, and next year in the battle of Mycale in the coast of Asia Minor. At the same time in Sicily the allied army of Gelon, the tyranny of Syracuse and Gela, and Theron, the tyranny of Acragas, repulsed Carchedonians near Himera in 480 B.C. In 474 B.C. Hieron(478～466), The tyrant of Syracuse and successor of Gelon, conquered Cyme

and

defeated

the

Tyrrhenians,

attaining

the

acme

power.

Afterwards

Carchedonians could not attack the Greeks more than 70 years, being reduced to just a few outposts

in Sicily.

It was during the Peloponnesian War that the Carchedonians renewed attack on the Greeks in Sicily. In 413 B.C. when the Athenian expedition to Sicily resulted in failure and those who won

in Sicily suffered after-effects of the war, Selinous, Acragas,

Gela and Himera got attacked from the Carchedonians to be crushed. Then, Dionysios, the general-tyrany of Syracuse stood against them in 397 B.C., by rallying the anti-democratic power. Those days, he got the confidence of Sparta as well as public favour by his tolerable dispositions. Dionysios defended stoutly the eastern Sicily, hiring mercenaries and making ships. He tried to attack Carthage several times in vain (397～392, 382～375, 368～7 B.C.). His son, Dionysios II,5) could not manage to dominate Syracuse. His uncle and Platon's friend, Dion, tried to establish the constitution of aristocracy, but he encountered resistence of his own party being assasinated in 354 B.C. As the city got into confusion, in 344/3 the mother city, Corinth, sent Timoleon to manage the situation. The Carchedonianslost a battle in the river Crymisos in 341 B.C., reducing to the western part, about one third of the territory of Sicily, while the 4) Cf. Diodoros-Ephoros XI,14 : XI,20,1 ; Herodotos, VII,157～167. 5) The period of his rule was 367～357, 347～344 B.C.

Greeks went ahead with finding a new settlement under the leadership of Timoleon. In 306/5 Agathocles was enthroned to the king of Syrause. He made expeditions to Carthage in Africa in 310～7 B.C. in vain, while he managed to calm down the situation of Sicily. He was supported by the democratic party, getting status of the strategos

(general)-autocrator

(dictator)

the

eastern

Sicily.

Perhaps

took

advantage of the confusion after the death of Timoleon, as the civil war breaking out between the oligarchic and democratic parties. Agathocles made expeditions to the southern Italy, but suddenly resigned from kingship in 289 B.C. on account of dissention with the successors of Alexander who advanced to influence on the west coast of Greece. With the beginning of the Punic Wars in the middle of the 3rd century B.C., Rome and Macedonia appeared to get involved in the matters around Sicily. In the end of the same century, the Macedonian king, Philip V, got encouraged to make alliance with Carthage, as Hannibal, the general of Carthage, defeated the Roman army beside the lake Trasimene. Philip V came to dominate the territory of Illyria in the northwestern Greece, getting hegemony on Greece for a while, after the agreement of Naupactos6) with the Phoenicians. Thus, Rome turned to be a prominent, potential enemy of Greece. Polybios defined the year 217 B.C. as the beginning of the unification of the eastern and western Mediterranean areas.7)

III. Coexistence as well as conflicts of the Greeks and Carthage-Phoenicians In fact, there are not lots of sources describing the relationship between the Greeks and the Carthage-Phoenicians. A few examples,8) however, might show that the conflicts

were

developed

not

much

between

the

Greeks

and

the

Carthage-Phoenicians, as among the Greeks themselves. That is, we can say, troubles among the Greeks were no less that those between the two ethnic groups, or the two sides were intertwined. The relevant examples are as following. 1. The people of Lipara were said to come from Knidos to Sicily under the leadership of Pentathlos.9) They had built first a city in the Cape Pachynon in Sicily, fighting however Elymoi and Phoenicians(Phoinikoi) to be banished to settle down in a group of islands called Aiolos. Among these they had residence in the island Lipara, going

cultivate

Diodoros,10)

other

islands,

Hiera,

Stronngyle

and

Didymai.

According

The Cnidians under the leadership of Pentathlos conquered Lilybaion, and

6) Polybios, V,104 7) Polybios, IV,28,1 8) Cf. Véronique Krings, Carthage et les Grecs c.580～480 av.J .-C. (Leiden/Boston/Köln, 1998). 9) Pausanias X 11,3～4 ; cf. Diodoros V,9. 10) Diodoros, V,9.

later got involved in the long war with Egesta and Selinous. Pentathlos himself was killed in the war. The people of Lipara also dedicated the statues to Delphoi, commemorating the victory over Tyrrheninas. Thus, the Cnidians fought not only the Greeks but Phoenicians and Tyrrhenians. and there were no constant divisions of war parties according to definite ethnic groups. 2. The Phocaians from Asia Minor came to the west coast of Italy and competed with the Tyrrhenians. Some people of Phocaia, Ionians (Iones), banished by civil war came over to Oinousai and tried to buy it from Chios11) to settle down. The Chians, however, were afraid of being damaged on engaging in commerce and did not sell it. Then, the Phocaians sailed over to Corsica (Cyrnos), where they had already built a city, Alalia, twenty years before according to the oracle. Before leaving this time, they went first to Phocaia and destroyed the Persian garisson which Harpagos invited to defend the city. Then they went on sail cursing the people left in homeland. Throwing a mass of iron to the sea, they swore not to return forever to Phocaia until the iron came up on the surface of the sea. The half of them, however, came to return giving in to nostalgia for homeland, while those who kept their vows left Oinousai and arrived at Kyrnos living together with those who had come earlier. When

they

looted

the

neighbourhood

areas,

the

Tyrrhenians

(Tyrrhenoi)

and

Carchedonians formed alliance to attack the Phocaians with 60 ships. The Phocaians, too, came up against them with 60 ships in the sea Sardonion. Even if they won in this battle, the Phocaians suffered so much damages, 40 ships destroyed and 20 ships damaged. Then, they left Kyrnos loading on the ships wives and children in Alalia, and arrived at Rhegion in the southern Italy. The Phocaians who remained in the destroyed ships were assigned by lottery to the Agylaioi among the Tyrrhenians, the latter stoned all of the Phocaians to death. Afterwards, everytime the Agylaioi as well as the cattle of Agyla came by the place where the Phoenicians died, they came to cripple and were paralysed. Then, the Agylaioi got the oracle of Delphoi, and sacrificed for appeasing the dead, performing gymnastic and chariot competitions, and those customs were said to go on till the days of Herodotos. On the other hand, the refugees to Rhegion built a city, Hyele, near Oinotria, as they interpreted that Kyrnos which the Pythia of Delphoi foretold did not refer to a region but a hero. The conflict between the Phocaians and the Tyrrhenians was not an ethnic. They had rather a common cultural background referring to Delphoi. And they might had a common origin of Asia Minor, as Herodotos said that The Tyrrhenians came from a city of Asia Minor. Furthermore, The Tyrrhenians used to form alliance with the Carchedonians, as we see in a story mentioned just above. Thus, we can say, the conflicts, which occurred in the Mediterranean Sea in the ancient times ethnically 11) Herodotos I,165ď˝&#x17E;167. Cf. Oinousai is an island which lied beteen Chios and the coast of Asia Minor.

intertwined, referring rather to securing territorial domination. 3. There was a story on Dorieus, son of Anaxandrides, who belonged to the royal family Euristhenes in Lacedaimon, coming to live in Sicily.12) He was a legitimate child of the first wife of the king, but born later than the son of the second wife. Thus he could not succeed the throne and getting upset emigrated out to Lybia, near the river Kynips. Three years later, however, he came to return to Sparta, driven out by the Macheoi, Lybioi and Carchedonians. And again getting the counselling of Antichares and the oracle of Delphoi, he wanted to sail over to Heracleia of Sicily, where Heracles allegedly took out of Eryx, thus the territory being called Erycine. Then, as Telys, the king of Sybaris, was going to attack Croton, the people of Croton requested help to Dorieus, and he responded to it at will.13) While Dorieus and other Spartans sailed over to Sicily, most of them were killed by the Phoenicians and the people of Egesta, except Euryleon who managed to lead the survivals to settle down in Minoa which was a colony of Selinous. He liberated peole from the tyranny of Selinous, Pythagoras, but later he tried himself to be a tyranny, being killed by the people of Selinous in front of the temple of Zeus in the agora. 4. When the Persian(Median) Wars broke out in Greek mainland and Amilcas of Carthage invaded the Greeks in Sicily, dissensions among the Greeks came up agai n.14) Gelon, the tyrant of Syracuse, tried to help the Greeks against the Medians, but he could not and just sent some money to Delphi. The cause was that under the leadership

Amilcas

Ligyes(Ligureians),

three

Elisyci15),

hundreds

army

Phoenicians,

Libyans,

Iberians,

Sardinians, and Cyrnians(Corsicans) attacked against

Gelon, son of Annon, the king of Syracuse,16) The behind story was following : Terillus son of Crinippus, the tyrant of Himera was expelled from Himera by Theron son of Aenesidemos, Acragas. Terillus had induced Amilcas to get involved

sovereign ruler of

this partly through the

prerogative of personal friendship, but mainly through the efforts of Anaxilaus son of Cretines, tyrant of Rhegion. He had handed over his own children as hostages to Amilcas, and brought him into Sicily to the help of his father-in-law; for Anaxilaus had as his wife Terillus' daughter Cydippe. Anyway, on the same day the Greeks repulsed Medians in Salamis,

Gelon and

12) Herodotos, V 39～48 ; cf. Pausanias, III 16,4～5 ; Diodoros, IV 23,3 ; Justin XIX,9. 13) The fact of getting help from Dorieus was said by the people of Sybaris, while those of Kroton said that the people of Iamitheoi were supported just by the prophet Callias. Thus, The people of Croton alloted land to the descendents of Kallias, but not to those of Dorieus. Cf. Herodotos, V 39 ～48. 14) Herodotos, VII,165～167. 15) Iberian people living on the coast between the Pyrenees and the Rhone. 16) According to a statement quoted from the historian Ephorus, this Carchedonian expedition was part of a concerted plan, whereby the Greek world was to be attacked by the Carchedonians in the west and the Persians in the east simultaneously.

Theron won vidtory over Amilcas the Carchedonian in Sicily. The father of Amilcas was a Carchedonian, while his mother was a Syracusian. Amilcas became king of Carthage on his abilities. As Amilcas was defeated, Gelon tried to find him but he was never found, dead or alive.17) According to a tradition of Carchedonians, Amilcas threw himself into fire to die during sacrificial ritual in the dawn, seeing the defeat of his army, his body being not founded. According to Herodotos, the Phoenicians said that the rituals for Amilcas were performed in all the cities of colony and the monuments erected, the monument in Carthage being the largest. 5. The fierce battles in Sicily were conducted between Athens and Sparta in

415ď˝&#x17E;

413 B.C. According to Thcydides, Alcibiades, Athenian general, had a dream to get wealth and honour, subjugating first Sicily, and later Carthage.18) On the on hand, the Syracusians, preparing against the attack of Athenians, sent envoy to Corinth as well as Carthage, requesting help.19) On the other hand, the Athenians, too, on arriving at Sicily, sent ships to Carthage for help, and also to the cities of Tyrrhenia to invite them to take part in the war. From these examples described above, the feuds, which seem to develop between the Greeks and the Carchedonians, were connected at the same time to discords among the Greeks. Furthermore, the history of colony of various ethnics in the Mediterranean areas was so complicate and intertwined, so that no region was consisted of just one ethnic race. And the people themseves were of mixed blood, as we can see in Amilcas, king of Carthage, who was Carchedonian in his father's side and Syracusian on his mother's. And the fact that the monuments for Amilcar were widely spread around the cities of Carthage, Sicily and so on, shows that common cultural and emotional solidarity surpassed the exclusivenes of ethnic community.

IV. The Constitution of Carthage Polybios, who lived 200 years later that Aristotle, witnessed the downfall of Carthage. He compared the widespread bribery of Carthage with the austere morality of Rome.20) The Carchedonians, it is said, themselves seeking after profit, they hired mercenary soldiers

to fight, and these were inferior to the Roman citizen army.

According to Aristotle, however, The Carchedonians were quite belligerent.21) He says that their education and most of laws were fit for assuming war. And while the

17) Cf. Herodotos, VII,165ď˝&#x17E;167. 18) Thucydides, VI. 15 : cf. VI,90. 19) Thucydides, VI.34. 20) Cf. H.H. Scullard, "Carthage," p.104. Moral denunciation to the enemy of Rome could be found later in Salustus in case of Jugurtha who stood against Rome in Numidia of the northern Africa (cf. Abdallah Laroui, The History of the Maghrib : An Interpretive Essay [New Jersey, 1977]), p.30. 21) Aristoteles, P olitika, 1324b 12.

Scythians, Persians, Thracians and Celts had a great regard for army forces, in the same context, the bellicosity of Carchedonians is described as following. ... as in Sparta and Crete both the system of education and the mass of the laws are framed in the main with a view to war; and also among all the non-Hellenic nations that are strong enough to expand at the expense of others, military strength has been held in honor, for example, among the Scythians, Persians, Thracians and Celts. Indeed among some peoples there are even certain laws stimulating military valor; for instance at Carthage, we are told, warriors receive the decoration of armlets of the same number as the campaigns on which they have served; and at one time there was also a law in Macedonia that a man who had never killed an enemy must wear his halter instead of a belt. Among Scythian tribes at a certain festival a cup was carried round from which a man that had not killed an enemy was not allowed to drink. Among the Iberians, a warlike race, they fix small spits.22) The Carchedonians could be regarded as courageous and had competent generals who were intelligent as well as resolute.23) In the last days of Carthage, they desperately resisted against the Romans. In Carthage, there was a system of common meal called 'sissitia' which could be compared to 'phiditia' or 'sissitia' of Sparta. As the military system of Spartan citizens was closely related to 'sissitia', we can surmise, the citizen soldiers of Carthage might have a common element with that of Sparta. Furthermore, Aristotle defined the constitution(politeia) of Carthage as an excellent, similar to that of Lacedaemon or Crete.24) Even if Carthage had a large population, her constitution, being well balaced, did not suffer any fluctuations. There were no civil war and any attempt for tyranny. And she had a kind of mixed constitution : King, Senate of thirty, Assembly, Committee of five members and 104 governors coexisted. According to Aristotle, these organs of the constitution assumed checks and balances with each other.25) There was, however, some difference between Carthage and Sparta in the point that in the latter the officials were elected rather by random, but the former by degree of contributions. And while the king and the senate of Carthage could be equal to those of Sparta, the difference between them was that, two kings of Sparta came from each one of two families, but the king of Carthage, who had considerable power, from whichever family by election. The committee of five members presided important affairs and elected 100 governors. They did not get salary and were not appointed

lot.

The

committee

22) Aristotle, Politics, 1324b 7ď˝&#x17E;20. 23) Cf. H.H. Scullard, "Carthage," p.104. 24) Aristoteles, P olitika, 1272b 24ff. 25) Cf. H.H. Scullard, "Carthage," p.104.

five

members

had

all

the

competence

judgement. While the constitution of Carthage was a kind of 'mixed constitution (politeia)' based on aristocracy, it also used to be criticized as having a tendency of 'demos (democracy)' as well as oligarchy. As an aspect of oligarchy, as, if the king and the senate voted for something unanimously, it was to be executed. Otherwise, the case was transmitted to the assembly of demos, where the liberal discussion as well as decision were made. The Carchedonian assembly was different from that of Sparta, as liberal discussion was not permitted in the latter, but just voting for or against. The public officers of Carthage were appointed on the point of not only personal but financial abilities. Aristotle commented that it was a legislator's fault having the position of public official bought with money. There was another flaw of Carthage that one could have lots of duties in charge, as electing a wrong person to a public post be fatal. According to Aristotle, in case of large countries, the more people the official duties were allotted to, the more the affairs could be fair, efficient and speedy. The society of Carthage Aristotle described had some common aspects which could be compared with the Greek Poleis.26) She had some points, as mentioned above, similar to Sparta in the political system, while others in contrast. For example, the commerce developed in Carthage, but not in Sparta. Aristotle stated that Carthage did not prohibit commerce, and civil war did not break out there.27) They had an aristocratic constitution inducing the agreement of citizens, and they prevented civil war by disseminating populations to various cities of colony. There were mercenary as well as citizen soldiers in Carthage,28) and both of comerce and agriculture developed. Carchedonians were good at commerce, trading from the Pillar of Heracles (the Strait of Gibraltar) to Spain of silver, Britania and Cornwall

tin,

Cameroon

gold

South

Africa.

the

same

time,

the

Carchedonians were expert for high level of agriculture, so that the Senate of Rome have the Mago's book for agriculture translated to Latin languages.29) The Carchedonians who were engaged with trade had to travel far from their homeland, facing different situations from those cultivating in homeland. The former need mercenary soldiers much more than the latter, protecting their own lives and properties of trade. The fact that the Carchedonians employed mercenary did not necessarily mean that they were militaristic as much as the Romans did in the later periods. That is, mercenary could be exploited for militaristic imperialism invading other countries, but in case of Carchedonians regarding much of trade, just for protecting economic profits. On the other hand, the Carchednians rather preferred small scale of city state to the large. They were said to avoid civil war disseminating population and making lots of

26) Aristoteles, P olitika, 1272b 24ff. 27) Aristoteles, P olitika, 1316b 5ff. 28) Cf. Madeleine Hours-MiĂŠdan, Carthage (Paris, 1949), p.63. 29) Cf. H.H. Scullard, "Carthage," Greece & Rome , 2nd Ser. II, no.3 (1955), p.104.

colonial cities. It means they were decentralizing political power, and the farmers in Carthage were more similar, it can be supposed, to the citizen soldiers of defensive military system in the poleis of Greece. Thus, the two protagonists of the Punic Wars, Carhage and Rome, had different tendency referring to military system. The Romans were militaristic in the point that before the Punic Wars they already had the Centuriata, a kind of assembly which was consisted of soldiers, and later mercenary soldiers of Rome was developed for imperialistic assault.

V. Conclusion From the 5th century B.C. when the Persian Wars and the Peloponnesian Wars broke out, the militarism gradually grew in the Mediterranean Sea. These wars contributed in turn, directly or indirectly, the growth of the Roman imperialism. The turning point of such a development was the Punic Wars, with which made Rome completely vanquish Carthage to be ousted imperialism initiated

Rome

developed,

of the world. And afterwards, the

coercing

duty,

law and

order

the

appeared,

the

Mediterranean Sea. And Rome appeared as a christian empire in later periods. In

the

Mediterranean

world

before

the

Roman

imperialism

Carthage-Phoenicians and the Greeks were co-existed so that it was difficult to divide them on the criterion of ethnic groups of distinct interests. They were divided into lots of poleis, living in harmony or friction with each other, according to economic interests or political ideals. The interchanges of conflicts of the Carchedonians and the Greeks denoted complicate aspects. Ethnic constituents of a region could be homogeneous but mixed blood. The region around Sicily was a pertinent example of racial complication. The growth of Roman hegemony to the Mediterranean Sea including Sicily did not necessarily refer to the expansion of Roman race, but of the militarism initiated by Rome as well as social inequality. In Mediterranean world before the Punic Wars (26 4ď˝&#x17E;146 B.C.), lots of ethnics and cities interacted with each other in relatively balanced situations, as variety, multiplicity and liberty being more widely spread, while sometimes getting involved however in the conflicts of small scale. On the contrary, the unification of the Mediterranean Sea came to be realized on the Roman military power. In this point, we can suppose that, if Carthage had won victory over the Romans, cities of small scale and liberty of citizens could have been widely spread than the uniformed imperialism of Rome based on military power, exacting duty, law and order. The expansion of Roman hegemony could not be an inevitable development of history like a destiny.

Discussion Interchanges as well as conflicts between the Cathage-Phoenicians and the Greeks

Discussant : Song, Do Young (Hanyang University)

Title of the Article: “Interchange as well as conflicts between the Carthage-Phoenicians and the Greeks”

This article argues that the history of relationship between the Greeks and the th

Carthage-Phoenicians around 5 harmonious(?) one.

till 2

century B.C. as a relatively balanced and

In one part of the article, the author emphasizes that;

“the conflicts were developed not so much between Greeks and the CarthagePhoenicians, as among the Greeks themselves”. In another part, the author even advances the hypothesis of ‘mixture’ of two groups saying ; “The two sides were intertwined” “The conflict between the Phocaians and the Tyrrhenians was not an ethnic” “They had rather a common cultural background referring to Delphoi” “They might had a common origin of Asia Minor”

I agree with the main lines of argument concerning the possibility of dynamic exchange among residents in Mediterranean World, not only during those particular ages but even after the advent of Roman Empire. Mediterranean World has been, since

Ancient

Ages,

the

stage

innumerable

migrations

and

human/cultural

exchanges. And Greeks would be one of the most dispersed linguistic groups in Mediterranean World of BC. But we need to clarify here that the author is arguing th

the historical subject of 5

till 2

century B.C. from 21th century’s perspectives and

categories of identification. Who were ‘Greeks’ and who were ‘Carthage-Phoenicians’ in

century

B.C.?

And

those

identifications

achieved

from

which

factor

socio-cultural identification? Various categories of identification like ‘ethnic’, ‘race’, ‘blood’ and ‘culture’ are

employed in this article in a confused way.

And we know that the connotations and

significations of those (and not scientifically justifiable!!) categories can be different along the historical context of each area, and each period of time. some

Greeks

would

not

distinguished,

ethnically

and

For example, if

culturally,

from some

Carthage-Phoenicians, how can we say that there had been conflicts or peace ‘between’ Greeks and Carthage-Phoenicians? And the author even tries to explain the similarity of political system of Carthage and that of Sparta which had a considerably different system from that of Athens, for example.

We know also that the notion of

‘Greece’ is variable following historical period: there are proto-Greeks, Mycenaean Greeks, Classical Greeks, Hellenistic Greeks, Byzantine Greeks and even Ottoman Greeks till modern Greeks. Byzantine Greeks called themselves Romioi and considered themselves the political and cultural heirs of Rome…

In this way, we can say that

the notions of ‘Greece’ and ‘Greeks’ are also an invention of Modern Ages.) Another remark on the conclusion of the article: the author seems to criticize Roman Empire’s dominance, in behalf of Carthage-Phoenicians’ socio-political system (…”cities of small scale and liberty of citizens could have been widely spread than the uniformed imperialism of Rome…”). I am not arguing here in behalf of Roman domination. But I do not understand clearly that how the author can explain the historical facts of wars and other incessant conflicts where involved many Greeks and Phoenicians etc. so diligently described at the first half of this article. Were these relatively ‘peaceful’ wars? But there is never a ‘peaceful war’, even in a relative way.

The Agriculture in Egypt during the Medieval Ages : A Focus on Mamluk Period* 30)

Wan Kamal Mujani (National University of Malaysia)

An Overview of Agriculture in Egypt It is interesting to discuss the history of agriculture of the Mamluk kingdom (1250-1517) for two reasons. First, it is a continuation of the same sector during Pharaonic times. Second, it has close ties with modern agriculture. Modern scholars mention that some aspects of agricultural activity in Egypt have remained unchanged for a thousand years. Another interesting point is that natural aspects such as the climate, the role of the Nile and natural disasters have not changed much in the long history of Egypt (Bell, 1975: 223-269). For these reasons, a discussion of agriculture during the Mamluk period could reasonably be based on knowledge of both the ancient and modern agriculture of Egypt.

The Climate The Nile is the main factor in agricultural prosperity in Egypt. The importance of the Nile to Egypt is obvious from an understanding of the climate and geographical characteristics of the country. Egypt which occupies the north-eastern corner of the African continent has a dry climate and consists wholly of desert. There is a very little rainfall because the northeast trade winds which originate at about latitude 28o N. near the northern boundary of the continent and warm as they approach the equator take up but do not redeposit moisture (Gemmill, 1928: 296).

The Nile Indeed,

the

Nile

saves

Egypt

from

the

desert

and

provides

the

means

for

agriculture and settlement along the river. The Nile in Egypt receives its water from * The

word

‘Mamluk’

means

slave,

specifically

white

slave,

used

the

military

establishment. For more than two hundred and fifty years the Mamluks ruled Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Palestine. The era of Mamluk rule can be divided into two periods i.e. the ‘Turkish Mamluk’ period (1250-1381) and the ‘Circassian Mamluk’ period (1382-1517).

two major sources: the White Nile, which drains a large area of equatorial Africa, and the Ethiopian tributaries (Hassan, 1981: 1143). The Ethiopian tributaries, namely the Atbara and the Blue Nile, are more important for agriculture in Egypt since they contain a lot of sediment. Flooding has been by far the most fundamental and continuous aspect in the agricultural life of Egypt from Pharaonic to modern times. Thus, the yearly has always been the most important event in Egypt and for generations was eagerly awaited. This flood is caused by heavy rainfall in the highlands of Ethiopia where the Blue Nile and Atbara have their sources.

The Nile has formed two major and distinct areas of arable land in Egypt, namely the Nile Valley in Upper Egypt and the Delta in Lower Egypt. The Nile valley is a narrow strip of land running from Wadi Halfa to the Delta. It is variable in width, but five to six miles is perhaps a fair average. In Cairo, the Nile forms two branches, namely the Rosetta and the Damietta which spread to diverge greatly from each other by the time they reach the Mediterranean Sea. In this way the Delta of the Nile is formed, and within the sides of this triangle is to be found the most fertile soil in Egypt (Cooper, 1977: 190).

The Soil Modern research has found that the rocks of Egypt alone would provide only a poor, sandy and calcareous soil. However, the Nile makes life in this country possible. When the inundations begin, the Nile flows down, a reddish colour, loaded with sand and mud. This overflow covers the nearby fields and when subsiding leaves a rich fertilizing deposit which it has carried down from the highlands. The deposit contains a large percentage of carbonate of lime, oxide of iron and carbonate of soda. The land thus fertilised produces large crops.

The System of Cultivation The system of cultivation in the Mamluk period also showed historical continuity from earlier

times.

The

peasants

inherited

the

agricultural

calendar

from their

pre-Islamic predecessors. It is still in use today. The times of sowing and harvesting of various kinds of crops were fixed and timed according to the Coptic solar year (Shoshan, 1978: 20).

The Techniques of Cultivation The first work that had to be done in preparing the soil for cultivation was tilling, furrowing and shaking it to loosen it and let the air and sun penetrate. This would remove moisture and clear the soil of weeds. Ploughing took place over a period of up to fifty or sixty days a year and a very small area could be ploughed in a day. There were various methods of sowing depending on the types of crops and soil. When the plants started to grow, the peasants had to pull out the weeds. This work was very important for productive agriculture.

When the harvest season arrived, the peasants used the short sickle to reap their crops. In the threshing activity to spread the grain out, cows and bulls were driven round the threshing floor in a circle and the hooves of these animals would tread the grain.

The

winnowing

operation

remove

the

chaff

from the

grain

followed

threshing. They used a wooden winnowing fork or sometimes two small bent boards to aerate the grain, which fell straight down while the chaff was blown aside. The grain was passed through a coarse sieve to separate it from the worst chaff and dirt (Rabie, 1981: 63).

The Crops During the Mamluk period, winter was the principal agricultural season. Thus, most of the crops cultivated in this season were the important agricultural products in Egypt. Winter crops were also grown on the largest portion of the cultivated land, especially in Upper Egypt. There were also summer crops in Egypt, especially on the Delta. It was possible to cultivate summer crops in this region because the level of the Nile and that of the agricultural land were not so different. Thus, by using artificial methods, water could be raised easily from the Nile to irrigate the fields. The crops which were cultivated in Egypt can be classified into two categories namely, main crops and secondary crops. The main crops can be further divided into three categories i.e. food crops, crops grown for oil and crops for industrial purposes. The secondary crops can also be divided into three categories, namely, vegetables, fruits and flowers (al-Maqrizi 1998, 1: 291-295).

The Agricultural Situation during the Mamluk Period (1468-1517) To

provide

adequate

description

the

changing

situation

agricultural

productivity during the period under review is quite complex. A long-term perspective is needed to show the fluctuation of agricultural productivity and consequently to see whether

surprisingly

increased

unavailable

decreased. for

the

Such

period

detailed

under

information

consideration.

is,

From

however, the

not

Mamluk

historians’ works we can find only scattered figures and incomplete data, but these do indicate in general terms the situation of agriculture at that time. In order to supplement contemporary accounts and hence to shed further light on the agricultural situation during the fifty years before the fall of the kingdom, it is necessary to look at the economic situation before and after that period. The information thus acquired can be used to provide indirect testimony to the situation of agriculture during the period under consideration.

I) The Agricultural Land and its ‘Ibra (an annual revenue) As discussed earlier, the cultivated areas in Egypt were confined to those places reached by the Nile flood or which could be irrigated by the primitive methods available, that is, the Nile Valley and the Delta. Ibn al-Ji‘an (1974: 1-10) (d. 1480) gives an estimate of the size of the cultivable area during his period, stating that it was about 3.5 million faddans. (The size of a medieval faddan was 5,900 square metres). However, the modern scholars Muhammad Mahmud al-Sayyad and Ahmad Sadiq Sa‘d maintain that the actual area which was cultivated was smaller than this for several reasons, such as problems with the irrigation system, political unrest and the reduction of manpower available to work in the agricultural sector.

There was also a reduction in the number of villages, which meant that some areas of land were left uncultivated. This was the result of emigration or mortality due to the plague, problems in the iqta‘ system,1) Bedouin encroachment and so on. For example, there were only 2,121 villages in 1477 as compared to 2,254 villages in 1375. The ‘ibra figure also shows a shrinkage in cultivated land during the Mamluk period.

During the period under review there was a reduction in the ‘ibra in several villages. This indicates that in those places agricultural production and the amount of land under cultivation also witnessed a reduction. A number of places were affected. Thus, there was a reduction in the ‘ibra in some villages in Sharqiyya province. It also got smaller in some villages in Daqhiliyya and Murtahiyya provinces. Other

1) The iqta‘ could be describe as the land or, rarely, taxes allocated by the great amir or sultan to soldiers in return for military service.

villages in which the

‘ibra lessened included several

in Gharbiyya,

Manufiyya,

Buhayra, Fayyum, Bahnasa, Ashmunayn and Ikhmim Ibn al-Ji‘an (1974: 1-15).

A contraction in the size of agricultural land during the period under review can also be seen in the kharaj (land-tax) revenue which was the main income for the Mamluk sultanate. This land-tax was taken from cultivated areas. In 1315, land tax in Egypt amounted to 9,428,289 dinars and in 1410 to 4,257,000 dinars. Shortly after the Ottoman conquest of Egypt in 1517, this figure had dropped to 1,800,000 dinars (Basha 1916, 1: 127).

The changing situation of agricultural production during the period under review can be

seen in the fluctuation of crop prices during that

time. According to

contemporary historians, the prices of crops increased several times because of shortages, such as in September 1468,2) December 1469-January 1470, OctoberNovember 1474, February-March 1483, November-December 1484, January-February 1486, December 1486-January 1487, October-November 1508, March-April 1509, May 1511 and November-December 1511. The prices of crops increased during the period under consideration compared to the fifty years before it.3)

ii) The Volume of Imports of Certain Goods (Agricultural Production) The supply and demand of agricultural goods in a country can be taken as indicating

the

agricultural

situation

that

country.

During

normal

years,

the

Mamluks were capable of exporting a quantity of agricultural produce to other countries, such as wheat to Syria, Hijaz and southern Europe. However, during the period under consideration, the Mamluks imported a quantity of agricultural produce in order to ensure a sufficient supply of grain and other foodstuffs for people’s consumption or to be re-exported to other countries. Among the foodstuffs which were imported into Egypt during the period under review were fruits, olive oil, honey, Apulian almonds, chestnuts, hazelnuts, figs, dried raisins and dairy products such as butter and cheese (Arbel, 2004: 63). Wheat was also imported into Egypt. There are documents that refer to the import of this grain in years when the country faced problems due to the insufficient inundation of the Nile or for other reasons.

2) For example, the price of wheat increased from 400 dirhams to 900 dirhams per irdabb. (One irdabb was equal to seventy kilograms during the Mamluk periods). 3) For example, the price of wheat before the period under consideration was normally less than 300

dirhams per irdabb. It was very rare for the price of wheat to increase to more then a 1000 dirhams per irdabb as what was the norm during the period under review.

Human Factors which affected Agriculture Aside from natural factors, humans also clearly affect agriculture. The ill-effects that they may have can be seen in the later stage of the Mamluk kingdom when maladministration, extortion, exploitation and so on by sultans, amirs and officials all contributed to a reduction in agricultural production. The main areas where problems arose were with the iqta‘ system, the irrigation system, and the lack of both a productive labour force and of technological innovation. These are dealt with in what follows.

i) The Problems in the Iqta‘ System The period under discussion was witness to the impacts of the changes in the iqta‘ system in Egypt. The abolition of the hereditary character of the iqta‘ made a number of the iqta‘ holders abandon their agricultural lands or make no effort to maintain them. This was simply because the land could not be transferred to their heirs. The

iqta‘ holders were only concerned to get as much revenue as they could while they were still granted those iqta‘s. As a result, great pressure was put on the peasants by imposing high taxes to gain great revenue. With this as a working environment, the peasants could not be productive labourers and some of them fled (Poliak, 1939: 64).

Some of the iqta‘ holders also successfully avoided these lands being taken away by the sultan by converting them into waqf-land (pious endowments). In this way, the

lands

continued

benefit

their

descendants.4)

The

consequence

this

transformation of agricultural land from iqta‘s to another category of land tenure like

waqf affected the kharaj (land tax) that was one of the main sources of the state treasury at that time.

Another factor which affected the iqta‘ system was the geographical scattering of

iqta‘s. From 1315, the Mamluk sultans conferred upon the amirs iqta‘s scattered over many provinces of Lower and Upper Egypt. This was intended to reduce the influence

the

iqta‘ holders in his iqta‘ and to prevent any move towards

independence or rebellion. However, this situation reduced the desire of the iqta‘ holders to make an effort and manage his iqta‘, since this was far away from his residence which was normally situated in the vicinity of Cairo (Qasim 1994: 162). The 4) These waqfs were also exempt from taxes.

iqta‘ holders also needed to employ a separate agent and staff of clerks in each part of his iqta‘ and the cost of their salaries, as well as the frequent dishonesty, affected the revenue derived from the iqta‘. This state of affairs was untenable and did not benefit the small iqta‘ holder. At the same time, the iqta‘s which were situated in the countryside and far from the city were exposed to the pillaging of the Bedouin.

ii) The Problems in the Irrigation System Regarding the situation of the irrigation system, the Mamluk chroniclers make a few remarks about the restoration of dykes and bridges by the government during the period under review. Sometimes, the work of maintenance and repairing could not be

done

time

because

the

allocation

cover

the

costs

was

not

enough.

Consequently, the peasants could not enjoy the benefits of the irrigation system.

At the end of the Mamluk period, the office of kashf al-jusur (inspection of irrigation dams) which was responsible for looking after the irrigation system was not properly run by the amirs. Thus, much of the maintenance work was affected. The results of this inefficiency were apparent. Thus, in 1478, the Abu al-Manja Dam

collapsed

resulting

casualties

and

affecting

some

cultivated

lands.

July-August 1509, a dyke in al-Jiza province ruptured and damaged the fields (Ibn Iyas 1960, 4: 159). The same thing happened when the Fayyum Dam was damaged in 1516. The inefficiency in maintaining the irrigation system also resulted in water not being supplied to the arable land, which meant some lands were not suitable for grain agriculture. The inefficiency therefore affected the area of land under cultivation and agricultural products.

iii) The Lack of a Productive Labour Force for the Land al-Asadi (1968: 92) says that the oppression of the peasants was one of the factors that

affected

the

agricultural

sector

Egypt.

al-Maqrizi

also

mentions

that

maltreatment of the peasants affected farming areas and arable lands. Agricultural activities

were

sometimes

discontinued

and

productivity

impaired

because

some

peasants fled from the villages. Modern scholars also express a similar point of view when they say that the oppression of the peasantry through excessive taxation and exploitation affected Egyptian agriculture.

The Mamluk sources mention that the peasants were always oppressed by the iqta‘

holders and were allowed to keep an insufficient proportion of their produce or had to pay a high rent. The peasants usually had to rely on the iqtaâ&#x20AC;&#x2DC; holders to provide them with them seed and the means of livelihood and were therefore heavily indebted to them. In the later Mamluk period, the burden of falling agricultural revenues was shifted to the peasantry in the form of higher taxes, higher interest rates for the loan of grain and extraordinary payments. Occasionally, the sultans ordered the peasants to provide for their own needs. (Ibn Iyas 1960, 4: 153,294,354).

In brief, we can say that the peasants at the end of the Mamluk period were treated very harshly and suffered from such as financial

burdens,

exploitation,

psychological pressure and tyranny. In this, the administrative apparatus is seen to have abused its authority and utilised illegal methods in the treatment of the peasants. The consequence of all this was considerable damage to the agricultural sector in Egypt. Indeed, some of the iqtaâ&#x20AC;&#x2DC; holders tried to rescue their lands by forbidding the peasants from leaving them.5) This migration resulted in a lack of labourers to work on the lands and this led to some of the cultivated areas being neglected with a necessary effect on agricultural products.

iv) The Lack of Technological Innovation in Agriculture It appears that the lack of initiative to adopt new techniques in agriculture, such as tools for cultivation and the irrigation system, was not a factor in the decline of Egyptian agriculture. Indeed, the earlier empires in Egypt achieved their prosperity in the agricultural sector using the same methods and tools. However, at the end of the Mamluk period, the lack of technological innovation in agriculture limited agricultural production at a time when the state needed more agricultural products for its own consumption and for trade. Added to this was the fact that cultivation was only possible once a year because it depended on the yearly flood and basin irrigation system.6)

times

drought,

cultivation

was

not

possible.

Moreover,

natural

disasters and political and social unrest also had their effects on agricultural activity and production.

Among the main economic problems of mature empires is the lack of innovation in technology. At a certain time, mature empires need to apply new technology to enrich 5) The migration of the peasants despite the governmentâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s attempt to keep them in the villages was not a new phenomenon at the end of the Mamluk kingdom. It had happened since the period of al-Maqrizi (d.1442). 6) Cultivation twice a year was possible only in a limited area in the Delta.

products. The Mamluk empire is a case in point. Medieval Egyptian peasants used the tools which were known and used in Pharaonic times and are still used by peasants today without much change.

All of the tools used in agricultural activities in the Mamluk kingdom, from planting to harvesting, were primitive. The plough, for instance, had no wheels.7) It was not designed to turn the soil and had only a shallow penetration. During this era, a pair of oxen could plough two-thirds or less of a faddan a day in hard soil, and in soft soil they ploughed about a faddan. For the purpose of tilling or hoeing the soil, the medieval peasants used the pickaxe and axe or spade. These tools are still used by modern peasants in Egypt. Other tools such as the sickle to reap the crops, and agricultural techniques such as threshing, remain basically unchanged. Threshing by driving cows and bulls over the crops and winnowing by wooden forks, as well as other rudimentary techniques were similarly still in use until modern times.

Primitive techniques were used to irrigate the soil for summer crops. Water was carried to the fields in buckets or jars, tied to the necks of oxen or the sides of donkeys. The other methods of irrigation used by the medieval Egyptian peasants were the nattala and the shaduf. All of these methods were inherited from an older time and some of them still continue to this day. In spite of this, and because there was no alternative, the medieval peasants in Egypt had to produce crops for their

iqtaâ&#x20AC;&#x2DC; holders and for their own consumption. With these primitive implements they ploughed and tilled the soil. Using the ancient methods of artificial irrigation, they irrigated the land and they harvested their crops with sickles. They had no defences against disasters due to the vagaries of the elements, such as crop blight, rats or drought (Rabie, 1981: 81). The consequence of using these primitive tools and old methods of irrigation was that agricultural production was always limited at a time when the state needed more products for its own consumption and for trade.

Natural Factors which affected Agriculture Any assessment of the agricultural situation in the Circassian Mamluk period is inaccurate without discussing environmental hazards and natural disasters since these often had an adverse effect on the agricultural sector and caused economic loss. The Mamluk historians have preserved valuable data on the natural disasters during their 7) The French noble, Jean de Joinville, one of Saint Louisâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; Companions during his Crusade to Egypt in the middle of the thirteen century, was astonished to see a plough with no wheels, compared to what he had seen in his native Champagne.

times

which

sometimes

destroyed

the

crops.

Two

archive

monarch's

possession and refusing to open to the public were practically overcome. This appeared as a common value for the citizen based on 'interrelationship of a country's duty and the right of citizen' and the archive to be institutional guarantee of citizen's access. It also means historical change that could be symbolized as a higher concept of citizen for a country.

V. Relationship between Democracy and Modern Archival Management The last 20th century was the period of remarkable development in democracy and material civilization. However, before and after the two World Wars, the freedom and dignity of citizen experienced lots of misfortunes between the relationships of the countries (that is imperialism, capitalism, and nationalism). Moreover, these days defined as age of 'Avatar' do not end this miserable situation. Then what is the role of archives in this age? The archives were sometimes the tools to hide a social control and 'veritas', but in some cases it acts like an armory for

citizen's

victory

for

democratic

participation

and

against

suppression

uncontrolled national intellect. These variable 'roles of the archives' were possible because it left the truth of a winner as well as the truth of a failure as perpetual memories. In 2006, the repatriation of the Gustav Klimt's ă&#x20AC;&#x152;Giudittaă&#x20AC;?to its original Jewish owner gained after a long period of struggle symbolizes the recovery of stolen human right. People were aware of this truth because all documents written during the persecution of the Jews still remain at National Historical Archives in Austria today. Brazilian president Luix Inacio Lula da Silva's decision (December 2005) which disclosed the documents about the

concealment of the truth of the Vietanam War by

the U.S. government and the governmental organizations worked for the dictatorship

was due to the 'boomerang effect'. Other than 'boomerang effect', today archives are considered as a criterion of judgment of the country's democratic level. It is a matter of how much the authority of a democratic country based on the theory of a check and balance allows the reading of the historical archives decided to be permanently preserved after a sorting process. In the case of a country, it is unavoidable to have an area of confidential matters in the process of reign. Still, as we have seen from the Ustica massacre2) of Italy and the attitude of U.S government toward the Vietnam War, if a country wears a mask or hides itself just to get away from the eyes (surveillance)- as Norberto Bobbio said- it will mean the unsuccess of Democracy and the value of archive for citizens will no longer exist. Furthermore, today when techno-politics, absolute trust in the technology, bureaucracy, and generalization of multinational corporation or international finance organization prevail, strict restriction on the access to the archives means the retreat of the Democracy. On the other hand, these negative results can occur when the citizen's access to the archive is too easily permitted. In other words, easy access to archive can threaten the privacy of citizens. This is the reason why we need to check and balance more than any other eras.

VI. Conclusion: Necessity of Archival Software for the Democracy In the Ancient and the Middle Age, the archive did its part as political-diplomatic, a role which is faithfully performed as a source of authority. After the French Revolution, on the other hand, the archive broadened its role as gaining the rights of the individuals, and later on adapted the new role for the whole individuals, the right of the group. As a result, the definition of archive updated as a symbol of sanctity of life,

overcoming

the

national

limit

because

represents

the

rights

citizens

nowadays. The reading of public archives is the right of the citizen, and they are read by the individuals based on their diverse needs. If this is a simple but pure right, it is legal to pursue communication with public archives to produce and preserve their ratio, and reveal it clearly. Today the relationship of nation and citizen overcomes the boundaries of territories, languages, and customs. Both the native and the foreigner possess equal qualification in the use of historical archives. To make the access of citizen easier, the country 2) On Friday, June 27th, 1980, a DC-9 model with 81 passenger had in-flight explosion between Ustica island and Poncia. Although 20 years of investigation the truth has not been revealed while some claim that the Italian air force had fabricated and damaged the evidence.

must provide the measures for the use of archives. In order to do so, they must make an effort to organize and

keep the archives as well as to prevent the damage

of the archives. They also should continuously observe the related rules. These statements are the hardware of nation-citizen relationship which is known from today's archives management. But the problem is how much these rules are obeyed in reality where there are so many different variables. We need to level up the standard of archives management and develop software to refine the related rules.

A Study on the cognition & responses to Middle Eastern Terrorism

Choi, Jae Hoon (IMS) As for the definition of terrorism, academics and analysts diverge in their opinions. No one has been able to produce a universally agreed definition. Walter Laqueur, even argues that terrorism is simply undefinable and unworthy of definition. One of the controversial questions related to a finite definition of terrorism is how to identify state terrorism. In this regard, the West blames some Arab nations and the Muslim world for state terrorism and religious terrorism by supporting Islamic Radicals or Islamic extremist, while Arab nations and the Muslim world ascribe terrorism to the developed nations’ colonization of the less developed nations. Terrorist

groups

the

Middle

East

have

diverse

origins,

ideologies,

and

organizational structures. These groups date back to the late 1960s and early 1970s, and the majority of these were formally or informally linked to the PLO. Typically, they are also relatively bureaucratic and maintain a nationalist or Marxist agenda. In contrast, most new generation groups arose in the 1980s and 1990s, have more fluid organizational forms, and rely on Islam, especially the concept of Jihad as a basis for their radical ideology. The groups have survived to this day partly through support from states such as Syria, Libya, and Iran. The groups retain the ability to train and prepare for terrorist missions; however, their involvement in actual operations has been limited in recent years, partly because of successful counter terrorism campaigns by Israeli and Western Anti-terrorism agencies. In contrast, the newer and less hierarchical groups, such as Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), Hizbullah, Algeria’s Armed Islamic Group (GIA), the Egyptian Islamic Group (IG), and Osama bin Laden’s Arab Afghans, have become the most active organizations in and around the Middle East. After the gulf war in 1991, Muslims regard the coalition army, especially the US military presence as an intimidation of Islam by the West. Al-Qaeda's ideology and behavior is seen as an extreme form of Islam and as a political movement by modern Islamic Fundamentalists, and one of its ideals is pan-Islamic unity. To Al-Qaeda in particular, the world is viewed as a struggle between their extreme Islamist ideology on one hand and non-Islam, like Zionism, Christianity and the secular West on the other.

ă&#x20AC;?Key Words : Middle Eastern Terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism, Islamist terrorism, Global Terrorism, Jihad. Low Intensity Conflictă&#x20AC;&#x2018;

Session Ⅱ

～

(16:00

18:00)

Panel 1 Human Sciences(Cinema / Culture) (Rose Room) Chair : Nam, In Young(Dongseo University) 1. The expanded theater : Spanish meta-theatre and space Seo, Hyun Suk (Yunsei University) Discussant : Kim, Seon Uk (Korea University) 2. Cruel yet Childish : Representations of Childhood in Dario Argento Philippe Met (University of Pennsylvania) Discussant : Cho, Young Jung (Pusan International Film Festival) 3. Representations of the stranger in the French-Italian Cinema : Lo Straniero (The Stranger) by Visconti Antoine Coppola (Sungkyunkwan University) Discussant : Song, Byung Joon (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies) 4. The Image of Arabs represented in the Korean Media Lee, In Seop (Hankook University Of Foreign Studies) Discussant : Kim, Gye Joong (Sungkyul University)

The Expanded Theater : Spanish Meta-theatre and Space

Seo, Hyun Suk (Yunsei University)

The staged theater performance The History of Ronald, the Clown of McDonald’s

(La historia de Ronald el payaso de McDonald’s),1) directed by Rodrigo García for La Carnicería Teatro(Butchery Theater),2) offers more than a verbal critique upon the omnipresence of multi-national corporates like the McDonald’s in the globalized culture. The performers attack the famous McDonald’s icon as well as the audience’s senses when they submit their bodies to be smeared with and bathed in hamburgers and French fries. The sensory attack, mostly olfactory, upon the tamed habits of the conforming consumers coincides with the political agitation to act against the process of globalization. The radicality of the performance reaches its height when the performers toss to the audience ropes of which the other ends are solidly tied to a stake installed on the stage floor. The ropes’ ends reach the very end row of the auditorium, and all audience members are asked to pull them together “until the stage comes apart and liberates itself from the immobility of theatrical representation.” As the forth wall of the stage is broken down, the deceivingly casual critique upon the overwhelming power of capitalism is symbolically handed down to the audience members, who are now demanded to apply physical strength to change the status quo. Acknowledging that the world is not changed by mere vocal or theatrical representations of critical thinking, García assigns each audience member to stop being a mere ‘spectator’ and become an ‘activist.’ The individual mission is to contribute

conventional

the

collective

theatrical

efforts

representation.

dismantle

The

group

the

euphoric

attempts

realism

orchestrated

the

performers to uproot the illusionist foundation of theatrical representation instantly transform the static auditorium into a dynamic field of labor and communication, as the individual strengths amount to a charged communal bonding. The mimetic engagement supported by the Aristotlian aesthetics is replaced by action, the dramatic 1) The History of Ronald, the Clown of McDonald’s was presented at Mary Hall, Seogang University in Seoul, as a part of the Seoul Performing Arts Festival, from September 23 to 24, 2005. 2) Formed in Madrid in 1989 by Argentinian-born Rodrigo García, La Carnicería Teatro has developed a unique theatrical form that interweaves body, materials, and popular culture with politically engaging texts written by García.

construction by the intervention of the spectators upon the representational space. It is in this sense of replacement through which the political implication of the act merges with the formative subversion of the dichotomy between the audience and the stage. As the performance makes it clear, changing the world requires more than ideas and words; it calls for muscles and sweat.

The History of Ronald, the Clown of McDonald’s by Rodrigo García, La Carnicería Teatro.

The message behind the communal collectivism surfaces more clearly as the cooperative power of the audience turns out to be insufficient to “liberate” the theatrical stage despite the contagious enthusiasm shared by the cheering performers and the willing audience. Once the passionate idealism acted out by the participating audience exhausts itself, the audience encounters the harsh reality of impossibility and frustration; collective bond falls short of accomplishing the miraculous transformation. The audience realizes that the very effort to physically uproot the stage was bound to fail in the first place and that the performers’ urge to collect the physical strengths was a mere theatrical gesture not much different from any emotive representations of the conventional theater. The world remains unchanged, and so does the theatrical convention. The politicization of the audience experience that García evokes, however poignantly mimetic or self-defeating, is nevertheless indicative of the radical changes activated by the new generation of Spanish experimental stage directors that emerged in the 1990’s. Highly critical of both the corporate culture and the conventions of the theatrical spectacle, a number of directors working today are producing works that challenge the norms of theatrical spectatorship. In their ‘meta-theater’ works, such

directors as Christina Blanco, Roger Bernat, Cuqui Jerez, as well as Rodrigo García, reconstruct the spatial context of viewing that the audience is engaged with. Leaving behind the empty legacies of the Franco era, which had subdued the avant-garde movements of the 1920’s,

often associated with the anarchist movement,

these

directors go back to the very fundamentals of theater to start changing the common notion of art practices. Cristina

Blanco’s

solo

sQUARE_aRROW_rUNNING

performance

pERSON

(cUADRADO_fLECHA_pERSONA qUE cORRE) 3) is a collage of simple gestures that playfully question our habitual ways of reading signs in public places. Trained in dance, Blanco re-examines the very defining properties of dance by situating her movements in the context of social codification of geometric forms and the human body, a context that not only enables communication but also induces slippage, misreading, and transformation of signifiers. Performed in a non-theatrical, empty room with florescent lights and common office interior, Blanco eliminates what even the

most

faithful

“supplementary”

supporters the

very

realist

essence

theater theater,

had namely

theory

stage

considered

lighting,

scenic

instruments, music, and costume. Replacing such artificial components with ordinary objects and existing architectural elements such as walls, doors, partitions, electric outlets, signs, and switches, Blanco transforms the ordinary room into a stage, or rather brings the staged spectacle down to the everyday reality. By playfully adding lines and dots with a magic marker and utility tapes to these ordinary objects, she transforms them to signs, or turns the signs to meaningless objects. An electric outlet with two holes circumscribed by an encircling outline becomes a smile when she draws a curve under the holes; an alarm switch turns out to be a donut when she takes it off the wall and holds it with one hand while holding a cup of coffee with the other; a fire extinguisher becomes her dance partner when she holds it in her arms and takes its arm with one hand. The act of “dancing” no longer conveys physical balance and formative harmony; it becomes a semiotic activity through which objects and signs are formed and reinterpreted. The boundary that separates the stage from the everyday space no longer exists. Once the contractual division of space collapses, Blanco’s ‘choreographic’ construction asks whether the body can truly by free from the vast network of signs.

3) cUADRADO_fLECHA_pERSONA qUE cORRE was presented at LIG L Space in Seoul as a part of Festival Bom from April 6 to 7, 2009.

Cristina Blanco’s cUADRADO_fLECHA_pERSONA qUE cORRE

The demystification or physical dismantling of the theatrical stage in both Blanco’s and García’s works echoes the Modernist reductionism, through which artists have

—

interrogated the very material foundation of a medium

painting, sculpture, film. The

Modernist reflection upon the medium of theater, which gained its momentum since the 1990’s, has been a rather delayed one belatedly taking upon the similar attitudes in the fields of painting, sculpture, film, and photography. As Hans-Thies Lehmann points out in his landmark book Postdramatic Theatre, such notions that thrust the avant-garde

movement

from

the

1950’s

“self-referentiality,

non-figurative,

abstract/concrete, autonomization of signifiers, seriality, aleatoric art" were applied to performing arts only after the 1970’s.4) The

radicalization

the

stage

—

media

dance,

—

theater

the

spirit

the

avant-garde takes place as a kind of archeological re(dis)covery of the originating conditions of stage performances. We are reminded that the term ‘scenography,’ for instance, which refers to the amalgamation of all elements of stage sets and devices in today’s terminology, originates from the context of landscaping rather than that of th

theater. As late as in the 17

century, the usage of the term ‘scenography’ was

applied to the acts of designing and constructing gardens, for instance, which then involved more than the distanced spectatorship from an external point of view. The term, in other words, included both the visual outlook of a garden and the interior experience of what envelopes the stroller.5) Consciously taken into consideration when ‘scenographing’ gardens was the placement of the body within the site, not just in

front of it. Scenography involved highly individualized, organic interactions with the surrounding environment. The phenomenological implication of the term is of course

4) Hans-Thies Lehmann, P ostdramatic Theatre. trans. Karen Jürs-Munby. Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2006, p.94. According to Lehmann, such migration of art-specific terms onto performing arts ensued as visual artists started experimenting with the conventions of theater and dance. 5) Bojana Bauer, "Interview with Nadia Lauro," Dance Zone P rague, February 2007.

lost in its current application, as it confines the same term to artificial arrangements designed for the remote spectatorship. This kind of etymological return to the origin supports the necessity to reform the architectural conditions for theatrical experiences. Similarly, the term ‘theater,’ stemming from the Greek ‘theatron,’ originally implies the placement of people gathered for various visual experiences. ‘Theatron’ during the Renaissance encompassed a broad spectrum of spatial settings, including gardens, staircases, fountains, and other domestic spaces, not necessarily limited to the parallel rows of seats that immobilize the spectators’ bodies as well as their gaze.6) The originating conditions, in other words, did not construct the unvaried homogenization of looking as does the modern auditorium. This difference connotes much more than variations in seat arrangement in that, as French performance artist puts it, “[t]he gaze operates inside the conventions of the site.”7) The grid formation for seating spectators is a modern invention that regulates and standardizes the act of looking. As Catalan director Roger Bernat acknowledges, the western tradition of theater th

since the mid-19

century has “disciplined” the body of the theatrical spectator as a

consumer of staged spectacles.8) From this Foucauldian perspective, the uses of stage light and the architectural setting of the auditorium have functioned to train the body to be passively immersed in sensory stimuli, deprived of any critical thinking or communal bonding. “Alienation,” in the Brechtian sense, is an invention of many devices to control the mass, auditorium included. Bernat’s own theatrical production Domini P úblic9) removes the ‘theatron’ from the dominance of the twentieth century architecture and places the theatrical experience in the public sphere. Upon arrival on the performance site, the spectators/participants receive a wireless headset, through which they are to hear a narrator’s voice asking a series

questions.

Scattered

around

the

site

the

onset

the

show,

the

participants are led to reposition themselves according to their answers to the questions that they hear on the headsets. The questions range from private to demographic, from trivial to ontological ones, sporadically dealing with the life style, social status, cultural taste, habits, family background, opinions, and so on. For instance: “If you have read today’s newspaper before you came here, take four steps towards the front.”; “If you think you are talented, raise a finger towards the sky.”; “If you are participating in the show with an invitation ticket, move towards the 6) Lehmann, “Theory in Theatre?,” Experts of the Everyday: The Theatre of Rimini Protokoll. ed. Miriam Dreysse, Florian Malzacher. trans. Daniel Belasco Rogers, Ehren Fordyce, Geoffrey Garrison, Mat Hand, Sophia New, Walter Suttcliffe. Berlin: Alexander Verlag Berlin, 2008, pp.152-167. 7) Bauer, "Interview with Nadia Lauro." 8) Roger Bernat, talk with the artist, Arko Museum of Art, Seoul, April 17, 2010. 9) Domini P úblic was presented affront Arko Museum of Art in Seoul as a part of Festival Bom from April 17 to 18, 2010.

usher.”; “If you took your summer vacation at Haewoondae beach, touch the woman in front of you.”; “If you are born in this city[Seoul], put on the yellow jacket provided by the staff.”; and so on. The responses are expressed in various simple gestures such as stepping forward, raising hands, moving to designated areas, pointing to other participants, etc. The entire performance consists of the participants’ movements, spontaneously choreographed by their own reactions to the verbalized questions. The audience, in short, takes the place of performers; the theatron is collapsed into the stage.

Roger Bernat’s Domini P úblic, performed in Seoul, April, 2010.

The participants’ instantaneous behaviors performatively form into patterns or small groups that form and annul themselves instantly. The ephemeral states of each new group often involve or resonate socially conflictive groupings (which occur according to geographic divisions or social roles) and thus reflect in a microcosmic scale the large makeup of the society and its history. The instantly choreographed movements visualize how social groups are formed according to complex sets of conditions. The participants are then resituated as ‘social actors’ whose stage expands beyond the spatial and temporal parameters of the performance. If the conventional theater is where “audience members and actors co-exist” as Suzuki Tadashi asserts, audience members exist as actors in Bernat’s theater site. “The world is a stage,” as the old Shakespearean metaphor wittingly informs.

Domini Públic radicalizes the very act of theatrical direction and transforms the public park or square into an “expanded stage,” so to speak. The term of course resonates the physical as well as psychological ‘expansion’ of the cinematic experience to include the spatial context of the screening room in what Gene Youngblood calls the “expanded cinema.” ‘Expanding’ the conventions or contexts of site not only entails reconditioning of the theatrical spectatorship but more significantly restructures the very foundation of the aesthetic experience. Freely mobilized from the idealized immobility of the grid that upholds the ideological basis of the linear perspective, the

physically active audience no longer idealizes the staged spectacle as an artistic object for spectatorship. The theatrical innovations that García, Blanco, and Bernat advanced are not isolated efforts specific to Spanish theatrical communities but rather a part of an overall movement that is taking place in other European countries. As Lehmann points out, various forms of experimentation and questions have risen since the 1990’s upon the long tradition of realist theater.10) What is unique about the Spanish directors’ endeavors is that the necessity to recondition the theatrical viewing experience stems from or coincides with the efforts to create communal processes to understand and communicate with each other. The communicative link that these directors establish between the performers and the audience, between the stage and the ‘theatron,’ is open and organic, often physically direct and intimate. The communicative openness in their works gains its efficacy when the space of representation collapses to the spectatorial positions. The finale of Domini P úblic offers an externalized view upon the spectator-actors’ behaviors. The narrator asks them to come inside the adjacent building (or Arko Museum in the Seoul performance), where they encounter a miniature simulation of none other than what they had gone through: loosely grouped people in an open space. While the narrator continues with questions with no demand for physical responses, a video screen on the wall shows sections of the miniature installation, in which small figures display similar physical postures that the participants themselves had enacted just before. The frozen mise-en-abyme reveals the uncannyness of the group behaviors that each participant had been a part of. The microscopic mirror effect is at once macroscopic as well, proposing a bird-eye view on how social groupings take place on a larger scale. A moment of self-reflexivity, both critical and poetic, is a moment when the questions are directed towards the self as well as the social dynamic, towards the external world as well as the art work itself. This Brechtian distanciation or sociological overview upon ourselves is precisely what the collapse of the spectatorial and the participatory trajectories ultimately leads to. The ‘expansion’ of stage practices is in this sense a spatial metaphor for psychological and metaphysical ones as well as physical. To question the foundation of art is to question life.

10) Lehmann, P ostdramatic Theatre.

Discussion The expanded Theater : Spanish meta-theatre and space

Discussant : Kim, Seon Uk (Korea University)

This article is focused on the new concept of the theatrical space about three spanish contemporaneous plays performed in Korea, The History of Ronald, the

Clown of McDonalds by Rodrigo García, sQUARE-aRROW-rUNNING pERSON by Cristina Blanco and Domini Públic by Roger Bernat. The theme is very interesting because these three authors/directors attempt to break the theatrical space based on the traditional concept. First,

Dr.

Seo analyzes the space

of The

History of Ronald,

the Clown of

McDonald. In this play the forth wall of the traditional stage is broken down, and the director assigns the audience to intervene actively. It is a formative subversion of the dichotomy between the audience and the stage. However, this attempt ends in failure. He points out that the audience realized that the very effort to physically uproot the stage was bound to fail in the first place and that the performers’ urge to intervene was a mere theatrical gesture not much different from the conventional theatre. This result is very important and interesting. It means that this world remains unchanged, and so does the theatrical convention. And sQUARE-aRROW-rUNNING pERSON transforms the ordinary room into a stage, and replaces the artificial components like stage lighting, scene instruments, music and costume with ordinary objects and architectural elements such as walls, doors, partitions, electric outlets, signs and switches. In others words, the theatrical space of this play is differentiated from that of the traditional theatre. And if so, I suggest that the meaning and the function of this theatrical space should be treated more concretely. The last play, Roger Bernat's Domini P ublic removes the 'theatron' and places the theatrical experience in the public sphere. This play also induces the audience to participate

the

performance.

Upon

arrival

the

performance

site,

the

spectators/participants receive a wireless headset, through which they are to hear a

narrator's voice asking a series of questions. Scattered around the site at the onset of the show, the participants are led to reposition themselves according to their answers to the questions that they hear on the headsets. The audience takes the place of performers. Through this participation, however, what artistic experience do the participants gain? And the Dr. Seo concludes that the participants' instantaneous behaviors performatively form into patterns or small groups that form and annul themselves instantly, and the instantly choreographed movements visualize how social groups are formed according to complex sets of conditions. If it is so, what patterns do the participants show in the performance in Seoul, April, 2010?

“Cruel yet childish” : Representations of Childhood in Dario Argento

Philippe Met (University of Pennsylvania)

“Many people forget their life experience as a child. I never could. It was a living hell […]” (Dario Argento)1)

I. Filiation I want to start right off the bat by foregrounding the notion of filiation, not only to the degree that it seems appropriate for, and germane to, a study of childhood on celluloid, but because I intend to use it as an admittedly twisted Ariadne’s thread to guide me through the labyrinth of infantile fears and desires as well as aberrant and abhorrent family configurations that constitutes the backbone of Dario Argento’s ongoing filmography. It is perhaps worth recalling that the Italian horrormeister’s work essentially falls within 2 (sub)genre categories:

- a/ the giallo

–

a hybrid and lurid horror-meets-crime or slasher vein, replete

with generous (and, arguably, misogynistic) doses of gore and nudity, that first emerged in early 1960s Italy thanks to Mario Bava’s creative genius. It was strikingly rejuvenated, gaining enhanced visibility and popularity in the process, with Argento’s directorial debut, The Bird with the Crystal P lumage (L’uccello

dalle piume di cristallo, 1970). In that respect, Argento was instrumental in to codifying and solidifying all the tropes of a highly formulaic genre structured around fetishized, ritualized, estheticized murder set-pieces

–

a genre that

subsequently thrived at the Italian box-office. - b/ supernatural chillers all’italiana developed by the likes of Bava (again), Riccardo Freda, Antonio Margheriti et al. in the late 50s throughout the 60s (a decade justifiably known as the Golden Age of Italian Gothic Horror). Here again, Argento later capped and modernized that filone with his flamboyantly iconic Suspiria (1977). 1) Qtd. by Alan Jones in Profondo Argento. The Man, the Myths and the Magic (Godalming, UK: Fab Press, 2004), 35.

If critics have generally tended to overemphasize, if not muddle, the creative lineage from Mario Bava to Dario Argento, one important point of commonality certainly lies in the figure of the child or representations of childhood as recurring and prominent features throughout both directors’ respective careers. This tapping into a childhood imaginary world that adheres to nightmare logic was in turn inspired, determined and fashioned by early readings of classic horror tales, with a marked penchant for Mérimée and Gogol in Bava’s case, E. A. Poe and H. P. Lovecraft in Argento’s. As a matter of fact the latter’s perverse stories often play out like horrific fairy tales in (thin) disguise. A classic example that definitely requires a willing suspension of disbelief despite its pseudo-scientific trappings is when the youthful protagonist of

P henomena (1985) is guided by a firefly towards a maggot-covered black glove left behind by the murderer, an important clue for the rest of the investigation. In a film where barely oblique references to the intricate stuff that folktales and bedtime stories are made of abound, and which generally “mak[es] mocking use of Hansel and Gretel cottages and romantic lakes,” as one critic aptly put it,2) a macabre link is thus established between the luminescent, quasi-ethereal realm (firefly) and the Conqueror Worm (maggots)… To take another instance, that of Argento’s indisputable occult horror masterpiece, Suspiria need not even include any actual child in its cast in order to create a twisted Snow White feel

–

from the stunning use of primary colors

ostensibly borrowed from the 1937 Walt Disney animated feature to the young adolescent frantically running through the woods on a dark stormy night in the opening frames, or the pure and fair heroine (but she might just as conceivably be perceived as some latter-day Little Red Riding Hood…) pitted against an evil, “Black Queen” witch. Not to mention the higher-than-normal door handles (by no less than 8 inches!) which Argento insisted on, as a fixture of the set design, since they visually returned the bevy of nubile ballet dancers at the Tanz Akademie in Freiburg to a younger status more in line with the initial screenplay where the students were mostly aged 8 to 10… Much closer to our time, the Italian director has defined

J enifer (2005), his contribution to the first season of Showtime’s “Masters of Horror” whose script was based on a comic book from the 1970s, as “Beauty and the Beast in reverse,” or collapsed into one entity in lieu of the original dichotomy… Viewed

now in

less

figurative

(i.e.,

spiritual

referential)

than

literal

(i.e.,

biological or biographical) terms, the notion of filiation is further brought to the fore, when one considers that Lamberto Bava, Mario’s son, started out in the film industry by collaborating, mostly as assistant director, on a number of his father’s films before

2) Matthew Coniam, in Chris Gallant (ed.), Art of Darkness: The Cinema of Dario Argento (Guildford: FAB Press, 2000), 191.

helming (with mixed results) his own horror and giallo efforts. Or that Dario Argento’s daughters appeared at various ages in several of their progenitor’s films. Although she eventually opted out of a full-fledged acting career, Fiore has cameo roles in Phenomena and The Card P layer (Il Cartaio, 2004), as well as in Lamberto Bava’s Demons (Demoni, 1985), produced and co-scripted by Dario Argento. As for Asia, now an international star in her own right, some of her first lead performances were in Trauma (1993), as an anorexic teenage runaway;3) The Stendhal Syndrome (La sindrome di Stendhal, 1996), as a young female cop who goes through a drastic identity crisis after falling prey to a serial rapist; and The P hantom of the Opera (Il

fantasma dell’opera, 1998), as chorus singer and leading diva’s understudy. As Dario once suggested, these successive films could be seen as constituting “a trilogy on their own merits,”4) a clear reference to his iconic “Three Mothers” cycle that was finally completed, over a quarter century after the first two installments (Suspiria and

Inferno [1980]), with Mother of Tears (La terza madre , 2007), incidentally a new vehicle for Asia. More to the point, however, and despite the fact that none of them directly addresses the question of childhood or explicitly includes a child figure, are the various common threads running through the three 1990s films, from a significant gender

shift

from

Argento’s

films

terms

characterization

and

focalization (with the male cast generally taking a back seat) to the correlation of the chrysalis

alienation

adolescence

post-adolescence)5)

(or

(self-destructiveness,

hallucinatory

spells

associated

drug with

addiction an

intense

with or

form

anorexia

esthetic

shock

affliction

Trauma; in

The

and

dizzy,

Stendhal

Syndrome ).

II. Primal scene If childhood trauma, its “pop” psychological genesis (as some detractors have argued) and deleterious aftereffects, may be considered as staple ingredients of typical giallo fare, they literally haunt

most of Dario Argento’s films. Such traumatic

experience is exemplarily, albeit not exclusively, iconized by a primal scene, featuring a

child’s

parents

engaged

subjected

murderous

mayhem,

which

both

3) The character was partly based on Asia’s half-sister, Anna, who suffered from the disorder and died in a motorcycle accident shortly after the film’s release, making Trauma an uncanny auto-analytic exercise in family tension and dysfunction as much as a retread of giallo terrain, especially when one factors in Argento’s concomitant separation from his longtime companion, Daria Nicolodi… 4) Qtd. by Alan Jones (283). It is also worth recalling here a statement Asia made, whether in jest or in all seriousness, about her father “g[iving] [her] life because he needed a lead actress for his films …” (interview for Dark Dreams

–

http://www.dark-dreams.co.uk/interviews/asia4.php).

5) It has been noted that the Asia Argento character is much too young in The Stendhal Syndrome to be credible as a top-ranking police officer. The actress was barely twenty at the time.

transposes and displaces a canonical Freudian paradigm. As posited and evidenced in the well-known case study of the “Wolf Man,” a witnessed scene of parental coitus, in actuality or in imagination, subsequently leads a child to equate intercourse with aggression and violence, or to experience castration anxiety. A witnessed scene

–

or,

better still, an eye-witnessed mise-en-scène , given the prevalence of the scopic drive and fantasized (re)enactment inherent to this originary “crisis” within the dual context of human psyche formation and cinematic viewing. Primal or not, repressed (infantile) trauma is, following a classic psychoanalytic mechanism, bound to “return.” Inside the basic parameters of the giallo format where suspense, twists and turns, or red herrings commonly prevail, total recall is hardly a viable narrational option (unless it serves as shockingly abrupt denouement).6) Instead, the resurfacing of the suppressed is usually accompanied, signaled or rendered, visually as well as narratively, by repeated flashback sequences that first come about as partial, fragmented or obscured non-diegetic inserts (as the ever trailblazing Mario Bava had already demonstrated in

Hatchet for the Honeymoon [Il rosso segno della folia, 1969]). Confusion is thus deliberately created in terms of focalization and space-time continuum as well as of significance or attribution, especially in view of the aftermath of the original trauma and, even more importantly, the response to the victimization process, whether identificatory or oppositional in nature. This is all part of not only the investigative or hermeneutic thrust but also the double-edged strategy of unveiling and obfuscation (not to mention deception or misdirection) which subtend Argento’s thrillers and need to be reinscribed within the broader scope of a thorough, methodical questioning of the filmic image (its function, meaning and impact) after Antonioni’s seminal Blow-up (1966). Outside of Deep Red (P rofondo Rosso, 1975), a cult giallo in the history of the genre and arguably its crowning achievement, which I will return to toward the end of this essay by examining its uniquely innovative credits sequence, prime examples of a primal scene in Argento notably include:

- Sleepless (Nonhosonno, 2000), much-touted at the time of its release as Dario’s return to true giallo form and pure giallo format (echoing earlier masterpieces of his such as Deep Red and Tenebre [Tenebrae, 1982]) - Do You Like Hitchcock? (Ti Piace Hitchcock? , 2005), an explicitly stylistic and intertextual homage to the single most celebrated cinematic Master of Suspense (and, as such, a major influence on the young Argento who, nonetheless, later came to resent being dubbed “the Italian Hitchcock” in the media…). 6) In a related genre, see the controversially cathartic ending of Hitchcock’s Marnie (1964).

In Sleepless, moving from his native Torino to Rome and using alcohol by way of nepenthe, Giacomo has been desperately trying to suppress a devastatingly traumatic event he helplessly witnessed in his youth, namely his mother’s gruesome murder, a mere few feet away from him, at the hands of an unseen assailant who inexplicably seems to be back on a killing spree after a hiatus of some 17 years. The film opens with the police arriving at the initial murder scene post facto, but it is only upon Giacomo’s return on the premises that repressed memories are unleashed via a brief flashback sequence. The maniacal killer will eventually be revealed to be Lorenzo, Giacomo’s childhood friend, who was thus only a young boy when he started out on his homicidal career by butchering Giacomo’s mother.

Do You Like Hitchcock? , on the other hand, offers a different twist on the trope in its opening sequence. Biking through a forest the protagonist as a young boy comes upon an isolated cabin. Peering through a window he catches sight of two young women (possibly lesbians) savagely slaughtering a rooster, presumably as part of some black magic ritual. This is one of the rare occurrences of bloodshed in a film that was originally made for RAI television (hence the general toning down of customary Argentoesque graphic violence and gore), but it does set up the central motif of voyeurism as well as foreshadow the present day narrative that focuses on a grown up Giulio, now a media student writing his thesis on German Expressionism, stalking and spying (at leisure after he fractures his leg and is confined to his apartment à la Rear Window [1954]) on a couple of female neighbors, a brunette and a blonde, he suspects of having entered into an “exchange murders” pact à la

Strangers on a Train (1951). I might mention in passing that I have attempted elsewhere to show the extent to which the giallo genre at large was impacted by Hitchcock’s oeuvre , more particularly P sycho’s iconic shower scene as an inaccessible pinnacle or unmatchable template for aspiring Italian horror and thriller maestros who repeatedly proceeded to reference, short of reduplicating, the primacy or primalness of such a filmic “trauma,” oftentimes in a self-conscious, if not self-indulgent, mise en

abîme effect.7)

7) See my “"Knowing Too Much" About Hitchcock: The Genesis of Italian Giallo,” in R. Barton Palmer & David Boyd (eds.), After Hitchcock: Influence, Imitation and Intertextuality, Austin: University of Texas Press, 2006, 195-214.

III. The family and its substitutes Delineating a form of deflected filiation, tutelary figures or parental surrogates are not completely absent from Dario Argento’s filmic corpus. Consider, for instance,

Sleepless’s aging police detective with a failing memory and 20-some-year-old Giacomo (a quasi-orphan since the brutal death of his mother and the remarrying of his neglecting father over a decade earlier). Their respective lives get mutually regenerated by teaming up together in an effort to unmask the so-called dwarf killer, in other words to make good on an unfulfilled promise (Moretti had pledged to the young boy that he would bring his mother’s murderer to justice) and provide some much-needed closure. Or take Dr. McGregor, the paralytic, benign scientist befriended by the young heroine in Phenomena. As Jennifer confesses to her roommate, her mother abandoned the family on Christmas Day (just as Argento's own genitrix reportedly did…) and her father, an American film star, is currently spending a year in the Philippines more or less incommunicado. Already made to feel “different” by her taunting peers (due to both her sleepwalking proclivity and eerie gift for telepathic communication with insects à la Dr. Dolittle), she finds herself alone in a foreign country (ominously referred to as the Swiss Transylvania…)8) where she attends a Gothic-looking boarding school somewhat reminiscent of Suspiria’s German ballet academy that harbored a secret coven headed by the fearsome Helena Markos. For

Argento,

formal

instruction

clearly

represents

form

oppression

indoctrination, with headmistresses akin to malevolent witches presiding over a Foucauldian controlling system of power and knowledge

–

in sum, the architectural

or institutional(izing) equivalent of a bad mother. In a more strictly clinical or psychoanalytic sense, a heinous matriarch (in the guise of a gentle, harmless soul), played by none other than the director’s then soon-to-be-estranged paramour Daria Nicolodi, is in fact featured in the film. In order to protect Patua, her malignant, murderous son, the demented Frau Brückner does not balk at killing, including the good paternal persona of John McGregor or the avuncular figure of Jennifer’s father’s agent, savagely beheaded at the end before the young girl’s very eyes. It is precisely after her progeny has been consumed first

by an apocalyptic swarm of bees

(summoned by the virginal heroine), then by flames, that Frau Brückner’s visceral maternal attachment is voiced as a monstrous, albeit poignant cri du cœur: “he was diseased, but he was my son.” If “mutant” Patua is clearly a psychopathic case (i.e., with more weight given to the hereditary than to the environmental) as the offspring 8) According to Argento himself, the region is thus called because of a prevalent Foehn wind that, legend has it, not only “drives people mad” but “caus[es] the birth of monsters as it tends to knock down pregnant women…” Qtd. in Alan Jones (128).

of a brutal rape (his mother was physically assaulted by an inmate of the asylum where she used to work), the male-hating and targeting Mimsy Farmer character in

Four Flies on Grey Velvet (Quattro mosche di velluto grigio, 1972) could be defined as the sociopathic product (i.e., with less emphasis on the innate than on the acquired) of horrible parent-child dynamics since Nina’s sadistic father beat her up into growing up as a boy. Frau Brückner, Nina’s father and their ilk are an unambiguous indication that, despite the strong (or at least healthy…) formative and emotional bonds developed around

the

above-mentioned

substitute

pairings

(to

which

one

might

add

the

mentor-and-disciple doublets in The Cat O’ Nine Tails [Il Gatto a Nove Code, 1971] and Tenebre),9) the family unit as such, be it nuclear or single-parent, and as it is presented throughout Argento’s œuvre, remains a hotbed of neurosis and psychosis, if not the root of all evil (or “the way of all devils,” as Fassbinder once famously put it …), which the primal, miasmic cesspool (overflowing with decomposing bodies and bobbing skulls) that serves as the dungeon-like basement of Frau Brückner’s home in

P henomena

could

possibly

construed

visually

gruesome

analogue

of.

Admittedly, this is to a large extent a trademark of the genre industry all’Italiana, more specifically in its related horror, thriller and fantastic variants again

with

Mario

Bava’s

filmography,

which

consistently

–

depicts

starting, once the

horrific

disintegration of family ties or its teratological reformation (or restructuring), as in the I Wurdalak episode of Black Sabbath (Tre volti della paura, 1963), where the

pater familias, played by Boris Karloff in one of his very last performances, returns home to literally, that is vampirically, turn the rest of the family into a newly reconfigured, closely knit, self-feeding organism. In that sense, whether demonized or victimized (or simultaneously both), the

bambini of Italian chillers are arguably the ideological vehicles or instruments of a larger, at least two-fold agenda (with Argento’s opuses as frequent cases in point): a/ the destruction or subversion of the sacrosanct famiglia and its long history of Catholic values, child-oriented culture or patriarchal organization; b/ an intentional distancing from, if not a fierce reaction against, the dominance of historiographically sanctioned neo-realism. It is a well-documented fact that, framed by an indelible, albeit rigid and mostly irreversible dichotomy (persecuted innocence, lucidity and rectitude vs. corruption, deception and perversion), neo-realist films routinely feature a salient child figure, usually in the form of a silent witness, an oppositional Other or Actant-Oppositionist (to borrow from Russian formalism). Such 9) Needless to say, said bonds constitute the polar opposite of the Frau Brückner-Patua situation in

P henomena, with the son physically chained to a wall (before breaking free) in the opening sequence and, more figuratively, to his own mother via an infantilizing, quasi-incestuous relationship.

a persona acts as moral conscience

–

or internel state of consciousness, to use this

time Deleuze’s Péguy-inspired terminology, meaning the e-ternity of an inner time that cinema can bring to the same surface10)

–

in the face of the turpitudes, crimes

and horrors committed by adults, in times of peace and war alike.11) It thus comes as no surprise that generic contestation of neorealist dogma or doxa readily assumed the specific form (soon ossified into an obligatory trope, if not a trite stereotype) of childhood as inextricably virginal and tainted, angelic and demonic. Argento himself was not adverse to such a facile, if eerie effect, with the inclusion, for example, of a background or even tangential character in Deep Red, named Olga, who is scolded and smacked by her father, the caretaker of the creepy “House of the Screaming Child,” for her disturbingly compulsive habit of spearing live lizards. To which the young

girl

responds

with

wicked

smirk

and

malicious

stare,

courtesy

freckle-faced child-actress Nicoletta Emmi, spotted a couple of years earlier in Mario Bava’s Bay of Blood (Reazione a catena, 1971) as well as Baron Blood (Gli orrori

del castello di Norimberga, 1972), and a regular sight on Italian screens throughout the decade in thrillers or possession flicks… Finally, it bears mentioning that the portrayal of childhood in Argento is also generally distinct from the treatment found in many gialli of the 1970s, which tended to be built around a paranoia or conspiracy premise whereby children turned out to be the hapless martyrs of a covertly vitiated, abusive adult masculine world involved in

pedophilia

and

respectability and

the

prostitution

piety.12)

minors

beneath

veneer

bourgeois

Not that Argento is necessarily out of touch with the

zeitgeist, but he mostly refers to it obliquely. In that respect, Tenebre is indirectly but nonetheless distinctly a product of a troubled socio-political era (the infamous “Years

Lead”

Italy),

and

Opera

may

read,

amongst

other

possible

interpretations, as a metaphor for the impossibility of love in the time of AIDS, as the

director

has

himself

emphasized.

largely,

Argento’s

auteur

status

reflective of a systematic thrust of innovation in his oeuvre rather than derivation, as is too frequently the case with many of his giallo cohorts, hence a relatively minimal

10) Cinema 2. The Time-Image , translated by H. Tomlinson (Minneapolis, MN: Univ. of Minnesota Press,

1989),

91.

Quoted

Giuseppina

Mecchia

“The

Children

Are

Still

Watching

Us,

Caché/ Hidden in the folds of time” (Studies in French Cinema, 7.2, 2007), 138. Internel is usually translated into English as hyphenated “in-ternal.” 11) See for instance De Sica’s The Children Are Watching Us (I bambini ci guardano, 1944), or Rossellini’s Open City (Roma, città aperta, 1945). 12) See in particular Lucio Fulci’s Don’t Torture a Duckling (Non Si Sevizia un P aperino, 1972), Aldo Lado’s Short Night of the Glass Dolls (Corta notte delle bambole di vetro, aka Malastrana, 1971) and Who Saw Her Die? (Chi l’ha vista morire? , 1972), or Massimo Dallamano’s What Have You

Done to Solange? (Cosa Avete Fatto a Solange? , 1972) and What Have They Done to Your Daughters (La polizia chiede aiuto, 1976).

reliance on explicit cinematic intertextuality in his films (with the notable exception, for reasons previously noted, of Do You Like Hitchcock? ). One will however find in

J enifer a citational “one-two punch” pertaining to the child figure. Echoing the brief yet tragic lakeside encounter of the monster of Frankenstein and a guileless little girl in James Whale’s classic adaptation of the Mary Shelley novella, the titular heroine, a curvaceous and sexually voracious woman with a hideously disfigured face and no known past, meets a young female neighbor by a garden pool throwing flowers in the water (like her 1930s predecessor) and asking for her name. Shortly thereafter, in a scene more reminiscent of George Romero’s Night of the Living Dead (1968) this time, Jenifer is found feasting on the dead child’s entrails in a cellar…

IV/ A child’s panoply Dario Argento’s true signature representation of childhood seems to reside, however, in a reconfiguration of traditional, visual as well as aural, child(ish) iconography and paraphernalia within a violent, (pre-)homicidal context. The art of murder or murder as “total spectacle” (the way Wagner conceived of opera as a synthesis of all the arts)

consistently,

notoriously

sexualized

his

films:

not

only

its

actua(liza)tion (with an emphasis on penetration, amputation and strangulation, hence the rarity of firearms), but in its preparation. Besides an almost invariable set of sartorial accoutrements (including black gloves, preferably zippered, and a shiny raincoat),

the

archetypal

Argentoesque

psychopath

keeps

fetishistic

array

accessories as so many “tools of the trade,” so to speak. They are typically but no less sickeningly mixed with or transposed from an assortment of items that are as much transitional objects (to use a Winnicottian terminology) as plain toys or playthings serving as traditional synecdoches of a child’s universe: dolls, puppets, marbles, music boxes, nursery rhymes, drawings.13) This type of disquieting linkage is not without illustrious precedents in the “fantastic” or horror genre: one may think in particular of Luis Buñuel’s The Criminal Life of Archibaldo De La Cruz (Ensayo

de un crimen, 1955), Jack Clayton’s The Innocents (1961), or most of Mario Bava’s filmography, more specifically his Kill, Baby, Kill (Operazione P aura, 1966) that features prominently the ghostly figure of a blond-haired little girl named Melissa (and played by a young boy for subliminally enhanced gender confusion)14) whose 13) The list would not be complete without the disturbing child mask worn by the stranger snapping photographs of the staged murder scene in the deserted theatre early in Four Flies on Grey

Velvet. 14) Argento would later develop this thematic to great effect, from a child’s ambiguously gendered legs in Deep Red’s opening titles to the transsexual playing the young woman with red shoes who torments one of the killers in a series of flashback sequences in Tenebre .

every vengeful appearance is portended by her ball bouncing down stairs or along corridors. As suggested earlier, in Dario Argento’s films childhood trauma is recurrently carried over or resurfacing into adulthood. As such, it contaminates the developmental process of the character concerned in a tragically “twisted” or dysfunctional manner. Picked up by Helga Ulman’s telepathic powers in the post-opening-credits shots of

Deep Red, the incognito murderer’s thoughts

–

“cruel and yet childish at the same

time,” as she oxymoronically and therefore aptly describes them15)

–

constitute a

perfect exemplification of such a squirm-inducing blend of naïveté and morbidity. An equally striking encapsulation is to be found in the vaguely Brueghelesque painting of

The Bird with the Crystal P lumage, at once “primitive” in its design and macabre in its subject matter, which insidiously reactivates Monica’s dormant paranoid and psychopathic tendencies as it depicts a violent encounter (a hat-wearing figure stabbing a young girl in an otherwise empty, snow-covered field) similar to the one she was subjected to when assaulted at age 10. If Mario Bava’s predilection for and obsessive use of manikins and statues (in such films as Hatchet for the Honeymoon or Lisa and the Devil [Lisa e il diavolo, 1972]) is well known, Argento similarly tends to use the puppet motif in order to achieve a sense of confusion between the animate and the inanimate, or of conflation of the two. Mainly an efficient and suspenseful decoy immediately preceding the grisly dispatching of Professor Giordani in Deep Red, it takes on a more subtly sinister dimension when the heroine of P henomena mistakes the back of a child-sized doll with moving joints for Frau Brückner’s son. The ghastly deformed, degenerate killer boy is actually played by a dwarf, which might be read as a deliberately half-veiled attempt

metaphorize

stunted

psychological “blockage.”16)

growth

physical

visual

equivalent

Add gender equivocation and personal family drama

involvement into the mix with then-10-year-old Asia Argento dubbing the character’s voice…

In fine I would like to highlight two even more prevalent leitmotifs: 1/ The use of children’s artwork

–

e.g., the animal-shaped cut-out figurines left

on the scene of each murder in Sleepless, or the murderess’s son paper and mural drawings in Deep Red. Not only do such items serve as so many (sometimes misleading) clues in the investigative process, they more largely allegorize Argento’s 15) Unless, that is, one wants to read this syntagm as a roundabout comment on the putatively inborn cruelty of children. After all, Argento himself did once point out “there is a heartlessness about young children that is quite menacing” (qtd. by Alan Jones, 287). 16) The midget figure reappears in Sleepless where the first murder suspect is one Vincenzo de Fabritiis, nicknamed “the Dwarf,” on the basis of an unpublished giallo novel, “The Death Farm,” containing a nursery rhyme that the killer seems to be following to the letter.

own visual (baroque) esthetic, which has been likened, suitably enough although somewhat reductively, to “the delirious colors of a picture book drawn by demented children.”17) 2/ The inclusion of children’s music, both non-diegetic (a mere “la-la-la”-inflected lullaby in J enifer as ironic counterpoint to particularly gory events; “Nina nana in blu,” Ennio Morricone’s nursery rhyme theme for Four Flies on Grey Velvet, heard one last time in the film’s coda over the heroine’s decapitation in a car crash, mixed in with horrendous metallic sounds of crushed bodywork) and diegetic (as when

Deep Red’s homicidal maniac plays a children’s tune on a tape recorder18) as a deviant prelude to and catalyst for her gruesome acts of bodily mayhem). Far from being reduced to mere secondary sound effects, those aural c(l)ues, combined with the progressive rock accents of a soundtrack often scored by composer Claudio Simonetti and Italian band Goblin, tend in most cases to take center stage and “drive” the murder set-pieces.

V/ A case study: Deep Red’s credits sequence Last but not least, I wish to provide a brief micro-analysis of the start of Deep

Red as it epitomizes or crystallizes in memorably idiosyncratic fashion most, if not all of the childhood-related issues that I have covered so far. No sooner have they begun to roll than the minimalist black-and-white credits (along with the theme music) are abruptly suspended and replaced, via a black screen when the titles momentarily disappear, by a brief colorful vignette (a low-level static shot). In a 1950s decoration style living room (and at a time of year that should be a cause for harmony and celebration judging from the Christmas tree in the background) a murder is being committed in silhouette or stylized shadow play to the haunting, wordless tune of a children’s song which clashes with the strident Goblin soundtrack over the actual titles, but whose creepiness is yet enhanced by a piercing scream. A blood-smeared knife is then thrown onto the hardwood floor and into frame as a child’s pair of legs is seen approaching (in suitably non-gender specific white high socks and black patent shoes in a possible bi-chromatic echo of the titles). Fade to black. Credit titles and Goblin’s signature tune resume, uninterrupted this time, until the screen goes black again and the music is suddenly dropped. Then, and only then, does the film (narrative) truly “begin,” or so the viewer might assume. 17) See Suspiria entry in 101 Horror Movies. Ed. Steven Jay Schneider (Barron’s Educational Series, 2009). 18) Marc, the central investigating figure, soon finds out the tune is also creepily featured on a commercially available “Songs for Little Children” record.

By definition a credits sequence constitutes a paratext (to borrow from narratology) or a parafilmic, liminal space as well as a gesture or seal of authorship (whereby a director claims, among other things, the paternity of a (brain)child as on a birth certificate). In that sense, Deep Red’s titles (or perhaps one should say “pre-opening sequence” given its one-of-a-kind status) fittingly yet radically point to an infancy of the narrative (which will also make up its consubstantial core), to a pre-diegetic yet decisive event, to an obscure “prior” in the guise of a traumatic originary crisis that was tragically left unresolved. Hence a compulsion to repetition and ritualization, with similarly non-/para-diegetic, inserted or bracketed shots providing insight into the psycho-killer’s depraved mindscape and signaling the onslaught of each murderous rampage. Hence also an eventual return to a full development of that unutterable childhood point of origin that all along kept at once recurring and interfering with, or parasitizing,19) the narrative fabric

–

feeding off it, feeding into it. In light of which,

and as I hope to have shown, it might not be too much of an overstatement to make childhood the alpha and omega of Argento’s cinematic art.

19) I am here using the term in the various senses deployed by French philosopher Michel Serres: disruption,

static,

infiltration,

etc.

See

his

The

(Minneapolis : University of Minnesota Press, 2007).

parasite,

translated

Lawrence

Schehr

Discussion “Cruel yet childish” : Representations of Childhood in Dario Argento

Discussant : Cho, Young Jung (Programmer, Pusan International Film Festival)

Philippe Met’s article examines Dario Argento’s representation of childhood in 4 categories. Without

formal

introduction

deviated

from the

formal

structure

theoretical

writing, Met’s article leaps into the arguments with the notion of “filiation.” In this chapter, he locates Argento’s position in the relations with Italian horror films and/or giallo films and legitimates his bloodline. In its followed chapter, “Primal Scene,” he explains how it is co-related with Argento’s aesthetic style, mise-en-scène and narrative configuration. These first two chapters present the general characteristics of Argento’s works as if every human must inevitably endure their childhood. However, a particular traumatic experience must shape a certain person in very distinctive way, Chapter 3 leads us into the special realm of Argento’s world. According to Met, Argento’s representation of childhood is his way of detaching his works from the established value system such as the sanctity of family and purity of a child groomed by Neo-realism in historical sense, and the representation of victimized child in Argento’s contemporary Giallo films of the 70s. Such uniqueness of Argento films is complemented by ‘Argento style’ in chapter 4. When Argento’s way of representing “Murder of Art as ‘total spectacle’” meets the ‘children’s universe’ visually and aurally, becomes something uniquely “Argento” and thus, as Met put it, “childhood is the alpha and omega of Argento’s cinematic art.”

In Philippe Met’s article, the meaning of childhood needs to be examined. Childhood in his writing is not limited into the memories of childhood or the actual presence of a child in the narrative. Interestingly enough, the “cruel yet childish” way of nightmarish childhood is indeed the aesthetic and narrative method of Argento’s works. In that regards, it explains the certain ‘childish’ elements in Argento films. For example, all adults cast with one exception of a bizarre looking pre-teen blond boy,

Suspiria offers a romance between the Suzy and Daniel, who has a very little significance in the story. Their romance, however, turns out to be a pre-teen giggly flirt rather than a sexual attraction. More fine example will be found in Deep Red, where Marcus and the reporter lead their relationship in a very childish plays such as arm wrestling and the broken car situation (i.e. putting the hero’s position literally a kid due to the broken seat and struggling to get out of the car through the roof due to the

broken door which he childishly locked themselves.).

Yet

such childish

anecdotes echo with the horrifying moments. That is, the rules presented in Argento’s films

exercised

the

evil

forces

repressing

their

victims

into

the

horrifying

environment, as Met explains, also coincide with the rules of victims’ child-like plays. As in Suspiria Suzy follows the notes of footsteps of which her friend left and in Deep Red, Marcus plays a game with his own memories, they haul them into the horror as much as the evils have done. It is like ghosts in The Shining by Stanley Kubrick hauntingly invite the victim into the play in that haunted hotel: “Come and play with us.”

Then an important question should be raised; the space. In his article, Philippe Met rightly points out the significance of the dungeon in Phenomena and the school environment in Suspiria and Phenomena. Yet reading them as a necessary element of mise-en-scène and/or narrative metaphor seems to reduce the meaning of space in Argento films. One of the most important aesthetics of Argento films is his use of space: his dizzy way of camera work and astounding combination of long shots and closer shots. Not to mention, these rules the characters are suffering is due to heavily on its space: the oppressive formality of the institution and the suffocating mazes. To complete Argento’s representation of childhood, it should be explained how the aesthetic of the space is interlocked with the representation. The space, after all, is the children’s playground.

At last, I would like to excuse myself by pointing out the fascinating structure of this article. This article, at least formally that is, does not have an introduction or conclusion. As Met himself eloquently put it to follow the Argento’s world, the reader of this article also must follow the Ariadne’s thread only to find the beginning; the primal scene, the paratexual “originary crisis.” It is more than proper way to describe the secretive and mysterious world of giallo where Argento’s childhood is residing.

Representation of the stranger in the French-italian cinema :

Lo Straniero(The Stranger) by Visconti

Antoine Coppola (Sungkyunkwan University)

This case is not on foreigners living abroad but foreigners in the context of historical colonization.

This Italian film is an adaptation of a French novel wrote by Albert Camus. Camus published L’Etranger in 1942. Camus doesn’t focus on the colonial situation in Algeria but he uses it as a background and a distorted mirror of the existential crisis of an ordinary office worker who became a murderer. Algeria was a French colony since 1830. A strong European community doesn’t mix with the indigenous. The ruling class is mostly white and the “Arabs” belong to the proletariat or lumpen-proletariat. Visconti was related to the Neorealist movement in the Italian cinema, he directed

Rocco e suei fratelli in 1960, a story of migrant workers going from the traditional south of Italy to the modern north. With films like Il Gattopardo, Visconti describes the decadence of the aristocracy and his moral and social values. “Stranger” is not far from his past films (and even prepares later films) because Camus’s story has both sides: a moral crisis and a intern social crisis which create “foreigners”. The misunderstanding between Camus’s wife and Visconti is interesting for the background of the film. Visconti wrote a script which tried to describe more clearly the situation of the hero Meursault. Because1967 is not 1942 said Visconti. In 1942, M. was a model for the young generation facing the war and losing idealism, religion and faith in the civilization. And Camus describes a man who only trusts the evidence of facts without any justification (metaphysical or psychological): existential. He assumes is crime, not like the hypocrite idealistic society (the court will condemn him to death because of his moral rebellion). But in 1967, the decolonization was almost over, M. can be understand differently, his crime can be an act of “ordinary racism” of an ordinary unconscious office worker born in a colony and pushed by the sociopolitical situation. He is an ordinary “menefreghista” who does not want to get

involved in the real social world until he kills someone (topic of sartrian political commitment). But Camus’s widow refused the script and asks Visconti to strictly follow the text. Nevertheless, Visconti succeeded to give is own point of view on the “The Stranger” by linking some novel’s topics to his owns.

1-The mistress: Raymond, M.’s friend, told him that he wants to get rid of his mistress. He used to play beating her before going to bed. M. asks: “an Arab?” Raymond’s answer is positive. This dialogue shows that from a sado-masochist game it turns to a colonialist harassment against a poor indigenous woman who sales her body to a white man. Later, Visconti shows the face of the woman crying clearly wearing Muslim signs on her. She represents the sin of the white man, the biblical sensual devil woman, the Beast and the heretic. The French policeman seems to be on the side of the woman but later, at the police station, M. and Raymond get the woman accused. This suggests that the colonial police is corrupted and racist. 2-The indigenous workers: An unexpected movement of camera in M.’s office shows behind him a group of Arabs workers having a lunch break. They represent the working class reality behind the white men. They stare at the camera like, later, other Arabs in M.’s jail. They are an obsessed presence of the working class mostly composed by foreigners living all around, just evidence that M. still refuse to notice and care until he kills one of them. 3-The young “Arabs”, mistress’s friends: At first, we can see them in a bar as M. and Raymond notice them. They look young and handsome. Some vitality and wilderness shine in their eyes. They don’t move, don’t speak, they are a presence but a separation too and a danger, a fascinating danger. They seek for revenge. In the second apparition, Visconti focuses on the facts: the silence of non communication, the irony of the youngsters dangerous only by their presence, the knife, Raymond wounded. M. repeats to Marie: “it is just a fight with Arabs”. Later, the youngsters lay down near a clear waterfall running on the rocks, surrounded by a friendly shade, like semi-gods with beautiful bodies, pure instincts coming from the nature itself. The French feels both fascination and danger. Soon after, M. is suddenly faded-up with Marie (she is his good conscience). Mysteriously fascinated under the shining sun, he is tired to carry his life. The “tender indifference of the world” touches him said Camus. Revelators, the youngsters are another he, the “natural,” the “factual” behind the masks of religion and social

order. 4-The murder : This was a polemic around Camus novel. Is it a racist crime commits by a colonialist? The situation pushes him like fatality to kill. The gun was Raymondâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s gun; he did not plan to kill. Visconti focuses on the knife which reflects the sun on M.â&#x20AC;&#x2122;s eyes; it shows him the light of real life, plays with his culpability. He shoots 4 more times, like knocking on the door of unhappiness says the voice over. So he is aware of his crime and assumes it in front of the court. He tells the facts with no moral or psychological justifications. But, since the beginning the judge says to M. that God can forgive everything to good believers. He suggests that this murder can be forgotten. So Mâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s crime is to be a rebel to life and society. 5-The jail: M. is introduced by mistake into a jail full of Arabs. He is not afraid to admit that he has killed an Arab. Everybody looks at him. Visconti lets the ambiguity of the hero plays for a short time, he is wondering by is own action. But a young smiling Arab offers him to smoke, and then the hero seems to realize that he is in front of real people, real men. But soon the racist justice divides them. In the film, a community of destiny appears shortly but clearly between social outsiders.

The Image of Arabs Represented in the Korean Media

Lee, In Seop* (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies) 20)

I. Introduction Korea has become a multicultural society. Therefore, how Korea is perceived by the multicultural people and how Korea recognizes the multicultural society has emerged as an important issue. Actually, interest in Islam in the Korean society is rapidly growing yet our society knows little about it. Recently, in the Middle Eastern countries, Hallyu, or Korean Wave has attracted the attention of the public due to Korean dramas. Therefore, it is high time to look into the image of Arabs represented in the Korean media. This study deals with the image of Arabs and the point of views or the ideas about the Arab world reflected in the Korean media. As a result, this study will examine how our society perceives the Arab world and suggest the possible changes on these perceptions. This study will research

the

image

Arabs

represented

the

Korean

picture

media

and

subcategorize into movies, drama, advertisement, and entertainment.

II. Cultural exchange between Korean and the Arab world 1. Hallyu (Korean Wave) Korea is referred to as the â&#x20AC;&#x153;Drama Empire.â&#x20AC;? Numerous dramas are produced and the public is highly interested in dramas. Korean people in the time of poverty did not have the money to watch movies and now that we have become fairly affluent, we do not have the time to watch them. Against this backdrop, Koreans seek comfort in dramas. Some even say that Korea will be ruined because of dramas. As US exports Hollywood movies and Japan animations, Korea has become a nation that exports dramas. Since it has started exporting dramas, Korea has gained much attention from all over the world. In Iran, since the appearance of Korean dramas, especially historical dramas on television, there is said to be no interaction between family members. Also, drama * Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Graduate School of Interpretation and Translation, associate professor

such as Daejanggeum (A Jewel in the Palace), Winter Sonata, A Tale of Autumn, God of Sea, and The last Scandal have been shown on TV in the Arab world. Through these dramas, Korea’s image in the Arab world has extremely improved. It is apparent that Korea’s image has been boosted through its introduction in the Arab world through these dramas. Above all, more people want to visit Korea and learn Korean. Also, some young people who lead the way of accepting the Korean culture introduce it to the Arab world as in the following examples.

Taegoon’s ‘Deceived’1), “You left me,

Taegoon’s ‘Decived’, “I believed, believed,

I already erased you”

believed the kind of person you were”

After School’s ‘Because of you’2),

After School’s ‘Because of you’, “The sound

“You tore my heart, trampled on my pride”

of rain drops outside the window shake me up”

Miss Gold Digger (Yonguijudo Miss Shin) is a 2007 South Korean film3)

Wonder Girls’ ‘So Hot’4), “I'm so hot”

Wonder Girls’ ‘Nobody’5), “I want nobody nobody nobody nobody”

1) http://sarangarab.wordpress.com/2010/02/14/%e2%98%86-%d8%a3%d8%ba%d8%a7%d9%86%d9%8a%d9%83%d9%88%d8%b1%d9%8a%d8%a9-%d8%a8%d8%aa%d8%b1%d8%ac%d9%85%d8%a9-%d8%b9 %d8%b1%d8%a8%d9%8a%d8%a9-%e2%98%86/ 2) ibid.

2. Arabs in Korean Society Foreign Muslims currently living in Korea are about 150thousand and of those people, there are 2000 Arabs. Of those 2000, 170 Arabs are married to Koreans. In Korea, there are nine mosques, seven Islam centers, and some sixty praying sites. Like this, Muslims and Arabs have settled in our country and have become part of our society. However, there is a lack of understanding of Muslims and Arabs in our society. It is therefore crucial to develop a correct understanding of them in our society which has become multicultural and multiracial. To correct the image of Arabs, this study attempts to research on our perspective of Arabs and the Arab World portrayed in Korean dramas, movies, and commercials through picture media.

III. Image of Arabs on Screen Because Hollywood movies are made with Jewish capital, they are influenced to introduce Arabs negatively as terrorists or filthy race.

For example, in the movie ‘Family Revival- Family Honor3’, in a duel scene, prosecutor Bong Myung phil’s (played by Gong Hyung jin) lines go as “What are you saying? You fatty Arab brute” to Jang In Jae (played by Shin Hyun jun)

movie ‘Family Revival- Family Honor3’, “What are you saying? You fatty Arab brute”

Also, it is widely known that polygamy is allowed in the Islamic world. This Islamic region is represented by the Arab world, thus people believe that each Arab can have many wives. This idea is well portrayed in the lines of a movie released in 2009 called “Girlfriends.” The main male character was seeing three women at the same time,

3) http://video.yahoo.com/watch/5791021 4) http://www.dramauniverse.com/so-hot/wonder-girls-video_67ab14da6.html 5) http://yakamar.com/video/watch4622.html

and when this was revealed, the female characters used the following expression about the man. “It’s not even one, or two, but three? Is he an Arab prince or what?” This expression is a negative line that can remind us of the polygamy in Islam.

IV. Image of Arabs in Dramas Most appearances of Arabs in Korean dramas are in the ‘Lobbyist(2007)” In this drama, the heroine Jang Jin young met with the influential Saudi Arabian prince as the role of a lobbyist. However, in this drama, due to the lack of understanding of Arab traditions on the part of the writers, some strange scenes appeared.

First of all, Arabs exchange kisses on the cheek with only family members or close relatives similar to a French bize. They do not exchange kisses on the cheek with the opposite sex other than your family. The writer or director, unaware of these greeting manners, created some misunderstanding.

Arabs do not enter and close the door of an enclosed space in which the opposite sex is alone. However, in this drama, the heroine (played by Jang Jin young) enters and closes the door of a hotel room where the Arab prince is alone. This obviously leads to some misunderstanding about the woman on the part of the Arab prince. Considering the fact that this drama deals with the occupation of a lobbyist, it is not necessarily wrong to see such a scene happen.

The behavior of the Arab prince towards the heroine who entered his hotel room.

Arabs usually use the right hand when eating. The left hand used in the toilet is

carefully used when dining with other people. However, when eating alone, it is different. The notion that the left hand must not be used even when eating alone is wrong. In the following scene where the butler of the Arab prince’s mansion provides the meal and says “No, never the left hand” You should only use the right hand” is a misunderstanding of the Arab tradition. How can one only use the left hand when eating? This is a mistake made from a misunderstanding of the Arab tradition.

Also, washing the feet of others is not an Arab tradition. In the bible, it is mentioned several times that when Jewish people receive others cordially, they offer water for them to wash their feet, and serve them with water and food Also, washing the feet of Jesus or Jesus washing the feet of his disciples is mentioned in the bible. This act of washing the feet is a custom of Israeli people not the Arabs. The writer must have confused it with the Arab customs.

Arabic, the important international language on the international stage was new to us. However, after the 9/11 in 2001, Arabic gained much attention in Korea. This change was apparent in the drama “My Woman” in 2008. In this drama, the heroine Yoon Sara (played by Park Sol mi) is multilingual including fluency in Arabic. This woman studying this unusual language was portrayed as a competent woman in this globalized era. Through this drama, it was well conveyed that Arabic is not just a new language to us anymore but an important international language.

Drama ‘My woman’,

“(al-sala:mu alaykum)”

“(uHibuka)”-(the wrong version of “uHibbuka”)

Also, for the exotic atmosphere, Arabic was used. th

In the drama “Invincible Lee Pyung Gang”, in the scene of the 11

episode, a

shopping bag with Arabic written on it was used as a prop.

V. Image of Arabs in other Picture Media The

content

Arabs

appeared

not

only

screen

dramas,

but

commercials and entertainment which have to attract viewers’ attention.

1. Image of Arabs in Commercials Among Arab clothing, Arab men’s scarf called kufieh or shimagh6) were used as props. The first people to put around these shimaghs were activists against the Iraqi war in 2003. Since it was against the war and a joint act to empathize with the difficult situation in the Middle East, it slightly had a political motivation until then. However, in the recent years, the shimaghs have become part of the fashion delivering a totally different feeling. Arab scarf called shimaghs is one of the Arab traditional clothing. The Zaytun Division dispatched in the recent

Iraq war,

Koreans kidnapped in Afghanistan,

journalists and activists in the troubled parts of the Middle East were often seen with the shimaghs around.

6) http://www.cyworld.com/elitehsno1/3322840

Recently, Korean celebrities such as Chug Rye won, Lee Hyori, and Lee juck wore these scarfs and Kim hye sung playing the role of Lee min ho in <High Kick> appeared with this scarf around. However, it was difficult to become a fashion by just wearing an unusual scarf. Big Bang, beyond being idol stars, has been talked about as fashion leaders, or fashionistas. They also frequently wore these Arab scarves. So, nowadays, it has been labeled as ‘Big Bang Scarf’, ‘Big Bang Style’ and has become a fad. In Dongdaemun and internet shopping malls, variations of these scarves are being sold under the same name.

Nov. 1, 2008 MBC ‘Infinite Challenge’

A scene from the movie “Girlfriends’

Yoo Jae suck imitated the ‘Big Bang style’ having shimaghs around his neck

In the early 2007, Shin Hyun jun and Jung jun ho dressed up as Arabs appeared on a Hyundai Oil bank commercial and emceed in Arabic. Also, looking at real Arabs appearing on broadcasting media advertising Korean, we can see that entering the st

first 21

century, we admit the Arab society as coexisting culture within us rather

than far neighbors.

Arab riches of the Gulf Region also with the scarf around come on the following commercial.

Hyundai Oil bank

‘(Leadcorp) Loan Commercial7)

As seen in the above examples, shimaghs at first reflected the harsh image of 7) http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OpXbg_CewTY&feature=PlayList&p=0DC87A6C3056DF6C& playnext=1&playnext_from=PL&index=8

terrorists and troubled areas. However, as Korean celebrities applied them to fashion, these scarves are gradually transforming into an exotic and global image.

‘Invincible Lee Pyung Gang’ 2

episode

‘Halal’ food introduced in the above scene is the permitted food for eating in Islam. Through these lines in the drama, we can see that we mention the food culture of Islam in our society. However, still some people around us do not understand the meaning of ‘Halal’ and think that it is just some simple exotic food.

2. Image of Arabs in Entertainment nd

In March 2 ,

2008,

Noh Hong chul disguised as an Arab named ‘Abdullah

Mohammed Horichuri’ in SBS’ ‘We love Sunday’ and ‘Change.’ These entertainment programs were designed to see how Koreans perceive the unfamiliar Arabs. We tend to be unfamiliar and uncomfortable with Arabs considering that it is geographically far away from us compared to our neighbors China and Japan. Especially, we perceive Arabs as being hard to approach due to the prejudice and distortions generated by the various media home and abroad. In reality, people could not easily approach Noh Hong chul who roamed around the subway with flowers in his hands. People who were able to converse naturally with him, and people who gave a hug seeing the ‘Free hug’ sign were actually foreigners. This program was not just providing fun through the disguise but it shows the portrait of us that our society needs to rethink.

March 2, 2009 SBS ‘We love Sunday’, ‘Change’

March 2, 2009 SBS ‘We love Sunday’, ‘Change’ Person encountered in subway was a long resident of Saudi Arabia

This program showed that foreigners were more open to strangers than Koreans

VI. Conclusion The image of Arabs and the Arab world perceived by Koreans is generally negative and disparate. Image of Arabs in movies and drams was negative and highly distorted. However, Arabic and Arab clothing have received much press and thus, Arab culture is not all that new. In a globalized society, Arab culture is something that we admit and start accepting as being mixed in our culture. I hope that through this study, our society better understands the Arab world with open mind and that it shows a way of multiracial and multicultural society to coexist.

VII. References http://sarangarab.wordpress.com/2010/02/14/%e2%98%86-%d8%a3%d8%ba%d8%a7% d9%86%d9%8a-%d9%83%d9%88%d8%b1%d9%8a%d8%a9-%d8%a8%d8%aa%d8%b1 %d8%ac%d9%85%d8%a9-%d8%b9%d8%b1%d8%a8%d9%8a%d8%a9-%e2%98%86/

http://video.yahoo.com/watch/5791021 http://www.dramauniverse.com/so-hot/wonder-girls-video_67ab14da6.html http://yakamar.com/video/watch4622.html http://www.cyworld.com/elitehsno1/3322840  http://www.youtube. com/watch?v=OpXbg_CewTY&feature=PlayList&p= 0DC87A6C3056DF6C&playnext=1&playnext_from=PL&index=8

Discussion The Image of Arabs Represented in the Korean Media

Discussant : Kim, Gye Joong (Sungkyul University)

1. Questions on the cultural exchange? “Recently, in the Middle Eastern countries, Hallyu, or Korean Wave has attracted the attention of the public due to Korean dramas. Therefore, it is high time to look into the image of Arabs represented in the Korean media.” In terms of the issue regarding cultural exchange between two different cultural area, Korea and Arabian countries, there is no any point to deal it. There is no enough explanation of why it is high time to look into the representation of Arabs in Korean media. If it is not dealt, there is no need to bring the fact that the flood of Korean pop culture and the influence of its representation of Korean culture is due to the occurrence of ‘Hanryu’, Korean new wave in its commercial exchange.

2. What would be the consequential effect upon the countries especially Arabian region, from the imports and ‘dominant living room TV repertoire’ by Korean dramas? “In Iran, since the appearance of Korean dramas, especially historical dramas on television, there is said to be no interaction between family members. Also, drama such as Daejanggeum (A J ewel in the Palace), Winter Sonata, A Tale of Autumn, God of Sea, and The last Scandal have been shown on TV in the Arab world. Through these dramas, Korea’s image in the Arab world has extremely improved.” There are a few points made by the observation on the strong appearance of Korean TV dramas on Arabian world in their TV culture. There is a need to specify the cause of the phenomenon and furthermore the reflected comparison which will be mentioned later on the reflux to the one towards Korean culture accordingly.

3. What would the ideal approach to reduce the misunderstanding of image of Arabs?

“To correct the image of Arabs, this study attempts to research on our perspective of Arabs and the Arab World portrayed in Korean dramas, movies, and commercials through picture media.” What would be the legitimate attitude of having to correct the images of Arabs occurred from the cultural misunderstanding? Although the increase of the population of Arabians in Korean society, there still will be the possibility of distortion of the images from the social prejudice which will be reflected on the representation on media. Is there any way to bring the deeper roots of the problem and closely look at the detailed cultural reflection of Arabian culture in Korea?

4. How should we define the fundamental relationship of cultural communication between Arabian and Korean culture and its representation? It is inevitable, at this point, to contemplate and research on how the two different cultures and its social codes are received and produced as images on mass media. Beforehand, an approach by social and historical study of how the representations have to establish accordingly. Modern society maps out very complicated system of how they deliver the reflection of ‘others’, as cultural images, because it is determined by socio-politics and economic relationship of communication through mass media.

Panel 2 Human Sciences(History/Religion) (Lilac Room) Chair : Park, Sang Jin (Pusan University Of Foreign Studies)

1. A Study of Armenian Orthodox Hwang, Eui Gab (IMS) Discussant : Ahn, Jung Kook (Myongji University) 2. Divorce in Roman Law Cho, Eun Rae (Pusan University of Foreign Studies) Discussant : Jeong, Seong Suk (Youngsan University) 3. The Advance of Ottoman Empire to the Mediterranean and Cultural Influence in the 15-17C Lee, Hee Soo (Hanyang University) Discussant : Oh, Eun Kyung (Dongduk Womenâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s University) 4. What was the Crusading Movement between Christians and Muslims? Song, Kyung Keun (Chosun University) Discussant : Kato, Hiroshi (Hitotsubashi University)

A Study of Armenian Orthodox

Hwang, Eui Gab (IMS) 1. Origins of Armenian Orthodox Church Many stories regarding to the origin of the Armenian Orthodox deal with the Apostles. In terms of their authority, many Christian churches, particularly in the east, regard Apostolic succession as the most important factor. For example, the Armenian church has made use of the story that Jesus healed Abgar V of Edessa for its own authority and legitimacy as it claims that Abgar was a prince of Armenia. Armenia was the first kingdom which adopted Christianity as its own official religion in the world. According to Mikayel Chamchian’s work, Armenian history from

the beginning of the world to the year 1784, this event dated to AD 301 when St. Gregory the Illuminator converted King Tiridates III and his family and staff men. However,

most

scholars

nowadays

argue

that

had

occurred

somewhat

later

presumably by 313. When Gregory returned to his home to peach about 287 after he trained and ordained in Christainity at Caesarea, Tiridates III was not favorable to him with some political and personal reasons. Tiridates put him in prison for 13 years. There was an event that 37 Christian virgins, including Saint Nune who became the founder of the Georgian Orthodox Cuhrch, came to Armenia to find a refuge from Roman persecution. Although Tiridates wanted to make one of them, Rhipsime, as his wife, his proposal was turned down. Conseqently, Tiridates martyred all of them. It is believed that his brutal persecution of Christinas caused an sudden illness by God which made him crawl around insanely. His sister, Xosroviduxt, had a dream which changed Tiridates’ mind dramatically. According to her dream, Tiridates’ persecution should be stopped. As a result of Xosroviduxt’s dream, Gregory was released from prision and he healed Tiridates. This event led him to convert to Christianity and he finally declared his nation, Armenia, to be a officially Christian state. As the first

Catholicos of the church,

Gregory began to make Caesarea as

sanctuary. He believed that God wanted him to establish the main Armenian church in the old capital city of Vagharshapat where Christ came down to the earth to strike it with a hammer. He changed the name of this holy Armenian city as Etchmiadzin which means "the place of the descent of the only-begotten". At the beginning, the

Armenian church was enthusiastically involved in the affairs of the larger church world as its Catholicos participated in the First Council of Nicea and the First Coucil th

of Constantinople. Until the early 7 under

the

jurisdiction

the

Century, the Georgian Orthodox Church was also

Armenian

Orthodox

Church.

Since

373,

the

Armenican Church had begun to not involved in the larger church world. Althouth Armenians had their own spoken language, they did not have their own written one prior to the fifth century. Therefore, they borrowed Greek for their Bible and liturgy. The effort for creating an Armenian alphabet was initiated by the Catholicos Sahak’s instructions which commissioned scholar St. Mesrob to create an Armenian alphabet. As Mesrob completed his mission in 406, Christianity prospered and strengthened in Armenia with the works of the translation of the Bible and liturgy into the Armenian language. The creation of an Armenian alphabet brought about the golden age of Armenian literature and cultural renaissance. In contrast with the

the

Bibles

other

Eastern

Churches,

the

Armenian

Bible

was

originally

composed of 39 books in the Old Testament. In terms of so called Apocryhpha books, th

they were not translated until the 8 th

until the 12

century and weren not read in the churches

century. th

Until the ealy of the 7

century, the Catholicoi of Georgia and Albania belonged to rd

Armenian Apostolic Church. The 3

Council of Divin (609-610) was convened to

make the relationship between the Armenian Church and the Georgian one clear after the detachment of the Georgian Church from the Armenian Church. In this Council, Georgians were deprived of taking communion in the Armenian Church. Regardless of this

event,

the

Albanian

Church

committed

Oriental

Ortodhoxy

under

the

jurisdiction of the Armenian Church.

2. The Characteristics of Armenian Orthodox Church As the Armenian Church oppossed the decisions of Council of Chalcedon which argued for the belief of two natures of Chirst, it has been regarded as monophysite by not only Roman Catholic theologians but also Eastern Orthodox ones. The Armenian Church officially broke off its relations with Rome and Constantinople in 554. The Armenian Orthodox Church argues that its position does not stand for monophysitism but adheres to the doctrine defined by Cyril of Alexandria. This doctrine follows the belief of one incarnate nature of Christ, where both divine and human nature are united. In comparison with the monophysitism, this doctrine is regarded as miaphysitism. While the prefix “mono” refers to a singular one, the prefix “mia” refers to a compound one. Therefore it is not correct that the Armenian Church

is classified as monophysite regarding its position on the nature of Christ.

1) Structure The

Armenican

Apostolic

Church

headed

Catholicos (the

plural

Catholicoi). In the Armenian Church hierarchy, Catholicos’ position is higher than the Patriarch, the supreme head of Eastern churches. The Armenian Apostolic Church presently has two catholicoi, (respectively His Holiness Karekin II, Supreme Patriarch and Catholicos of All Armenians; and Aram I, Catholicos of the Great House of Cilicia), and two patriarchs, plus Primates, Archbishops and Bishops, lower clergy and laity. The Catholicos of All Armenians is in charge of the centralized authority of the Armenian Church. In additon, he is the supreme judge and the head of the legislative body. He is President of the Supreme Spiritual Council as well as the College of Bishops. The spiritual and administrative work of the Armenian Church in the Republic of Armenia is accomplished under the leadership of His Holiness Karekin II. Underneath this administrative structure are the hierarchal Sees.

2) Main Buildings The Mother See of Holy Etchmiadzin (Armenian:

Մայր Աթոռ Սուրբ Էջմիածին

) is

the spiritual and administrative headquarters of the worldwide Armenian Church. The Mother Cathedral of the Armenian Church is the center of the faith of the Armenian community where His Holiness Karekin II and Supreme Patriarch and Catholicos of all Armenians reside. As the place of a blend of past, present, and future of the Armenian Church, there are many museums, libraries which hold past richness of history and treasures. The Mother Sees are in charge of social, cultural, and educational programs for Armenia and the Diaspora under the leadership and guidance of His Holiness Karekin II, Supreme Patriarch, and Catholicos of all Armenians. The Catholicosate of the Great House of Cilicia (Armenian:

Մեծի Տանն Կիլիկիոյ)

located in Antelias,

Lebanon.

Կաթողիկոսութիւն Հայոց

As a regional

See of

the

Armenian Apostolic Church, it has an autonomous and control over certain segments of the Armenian diaspora. Currently, Catholicos Aram I is the head and Catholicos of the Holy See of Cilicia. The See has current controlled over Dioceses and Prelacies in Lebanon, Syria and Cyprus, Greece, Iran, the Arab Gulf, the United States, Canada and Venezuela. In the United States and Canada, there are Prelacies and Dioceses that are related to the Mother See of Holy Etchmiadzin, so there is duality of representation of Armenian Apostolic churches in these two countries. The primacy of honor of the Catholicossate of Etchmiadzin (Mother See of Holy Etchmiadzin) has always been recognized by the Catholicosate of Great House of Cilicia.

3) Causes of division The division of two Catholicossates is originated from frequent relocations of church headquarters by political and military disturbances. The division has increased during the Soviet period with the influence of the Cold War. The Tashnag (Dashnag) Party, a nationalist political party that had dominated the independent Republic of Armenia from 1918 to 1920 and was active in the diaspora, saw the Church and clergy, with its worldwide headquarters at Echmiadzin in the Soviet Republic of Armenia, as a captive Communist puppet, and accused its clergy in the US as unduly influenced by Communists, particularly as the clergy were reluctant to participate in nationalist events and memorials that could be perceived as anti-Soviet. On

December

24 ,

1933,

Easter

Diocese

Archbishop,

Levon

Tourian,

was

assassinated when he walked down the aisle of Holy Cross Armenian Church in the Washington Heights around the New York City during the Divine Liturgy. As nine Tashnags were arrested and convicted, the incident divided the Armenian community. The sympathizers of Tashnag founded congregations independent of Etchmiadzin which declared loyalty escaping from the See based in Antelias in Lebanon. The division was established in 1956 when the Antelias(Cilesian) See separated from the Echmiadzin See. The division in the United States which has most large Armenian communities has become entrenched. There were two parish churches. Even though theoretically there were no differences, one only answered to each See. Since the Soviet Union has fallen in 1995, many lay and clergy made an effort to reunite. Especially, in 1995 Karekin II, Catholicos of Cilicia between 1983 and 1994 was also adopted Catholicos in Echmiadzin and became Karenkin I. Even though he headed both parties, the two Catholicossates could not be united.

4) Patriarchates of the Constantinople and Jerusalem There are two patriarchates in the Armenian Apostolic Church which has high authority both under the jurisdiction of the Catholicos of All Armenians. One is the Armenian Patriarchate of Jerusalem (Armenian:

նց Յերուսաղեմ

Առաքելական Աթոռ Սրբոց Յակովբեա

literally Apostolic Seat of St. James in Jerusalem) This is located in

the Armenian Quarter of Jerusalem headed by the Patriarch of Jerusalem Archbishop Torkom Manoogian. Another is Armenian Patriarchate of Constantinople in Istanbul, Turkey (Armenian:

Պատրիարքութիւն Հայոց Կոստանդնուպոլսոյ)

1998 by Patriarch Constantinople Archbishop Mesrob II Mutafyan

which headed since

5) Women’s role in the Armenian Church Even though, historically monastic women have been ordained as deaconesses within a convent environment, the Armenian Church does not allowed women to ordain to the priesthood. While women are ordained, these deaconesses cannot minister in traditional parish churches or cathedrals. Although women are not allowed on the altar of the Armenian Church, in a small parish, there are not enough boys or men to serve. Because of this, in practical ways, there are exceptions which allow for altar girls and lay readers. The roles of women commonly serve the church as the choir or organ players. Also, they volunteer for the church events, fundraisers, and the Sunday school teachers. The wives of priests (Der Hayr) generally play an important role in the parish which is entitled to Yeretzgin. The Armenian Church allows for divorce and remarriage. Abortion is not forbidden, at least not as a matter of dogma.

3. Comparison to other Orthodox Churches From the prospect of liturgy, the Church has had much in common both with the Latin Rite, especially as it was the time of separation and with the Eastern Orthodox Church. For instance, both Western and Armenian bishops wear almost identical mitres. Also, as it was used in the West at the time of separation, they use a curtain instead of a full iconostasis. In case of music, they use Armenian chant. Before Armenian priests have done their ordination, they can be married. The descendants use surname with the prefix “Ter” or “Der” in the Western Armenian which means “Lord” to indicate their lineage. Compared to the common celebration of Christmas on 25th of December as later Christian tradition originated in Rome, the Armenian Apostolic Church celebrates TH

Christmas on 6

of January which is the Nativity of Jesus in combination with the

Feast of the Epiphany. As most civil authorities and Western Christian churches follow the Gregorian calendar, the church has adopted it since 1923 except the Armenian Patriarchate of Jerusalem. The large populations of Armenian Apostolic spread outside Armenia such as Iran, Russia, Iraq, Georgia, France, the United States, Lebanon, Syria, Canada, Australia, Cyprus, Israel, Greece, Bulgaria, Belgium, Egypt, Estonia, England, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Romania, Sweden, Switzerland, Argentina, Uruguay, and India and so on. In case of Israel, the Armenian is mainly present in the Armenian Quarter of Jerusalem

which

associated

with

the

Armenian

Patriarchate

Jerusalem.

Moreover, the importance of the Armenian Patriarchate of Constantinople in Turkey and the Armenian Apostolic Church of Iran represent the largest Christian ethnic minority in predominant Muslim countries.

Divorce in Roman Law

Cho Eun Rae (Pusan University of Foreign Studies)*

â&#x2026; . The transitional process of divorce In the Roman era, marriages could be dissolved through legal settlement or through the voluntary settlement of divorce. In early Roman times, unilateral divorce by a woman without the husband's consent was impossible, since a woman was subject to the authority of her husband. Throughout the duration of the empire's existence, Rome maintained strict patriarchy and monogamy, and a woman kept her family name even after marriage. The first divorce case was the divorce of Spurius Carvilius Ruga (BC 231: Gell. 4.3.1 sqq), who repudiated his wife on grounds of infertility. This divorce by Carvilius, who rejected his wife for trivial cause without discussion or family consultation, resulted in demands by the wife and her father for restitution of dowry, on the grounds of wrongful divorce. This incident led to institutionalization of the legal process to sue for restitution of dowry in Rome. This incident also exemplifies that era's trend of divorce for petty reasons (Aulus Gellius, X, 15). This divorce case became a turning point that enabled the restitution of dowry. The law under King Romulus (Plutarch, Romulus 22) prohibited a wife from leaving her husband. However, a husband could repudiate his wife in cases where the wife took drugs to induce abortion, entered the wine storage area in violation of the husband's orders, or committed adultery. If a husband rejected his wife for reasons other than these, half of the husband's estate would belong to the wife and the remaining half would be consecrated to the goddess Demeter (Roman cognate Ceres). As the status of upper-class women improved, and as manus marriage1) and guardianship (tutela) * J.S.D, professor/law Dept, College of Humanities and Social Sciences, PUSAN UNIVERSITY OF FOREIGN STUDIES. 1) Manus (pronounced /ma.nus/) is Ancient Roman marriage, of which there were two forms: cum manu and sine manu. In a cum manu marriage the wife was placed under the legal control of the husband. In a sine manu marriage the wife was still under the legal control of her father. In both cases, the marriage could only take place with the approval of the patresfamilias if both the husband and wife were alieni iuris. However, the creation and termination of the marriage somewhat depended on the type of marriage. Initially cum manu was the only form of marriage but in time the cum manu union faded and only sine manu marriage was widely practiced. Jane F. Gardner,

Women in Roman Law and Society, First Midland Book Edition, 1991, 11; Marcia L. Colish, The Stoic Tradition from Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages, Brill Academic Publishers, 1990, 2nd ed., 383.

of women passed out of practice in the late republican period, women were able to divorce more freely, with free marriage and free divorce becoming major principles of Roman marriage law. Divorce actually became a very common occurrence starting in the late republican period, and particularly in the upper class, political marriages and divorce were rampant. Women used marriage for social advancement. However, even if they became widowed or divorced from their husbands, they experienced very few discomforts. In the patriarchal Roman society, a married woman's father had greater authority over her than did her husband. The tendency to stay single or bear fewer children was clearly marked in the upper class. The marriage legislation enacted under Augustus was formed against this background. This law was established with the intention of enforcing the mandate of 'marriage for reproduction' and of reviving ancient Roman morals.2) Under this law, long-term engagement and divorce were prohibited, single men and women were ordered to marry as soon as possible, and widows under 50 and widowers under 60 were ordered to remarry within two years. Married couples without children were subject to disadvantages, while couples with at least three children were able to advance in their public offices and social stations. Adultery laws (Julian

laws

governing

adultery

and

infidelity)

attempted

mete

out

harsh

punishment to unfaithful couples by confiscating the assets of the adulterous parties and prohibiting them from marrying one another.3) However, these efforts later proved to be in vain.4) Nevertheless, by and large there was antipathy concerning divorce.

2) Marriage law was targeted only the upper and middle classes of Roman society. According to this law, men between 25 and 60 and women between 20 and 50 were supposed to stay in a matrimonial state, except during certain grace periods following divorce or bereavement. However, since those who were childless were subject to penalties, they had to divorce and remarry in order to avoid this disadvantage. Hidden behind this practice of forcing marriage only for reproduction were forced divorces and remarriages. L. F. Radista, Augustus' Legislation Concerning Marriage, Procreation, Love Affairs and Adultery, ANRW

â&#x2026;Ą 13, 1980, pp. 310-319.

3) Prior to the enactment of the lex Julia de adulteriis, women alone were blamed for adultery, a husband simply had to divorce his wife without suffering any damage, and the killing of a wife by a humiliated husband did not result in any problem. Adultery was considered a private matter, not something demanding the involvement of the state. The lex julia de adulteriis handled a husband's adultery the same as adultery by a wife. In addition, adultery by husbands became an official crime. The fact that adultery was treated as a crime (as in contemporary law) is an indication that adultery was already frequent in those times. 4) Until the early 3rd century, even the existence of the adultery law was doubtful. Augustus himself admitted, in the end, that his marriage laws neither suppressed unfaithfulness nor raised the birthrate. However, the law did have some effect. The law resulted in an enriched national treasury and also produced informants, who later remained as a cancer on society. Jrme Carcopino, Rome a l'apogee de l'Empire: La vie quotidienne (1939), translated by Ryu Jae Hwa (2003), p. 197.

â&#x2026;Ą. Requirements for divorce and effects of divorce The requirements for divorce were fulfilled by either agreement of both parties or a declaration by one party of the intention to divorce. Then, the forms of divorce could be categorized as consensual divorce and divorce without consent. However, there was no difference in terms of legal effect. Also, since fixed-term and conditional marriages were invalid under Roman law, any contract stating the intention not to divorce, therefore, was also invalid and had no legal effect. There were no restrictions on the declaration of the intention to divorce. Explicit or implicit declaration of such an

intention

either

party

constituted

valid

divorce.

Alternately,

certain

acts

incompatible with matrimony also constituted valid divorce. For example, a spouse having commenced to live together with a third party is an application of this case, since this action by a spouse was interpreted as a declaration of the intention to divorce, having no intention of continuing matrimony. However, merely a simple domestic dispute did not constitute a divorce. While remarrying immediately after divorce was permissible, bereaved women whose husbands had died were required to wait ten months. Despite the fact that freedom of divorce was guaranteed through the Principatus, almost no divorces came to pass due to the fact that divorce was not permitted without reasonable cause. By the end of the republican era, the divorce rate had increased, but for most of these divorces, the grounds were childlessness caused by the wife's infertility or personality disorders in one's spouse. The lex julia de adulteriis of Augustus was the first to rule a wife's adultery and the husband's forgiveness as crimes, under criminal law. In any case, because of this, evidence of unmarried status became important. Also, a new manner of divorce was introduced: divorce without consent could be approved only by a freedman of the party, and it had to be witnessed in the presence of seven adult Roman citizens over the age of puberty. In the Dominate, which was influenced by Christianity, divorce by declaration of intention without consent was legally regulated in marriage law. The provisions of the

constitutiones

principum of

Constantinus,

A.D.

313,

sanction

divorce

declaration of intention without consent.5) Although illegal divorce without consent was not invalid, the divorced parties were subject to penalties in terms of assets. For example, a woman who divorced without consent was subject to loss of her own property (dowry, etc.) and other assets, deportation, and at the same time was prohibited from remarrying. In addition, a husband who illegally divorced without 5) For example, grounds for a wife's divorce without consent of her husband included murder, poisoning, or grave robbing, whereas grounds for a husband's divorce included the wife's adultery, grave robbing, or procuring prostitution. Codex Theodosianus. 3. 10. 1.

consent was forced to return the wife's own property which he had acquired. If an illegally-divorced husband remarried, the ex-wife could take the property of the current wife. However, Constantinus' regulation of illegal divorce was inhumane and harsh, so the application of the constitutiones principum was temporarily suspended upon his death. In A.D. 421, Honorius and Constantius the Second legislated new divorce regulations. This law, in light of the effects of illegal divorce, classified grounds for divorce according to severity, and allowed divorce without consent when resulting from significant cause. For example, when a wife divorced over insignificant cause, she would lose her own property and marriage settlement, and was prohibited from remarrying. When a woman divorced without consent, and without lawful grounds, she not only would lose all her assets and would be prohibited from remarrying, but would also face permanent banishment. On the other hand, when a husband divorced over insignificant cause, he had to return the wife's own property, but was allowed to collect a marriage settlement, and would be able to remarry after two years had passed. However, when a husband divorced without lawful reason, then too would he have to return his wife's personal property, would relinquish any marriage settlement, and would be prohibited from remarrying for the rest of his life. With a complete reform of the divorce system in his time, Justinianus categorized and distinguished

divorces

lawful

divorce,

wrongful

divorce,

and

divorce

for

unavoidable cause, with each type having different requirements and legal effects.6) In particular, for the first time, he suggested that divorce without cause was legally invalid. Starting with his era, free consensual divorce between the pertinent parties, which had been established in principle since the republican period, disappeared. Instead, the principle of no dissolution of marriage, based in Christianity, became dominant and continued through the medieval period. Today, divorce is an exceptional and pathological phenomenon that destroys the original purpose of marriage, that is, continuous cohabitation of husband and wife. However, since inhibiting divorce could lead to more harmful consequences and

6) Legitimate grounds for divorce by a husband included his wife bearing false witness to the emperor or concealing the truth, committing adultery, causing harm to the husband's life, accompanying someone other than her husband to a banquet hall or a bath house despite the husband's prohibition, visiting places other than her parents' house without her husband's knowledge, or going to the theater without her husband's knowledge, among others. Legitimate grounds for divorce by a wife included the husband committing treason, threatening his wife's life, persuading or ordering her to commit adultery or other infringements of the traditional moral code, falsely accusing the wife of adultery, or defrauding his wife in a way that violates her personal rights. Unavoidable reasons included impotence or infertility, a husband being gone as a prisoner of war for five years or more, not hearing from the husband (when there has been no news from the husband for four years), mental disorders, entering a monastery or taking a vow of celibacy, or returning to slave status, among others. Novellae. 117. 22; Codex Iustinianus. 5, 17, 10; Digesta. 24, 2, 6.

tragedy, the majority of countries in the world today legally recognize a divorce system. Korean divorce laws were defined through Japan's consensual divorce system in its civil law.

â&#x2026;˘. Conclusion The marriage system of Rome was very much a private matter, but it later came to be included within the public sector due to concentration of state power. Views on adultery indicate continuing androcentricism, since extramarital sex by men was excused, whereas the sexual behavior of women only was subject to regulation. The new laws regarding marriage soon lost their effectiveness, because they upheld traditional values based on the premise of male dominance and female inferiority. The central

point

the

Roman

divorce

system

involved

the

change

intention

concerning marriage. A marriage was completed when the pertinent parties' intentions to enter marriage were in accord. But of course, matrimony ceased to exist when there was a change of intention by one party concerning continuing a marriage. In addition, under the principle of monogamy, two legal marriages could not co-exist for a single individual, and there was no possibility of bigamy even coming into existence. However, bigamy later became a common occurrence, due to the fact that a person in legal matrimony became able to establish a new marriage. This was owing to a new concept of marriage, namely that the change of intention by one party concerning continuation of marriage doesn't naturally end marriage, because intention of marriage came to refer only to the intention of establishing marriage. So, marriage law in late Roman times suppressed divorce, and at the same time prohibited the wrongfully divorced from remarrying by imposing binding force on the intention of marriage. As regards divorce, the specific grounds for divorce have varied with the times, since different historical times have different circumstances. However, from ancient times to the present, adultery or cheating7) has remained a constant as a reason for divorce. It appears that divorce was suppressed in Roman times because of public sentiment that marriage makes great contributions to the nation's growth, through reproduction of offspring and prosperity of the family.

7) In Korea, divorces resulting from the wife's infidelity accounted for only 15% of the total divorces at the end of the 1990s, but by 2008, this figure increased to 25%.

References Kim, Ju Su. Family Law and Succession Law, Bobmunsa, 2008. Machiavelli, Niccol (translated by Kang Jung In and Ahn Sun Jae). Discourses on

Livy, Hangilsa, 2003. Shiono, Nanami (translated by Kim Seok-Hee). Roma-jin no Monogatari (Stories of

the Romans) 6, Hangilsa, 1997. Choi, Byoung Jo. Lectures on Roman Law, Pakyoungsa, 1999. Heichelheim, Fritz M. (translated by Kim Deok Su). A History of the Roman P eople , Hyundai Jisungsa, 1999. Hyun, Soong Jong and Kyu Chang Cho. Roman Law, Bobmunsa, 1996. Boren, Henry C. (translated by Lee, Seok Woo).[Roman society : a social, economic,

and cultural history?], Tamgudang, 1999. Carcopino, Jrme (Translated by Ryu, Jae Hwa). Rome a l'apogee de l'Empire: la vie

quotidienne, Umuli inneun jip, 2003. Kim Sang Yeup. The Low Childbirth in the Ancient Rome and the Marriage Laws of Augustus,

Yeoksa-wa

damnon/ History

and

discourse,

Ho-Suh

Historical

Association, v.44, Ho-Suh Historical Association, 2006. Yim Woong. The Roman Prostitution and Prostitutes in the Early Roman Empire Revealed by the Legal Sources (focusing on marriage law and adultery law by Augustus), J ournal of History, v.180, Korean Historical Association, 2003. Choi, Byoung Jo. D.50.14 De Proxeneticis; C.5.1 De sponsalibus et arris sponsaliciis et proxeneticis;

D.23.1

sponsalibus,

Text,

Translation,

and

Commentary.

Studies of Law, 39/4, Seoul National University, 1999. Cicero, de off., 1, 17, 54. CF. Biondi, Diritto romano cristiano Goria, Studi Grosso, 6. Gardner, Jane F. Women in Roman Law and Society, First Midland Book Edition, 1991, 11. Colish, Marcia L. The Stoic Tradition from Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages, Brill Academic Publishers, 1990, 2nd ed., 383. Metro, ((Binas nuptias constituere)) in D. 3, 3, 1. IVRA, 26(1975) Zablocka, Le modifiche introdotte nelle leggi matrimoniali augustee sotto la dinastia giulio-claudia, BIDR, 89(1986) http://blog.naver.com/ratatoskr?Redirect=Log&logNo=100007534364

Discussion Divorce on Roman Law

Discussant : Jeong, Seong Suk (Youngsan University)

Presenters have very well described Legal aspects about the possibility of divorce in the Roman era and requirements and the effects of divorce, etc. I would like introduce the reality of divorce in Roma and I want to replace the discussion. Monarchy, republic, democracy and all political systems have it's drawbacks and this drawbacks reveal when the great person is dead or retired. And the country will destroy as a result of reveal it's drawbacks. In this respect, Rome was declined gradually, this is rare occasion of ancient country. But this doesn't mean a great man had been appearing continually in Rome for 1000 years. In fact, Rome had many great person more than any other country. So, there were several relative gaps. There were some confusions in gap. That is not serious problem as much as the treat of country. We don't feel seriously about Rome's political gaps, that is caused by Romans and Rome based on the law. Rome had strong the law and systems, and no one could defy for the law. So, the law was mainstay of country's power vacuum situation. That is driving force of overcome the crisis without great difficulty. General and commander(they protect assigned area by the law) must protect their area regardless of order by person in power. Even the Senate and Emperor must follow the law which is transcendental power. The law was mainstay of the country. But, this age had any sanction beyond our imagination. One of most important reasons for collapse of Rome was divorce, and divorce was very serious problem in Rome.

Commonly

saying

that

"They

divorced

for

marrying,

and

married

for

divorcing". If you study history of Rome, you will know the Roman's degenerate love lives. Very famous great Roman who also has married and divorced with women many times. Furthermore, extramarital affair was took for granted. Romans was so proud of scores of lovers, that no matter whether men or women. Several times of marriage were common in Rome. We don't know that Roman has foresight or wisdom. Clearly, mostly women in high-class of Rome, they were experienced marriage and divorce two or three times . But, Rome didn't guaranteed human rights and maintained gender equality, and marriage of convenience is prevalent in Rome.

According to Proud journal, husbands threw away their unfaithful wife. One of divorce reasons is drinking wines as much as women can't pregnancy. Like this, Romans checked their wife's lip for prevent abusing alcoholic drink. All these things made tradition of kissing with women's lip. No formal marriage, no formal divorce. At first, there were no rules with divorce. In Athens and Rome, there was no legal divorce and that is husband's discretional. Divorce had to go in the provincial. But, there is no existing overruled data of divorce. Only, ancient and modern anthropologist's views are in consonance. For this reasons : Divorce by agreement is mainly existing in matriarchal society, because there were powerful women that caused by matriarchal society look up to pregnancy capacity. Contrary to the people in patriarchal society thought buying women's pregnancy capacity and sexual rights with marriage cost. So, mostly divorce was by men's one-side convenience.

The Advance of Ottoman Empire to the Mediterranean

～

and Cultural Influence in the 15

17C

Lee. Hee Soo (Hanyang University)

1. Prologue Since the Ottoman Empire(1299～1923) was established at a small city, Bursa, not far from Mediterranean coast, the empire developed and declined on the base of Mediterranean.

The control of Mediterranean traffic and sustainable supply of goods

needed, became vital factors for the empire to advance toward European territory. In particular, the victory of Ottomans in the Mediterranean against European powers, led to the empire's best prosperity and expansion in the 15～17th centuries.

Under the early Arabs, the Mediterranean had been in Islam's pocket. The Mecca pilgrims crowded the sea lanes of eastern Mediterranean, and the grain ships from Egypt came lumbering up to Istanbul. The 14th century's well-known Arab historian Ibn Khaldun travelled Egypt following the North African Mediterranean. By the 15th century, the Turks had resolved to put it back there. The year 1453 was a turning point in Mediterranean hegemony between Turks and Europeans. The assembly of a fleet allowed 24 years old Sultan Mehmet II(1451～1481) to take Constantinople. His successor, Sultan Beyazit laid the foundation of Ottoman maritime power, renovating the Arsenal to launch a fleet capable of sustaining war with Venice, the supreme mediterranean power of the age.

With advent of Ottomans in the mediterranean, Europe had closer encounter with Islamic-Middle East

world through wars or

trade.

A wide range of advanced

civilization of Oriental-Islamic world penetrate into medieval European society. And since 17th century, more developed European new technology and system were introduced to Muslim world through Ottoman Empire.

This paper is designed to dig out; 1)the process of capturing mediterranean hegemony by Ottoman Empire in 15～17th centuries when the Empire was at his full glory, 2)cultural confluence between Europeans and Ottomans.

2. From Roman Sea to Islamic Sea By origin, the Ottoman state was one of Turkish principalities generated by the expansion of the Seljuks and Turkish immigrants westwards into Anatolia in the middle of 11th century. On the disputed and shifting spuntier with the Byzantine empire therery.ew er a nng sp of such principalities. That founded by Osman was situated in Bursa1tht the m On point of contact with the ByzantineOn point end of the e empire thef ts forirs had crossed the straits into eastern Europe and expanded rapidly there.

With the conquest of Constantinople on May 29th, 1453 by Ottoman Sultan Mehmet II,

the Mediterranean was faced to a dramatic change in its basic characteristics.

This victory established the Ottoman sultanate as the spearhead of Islam pointing to the West, and brought it immense prestige within the Islamic world. Mehmet's reign was devoted to a series of military campaign on both European and Asian frontiers. In Europe, Ottoman armies subjugated the last Greek despotates in the Morea, made Serbia and Bosnia Ottoman provinces, and conquered several of the Greek islands. Gradually the Mediterranean shifted from Roman Sea to Islamic Sea where the Ottomans required a navy; without one, they could

not wrest control of maritime

commerce from the threat of well-established Italian city-states, most notably Venice. The Sultan Mehmet II constructed shipyards in Istanbul; gathered skilled carpenters, merchants, and sailors from the coastal regions under his rule; and forged an Ottoman navy that eventually drove Venice from the eastern Mediterranean and established the Ottomans as the supreme maritime power from the Adriatic to the Black Sea. The creation of a fleet also enabled the Ottomans to conquer and occupy the principal strategic Mediterranean islands from Rhodos(1522) and Cyprus(1570) in the east to Crete(1664) in the center(Cleveland, 1994:41).

The unique system in the recruitment of Ottoman navy is to mentntntnerienced corsairs from the North African Mediterranean(Algiers, Tunis, Tripoli). Together with new construction of fleet,

the Ottoman government gave a special

prestige to

Kcetan-i Derya(Admiral-tntChief) as the same position of Sadrazam(Premier).

Of course, the Ottoman government fully mobilized dual strategies- negotiation and wars in relations with traditional maritime republics as Venice, Genoa. In 1352, The Ottomans recognized Genoa and Venice their right to do free trade in the territory of

the Ottoman Empire. But in 1473, The Ottoman fleet headed by Mahmut Pasha attacked Euboea, a base camp for Venice trade in eastern Mediterranean. Again in 1479,

peace

treaty

was

agreed

and

the

relations

was

normalized

between

the

Ottomans and Venice.

3. The Decline of Republics of Genoa and Venice Genoa suffered most from Ottoman conquest. The humble effort the Genoese had made, in 1423, to butter up their future conquerors by inviting the Sultan to put his mark on the tower they were building in Pera(located in the Golden Horn in Istanbul), and the neutrality they had observed during the siege of Constantinople, came to nothing. The fall of Constantinople closed up her access to the Black Sea, and shortly afterwards Genoa should sell all interests in her prosperous trading colonies in the Crimea and Trabzon. In 20 years the Genoese were swept form the Black Sea, leaving their ship's designs and galley model, the most effective and terrible Mediterranean ship in which men worked the oars in chains. The Genoese trade was very much reduced and damaged by the loss of the Black Sea and the Aegean between 1456 and 1462, that they were driven to make a clean break, and served the Spaniards as Venice serviced the Porte, giving Spain the Genoese sailor Columbus(Goodwin, 1998: 122).

Meanwhile, Venice famously never made a break at all. She pursued her eastern trade, as ever mingling war with negotiation. But she also gradually lost her maritime power in eastern Mediterranean, in 1499 Lepanto was gone, Coron and Modon in 1503, Naupolia in 1540, Cyprus in 1570.

This time, Ottoman Sultans well recognized the importance of the Mediterranean paying more attention to advice of the aide. "If the sea is not safe no ships will come, and if no ships come, Istanbul perishes." Accordingly Sultan Selim I took Egypt and Sultan Sulaiman Rhodos, so that the eastern Mediterranean was secure, and relations with Venice were in practical terms an internal affairs(Goodwin, 1998: 122).

From 16th century, the Ottoman Empire became the principal military and naval power in the eastern Mediterranean, and also in the Red Sea, and this brought it into potential conflict with the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean and the Spaniards in the western Mediterranean. In the Red Sea area its policy was one of defence, to prevent

the Portuguese advancing, but in the Mediterranean it used its naval power to check Spanish expansion and establish a chain of strong points at Algiers in the 1520s, Tripoli in the 1550s and Tunis in 1574, but not further west in Morocco(Hourani, 1991 215).

With the beginning of the 16th century, the only adversary of the Ottoman was the Habsburg in Austria. Charles V, the emperor of the Habsburg appointed Andrea Doria chief admiral to confront with the Ottoman counterpart. As a result, however, in the wars

secure

the

Mediterranean

hegemony,

the

Ottomans

was

aneabsolute

advantageous position. It was possible that the Ottoman navy had a remarkable admiral named Barbarossa Hayreddin Pasha(Goodwin, 1998: 124).

4. Admiral Barbarossa and Preveza Battle Barbarossa Hayreddin Pasha of the Ottoman Navy(1478-1546) was a Turkish privateer and Ottoman admiral who dominated the Mediterranean for decades. He was born on the Ottoman island of Midilli(Lesbos) and died in Istanbul. His original name was Hizir Reis, later he became well known as Barbarossa (Red beard) in Europe.

His four brothers became seamen, engaged in marine affairs and international sea trade. Hızır began his career at sea operating in the Aegean Sea. Due to his excellent maritime experience Hızır Reis, given the title of Beylerbey by Sultan Selim I, along with

janissaries,

galleys

and

cannons,

inherited

his

brother's

place,

his

name

(Barbarossa) and his mission.

With a fresh force of Turkish soldiers sent by the Ottoman sultan, Barbarossa recaptured

Tlemcen

December

1518.

continued

the

policy

bringing

Mudejars(Muslims) from Spain to North Africa, thereby assuring himself of a sizeable following of grateful and loyal Muslims, who harbored an intense hatred for Spain. He captured Bone, and in 1519 he defeated a Spanish-Italian army. Still in 1519 he raided Toulon and southern France. In 1521 he raided the Balearic Islands and later captured several Spanish ships returning from the New World off Cadiz. In 1522 he sent his ships, under the command of Kurtoğlu, to participate in the Ottoman conquest of Rhodes which resulted in the departure of the Knights of St. John from that island in 1523. From 1525 and onward, he raided many ports and castles on the Mediterranean coasts of Italy and Spain. Barbarossa Hayreddin Pasha defeats the Holy League of

Charles V under the command of Andrea Doria at the Battle of Preveza in 1538. In 1534, he was made Kapudan Pasha, and he brought to the Ottoman world, weighed down by thought of Hungary and Persia, a huge new range. With a fleet of 84 ships, 61 of them new built at the Arsenal, he set sail for the Italian coast.

In 1535, Barbarossa captured the island Capri. The Turks eventually departed from Capri, but another famous Ottoman admiral, Turgut Reis, recaptured both the island and the castle in 1553. In 1536 Barbarossa was called back to Istanbul to take command of 200 ships in a naval attack on the Habsburg Kingdom of Naples.

In February 1538, Pope Paul III succeeded in assembling a Holy League (composed of the Papacy, Spain, the Holy Roman Empire, Venice and the Maltese Knights) against the Ottomans, but Barbarossa defeated its combined fleet, commanded by Andrea Doria, at the Battle of Preveza in September 1538. This victory secured Turkish dominance over the Mediterranean for the next 33 years, until the Battle of Lepanto in 1571.

In September 1540, Emperor Charles V contacted Barbarossa and offered him to become his Admiral-in-Chief as well as the ruler of Spain's territories in North Africa, but he refused. Unable to persuade Barbarossa to switch sides, in 1541, Charles himself laid siege to Algiers, seeking to end the corsair threat to the Spanish domains and Christian shipping in the western Mediterranean. Eventually a violent storm disrupted Charles' landing operations. Andrea Doria took his fleet away into open waters to avoid being wrecked on the shore, but much of the Spanish fleet went aground. After some indecisive fighting on land, Charles had to abandon the effort and withdraw his severely battered force.

In 1543, Barbarossa sailed for Toulon with the fleet. By the war against Charles V, the southern coasts were already under Ottoman sway(Goodwin, 1998:127). The Ottoman fleet then assaulted the coasts of Sardinia before appearing at Ischia and landing there in July 1544, capturing the city as well as Forio. Encountering 30 galleys under Giannettino Doria, Barbarossa forced them to sail away towards Sicily and seek refuge in Messina. Due to strong winds the Ottomans were unable to attack Salerno but managed to land at Cape Palinuro nearby. Barbarossa then entered the Strait of Messina and landed at Catona, Fiumara and Calanna near Reggio Calabria and later at Cariati and at Lipari, which was his final landing on the Italian peninsula. There he bombarded the citadel for 15 days after the city refused to surrender, and

eventually captured it.

He finally returned to Istanbul, and in 1545 left the city for his final naval expeditions, during which he bombarded the ports of the Spanish mainland and landed at Majorca and Minorca for the last time. As long as Barbarossa led the fleet, victory followed victory. But he died in 1546 in his seaside palace in Istanbul(Goodwin, 1998: 128).

Barbarossa Hayreddin Pasha established Ottoman supremacy in the Mediterranean which lasted until the Battle of Lepanto in 1571. But even after their defeat in Lepanto, the Ottoman Turks quickly rebuilt their fleet, regained Cyprus and other lost territories in Morea and Dalmatia from the Republic of Venice between 1571 and 1572, and conquered Tunisia from Spain in 1574. Furthermore, the Ottomans ventured into the northern Atlantic Ocean between 1585 and 1660, and continued to be a major Mediterranean sea power for three more centuries, until the reign of Sultan Abdülaziz, when the Ottoman fleet, which had 21 battleships and 173 other types of warships, ranked as the third largest naval force in the world after the British and French navies.

The Preveza Battle The naval Battle of Preveza took place in 1538 near Preveza in northwestern Greece between an Ottoman fleet and that of a Christian alliance assembled by Pope Paul III.

In 1537, commanding a large Ottoman fleet, Barbarossa Hayreddin Pasha

captured a number of Aegean and Ionian islands belonging to Venice and annexed to the Ottoman Empire. He then besieged the Venetian stronghold of Corfu and ravaged the Spanish-held Calabrian coast in southern Italy.

In the face of this threat, Pope Paul III appealed a ’’Holy League’’, comprising the Papacy, Spain, Genoa, Venice and the Knights of Malta, to confront Barbarossa. The Christian fleet was headed by Admiral Doria.

The two fleets finally engaged on 28

September 1538 in the Gulf of Arta, near Preveza. At the end of the battle, the Turks had sunk 10 ships, burned 3 others, captured 36, and had taken about 3000 prisoners. The Turks did not lose any ships but suffered 400 dead and 800 wounded.

In 1539

Barbarossa returned and captured almost all the remaining Christian outposts in the Ionian and Aegean Seas.

A peace treaty was signed between Venice and the Ottoman Empire in October 1540, under which the Turks took control of the Venetian possessions in the Morea and in Dalmatia and of the formerly Venetian islands in the Aegean, Ionian and eastern Adriatic Seas. Venice also had to pay a war indemnification of 300,000 ducats of gold to the Ottoman Empire.

With the victory at Preveza and the subsequent victory in the Battle of Djerba in 1560, the Ottoman Empire successfully repulsed the efforts of Venice and Spain, the two

principal

Mediterranean

powers,

stop

the

Turkish

drive

control

the

Mediterranean. This only changed with the Battle of Lepanto in 1571.

5. The Dramatic Change in the Ottoman Navy after the Lepanto Battle Although the Ottoman Empire had entered a period of decline, the island of Cyprus was occupied, its internal weakness were discerned only by the most observant Ottoman and foreign personages. Most Europeans still continued to fear the Ottoman army; and though its ability was reduced, it remained strong enough to prevent the provincial rebels from assuming complete control, and to make a few significant conquests in both the East and the West. During the reign of Selim II, who succeeded Sulayman I in 1566, the island of Cyprus was occupied in 1571. The Turks were received as liberators by the Orthodox Christian Cypriots, who were groaning under Latin tyranny(Sonyel, 1993: 66).

However, the Ottomans suffered their first major defeat in the Lepanto battle on October 7th, 1571, when a galley fleet of the Holy League, a coalition of Spain including its territories of Naples, Sicily and Sardinia, Venice, the Papacy under Pope St. Pius V, Genoa, the Knights Hospitaller and others.

The Holy League's fleet consisted of 206 galleys and 6 galleasses and

commanded

by Don Juan de Austria. Vessels had been contributed by the various Christian states. All members of the alliance viewed the Ottoman navy as a significant threat, both to the security of maritime trade in the Mediterranean Sea and to the security of continental Europe itself.

This fleet of the Christian alliance was manned by 12,920 sailors while the Ottoman galleys were manned by 13,000 sailors and 34,000 soldiers.

Kaptan-覺 Derya(Admiral)

Ali Pasha supported by the corsairs commanded an Ottoman force of 222 war galleys,

56 galliots, and some smaller vessels.

During the Battle of Lepanto, the western sea of Greece, twice the Spanish were repelled with great loss, but at the third attempt, with reinforcements the Christian fleet prevailed. The Ottoman admiral Ali Pasha was killed and beheaded, which contributed greatly to the destruction of Turkish morale. The battle concluded and the Turkish fleet suffered the loss of about 210 ships. On the Christian side 20 galleys were destroyed and 30 were damaged so seriously that they had to be scuttled.

The Lepanto battle was a significant defeat for the Ottomans, who had not lost a major naval battle since the fifteenth century. The Battle of Lepanto was celebrated all over Christian Europe as a great victory. The defeat was mourned as an act of Divine Will, contemporary chronicles recording that "the Imperial fleet encountered the fleet of the wretched infidels and the will of God turned another way"(Wheatcroft, 2004: 33-34). This event at the same time, encouraged hope for the downfall of the Turk, who was regarded as the "Sempiternal Enemy of the Christian". Indeed, the Empire lost all but 30 of its ships and as many as 30,000 men and some Western historians have held it to be the most decisive naval battle anywhere on the globe since the Battle of Actium of 31 BC (Keegan, John, 1993).

It was, however, far less important than the defeat and destruction of the Ottoman fleet in Asian waters. Before long, The Ottomans were able to restore their naval power

the

Mediterranean

and

protect

their

European

conquests

from

attacks(Lewis, 1995: 116). Selim II's the Grand Vizier Mehmed Sokullu, suggested to the Venetian emissary Marcantonio Barbaro that the Christian triumph at Lepanto was meaningless, saying:

"You come to see how we bear our misfortune. But I would have you know the difference between your loss and ours. In wresting Cyprus from you, we deprived you of an arm; in defeating our fleet, you have only shaved our beard. An arm when cut off cannot grow again; but a shorn beard will grow all the better for the razor"(Wheatcroft, 2004: 34).

In fact, wth a massive effort, the Ottoman Empire rebuilt its navy. By 1572, more than 150 galleys and 8 galleasses had been built, adding eight of the largest capital ships ever seen in the Mediterranean. On 7 March 1573 the Venetians thuever

sgnized by teraty the Ottoman possession of Cyprus.

That summer the Ottoman

navy ravaged the geographically vulnerable coasts of Sicily and southern Italy.

However, as historian Paul K. Davis has argued, The Ottomans remained no more powerful factor in Mediterranean.

"This Turkish defeat stopped Turkey's expansion into the Mediterranean, thus maintaining

western

dominance,

and

confidence

grew

the

west

that

Turks,

previously unstoppable, could be beaten."

Thus, this victory for the Holy League was historically important not only because the Turks lost main ships, but because the victory heralded the end of Turkish supremacy in the Mediterranean. It has been said that "after Lepanto the pendulum swung back the other way and the wealth began to flow from East to West", as well as "a crucial turning point in the ongoing conflict between the Middle East and Europe, which has not yet completely been resolved."(Hazar, 2008:16/Goodwin, 1998: 128).

Maritime warfare continued for some time between Ottomans and Spaniards, but Spanish energies were mainly directed towards the new world of America. A more or less stable division of naval power in the Mediterranean grew up, and from 1580 onwards Spain and the Ottomans had peaceful relations(Hourani, 1991:215).

So with few exceptions the history of the Ottoman navy is one of accelerated decline. Warships rotted in the Arsenal, for lack of funds and knowledknable crew. Only the cosairs understood the sna, and they preferred to work independentl of ther than nail their colours to the falling mast. As a result the Ottomans suffereod udden rude shockrotThe Black Sna was never really a lake, Ottoman or otherwise; and Cossacksof ided Sinope in 1614ottIn 1654, through a mixture of bungling and bad luck, the Ottomans were blockaded in the Dardanelles by VenirottIn 1787 they were thunderstruck by the arrival of a Russr otfleet off Greece which had not come through the Bosphos r(Goodwin, 1998: 129).tThe Mediterranean is no more dominated by Ottoman Empire, rather become international sea.

6. East-West Cultural Exchange through Mediterranean As intermediate place, the eastern Mediterranean was fully functioned during the Ottoman dorminance in the 15-17th centuries. The Ottoman culture itself was a kind of amalgam harmoniously mixed with nomadic from Central Asia, oasis in Arabian peninsula, and high level of sedentary city civilization from Byzantine and Persia. The rich and exotic culture of the Ottoman could fully draw European attraction. It was deeply rooted in European society as new fashion and trend.

Such new items as Turkish towel, Pajama, Divan(Turkish bed) together with orange, lemon, sugar, olive, alcohol, music were widely penetrated into Europe as very popular daily goods.

A large number of Ottoman sultans were patrons of art and literature. Mehmet II the Conqueror gave his troops free reins for three days in the conquered city. But immediately afterward the Sultan forced Christians to return to their homes. Some of them were architects, skillful artisans, and textile weavers who kept the tradition of local art and industry alive. Byzantine woven silks were highly prized in Europe. Other Byzantine artistic motif are clear in Turkish architecture especially in the interior decoration of Mosques and palaces. Traces of the Italian style are also apparent(Hitti, 1961: 350ď˝&#x17E;351).

The tulip flower in Ottoman society figured prominently in mosaic, textile, and other decoration especially in the 16th century. The tulip flower was symbol of the Ottoman

palace.

The

plant

itself

was

introduced

into

Vienna

1554

ambassador to Turkey and in 1591 to Holland, where it achieved great success and popularity. Between 1634 and 1637 a single flower was sold for the equivalent of US$5,200. Ownership of one flower, at times even non-exitent, was often divided into shares. Today the cultivation of tulip bulbs and their exportation have become an main industry in Holland(Hitti, 1961: 351).

The main inspiration for Turkish artistic development came from Persia. Before migrating into West Asia the Turks had firsthand contacts with Persian culture which were reinforced in the course of the many campaigns conducted from Istanbul. Among the trophies carried away by Selim I and other Ottoman sultans were objects of art which served as models. Persian borrowing is clear in mosaic, architectural decoration, miniatures, woven silks and textiles. In all these fields Turkish artists,

first imitators, developed their own techniques and a style of their own. In addition Turks

succeeded

the

silks

and

velvets

Byzantium.

Genoese

and

Venetian

merchants supplied the products of Istanbul and Bursa into Italy, whence they reached France and attained some vogue in Western Europe(Hitti, 1961: 351).

7. Conclusion The great Ottoman Empire has declined from the later part of 17th century mainly due to the failure of eastern Mediterranean hegemony. Furthermore, new era of discovery

initiated

Spain

and

Portugal

struck

decisive

damage

Ottoman

economy which controlled for centuries the triangle regional trade connecting Istanbul with Red Sea and Indian Ocean. When few political elites of the Empire recognised the seriousness of their empire and made every efforts to restore the past glory in the 18th century, it eas too late. The new power of Europe never gave chance for the Ottomans to recover their capability. It is very clear and historical lesson that the emergence of new Powers in the Mediterranean is absolutely relied on the control of the Sea.

Bibliography A History of the Modern Middle East, Boulder. Goodwin, Jason, 1998, Lords of the Horizons , New York Cleveland, William L, 1994,

Hazar, Serpil Atamaz, â&#x20AC;&#x153;Review of Confrontation at Lepanto: Christendom vs. Islam,â&#x20AC;?

The Historian 70.1 (Spring 2008). Hitti, Phillip, 1961, The Near East in History , princeton Hourani, Albert, 1991, A History of Arab Peoples , Cambridge. Keegan, John, 1993, A History Of Warfare , Vintage. Lee, Hee Soo, 1993, Turkish History, Daehangyoguasoe, Seoul. Lewis, Bernard, 1995, The Middle East , New York. Sonyel, Salahi, 1993, Minorities and the Destruction of the Ottoman Empire, Istanbul Wheatcroft,

Andrew,

2004,

Infidels: A History of the Conflict between

Christendom and Islam. Penguin Books. Yildiz, Hakki Dursun, 1989, Buyuk Islam Tarihi

Vol.10, Istanbul

What was the Crusading Movement between Christians and Muslims?

Song, Kyong Keun (Chosun University)

The Crusading Movement was a series of campaigns motivated by a desire to bring the holy places of Christendom and to protect it as European viewpoint. Many European historians thought the Crusading Movement lasted from 1095, when Pope Urbanus II made his famous call to arms, until the fall of Acre in 1291 as the termination of serious Crusader activity against the Muslim Levant. The Crusading Movement formed important parts in two distinct but interconnected histories; Europe and the Islamic world. In Europe, the Crusades were part of the evolution of medieval western Europe. In Muslim East, the Crusades played a transient, but unforgettable role which has left its impact on the Islamic consciousness until the present day. The historiography of Crusades, as seen from European viewpoint can be divided into three periods, of which the first, and longest, went from 1095 until the end of the sixteenth century; the second covered the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and the third began in the early nineteenth century to the present. The first period considered the

Crusading

Movement

response

the

Muslim threats

to the

Christian holy places and the people in the east. The second period of Crusading historiography was ushered in by the rationalist writers who called the Crusaders adventurers and brigands and considered the Crusading Movement as "a savage fanaticism". The Crusades have taken their place in public opinion "among the monuments of folly and tyranny". The third period turned the tide of opinion about the

Crusades.

sympathetic

attitude

toward

the

Middle

Ages,

including

the

Crusaders, emerged in the late eighteen and early nineteenth centuries under the influence of romanticism and nationalism and could be seen in favorable depictions of the Crusaders in literature, art, music and novels. The image of the Crusaders was partly recovered. After the French Revolution nationalism made the Crusaders the symbol of European expansion. At last they were considered the soldiers of the right and justice without a religious meaning. On the other hand, the image of Crusades, as seen from Islamic world, was always unchangeable and it was as plunders. Muslims considered the Crusading Movement as a European invasion in Islamic world rather than a recapturing movement of holy land by medieval Europe. They

also have never confined the Crusading invasion within Levant and have tended to understand continuous European invasion in Islamic world. What of worse, some Muslims

considered

all

European

invasion

Islamic

world

the

Crusading

Movement. Moreover, they used to think all of external invasions in Islamic world were related with the Crusading Movement. However, many Muslims considered Christians-Muslims'

war

from

Levant

Iberian

Peninsula

the

Crusading

Movement. Specifically they tend to regard not only medieval European invasion in Levant and Egypt for recapturing holy land but also Christians-Muslims' war in the Iberian Peninsula as the Crusading Movement. The Islamic world was offensive against Europe except the recapturing movement of holy land and the Reconqista of the Iberian peninsula until 16th century. Muslims divided the world two parts. The first is "Dar al-Islam(House of Islam)"that is the Islamic

community

and

Muslim

the

al-Harb(House of War) that is outside of

ruler

it.

The

second

"Dar

"Dar al-Islam". All of Muslims have

believed Dar al-Harb is changed to Dar al-Islam. Although the infidels occupied the part of Dar al-Islam and it was originally infidel's territory, Muslims considered it theirs and infidels invaded their territory. It had to be recovered by all means. It was not only the combat but it was also peaceful mission, commerce and diplomacy. However, it was mainly completed by the concept of jihad with Europe, which has threaten the existence & life of western European Christian civilization several times. European historians thought that the Crusading Movement occurred because of complex factors like political, economic, religious conflicts. On the other hand Muslim historians looked that it has only happened within religious conflicts. They also thought

it was the first Christian counter-attack or invasion against the expansion

of Islam in conflict between Muslims and Christians. Muslims tried to expel the Crusaders by the concept of Jihad. Their jihad was connected with global nature of Islam and it could happened wherever Islamic world was threatened. Jihad demanded any Muslim had to participate and it was performed by the voluntary individual character without the authorized leadership. Islamic Jihad declared defence of Islam and spread of it publicly. The Crusader was the answer for Pope's appeal and religious and collective movement. They moved on the belief that their sins was forgiven. It contained the meaning of pilgrimage. Jihad was permanent and the Crusading Movement has occurred for the extraordinary events. There was no concept like jihad of Islam in Christianity originally. Augustine suggested conditions of orthodox war in 5th century. At the same time, he asserted that the Christian should not perform war for conversion or elimination of infidels and unbelievers. He thought that the war was the necessary evil and the good leader

could rarely do it under the unavoidable circumstance. He suggested that it could not be a instrument of church. However, it had to be continued to expel Muslims in Spain, and had to begin to be considered the holy war. The Holy war developed a firm concept to justify the Crusading Movement theologically and morally. The Christian churches were divided and conflicted with each other. The leader of a religion was different from the leader of politics in Christianity. Christians had no leader like Caliphate of Islam who had both power of religion and

politics. The

Christian holy war originally had problems to be systematized like jihad of Islam. Christian's Crusading Movement meant recovering the original situation that was recapturing holy land and if it was commented once again, it was a little defensive and contained a temporary meaning. Nevertheless, why did the Islamic world so strongly feel that Crusaders meant plunder and destruction as a symbol of invasion ? The reason was that Crusaders basically tried not to recognize the existence of another

religion.

The

Crusaders

continued

persecute

the

infidels

who

were

permitted to dwell in their territory reluctantly and caused the conflict as outsiders of that area until last time. They had heavily taxed goods of caravan like looter in their territory or had looted it. Such looting and persecution caused the unstability and poverty of their dominated region. If any foreign invader accepted Islam and recognised the Islamic dominant system, the Islamic community of the Middle East has never discriminate against him in performance of political power and his political position. The Turk who had fought with Crusaders, could be applicable to it. Although they were foreigners, they accepted

Islam

and

its

dominant

system.

After

they

have

never

felt

any

discrimination in performance of political power in comparison with the native Arab rulers. However, Crusaders could not be Muslims against the Christian doctrine. They were left as outsiders in the Islamic community for the last time. Moreover, their plunder, arson, destruction, massacre gave them the image of savage invaders in the Islamic world. Many Muslim historians have seen that Christian's first counter-attack to stop the spread of Islam was started from the fall of Toledo in Spain, 1089. They have denied that it was started from the first Crusading Movement(1096-1099). It was conducted by Reconquista of Spain in the west and occupation of Jerusalem in the east at the same time. Thus, eventually the Crusaders concentrated their movement on Spain in the conscious and recaptured Lisbon in 1147. However the result of both lines was a sharp contrast. Christians pushed back Muslims in Spain successively. Christian success in the east was temporary and ultimately it was a failure when the last Crusader's base in Acre was fallen by Muslims, 1291.

There was an aspect that the Spanish Christians responded to the Muslim invasion politically. Meanwhile, there was an aspect that the Levantine Christians

invaded the

Islamic world with religious zeal. Muslims were angry at the cruelty, disorder and ignorance of Crusaders. However, it was enough for Muslims to know that the heretics invaded the edges of the Islamic world. The people of Egypt and Levant was exception. Because that area was invaded by Crusaders directly. Substantially, the Crusading Movement could not make any change in the heart of the Islamic world. As a result, the Crusading Movement triggered the increase of Mediterranean trade between Christian world and Islamic world and the social situation of non-Muslims which was ruled by Muslims became worse permanently. The Christianity started its history in the Middle East. Before the coming of Islam the Christianity was the religion of the majority in it. Islam governed the Middle East, North Africa & Spain since 8th century. The Crusading Movement was the unexpected invasion of Muslim Levant. Muslims faced with the Christian cruel savagery hardly. Although the infidels occupied the part of Dar al-Islam which was originally infidel's territory, Muslims considered it theirs and infidels invaded Muslim's territory. It meant Levant could be the Christian territory and simultaneously Muslim territory. Therefore Crusading Movement can be the expedition as viewpoint of Islamic world, and it can be the invasion as European Christian viewpoint. When the Crusading Movement started in Europe the Crusaders thought that they could not pilgrim the holy land because Muslims occupied it. But it was not true. There was an aspect that some people amplified misunderstandings to get the political and material benefits. If any Christians admitted the Islamic dominant system Muslims could not really prevent their pilgrimage because they were monotheists like Muslims. However, Muslim thought that the Christian recapturing movement of holy land was an unreasonable invasion. Moreover, Christian ignorance, greed and chaos induced Muslims more disgust and hatred against Crusader. We can't answer which is right on the basis of the black and white logic. The answer is changeable under the many circumstances. The right answer can be determined under the circumstances that can be understood each other without the external force through war, terrorism, coercive politics and economic sanction and that can be seen the Crusading Movement objectively on the basis of just concepts and definitions without selfishness.

<Reference> 김정위, 중동사, 서울 :대한교과서주식회사,

1993

타트, 조르주, 십자군 전쟁, 서울 :시공디스커버리 총서, 루엘랑, 자크 송경근,

G.,

1999, -문화

안상준,

성전, 서울

한길사,

1998

2003

선교-문화 연구, “기독교와 이슬람의 역사적 관계”, 제2호, 천안대학교 선교 연구소.

<서양학계의

십자군 본질 논쟁과 연구동향>,

≪서양사론≫ 제

97호(2008. 6)

Al-Mu'adid, Khashi'u wa Akhr, al-Watan al-'Arabi wa al-Ghazu wa al-Salibi, Armstrong, Karen, Holy War, New York:Anghor Books. 2001 Baghdad:Tarikh al-Watan al-'Arabi. 1981. ‘Ashur, Said, al-Harakah al-Salibiyah, al-Qahirah:Maktabah al-Anglo al-Misriyah. 1982 Gabrieli, Francesco, Hillenbrand,

Carole,

Arab Historians of the Crusades, New York:Dorset Press. 1989. The

Crusades,

Islamic

Perspectives,

Edinburgh:Edinbugh

University Press. 1999. 'Imarah, Muhammad, Ma'arik Lil'arab did Lilghuzah, Bayrut:al-Muassat al-'Arabiyah Lidirasat wa al-Nashr. 1975. Laiou, Angeliki E. & Mottahedeh, Roy Parviz, The Crusades from the Perspective of Byzantium and the Muslim World, Washington D.C.:Dumbarton Oaks. 2001 Joinville & Villehardouin, Chronicles of the Crusades, New York:Dorset Press. 1985. Maalouf, Amin, The Crusades through Arab eyes, Cairo: A U C Press. 1990. Ramadan,

'Abd

al-'Azim,

al-Sira'u

baina

al-'Arab

Uruba,

al-Qahirah:Dar

al-Ma'arif, 1983 Runciman, Steven, A History of the Crusades, Cambridge University Press:Penguin Books. 1985 Shalabi, Ahmad, al-Hurub al-Salibiyah, al-Qahirah:Maktabah al-Nahdah al-Misriyah. 1986

Panel 3. Social Sciences (International Relations) (Tulip Room) Chair : Chang, Byong Ock (Hankuk University Of Foreign Studies)

1. Evaluation on the Business Climate and Investment Opportunities of Tunisia Kim, Joong Kwan (Dongkuk University) Discussant : Kim, Hyo Jung (Myongji University) 2. Turkic Muslim Communities in Korea Kim, Dae Sung/Oh, Chong Jin (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies) Discussant : Lee, Ji Eun (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies) 3. Study on the Korean Attitude and Perception toward Koslim (1.5 and 2ndgeneration Muslim immigrant of Korea) : based on the survey research Cho, Hee Sun (Myongji University) Discussant : Park, Jae Won (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies) 4. Wolf-warriors, the Argonauts, and the Foundation of Trebizond Andreas Katonis (University of Aristotle[Thessaloniki]) Discussant : Choi, Hae Young (Chonnam National University)

Evaluation on the Investment Opportunities within Business Climate of Tunisia

Kim, Joong Kwan (Dongguk University)

1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Contents Introduction Current Socio-Economic Feature National Competitiveness on Market Evaluation on Investment Opportunities Conclusion

â&#x2026; . Introduction Tunisia has

got

an initiative to Union for

the

Mediterranean (UfM)

to get

incentives for reform, as it focuses on physical infrastructures as well as institutional upgrading and include any conditionality mechanism, agricultural development, labor movements, services and trade. So it is not difficult to foresee any impact on accelerating structural reforms for investment opportunities. Moreover, Tunisia will remain stable as of its pursuit on the value of Arab moderation and its support for the economic policy will focus on increasing the competitiveness of the economy to attract more investment in order to raise growth rates and create jobs. However, efforts to increase transparency in the private sector may be delayed for political reasons, and the government used to move slowly on other reforms to avoid social unrest. Real GDP growth will accelerate in 2009, before easing slightly in 2010 as a recovery in manufacturing and tourism and a pick up in export expansion is offset by more modest growth in agriculture. In the respect of economic policy outlook, there have been no changes to the economic policy outlook after 2010. In this paper, we will evaluate the Tunisian economy through the economic features and the opportunities of investment. And will review the Economic Policy of Tunisia on the current socio-economic feature and national competitiveness on its market.

â&#x2026;Ą. Current Socio-economic Feature 1) Stabilization on the interior section

The

government

would

continue

liberalize

the

Tunisia's

economy

and

strengthen its significant achievements in education, health and housing, although such socio-economic developments will make the country's repressive political system appear ever more anachronistic. Domestic and external pressures for political change will grow, but the present regime will prove unwilling to respond to such demands, except

through

even

greater

repression.

addition,

unemployment

will

remain

resentment over corruption among the business and beau racy. The problem is that if living

standards

fall,

restrictions

free

speech

could

radicalize

dissent,

thus

increasing the risk of violence. For the moment, however, stability and prosperity on the economic field are more urgent than distribution of resources for Tunisia. Mr. Ben Ali can be expected to continue to play a prominent international role, as he did by hosting a Euro-Med meeting and the Arab League summit, and as he will do by hosting the World Summit on the Information Society. Despite the US repression to end unqualified support for authoritarian Arab regimes, criticism of Tunisia will be fairly mild and is unlikely to lead to a substantive weakening of ties with the Western allies.

2) Governmental policy against to Exterior issues Governmental policy towards the EU is expected to continue to be positive, despite some differences. The government recognizes the value of its Association Agreement with the European countries, which has helped to modernize industry and create Domestic politics International relations jobs, but is fearful that EU expansion to the east will reduce financial support to ease the pain of free trade. Tunisia to seek to develop its links with the US as a counterbalance to the EU. Tunisia and the US are now linked by a number of trade and investment agreements, these to lead to a full free-trade agreement.

3) Economic policy outlook Economic policy will focus on stimulating economic growth to cut unemployment and raise real wages. As outlined in the government's development plan continuously, these aims are to be achieved by the following means: boosting domestic investment, partly through privatizations; encouraging greater foreign participation; reforming the financial

sector;

and

improving

the

competitiveness

industry,

services

and

agriculture. The goal is to leave local businesses better placed to withstand the substantial shocks of greater competition from the EU and from rival exporters in Asia, particularly with the ending of the Multi-Fibre Arrangement quotas on textiles in 2005. Despite some progress towards reform, the public sector will continue to play

a significant role in the economy, particularly as the government will seek to avoid any reforms that could increase unemployment and threaten social stability.

4) Privatization The government has extended trade liberalization by cutting some non-EU customs duties and has introduced other measures to encourage firms to modernize. There are plans for further reform of the banking sector, including the sale of at least one more state bank although this process may stall for a while following the government failure to attract any bids for its sale of a 33% stake in Banque du Sud. Moreover, the government will be cautious about increasing the transparency of the allocation of funds to the private sector. There is political resistance to some reforms, especially to efforts to remove the secrecy that surrounds much business activity, which has hindered investment, particularly from abroad. The government proceed with the sale of a minority stake in Tunisie Telecom (TT), probably through an offering on the stock market of some 10% of the company in coming months and the sale of a larger bloc in 2005. However, the authorities will move only slowly on other issues, such as the liberalization of domestic prices. The government also needs to move faster to trim the public-sector wage bill, which according to our estimates exceeded 12% of GDP

2003.

Fiscal

adjustment

will

supported

the

forecast

period

privatization and by the sale of concessions, including in telecommunications and in airport and power infrastructure.

5) Basic fundamental Index Although

the

authorities

will

continue

work

towards

fiscal

stability,

the

government will be reluctant to limit the growth of public-sector jobs for fear of sowing discontent. The draft budget for 2009 aims to limit the fiscal deficit to around 2% of GDP, excluding privatization proceeds"or to 2.5% of GDP, with the further exclusion of grants. Despite the projected fall in the deficit, the budget still points to considerable increases in spending. Current expenditure is budgeted to rise by 6.5% on 2008, with the bulk of the increase earmarked for wages, although we expect current spending to rise faster than expenditure on government projects. The budget also calls for a 5.0% increase in development spending, but again we expect this item to rise by a faster rate, of around 6.5%, unlike in 2008 when it fell well short of the budget target. Nevertheless, we still expect the deficit to contract throughout the forecast period, as the healthy economic performance, with private consumption and the business sector picking up strongly, is likely to ensure that tax revenue growth outpaces

spending increases, particularly in 2009, even though cuts in customs duties and new tax benefits aimed at boosting private-sector growth will put a cap on the rate of expansion of state revenue. Some of these receipts will be used for financing rather than revenue purposes, the deficit would be just 1% of GDP if privatization proceeds were included. Despite renewed pledges to curb spending, expenditure will rise in 2010, albeit at a slightly lower rate than in 2009. As stronger domestic demand boosts tax revenue, offsetting the continued decline in customs duties, the fiscal deficit is expected to narrow to 2.5% of GDP, excluding privatization revenue. With the bulk of the TT sale now likely in 2005, if privatization revenue were included Tunisia's fiscal position would be close to balance. The stringent approach to liquidity management taken by the Banque centrale de Tunisie (BCT; the central bank) loosened slightly, However, monetary policy will stay sufficiently tight to keep growth in broad money manageable. As domestic demand becomes increasingly robust, however, and in a bid to contain the upward trend in prices. Although euro rates will be fairly stable, further small rises in Tunisian interest rates are probable over the remainder of the forecast period as global rates generally trend upwards.

6) Monetary policy The global economy looks set to expand at its fastest rate since 2000. We expect world GDP growth on a purchasing power parity basis to accelerate from an estimated 3.5% in 2008 to an impressive 4% in 2009. Expansion is also picking up in the euro zone, the destination of most Tunisian exports, after two years of near stagnation. However, we remain concerned about the weakness of EU domestic demand,

which is damaging investment

and employment

prospects,

as well

restricting consumer confidence. We expect average growth in the euro zone of a disappointing 2.0% in 2008, before it picks up speed in the second half of the forecast period, averaging 2.2% in 2009. In 2008 expansion will accelerate to 2.2% in France, but to just 1.5% in Italy, Those are Tunisia's two main export markets. Despite sluggish consumption growth, both economies are expected to strengthen in 2010. The strength of the euro, although more modest than we had previously forecast"should last well into 2010, and will be a concern for economies within the euro zone, although it could potentially make Tunisian exports more competitive in its main market. Anxieties over global supply will keep oil prices high for much of 2009, but average prices are expected to fall later in the forecast period, reducing subsidy levels and import costs for Tunisia. Real GDP growth accelerated to 5.5% in 2008 as agriculture rebounded strongly

following good rains after three years of drought. Government consumption also drove GDP growth in 2008, and will be robust in 2009-10 as the administration seeks to mitigate the social impact of high unemployment, as well as to mollify public-sector workers. Although prospects look good for the 2009 harvest, agricultural expansion is likely to be more modest than in 2008 when the sector was bouncing back from drought. We also expect a strong pick-up in tourism, the country's third-largest employer, over the forecast period. External International assumptions demand is also likely

record

stronger

growth

economies

expand

rapidly,

thus

stimulating manufacturing. In 2009-10 foreign direct investment will stay high as global economic confidence begins to recover and progress is made on structural reform in the domestic economy. We therefore expect the economy to expand by 6.3% in 2004 and by 5.7% in 2005 (as the agricultural sector consolidates). The main risks to this forecast are further terror attacks, which would deter tourists and foreign investors, and the possibility that drought could cut agricultural output more sharply in 2005 than the small downturn we currently anticipate, hurting private consumption and exports, and forcing Tunisia to increase food imports. An anticipated movement of international capital back to OECD markets in 2009-10 after the popularity of emerging markets in recent years could also dampen growth by limiting Tunisia's sources of financing and investment.

7) Financial policy Rising inflationary pressures in the second half of 2008 resulted in year-end inflation of 4.5%. In 2009 strengthening domestic demand and higher prices for international industrial raw materials and imported foodstuffs (food has a 40% weighting in the consumer price index basket) will keep price growth slightly higher than the

historical

average

of recent

years.

With oil

prices

staying

high,

the

government will pass on some of these costs to consumers in a bid to limit subsidy expenses. Year-on-year inflation stood at 5%, easing slightly to 4.5% the following month.

Overall,

expect

inflation

average

4.0%,

some

way

above

the

government's official target of 2.5%. From late 2009 we expect oil prices to fall. In 2010, although the price of wheat an important import for Tunisia will continue to rise, prices for other commodities will fall or stay flat. With the dinar fairly stable against the euro, this Inflation will help to contain imported inflation despite the continued strength of domestic demand. Inflation will ease from a year-end rate of 3.5% in 2009 to an average of 3.0% in 2010. Although the authorities have yet to establish a fully market-driven exchange rate policy framework that would allow the central bank to reduce its interventions in the

foreign-exchange market, the BCT is taking a more flexible approach than in the past, and we expect the government to maintain this stance during the forecast period. In 2008 the dinar depreciated in real effective terms by around 6.5% against the euro, to an average of TD1.42:USD1.1)With the euro expected to continue to strengthen against the US dollar for a time being, as the authorities try to maintain Tunisia's export competitiveness in the EU. European

demand

growth

for

Tunisian

manufactured

goods

expected

accelerate in 2009 and remain strong in 2010, underpinned by a modest pickup in demand in the EU and by an attractive euro: dinar exchange rate. We estimate export earnings to rise sharply to US$12.5bn in 2009 and to US$12.7bn in 2010. Despite the relaxation of the import squeeze imposed by the government in 2007, real import demand in 2008 was weak, although in US dollar terms spending picked up to US$12.3bn, a rise of 14.8%. However, import costs have continued to increase at a fast pace and we expect import spending to grow to US$14bn in 2009 and to US$15bn in 2010. The rise will also be partly in response to strong domestic economic expansion and the programme of industrial modernization already under way, with food imports picking up in 2010 after falling in 2009. The current transfers surplus will strengthen considerably as European economies begin to recover and as the dollar weakens further. Overall, owing largely to the sharp fall in the trade deficit, we forecast that the current account will move into a surplus in 2009 the first since 2001 of 0.5% of GDP, before returning to a Exchange rates.

Economic Forecast of Tunisia

(% unless otherwise indicated)

2007

2008

Real GDP growth

4.7

5.6

6.3

5.7

Industrial production growth

0.7

-0.1

4.4

4.6

Gross agricultural production growth

3.0

21.5

5.8

1.5

14.9

14.3

13.8

13.5

2.7

4.1

2.9

-3.1

-3.2

-2.7

-2.5

Exports of goods fob (US$ bn)

8.2

11.8

12.5

12.7

Imports of goods fob (US$ bn)

11.0

13.3

14.0

15.0

External debt (US$ bn)

12.8

14.3

14.8

17.3

Unemployment rate (av) Consumer price inflation (av) Government balance (% of GDP)

2009(e) 2010(f)

1) whereas it appreciated by some 8% against the US dollar, to an average of TD1.20:US$1, reflecting the strengthening of the euro against the US currency; the euro is estimated to account for at least two-thirds of the dinar currency basket.

â&#x2026;˘. Competitiveness of emerging Market of Tunisia 1) Evaluation on the Economic Feature Economic policy of Tunisia had been primarily to promote light industry and tourism, and develop its phosphate deposits. The major sector remained agriculture with small farms prevailing, but these did not produce well. In the early 2000s, the economy slowed down, but the socialist program did not prove to be the cure. In the 20th century, the economy of Tunisia expanded at a very agreeable rate. Oil was

discovered,

and

tourism

continued.

City

and

countryside

populations

drew

roughly equal in number. Yet agricultural problems and urban unemployment led to increased migration to Europe. Between 1998 and 2008 the economy more than doubled. The economic average growth rate was 5.6% per year during the 2000s (the best in North Africa). Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was composed of approximately 12.5% agriculture, 33.1% industry, and 54.4% services. Tunisia's exports went to France 29%, Italy 20%, Germany 9%, Spain 6%, and Libya5%, and U.S.A. 4%. Imports came from France 25%, Italy 22%, Germany 10%, and Spain 5%. An association agreement with the European Union is scheduled to move Tunisia toward full free trade with the EU by 2008. Manufacturing industries, producing largely for export, are a major source of foreign currency revenue. Industrial production represents about 28% of GDP and primarily consists of petroleum, mining (particularly phosphates), textiles, footwear, food processing, and electrical and mechanical manufactures. Textiles are a major source of foreign currency revenue, with more than 90% of production being exported. While

the

end

competitiveness manufacturers

of in

are

its

the

Multi-fiber

traditional

successfully

Arrangement

European

upgrading

textile product

2005

markets, lines

eroded to

and

Tunisia's

counteract

exporting

this,

smaller

quantities of higher value items. Tourism is a major source of foreign exchange, representing about 20% of hard currency receipts, as well as an important sector for employment. In 2006,6.5 million tourists visited Tunisia, hailing largely from Europe and North Africa. While the influx of tourists represents a boon to the economy. Tunisia's large expatriate population (about 1 million) also makes a positive and significant contribution. Over the

past

five

years,

remittances

from

abroad

averaged

1.61

million

dinars

(approximately 1.21 million USD) a year, or roughly 5% of Tunisia's GDP and one fourth of the country's foreign currency earnings. Ever increasing oil prices have grabbed the Tunisian economy. The country is a

net importer of hydrocarbon products. Domestic crude production is approximately 112,000 barrels per day, but refining capacity is only about 30,000 barrels a day. Proven reserves are in the region of 300 million barrels. Tunisia has one oil refinery in Bizerte on the north coast and in 2006 awarded a tender for a second at La Skhira near Gabes to Qatar Petroleum. Natural gas production is currently about 3 million tons oil equivalent Proven reserves are about 2.8 trillion cubic feet, two-thirds of which are located offshore. British Gas is the major developer of the natural gas industry, and the largest foreign investor in Tunisia. The government still retains control over certain "strategic" sectors of the economy (finance, hydrocarbons, aviation, electricity and gas distribution, and water resources) but the private sector is playing an increasingly important role. Tunisia is a founding member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and is publicly committed to a free trade regime and export-led growth. Most goods can be imported without prior licensing, although non-tariff administrative barriers sometimes delay imports of goods. Significant import duties, coupled with high consumption taxes on certain items and a value-added tax (VAT), add considerably to the local price of imported goods. The Government of Tunisia is beginning to take a more proactive stance on intellectual

property

rights

(IPR)

enforcement

and

education.

Tunisia's

recent

intellectual property rights law is designed to meet WTO TRIPS (Trade-Related Aspects

Intellectual

Property)

minimum

standards

and

there

on-going

collaboration between the United States and Tunisian governments to promote public awareness

these

rights.

2005

the

Tunisian

Central

Bank

issued

new

Euro-denominated bond on the London financial market.2) The issue totaled over $450 million (400 million Euros) with a maturity of 15 years. The Government of Tunisia sold a similar bond with a total value of nearly $550 million and seven-year maturity at the same period. Average annual income per capita in Tunisia is approaching $4000. The minimum monthly legal wage for a 48-hour week was recently raised to approximately $250. Tunisia's goal of pushing per capita incomes into the middle emerging market level calls for an average 7% growth rate instead of 5%. In 2008, GDP growth was 5.2%, 2) The Central Bank is moving from direct management of the financial sector towards a more traditional supervisory and regulatory role. Commercial banks are permitted to participate in the forward foreign exchange market. The dinar is convertible for current account transactions but some convertible dinar/foreign exchange account transactions still require Central Bank authorization. Total convertibility of the Tunisian dinar is probably still some years away. The dinar is traded on an intra-bank market. Trading operates around a managed float established by the Central Bank (based upon a basket of the Euro, the U.S. Dollar and the Japanese Yen). The stock exchange remains under the supervision of the state-run financial market council, and lists about 50 companies. A new phase of the Mise a Niveau program aims to double this figure.

but

inflation

spiked

4.5%,

from

2% the

year

before.

Official

figures

claim

unemployment is around 14%, but it is generally believed to be much higher in some regions. Despite the present low rate of population growth, a demographic peak is now hitting higher education and the job market. Tunisia has invested heavily in education and the number of students enrolled at university has soared from 40,000 in 1985 to over 370,000 in 2008. Providing jobs for these highly educated people represents a major challenge for the Government of Tunisia.

2) Evaluation on the Economic Policy The Economic policy of the Tunisia has stressed on the financial sector, unable to date to adequately conduct credit to private firms. Another way to synthetically capture structural reform improvements is observing the trend in apparent labor productivity that progress in microeconomic and institutional reforms yields significant productivity growth for reformist countries. The main uncertainty of the Tunisian economies at the present moment is not only economic in origin, but also its socio-political policy of the governments to carry out reforms speedily and to create a stable framework for investment in the presence of internal political instability. In the short term run governments may slowdown the microeconomic

policy

and

institutional

reforms

and

mitigate

macroeconomic

stabilization efforts to avoid exacerbating social discontent and to maintain their legitimacy in the economic sphere. Delaying these reforms may increase the cost of implementing them in the future, thus having a spiral effect, such as the one that led to the economic crises in the 1980s. This is more so under the foreseeable impact of the

international

crisis,

which

will

both

divert

policy-makers

efforts

towards

maintaining macro stability and increase the political cost of implementing structural reforms in the face of a difficult international economic environment. In short, microeconomic reforms and institutional consolidation have not occurred at the rate of macroeconomic stabilization, and the prospects point to a continuation of this

double-track

reform path.

This unequal

result

economic

policy

can be

explained by technical and political economy reasons. Technically, macroeconomic reforms are always more simple to implement. Their institutional requirements are, in general, smaller since the number of decisions and players affected is relatively low, unlike microeconomic reforms, which involve a higher number of transactions and agents. From a political economy perspective, although macroeconomic stabilization also involves the appearance of winners and losers, structural reforms enable a more precise and visible income redistribution, so they raise more political difficulties. To be sure, in recent years there has been a modest and gradual change in Tunisia

in favor of accelerating reforms and the modernization of economic institutions. An example of that is the transition in economic policies towards more emphasis on microeconomic issues related to an increase in productivity and modernization of the productive apparatus and institutional environment.

3) Recognized competitiveness The competitiveness of Market of Tunisia has been highly rated (Investment Grade granted since 1994) as to Standard & Poor's: BBB, MoodyÂ 's: Baa2, IBCA-FITCH: BBB, and R & I (Japan): BBB+. We have a success stories on foreign direct investment.3)

(1) Legal & Regulatory Framework The highlights of framework to coverall sectors of activity, except for mines, energy, foreign trade and financial sector, which are governed by specific laws. (The investment Incentives Law dated December 27th, 1993). First, activities open to foreign participation but subject to authorization related to the conditions of operations regardless of the status and nationality of the investors. Examples of such activities are banks and investment companies. Second, the activities subject to authorization when the equity participation exceeds 50%. Examples of such activities are insurance companies, stockbrokers, transit, transport and shipping. Tunisia has a Foreign Direct Investment Regime to foreigners may, without a prior authorization, own up to 100% of the Project capital, with the following exceptions: Certain sectors of service activities which do not engage exclusively in export; these require approval from the Higher Investment Commission when foreign shareholding exceeds 50% of capital. Also Appropriation by non-nationals of farm land; such land may, however, be let out on long-term lease. The ceiling on foreign ownership of equity in companies engaged in farming and aquaculture is 66%.

(2) Portfolio Investment The

purchase

securities

with

non-nationals

voting

rights

(in

and

foreign

currency)

companies

Tunisian set

transferable Tunisia

unrestricted when total foreign shareholding is less than 50%. Beyond that proportion, approval must be obtained from the Higher Investment Commission. The purchase by non-nationals (in foreign currency) of Tunisian transferable non-voting securities

3) ALCATEL, BENETTON, BRITISH GAS, GENERAL ELECTRIC, GENERAL MOTORS, HAIER, HYDRO

QUEBEC,

CORPORATION, MIROGLIO,

ISUZU,

LEE

JAPAN

COOPER,

NECKERMAN,

TOBACCO

LUCENT

PFIZER,

PHILIPS,

(JT),

LABINAL,

TECHNOLOGIES, PIRELLI,

LATECOERE,

MARUBENI,

RHONE

POULENC,

SIEMENS, SONY, TELEPERFORMANCE, THOMSON, UNILEVER, VALEO.

LEAR

MICROSOFT, SARA

LEE,

(excluding loan certificates) is unrestricted.

(3) Labor wages & social security

Workers may be employed under contracts for limited or unlimited periods. Fully exporting companies can recruit freely up to 4 foreign national management or supervisory staff. Additional foreign managerial staff requires an authorization.

(4) Advantages granted to the investor

Investors benefit from the governmentâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s taking over the following payments during a five years period. And 100% of the employer's contribution to the social security system for salaries and wages paid to Tunisian employees in the case of investments made in regional development areas. 50% of the employer's contribution to the social security system for salaries and wages paid to newly-created work shifts added to the first shift. 100% of the employer's contribution to the social security system for salaries and wages paid to employees of Tunisian nationality holding a higher degree

(5) Vocational Training Vocational

training

nowadays

designed

fit

the

needs

the

company.

Supporting measures were designed by the State in order to favor the initial formation within the company through the possibility of bearing by the government of 50% of the costs of training. And encourage the continuous training through: rebate on the vocational training tax, financial support for Continuous Training, bearing by the State of 50% of the costs of training intended to introduce new technologies.

â&#x2026;Ł. Investment Opportunities Investment Opportunities can be found at Industrial and Service Sectors, Upgrading Program, Privatization, Concession, Textiles and Clothing over2000 companies. Their employment is more 200,000 persons and over 1700 are fully exporting companies with 5th clothing supplier to EU. The competitive strengths are successful export performance and the availability of experienced labor with the ability to learn quickly. The substantial outlays by the government to help firms in the sectors are actual investment opportunities in Yarn/thread for the local market. Also the automotive components have 200 companies with employment of 30,000 persons. Their production growth recorded 12% (1998-2008) and exports doubled between 1998 & 2008. The competitive strengths of automotive components are as follow. A proven track record in automobile component supply, Strong export growth and close linkages to the electrical and electronic components sector. The availability is an experienced and highly adaptable workforce at relatively low costs. The

presence of major car components manufacturers: Lear Corporation, Draxelmaier, Leonishe, ValĂŠo and etc. Fabric for offshore clothing factories, Hosiery, Up-market ready to wear clothing, Professional clothes, Protective and safety clothing. Investment Opportunities can be Automobile parts, Electronic parts, Plastic parts, Rubber parts, Seat assembly and seat cover production, Mufflers, Shock absorbers, Filters,

Motor

wheels.

Computer

services

sector

has

also

competitivestrengths.

Tunisia's engineers display a very high level of skill and technical ability. Increasing numbers

degree-holders

trained

computer

scientists

and

data-processing

managers ensure the availability of skilled labor. Geographic and cultural proximity to the countries is on the north shore of the Mediterranean and proficiency in foreign languages. Investment opportunities can be found such as, development of internet applications, call centers, business to business electronic commerce, computer engineering services, design and production of applications), and software development. Tunisia developed Technoparks included Communication Technologies (El Ghazala), Renewable Energy, Water and Environment and Plant Biotechnology (Borj CĂŠdria), Biotechnology and Pharmaceutical Industry (Sidi Thabet), Mechanical, Electronic and Computer

Science

(Monastir),

Food

(Sousse),

and

Industry

Products

Multimedia (Bizerte),

(Sfax), and

Textiles

and

Clothing

Cinematographic

Industry

(Gammarth). Moreover, 5 Cyberparcs are built in various regions of the country and their main activities: Call centers, Data-processing, Software development, Web site development, and Services based on communication technologies Food Processing also has competitive strengths. Some flagship products are olive oil, dates, Maltese oranges, wine and seafood. The population of the country grow and strong economic performance which ensure rapid development of the local market. Moreover

production

control

systems

that

handles

health

inspections

export

products, and exporters' desire to comply with international standards. We have some opportunities

follows.

Olive

oil

refining

and

packaging,

Production

new

date-based products, Modernization of Dates packaging plants, Fish dishes production, Upgrading program, Total Number of companies involved: 3,000, and Investments: 3.0 Billion

TND.

Main

opportunities

are

partnerships

and

alliances,

subcontracting,

industrial and logistic platform for the region, and modernization within companies. Privatization Program has been activating as 217 companies have been privatized by the end of 2008. Foreign investment contributed to nearly 78% of the sales income. Tunisia ongoing building infrastructures as Construction of a new airport "Enfidha", Port facilities in Rades, Purification station West of Tunis, Conversion of the port of Tunis into a marina, Station to desalinize sea water in Jerba, and New

350 to 500 MW electrical plants in the South.

â&#x2026;¤. Conclusion Tunisia's business economy is diverse. Its commercial products come primarily from

light

industry

(food

processing,

textiles,

footwear,

agribusiness,

mining

commodities, construction materials) and from agriculture(olives, olive oil, grains (wheat and barley), tomatoes, citrus, sugar beets, dates, almonds, figs, vegetables, grapes, beef dairy), as well as livestock (sheep, goats) and fishing. Other production comes from petroleum and mining (phosphates, iron, oil, lead, zinc, salt). Tunisia is self-sufficient in oil, but not in natural gas. A very significant portion of the economy derives from the tourist industry. Tunisia's economy has emerged from rigid state control and is now mostly liberalized. World Bank and IMF support, coupled with prudent economic policies implemented by the Tunisian Government in the mid-eighties after a balance of payments crisis, has resulted in regular stable growth. Although the economy has since bounced back, thanks to healthy exports, renewed growth in tourism, and favorable climatic conditions which boosted agricultural production. Tunisia's timely complete economic reform and subsequent fiscal conservatism have earned it

investment

grade ratings from a number of international

institutions,

therefore, Standard and Poor has noted that ratings BBB, MoodyBaa2, IBCA-FITCH: BBB, and R&I (Japan): BBB+ on Tunisia are comparatively promising on the system and structure to invest.

References Escribano, G. (2006), "Europeanization without Europe? The Mediterranean and the Neighbourhood Policy," Working Paper of the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, Florence, 2006/19. Escribano, G. and Lorca, A. (2008a), "Economic Reform in the Maghreb: from Stabilization to Modernization", in Zoubir, Y. and H. Amirah, eds.: North Africa: Politics, Region, and the Limits of Transformation, Routledge, 135-158. Escribano, G. and A. Lorca (2008b): "The Mediterranean Union: A Union in Search of a Project". Real Instituto Elcano Working Paper 13/2008. IMF

(2008),

Regional

Economic

Outlook,

Middle

East

and

Central

Asia,

May.

Washington DC. Kim, Joong-Kwan (2009), "Economic Building between EU and Maghreb within

Tunisian

Policy

and

Role,"

Journal

Mediterranean

Area,

Institute

Mediterranean Area, BUFS. M. Emerson and N. Tocci (2007), ‘A Little Clarification, Please, on the Union of the Mediterranean’, CEPS Commentary, 8/VI/2007. Shaoyan. and J. Waterbury (2006), A Political Economy of the Middle East, 2nd edition, Boulder, Westview Press. Sonnsang Tongar (2007), Profil Pays Tunisié, Institut de la Méditerranée, Marseille. Tim Niblock (2001), Pariah States and Sanctions in the Middle East: Libya, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, Co. Tovias, A. and M. Ugur (2004), "Can the EU Anchor Policy Reform in Third Countries? An Analysis of the Euro-Med Partnership", European Union Politics, Vol. 5, No. 4, pp. 395-418. World Bank (2008), 2008 Economic Development and Prospects, MENA Region. Washington DC. CIA World Fact book (September 2009) EIU

(several

years),

Tunisia

Country

profile

and

Country

Intelligence Unit, London. U.S. Dept. of State Country Background Notes (February 2009)

Report,

Economist

Discussion Evaluation on the Investment Opportunities within Business Climate of Tunisia

Discussant : Kim, Hyo Jung (Myongji University)

It was a good chance to examine current economical circumstances in Tunisia clearly. And it was a meaningful presentation as it provided us with an opportunity to predict its future economy. We could see that the Tunisian economy's reliance on agriculture and the sightseeing industry is now moving forward through expanded exchange with EU partners and joining the Free Trade Agreement.

I'd like to ask you a few questions. First, Tunisia has been prolonged by president Ben Ali since 1987. And as you mentioned it in your paper, the individual right to speak has been restricted, and political reformation has been called for from outside the country. It has been a hot potato for a long time, the relationship between democracy and economic growth, or which

the

priority

between

establishing

democracy

and

economic

growth.

Considering almost every advanced country is a democracy, it seems that without establishing democracy first, it is impossible to achieve economic development. But if we look at many countries that achieved rapid economical growth in the late 20th century,

they

were

under

authoritarian

regime

rather

than

democratic

government. So in this political context, do you believe that the Tunisian dictatorship will have a positive influence on its future economic growth? Second, in your paper, we could realize that investment increase of EU is affecting Tunisia's employment and economic structure greatly. Is it just limited to Tunisia among Magreb areas? How do you see the AMU's plan for integrating them into a single market? Third, traditionally Tunisia has been supplying agricultural products to Europe and has an economic structure relying on primary industry. You are saying Tunisia is the 5th clothing exporter(supplier) to EU and that the export of electronic components is quite competitive. Considering all these aspects, can we say that its traditional

industrial structure could change in the future? Lastly, I believe that major companies such as airlines, water resources, power and finance should come under private management to strengthen Tunisia's competitive economic power. How do you predict such an outcome?

Turkic Muslim Communities in Korea

Kim, Dae Sugn/Oh, Chong Jin (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies)

I. Introduction th

Islam is the fastest growing religion in the world in 20

and 21

century. Among

every four humans in the world, one of them is Muslim. Muslims have increased by over 235 percent in the last fifty years up to nearly 1.6 billion. By comparison, Christians have increased by only 47 percent, Hinduism, 117 percent, and Buddhism by 63 percent.1) Islam is regarded as the second largest religious group in France, Great Britain and USA. Muslim population in Asia is around one billion and is about 30% of Asian total population. It is expected that Muslim population in Asia will rapidly increase than any other religion. Korea was traditionally Confucianistic and Buddhistic society until 1950, when the Korean War broke. Especially after the 1970s, when Korea was developing rapidly in the economic field, many Korean construction workers and businessmen had a chance to contact Muslims in the Middle East. In other words, Korea had a so-called, â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;Middle East Boomâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; during the 1970s, which eventually led to frequent contacts with the Muslims in the Middle East. Moreover after the mid-1980s when the Korean economic development was at the high peak, many Muslim immigrant workers came to Korea due to the labor shortage in Korea. Korea became the attractive place for the immigrant workers who seek for a better life since 2000. Also globalization and a growing internationalization of the Korean society made many foreign brides and students to head Korea for their dream. Considering

the

mentioned

above,

this

article

aims

explore

the

Muslim

communities in Korea, particularly focusing on the Turkic Muslims. Since the both researcher were from the Turkic Studies background, it was easier for us to investigate the Turkic Muslim groups in Korea. By utilizing the personal network with the

Turkic people,

this

research attempt

to illustrate

the

Turkic

Muslim

communities in Korea. Based on fieldwork among Turkish, Azeri, Uzbek, Kazak, and Kyrgyz migrants, the

1) http://www.nationmaster.com/graph/rel_isl_pop-religion-islam-population; http://www.islamicweb.com/begin/results.htm

study tried to examine the peculiarity and present state of Central Asian communities in Korea. It will not only the overview the Turkic communities in Korea but also will try to show the life of Turkic people in Korea. Moreover, this study will analyze the general attitude of Korean towards the Turkic Muslim people in Korea. To be sure, there is some different attitude of Koreans towards the Turkic Muslim people compared with the other Muslim people, say Arabs or South Asian Muslims. In addition, Turkic Muslim composes itself as the 3rd largest Muslim groups in Korea. Likewise in International marriage, Central Asian Turkic Muslim women were one of the major group that marry with the Korean men. International marriage has grown rapidly in Korea since the late 1990s, and this phenomenon is especially common in rural farming communities. Most brides come from China, followed by Vietnam and other southeast Asian countries. However, as mentioned earlier, there are quite a good number of Central Asian brides in Korean society. There is growing number of Central Asian brides settling in Korea, which would eventually create Muslim families

growing

Korean

multicultural

societies.

This

fact

and

data

influenced the researcher to investigate the Turkic Muslim communities in Korea. In terms of size and the importance, the Turkic Muslim community deserves to be worth noticing.

II. Muslim Communities in the Korean Korea's long history of being a homogeneous nation is facing a rapid change as Korea is fast becoming a multi-ethnic society with a growing number of foreign migrant workers, international students, and inter-racial marriages. Nowadays, it is easy to see foreign communities scattered around the Seoul metropolitan area and outside the capital. There is even a prime time talk show solely dedicated to what foreign residents in Korea think about the country. With the growing number of foreign brides, migrant workers and foreign students, the number of foreign residents exceeded the 1 million mark as of August 2007. Considering that the number stood at a mere 40,000 in 1990, it is truly a dramatic change. Although multi-cultural Korean society is the important topic of growing debate in the Korean society, there is a big lackness that deals on the Muslim community or immigrant in Korea. According to immigration office data, among 1 million foreign immigrants in Korea, there are an estimated 104,427 Muslims living in Korea, occupying about 10% of foreign residents. Considering the high birth rates among Muslim immigrants

and stagnated birth rates

of Koreans,

worthwhile

investigate Muslim communities in Korea. Perhaps, it is the right time to research on

Muslim immigrants in Korean society. Islam is the fastest growing religion in the world. Today there are increasing numbers of Muslim immigrant communities around the world. In the same vein, Muslim community in Korea is also growing fast, reaching up to over 100,000 in 2008. According to the analysis of the immigration office data, there are about 104,427 Muslim immigrants in Korea, which includes illegal immigrants. Also Korea Muslim Federation estimates that there are about 110 thousand foreign Muslims in Korea. Exact

figure

Muslim

immigrants

are

impossible

estimate

due

illegal

immigrants. Illegal ratio among Muslim immigrants is 36%, which is relatively high considering the average illegal ratio (20%) of foreign immigrants. As seen in Table below South Asian Muslims, generally Pakistani and Bangladeshi, dominates the biggest

Muslim group in Korea.

Indonesian and Malaysian who

dominates South East Asian Muslims follow behind the South Asian Muslims. The third biggest Muslim communities are formed by Uzbek, Kazak, Kyrgyz and Turkey from Turkic Muslims. Thus, these three major Muslim groups, South Asian, South East Asian, and Turkic Muslims, dominates more than 90 percent of Muslims in Korea. Arab Muslims are only around 3-4 thousand in Korea. This is because of geographical and social distance between Korea and these countries. In other words, geographical advantages and social proximity of Central Asia, South Asia, South East Asia between Korea made Muslims from these regions to be the biggest Muslim groups in Korea. Many Arab migrant workers argue that travel expense to Korea is more expensive than to Europe, which makes Korea less favorite destination for working.

Current State of Muslim Communities in Korea (2007) Total Muslim

Legal

Illegal

Immigrants

Total Muslim immigrants

104,427

74,062

30,365

36%

Arab Muslims

2,828

2,154

674

23%

20,978

15,243

5,735

27%

South Asian Muslims

42,623

25,853

16,770

39%

South East Asian Muslims

34,835

28,496

6,339

18%

Muslims in Korea

Illegal Ratio

Turkic Muslims (Turkey+Turkic Central Asian States)

Source: Reorganization of 2007 Immigration office Statistics data. 2007 Chul-ip-guk Gal-ri

Tong-gae-yeon-bo.

II.1. Muslim Immigrants as Worker Among these Muslim immigrants seven out of ten immigrants are migrant workers. In other words, we can say that the Korea's Muslim society grew with the arrivals of migrant workers since mid 1980s. Especially, foreign Muslims came to Korea as laborers, businessman, and students etc. and increased after 1988 when Olympic Games were held(Kim 2008: 171). These migrant workers occupied the so-called 3-D (dirty, difficult and dangerous) job sector in Korea. In other words, migrant workers become as the major labor force in a small and mid-sized businesses in Korea. In all Muslim communities, migrant workers occupy around 60 percent of its communities. In case of Turkic Muslims, 80 percent of their residents are migrant workers. Korea actually used export of labor in the 1970s and 1980s as one way of developing the resources needed for its own economic take-off. But the success of the export-led growth strategy quickly used up available domestic labor reserves. In addition economic growth, as in other industrial countries, was accompanied by declining fertility. It was inevitable that import of labor would be needed to sustain economic growth. Korea introduced the ‘Industrial Trainee System’(ITS) in 1994 as a disguised framework for the import of low-skilled labor. Among different Muslim groups Muslims workers from Central Asia (mostly from Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan), South East Asia (mostly from Indonesia), South Asia (mostly from Pakistan and Bangladesh) only had a chance to work in Korea through this Industrial Trainee System. Due to this program Muslim migrant workers from Central Asia, South East Asia and South Asia became a major labor force from Muslim countries. This ITS program gave them easier access to Korea, playing a critical role bridging between their countries and Korea. However, 'trainees' did not enjoy the legal rights of workers and were paid below the minimum wage. In a situation of labor scarcity, trainees left their posts and found irregular work, with better pay and conditions. Actually this is reason why, there are many illegal Muslim workers in Korea. To a certain extent, ITS program induced legal workers to illegal workers. By December 2007 there were officially estimated to be 289,239 undocumented migrants (2007 Immigration office Statistics data: 2006 Chul-ip-guk Gal-ri Tong-gae-yeon-bo). In response, the Korean Government introduced the Employment Permit System (EPS) and phased out the trainee system. However, it seems that results are almost similar between them. The EPS is designed to prevent long-term settlement by requiring workers to rotate and by prohibiting family entry. Its basic idea was to ensure ‘'rotation’' by recruiting workers for a limited period, restricting their rights and minimizing family reunion. Migrants were expected to accept relatively poor wages and conditions, make little demand on social infrastructure and not to get involved in

labor struggles. In conditions of strong labor demand, it was hard to sustain such principles. Employers wanted to keep on good workers, and family reunion soon started through the practice of recruiting wives or husbands of existing migrants as workers. They joined the workforce, but once families were re-united the birth of children and long-term settlement were inevitable. At any rate, ITS and EPS program played as a gateway role for Muslim from South Asia, South East Asia and Turkic Muslim to work in Korea.

Legal Muslim Immigrants According to Occupation (2007) Total Legal Residence Total

Student

Sex M:1,772

Arab Muslims

2,154

F:382 M:82% / F:18%

Muslims

15,243

F:20%

Muslims

25,853

Ratio: 3.6%

F:3%

28,463

Muslims

1,116

77 M:58/F:19

11,921

M:129

Business

270

339

Ratio: 78% Ratio: 10.5% Ratio: 2.2% 14,550

967 M:936/F:31

Ratio: 1.6% Ratio: 56.3% Ratio: 3.7%

M:23,400

South East Asian

422

F:865 M:97% /

Immigrant

F:1,478

M:24,988 South Asian

Worker

1,607 551

F: 3,036 M:80% /

Marriage

Ratio: 4.3% Ratio: 51.8% Ratio: 3.6% Ratio: 12.5%

M: 12,197 Turkic

Migrant

F:5,063 M:82% / F:18%

575

23,371

Ratio: 2%

Ratio: 82%

422 M:44/F:378 Ratio: 1.5%

691 Ratio: 2.7% 190 Ratio: 0.7%

Source: Reorganization of 2007 Immigration office Statistics data. 2007 Chul-ip-guk Gal-ri

Tong-gae-yeon-bo.

There are about 15,243 legal Turkic Muslims living in Korea. Interesting fact is that international marriage between the Korean and the Muslim people are found at the Turkic Muslim group. This fact can be interpreted as that the Turkic Muslim people is the biggest Muslim group that joins the multicultural society in Korea. More detail analysis will be at next section.

II.2. Muslim Foreign Brides and Students Another segment of immigrants is taken up by foreign brides and students in Korea. It is estimated that 38,000 Koreans married foreigners in 2007, accounting for about 11 percent of all marriages that year. Korea had 260,000 immigrants through

interracial

marriages,

2007(Kuki

News,

05.sept.2007).

The

percentage

international marriages was particularly high in industrial suburbs, where large concentrations of foreign-born migrant workers reside, and rural communities, where demographic forces are forcing rural men to "import" brides from abroad. The numbers are, in a word, shocking. In 2005, 22 provincial cities and counties recorded international marriage rates of over 30 percent. One rural county, Boeun-gun in Chungcheongbuk-do, became the first in the country to record an international marriage rate of 40 percent; of 205 marriages registered there, 82 were international unions (Joongang Ilbo 08.Sept.2008). Nationwide, 35.7 percent of all marriages that were recorded in rural communities in 2007 were international marriages, over half of which were between Korean men and Vietnamese women(ibid.). Such trend is also affecting Muslim communities as well. Although marriage immigrants occupies less then 10 percent of total Muslim population it is steadily growing. Particularly, Muslims from Turkic Central Asia show prominent increase among other

Muslims.

Moreover,

while

marriages between Korean women and

Muslim men dominates the most cases in other Muslim groups, in Central Asian cases, many Korean men married to Central Asian women. In case of Turkic Central Asia, interracial marriage was particularly prominent among mid aged (generally in his 40s) Korean men in rural or industrial area, who had hard time finding spouses. There was even matchmaking companies or marriage brokers who were finding Central Asian women for Korean men. This phenomenon is quite rare in other Muslim groups. Due to the Soviet experiences, many Central Asians became nominal Muslim, which made them relatively free from religious bindings. For instance, according to the survey and interviews during the research, over 90 percent of Central Asians (Uzbek, Kazak, Kyrgyz), both male and female, would be open to the idea of marrying a non Muslim foreigner. Their openness and flexibility toward Islam played a crucial role in this process. Likewise, foreign Muslim students were also dramatically increasing in Korea these days. According to the Korean Herald report, the Education Ministry unveiled a set of plans to double its number of foreign students in Korea to 100,000 by 2012(Korea Herald, 08.Aug. 2008). The government revised the aim of its so-called "Study Korea" project, initially devised in 2004, as the number of foreign students in Korea passed 50,000 last year, three years ahead of its original target. Nearly 55,000 foreign students were studying in Korea in April of 2008(ibid.) The ministry said it will focus on attracting students from countries like Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, which have great interest in Korea(ibid.). What is important here is that these countries are all Muslim states. Recently many foreign students were

dominated

Chinese,

Japanese,

Vietnamese,

etc.

However,

with

the

Korean

government's warm approach to the resource rich Muslim countries, particularly from the Turkic Muslim countries in Central Asia and Caucasus, students from Islamic countries is likely to increase

far faster

than before.

Moreover,

many Muslim

countries have a positive and good image of Korea, as a high-tech country. Thus, many Muslim students in Korea contend that Korea is an attractive destination for their studies. Besides, Korea doesn't have negative image as an imperialistic like many western countries. These Muslim foreign students are expected to find better chances of locating job opportunities in Korea, as rules will be eased for student visa holders. The Korean government started to see foreigners graduating from Korean universities as a potential driving force for the country, helping counter low fertility rates and rapid population ageing. The Education ministry currently allowed foreign students to sojourn in Korea for a certain period after earning a Korean graduate degree, so that they

may

for

employment.

The

Korean

government

also

encouraged

universities and industries to develop collaborated internship programs for foreign students. Now

most

regards,

Korea,

other

developed

states,

becoming

increasingly attractive destination for immigrants, for their better life. Another major factor is Korea's low birthrate. Korea's birthrate hit a record low of 1.08 in 2005, according to the OECD. Accordingly, Korea's population is expected to shrink from its current 48 million to 40 million by 2050. Bluntly speaking, there are not enough labor force to do the work of keeping Korea Inc. operating at maximum efficiency. To, conclude this section, we can say that the Turkic Muslims are favorable Muslim group that has easier access to come to Korea as student, bride, and immigrant worker. Especially, Turkic Central Asian Muslims had closer relations due to their closer geographical distance than Turkey.

III. Turkic Muslim Community in Korea III.1 Turkic Muslim community in the early years of the 20th century Koreans began to contact with Turkic Muslims who escaped pressure from the Soviet Bolshevik regime in 1920s. Around 200 Kazan Tatar Muslims settled in Seoul under the Japanese colonial administration which had started in 1910. Among many Turks of various races, Kazan Tatar Muslims succeeded in entering into Korea under Japanese occupation. Some Turkic soldiers of the Russian Army and Turkic war prisoners escaped to Korea as refugees for settlement. Turks in Korea seemed to be

scattered to every corner of the corner to find new business possibilities. Since the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, regular immigration of Turks from Manchuria and Japan continued right up to the late 1930s (Lee 1994: 70). Turkic Muslims undertook small scale business based on very limited capital as the first step. As time passed, they succeed in opening their own shops in various cities such as Seoul, Pusan, Pyongyang and Inchon. They could secure privileges and social position in Korea owing to their profitable business. As they could manage to continue normal life in Korea, they were able to preserve their own traditional rites and religious obligations such as: the celebration of religious festivals, wedding, funeral ceremonies and circumcision feast. However, these early days Turkic Muslims in Korea had to leave Korea due to the political turmoil which came with Korean War. They immigrate to Turkey, United States and other countries.

II.2. Turkic Muslim Community since the New Millennium As mentioned in the earlier chapter, Turkic Muslim peoples had an advantageous means to enter Korea, as Migrant worker, student, and marriage immigrant, compared with other Muslim groups. As a result, Turkic Muslim people could enter Korea more easily. Among Turkic Muslims, Uzbek dominates the biggest group due to their close socio-economical relationship with Korea. Since there are about 240,000 local Koreans are inhabiting in Uzbekistan, Korea shows more interest to Uzbekistan, in terms of social, economical, cultural relations and cooperation. Other Central Asian states also host a certain number of local Koreans. And these Turkic Central Asian states are rich natural resource country with booming economy for its economic take-off. Thus, creating a social and economical bridge between these countries with Korea was necessary measure for the Koreaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s sustain development. When various cooperation was established Turkic Central Asian Muslims could have easier access to enter Korea compared with other Muslims. In case of Turkey, she was traditionally ally of Korea since the Korean War. Politically Turkey was one of the closest countries in the Muslim world. However, because of its geographical distance, strong social or economical network was not established.

Geographical distance with relatively high travel expense made Korea

less favorite destination for Turkish. Also, for Turkish emotional and social distance they felt toward Korea was far, although there was strong political relationship with Korea. Turkish tends to have a closer social and emotional network toward Europe rather than Korea. It was just right after 2002 World Cup Game, one of the world best

sports

events,

when

Turkish

started

get

interested

for

their

working

destination. Truly, the booming economy of Korea right after the World Cup game

has made many foreign workers and students to head Korea for their future dream. Although the total number of student is still small, recently, Turkish students are increasing in good numbers compared with other segment of the immigrants. These students tend to stay longer after their graduation due to their occupation. And they often

marry

Korean

women

which

makes

them important

part

the

Korean

Multicultural society. Many male Turkish students are marrying to Korean women after their graduation and make their longer settlement in Korea.

Turkic Muslims in Korea, 2007 Total Residence Total Total Foreign Immigrant Turkic Muslims Uzbekistan Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan

1,066,273 20,978 15,380 2,705 2,171

Turkmenistan

Azerbaijan

Turkey

681

Sex

Student

Migrant

Marriage

Workerm

Immigrant

18,173

1,527

M:617,494 F:448,779 M: 16,341

604

F: 4,637 M: 12,478 F: 2,902 M: 1,942 F: 763 M: 1,344 F: 827 M: 4 F: 6 M: 23 F: 8 M: 550 F: 131

377 99 46 2 10 80

M:266 F:111 M:37 F:62 M:21 F:25 M:1 F:1 M:8 F:2 M:64 F:16

13,484 2,284 1,861 1 3 543

M:11892 F:1592 M:1839 F:445 M:1372 F:489 M:1 F:0 M:3 F:0 M:498 F:95

1,081 196 236 5 2 9

M:32 F:1049 M:9 F:187 M:4 F:232 M:0 F:5 M:2 F:0 M:5 F:4

Source: Reorganization of 2007 Immigration office Statistics data. 2007 Chul-ip-guk Gal-ri

Tong-gae-yeon-bo.

As seen from the below table, from the total number of the people who obtained the Korean citizenship, around 4% are from the Turkic Muslim people. According to 2008 Immigration Office Statistics, 350 Turkic Muslims were naturalized as Korean citizen. Although the Turkic Muslims were not the biggest group at the moment, the number of naturalization among Turkic Muslims are increasing every year. This phenomenon tells us that there are growing number of Turkic Muslimâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s marriage with Koreans and family unit settlement in Korea. There was even matchmaking companies or marriage brokers who were finding Central Asian women for Korean men. Thi

Number of Turkic Muslims naturalized as a Korean citizen, 2008 Country

Naturalization

Total number of Naturalization

8,536

Total number of Turkic Muslims

350 (4.1%)

Naturalized as Korean citizen Uzbekistan

224

Kazakhstan

Kyrgyzstan

Turkmenistan

Azerbaijan

Turkey

Source: Reorganization of 2008 Immigration office Statistics data.

Turkic Muslims’ Marriage Immigrant Since 2001 2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

25,182

34,710

44,416

57,069

75,011

93,786

110,362

275

558

907

1,090

1312

1,500

1,670

Uzbekistan

134

312

571

730

917

1,056

1,208

Kazakhstan

104

160

167

189

190

182

Kyrgyzstan

135

169

183

193

235

249

Turkmenistan

Azerbaijan

Turkey

Total Number of Marriage Immigrant Turkic Muslims’ Marriage Immigrant

* Turkic Muslims occupy 1.49% of total Marriage Immigrants of Korea Source: Reorganization of Immigration office Statistics data from 2001～2007.

III. Conclusion In Korea, the spreading of islam is relatively slow because Korean generally insist to adhere to their tradition. In spite of slow increasing of Korean Muslims, some Korean Muslims said that the future of Islam in Korea seems to be positive because of the full freedom of all kinds of religious activities guaranteed by the Korean constitution and friendly relations between Korea and Islamic Worlds nowadays. Additionally, the number of foreign muslims are now increasing day by day. Muslim community in Korea is also growing fast, reaching up to over 100,000 in 2008. Korea has for some time taken pride in its claims to be one of the world's few ethnically homogeneous nations. As time passes, however, the nation's claims to

ethnic homogeneity have grown increasingly tenuous. A powerful combination of increasing

globalization

and

stark

demographic

trends

has

led

growing

internationalization of Korean society. With more and more foreigners coming to Korea in search of the Korean Dream and more and more foreign woman marrying Korean men, there can be no denying that the face of Korea is changing - quite literally. Korea decided to be a full participant in the emerging global economy. It confirmed that decision when it decided to actively recruit foreign migrants to meet the economic and demographic needs of a fast-growing society. Koreans' xenophobia, which in the past was criticized by many, is slowly going away with the looming foreign community. According to a Gender Equality survey, eight out of 10 Koreans show favorable reaction toward their foreign neighbors. There are rising numbers of mixed marriages in Korea. The number is increasing due to rural women moving into cities, leaving young farmers and fishermen to find brides from other Asian nations. International marriages now make up 13 percent of all marriages in Korea. More than 30 percent of international marriages are unions between rural Korean men and foreign brides. According to the Korea Herald, there are about 35,000 mixed-race children

Korea

(The

Korea

Herald,

03.Aug.2006)

Furthermore,

recently,

the

government is reviewing plans to give citizenship or residency status to those who marry Koreans and to their children. The important one of the Korean Government policies toward foreigners will also handle national campaigns and multicultural programs to create general social acceptance toward all kinds of immigrants muslim-non muslim- and raise public awareness(Donga Ilbo. 08.Aug.2007). In this context, foreign muslims are starting to form a kind of foreign ghetto in some

places

Seoul

and

its

outskirts.

case

Muslim

communities,

Itaewon-dong, Muslims have set up the Muslim Cultural avenue in the vicinity of the Seoul Central mosque. The huge influx of Muslims to Iteawon changed the

image of

Itaewon from the Western-American culture to Islamic culture. Many bars and pubs were closed, instead Muslim restaurants and halal shops were filled in. In a nutshell, Muslim town is under establishment. Along with the multiculturalizing of Korean Society, Muslim communities in Korea are also growing fast then ever. Foreign Muslims especially are forming their new town in the center of Seoul, Itewon-Dong where there is Central Mosque among 9 Mosques nationwide in Korea.

Bibliography Immigration office Statistics data: 2006. Chul-ip-guk Gal-ri Tong-gae-yeon-bo

Kim, Dae Sung & others, 2008. "A Study on the Research Model for the Muslim Immigrant in Korean Society", Annals of Korean Association of the Islamic Studies, The Korean Association of Islamic Studies, Vol. 18-1. Lee, Hee Soo, 1994. "Islam in Korea", Annals of Korean Association of the Islamic Studies, The Korean Association of Islamic Studies, Vol. 4 Newspapers: Donga Ilbo. 08.Aug.2007 Joongang Ilbo 08.Sept.2008 Korea Herald, 08.Aug. 2008. Kuki News, 05.sept.2007 The Korea Herald, 03.Aug.2006

Study on the Korean Attitude and Perception toward nd

Koslim (1.5 and 2

generation Muslim immigrant of

Korea) : based on the survey research

Cho, Hee Sun *

(Myongji University) 1)

Since the globalization, many changes are occurring in our society. Multicultural phenonmenon in the society is becoming one of our major concern in the Korean society. Thus, this study is focusing on the multicultural phenomenon that we are facing since the globalization in Korea. No doubt that immigration is a growing force influencing the demographics of Korea. Since the mid-1990s, immigrant children and children from mixed marriage have become the fastest growing and the most extraordinarily diverse segment of Korea's child population. Until the recent past, Korea's major social attention has focused on adult immigrants to the neglect of their offspring, creating a profound gap between the strategic importance of the new second generation and the knowledge about its socioeconomic circumstances. In other words, there is a significant lack of studies on children of migrant, particularly from the Muslim background living in Korea. International marriage has grown rapidly in Korea since the late 1990s, and this phenomenon is especially common in rural farming communities. Most brides come from China, followed by Vietnam and other southeast Asian countries. However, there are certain number of Muslim bride coming to Korea. There are about 100 thousand muslim peoples living in Korean society. Among them 2.92% are Muslim immigrants' intermarriage with the Koreans. As a result, there are growing number of muslim brides and bridegroom settling in Korea, which would eventually create muslim families in growing korean multicultural societies. Since the new milleniun, the term Kosian is widely spoken in Korean society. The term, Kosian was first coined in 1997 by intercultural families to refer to themselves. The term is most commonly applied to children from the mix-marriage between the Korean and Asian migrant. It indicated the multicultural family which mixes Korean and other Asian cultures. As mentioned, its use spread in the early 2000s as international marriages became more common in rural areas. Currently such children

1) Co-authors: KIM, Dae-Sung(HUFS), AHN, Jung-Kuk(Myongji Univ.), OH, Jong-Jin(HUFS), Kim, Hyo-Jung(Myongji Univ.), Yoo, Wang-Jong(Sungkyol Univ.)

make up about 0.5% of children born in Korea, however, some projections suggest that this will grow to 30% by 2020. This trend is partly due to the low birthrate in South Korea, and partly to rising rates of international marriage. Today, there are approximately 30,000 Kosians in Korean society. Bearing this in mind, this study specify its research on the muslim fixed family by focusing on the offsprings of the muslim background. Our research team has created the new term on such research nd

subject by using Koslim. Koslim is a 1.5 and 2 ground family living in Korea. Thus, the

generation from the Muslim back

objective of this study is to examine the

awareness and the perception of Koslim by the Korean mainstream people. By doing so, it can analyze the general attitude of Koreans towards the Koslim people. No, doubt, in Korean society, the term multicultural or mixed-race has a definitely discriminating connotation. As a result, the children of intermarriages, which includes Koslim, are now categorized as belonging to cultural groups different from the homogeneous mainstream of Korean society. This research selected the university students as a sample of mainstream korean. By investigating the Korean university students this study tried to evaluate the types of experiences regarding Koslims, and the openness and stereotypes of Koreans over Koslims. Through survey research behavioral, cognitive and emotional openness of Koreans towards Koslims will be analyzed. Our research team believes that such effort will put Koslim studies into scholarly studies that can facilitate a better understanding of the new second generation of Koslim. This

research

utilized

qualitative

research

method

using

survey

research.

Through purposive sampling(coyne 1997), in which the sample is selected according to the requirement of the study, the study included a total of 1129 participants' survey from the 9 different campuses around the metropolitan area. Students from the metropolitan area are collected from Hankuk University of Foreign Studies(Seoul & Yongin Campus), Myongi University(Seoul & Yongin Campus), Sookmyung Women's University, Sungshin Women's University, and Sungkyul University. Data from the provincial city were collected from Pusan Univeristy of Foreign Studies from Busan, and Chosun University from Gwangju city. Among the 1129 student participants, 269 students were from the Islamic studies related department. (e.g Dept. of Arabic, Dept. of Turkish-Azerbaijani, Dept. Central Asian studies, etc.) In other words, about 23.8% of participants from the survey were familiar with the Islamic culture and tradition. Survey participant completed 5-point scale self-administered questionnaires which were designed to examine the Korean attitude and perception toward Koslim.

Before,

the main survey questions, a brief questionnaire were employed to evaluate the participant background knowledge about Islam. The data were analyzed using the

statistical program of SPSS/WIN(Ver.14.0) T-test, ANOVA, and correlation analysis were applied for data processing. As a result of this research, it can be concluded that students who has direct or indirect relationship with Koslims have a higher degree of open attitude and positive perception toward Koslims than the group who doesn't have any relationship. From the point of positive awareness domain, students with direct and indirect experience perceived Koslims positively as the degree of relationship got more intimate. Also, as a results of survey, there was a difference in attitude, openness and perception towards Koslims among different religions. Catholic christians were shown to be more open in all aspects of openness, including to have more negative awareness toward Koslims in all manners. Survey

showed

that

many

Koreans

are

beginning

the

social

transformation of Korean society, and they were aware of the need for social transformation to a successful multicultrual society. More importantly, it showed that positive awareness of Koslims can refrain people having a stereotype attitude.

Also,

the fact that higher intimacy level of contact with Koslims showed open and positive attitude, can be analyzed as whether or not a person who has experienced Koslims is an important variable. In reality the

number

foreigners in Korea has exceeded one

million and

comprises two percent of the population. Intermarriage also makes up over 10 percent of all marriages, reminding us that we have already trodden toward the new path. However

need

realistic

before

hastily

applying

foreign-based

multiculturalism. As universal as its value sounds, there's still a need to adjust it to the Korean context. This is because Korea is not a nation formed of immigrants but of natives that have long shared common values and bloodlines. Korea needs a step-by-step approach to establish its own multicultural society; one that embraces Korean values. Right now, at the first stage of opening up the society, we need to first

guarantee

basic needs,

especially to children,

who will

future Korean.

Through non-discrimination acts and other active policies for minority groups, we need

widen

opportunities

for

them

(including

Koslim)

take

part

the

mainstream. Korean society and the government should encourage mainstream groups to recognize minority groups as their equal. Further, the country needs to re-establish its identity as a people united not by blood or race but by citizenship and broaden education about the meaning of multiculturalism. In this sense this study intends to play a groundwork to promote successful coexistence between Korean and Koslim. It is anticipated that this research can lay the basis for Koreans to have more open and tolerant attitude towards our new members of society that is increasing everyday.

Discussion Study on the Korean Attitude and Perception toward nd

Koslim (1.5 and 2

generation Muslim immigrant of

Korea) : based on the survey research

Discussant : Park, Jae Won (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies)

The researchers suggested that their article would focus on the Korean university students' perception toward Koslim, or 1.5 and 2nd. generation Muslim immigrants to Korea. The subject was new and fresh, and reflected recent changes that occurred in Korean society. I think that the subject was published for the first time in Korea, at least as a serious study. The first exploration used to be highly appraised, but it may be exposed to a high risk just because it is a pioneer in certain field. The paper was based on the survey of as many as 1,129 samples which include students from 9 universities in Korea, with 269 students(23.8% of all the samples) among them who major in Arabic language or Middle Eastern and Islamic studies. Although the limited number of university students, of course, can not represent all the members of Korean society, more than a thousand samples would bring a meaningful result if the data be processed in a strict statistical method. The researcher's definition on the concepts of 'Kosian' and 'Koslim' is clear to a certain extent. However, the researchers seemed to fall in a mistake in the distinction between Muslim and Koslm. Here the first question of mine arises; will the siblings of a Muslim immigrant automatically be active and fundamental Muslims, or can they be cultural

Koreans who adapted themselves to Korean tradition,

customs and

manners? It will be reasonable to consider most of them to be in-between, as long as one of their parents be a Korean. Moreover, the Koslims will acquire Korean way of life by mixing themselves with colleagues in schools, groups and society. My second question is also about the Koslims; How the sample students got the information about the Koslims? It is not the question of the nature of the channels, but of the Koslims' existence in Korean society. Most of them are still too young to talk about their social life. Ordinary Koreans did not have chances to have any kind of contacts with them, directly or indirectly. How could the sample students build the

image of Koslims without contacts? When I began reading the paper I looked forward to see a concrete, tangible and positive result, especially because the researchers relied on detailed statistics. They seem to have conducted research on the images of Muslim's in Korea, not the Koslim's. The researchers are not free from a bias when they say that the Muslims tend to maintain their own religion and culture, equally within their countries or in secular communities of the outer world. The third question is: are the Muslims unique in that aspect, and other religious and cultural groups are not so? The study includes a lot of undeniable merits such as - to name some of them objectiveness and elaborateness. Above all, it made a remarkable contribution to Middle Eastern related academic circles by collecting and analyzing Korean youth's attitude toward Muslim immigrants to the country. Reading the paper was interesting, and to be a commentator on it was a pleasure and an honor.

Discussion Wolf-warriors, the Argonauts, and the foundation of Trebizond

Discussant : Choi, Hae Young (Chonnam National University)

This article is very interesting and inspiring. While reading I was very excited and it helped me a lot to widen my knowledge. Especially I perfectly agree to the point where

wolfs

were

symbolically

identified

warriors

and

reflecting

expedition

activities. However, I have doubt on the argument that an Indo-European feature could be seen in the theme of wolves. I think wolves could be understood not in the Indo-European or Asia- African context, but by the terms of life style : agriculture or nomadic.

To the ancient Greeks and Romans, wolves were usually symbolized as foreigners, invaders, or even uncivilized people. For example, when Danaos arrived at Argos and competed with the king of Argos for the throne, suddenly a wolf appeared. Then, the peoples of Argos, interpreting the omen of a wolf as

foreigner's victory, gave the

crown to Danaos. Considering the myth that Danaos came from Egypt, it cannot be interpreted in the Indo-European context. On the contrary, wolves' myth is strikingly common among nomadic people from Asia. Founders of nations such as Huns, Turks, and Mongols, they were unanimously related to wolves. The story usually goes in this way: A child was left alone after a massacre of fierce battle, then a wolf raise him to become a king of a new country, or even marry the child to bear a founder of a nation.

The region of Arcadia mentioned in this paper was indeed a cradle of wolf worship. Arcadia was famous for the worship of Zeus Likaios and Pan Likaios. They say that Zeus Likaios and the festival of Likaion were started by Likaion1), son of Pelasgos. As for Likaion, there are two different versions, good Likaion and wicked Likaion. We might guess that the story of wicked Likaion was made by opposite side who

1) Statius, Silvae, 1.3.78. cf. Aug. Civ. dei 18.17; Plin. 8. 81-82; Paus. 8.2.6.

eventually succeed to rule Arcadia. In addition to it, it is noteworthy that a guardian god of Arcadia was Pan2). In ancient documents, Pan was described as a god of animals, cattlemen and hunting3). According to Herodotos, the earliest people of Arcadia were nomadic and came from Asia. Ovid also mentioned that Arcadians were the oldest people in the world, and they did not have bulls, arts and even clothing. Considering the fact that bulls usually meant fecundity of agriculture in ancient thoughts, we might guess that Arcadians were basically nomadic-hunting people from Asia.

Lastly, we could consider that there was a myth that Evandros from Arcadia established Lupercalia in Rome, and that Romulus and Remus, the founder of Rome were protected by a she-wolf and grew up among cattlemen. According to Justin, Evandros

from Arcadia

built

temple

the

hillside

Palatin

dedicated

Likeaes(wolf) whom Greeks called Pan, and Romans Lupercus. Here we could see that wolf theme was deeply related with Arcadia, Pan and Lupercalia and even the founders of ancient Rome, and this could not be interpreted as an Indo- European story but related with nomadic life of the ancient people. In short, wolf-theme should be considered not in the Indo-European context, but in the nomadic one.

2) Pausanias, 8.38.10; 8.42.1; Greek Lyric 5. 3) Homeric Hymn 19, "theos nomios"; Virgil, Georg. 1.16; Callimachus, Hym. Artem. 86; Propertius,

Eleg. 3.13; Nonnus, Dionysiaca 14.67; 16.101; 16.185; 36.196; Suidas â&#x20AC;&#x153;Agrotasâ&#x20AC;?; Argonautica 3.46.

Valerius Flaccus,

Panel 4. Social Sciences (Ph.D candidate) (Cosmos Room) Chair : Woo, Duck Chan (Pusan University Of Foreign Studies)

1. Turkeyâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Europe Adventure in the 21stCentury Erhan Atay (Ph.D candidate, Kyunghee University) Discussant : Kim, Hyo Joung (Pusan University of Foreign Studies) 2. The Dowry in the East Mediterranean Area-Ancient Greece, Rome, Arab-Islam Society Kim, Su Jung (Ph.D candidate, Pusan University of Foreign Studies) Discussant : Youn, Yong Su (IMS) 3. The Theatres of Politicization of Sadallah Wannus(1941-1997) in the 1960s-70s Koo, Mi Ran (Ph.D candidate, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies) Discussant : Lee, Jong Hwa (Myongji University)

Turkey's Europe Advanture in the 21

Century

Erhan Atay (Ph.D candidate, Kyunghee University)

1. Introduction Turkish foreign policy entered into a new era with the election of AKP as the single-party government in November 2002. The architect of the new foreign policy The Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu argues that Turkey cannot wait forever for EU membership, and needs to develop a more active and multidimensional foreign

policy

utilizing

its

geopolitical

and

geostrategic

advantages.

AKP

government has treated accession to the European Union (EU) as part of this multidimensional

foreign

policy.

The

popular

support

AKP

enjoys

gave

the

government power to adopt reform packages and constitutional amendments in line with the Copenhagen Criteria which is required for EU membership. Furthermore, AKP administration’s political will-power has led them towards dealing with issues that have been long seen as taboos by previous administrations such as the Cyprus issue, Armenia-Turkey relations, the Kurdish issue and civil-military relations all of which the EU are interested in. As part of the multidimensional foreign policy, which argues for ‘zero-problem with the neighbors’, Turkey has improved its relations with its Eastern and Southern neighbors. Davutoğlu used a bow-arrow metaphor to explain how fair relations with its Asian neighbors complemented relations with the EU: the more Turkey stretches its bow in Asia, the further and more precisely will its arrow extend into Europe. The minister insisted that “if Turkey does not have a solid stance in Asia, it would have very limited chances with the EU.” The overall Turkish foreign policy and EU policies under AKP government are in contrast with the realist interpretation of the international system. The effectiveness of

single-party

governments

opposed

coalition

governments

making

constitution amendments and adopting reform packages, the role of individuals in policymaking (including foreign policy), the impact of the extent of the political will-power of the governments in making changes on politically difficult issues and other domestic political factors challenge the realist assumption that these factors do not matter much in the international system.

2. Analytical Framework International relations theorists endeavor to explain the international system and how it functions. Realism is seen as the mainstream theory in the field. For realists, the international system is anarchic and it is a self-help world. Anarchy is defined as the absence of authority higher than the individual states. The states are the main actors

and

they

act

rationally

maximize

their

interests.

Realism

explains

international relations in terms of power. Politics involves a struggle for power between states in the pursuit of their national interests. Power is needed in order to ensure survival and sovereignty. A country’s GDP and military force are main indicators of its power. Relative power is more important than absolute power which implies that one state’s increasing

–

relative- power may create security concerns for

other states. Emphasis on relative power is supported by the most studied game (in game theory) Prisoner’s Dilemma that is based on a zero-sum game which can lead to security dilemma. States balance power of other states on their own or by forming alliances. For realists, states can come together through international organizations to cooperate on issues of common interest.

However, international organizations cannot

serve as a world government and do not constrain states’ behavior. States are still responsible for self-help, maintaining power and protecting their national interests. International organizations are only marginal players in world politics; they are subject to the actions of the states, and particularly the powerful states which have control over them. The integration, interdependency and what-so called ‘democratic peace’ of European states under the flag of EU has been a difficult case for realists to explain. Even though the EU has not converted into a federal state (a European government), it definitely has partially limited sovereignty of member and candidate states and, in turn,

has

constrained

their

behavior.

Realists

admit

that

there

are

pockets

cooperation within the anarchic system, yet within the EU cooperation is more intense than realist admission. Economic integration and the use of common currency in most member countries, more than anything else, go well beyond the realist assumptions of cooperation. The processes within the EU challenges realist claims, however these discussions are beyond the scope of this paper. This paper will focus on how domestic politics and individuals play significant roles in international political system. In addition, the author of this paper agrees with the constructivist arguments that state interests are not pre-given and the rationality of state decisions depends, in a great deal, on political elites that involve in making those decisions. Realists overvalue pre-given, rational, state interests and undervalue

unit-level factors such as role of domestic politics and individuals in foreign policy making. Turkey’s relations with the EU, with a particular focus on the AKP government era since 2002, will be examined in this respect as a challenge to the realist interpretation of international relations.

3. Justice and Development Party (AK Party or AKP) Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP), literally Justice and Development Party, was found in 2001 and entered its first general elections in 2002. AKP calls itself a conservative democrat party and its stand is often likened to that of Christian Democrats in Europe. Indeed, AKP is an observer member of European People’s Party. Most of its founding members, including the leader R. Tayyip Erdoğan and his two closest deputies Abdullah Gül and Bülent Arınç were former members of Fazilet Partisi (FP), Virtue Party, known for its strong Islamist views. Some FP members demanded internal democracy and reform within the party; Abdullah Gül even ran unsuccessfully for the party leadership. However, they encountered a resistance from the conservative segment of the party. The reformists then found AKP, or AK Parti as its official abbreviation, together with mostly other former members from MHP (Nationalist Movement Party) and ANAP (Motherland Party). Formation of the party with a collection of members from different right wing parties, in addition to some from the left wing, made AKP a strong party in Turkish central-right wing. In the first general elections it participated in 2002, AKP won 34.3% of popular vote and due to the 10% total vote threshold it was allocated 363 seats in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM) which has a total of 550 seats. In 2007 elections, AKP increased its share of the popular vote to an unprecedented 46.6% and was allocated 341 seats in TBMM. Both elections guaranteed AKP a single-party government which is unusual in Turkey where governments are usually formed by two or

three party coalitions.

AKP is the first

party to form a single-party

government after elections (2002 elections and 2007 elections) with participation of more than three parties, and also it is the first government party to increase its votes in the following elections. These facts about AKP are significant, because one-party government stabilized Turkish

politics,

economy

and

catalyzed

changes

(e.g.

constitution

amendments,

reforms, policy changes etc.). Prior to 2002 elections, there was a three-party coalition government of DSP (Democratic Left Party), MHP (Nationalist Movement Party) and ANAP (Motherland Party). These three parties were from very different parts of the political spectrum, and it had been very difficult to come to consensus on policies.

The instability under DSP-MHP-ANAP government cost these parties dear: three parties were punished by the voters as none of them were able to pass the 10% threshold; in other words these parties failed to enter the TBMM (Assembly) after 2002 elections. The case was not much different during other coalition governments. There are three central figures in AKP government (2002-present) that played significant roles in Turkey’s EU policy: The head of AKP and Turkish Prime Minister (2003-present) R. Tayyip Erdoğan; one of the founders of AKP, former Prime Minister (2002-2003), former Foreign Minister (2003-2007) and current Turkish President (2007-present) Abdullah Gül; and the current Turkish Foreign Minister (2009-present) Ahmet Davutoğlu. Davutoğlu had been Erdoğan’s chief foreign policy advisor since AKP was elected in 2002 and has been the key policymaker behind AKP’s foreign policy. He was appointed the Minister of Foreign Affairs in May 2009 to become Turkey’s first appointed (non-elected) foreign minister. Ahmet Davutoğlu’s book, Strategic Depth (2001), has been the guideline for AKP’s foreign policy agenda including the policies regarding European Union.

4. Turkey’s EU Adventure Prior to November 2002 The Republic of Turkey leaned towards Europe since it was found in 1923 following Ottoman Empire’s defeat against European powers in the First World War. Turkey has been a NATO member

since

1952,

an Organization for

Economic

Cooperation and Development (OECD) member since 1961 and joined the Council of Europe in 1949. Turkey chose to apply for associate membership of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1959 under Democratic Party government , the first elected government of the Republic of Turkey. Ankara Agreement was signed in 1963 between Turkey and EEC to take Turkey into customs union first and accept it as EEC full member later. This was the first step for Turkey’s about four decade long EU accession path. However, the problem over Cyprus in 1974 and military coup d’état in 1980 impeded Turkey’s EU process. The EU suspended relations with Turkey for six years after the coup. In 1987, Turkey applied for full EEC membership during ANAP (Motherland Party) government.

Turkey entered into customs union in

1996. Turkey was given official candidate status at the Helsinki Summit in December 1999, two years after being declined candidate status at Luxemburg Summit. In the period between 1999 and 2002, the coalition government took some important steps to meet the Copenhagen criteria for EU membership. In this context, in September 2001 Turkish parliament adopted over thirty constitution amendments. Some reforms were passed in the parliament to improve human rights in Turkey.

5. Overall Change in Foreign Policy and EU Relations during AKP Government Turkish foreign policy has witnessed more activism and change under AKP government since 2002. The key policymaker during this time has been Ahmet Davutoğlu, Prime Minister’s chief foreign policy advisor and current Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Minister intended that Turkey should not avoid its Ottoman past while following a “zero problem policy toward Turkey’s neighbors.” Davutoğlu argued that Turkey should re-interpret its post-Cold War role to transform into a globally influential country from being a regional power. In his book, Strategic Depth (2001), Davutoğlu proposed a more assertive, more multidimensional and more long-term focused Turkish foreign policy for Turkey to realize its deserved place in the changing international system. Davutoğlu (2001) argues that in order to formulate a long-run strategic perspective, the policymakers need to take into account “historical depth,” that links the past, present, and future, as well as a “geographical depth,” that requires penetration of the dynamics

the

relations

between

domestic,

regional,

and

global

factors.

The

geo-cultural, geo-political, and geo-economic factors that contribute to the “strategic depth” of a country can only be interpreted fairly at the intersection of these historical and geographic paradigms. In this respect, Turkey should not escape its Ottoman roots; Turkey no longer needs to avoid the East for the sake of aligning with the West. Davutoğlu argues that the more Turkey stretches its bow in Asia, the further and more precisely will its arrow extend into Europe. Thus, he (2001, 551-563) states that “if Turkey does not have a solid stance in Asia, it would have very limited chances with the EU”. The major argument there is that Turkey is a central country, strategically located between Europe and Asia and very close to Africa. Thus, Turkey has multiple

–

regional- identities that cannot, and need not, to

be reduced to one single identity, requiring it to extend its influence to Europe, the Middle East, the Balkans, the Black Sea, the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Caspian, and the Mediterranean at the same time (Davutoğlu, 2007).

This proactive foreign policy

approach necessitated developing friendly relations with the Middle East and Eurasia as well as the EU. In this context, Turkey has pursued very active diplomacy with especially the Arab countries, Iran, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Russia. Turkey more enthusiastically demonstrated its role as a geopolitical, geo-cultural and geo-economic bridge. In the past, being a “torn country” between two different civilization lines, as Samuel Huntington put it (1996), meant being stuck in the middle; having neither a Muslim identity nor a Western one. Under Davutoğlu’s guidance, Turkey no longer has to be stuck in the middle, with no clear identity; it

assumes the role of a peaceful mediator, with a dual (or multiple) identity. Davutoğlu repeatedly emphasized that one identity, or good relations with one side, should not come at the expense of another. In order to be part of the Western world (e.g., NATO, the EU) as a democratic nation, Turkey does not have to ignore its population's Muslim identity, nor does Turkey have to turn its back on the Muslim world. The fact that Turkey has become closer to both the Muslim world (and Caucasus) and the EU offers prospects for Turkey serving as a mediator between the EU and the Muslim world (Ayhan, 2009, March 31). Turkey’s active diplomacy outside Europe indeed provided it with more leverage in its relations with EU. Turkey has very significant soft power potential in the Muslim world and among the Muslim populations elsewhere (including within Europe). Indeed, Turkey has started utilizing its soft power more enthusiastically during the AKP government. Turkey's election to the temporary seat in the UN Security Council was believed to be an outcome of its active diplomacy (a source of soft power). EU can make use of Turkey's soft power in the Islamic world for mutually beneficial goals such as the war on terrorism, democratization and fighting anti-Western sentiments. The EU is accepted a soft power superpower in the world as many authors argue.

However, in

the Muslim world EU’s soft power must be complemented with Turkey's soft power; because the reception of the projection of Turkish soft power would be smoother since Turkey shares a common identity with the countries and people of the Islamic world (Ayhan, 2009, April 1). Turkish culture, Turkish democracy and Turkish foreign policy, particularly towards the Middle East, appeal more to the Islamic World than European ones. One can easily notice Prime Minister Erdoğan’s popularity throughout the region, particularly due to AKP government’s strong stance for the people of Palestine. This soft power potential is more realized, and more projected, under AKP governance particularly due to Davutoğlu factor. Turkey’s soft power potential provided the country with more leverage against the EU. In addition, the role of Turkey as a significant energy corridor is being developed further, and numerous concrete steps have been taken in this direction. Turkey is pushing towards turning into a major energy hub as a transit country. As the energy demand is rapidly increasing, the struggle over access to and control of energy resources has also been intensifying. Turkey is situated right next to the strategic energy ellipse, encompassing the Caspian region and the Persian Gulf, where about 70% of the global petroleum reserves and more than 40% of the world’s natural gas resources

are

located.

shaping

the

complex

dynamics

Eurasian

energy

geopolitics, three major issues are of critical significance for all key actors: 1) the amount of energy reserves available for extraction; 2) the ownership of the resource;

and 3) the distribution routes that determine direct and environmental costs (Öniş & Yılmaz, 2009, 10). In this respect, Turkey increased its geopolitical significance as an inevitable energy

–

transit country. The East

West Energy Corridor aims at transporting Caucasian and

Central Asian oil and gas to international markets via alternative routes to Russia

–

and Iran. The main component of this energy corridor is the Baku

–

Tbilisi

Ceyhan

(BTC) (Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey) pipeline project, which is strongly backed by the United States. It began operating in 2005. In addition, the energy corridor will also include

–

Shah

Deniz

natural

gas

–

pipeline

(Baku

–

Tbilisi

Erzurum)

(Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey), The Turkey-Greece-Italy (TGI) pipeline and Nabucco pipeline (Turkey-Bulgaria-Romania-Hungary-Austria) in the near future. All these projects are initiated during AKP era as part of the active and assertive foreign policy. In the first three years of AKP era (2002- 2005), the government made aggressive economic and democratization reforms to fulfill Copenhagen Criteria to guarantee Turkey’s full membership in the EU. In December 2002 at the Copenhagen Summit, one month into AKP government, the European Council noted that Turkey has to do more reforms to be able start accession negotiations. The European Council decided to start accession negotiations with Turkey in December 2004 if Turkey meets the Copenhagen political criteria by then. Following 2002 Copenhagen Summit, the AKP government has made significant reforms rapidly and demonstrated its determination to meet the Copenhagen Criteria. The

European Commission’s 2003 Regular

Report

describes Turkey’s significant

progress under AKP governance towards meeting the Copenhagen political and economic criteria. In 2003, the government made important political and legal reforms. Eight reform packages had been adopted between February 2002 and July 2004 with an aim to fulfill the criteria required to join the EU. With these reforms, 218 articles of 53 different laws had been changed. Furthermore, constitutional amendments regarding

gender

equality,

freedom

the

press,

the

status

international

conventions and the functioning of the judiciary were adopted and entered into force in May 2004 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2008). The European Commission (2005) noted that the Turkish government also took significant steps to ensure effective implementation of these reforms in order to improve human rights and freedoms of Turkish public in line with the European standards. Commission’s 2004 Regular Report acknowledged that Turkey made significant progress in its political reform process, particularly by adopting constitutional and legislative changes compatible with the Copenhagen Criteria. It must be mentioned

that such changes were difficult to make during coalition governments due to lack of political consensus over policies. AKP’s strength in TBMM (Assembly) provided it with the power to make constitutional and legislative changes with relative ease. Consequently, the Commission in its Recommendation of 6 October 2004 noted that Turkey sufficiently meets the Copenhagen Criteria. The Recommendation included beginning of conditional accession negotiations with Turkey. The European Council of December 2004 laid out a plan that opens accession negotiations with Turkey in October 2005 (Europa, 2005). That date marked the official beginning of accession negotiations of Turkey as an EU member candidate. 2004 was a critical year as the EU welcomed ten new members, including Cyprus, or Southern Cyprus Greek Administration as Turkey calls it. In the same year, there was a referendum in both sides of Cyprus to settle the problem in the divided island. AKP supported the Annan Plan, named after former UN General Secretary Kofi Annan, despite strong opposition from secularists and nationalists within Turkey and also from then-Northern Cyprus Turkish Republic (NCTR) President and Founder Rauf Denktas. AKP government’s support for the Plan was seen as equivalent to “selling out Cyprus” by its opponents. In the referendum, the Turkish side of the island voted for the Plan which would end the division in the island; while the Greek side voted against it. By risking its legitimacy at home on a taboo-issue, AKP government strengthened its hand against the EU by showing its commitment to settlement in Cyprus. However, currently there is a deadlock in the Cyprus issue which seems to be the main obstacle against Turkey’s accession into the EU. Turkish government has not been willing to open its ports and airports to Greek Cypriot ships despite its legal commitment to do so, because the EU also failed to keep its promises to Turkish Cypriots on easing the trade embargoes. The deadlock does not seem to be solved any time soon because of differences in perspectives: Greek Cypriots want to use their veto power against Turkey as an EU member, while Turkey does not want to recognize the Greek Administration as the government of Cyprus and leave Turkish Cypriots even more isolated. After late 2005, the foreign policy activism continued; but the focus was no longer on the EU. The Turkey membership controversy in some countries, particularly France, Germany and Austria, augmented anti-EU nationalism within Turkey. The issue of identity within the EU and the question of whether the EU being a “Christian Club” further escalated opposition to EU membership in Turkey. Why after all would Turkey want to join the EU if the Europeans oppose Turkey’s membership? Why Turkey would have to meet the Copenhagen Criteria and give up some of its sovereignty for a multinational organization that Turkey seems unlikely join? Why

Turkey was given hope again and again if its identity, its history and its Muslim population were obstacles against its EU bid? Even though, the public support for the EU membership remained still relatively high, it dropped dramatically from a record high of 74 percent in 2002 to around 50 percent by 2007 (Eurobarometer, 2007). Prime Minister Erdoğan repeatedly said that the EU reforms are for Turkish citizens’ benefit, and if after all Turkey is rejected a membership, then the government could just rename Copenhagen Criteria as Ankara Criteria and continue reforms in that direction. This meant that the government rather aspired democratic political values in Europe, and not the EU itself. However, AKP as any other government in democratic countries had to consider the public’s concerns and slowed down the EU reforms accordingly. During this period, Turkey focused on relations with its Eastern and Southern neighbors, its historical hinterland, solidifying its base in Asia in line with Davutoğlu’s bow-arrow metaphor. Foreign Affairs Minister Davutoğlu argues that the country cannot wait forever for EU membership, and needs to develop a more active and multidimensional foreign policy by utilizing its geopolitical and geostrategic advantages. 2007 was the year that AKP was reelected again as the single-party government by increasing its votes substantially to 46.6% and the year that AKP’s Foreign Minister and deputy leader Abdullah Gül was elected the President. The elections demonstrated the mass support AKP has and gave the government courage to continue

making

changes

that

would

have

been

unlikely

during

coalition

government. This courage got AKP very close to be closed down. AKP, with the encouragement of MHP (Nationalist Movement Party), moved to lift the headscarf ban at the universities as it promised its conservative voters. However, this move was interpreted as a threat to the laic (secular) regime of the Republic of Turkey by the opposition. The chief prosecutor filed a case against AKP calling for the party to be closed on the grounds that the party undermines the laic regime by adopting religion as its reference. The EU had been very interested and very concerned about the court case. The EU's Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn condemned this development. He said: "In EU member states, the kind of political issues referred to in this case are debated in the parliament and decided through the ballot box, not in court rooms…Such a measure [banning a party] may only be justified in the case of parties which advocate the use of violence or use violence as a political means to overthrow the democratic constitutional order. I do not see any such justification for this case" (Euractiv, 2008). On July 30, 2008, The Constitutional Court decided not to close down AKP. This decision was welcomed by the EU and probably saved Turkey’s hopes for EU

membership. In 1980, it was a military coup d’état in Turkey that impeded the country from joining the EU and suspended relations for six years. If AKP was banned, it could have led to a similar outcome causing the “train crash.” AKP, however, realized that it should continue reform packages rather than making reforms one by one. What could be interpreted as protecting “religious freedoms” in a reform package was

–

intentionally- seen as a threat against the secular establishment of the

Republic. The EU reforms included regulation of civil-military relations. The current Turkish Constitution

was

adopted

1982

the

military

government

the

time.

Traditionally, the military has been an influential actor in Turkish political scene unlike the case in EU member states. The military’s political influence has been weakened in line with the EU reforms. However, military still considers itself the protector of the laic regime. Therefore, the military concerns itself with the perceived threats against the regime, threats that are not necessarily against the security of the Republic. AKP’s Islamic sensitivities discomforted the secularist military. Before the presidential elections of 2007, the military even sent a public warning note to the government. Many failed coup d’état plans against the AKP government have been revealed, namely Sarıkız, Ayışığı, Eldiven and Balyoz. Turkey’s democratization is still at consolidation stage. Democratization process, in line with Copenhagen Criteria, threatens vested interests of some parties (some political parties, some in the military, some businessmen etc.). Thus, complicated internal dynamics and conflictual character of Turkish politics affects policy-making (including foreign policy) process more than in a country that is more democratic. The realist assumption that unit-level factors (individual decision-makers, domestic politics etc.) do not matter much, in turn, is not valid in Turkish context. Political will-power of governments is another significant factor that influences policy

changes.

Political

will-power

much

dependent

real

power

administrations have. In democracies, the power of governments is measured by their public support. In Turkey, AKP has massive public support that feeds its political will-power. Even though from time to time its will-power is tested by the secularist opposition (including the military), AKP demonstrated that it has enough will-power to deal with issues that Turkey previously had fixed positions on. AKP’s approach towards the Cyprus issue, particularly Annan Plan, is an example. Another such instance was the relations with Armenia. Prime Minister Erdoğan sent an invitation letter to Armenian President Robert Kocharian; President Gül visited Armenian capital to watch Armenia-Turkey football game together with President Kocharian; historical Akdamar (Armenian) Church in Turkish city Van was refurbished and reopened; and

lastly an accord was signed between the two sides for normalization of diplomatic relations. Another taboo that has been broken during AKP government was the Kurdish

issue.

AKP

government

improved

relations

with

the

Kurdish

Regional

Government in Iraq and extended the socio-cultural rights of its Kurdish citizens: bans on the use of Kurdish language are eased, Kurdish language schools are opened; state channel TRT opened a special channel broadcast in Kurdish (TRT 6) etc. More are expected to come in 2010, as the government plans to move on its “Democratic Initiative”

which

traditionally

includes

interested

what all

so-called these

the

three

“Kurdish issues,

opening.” namely

The

Cyprus

issue,

Armenia-Turkey relations and Kurdish issue, as well as the issue of civil-military relations in its engagement with Turkey. The previous governments did not have the political will-power that AKP has to change Turkish state’s fixed positions on these issues because of the political risks involved.

6. Conclusion AKP government introduced a new Turkish foreign policy after the Party got elected as the government in November 2002. Prime Minister Erdoğan, who is also the head of AKP, decided to follow his chief advisor Ahmet Davutoğlu’s foreign policy proposal that he outlined in his book named Strategic Depth. The architect of the new foreign policy Davutoğlu was later named the Minister of Foreign Affairs in May 2009 after being almost a de facto Minister for seven years. About Turkey’s EU membership, Davutoğlu argues that Turkey cannot wait forever at EU’s door, and needs to develop a more active and multidimensional foreign policy by utilizing its geopolitical and geostrategic advantages. The massive support AKP got in 2002 and 2007 elections gave the party power to adopt reform packages and constitutional amendments in line with the Copenhagen Criteria which is required for EU membership. Furthermore, the party demonstrated political will-power in dealing with issues that have been long seen as taboos by previous administrations such as the Cyprus issue, Armenia-Turkey relations, the Kurdish issue and civil-military relations all of which the EU are interested in. As part of the multidimensional foreign policy that considers Turkey a central country, not necessarily part of the ‘European axis,’ the country has improved its relations with proximate countries in the Middle East and Caucasia. Davutoğlu explained how good relations with Turkey’s Asian neighbors complemented relations with the EU using a bow-arrow metaphor: the more Turkey stretches its bow in Asia, the further and more precisely will its arrow extend into Europe.

The

overall

Turkish

foreign

policy

and

policies

under

AKP

government

challenged the realist interpretation of the international system. The effectiveness of single-party governments as opposed to coalition governments in making constitution amendments and adopting reform packages, the role of individuals in policymaking (including foreign policy), the impact of the extent of the political will-power of the governments in making changes on politically difficult issues and other domestic political factors are in contrast with the realist assumption that these unit-level factors do not matter much in the international system.

7. References Cover page picture source: Fourth Don Quichotte International Cartoon Competition Ayhan, K. (2009, April 1). Is Turkey Asian or European? (2). Today's Zaman, p. 14. Retrieved

from

http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/detaylar.do?

load=detay

&link=171098 Ayhan, K. (2009, March 31). Is Turkey Asian or European? (1). Today's Zaman, p. 14.

Retrieved

from

http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/

detaylar.do?load=

detay&link=171013 Davutoğlu, A. (2001). Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye'nin Uluslararası Konumu. İstanbul: Küre Yayınları. Davutoğlu, A. (2007). Turkey's Foreign Policy Vision. Insight Turkey, 10(1), 77-96. Euractiv. (2008). EU slams Turkish Court's decision to hear AKP ban. Retrieved January

20,

2010,

from

http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/eu-slams-

turkish-court-decision-hear-akp-ban/article-171240 Eurobarometer. (2007). Eurobarometer 67, Public Opinion in the European Union: European Commission. Europa.

(2005).

Retrieved

Turkey's January

pre-accession 20,

2010,

strategy.

from

Summaries

legislation

http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/

enlargement/ongoing_enlargement/e40113_en.htm Huntington, S. P. (1996). The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order. New York: Simon & Schuster. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2008). Relations Between Turkey and the European Union

Retrieved

January

15,

2010,

from

http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-

between-turkey-and-the-european-union.en.mfa Öniş, Z., & Yılmaz, Ş. (2009). Between Europeanization and Euro-Asianism: Foreign Policy Activism in Turkey during the AKP Era. Turkish Studies, 10(1), 7-24.

Discussion st

Turkey's Europe Advanture in the 21

Century

Discussant : Kim, Hyo Joung (Pusan University of Foreign Studies)

With the subject of Turkey’s EU relationship, this paper focus on how domestic politics and individuals play significant roles in international political system. AS the author mentioned, Turkish foreign policy has witnessed more activism and change under AKP government since 2002. The key foreign policy maker during this time has been Ahmet Davutoğlu, Prime Minister’s chief foreign policy advisor and current Minister of Foreign Affairs, made the most important role. He intended that Turkey should not avoid its Ottoman past while following a “zero problem policy toward Turkey’s neighbors, so called the multidimensional foreign policy. Regarding to Turkey’s policy of EU membership, Davutoğlu believed that the more Turkey stretches its bow in Asia, the further and more precisely will its arrow extend into Europe. He always argues that if Turkey does not have a solid stance in Asia, it would have very limited chances with the EU. He and AKP regime is more enthusiastic in demonstrating Turkey’s role as not only a geopolitical, but also geo-cultural and geo-economic bridge between the West and the East. Under Davutoğlu’s guidance, Turkey no longer has to be stuck in the middle, with no clear identity. In order to be part of the Western world as a democratic nation, he argues, Turkey does not have to ignore its population's Muslim identity, nor does Turkey have to turn its back on the Muslim world. The fact that Turkey has become closer to both the Muslim world and the EU offers prospects on the relationship of Turkey and EU. From this point of view, the author argues that EU can make use of Turkey's soft power in the Islamic world for mutually beneficial goals such as the war on terrorism, democratization and fighting anti-Western sentiments. However, the author is doing a big mistake in missing a crucial point that the most influential EU leaders are very anxious about the soft power of Turkey. Under the AKP’s regime, Islamic identity has been significantly bolstered in Turkey. AKP’s strong and persistent Islamic policy has been seriously confronted many times in Turkey by the secularist opposition, including the military which is traditionally

supposed to be the last and strongest force to keep the national banner of Ataturk’s secular state. This political movement of AKP has stirred up European traditional anti-Islamic sentiment. It is well known that, in recent years, European leaders have been very sick not only with Islamic socio-religious movement in Europe but also Islamic global jihad and terrorism. Now Islam issue has become one of the most important European agendas and it is closely related with EU domestic politics. Thus Europeans are more and more suspicious to the AKP’s Islamic movement. They are watching cautiously AKP’s domestic policy, especially its’ debates and confrontations with intellectuals and the military on the Islamic identity of state. The author admitted that domestic politics and individuals play significant roles in international political system. In the same way, Turkey’s EU membership is closely related with EU domestic politics. It is noteworthy that, although such endeavor of AKP’s regime to EU membership, the road map of AKP does not function and move forward. In my opinion, Turkey’s EU full membership almost depends upon Turkey’s religious and Islamic identity. The more AKP strengthen state Islamic identity, the further and more Europeans go far away. This is my realist interpretation of international relationship between Turkey and EU.

The Dowry in East Mediterranean Area -Ancient Greece, Rome, Arab-Islam Society-

Kim, Su Jung (Pusan University of Foreign Studies)

â&#x2026; . Introduction There have been a wide range of changes in ways of human life from the ancient times through the present. In the face of those changes, marriage has been acting consistently as a foundation of maintaining and developing identities of family, tribe, and nation Marriage has a personal

meaning and an important social

meaning as well.

Marriage is a common institution in human race across time and place, and across history and cultures. It is this institution which distinguishes between man and animals; which makes a person's dignity solid,; and which unites an individual as a member of society. (Mu`min, 2008: 45). In addition, marriage is one of social relations in which more than two persons are associated

the

system

society;

socially

approved

institution

sexual

relationship between men and women; and a contract leading to such relationship. (Bae, Young-gi 2006: 65) As

described

above,

marriage

important

social

norm

and

universal

institution as well, but it does not reflect the same configuration in so many different cultures. Different times and places have shown as many different types of marriage and as many different marital rights and duties. This may often be accountable to social, racial or religious traits. Marriage in history was usually a union of families or a

contract

between

tribes

and

nations,

which

essentially

different

from

institution and conceptions of contemporary marriage. In the Mediterranean regions in the ancient times and the Middle Ages, marriage represented characteristics of patriarchical society; a householder exercised absolute powers; but opinions of women as one of both married partners were seldom recognized. Thus, a political, economic coalition between groups through marriage acted even as a factor deteriorating women's position and prestige. Institutions related to marriage appeared in many different forms depending upon historical

times

and

cultures.

With

respect

forms

marriage,

there

were

monogamy, polyandry, polygamy, etc. Besides, marriage was perceived as a contract, and as a result many different forms of marriage portion(dowry) systems came into being. In general, marriage portion(dowry) meant a reward for fertility and labor power provided by women, inheritance of property, or seed money for the newly-weds to facilitate a stable marriage life. The authority to own and/or use dowry belonged to a female spouse in Arabic, Islamic cultures; it belonged to a male spouse in ancient Rome; and in ancient Greece, husbands had its ownership, but they could use it with their

wive's

consent.

conclusion,

dowry

institutions

reflected

different

characteristics of different times and cultures. As

Greek,

Roman

and

Arabic

civilizations

which

took

turns

leading

the

Mediterranean culture and economy in the ancient history were adjacent to one another, and are considered to have continued exchanges in every respect, these civilizations are supposed to be associated with one another regarding dowry. This paper aims to comparatively analyze major civilizations and their dowry systems

the

Eastern

Mediterranean

including

Greek,

Roman,

and

Arabic

civilizations; to study common things and individual unique characteristics in the systems; and to compare and identify women's status in the Eastern Mediterranean regions. Ancient Greek, Roman, and Arabic Islamic societies as subjects of this study are chronically

different.

These

civilizations,

however,

developed

their

own

ones

independently in neighboring regions. This is why a comparison of formative periods and culmination periods of these civilizations is supposed to be very meaningful in studying Eastern Mediterranean civilizations in the ancient times and the Middle Ages.

â&#x2026;Ą. Dowry in Ancient Greek Society In the ancient Greek society called 'an origin of Western democracy', women's civil rights were not significantly different from those of men. In the Athenian society which restricted contacts of men and women strictly, women were not decision makers; so they could not even select their spouses on their own; the choice of their future husbands did not require her consent, but the consent of her father, or her patron. In ancient Greece, marriage was an institution necessary to conserve Oikos1) 1) Oikos is translated into a family, which was a small community under absolute authorities of a patriarch and at the same time a religious community in which outliers who were not approved by a patriarch were thoroughly excluded. (Moon, Hyae-gyung 2005: 7)

privately and to sustain polis publically (Fustel 1935: 44-46); so in this context a marital contract required dowry to obtain legal warrants. This practice in the ancient Greek society made marriage not a love matter between a man and a woman but a combination of interests and benefits for the sake of both families or groups, whose actual evidence was dowry. A legitimate marriage involved dowry; Only children born through this type of marriage were recognized as legitimate children. There was a clear difference in social status between legitimate children and children of concubines, which had a decisive influence on inheritance of Oikos, property, and citizenship. Dowry was wealth which a bride inherited from her father. What a woman could inherit from her father was in the form of dowry. Although there were male heirs, part of family wealth was handed down to women. (Seong, Joo-yeon 1995: 15). Even poor fathers implemented their moral obligations for dowry. They might have provided a large proportion of what they own in Oikos in the form of dowry so that their daughters could marry better off partners. (Roger 1989: 79). Nonetheless, poor families were actually not in the power of meeting demands of rich families. Thus, parents at that time might have favored sons-in-law from families similar to them in social and economic status. On the other hand, there must have been women who could not afford dowry; since it was not possible for them to get married legitimately under good security(egguos), they became often concubines. There were cases that relatives or friends provided marriage portion instead of badly-off fathers. As a woman came to belong to her husband, title to dowry moved to him. However, he managed the wealth, but he could not completely own the wealth. A husband could utilize dowry to increase properties, but he could not dispose of the wealth at will. That is, the title to the marriage portion belonged to the husband only while the marriage lasted. In case the marriage got resolved due to husband's death or divorce, the woman retrieved the marriage portion and at the same time recovered the right of kyrios2)3) . This implies that marriage did not make earlier legal patron's right to a woman and marriage portion disappear and that dowry was designed to protect women against cancellation from marriage. The custom of dowry refund served as a shield of protecting against divorce, and allowed women to exercise their voices in the household and their influence on the title to properties. In addition, when the marriage was dissolved, it opened the road to

2) kyrios meant a legal patron, who was usually father of a woman, or otherwise sometimes father's brother or grandfather when father was deceased.. 3) The right as kyrios who managed dowry before did not disappear completely with marriage, but was reserved in case of divorce or death of a husband. It was a right which could be recovered anytime. (W. K. 1968: 10).

remarriage which might promote women's rights and prestige, and otherwise provided a economic foundation for them and their children. Some scholars argued that dowry meant merely lowering women's value as economic products or an efficient system of controlling divorce rates; but in the Greek society which remarkably discriminated women against men, it was a fact that a custom of dowry guaranteed a minimum of women's rights.

â&#x2026;˘. Dowry in the ancient Roman society As in ancient Greece examined earlier, women's rights in ancient Rome were feeble when compared to men's. Roman codes regarded women as minors and legally permanent incompetent persons, stressing inferiority of women. Like in Greece, love was not a prerequisite for marriage to ancient Romans. Their purpose of marriage was to reproduce children, which was considered to be beneficial to a family and furthermore a nation. Thus, marriage was sometimes strategically used in the sense of combining two families, and was sometimes controlled by the nation. In these circumstances, women acted as an agent to link two families or collateral. (Joe, Eun-rae 2009:119) Marriage in Rome did not always require dowry. However, the existence of dowry was an evidence which represented legitimate marriage. We can't tell an extent to which the practice of dowry was permeated into the Roman society, but it must have been an established practice among all the classes, given documents that poor women filled dowry with their whole properties and that even women slaves provided dowry for their marriage. (Susan 1991: 323). In ancient Rome a man had no legal obligations to use for the sake of his wife alone dowry which she brought in marriage. He had responsibilities to support his wife and children. Classical lawyers took it for granted that a husband had the right to own and utilize dowry, because it was his basic responsibility to support his wife. (Kim, Gyung-hee 1998: 75). Regardless of marriage types, dowry used to be part of properties on the part of a husband family as long as the marriage continued. (Kim, Gyung-hee 1998: 77). Dowry return at

divorce

death of

a husband was essentially not

to be

implemented. But due to Spurius Cavilius Ruga's divorce in 231 B.C., principles of dowry return ((actio rei uxoriae)) were firmly established4). It is said that Spurius Cavilius Ruga was publically criticised because he excused that he had divorced his 4) As Spurius Cavilius Ruga did not undergo through a formal family conference and intended to divorce his wife for a trivial reason, but not for a great misbehavior, his wife and her father demanded for dowry return.

wife because she was infertile after he drove out his wife without reason. This incident was a reason why dowry return had become a social issue during the late Roman Republic when divorce took place very frequently. The late Roman Republic, especially the last 150 years (B.C 180-31) was a period of political confusion and fierce competition among elite families surrounding top ranks of social position. Elite families made strategic use of marriage, especially women. As a result, Some women at that time underwent politically motivated marriages, divorces, and remarriages at the will of their fathers. A patriarch who craved for a political coalition between families through marriage pushed ahead his daughter's repeated marriages, which required a big dowry. Such a patriarch had to provide a big dowry everytime, which became a big burden to him and his family. This burdensome situation made patriarchs invent ideas of dowry return instead of procuring a new dowry in each event of remarriage. Paradoxically a possible dowry return played an important role in preventing men from maltreating their wives. Namely, a legal device of dowry return was the one protecting women against divorce. But as divorces and remarriages frequently took place during the late Roman Republic, the legal device of dowry refund might have had limitations to protecting women. And remarriage which was an engine driving dowry refund was originally intended to allow for benefits of their families, but not to choose their favorite partners of life. The nation also exploited remarriage as a means of fertility. In addition, it might be difficult to think that dowry return did play a big role in promoting women's rights, given that dowry returned did not belong to women for the sake of their independence, but it belonged under patriarchs' authority.

â&#x2026;Ł. Dowry in Arab-Islamic Society Arabic women's rights before Islam were not very different from those of

women

in ancient Greece or Rome. But with the introduction of Islam, Arabic women's status faced a great change. Islam was a drastic revolution and blessing in terms of women's rights. (Yoon, Yong-soo, Jeon, Wan-gyung 2009: 189). The appearance of Islam resulted in effects of improving women's social positions including heirship or ownership. Not to mention of social positions, women's status in household turned for the better, which could be observed through a system of marriage. Marriage in Islamic societies is regarded as a contract between persons concerned as well as a union of a man and a woman. A marital contract is implemented the way a woman accepts it if a man proposes marriage in front of two witnesses. Islam suggests many prerequisites for a happy married life. Among those, dowry is great in

importance. With respect to dowry, the Koran and the Hadith, etc. stipulate in detail. In the Koran, dowry means terms for (farīḑah, religious obligations) or (ṣadaqah, offering); This means that dowry is not a mere business interaction but a religious obligation and a social protective device. In Islamic societies, marriage portion is translated into dowry, but its concept is distinguished from that in ancient Greece and Rome. Though dowry in ancient Greece and Rome meant money or its equivalent properties provided by a bride's family in marriage, that in Islamic societies is different in sense, in that it is given to a wife to be by a bridegroom or his family. The amount of dowry is adjustable depending upon a groom's economic ability, but it seems that dowry is indispensable in Arabic marriages since marriages without dowry cease to be legally in force or effect. A husband has no right to dowry. From the point of Islam, dowry is a personal property which a wife can do with at her discretion. Classical views regarding dowry stipulated the meaning of dowry as follows: A husband had an exclusive right to labor and sexuality provided by his wife, and the reward for these was dowry. But in modern societies, it is construed as an indication of gratitude and respect toward a wife and at the same time a guarantee for her economic stability during or after marriage. (Richard C. 2004: 424). Aside from a system related divorce which is favorable to men, a social protective mechanism in Islamic societies is very vulnerable when unexpected incidents such as divorce or death of a spouse take place. As mentioned above, dowry in Arabic and Islamic societies serves to solidify a marital contract on the part of men and acts as a social insurance policy to protect socially disadvantaged on the part of women.

Ⅴ. Conclusion Ancient

Greece,

Rome

and

Islamic

regions

created

major

civilizations

the

Mediterranean. These civilizations were geographically adjoined so that they had influenced, interacted and exchanged mutually and constantly. Constant interactions lead the civilizations to have numerous common features and at the same time, they show many differences as well. Their common features and the differences are spread throughout the world at large in a diversity of forms. However, since the modern period, these civilizations undergoing disparate historical development processes had caused the differences more prominent and in the present day, it is true that each civilization is recognized as distinct one from each other emphasizing more heavily on the differences than their relevancies.

This recognition is considered to be common understanding throughout the fields of politics, economy, society, culture and science. Also the understanding on women's social

status

goes

with

the

similar

flow.

other

words,

since

the

gender

discrimination against arab and islamic women has been revealed severely, arab islam nations are happened to be widely recognized to maintain barbaric traditions. Customs of polygamy, marriage portion and circumcision on women are thought to be features of discrimination against women in arab islamic regions and those have became the targets of western societies' criticism. This study as an objection against the general understanding was initiated from a question whether arab islamic women's social status was inferior than what was of ancient greek and roman women and in order to resolve the question marriage portion is chosen as a research object. The marriage in mediterranean regions in ancient times and medieval times was lied absolutely within right of the head of a family owing to the patrilineal society and opinions of women who were the contracting parties in a marriage were hardly counted. Thus, unions between groups and political, economical alliances by marriages acted as a primary factor to depreciate right and social status of women who were the socially underprivileged ones. Social status and right of women have been differed from ages and each country. Marriage system has been also appeared in various forms depending upon ages and countries. As forms of marriage there were monogamy, polyandry and polygamy and system of marriage portion was appeared considering a marriage as a form of a contract. Although a dowry was a common custom in mediterranean regions in ancient age, it was in fact disappeared from western society since the Middle Age and on the other hand, it is still carried on in arab islamic society. Despite the historical fact, modern western society instances marriage portion as a representative example of an irrationality of islamic society, a discrimination against women and a violation of human rights. Therefore, in this thesis, a study on marriage portion carried out commonly in ancient mediterranean society was conducted and with this study, social status of women in each civilization was evaluated. A

conception

"Marriage

contract."

typically

shared

eastern

mediterranean countries as well as a dowry being essential condition in a marriage. Though an aspect that subjects of providing a marriage portion in ancient greek, roman society and arab islamic society are contradicted is comprehended as a distinctive difference in each civilization. In other words, a dowry in ancient Greece

and Rome had a meaning of property inheritance and on the other hand what is in arab islamic society reflected a compensation for woman's labor in preislamic age and a financial shelter for a woman since Islamic age. Consequently it can be said that in ancient mediterranean regions, women's social status in arab islamic society was not inferior than women's in ancient greek, roman society and on the contrary they attained higher standard. In 21st century, the social standing of women in western society has greatly improved and becomes nearly equal to men's social position. On the other hand, social standing of women in arab islamic society does not yet show much distinction from that in medieval times. As a matter of

fact, social participation and freedom of

career choice in modern arabic society are rather limited and they are lack of protective social systems for women. Giving consideration to characters of arab islamic society, it is a fact that a marriage portion has a role of a protective financial and social system for women. In consequence, rather than having an illogical negative recognition, it is necessary to have an understanding on social circumstance in arab islamic society which created system of marriage portion and lead the system to be carried on up until today. Such attitude would be considered as a proper life-style and a manner to live 21st century coexisting with other cultures.

<References> 김경희.

1998. “로마의

사문화학회. 문혜경.

pp. 71-103.

1999. “고전기

소.

지참금 제도에 관한 연구”. 서양고대사연구. 6권. 한국서양고대역 아테네 여성과 재산”. 인문학연구. 제4호. 경희대학교 인문학연구

pp. 415-436.

배영기.

2006.

결혼의 역사와 문화. 파주: 한국학술정보(주).

성주연.

1995.

아테네 여성의 지위에 관한 연구: 기원전 5세기 아테네의 결혼제도를 중심

으로. 대구: 효성여자대학교 대학원. 윤용수, 전완경 편역. 조은래.

2009.

2009. “로마법상의

이슬람의 에티켓과 금기. 서울: 주류성 출판사ㆍ북스페인. 혼인제도”. 법학연구. 제35권. 한국법학회.

pp. 117-141.

Daliyā Mu`min, 2008, Al-'usrah wa al-`alāj al-'usraī, Cairo: Dāru as-Sihāb. Fustel de Coulanges. 1935. The Ancient City. New York. Richard C. Martin. 2004. Encyclopedia of Islam and the Muslim world. Thomson Gale. Roger Just. 1989. Women in Athenian Law and Life. Routledge. Susan Treggiari. 1991. Roman Marriage: Iusti Coniuges from the time of Cicero to the Time of Ulpian. Oxford: Clarendon.

W. K. Lacey. 1968. The Family in Classic of Aristophanes. New York: Thames & Hudson.

Discussion The Dowry in East Mediterranean Area -Ancient Greece, Rome, Arab-Islam Society-

Discussant : Youn, Yong Su (IMS) A comparative cultural study is a very important and interesting subject in the Mediterranean studies. Until now, most researchers around in the Mediterranean area were concentrated to the individual area studies for example Greece, Turkey, Spain and Arab etc. But approximately twenty years ago, there was a new approach and new academic trend to this area. Namely, some of the progressive scholars have researched the Mediterranean area by the integration method. They view this area as the connected region by sea not separated area by sea. Although many historic wars and conflicts were happened in the Mediterranean, they have tried to explain the history of the Mediterranean as the interchange and understanding but the conflict and opposition. For them, how we study this area is more important than what we study. For their research, a comparative study is a very useful tool and methodology. Using this methodology, they expect to present the new interpretation about the interchange of civilizations in the Mediterranean area. I think that this is more progressive and modern explanation about the Mediterranean. In

your

article,

you

researched

the

social

system(dowry)

the

east

Mediterranean(ancient Greece, Rome and Arab) using the comparative methodology also. The dowry was the common system in the east Mediterranean during the ancient and the medieval time in spite of the many distinctions. To analysis there common points

and

the

distinguished

one

the

very

useful

and

interesting

work

understand this area. whatever your conclusions, my question is simple. What is your thought and explanation about the relationship among the ancient Greece, Rome and Arab? and

what is your research plan about the Mediterranean in the future? I expect you to continue this research in this field. Thank you for your presentation.

The Theatres of Politicization of Sadallah Wannus(1941-1997) in the 1960s-70s

Koo, Mi Ran

(Ph. D candidate. Hankuk University of Foreign Studies) 5)

Ⅰ. Introduction Ⅱ. Theatre in the Arab World Ⅲ. Wannus's life and Influence of the Europe theatre of Politicization to Wannus Ⅳ. Wannus’s Theatres of Politicization in 1960s-70s 1. Ḥflat Samar min Ajl 5 Ḥazirān (Evening Party for the 5th of June, 1968) 2. al-Fīll yā malik al-zamān (Elephant, The King of era, 1969), 3. Mugāmarat ra’s al-Mamlūk Jābir (Adventure of the Head of Jabir the Slave, 1970) 4. al-malik huwa al-malik (The King is the King, 1977). Ⅴ. Conclusion

Ⅰ. Introduction The literary works are like a mirror that reflects the society at that age. Among the different genres of literature, the drama is “a form of literature that describes the actions to be taken by actors(LEE Jae-myung 2004: 12), and the dramatist delivers his/her strong message to the audience through the actor's mouth. The theatre features lives of each era and plays the role as 'mirror of the lives' that show cultural aspects of that time. So the theatre generally shows the lives and characteristics of lives at that era to the audiences much more than any other arts do. At the same time, it keeps everlasting value of arts by showing general and essential lives of human beings. (KIM Seo-yong etc. 2002: 13)

* Department of Arab Studies, Myong-Ji University

Sadalla Wannus was a journalist, playwriter and writer who wrote various works at the same time. He emphasized the pivotal role of culture by using drama because he thought that culture is an important tool to resist oppression regardless of regions. So he presented works that delivered strong social message from 1960s and 1970s. His subjects covered the problems of the entire Arab world, not limiting to any special Arab region. The real political theatre in the Arab world emerged after the humiliating defeat of June 1967, as Arab intellectuals vied with each other to find an explanation or reasons for the disaster (Al-Abdulla 1992). Like other intellectuals, Wannus too tried to find reasons for the defeat and he thought that the theatre should play a role in enlightening people to overcome the disaster. He emphasized, "In a society in which people want to resist, the role of theatre should be helping a nation to achieve complete freedom and the society to develop. Realizing this, we started writing drama"(Abu Haif 1979:50). Wannus wrote the theatres of politicization during 1960s-1970s. His works reflected rapidly changing political situation of Arab at that time and he wanted to inform the Arab people about their situation and educate them.

Ⅱ. Modern Theatre in the Arab World The first show of modern theatre in the Arab world was introduced during Napoleon's expedition to Egypt. For the first time, Arab people saw the play of Comédie-Française that came to Egypt to entertain French troops stationed there. Though Egypt was the first place where the western modern theatre was introduced, but Levant1) was where the Arabs started to play their own modern theatre around th

late 19

century (SONG Kyuong-suk 1992 : 324).

The Syrian and Lebanese theatre groups came to Egypt and opened several theaters in Cairo and Alexandria. These groups performed French theatres translated into the Arabic language, especially the Egyptian dialect, and generated high interest among Egyptians (MOON Jung-Min 1986:7). The theatre activities in the late 19th century in the Arab world were mostly translated works - Marun al-Naqash2), Ahmad Abu Khalil al-Qabbani3) from Lebanon and Syria translated dramas of French neoclassicism playwriters like Racine4), Molière5),

1) It means Syria and Lebanon area. 2) Lebanese Playwriter, 1817-1855. 3) Syrian Playwriter, 1833-1902. 4) Jean Racine, French Playwriter, 1639-1699. 5) French Playwriter, 1622-1673.

Corneille6). This helped adaption of European literature to Egypt. (MOON Jung-Min 1986:9) One of the most important playwriters in the 20th century is Taufīq Al-Ḥakim7). He was called as ‘a consummator of Arab drama’ and worked as a pioneer in the theatre field. He wrote about 70 dramas. Critics classify his works into social dramas, philosophical dramas, and absurd dramas. He wrote philosophical dramas for the first time in the Arab world. Unfortunately, his dramas didn't succeed on the stage because they were complicated and difficult to understand for the people at that time. But he played a significant role in establishing drama's status in the Arab literature.

Ⅲ. Wannus's Life and the Influence of the European Theatre of Politicization to Wannus Wannus was born in Hosain al-Bahr near Tartus, Syria in 1941. After graduating high school, he went to Cairo to study journalism at a university. While he was staying in Cairo, the Federation of Syria-Egypt was split. He was influenced by the political situation at that time and he wrote dealing with the political matters. He was a journalist, playwriter and author at the same time. In the late 1960s, Sadallah Wannus went to Paris to study theatre. There he encountered various trends, streams and schools of European theatre. He adopted different forms of European theatre and tried to experiment modern styles. New theatrical trends he encountered include Brecht8), Artaud9), Piscator10) and many others. Wannus adopted traditional Arab heritage in content but he adopted the theatrical "technique"

from

educational

drama

improvisation from

modern from

theatrical Brecht,

Piradello12)

"forms" the

European

documentary

theatre:

drama

from

the

epic

and

Weiss11)

and

(Mohamed 'Izzam 2003:16).

During his stay in France, the Arab world was humiliatingly defeated in the war against Israel on June, 1967. Arab’s defeat was ‘the defeat of political system, fundamentals, structure, thought and leaders’ and was directly reflected in a lot of literary works including drama. (SONG Kyuong-suk 1992 : 350) Under such circumstances, Wannus chose European theatre of politicization to resist 6) Jean-Baptiste Poquelin(Molière is his stage name), French Playwrither, 1606-1684. 7) Egyptian Playwrither, 1898-1987 8) Bertold Brecht, Germanic playwriter, 1898-1956 9) Antonin Artaud, French playwriter, 1898-1948 10) Erwin Piscator, Germanic playwriter, 1893-1966 11) Peter Weis, Germanic playwriter, 1916-1982 12) Luigi Pirandello, Italian playwriter, 1867-1936

the

governmental

and

social

oppression

imposed

due

the

wrong

political

environment that was controlling the Arab world. Wannus wrote drama of politicization to educate the Arab people who were deeply shocked by the defeat in June 1967 : Ḥflat Samar min Ajl 5 Ḥazirān (Evening Party for the 5th of June,1968), al-Fīll yā malik al-zamān (Elephant, The King of era, 1969), Mugāmarat ra’s al-Mamlūk J ābir(Adventure of the Head of Jabir the Slave, 1970), and al-malik huwa al-malik (The King is the King, 1977). These dramas graft Arab’s traditional stories onto European theatrical form to enable easy understanding through improvisation and to win popularity. Wannus always tried to show his theatre easily to the audience and to change with them. It was the European style found in most of his works at that time. ('Alqam 1999: 100)

Ⅳ. Wannus’s Theatres of Politicization 1. Ḥflat Samar min Ajl 5 Ḥazirān (Evening Party for the 5th of June 1968) The evening party expected to start at 8:30 P.M. is not opened. There are no actors and no decorations on the empty stage. The audience is noisy and complaining. About 9:00 P.M., the director walks to the stage. He tells the reasons of delay. It is because the writer rejects to write a drama. At that time, the writer comes from seat onto the stage and the conversation between the two starts. The director says that he wanted to write a drama about the defeat of June 1967. While the director tells about that war, the stage is surrounding by blasts and roars of fighters. The confused audience is surprised by the roaring sounds. The theatre starts like this and continues with a story of a town symbolizing the Arab country, and four soldiers symbolizing Arab soldiers come on the stage. They represent the victims who resisted to the enemy and killed. They are symbolizing the realities of Arab soldiers who resisted to the enemy to win the war despite they were inferior in reality. Then, the stage shows a town ruined by attacks, and the people who are falling into confusion because they lost their base of life come onto the stage. Here, from the people, two persons step out and insist their opinions. Abdulla insists that they should not resist to the enemy because of the lack of power and should resist after they develop enough strength. On the contrary, Muktar insists that they have to resist to the enemy not to escape. These two persons represent the two contrary positions of Arabs at that time.

After the people withdraw, Abdul Rahman, Izza and Abdul Faraz come onto the stage from seats. They represent refugees. They express sorrow and anger of the Arabs who lost their base of life by enemy's attack. They discuss with the audience in the seats about the war and ask the audience which is better way for them to remain at their home town or leave home. The director tries to cut the conversation between the audience and those who are on the stage, but the audience prefers the conversation with them and forces the director to leave the stage instead. The conversation with the audience starts like this. The voices of the Arabs reflecting sorrow and anger come from the mouths of actors and the audience. They symbolically ask to a big mirror in front of them: "Who are we?" Who are responsible for the defeat? Wannus thinks that we all are responsible. He stands all the people in front of a mirror

–

people who are afraid of saying the truth,

escapists, refugees and intellectuals who browse the theory books only. But the conversation on the stage is intervened as a politician appears from the seat. A lot of people who participated in the conversation are arrested. The politician insists that the Arab was not defeated and he guarantees political stability and orders cooperation of people to keep the political structure. The audience leaves the theater in confusion. This is an epic and documentary drama and an improvisation that describes the humiliating defeat in the war in June1967 and the confused Arab society. This performance shown in Damascus on 1971 for the first time, and drew 25,000 people. And the critics lavishly praised for this performance. This work became his turning point in his playwriter's life. (SONG Kyuong-suk 1992 : 350)

2. al-Fīll yā malik al-zamān (Elephant, The King of era,1969) In this drama, Wannus symbolizes king's elephant as his own army that corrupts the

country.

Nobody

complains

against

the

violence

king's

elephant

and

dissatisfaction increases more and more. At that time, Zakariya, representing the intellectuals, encourages the people to express complaints and trains them to tell their complaints about the elephant in front of the king. But when the people come in front of the king, they never open their mouths in fear. The king urges them to tell why they came, when Zakariya comes out from the group and says "My Load, the elephant looks very lonely. Why don’t we find a female elephant to get married to?” The king is very glad at his idea and orders his vizir to go to India to find a female elephant to marry the king’s elephant. The people come out from the castle and stand

in one line toward the audience and tell them that they are actors and they have told on behalf of the audience. The actor group asks the audience why a female elephant is in need and why female elephants are increasing. They continue to tell that this story is not the end but another start, start of cruel sadness. In this work, Wannus grafts Bracht's educational dramatic form into the Arab subject. He tries to let the actors on the stage put questions to the audience to awaken their consciousness.

3. Mugāmarat ra’s al-Mamlūk Jābir (Adventure of the Head of Jabir the Slave, 1970) The historical narrative presents the Caliph of Baghdad in disagreement with his vizier. The Caliph is in a strong position and the vizier in a weak one; however, the latter has supporters, albeit foreigners with no roots in the soil of the homeland. It is not our concern here to know who of the two is right. Jabir, the slave, does not intend to become involved in political intrigue. But an important event makes him change his mind on the subject for the vizier has promised him abundant gifts should the vizier's mission be accomplished. The vizier wants to send an important message to his supporters abroad. The Caliph's men and soldiers, however, are zealous to watch out everywhere. Jabir, the slave, desiring to be free and to marry one of the slave-girls, devises a clever plan to smuggle the vizier's message out. He shaves his head and the vizier writes his message on his slave's scalp in indelible ink; when his hair has grown the slave sets off for Persia where he successfully conveys the message. Jabir, the slave, reaching Persia meets the king and informs him of the secret message. And what does message say? It says, "Let a foreign army intervene in favor of the vizier, etc... and cut off the head of the carrier of the message." Thus Jabir pays the price of his interference, and Baghdad and its people pay the price of the vizier's treason. The foreign army enters Baghdad as an invader and destroys it. What about of Baghdad who were content with the mere blessing of finding bread and were unconcerned with what happens "up there" must pay alone a dreadful real price.(Abul-Hayja') Wannus tries new experiment of theatre of politicization. In this play, two different debates are progressing. One is the performance on the stage trying to discuss with audiences and the other is in the audiences on the seats. Wannus wants the audience to actively participate in the play and express their hidden desires.

4. al-malik huwa al-malik (The King is the King,1977) The basic story, that of Abu al-Hasan, the henpecked husband in the Thousand and One Nights, is set in a frame like the original tale, involving two characters, Zahid and 'Ubayd, who orchestrate the actions and explain their implications. The central tale tells how Abu al-Hasan (whom Wannus calls Abu 'Izza in the play) is tricked by the King. The king agonizes to find fantastic play to get out of the groove. So he thought Abu 'Izza belived that he is king. The king visits him despite of vizir's holding to carry out his play. And there are two young men, Zahid and 'Ubayd, who want to change unjust society. They plan to gather mass power to change the kingdom. The king and his vizir come out from the palace in common dresses to visit Abu 'Izza and met him. They succeed in persuasion of him and they let him take a pill secretly and lay him down on king's bed in the palace. The king expects confusion in the next morning pleasantly. But next morning Abu 'Izza assumes the royal mantle with great ease, reducing the redoubtable Police Chief to a whimpering underling. The Queen seems entirely unworried by the change. The kingdom became stronger country than before through more oppressive politics of Abu 'Izza. So the king tries to define that real king is himself but nobody believes him. Finally the king goes crazy and be imprisoned hanging dog lead. At the end of the play, Abu 'Izza is still the king, and Zahid and 'Ubayd

retreat

to hide waiting for another chance to change the country.

â&#x2026;¤. Conclusion Sadalla Wannus wrote his theatre of politicization in 1960sď˝&#x17E;1970s dealing with confused political and social subjects at that time. He adopted traditional Arab heritage in content but he adopted the theatrical "techniques" from modern theatrical "forms" of European theatre. Wannus chooses the theatre as a tool to reform and change the confused Arab society. He removed the fourth wall to invite the audience in the play. It was the first experimental theatre in the Arab world. Wannus tried to participate Arab

people

theatre

and

asked

them

lot

questions

draw

their

self-awareness and build their subjectivity through new experimental theatre. Wannus wanted them to find answers by themselves because it is only way to achieve true

and complete independence for the Arab world.

References 김세영 외(2002). 연극의 이해, 새문사 문정민

(1986).

송경숙 외 이재명

타우휙 알하킴의 희곡에 관한 고찰, 한국외국어대학교 대학원 석사논문

(1992).

(2004)

아랍문학사, 송산출판사

극문학이란 무엇인가, 평민사

H. Al-Abdulla, Abdulaziz (1992) The politicization of Arab Theatre - Sa'd Allāh

Wannūs, Proceedings of the Annual Conference, British Society for Middle Eastern Studies. Abul-Hayja', Something from the Theater of Wannus, Modern Arabic Literature.

Discussion The Theatres of Politicization of Sadallah Wannus(1941-1997) in the 1960s-70s

Discussant : Lee, Jong Hwa (Myongji University)

This paper aims to study theatres of politicization of Sadalla Wannus in the 1960s ď˝&#x17E;70s. He was a journalist, play-writer and writer. He emphasized the pivotal role of culture by using drama because he thought that culture is an important tool to resist oppression regardless of regions. So he presented works that delivered strong social message from 1960s and 1970s. His subjects covered the problems of the entire Arab world.

And Wannus tried to participate Arab people in theatre and asked them a lot

of questions to draw their self-awareness and build their subjectivity through new experimental theatre. And Wannus wanted them to find answers by themselves because it is only way to achieve true and complete independence for the Arab world. In this respect, I have four questions about this paper.

1. - Wannus symbolized the government or leader of country in his play. I want to know whether the government suppressed or forbid his play because his political subject at that time?

2. - How was reaction of the Arab people who watched his new political theatre?

3. - What is influence of his political theatre on the Arab theatrical circle and the world?

4. - Have the Arab theatre ever played in Korea?

후원업체