Think South Asia 10 by South Asia

SADF Bulletin N.º10 Monday, 04th November 2013 www.sadf.eu

THINK SOUTH ASIA © Aapo Haapanen

FUNDAMENTALISM IN SOUTH ASIA

EDITORIAL Dear “Think South Asia Readers”,

Djan Sauerborn Editor of Think South Asia Policy advisor at SADF Department of Political Science, South Asia Institute (SAI) in Heidelberg, Germany

When I was informed in July of this year that I was supposed to succeed Antonio, and become the new editor in chief of TSA, I was both thrilled and anxious. I was thrilled because it was always one of my dreams to dive deep into the thoughts and ideas of writers and engage in fruitful, enlightening debates and dialogues. I was anxious, because I was well aware of the huge footsteps Antonio had left behind. Over the course of only 9 editions, Antonio had managed to breathe extraordinary life into this publication, and I am truly grateful to be able to build on such a formidable foundation. I would also like to use this opportunity to thank the whole SADF team for their continuous support. The region of South Asia never sleeps; some would even argue that it is at night that daily life flourishes the most. The

countries of South Asia have given us great testimonies of freedom struggles and have proven to the world that being a nascent democracy does not necessarily mean being an immature or fragile democracy. Unfortunately however, South Asia also hosts several groups, organizations, parties as well as individuals that act as anti-democratic countervailing forces, which undermine pluralistic democratization processes and whose aim it is to promote an agenda that disenfranchises and harms different belief systems, minorities and freedom as a whole. No one currently embodies this struggle against extremist forces better than Malala Yousafzai, a 16 year old Pakistani girl from Swat, who was shot in the head three times by the Taliban for promoting the rights of women and children to strive for better education. Almost exactly one year after this horrendous act, Malala was awarded

the “Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought”, the European Union’s annual human rights award. The Taliban have failed to stifle Malala’s vision of a world where all women are able to empower themselves through education, or in her words: “They can only shoot a body, they cannot shoot my dreams” This edition of TSA revolves around the issue of “Fundamentalism in South Asia” and its impact on South Asian societies. Who are the actors? What is their agenda? What methods do they utilize? What are the responses of the State? Who are the victims? What can be done to change the status quo? These questions seem rather straight forward, but in a region as complex and multifaceted as South Asia, the insight of regional experts cannot be overvalued and we are proud that so many renowned experts have agreed to contribute to TSA’s 10th edition. The rise of Islamist violence during the Genocide trials in Bangladesh, the bombing of a church in Peshawar, Pakistan that killed 85 Christians, the persecution of the Rohingya, the Muslim minority in Myanmar, the intensifying grip on civil society by radical Salafist elements in the Maldives are just a few examples that show us that the relevance of our chosen topic is almost unprecedented. In the last edition of TSA Antonio asked me if I could write an article on the situation of rising fundamentalism in the Maldives. Sadly, some of the predictions have become reality. The

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politicized and nepotistic Supreme Court is holding the democratic will of the populous hostage and has annulled elections that all election observers, internal as well as external, have described as free and fair. Autocratic elements have teamed up with radical groups, such as the “Adhaalath Party”, an Islamist party which has outspokenly voiced its will to put an end to a pluralist democracy. The future of the atoll state is uncertain. Not only the fragile polity of the nascent democracy is at stake, but also the achievements made between 2008 and 2012 regarding civil rights, human rights, women’s rights as well as freedom of expression. The incorporation of radical ideas and methods by politicians, as well as the incorporation of politics by radical elements is a reoccurring phenomenon in South Asia, and it is paramount that this cycle is broken. The European Union with its track record of overcoming the atrocities and pain of several wars between its nation states should increase its commitment of aiding pro-democratic sections of society in South Asia. The overall aim of TSA is to bridge the gap between policy makers, diplomats, analysts, academics and the public, to strike a balance between thorough analysis and gripping narrative, to be an intellectual stimulus that informs our readers on specific topics within South Asia and to give a voice to those who promote Human Rights and Democratic Values. We adhere to and believe in diversity, thus it is our goal to not only reach several different readers, but also to let people from various strata

EDITORIAL

of life catch the reader’s eye. Although the topic of fundamentalism in South Asia is very complex, we have decided that it is important to not only include academic insight. Thus, we are proud to present two interviews, one with the German Ambassador to Bangladesh Dr Conze and one with Mariya Ali , a former Deputy Minister of Health and Family in the Maldives who has been at the forefront of Women and Children’s Rights in the archipelago state. Additionally we have also decided to publish a rather personal account by Hassan Kilde Bajwa of experiencing the negative impact of fundamentalism within the educational system of Pakistan. La Toya Waha and Dr. Peter Lehr shed light on the often neglected subject of radical Buddhism in Sri Lanka and Myanmar. Dr. Siegfried O. Wolf offers a thorough historical and contextual analysis of fundamentalist groups and their impact on society in Bangladesh. Animesh Roul offers us some much needed insight on the resurgence of militancy in Kashmir. Dr. Mahadevan Prem and Eric Tope both highlight the role of terrorist outlets in Pakistan, and their intertwining with sections of the Pakistani polity. Last but not least Kai Fürstenberg dwells on the interest Iran has in establishing stronger ties with Afghanistan. As a child I always disliked books that gave away too much information in the first pages, so instead of giving brief summaries of each of the articles, I want to bestow the primacy of informing you upon the authors – through their own words*

Dear readers, I am confident that each and every one of you will find something intriguing, albeit troubling, that you can take back to your conference rooms, debating circles, committees, or just keep in your thoughts. Please feel free to contact me at djan@sadf.eu if you wish to comment on our published articles or would like to publish an article with “Think South Asia” yourself. I hope you enjoy the 10th edition of Think South Asia. Last, but I hope not least, I would like to dedicate the following poem to all the people in the Maldives, who are currently fighting an uphill battle against autocratic and fundamentalist actors preventing them from obtaining their basic Democratic and Human Rights. The Fading Dream of Freedom A grain of hope So fragile, innocent A hush, a whisper An anxious rupture Shining pearls Ground to sand Washed ashore To forever rest Yours truly, Djan Sauerborn * The views expressed in the articles are those of the authors and not of SADF. The authors are responsible for the content of their work.

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INDEX

05 Fundamentalism

23 The emerging Islamist

Dr. Albrecht Conze

Dr. Siegfried O. Wolf

08 F(l)ailing Democracy

27 Déjà vu in Kashmir:

in Bangladesh

in the Maldives Dr. Mariya Ali

13 Orwell’s Pakistan Hassan Bajwa

16 Between

Dhamma-Ghosa and BheriGhosa: Militant Buddhism in Burma Dr. Peter Lehr

plexus in Bangladesh

Resurgence of Islamic Militancy Animesh Roul

29 Rethinking

America’s Approach to Pakistan Eric Tope

31 The Al Qaeda Factor in Pakistan

Dr. Prem Mahadevan

19 Buddhist fundamentalism 35 in Sri Lanka Forging stronger ties: La Toya Waha

Iran’s strategic interests in Afghanistan Kai Fürstenberg

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Fundamentalism in Bangladesh Think South Asia (TSA): Although our topic for the interview is “Fundamentalism in Bangladesh”, we would like to ask you to say a few words to the European public on the devastating collapse of the Rana Plaza factory near Dhaka, Bangladesh’s worst industrial accident, in which more than 1000 workers lost their lives Dr. Albrecht Conze (AC): The collapse of Rana Plaza has come as a shock to Europe. As it had been preceded by the Tazreen fire, the general feeling now is that Bangladesh is a place where workers are being exploited at a high risk for their safety. There is less understanding for the important role of the garment sector for Bangladesh’s economic success. Hence, the industry should not lose any more time to do its utmost to restore Bangladesh’s reputation as a thriving emerging economy. In today’s global village it is impossible to neglect social standards, and hide scandalous working conditions. The country’s most important industry will need to brush up its tarnished image through bold measures leading to acceptable safety standards. A collective effort is necessary. European buyers, the

Government of Bangladesh, and local companies must cooperate to improve the overall situation. We see their readiness in principle, but we are yet to see the action that needs to be taken. TSA: Is fundamentalism on the rise in Bangladesh, and if yes, what are the implications for civil society? AC: After its independence in 1971 Bangladesh was founded on the principles of tolerance and the peaceful coexistence of religions and ethnicities. The people of Bangladesh are open-minded and accept religious individualism. Nevertheless, recent developments within the Islamic world towards a stricter interpretation of Islamic values and traditions have not spared Bangladesh. The recent appearance on the scene of fundamentalist groups such as Hefazate-Islam has shaken the identity of Bangladesh’s tolerance based society. A more radical practise of political Islam would put into question the development of this modern nation, and narrow down political choices for the country. It would definitely leave less space to the vibrant and dynamic civil society of Bangladesh.

Interview with

Dr. Albrecht Conze German Ambassador to Bangladesh and UN Peace Keeper

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TSA: The political party Jamaat-eIslami(J, the spearhead of political Islamism in Bangladesh, was banned from contesting next year’s elections when the high court ruled that it had breached Bangladesh’s secular constitution. To what extent will this affect JeI’s ability to mobilise, recruit and consolidate its social base? AC: Jamaat is an established political party in Bangladesh. While it is older than both Awami League and BNP, it has never been able to attract more than 10 per cent of the electorate, and seems weaker today than five years ago. Its political leverage is limited. Whether or not it was legally justified to ban Jamaat from taking part in the upcoming election is for the judiciary to decide. Whether this was a wise decision, is another matter. I doubt that it will be the end of Jamaat as a political force. TSA: Are you afraid of even stronger turmoil and violent protests, a clash between radical and secular forces, as witnessed in the wake of recent court verdicts that sentenced several JeI to long prison sentences or death for their involvement in the 1971 genocide? AC: The verdicts of the International Crimes Tribunal will not decide the country’s future. While it is important for Bangladesh to come to terms with its past, and establish responsibility for the atrocities committed during

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the war of independence, the burning issues of today will determine the coming elections much more than the scars of the past. I am much more concerned by another issue that could determine the outcome of the elections. Following the dynamics which were triggered by the Shabagh movement, the demonstrations of Hefazat and the subsequent election results in five important cities, the election campaign is at risk of focusing on an unhealthy competition of the two leading parties: who is the better defender of Islam? Such a development would be most unfortunate, changing the agenda of development, which this country continues to need. TSA: Does the reach of JeI’s agenda and alliances transcend the borders of Bangladesh? AC: Political Islam is a phenomenon in many countries where Muslims represent the majority of the population. It is often supported by certain rich countries, which advocate religious education in madrasas. Bangladesh must find its way in dealing with this kind of challenge. It is in the interest of modern development to contain the influence of political Islam – a movement that often lacks tolerance for religious and ethnic minorities. While Jamaat as a party seems to be mainly interested in succeeding in Bangladesh, its ideas can be found in many other countries in Asia and Africa.

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TSA: Could you please inform our readers of further religious extremist groups in Bangladesh (e.g. Hefajat-eIslam) and the scope of their influence as well as their agendas? AC: Hefazat-e-Islam is a fundamentalist Islamic group based on village madrasas. It wants a more traditional and religious Bangladesh.

elections, I think that Bangladesh has a bright future.

TSA: Bangladesh has proven time and time again that is an extremely resilient country. Between 2000 and 2010 Bangladesh has reduced the number of poor by 16 million; it has also made vast improvements in dealing with horrendous natural disasters. Are you convinced that it will also be successful in eradicating the impact of extremism and fundamentalism in the future?

AC: I simply cannot imagine Bangladesh falling into the hands of extremists. They will continue to make themselves inacceptable to the majority of the population. Regional cooperation in counter terrorism can serve as an early warning system.

AC: I am not entirely sure about that. Extremism and fundamentalism will only be kept at bay if poverty continues to be eradicated at the same fast pace as Bangladesh has managed to reduce it in the past year. I am very confident that Bangladesh will find an adequate solution for the recent rise of extremism and fundamentalism. People of Bangladesh strike me as innovative, tolerant and open-minded; the country is based on peaceful coexistence between members of all religions. Although there are still some challenges remaining, most notably the political stalemate in the run-up to the

TSA:To which extent and in which areas will a further advancement of anti-democratic forces pose a threat to the nationâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s economic relations with other SAARC members and the EU?

TSA: How can external actors, especially the EU, help in assisting Bangladesh in its quest to safeguarding democratic and secular values? AC: The European Union is strongly engaged in promoting democracy, human rights and religious tolerance. Therefore we will do everything in our power to assist Bangladesh on her way towards an even more tolerant and inclusive society. We are monitoring the situation very closely and will act when necessary.

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FUNDAMENTALISM IN SOUTH ASIA

F(l)ailing Democracy in the Maldives

Interview with

Dr. Mariya Ali Former Deputy Minister for Health & Family (Maldives, 2009-2011). Advocate for children’s rights under Islamic law.

Think South Asia (TSA): The Maldives are in a state of disarray. The Supreme Court, as feared not only postponed the second round of elections but also annulled the elections as a whole. On October 19th, which was the date slated for a fresh round of voting, Police stormed the Election Commission and stopped officials distributing election materials which once again resulted in the anullment of elections. Protestors are being arrested, death threats have been sent to representatives of the Election Commission and on October 7th six militants set fire to opposition aligned TV station Raajje TV. Are the Maldives on the brink of another coup d’état similar to the one the country experienced on February 7th, 2012? Has this decision thrown the country into a legal void? Mariya Ali (MA): Hours before the voting on 19 October 2013 the Police stopped the Elections Commissions from going ahead with the elections, stating the Elections Commission has breached the Supreme Court guidelines set in the second ruling pertaining to the 19 October 2013. According to the constitution it is the Elections Commission that has the mandate and set administrative procedures

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for conducting elections. Many have referred this to another coup. Article 110 clearly states, “Elections for the office of President shall be held within one hundred and twenty days to thirty days prior to the expiry of the existing presidential term.” Article 111 stipulates that if no candidate is able to obtain more than 50% of the votes then a run-off should take place within 21 days after the first round of elections. Therefore, constitutional deadlines have already been breached. To prevent any further breaches of the constitution the Elections Commission has announced 9 November 2013 as the fresh election date with a run off on the 16 November 2013. If there is no president elect by the 11 November, the end of the presidential term, this would throw the country into a constitutional crisis. TSA: Is the Supreme Court’s decision to annul the elections a first step towards the larger goal of preventing Former President Mohamed Nasheed from partaking in the elections, The PPM has just recently filed a case to disqualify Nasheed from the polls on the basis of “Unislamic” content in some of his speeches.

MA: The Right to “Freedom of Expression” under the Article 27, was given without discrimination during the time President Nasheed held office. This allowed many Imams including those that preached views that were more extreme and called for returning to traditional Shari’ah to give religious sermons. Many of these Imams were imprisoned and tortured under the former President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom’s regime. President Nasheed’s Minister for Islamic Affairs, Dr. Bari has clarified and confirmed in a televised interview that President Nasheed has never made attempts to go against Islamic values and advised many projects to be aligned with religious values. Additionally, given that more than half of the country lives below the poverty line, President Nasheed established a “Minimum Social Protection Floor” – guided by UNDP in order to eradicate wide scale impoverishment. The analysis of the social welfare system in collaboration with the UN started back in 2007. However, when President Nasheed established the system, it transformed the more feudal system of charitable giving in the Maldives and challenged the status quo where the rich controlled the wealth and it was never equally distributed. Many of his policies attempted, and was successfully, alleviating the population from hardship and social chaos: social protection system to the alleviate poverty, transportation system to ensure the population had cheaper access to

services such as health and education, introduction of universal healthcare, addressing the drug misuse from both a policing and rehabilitation perspective, and creating access to affordable housing. His policies also emphasized on celebrating the family unit and helping the family keep it intact, which is cornerstone of Islam. Many of these problems are interlinked and addressing one of them separately would be insufficient. For example if one looks a the drug issue in the Maldives it is not only resulting from a lack of activities for young people but many experience child sexual abuse or some form of violence in there lives, live in overcrowded housing taking shifts to sleep, lack of opportunities for higher education and lack of access to proper health care. UNICEF report in 2007 revealed that 20% of girls and 11% boys in secondary school have experienced childhood sexual abuse. And research around the world is clear that childhood abuse is a major cause of later life psychological and psychiatric problems, drug misuse, difficulty in maintaining relationships and so on; in younger children behavioural factors can be manifested’ such as bed wetting, engaging in play that is sexual, being aggressive, nightmares, and so on. Drug use threatens the very fundamental rights that Islam sets out to protect: protection of life, religion, intellect, lineage, and property. Hence, if one looked at President Nasheed’s polices closely they mirror the end result expressed in the doctrines

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of al-maqasid al-shari’ah (the Objective and purpose of Shari’ah – prevention of harm and protection of dignity) and maslahah (public interest). All his policies aimed at alleviating hardship and social problems that cause hardship to the community. And most importantly, when majority of the country lives under the poverty line a proper social protection mechanism was important to ensure that every Maldivian had the opportunities in life that would assist him/her reach their full potential. TSA: Ms Aishath Velezinee, former member of the Maldives Judicial Service Commission, has been very active and vocal on judicial reform in the past. What steps need be made in order for the Maldives to have a functioning judiciary in line with democratic principles?

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MA: In 2011, the International Commission of Jurists in their report “Securing an Independent Judiciary in a Time of Transition” found that the Judicial Service Commission of the Maldives had avoided investigating serious charges of abuse of power and sexual misconduct of some members of the judiciary. In addition to this report Ms. Aishath Velezinee has been very vocal about the level of knowledge among majority of judges at insufficient under the current Constitution. More recently the UN Special Rapporteur for the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, Gabriela Knaul, in her report highlighted that the concept of judicial independence has been “misconstrued and misinterpreted” by all actors, including the judiciary. None of the recommendations based on these reports have been implemented to date. It is important that these

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recommendations are implemented to ensure that judges with convictions and those that do not hold the required qualifications stipulated under Article 285 of the Constitution are investigated and necessary actions are taken. Additionally, it is a collective obligation laid on any Muslim population to ensure that those who hold positions in the office of the judge (judiciary) are pious, have the knowledge and high level of competence that is required of judges. TSA: What is the relationship between Sharia and Common law in the Maldives? What is the relationship between Sharia and Common law in the Maldives? And how important is the role of Sharia in the Maldivian legal system? MA: Islam is the state religion and is the basis for all laws is stipulated under Article 10 of the Constitution 2008. Additionally, a law that is in contradiction to the tenets of Islam cannot be passed. To date Islamic law is not codified in legislation but is considered authoritative in practice apart from the personal status or family law that was codified in 2000. Offences considered under the Penal Code are referred to as “legal offences” and those offences that are governed by Islamic Law are referred as “sharui offences”. Legal offences are administered under the Penal Code while “Sharui” offences are left up to the discretion of judges who employ principles of Shar’iah.

With the introduction of the new Constitution in 2008, references can only be made to laws and regulations. However, judges are required to follow procedures, circulars and rulings of the Supreme Court. TSA: What are the prospects of seeing perpetrators of Human Rights violations, being brought to justice in the Maldives? Is this only possible with judicial reform? MA: In July 2012, the Committee pertaining to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) recommended that an ‘Independent commission of inquiry to investigate all human rights violations’ be established. The collaborative effort of the human rights organisation REDRESS and Torture Victims Associations (TVA) of the Maldives presented a detailed report with accounts from survivors of torture, with many committed under President Gayoom’s regime. Furthermore, the Committee recommended that torture victims of 8th February 2012, following the transition of power, have been provided with compensation and rehabilitation. The government to date has followed none of these recommendations. Additionally, in March 2013, the Supreme Court re-instated the President of the Maldives Civil Service Commission ruling that the Parliament’s decision to remove Mr. Fahmy who was accused of sexually harassing a female employee from his post was unconstitutional. More

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recently, a sitting Supreme Court judge, Mr Ali Hameed, is allegedly seen engaging in sex acts with several women in a leaked video. While, these two acts are considered one of the gravest sins in Religious leaders have been silent on this matter, while they have been very vocal in claiming that President Nasheedâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s policies are un-Islamic. It is evident that human rights have not been given a priority and hence at this point it is very unlikely that perpetrators of human rights violations be brought to justice without judicial reform. TSA: How important is it to restore democracy in the Maldives â&#x20AC;&#x201C; in terms of child protection? MA: Restoring democracy is very important in the small island state Maldives. The dynamics of this beautiful chain of islands are also characterized by the lack of privacy and personalization of conflicts. Hence, working in child protection becomes a challenge both for child victims and duty bearers. Partisan politics greatly influenced workplace and service provision through perceived defragmentation of the civil service that was aligned with the former President Gayoom, from government policies of President Mohamed Nasheed). The social protection system is still in its infancy with little expertise in

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a country where government and politics have been pervasive, although to a lesser extent, with the steadfast democratization process in place since 2008. However, this progress has been reversed by the more dictatorial elements of the government that came into power through the coup. The adhoc and unsustainable welfare policies and dependence on the state is still promoted by those competing with the Maldivian Democratic Party in the presidential elections as part of their political aspirations. Multi party system introduced in 2004 and presidential system of governance has had varying degree of influences on the developing social and child protection system, ensuring transparency and greater accountability. The Maldives has a unique opportunity to develop an Islamic child protection system that is compliant with the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. However it cannot be achieved without restoring democracy and the reforming of the judiciary. TSA: Thank you very much for taking the time to answer our questions in these dire times your country is currently facing.

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Orwell’s Pakistan I was born in Pakistan in 1980, just as the country’s military dictator General Zia ul Haq’s Islamization process started gaining momentum. By the time I started school, Pakistan’s educational institutions were teaching a thoroughly Islamized curriculum in line with the American backed dictator’s vision for the nation. As I look back today I can see a shocking number of parallels between the society I was born into and the dystopian future imagined by George Orwell in his novel “1984”. Orwell’s inspiration for this novel came from Stalin’s Soviet Union and all the excesses associated with his regime. However, in the 1980’s the Soviet Union was crumbling and many considered this to be the ultimate negation of the Big Brother style of governance along with the brainwashing of the masses and historical revisionism that characterized it. Yet as glasnost and perestroika were sounding the funeral march of the USSR, Orwellian tactics were being employed by the Western Bloc’s staunchest ally in South Asia, Pakistan. Even though Zia is long dead and gone, the Pakistani nation is still suffering

from the consequences of this period of state-sponsored brainwashing. Renowned scholar and historian K.K. Aziz in his book “The Murder of History” exposes how the History and Pakistan Studies curricula was nothing more than political propaganda aimed at indoctrinating young minds through half-truths and blatant falsehoods. When the National Review Committee of the Federal Education Ministry appropriated the role of approving the ‘ideological’ content of our textbooks it was reminiscent of Orwell’s Ministry of Truth. Historical facts were distorted or deleted from our curriculum to support the islamist/jihadist narrative of the military government. A new “truth” was developed with the objective of creating a uniform and ideologically stunted youth. And it is this new “truth” that is still being taught in Pakistani school. Every year millions of students graduate from primary school believing that Maulana Maududi (founder of the subcontinent’s most prominent Islamist party Jamaat e Islami) was part of the battle to create Pakistan even though he was a vocal opponent. Our youth

Hassan Bajwa Pakistani/Danish entrepreneur, Communications Professional, TV & Radio host and social commentator

“Even though Zia is long dead and gone, the Pakistani nation is still suffering from the consequences of this period of state-sponsored brainwashing.” THINK SOUTH ASIA

“Every year millions of students graduate from primary school believing that Maulana Maududi (founder of the sub-continent’s most prominent Islamist party Jamaat e Islami) was part of the battle to create Pakistan even though he was a vocal opponent.”

“As a result we have a youth that (as noted by many surveys) is utterly confused about their identity, with an ingrained anti-India sentiment and a vague sense of pan-Islamic identity that suits the Islamist fundamentalist narrative perfectly.” 14

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believes that the separation of East Pakistan was a result of the “nefarious designs of the evil Hindus” (quoted from the Pakistan Studies textbook by A.K. Rabbani) rather than the refusal of West Pakistan to acknowledge East Pakistani Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s electoral victory in 1971 and the subsequent brutality of the Pakistani Army against East Pakistani protesters. These students grow up without knowledge of the address to Pakistan’s first Constituent Assembly by the nation’s founding father Muhammad Ali Jinnah, where he clearly outlined his secular vision for the new state. They know every detail about Jinnah,

but are never made aware of the fact that he was married to a Parsi and that his daughter married a non-Muslim. They are taught an incorrect translation of the Islamic proclamation of faith to justify the state’s persecution of the Ahmadi minority. The sheer scale of brainwashing is staggering considering the fact that this curriculum has been taught unchanged in Pakistani schools for 30 years. Its ramifications are even more horrifying considering that this propaganda is now dominating public discourse and forms the bulk of our national narrative. The majority of Pakistan’s opinion leaders

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comprise of the “educated elite” who were raised to consider this fictional history as the incontrovertible truth. Even today, TV anchors, journalists and politicians continue to churn out such half truths on a daily basis, lending credibility to a narrative thoroughly discredited by historians like Aziz. As a result we have a youth that (as noted by many surveys) is utterly confused about their identity, with an ingrained anti-India sentiment and a vague sense of pan-Islamic identity that suits the Islamist fundamentalist narrative perfectly. There is no doubt that fundamentalism is on the rise in Pakistan. Many however fail to understand why the fundamentalist narrative finds such popular support in our society. Most Pakistanis point to the proliferation of madrassas (seminaries) and mosques funded by Saudi petrodollars all around the country. While the madrassas and mosques play a key role in radicalizing the poor and disenfranchised, the greatest threat to Pakistan comes from the inability of the intellectual elite to provide a reasonable counter-narrative to the fire-and-brimstone rhetoric of the seminaries.

That is why even educated intellectuals pander to fundamentalist demands, why progressive parties like the PTI insist on dialogue with terrorist outfits and otherwise intelligent young people support the travesty of justice represented by the controversial Blasphemy and Hadood laws. In order for the Pakistani nation to correct the errors of the past and formulate a strong and consistent response to the increased radicalism and fundamentalism plaguing the society, I believe the first step lies in a thorough and comprehensive review of what our children are taught in school. Only through a sincere and thorough review of our school curricula can we hope to create the minds and personalities required to oppose the violent insanity of the fundamentalists.

“Only through a sincere and thorough review of our school curricula can we hope to create the minds and personalities required to oppose the violent insanity of the fundamentalists.”

“Who controls the past controls the future. Who controls the present controls the past.” says Orwell. Today the fundamentalist narrative controls Pakistan’s present. If we are to give our youth a future, we must strengthen them today so they may reclaim their past.

It is simply not possible for an educated class force-fed a fictional and historically incorrect “truth” to create the required counter narrative.

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Between Dhamma-Ghosa and Bheri-Ghosa: Militant Buddhism in Burma

Dr. Peter Lehr Lecturer in Terrorism Studies CSTPV, University of St Andrews Scotland/UK

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In one of his famous edicts, Maurya emperor Asoka declared that under his Buddhist rule, the sound of the war drum (Bheri-Ghosa) had been replaced by the call of Dhamma (Dhamma-Ghosa). Since then, a profound pacifism seemed to have been the hallmark of Buddhism and its various traditions, peacefully spreading all over India into Central, East and Southeast Asia. We are well aware of Christian fundamentalism, political Islam including Salafism-Jihadism, the Hindutva movement or militant Judaism and Sikhism. Extremist Buddhism however features only rarely: somehow, the very idea of Buddhist monks throwing Molotov cocktails or torching buildings while exhorting violent mobs to do likewise seems to be outright ludicrous. Recent events in Sri Lanka, Burma and Thailand however indicate that a militant strand of Buddhism (Theravada Buddhism, to be precise) is on the rise, with prominent Buddhist monks such as Ashin Wirathu (Burma) acting as preachers of hate – an expression that so far seemed to have been reserved for Islamists calling for a global Jihad. How can this be explained?

Let us start with the doctrine of Ahimsa, which, on the surface, should act as a powerful barrier against acts of violence committed by Buddhists – especially violence against human beings committed by fully-ordained Buddhist monks who, according to the Vinaya (Buddhist Monastic Code) would face excommunication and expulsion from the Sanghaor monastic community. However, as in any belief system, there are exceptions. For example, while expansionist warfare is prohibited, armed defence is seen as permissible under certain conditions, and even as unavoidable in this current age of Dukkha (suffering). One such condition would be the impression that Buddhism is under siege by a hostile non-Buddhist enemy – Buddhism defined not necessarily in the sense of an abstract belief system but as a concrete Buddhist community or polity inhabiting ‘sacred lands’. Militant Buddhism violence defined in this way is actually nothing new. In Sri Lanka, Buddhist monks were actively involved in anti-Tamil political violence from the early 1950s onward. In Thailand, monks were actively engaged

in the fight against Communism in the 1970s. And in Burma, monks were part of the armed resistance against the British colonial administration as early as the 1880s, against Indian Hindus and Muslims associated with the colonial system in the 1920s and 1930s, and against various antiBurmese insurgencies of non-Buddhist ethnic groups after independence. As of today, the most formidable and dangerous ‘other’ in the eyes of both Buddhist monks and laity in Burma, Sri Lanka and Thailand are Muslims. Again, Buddhist violence against Muslims is, strictly speaking, not a new phenomenon – especially not in Burma. The Democratic Kayin Buddhist Army (DKBA) for example was founded (in 1994) and led by monk U Thuzana, who used it as a vehicle to terrorize Muslim communities in Burma’s Kayin State with the aim to evict them from the region. Similarly, the Arakan Liberation Party, whose leadership nearly exclusively consisted of monks and former monks, also targeted Muslim with the same aim: evicting them from their ‘sacred’ Buddhist land. Today’s leading Burmese monk at the forefront of this on-going fight against perceived Muslim ‘intruders’ is Ashin Wirathu, described by The Economist as a ‘notorious chauvinist’ and by Time Magazineas ‘the face of Buddhist terror.’ Ashin Wirathu, who is actually proud to be called a radical

Buddhist, would beg to differ. From his perspective, Muslims are becoming stronger and more dangerous day by day, gradually taking over all the land, all the industry and finally all the resources until Burma will entirely be Muslim. Hence, this is not the time for calm meditation, but for firm action, defending the Buddhist nation: “You can be full of kindness and love, but you cannot sleep next to a mad dog. If we are weak, our land will become Muslim” (Thomas Fuller, Extremism Rises among Myanmar Buddhists, New York Times 20 June 2013). Against a backdrop of rapid socio-economic and socio-political change in Burma on the one hand, and the killing of a monk in Meiktila by Muslims in early 2013 on the other, it is not surprising that his message finds resonance among the Buddhist mainstream – he at least offers an easy-to-understand explanation for these unwelcome changes plus a convenient scapegoat on top of that. Very similar motivations are at work in the cases of Sri Lanka and Thailand – here restricted to the Deep South, however, where the Muslims are a majority in an otherwise Buddhist country. In this particular case, the rationalization and justification of anti-Muslim violence is basically the same as the one used in the fight against the Communists in the 1970s, when ultra-nationalist monk Phra Kittiwuttho declared that those ‘bestial types’ who try to destroy the

“As of today, the most formidable and dangerous ‘other’ in the eyes of both Buddhist monks and laity in Burma, Sri Lanka and Thailand are Muslims.”

“We are well aware of Christian fundamentalism, political Islam including SalafismJihadism, the Hindutva movement or militant Judaism and Sikhism. Extremist Buddhism however features only rarely.”

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“Ashin Wirathu, described by The Economist as a ‘notorious chauvinist’ and by Time Magazine as ‘the face of Buddhist terror.”

“These few examples should suffice to demonstrate that militant, extremist and ultra-nationalist Buddhist violence is not a new phenomenon.”

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Thai nation, religion and monarchy ‘are not complete persons’: “Thus we must intend not to kill people but to kill the Devil (Mara); this is the duty of all Thai” (Michael Jerryson, Appropriating a space for violence: State Buddhism in southern Thailand, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies Vol. 40, Issue 1, February 2009). Like in neighbouring Burma, the rather gruesome deaths of several monks, nuns and even novices serve as further justification, accelerating the violence and deepening the feeling of being under siege by a merciless enemy who is determined to destroy the Buddhist state, and finds ready support from the other side of the border: in the Thai case, Muslim Malaysia, in the Burmese case, Muslim Bangladesh – and, by extension, the whole Muslim world. These few examples should suffice to demonstrate that militant, extremist and ultra-nationalist Buddhist violence

is not a new phenomenon, but rather an over-looked and under-reported one that was successfully kept hidden for quite a while. In the era of modern media such as global television, Twitter or YouTube, this however is no longer possible: militant Buddhist violence and its current Islamophobia are out there for everyone to see. With regard to Buddhist violence against Muslim Rohingyas in Burma, this already led to a backlash: both the Taliban in Pakistan as well as the Indonesian Jemaah Islamiyah condemned the attacks, promising to avenge them. The bombing attacks against one of the holiest sites of Buddhism, the Bodh Gaya temple complex in Bihar in July 2013, indicates that these threats may not remain on a purely rhetorical level for much longer. In any case, for the time being it can be expected that the sound of war drums becomes louder and louder : as Ashin Wirathu said, this is not the time for calm…

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Buddhist fundamentalism in Sri Lanka Rising Buddhist fundamentalism in Sri Lanka goes hand in hand with Sinhalese nationalism. The increasing frequency and intensity of attacks against Muslims are reminiscent of the anti-Tamil riots in 1983 that marked the beginning of the violent 26 year long conflict. Just as after its independence in 1948, Sri Lanka once again has to create a nation. After its long lasting civil war, one of Sri Lanka’s main obstacles is the inclusion of minorities within the state and social framework, and to define which role they are going to play.. While after independence the Sinhalese majority’s resentment was targeted at the ethnic minority of Tamils, a new campaign has been launched against a different minority the Muslim community. This time the boundaries are drawn along religious lines. The radicalisation of Buddhist monks led to the formation of various fundamentalist groups which have been calling for “direct action” against the Muslim minority. Since these extremist Buddhist elements are increasing their influence –in the government as well as in the streets of Sri Lanka- violence and aggression against the Muslim minority has become a more frequent phenomenon. Due to radical Buddhist monks’ influence on Sri Lanka’s politics, it is doubtful that the role “envisioned” for the Muslims will contribute to a harmonious coexistence of Sri Lanka’s diverse communities.

Since 2011, only two years after the Tamil separatists were defeated, a chain of aggressive actions against Sri Lanka’s Muslim minority took place. Fundamentalist Buddhist organisations have launched campaigns against Muslims, claiming the proscription of cattle slaughter, halal classification of food and the conversion of Buddhists. The level of aggression is rising constantly, and frequency and severity of incidents are increasing as well. While in April 2012 a mosque in Dambulla, a town about 150 kilometres away from Sri Lanka’s capital Colombo fell victim to vandalism by Buddhist monks, only one month later another mosque in Dehiwala, a suburb of Colombo, was attacked by 200 demonstrators led by radical Buddhists accusing the Muslims of the performance of daily animal sacrifices, the mob threw stones and rotten animal meat at the mosque. Even private citizens and business men are not spared from attacks. At the beginning of 2013, monks stormed a Muslim slaughter house in Dematagoda, Colombo, accusing the owners of slaughtering calves which is forbidden in the capital. While the Muslims leaders repeatedly requested their members to refrain from violence and counter-strikes, it nonetheless came to first clashes after a mosque in Colombo was attacked by Buddhist monks, who threw stones at the mosque during the evening prayers,

La Toya Waha Masters Student of South Asian Studies at the South Asia Institute, Heidelberg University

“Due to radical Buddhist monks’ influence on Sri Lanka’s politics, it is doubtful that the role “envisioned” for the Muslims will contribute to a harmonious coexistence of Sri Lanka’s diverse communities.” THINK SOUTH ASIA

leaving at least five men injured. One day after the attack the two parties clashed in the streets. Although the police was able to bring the situation under control, a curfew was enforced.

“A great problem aside from the attacks is the entanglement of state officials with Buddhist radicals. ”

“Fundamentalist organisations of Buddhist monks create the picture of Muslims endangering the superiority and singularity of Buddhism in Sri Lanka, and the gradual extinction of the Sinhalese culture.”

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A great problem aside from the attacksis the entanglement of state officials with Buddhist radicals. Despite wilful damage to property and the injury of several people, no arrests have been made. The close ties between the government and one of the most prominent new hard-line groups, the Bodu Bala Sena (BBS) - “Buddhist Strength Force”- became obvious through the attendance at an opening ceremony and the rhetoric, high officials used to back the group’s actions. At the opening ceremony of the organisation’s new trainings centre, the Defence Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapaksa, the brother of Sri Lanka’s President Mahinda Rajapaksa, said: “It is the monks who protect our country, religion and race” and “No one should doubt these clergy. We’re here to give you encouragement.” It appears to be surprising that the Muslims, a Tamil- as well as Sinhalaspeaking minority of about 9 % of the population, who had taken the side of the government during the civil war despite having to face repressions from the Tamil separatists during the civil war, are now in the focus of hard-line Buddhist monks; despite the fundamental Buddhist rules of compassion and non-violence. Although the Sinhalese majority, about three-quarters is Buddhist, the religious groups haven been living peacefully together. After the defeat of the Tamil separatist movement and the “putting into place” of the Tamils, a new “outside group” had to be found against which a new Lankan identity could be formed. It is radicalized Buddhist monks who

want Sri Lanka to be a Buddhist state in order to secure their position in society. Therefore, fundamentalist organisations of Buddhist monks create the picture of Muslims endangering the superiority and singularity of Buddhism in Sri Lanka, and the gradual extinction of the Sinhalese culture. Akmeemana Dayarathana, a Buddhist monk who is the head of another fundamentalist group, the Sinhala Echo, stated: “Look around the world – Malaysia, Indonesia, Pakistan, Afghanistan and others, they were all Buddhist countries- but the Muslims destroyed the culture and then took over the country. We worry they’re planning it here too”. Here the confusion of religious fundamentalism and nationalism becomes obvious. The people on the street follow the Buddhist monks because they fear their culture is at the brink of destruction their land is in the midst of a take-over by Muslims. In addition Muslims are also made responsible for poor economic lconditions. The state officials are currently turning a blind eye on Buddhist violence since they hope it will turn out to be politically advantageous and that their actions will be legitimised in the name of Buddhism by the Buddhist clergy. The fact that parts of the government are supporting fundamentalist groups in one way or the other does not hint at a democratisation of the country. Rather it fortifies the impression that more and more power is conferred on the government. If parts of the society are attacked without a firm reaction of the state, and if the government seeks legitimisation through the Buddhist clergy rather than through fair and democratic elections, it is doubtful that Sri Lanka will succeed in becoming a stable and pluralistic democracy.

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The emerging Islamist plexus in Bangladesh Since the 1990s, Islamic fundamentalism in Bangladesh has been on the rise, not only in the parliamentary and politicaladministrative spheres, but also outside the institutional structure in the form of the emergence of militant outfits. Therefore, one can state that the Islamists are following a twofold strategy: First, trying to undermine the political system from within by using the opportunities offered in a democratic form of governance, which can be described as the formal ‘political front’ of the fundamentalist movement; second, the construction and implementation of an informal, extra-constitutional ‘militant front’. This finds its expression in the use of physical violence, armed confrontation, and other extra-judicial measures. Both strategies – political and militant – are aimed at achieving the core fundamentalist goal of establishing an Islamic state based on a narrow interpretation of Islam. One has to be aware, that this includes the elimination of democracy, the rejection of secularism, human rights, and especially women’s rights in Bangladesh. Due to close linkages with Islamist terrorist organizations like the Taliban it is becoming more obvious that the

Islamists in Bangladesh are increasingly applying the same tactics its peers use in Afghanistan in order to gain power. In assessing the performance of the Islamists, one must state that they have made worrying progress. Due to a political alliance with the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), Islamist political front organizations became a part of the government and entrenched themselves in party politics as well as in key positions of the institutional structure. Regarding the militant front one can state that the presence of Islamist parties in the political power structure, especially their anti-Indian, pro-Pakistan, and pro-Islamic policy, provide a convenient atmosphere for the growth of Islamic militancy. Furthermore, due to political patronage, especially the granting of impunity, militants felt increasingly encouraged to carry out their ‘Islamisation’ campaign by violent means. Especially in the rural areas this is gaining significance. In the earlier years it was common understanding that Islamic propaganda and action were confined to urban centre’s, because people on the country side were more concerned

Dr. Siegfried O. Wolf Director of Research of South Asia Democratic Forum; Lecturer in International Relations and Comparative Politics at the South Asia Institute, Heidelberg University, Germany

» THINK SOUTH ASIA

“Due to close linkages with Islamist terrorist organizations like the Taliban it is becoming more obvious that the Islamists in Bangladesh are increasingly applying the same tactics its peers use in Afghanistan in order to gain power.” 22

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with the daily life challenges than supporting religious fundamentalism. However, this argument must be questioned due to the increasing activities of the militant groups in rural areas. The following reasons must be mentioned: It is naïve to state, that unfortunate socio-economic conditions automatically lead to a disinterest towards religious fanaticism amongst the rural population. There is evidence from an international perspective, that especially because of the deterioration of living conditions, people are successfully being targeted by Islamist recruiting patterns. Furthermore, due to the use of force combined with the patronage from local authorities, people in remote areas lack sufficient protection against militant Islamists’ campaigns and are forced to accept their influence and to follow their fundamentalist directives. Consequently, religious fundamentalists, due to support from Islamists and Islamists-friendly political parties, gained significant leverage not only over vast parts of the country, but also over large sections of the society, urban as well as rural. Additionally, the Islamist movement was able to build firm bridgeheads in all governmental departments and the societal institutional structure. In brief, the fundamentalists are developing a strong countrywide network to gain and maintain power in order to carry out an Islamist revolution. In this context, one must state that Bangladesh Islamists are not only a firm and integrated part of an international terrorist network, but also a pivot of terror serving as an additional as well

as alternative resource and coordination base, providing man power, training facilities, hideouts, and logistics. Even more, Bangladesh is increasingly functioning as a plexus between South East Asia, South Asia, and Central Asia, from Thailand to Afghanistan. Here one can state that there is correlation between the resurgence and re-strengthening of militant Islamist forces in Afghanistan and Pakistan and the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in Bangladesh. Osama bin Laden’s wellknown declaration in 1998 that called for an coordinated international Jihad, did not only heave al-Qaida, the Taliban and other groups into the larger picture but also made Bangladeshi Islamist groups and organisations part of global jihad. In consequence, over the last years violent attacks by Islamists have been rising. But also in qualitative terms the threat scenario posed by militants is growing exponentially in Bangladesh. This finds its expression in more aggressive forms of fundamentalism. They have targeted ‘recalcitrant’ politicians, academics, journalists and bloggers, members of the judiciary, religious minorities, especially Buddhist, Hindus and Christians. Also moderate Muslims, who do not adhere to the extremist doctrines, are considered to be not Islamic (enough) and as such are labelled ‘infidels’ and subsequently-considered to be fair game. It is important to note, that the Islamists are not only fighting against members of certain religious minorities, or Islamic sects whom they view as un-

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Islamic (e.g. Ahmadiyya): the actions make it clear that Islamists want to eliminate everything which is related with these groups. In other words, they don’t only fight the followers of certain religious communities but their belief systems as well: burning Holy Scriptures and other texts of religious significance, destroying houses of worship and respective educational institutions and socio-economic development facilities. Furthermore, since religion is very much intermingled with local traditions, habits and customs, as well as going along ethnic lines, Islamists are also destroying regionally orientated cultural patterns, values and goods, like Bangladesh’s syncretistic folk tradition. Since regional culturalreligious elements underpin plurality and tolerance in Muslim societies they are perceived as a threat towards the pan-Islamic world view of Islamists. It is a large threat to the omnipotence of the sole and narrow interpretation of Islam extremist elements adhere to. Therefore, Islamic fundamentalism is the most dangerous challenge not only towards the existence but also for the values Bangladesh stands for: democracy, secularism, and tolerance. Instead of being a model for other countries with Muslim majority populations regarding the implementation of a democratic and secular form of governance, Bangladesh is dangerously close to turning into an autocratic, Islamic fundamentalist state. This is surprising since the majority of the Bangladeshis are committed to democratic order and secularism.

Despite all the political turmoil, surveys confirm that a democratic regime is the most preferable form of government in Bangladesh. For example, IDEA’s 2008 edition of the “State of Democracy in South Asia” points out that 69 per cent of the people are support democracy. Nevertheless, it seems that the political landscape in Bangladesh has changed to such an extent that even politicians and political parties, known as spearheads of secular and democratic principles, ignore the creeping Islamic takeover. This marks a trend which is diametric opposite to the long moderate tradition of Islam in Bangladesh. Therefore, one has to raise the question how this could happen. Why could Bangladesh transform from a state which perceived itself as deeply committed to secularism and tolerance, and as such the forefront of democratic transition in the Islamic world, to just another state which has to suffer from the chokehold of Islamic bigotry and fanaticism? In other words, why does the Bangladeshi state accept the deconstruction of its foundational identity, political-administrative system, and the terrorizing of its society? Needless to say, such a complex puzzle will be not solved easily, but a matrix of causalities can be identified. In general, the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in Bangladesh is determined by endogenous (domestic) and exogenous (international) elements. Both streams of factors led to a troubled and tragic political scenario which enabled the existence of a breeding ground for religious fanaticism. Regarding the

“Especially because of the deterioration of living conditions, people are successfully being targeted by Islamist recruiting patterns.”

“In other words, they don’t only fight the followers of certain religious communities but their belief systems as well.”

THINK SOUTH ASIA

“Islamic fundamentalism is the most dangerous challenge not only towards the existence but also for the values Bangladesh stands for: democracy, secularism, and tolerance.”

“Another important feature of Bangladesh’s uncertain political climate is the tense civil-military relationship which led to indirect militarization of politics and direct military rule”

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domestic dimension following reasons are predominantly responsible: To begin with, there is an unfortunate political culture which is determined by extraordinary polarisation, hostility, and politics of revenge between the two major political parties. By experiencing this, political actors see democracy as a zero-sum game marked by a destructive ‘tit-for-tat’ strategy in order to achieve partisan objectives which are prioritized over national concerns. In this context, not only political institutions and society are highly politicised but also the whole governmental machinery. Appointments in politics and administration are based more on loyalty, obedience, obeisance, charisma, and kinship, rather than on performance, merits, and skills. As a result, many of the state agencies remain ineffective or absent in rural/ remote areas which is yet just another nail in the coffin of already poor and stagnating governance. This has also enabled endemic corruption to spread like a wildfire. In addition to that, the undemocratic nature, unprofessional practice and behaviour of political parties contribute to the semblance of instability as well. Political parties possess a weak organizational structure, lack internal democracy and a code of ethics. They suffer from a high degree of intra-party factional feuds leading to numerous fissions (and fusions) in the past. Excessive personal leadership cult, dynastic rule, patron clientelism, as well as politics of patronage constitute other negative traits of the country’s polity. At the same time, criminalization of politics, coercion as an acceptable mode

of governance and widespread use of violence are punctuating the political landscape negatively. Subsequently politicians, rely on musclemen (mastaans/goondas) to achieve goals in an unrestricted struggle for power. Another important feature of Bangladesh’s uncertain political climate is the tense civil-military relationship which led to indirect militarization of politics and direct military rule. Therefore, it does not come as a surprise that there is a lack of confidence of the people in the political leadership which implemented a highly centralized and personalised decision-making style extending the power distance between politicians and general public. The latter is just seen as an instrument to outbid the political enemy. This is gaining significance, since there is also no constructive working relationship between the government and opposition. In result, the parliament as the place for political debate to deal with issues concerning the opposition and the people (which are already hampered by low social capital and education/ literacy) is paralysed and/or side-lined. Instead, in order to ventilate grievances, politics is moved towards the streets, especially by calling ‘hartals’ (general strikes) with detrimental ramifications for the already deteriorating socioeconomic conditions. In addition to these internal factors, external ones were crucial for the growth of the Islamists as well. One of the most significant roles is played by Saudi Arabia, especially by its financial support and other economic benefits. Like for (Sunni) Islamists, the

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Iranian revolution as inspiration for a global Islamist movement (mostly for the Shia stream), the defeat of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, the emergence of the Taliban movement and other international militant groups (including the supportive role of Pakistan), and, last but not least, the troubled relations of Bangladesh with India and Myanmar/Burma, as well as the ‘proxy-war’ between Pakistan and India. To sum up, besides all these determinants which prepared the inroad for the Islamists into the political and social system of Bangladesh, there are also still indications of the general desire and political will of secular forces to stop this process of transforming the county into an Islamic fundamentalist state. But there is no doubt that the influence over state and society of Islamists is growing and the quality of democracy especially the respect of human rights is

in a spiral decline. However, Bangladesh showed in the past that it is possible to form larger alliances. For example the massive political upheavals in 1990 or in 2006/2007, despite deep polarisation of society, the Bangladesh people and all kinds of civil society organisations, forced the political parties’ leadership to build a national consensus and to form an alliance against military rule. Also today, there is a need for such a national consensus in order to not only bounce back from Islamic fundamentalism but also to eradicate it from Bangladesh.

“There is a need for such a national consensus in order to not only bounce back from Islamic fundamentalism but also to eradicate it from Bangladesh. ” THINK SOUTH ASIA

Déjà vu in Kashmir: Resurgence of Islamic Militancy

Animesh Roul Executive Director at Society for the Study of Peace and Conflict, executive editor of South Asia Conflict Monitor (SACM)

“Blatant cases of ceasefire violation triggered heavy exchanges of fire at the LoC and reports of massive militant infiltration came into light in early 2013.” 26

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The reality so far in global geopolitics is ‘once a contested land, always a contested land’. The best example has been Jammu & Kashmir (J&K). Over 65 years have passed since the first batch of Pakistani intruders with the help of army regulars came face to face with the Indian army, the violence continues unabated in the J&K. Since then, India and Pakistan have fought at least three major wars and as many skirmishes, with intermittent, mostly half- hearted and ineffective bilateral peace overtures from both sides. Blatant cases of ceasefire violation triggered heavy exchanges of fire at the LoC and reports of massive militant infiltration came into light in early 2013. Since then fears of an impending border conflict have increased manifold between the two neighboring nuclear weapon powers as a series of ceasefire violations, terrorist incursions and suicide attacks on Indian Army and police forces virtually marked the onset of a long battle at the Line of Control (LoC). One estimate suggests, there have been nearly 120 incidents of ceasefire violation from Pakistan side along the LoC in J&K until late September this year, the highest since 2008. Indian Army and paramilitary forces are always busy fighting a two pronged war at the LoC: preventing infiltration of

militants into Jammu and Kashmir and at the same time tackling provocative firing from Pakistan side which acts as cover for sneaking militants. Gunfire and shelling from the Pakistani side of the LoC is common when simultaneous attempts are made to push militant proxies into Indian Territory. To note, Indian Army has been engaged with an ongoing anti-infiltration operation in Shalbhatti locality in Keran Sector since September 23 after noticing a group of 30 to 40 Pakistan based militants attempting to intrude into the Kashmir. Jammu and Kashmir has been on the boil one again with the early January beheadings and mutilations of Indian army soldiers in the Poonch sector by Islamic militants that spurred a pitched debate on the very intention of Pakistan especially when cross border violence has subsided substantially over the past many years. Again in early August (06), five Indian soldiers were killed in an ambush by around 20 heavily-armed militants along the Line of Control in the same Poonch sector of Jammu and Kashmir. The involvement of Pakistan Army’s Border Action Team (BAT) and heavily armed terrorists were confirmed through subsequent investigations. Soon after, Pakistani soldiers targeted at least 16 Indian army forward posts and civilian areas in Poonch. In late September (September

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26) Pakistan based militants with army fatigue perpetrated “fidayeen” (suicide) attacks on police posts and army units killing around 14 people, including a lieutenant-colonel of the Indian Army in Kathua and Samba districts of Jammu region. The twin terror attack was claimed by a hitherto unknown group Shuhada (martyrs) Brigade. It has to be recollected that efforts inside Pakistan to garner support for Jihad in Kashmir by militant groups like Hizbul Mujahideen, Lashkar-e-Taiba and AlBadr Mujahideen (HM-LeT-ABM) in the recent past resulted in the formation of this newly hybrid Jihadi group. The above mentioned groups have been organizing fund raising activities under the banner of “Shuada Conference” and conduct rallies to recruit new talent for revival of jihad in Kashmir and Afghanistan for some time openly in Pakistan. In all likelihood the Shuhada Brigade involved in September 26 and following incidents in J&K, a byproduct of HM-LeT-ABM’s Kashmir centric efforts in Pakistan. The disturbing situation at the border and inside Kashmir could be an act of desperation on the part of the Pakistani military and its Jihadi proxies. Even though Pakistan denies any involvement and washes its hand with that ‘Non state actor’ argument to favor its stand. Of course these so called Non State Actors are freely raising funds from government and private sources in Pakistan to wage jihad in Kashmir.

Evidently, the plan to revive Kashmiri militancy has already been implemented and is ongoing. This spurt of violence in J&K has a direct linkage with regular meetings of Kashmiri separatist leaders hosted by the All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC), Syed Salahuddin of Hizbul Mujahideen/United Jihad Council (HM/UJC) and Hafiz Saeed of the LeT/JuD who brainstorm to intensify Kashmiri militancy. The Pakistan based militant leaders are seen urgeing factions of separatists in the J&K to unite, with the sole purpose of reviving the Kashmir militant struggle. They also demanded Pakistan’s active support in carrying out a renewed armed insurgency in J&K in the past and even threatened in the following terms:”We (Jihadi militants) are fighting Pakistan’s war in Kashmir and if it withdraws its support, the war would be fought inside Pakistan.” Albeit, with change of guard in Islamabad it seems that there is a genuine concern within Islamabad’s political and civilian fraternities, to normalize bilateral ties with India, but alarmingly the military-militant nexus plays a spoilsport every time there is Indo-Pak bonhomie. And it clearly demonstrates that the government and military (along with is proxies) are not on the same page. Not surprisingly, the vexed issues of territory and terrorism remain unresolved and J&K continues to witness gunfire and bloodshed every now and then, justifying its tag as global flashpoint.

“Jammu and Kashmir has been on the boil one again with the early January beheadings and mutilations of Indian army soldiers in the Poonch sector by Islamic militants.”

“The Pakistan based militant leaders are seen urgeing factions of separatists in the J&K to unite, with the sole purpose of reviving the Kashmir militant struggle.”

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Rethinking America’s Approach to Pakistan

Eric Tope Contributor at International Security Observer (http://securityobserver.org)

“Pakistan has been handsomely rewarded with billions of dollars in American foreign aid. However the investment does not appear to have paid off.” 28

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Any long-term erosion of Islamic militancy in South Asia will surely demand broad support from the Pakistani government, which is precisely what the United States sought in 2001 upon enlisting Islamabad as an ally in the War on Terror. For their participation in this enterprise, Pakistan has been handsomely rewarded with billions of dollars in American foreign aid. However the investment does not appear to have paid off. Despite some modest collaboration, backing Islamic insurgents throughout the region remains a key component of Islamabad’s foreign policy. Consequently, militants, including al Qaeda and the Taliban, still roam Pakistan’s frontier and the prospect of their resurgence in Afghanistan following America’s extrication seems probable. Averting such an outcome will require U.S. policymakers to rethink the manner in which they attempt to induce Pakistan’s cooperation in subverting extremism. Although well-meaning, Washington’s policy of purchasing counterterrorism from Pakistani leaders with foreign aid has been counterproductive, primarily because it rests on flawed logic. Pakistan’s access to American funds is contingent on their pursuit

of militants. As several observers have noted, this arrangement provides them with strong motives to ensure they do not eradicate all jihadists within their grasp, as doing so would remove the basis for future U.S. contributions. Moreover, this approach does not take into account the rationale for Pakistan’s tolerance of radical dissidents, which is driven by their strategic rivalry with India. Islamabad’s track record of aiding militants northwest of the Durand Line, including the Taliban, is predicated on maintaining an anti-Indian regime in Kabul as part of their long-standing policy of retaining strategic depth in Afghanistan. Support for additional organizations including: Laskar-eTayyiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad, is likewise driven by discord with India. Although in this case it is for the purpose of prosecuting an asymmetric war against their conventionally superior foe, especially in the Kashmir valley. The current system of aid disbursement not only fails to acknowledge this, but a lack of accountability regarding distribution allows Pakistan to fund its proxies with American donations exacerbating the very predicament the policy was designed to resolve. Undoing these effects necessitates a restructuring of how payments are allocated as well as

a deeper consideration of what propels Pakistan’s foreign policy. Given that Islamabad’s hospitality to extremists is inextricably adjoined to its competition with New Delhi, any bid to alter the former’s behaviour cannot afford to neglect this correlation. Yet somewhat surprisingly, the mitigation of strife between the two nations, regarding Kashmir in particular, has garnered little in the way of American effort. If the U.S. hopes to genuinely curtail terrorism in South Asia, diplomatic resources and foreign aid must be redirected in order to construct a system of incentives aimed at easing tensions in the region. If successful, such a policy could undercut the very basis of Pakistan’s ties to jihadists, but it will not be easy. The legacy of bloodshed that accompanied partition, a history of constant warfare, India’s resistance to outside mediation, and the Pakistani Military’s determination to thwart rapprochement are all formidable obstacles. Generating a settlement is a tall order indeed, but it is not unprecedented for mortal enemies to ameliorate their hatred when properly incentivized. American aid proved to be crucial in brokering peace between Egypt and Israel despite deep historical animosities, disputes over territory,

and the occurrence of multiple wars beforehand. South Asia may prove to be a much more challenging case, but at the very least it merits some attention, especially considering how problematic the current strategy has been. With the preceding assessment in mind, the limited progress achieved in combating militancy in South Asia is unsurprising. If any lasting impact is to be made, extensive cooperation from Islamabad must be procured, which pay outs alone are unlikely to accomplish. Alleviating friction with India, however, stands a chance of neutralizing Pakistan’s desire to support various insurgent groups. Realizing such an outcome will surely be an arduous task, and even if it is attained violent fundamentalism will not evaporate in the region. Militants will still be able to abscond in Pakistan’s lawless frontier, and the Taliban will inevitably remain part of Afghan political life. Nevertheless, undermining the support network of such organizations could go a long way toward diminishing extremism in South Asia, and with America’s disengagement on the horizon now seems like a prudent time to reevaluate policies of questionable utility.

“If the U.S. hopes to genuinely curtail terrorism in South Asia, diplomatic resources and foreign aid must be redirected in order to construct a system of incentives aimed at easing tensions in the region.”

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The Al Qaeda Factor in Pakistan Dr. Prem Mahadevan Senior researcher with the Global Security Team at the Center for Security Studies (CSS) ETH, Zurich

“Al Qaeda is anticipating what it sees as a historical triumph over Western armies in an Islamic land, comparable to the Soviet withdrawal of 1989.” 30

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With the drawdown of Western forces in Afghanistan steadily approaching, attention has focused on the twin agendas of the Pakistani military and the Taliban. However, there is a third and equally potent actor at play. Al Qaeda is anticipating what it sees as a historical triumph over Western armies in an Islamic land, comparable to the Soviet withdrawal of 1989. While it has little interest in Afghanistan per se, the expected ‘victory’ of 2014 will give it more street credibility to expand operations in its real operational heartland – Pakistan.One would expect that this prospect would worry the Pakistani authorities, yet as American commentators have noted, the opposite seems to be true. There is general agreement that Al Qaeda continues to enjoy a relatively benign environment in Pakistan. This environment is not conducive for carrying out attacks, either internationally or against the Pakistani state, but it permits the limited task of communicating with affiliated groups across the world, which is now the real focus of Al Qaeda’s strategy. Since 9/11 Al Qaeda has failed to carry out a major attack in the West, but it does not need to: its regional franchises are willing to take up the slack and hit

Western interests in their own vicinity. The assaults on an Algerian gas facility (January 2013) and a Kenyan shopping mall (September 2013) are part of this trend. Yet, even as the Al Qaeda worldview permeates more regions, Pakistan remains ‘the Base’ as far as the group itself is concerned. One factor makes Pakistan an indispensable asset to international jihadism: possession of nuclear weapons. Al Qaeda sees the Pakistani nuclear arsenal as a bulwark against Western invasion. More than Afghanistan, which will for the foreseeable future remain a partially governed space into which the US military shall be able to project force, it is Pakistan, with its standing armed forces and nuclear deterrent, that will provide Al Qaeda with an unassailable sanctuary from which to direct the global jihad against both ‘near’ and ‘far’ enemies. For Pakistan to remain a sanctuary, the group needs to avoid targeting the Pakistani state. A cursory reading of Pakistani newspapers suggests that it is doing precisely the opposite. Attacks on security forces and religious and sectarian minorities are often traced to either the Pakistani Taliban or one of

the several freelance networks that have grown out of local groups sympathetic to Al Qaeda. However, closer analysis reveals a pattern: the relatively few attacks that demonstrate a strong Al Qaeda connection are directed at individuals, not institutions. Pakistani members of the group are going after isolated targets whose elimination removes potential threats in what is an otherwise safe context. Within this safe context, the killing of minorities is part of a growth strategy, akin to sectarian slaughters carried out by Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) prior to 2007. Despite admonishments from Al Qaeda Central in Pakistan, AQI had used sectarianism to push its brandname at the expense of rival Iraqi Shia militias. This was a risky approach as it brought AQI considerable shortterm negative publicity. In the longterm however, it allowed the group to consolidate to the point where it could export jihad to Syria following the 2011 ‘Arab Spring’. Eventually, Al Qaeda Central itself came to encourage sectarianism in Syria, seeing it as a way of increasing its ideological footprint in the Levant. Sectarian killings in Pakistan do not jeopardize Al Qaeda’s support base because Pakistan has a long and unrelated history of sectarian violence, which gives the group plausible deniability. They also collaterally increase the organizational heft of jihadists that do not engage in such killings but maintain ties with Al Qaeda, such as Lashkar-eTaiba. In exchange for not targeting either government officials or Pakistani

minorities, LeT extracts an assurance of passivity from the Pakistani state as far as its international operations are concerned. Al Qaeda is free-riding off the back of the network that organizes these operations, to establish ties with radicals Islamists outside South Asia. What makes Pakistan hospitable to Al Qaeda, despite cultural and linguistic differences, has been the statesponsored ‘Arabization’ of Pakistani society. From the 1970s, successive regimes in Islamabad/Rawalpindi, both civilian and military, have championed closer ties with the Arab world, and Saudi Arabia in particular. During the Soviet-Afghan War, Saudi funding for Pakistani covert operations was comparable to that of the Americans. A large diaspora in Persian Gulf countries has acted as a bridge between South Asia and the Middle East, effectively internationalizing the domestic Islamist militancy which the Pakistani army uses to maintain its political primacy. Through the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), the army has attempted to calibrate this militancy by directing it towards external targets, but only those confined to South Asia, primarily Afghanistan and India. Al Qaeda is doing the same through its rhetoric, except that it also encourages jihadists to strike further afield, at the transcontinental level. Groups such as the Afghan Taliban and Lashkar-e as bridges between regional and global jihadism. One boosts Al Qaeda’s narrative of fighting the West to a standstill and forcing it to retreat from Afghanistan, while the other provides infrastructure for Al Qaeda’s

“Yet, even as the Al Qaeda worldview permeates more regions, Pakistan remains ‘the Base’ as far as the group itself is concerned.”

“Killing of minorities is part of a growth strategy, akin to sectarian slaughters carried out by Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) prior to 2007.”

“What makes Pakistan hospitable to Al Qaeda, despite cultural and linguistic differences, has been the state-sponsored ‘Arabization’ of Pakistani society.”

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“In all this, the Pakistani security establishment has suffused its policy towards Al Qaeda with the same carefully nuanced ambivalence shown towards the Taliban.” long distance activities, including skillsharing in urban assault and hostage seizure.

“The best solution would be to persuade Pakistan to simultaneously launch operations against Al Qaeda, the Taliban and LeT, and thereby disrupt both the narratives and the networks that Al Qaeda thrives on.”

In all this, the Pakistani security establishment has suffused its policy towards Al Qaeda with the same carefully nuanced ambivalence shown towards the Taliban. Those jihadists who directly plan and participate in attacks on Pakistani soil are aggressively pursued, but since only a handful of Al Qaeda members are implicated in such incidents, the bulk of the group’s operatives are left alone. Words in themselves do not kill, as a serving ISI chief once indicated in an interview, when asked why Pakistan does not act against jihadist leaders calling for attacks on the West. As long as Al Qaeda does not micromanage terrorist activities directed against the Pakistani military, it does not need to fear that the military would trouble it in the absence of Western pressure.

The group has already survived losses that would have crippled any ordinary terrorist organization or network. It is now slowly nudging the United States towards a policy dilemma: if the US focuses on eliminating the remnants of Al Qaeda Central in Pakistan, which has so far been Washington’s favoured approach, then Al Qaeda affiliates in other parts of the world will remain free to hit Western targets at a local level. Yet, if the US chooses to go after the affiliates, it risks driving them under the direct operational control of Al Qaeda Central. The best solution would be to persuade Pakistan to simultaneously launch operations against Al Qaeda, the Taliban and LeT, and thereby disrupt both the narratives and the networks that Al Qaeda thrives on. Unfortunately, the Pakistani army sees numerous good reasons to do no such thing, which leaves the Arab jihadist group weakened but still standing.

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FUNDAMENTALISM IN SOUTH ASIA

Forging stronger ties: Iran’s strategic interests in Afghanistan In 2014 the western alliance will withdraw its combat troops from Afghanistan. Only military advisors will remain to train and advise the Afghan security forces of the Karzai regime. By then the fragile situation in Afghanistan will certainly deteriorate further. That will be the time of the regional powers. Two states of the region have special interest in Afghanistan: Pakistan, which traditionally considers Afghanistan as its strategic backyard and has a history of meddling in Afghani affairs; and Iran which considers itself as the protector of the Shias in the region and has certain strategic interests along its borders.With about 20% of the general population Shias are a considerable minority, mostly Hazara in central Afghanistan and Farah and Farsiwan in Herat, a province bordering eastern Iran. Being hostile towards the Taliban, Iran and the former Taliban government were enemies.The government in Teheran has a strong interest in preventing a renewal of the Taliban regime. The current regime led by Hamid Karzai, however, is not friendly either. The relations with Pakistan are similar to a small version of the Great Game, since both countries are trying to increase their influence in the country. To gain influence in Afghanistan, Iran is pursuing several strategies: Developmental aid, especially

aimed at the Shias minorities and political support, for example towards the Tajiks, especially the faction led by Abdullah Abdullah, a former Northern Alliance fighter. Why does Iran have such strategic interests in Afghanistan? Beside the ideological reasons, i.e. the protection of the Shia minority, the country considers itself a rising regional power which seeks to widen its influence on its neighbors. While there some reports of covert operations by Iranians, including attacks on journalists, Teheran’s ideological influence is likely to be confined to Shia communities. A radicalization of the Shias and influence towards religious violence are, however, unlikely, since that would cause instability and harm Iran’s larger interests, as we will see in this article. Additionally, allegations of arms deliveries to the Taliban can be dismissed, considering the ideological and strategic enmity between Iran’s leadership and the Taliban.With the withdrawal of the US led combat troops in Iraq, Iran is arguably the most influential foreign power there, which secures Teheran’s south-western border. In Syria, Iran is on the verge of losing its influence due to the civil war which threatens the allied Assad regime. Since a solution of the Syrian situation seems far away, securing the eastern border

Kai Fürstenberg Research fellow at the South Asia Democratic Forum and Researcher at the South Asia Institute, Heidelberg University

“Why does Iran have such strategic interests in Afghanistan? Beside the ideological reasons, i.e. the protection of the Shia minority, the country considers itself a rising regional power which seeks to widen its influence on its neighbors.” THINK SOUTH ASIA

“Allegations of arms deliveries to the Taliban can be dismissed, considering the ideological and strategic enmity between Iran’s leadership and the Taliban.”

“Iran shares certain economic interests in Afghanistan, for example trade routes into Central Asia and a new silk road connecting the Middle East and China via Afghanistan.”

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with Afghanistan is a major goal for Teheran’s strategic interests. When the western alliance retreats, Afghanistan will very likely be on the brink of a new civil war and Iran does not have the resources to be involved in two local conflicts. The leadership in Teheran will use its influence to keep the border region as quiet as possible and to provide its allies with the necessary support to control the border provinces of Herat and Farah. Since Syria will take up a lot of efforts, either diplomatic or military, the Iranian government would like to ‘cover its back’. A hint towards Iran’s interest in a generally stable Afghanistan, however, can be found in the security agreement signed in August 2013, which also includes cooperation on ‘threats to national security’ and could be interpreted as an attempt on Teheran’s side to support the regime in Kabul (for lack of a suitable alternative) against the Taliban. Furthermore, stability in Afghanistan would be beneficial in a wholly different aspect as well: Iran has received approximately one million refugees from Afghanistan who fled during the Soviet-Afghan war, the civil war afterwards, the rule of the Taliban and the war of 2001. Their presence is a huge liability for Afghan-Iranian relations and creates large pressure on the already crippled economy. Good relations with the Afghani government and at least some stability in the border regions could enable the successive repatriation of these refugees. Iran even may, under the new government led by president Rohani try to influence Afghan politics via diplomatic efforts as an ‘honest broker’,

mediating different interests from Pakistan, China and India; with the last two Iran shares certain economic interests in Afghanistan, for example trade routes into Central Asia and a new silk road connecting the Middle East and China via Afghanistan. In the case of Central Asia the interests become visible in form of railway connections to Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, of which the first section was inaugurated in May 2013. Plans to connect Iran and China through Afghanistan exist and are of high value to Iran and China, making trade between the energy-hungry China and the oil and gas producing Iran via a land route possible. The advantage would be that the Pirate-infested waters at Malacca could be avoided. But in order to realize these plans, Afghanistan needs some level of stability. The mentioned security agreement of August 2013 is a strong indicator to for these intentions. Further one has to remember that Iran is still under sanctions by most of the western world. Afghanistan’s proximity makes it a potential market for its goods. At last one has to consider the international dimensions of the Afghanistan situation. Iran shares its interest with China, India and Pakistan. Especially on security issues it has to either compete or cooperate with India or Pakistan. Cooperation with Pakistan is unlikely since both countries are directly competing for influence in the country and have very distinct security interest, e.g. Pakistan’s view of Afghanistan as its strategic backyard. Cooperation with India, an important economic partner, would be more advantageous, since both want

“Pakistan’s view of Afghanistan as its strategic backyard. Cooperation with India, an important economic partner, would be more advantageous, since both want to contain Pakistan’s influence.” to contain Pakistan’s influence. China, as already mentioned shares economic interests with Iran and is interested in Afghanistan’s stability in so far as it is necessary to ensure the completion of important trade links to the Middle East in general and to Iran in particular. Considering all this, it has to be said that Iran’s future policy towards Afghanistan and its actions inside the country, open or covert, largely depend on which faction in Iran itself will be dominant. In light of Rohani’s current policies, which include much more diplomacy than those of his predecessor, there are two possibilities: Improvement of relations through agreements and negotiations, both with Afghanistan and the western community, as probably preferred by the moderate-reformist camp led by Rohani; or infiltration of Afghani politics and possibly radicalization of the local Shia minority, probably preferred by the conservative faction led by Iran’s supreme leader Khamenei. It is hard to predict which way Teheran will go and which faction will gain the upper hand.

On the one hand it depends on how long Khamenei is going to live, as well as on the results of the elections for the Assembly of Experts in 2015 and the parliamentary elections in 2016. On the other hand it depends on the future developments in Afghanistan itself and if Karzai, or his successor, will be able to retain enough stability to put Iran’s leadership at ease. Iran may support the Shia minority in Afghanistan and is likely influence it on an ideological level, but the overall designs of the leadership in Teheran are of a more general strategic and economic nature. Iran has some justified and vital strategic interests in Afghanistan and will pursue them, but a large scale implementation of a fundamentalist Shia ideology or even preparations for a religious war can, in my opinion, be dismissed. Recent developments even give hope that these interests will be pursued with diplomatic and economic efforts rather than with strongmanpolitics and infiltration.

“Iran may support the Shia minority in Afghanistan and is likely influence it on an ideological level, but the overall designs of the leadership in Teheran are of a more general strategic and economic nature. ”

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