EXPERT CONTRIBUTIONS
Why Morocco’s Counterterrorism Evolution Matters to Africa CESAR A. VELASQUEZ, PROGRAMME OFFICE FOR COUNTER-TERRORISM AND TRAINING IN AFRICA, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE OF COUNTER-TERRORISM (UNOCT)
Following the 2003 Casablanca attacks, Morocco began a profound transformation of the Kingdom’s counterterrorism strategy. In the immediate aftermath, legislators and policymakers confronted national security challenges, including enhancing security for potential vulnerable targets and addressing conditions conducive to terrorism and violent extremism. This article outlines some of Morocco’s noteworthy changes in the country’s counterterrorism approach since 2003 and measures results against the current African terrorism landscape. In addition, it details how the newly opened United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT) programme office for counterterrorism and training in Rabat will aid in developing, strengthening and advancing law enforcement and whole-of-society counterterrorism responses for the African continent.
THE ATTACKS On May 16, 2003, in Casablanca, Morocco, 12 members of al-Salafiya al-Jihadiya, a Salafi-jihadi terrorist organisation affiliated with Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), attacked the Farah Hotel, the Jewish Community Centre, a Jewish restaurant, a Jewish cemetery, and a Spanish social club. The selection of targets suggested that terrorists wanted to destroy the symbols of Morocco’s religious tolerance and modernity1. The attacks left 45 people dead, including 12 suicide terrorists, and wounded 1002. Although considered small and unsophisticated compared to other international terrorist operations, the five bombings left an indelible mark on the country’s psyche. The attacks marked the introduction of suicide terrorism in Morocco, represented the expansion of the Al-Qaeda terrorist threat to Morocco, and the end of the belief that the country was immune to the political trends of the Arab Middle East because of its Sunni heritage and open approach to Islam3. It is believed that the planning for the attacks began in November 2002 in the Karian Toma district, considered to
be a hard-to-police Casablanca district with high unemployment and illiteracy rates4. Within weeks terrorists recruited a group of young men and introduced them to suicide terrorism training material. Once indoctrinated, recruits undertook physical conditioning training in the proximity of Karian Toma, produced a small batch of explosives and tested them at a cemetery before embarking on large-scale production5. With May 16 in sight, the terrorists prepared for the attacks by watching videos evocative of the awaited afterlife. Having prayed and promised to meet again in paradise, they began the final stage of the operation.6
A TURNING POINT In the lead-up to the May 16 attacks, Morocco had already experienced a sharp increase in terrorist operations against civilians, however, most of those operations did not involve explosives or suicide terrorists7. The Casablanca attacks set in motion a new wave of internationally-inspired domestic terrorism that would be eventually attested by the 2007 and 2015 Casablanca attacks; the 2011 attacks in Marrakech as well as the 2018 attacks in Imlil. The 2003 Casablanca—and subsequent—attacks prompted the Moroccan government to enhance its counterterrorism policies to address changing terrorist tactics, accelerated operational tempo and increased lethality. Law 03.03, passed two weeks after the 2003 attacks, became the first of a series of legislative reforms enhancing Morocco’s legal counterterrorism framework8. This law expanded the definition of terrorism to include incitement. It introduced sentencings in line with the classification of terrorism as a major crime for active participation in terrorist related activities, including a minimum of a 10-year sentence. In addition, Law 03.03 expanded the duration of police custody in cases of terrorism and enhanced both intelligence-gathering and
GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2022 | 77
