SPAN: January 1976

Page 1


IIW DISCOVIRIIS ABOUT OLD TOYS Time was when we regarded a set of blocks as just a dependable toy for toddlers. Most two-year-olds play happily with them for hours, tire far less easily than, say, with a fancy mechanical toy. Now we know why. The latest research by American psychologists and educators has shown that blocks play an important part in the child's development and learning experience. To build, use, change, destroy, and build again at will is mastery; and growing mastery giyes a child joy in his work. His resourcefulness and imagination are endlessly challenged but

never rigidly channeled. What exactly does a child learn with blocks? Many things, say the specialists. Blocks aid physical development-calling as they do for sensitive hand-eye coordination; they ease social relationships-seeking each other's help in building, youngsters learn to tolerate differences; they help emotional development-the construction process affords a child deep personal satisfaction. Above all, blocks satisfy man's age-old instinct to build. A child with his 1510cKsls""ai1ven tlle same spirit that raised the mighty pyramids in ancient Egypt. !

by


SPAN A LEfTER FROM THE PUBLISHER

This month, the eminent editor of the Financial Express, V.K. Narasimhan, shares with our readers his view of the state of Indo-American relations seen against the backdrop of such events as Secretary Kissinger's visit to India in October 1974, America's lifting of the arms embargo to the nations of the SUbcontinent, Minister Chavan's recent visit to the U.S. and the meeting of the Indo-American Joint Commission. Picking up Dr. Kissinger's thesis that nations of the world must cooperate in this era of interdependence, Narasimhan finds that Indian interests also demand a global approach to solving¡ problems-rather than emphasis on a world divided between the "developing" and the "developed." What will solve world problems? Some people used to say computers. But our twin articles (pages 5-17) on computers and human wisdom say no. Why? Because computers are too dumb. Ever since they were invented, people who should have known better have been talking about how these miraCle machines might some day "take over" -or at least solve most of our problems. Well, perhaps it's time that this myth was laid to rest, and the interment is handled with dexterity by two distinguished science writers, Fred Hapgoo<l, an American, and Dr. Jagjit Singh, .an Indian. Hapgood's dissection or computer intelligence not only provides fascinating insights into the latest research on the very nature of the human brain but also tells us about the latest developments in American computer technology. U.S. scientists are working on computers that will be able to "see" -which is a far more complex activity of the brain than deductive logic and speed of computation, according to the latest intelligence on intelligence .. These two articles leave one with a feeling of awe for human life in general and for the human brain in particular. They remind me of some interesting figures I saw a few months ago in a scientific article: The amount of information stored in an advanced computer does not seem impressive if one realizes that the DNA molecule in a single human gene can be arranged in some 10600 ways. To get an idea of the magnitude of this number, says the article, the entire universe contains only an estimated 1080 atoms! Another article I'd like to bring to your attention is "Economics for the Perplexed" (page 32), a lucid and witty primer for those who have always wanted to understand economics but never thought it was possible. Author Leonard Silk tells a lot about "the dismal science" that nobody loves but none can escape. He does not hesitate to poke fun at economists and their opaque discussions of fiscal and monetary policy. Still, the best barb on this subject belongs to George Bernard Shaw. Said he: "If all the economists in the world were laid end to end, they would not reach a conclusion." -A.E.H.

2 4 5 13 18 20 28

Toward Realism in Indo-American Relations by V.K. Narasimhan

Are Computers As Smart As We Think? by Fred Hapgood

Americans Are Talking About Interlochen: Where Teen-agers Take to the Arts

32 38 42 45

Re-examining American History

46

Five Americans Win Nobel Prizes

Hollywood's New Reality

by John A. Garraty

by Mal Oettinger

U.S. Honors Satyajit Ray

47

48 49 Front cover: To illustrate this issue's computer stories (pages 5-17) SPAN photographer Avinash Pasricha took a picture of a computer and another of a young man -and superimposed them to give this unusual effect, which attempts to dramatize the superiority of man over machine. In Pasricha's 15 years as SPAN's Photo Editor, this is the 22nd front cover he has produced for the magazine. Back cover: They've always been comfortable and cheap, but today's T-shirtsdecorated with all kinds of motifs and slogans-are more flamboyant than ever.

Managing Editor: Carmen KagaL Assistant Managing Editor: S.R. Madhu. Editorial Staff: Mohammed Reyazuddin, Avinash Pasricha, Nirmal Sharma, Krishan Gabrani, Murari Saha, Rocque Fernandes. Art Director: Nand KatyaI. Art Staff: Gopi Gajwani, B. Roy Choudhury, Kanti Roy, Suhas Nimbalkar. Chief of Production: Awtar S. Marwaha. Photographic Services: USIS Photo Lab. Published by the United States Information Service, 24 Kasturba Gandhi Marg, New Delhi 110001, on behalf of the American Embassy, New Delhi. The opinions expressed in this magazine do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the United States Government. Printed by Arun Mehta at Vakil & Sons Private Ltd., Yakils House, Sprott Road, 18 Ballard Estate, Bombay 400038. .

Photographs: Inside front cover--<ourtesy Shell Chemical. 13-Avinash Pasricha. 16--<ourlesy JohnsManville, Future. 2Q-27-Henry Groskinsky, Life. 41-American Heritage. 43-44-Gerry Gersten. 49-NASA. Back cover-Susanne Anderson.

Use of SPAN articles in other publications is encouraged, except when copyrighted. For permission, write to the Editor. Subscription: One year. 18 rupees; single copy, 2 rupees 50 paise. For change of address, send old address from a recent SPAN envelope along with new address to A.K. Mitra, Circulation Manager, SPAN magazine, 24 Kasturba Gandhi Marg, New Delhi 110001.


TOWARD REALISM IN INDO-AMERICAN RELATIONS An eminent Indian editor (photo above) discusses relations between the U.S. and India from 1974 to the present; he welcomes the new mood of pragmatic realism free from romanticism. During the past year and a quarter, Indo-American relations have swung all the way from euphoria in late 1974 to sober realism today. Perhaps such wide swings of the pendulum are not quite desirable in the relations between two large countries which together have a great role to play in the creation of a new international economic order. It must be hoped that with the latest developments in Indo-American relations, the agreement reached at the recent meeting of the Indo-American Joint Commission and its subcommissions in Washington, and the friendly talks that India's External Affairs Minister Y.B. Chavan had with President Gerald Ford, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and others, the two countries have resumed a dialogue which will be kept up without interruption. Between the euphoria of late 1974 and the pragmatic realism of the parleys last October, it may seem that there is a wide gap. Actualfy, however, there was good reason for the euphoria generated by Dr. Kissinger's 1974 visit and the far-reaching agreements reached then. The visit was in many ways a momentous one. It marked the beginning ofthe resumption offriendly talks between the two countries after a three-year break following the IndoPakistan conflict in 1971. A great deal was achieved during Dr. Kissinger's talks. While some of the issues, on which the approaches of the two countries diverged, remained unresolved, there was broad agreement on a wide front where there was no conflict of interests between the two countries. India had reason to feel reassured by many of Dr. Kissinger's pronouncements regarding the new p.erspectives of American foreign policy. For instance, it was recognized by the U.S. that India's approach to the problems ofthe Indian subcontinent, as indicated in the 1972 Indo-Pakistan Simla Agreement,

was the best way to solve these problems. Dr. Kissinger acknowledged the validity of the bilateral approach, free from interferenc~ by any outside powers. He admitted the renunciation by the United States of the concept of balance of power in the subcontinent and also categorically affirmed that the United States was not interested in promoting an arms race in South Asia. Apart from the assurance he gave in his private talks, Dr. Kissinger spelt out the objectives of American policy unambiguously in his brilliant address to the Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA) in New Delhi. Dr. Kissinger recognized in his address that "the size and position of India give it a special role of leadership in South Asian and in world affairs. They confer on it at the same time the special responsibility for accommodation and restraint that strength entails. The United States recognizes both these realities. They are wholly compatible with the close friendships and special bonds that we have with all the nations of the region. As we wish South Asia well, we wish India well." India has reason to feel satisfied with other accords reached during the October 1974 meetings which sought to place the relations between the two countries on a basis of equality and mutual respect for each,other. A good many ofthe misunderstandings that arose prior to 1971 should be attributed to a certain sense of inequality in relationship; America figured as a large-scale donor while India appeared as a recipient oflargesse. With the settlement of the vexed problem of PL-480 rupee accumulations and India's accent on selfreliance as one ofthe immediate objectives of its economic policy, it was expected that future economic relations between the two countries would be based primarily on equality and mutual interest. . Dr. Kissinger's acceptance of India's assurance that its activities in the nuclear

field are entirely limited to peaceful purposes was another gain, because, in the U.S., Canada and some other countries, the immediate reaction to the Pokharan "implosion" was rather adverse to India. At the same time, American recognition of India's nuclear capability meant that more vigorous steps had to be taken by all the nuclear powers to move as quickly as possible toward nuclear disarmament and harnessing the power of the atom entirely for human good. Although India has so far declined to subscribe to the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty for-reasons which are well known, there can be no doubt that India will warmly support every move for limiting and possibly eliminating nuclear armaments. India had also good reason to feel gratified that the earlier American attitude to the Indian policy of nonalignment had ceased to be relevant. Dr. Kissinger, in fact, went so far as to pay a tribute to Jawaharlal Nehru for his advocacy of the concept of nonalignment. He admitted that the American moves for a detente with the Soviet Union and for an understanding with Communist China signify "the transition from a bipolar world, locked in confrontation and seemingly destined for some final encounter, to the new world of dispersed power and reduced tension." "Our attitude to the nonaligned," Dr. Kissinger affirmed, "will be based on the principles of equality, mutual respect and shared endeavors and on the premise that all countries have a stake in a peaceful world. Condominium, hegemony, spheres of influence are historically obsolete and morally and politically untenable." When these highly encouraging declarations were accompanied by concrete attempts to set up joint bodies to work out detailed programs for cooperation between the two countries in the fields of trade and commerce, science and technology, edu-


cation and culture, there was every reason to feel that Indo-American relations had been placed on a "mature and durable" basis. The high-level Joint Commission that was set up in October 1974 held its firstmeeting,in New Delhi and the second meeting was to be held in March 1975, in Washington. I need not go into the circumstances which led to the sudden calling off of the March meeting following the American decision to lift the embargo on the sale of arms to Pakistan and India which had been imposed in 1971. While India may still be unreconciled to the sale of American arms to Pakistan as a factor that may not be conducive to the normalization of relations among the countries of the subcontinent, it has accepted the position that this should not Come in the way of cooperation between the U.S. and India in areas in which such cooperation can be mutually beneficial. It is this recognition on the part of New Delhi which paved the way for Minister Chavan's visit to Washington in October 1975 for the second meeting of the Indo-American Joint Commission. The results achieved at the Washington meeting may not be spectacular, but they represent a solid gain in terms of mutual understanding and willingness to cooperate in a well-defined and fairly wide area. It is true that on the old irritants like arms to Pakistan and the American base in the Indian Ocean island of Diego Garcia, the respective stances of the two countries have not changed. India has, however, accepted the American assurance that Washington sincerely desires that IndoPakistan problems should be solved in accordance with the Simla agreement and that there should be normalization of relations between the countries of the subcontinent without the intervention of outside powers. On Diego Garcia, India's stand is that it is not a bilateral issue, but one'in which all the littoral countries are vitally interested and a solution must be 'sought through multilateral negotiations. India's immediate concern is to go ahead with programs for Indo-American cooperation in areas in which both countries have common interests in a spirit of equality and understanding. This was underlined recently by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi when she told a news agency representative: "We have our differences with the U.S. ,Government in respect of certain global problems, particularly those relating to our own region. Nevertheless, we believe that we should build cooperation with them in various fields on the basis of equality, mutual benefit and reciprocity.

The recent meeting of the Indo-U.S. Joint Commission delineated these issues of cooperation in a concrete manner." What was achieved at the Washington meeting was an agreed basis for cooperation in the future. It is not as if such cooperation were an entirely new phenomenon in Indo-American relations. The conspicuous part played by American aid, including PL-480 supplies of foodgrains and other products, in sustaining India's development programs is a matter of history. What is new in the latest arrangements is the change-over from a relationship of giver and recipient to a relationship based on equality and mutual benefit. The old relationship implied a certain spirit of condescension on the one side and of dependence on the other. How the new programs of Indo-American cooperation in the economic and other fields work out remains to be seen. But what appears most important for me, in the context of the grave global problems facing the world today, is the need for close and continuous understanding between Washington and New Delhi. They may not agree on all issues. The global interests of the U.S. are wider and more complex than the Indian interests. But the U.S. cannot be indifferent to the attitude of a big and populous Asian country like India, which has emerged as one of the leading spokesmen for the developing countries. There is no major conflict of interests between the two countries. Politically they have much in common. Above all, they have a common interest in seeing that the new international economic order, which the United Nations seeks to bring about, will be achieved through cooperation among all the countries concerned, and a confrontation between the developed and the developing countries is avoided. As Dr. Kissinger admitted at the end of the meetings of the Joint Commission in Washington, both countries could "cooperate on global problems from the point of their different perspectives, nevertheless keeping always in mind that they have a common stake in world peace and a common interest in development on the basis of cooperation and not confrontation:". He added: "We agree with what the [Indian] Foreign Minister [Chavan] said at the United Nations that nations should begin confronting problems and not each other. Both India and the United States can make an important contribution to the spirit in which the relationship between the developed and developing nations should take place." And it is that contribution that will be of more enduring significance in the develop-

ment of Indo-American relations than any benefit they can derive from each other through trade or other forms of cooperation. I cannot conclude this article better than by quoting an eloquent passage from Dr. Kissinger's October 1974 address to the ICWA in which he affirmed the common concern which India and the United States shared for "a cooperative solution to man's fundamental needs": "The present crisis confronting both developed and developing nations reveals all too clearly the world's past failure to address global problems on a truly cooperative basis. India and the United States have much to contribute. The world's best minds must be mobilized, and India has the third largest pool of scientific talent while the United States has the first. We must apply the great economic strength of our two nations; the United States has the largest industrial output.in the world and India the 10th largest. Our ~conomies are complementary; the fact that India is only the 26th largest trading partner of the United States reveals what potential is yet untapped." Indian interests demand that New Delhi should pursue this global approach to world problems rather than think in terms of a world divided between the developed and developing countries. Whatever conflict of interest or approaches there may have been between the developed and the developing countries in the past, we are faced today with a situation in which the problems of the international economy have to be solved by the most comprehensive essay in international cooperation that is possible. In fact, Minister Chavan recognized this imperative in a speech he made in 1974. "There is," he said, "much that our two countries can do in promoting a new world economic order based on the aspirations and interests of all the nations. It is our objective to build a lasting structure of peace, stability and cooperation based on the independence, sovereignty an,d equality of all the nations." . For India to play its due role in this endeavor it is necessary that Indo-American relations should be placed on a realistic basis, free from romanticism, but with full recognition of what their joint efforts can mean to the building of a p.eaceful, just and progressive new world order. 0 About the Author: V.K. Narasimhan, one

of India's leading political and economic analysts, is editor of the Financial Express. His books include Democracy and Mixed Economy, Above the Battle and The Press, the Public and the Administration.


NEWS& VIEWS INDIAN SURGEON RECEIVES U.S. AWARD Dr. Narendra Pandya, a Bnmbay physician, has been honored by the American Society of Plastic and Reconstructive Surgeons - (ASPRS) for outstanding contributions in leprosy research. It was the second such award he has received from the ASPRS in the last three years. This latest award was conferred on Dr. Pandya a few months ago in Toronto, Canada, at the 44th annual Convention of the ASPRS. His citation was presented by Dr. John Simons, Chairman of the ASPRS Scholarship Committee, and Dr. William Grabb, Educational Foundation President. Dr. Grabb said Dr. Pandya was selected for "outstanding" research in plastic surgery. He pointed out that the award has been in existence for 27 years and has been presented to "some of the more outstanding" plastic surgeons in the world. In a New York interview prior to the awards ceremony, Dr. Pandya said he

Narendra Pandya

was "pleasantly surprised" and "very proud" to be honored again by the ASPRS. In 1973 he was the recipient of a first prize award at the society's annual meeting in Hollywood, Florida. The Indian surgeon explained that his 1975 award again involves research under the chairmanship of Dr. N.H. Antia at the Tata Department of Plastic Surgery, J.J. Hospital in Bombay-a pilot study begun three years ago. The study concerns a "meticulous" operative procedure to prevent deformities in leprosy patients. "People who get leprosy suffer from very severe deformities," said Dr. Pandya, "and what we have tried to do is to prevent long-term deformities by an operation on the nerves." He said he was very pleased to visit

America again since it afforded the .occasion to "renew contacts .with old friends and colleagues and learn what is happening in the field of plastic surgery in the United States." "I hope to adapt the newer advances to our conditions when I return home," Dr. Pandya added, noting that there is a "very, very strong cooperation among l'lastic surgeons in the United States and India." The Bombay specialist received his diploma from the American Board of Plastic Surgery in 1970 after studies at Northwestern University in Chicago, Illinois. In 1971 he served as AssoCiate Director of the Burn Unit, Cook County Hospital, Chicago. He is currently Honorary Assistant Plastic Surgeon at B.Y.L. Nair Hospital and the Jaslok Hospital and Research Centre in Bombay. He also serves as Honorary Assistant Professor of Plastic Surgery at the University of Bombay. Dr. Pandya said that he devotes approximately 75 per cent of his time to reconstructive surgery and 25 per cent to cosmetic surgery. The majority of his cases involve leprosy, burns, congenital deformities, auto accidents, and cancer of the head and face. Some 2,600 surgeons attended the ASPRS annual meeting. The organization has approximately 1,600 members and sponsors an international program to send plastic surgeons to practice and teach in developing nations of Asia, Africa and Latin America.

U.S.-SOVIET GRAIN DEAL The United States has signed a five-year grain sales agreement with the Soviet Union, a major buyer of U.S. wheat in recent years. Under the new agreement, which goes into effect October 1, 1976, the Soviet Union will buy annually from the U.S. six million metric tons of wheat and corn worth $1,000 million. The deal ensures that the sale of U.S. grain to the Soviet Union is regular, orderly and well spaced out over a l2-month period. It will impart stability to the world grain market by averting large-scale fluctuations in the availability and prices of grains. Such fluctuations occurred in the past following massive Soviet purchases of American grains. U.S. Undersecretary of State Charles Robinson told the American Congress that grain sales to the Soviet Union were a "unique case" and needed to be handled in a special way because of the large quantities involved. He assured Congress that the deal would not reduce the availability of grain for other nations. In fact, the agreement stipulated that if U.S. grain production in a particular year fell below 225 million tons [it has not, during the past 15 years], America could

reduce shipments to the U.S.S.R. This would ensure that the U.S. would honor commitments to other nations. Robinson said that the promise of a minimum sale of six million tons to the Soviet Union would induce American farmers to produce all they could-thus ensuring adequate supplies for the U.S. and other countries. The deal would enable the Soviet Union to stockpile grain when its production Was high, and draw on this stock during a lean year-another stabilizing factor in world grain supplies. Two other highlights of the agreement: .¡The Soviet Union has the option to buy an additional two million tons of grain a year without government-togovernment consultation. Purchases beyond eight million tons, however, will require consultation. • The American wheat and corn bought by the U.S;S.R. will be consumed within the Soviet Union. Announcing the agreement, U.S. President Gerald Ford said that it would promote American economic stability, and that it represented "a positive step in our relations with the Soviet Union."


In the article overleaf, the author tells how he beat an MIT computer named MacHack in five consecutive chess game~. 'During the last two games MacHack refused to give its moves when I was about to checkmate it. Finally a programmer extracted the record of MacHack's deliberations. It had been working over the mate variations, just looking at them over and over.... ' J


I

nthe late sixties a chess-playing computer program was written at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and was entered into some local tournaments, where it won a number of games and caught the interest of the local newspapers. I had been curiously following the portentous visions that arose out of articles on the "cybernetic revolution" and was still unsure what to make of the Computer. Since I play chess, this new program seemed to offer a chance to sample its mysteries firsthand. I called some friends at MIT, and they arranged for me to play MacHack, as the program was known. The room in which the computers were kept lacked all signs of diurnal rhythm. There were no windows. The illumination was low, so as not to interfere with the phosphor screens. The only sound was the clatter of high-speed readout printers, and underneath that, the hum of air conditioners and circulators. People quietly came and went with perfect indifference to the hour. I found the scene-the rapt and silent meditations of the programmers hunched over their terminals, the background hum with its suggestion of unceasing activity, the hushed light, the 24hour schedules-subtly exhilarating. I was shown how to code the moves and enter them into a terminal. The game itself began with a stock opening line: Both the computer and I knew the standard chess moves, and so far as I could tell, to about the same depth. I had decided on what I thought would be a winning strategy. Any programmer, I reasoned, would try to make the positions which his program had to evaluate simple ones -and would assign a priority to clarifying exchanges. I therefore set out to make the position as complex as possible, hoping that the machine would lose its way among the options and commit a common strategic blunder, entering into a premature series of exchanges that would end only by increasing the activity of my pieces. Instead, in a flurry of exchanges, I lost a pawn and nearly the game. The trick of playing with MacHack, I learned, is to keep the position free from tension. The program's strong point is tactics; it places priorities on piece mobility and material gain, and in the nature of chess these values generate local, tactical give-and-take. So my strategy was to play away from the program's abilities and to steer the game into slow-paced, stable, balanced positions. Whenever J did this, MacHack's game seemed to become nervous and

moody. The program would lose its cOncentration, begin to shift objectives restlessly, and launch speculative attacks. This is not an unfamiliar style; every chess club has some players-they are called "romantics"-whose joy is found in contact and tension, in games where pieces flash across the board and unexpected possibilities . open up with each new move. Put them in slow positions, and, like MacHack, they grow impatient and try to force their game. We played no more than five times; eventually, beating it became too easy. The winning formula was mechanically simple: Develop cautiously, keep contact between the two sides restricted, let the pawns lead out the pieces. MacHack would always develop in a rush and send its knights and , bishops skittering about the board trying to scare up some quick action; denied that action, its position would collapse in confusion.-The only way to lose to MacHack, I concluded, would be to playas though the dignity of Man somehow required one to crush the machine in the first dozen

'MacHack would always develop in' a rush and send its knights and bishops skittering about the board trying to scare up some quick action; denied that action, its position would collapse in confusion.' moves. If, instead, one just played away from it, the computer would barrel by and fall in a heap. I was far more bored than I would have been playing a human of similar sttength, and I came to feel that even if Mac Hack had been good enough to win most, or all, of its games I still would have felt I was wasting my time. During the last two games I played, MacHack refused to give its moves when I was about to checkmate it. My curiosity was piqued at this sullenness, and I stayed, trying to wait the machine out and get a reply. MacHack just hummed at me. Finally a programmer, becoming interested in this delay, extracted the record of MacHack's deliberations. It had been working over the mate variations, just looking at them, over and over. "Must be a bug somewhere," the programmer said.

* * * * *

Every culture has its juvenile embarrassments; misdirected enthusiasms which fail

dramatically and in retrospect seem to say something humiliating about the civilization that pursued them. The great computer craze of the late fifties and the sixties is such a case. From the erecting of the machine, any number of respected thinkers derived a vision of society. Edward Teller foresaw an automatic world, ruled by machines. Gerard Piel, publisher of Scientific American, wrote and spoke about the "disemployment of the nervous system." c.P. Snow thought that automation would be a revolution with effects "far more intimate in the tone of our daily lives ... than either the agricultural transformation in Neolithic times or the early industrial revolution." "Is the handwriting on the wall for the labor movement?" the Wall Street Journal asked, looking at the matter from its own perspective. The Ad Hoc Committee for the Triple Revolution (weaponry, automation, human rights), which was a study group composed of social luminaries like Gunnar Myrdal, Linus Pauling, A.J. Muste, Michael Harrington, Bayard Rustin, Irving Howe, Robert Heilbroner, and Tom Hayden and Todd Gitlin of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), saw the coming of automation as an argument for a guaranteed minimum income. "In 20 years," wrote Donald Michaels in a Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions book, "most of our citizens will be unable to understand the cybernated world in which we live ... the problems of goverument will be beyond the ken even of our college graduates. Most people will have had to recognize that, when it comes to logic, the machines by and large can think better than they .... There will be a small, almost separate society of people in rapport with the advanced computers. These cyberneticians will have established a relationship with their machines that cannot be shared with the average man. Those with the talent for the work probably will have to develop it from childhood and will be trained as extensively as classical ballerinas." Professor John Wilkinson of the University of California called for die founding of human sanctuaries "as we establish refuges for condors and whooping cranes." The pragmatists among those who worried about "America in the 'Automic' Age" thought about unemployment. The Bureau of Labor Statistics estimated that 300,000 workers were replaced annually by machines; the American Foundation of Employment and Automation calculated that two million jobs a year vanished.


President Kennedy said in 1962 that ad- recession which was not at ().llcaused by justing to automation was America's computer automation). Computers have greatest domestic "challenge" of the sixties, assumed a number of functions, some of which puts his negative prescience quotient which have been historically white-collar as high as anyone else's. jobs: reservations, credit and billing, pro:, But there was a visionary wing as well, cessing checks, payroll operations, invenand one which achieved, to judge by the tory scheduling; and some blue-collar: number of scare stories which ran in the freight routing, and especially flow monimedia, remarkable impact. Very roughly, toring and process control in the metaltwo scenarios were discernible. The first lurgical, petrocbemical, paper, and feed was that automation would proceed at an industries. But while what the computers ever-accelerating rate until computers had do is important, it certainly does not apentirely displaced the working and lower pear to add up to a revolution. If commiddle classes. Those classes, once thrown puters posed, and pose, a threat it lies not out of work, would mill about in proletarian in rendering less significant those decisions discontent. Then, depending on the per- humans make but, as in the privacy issue, spective of the seer, they would. either in enlarging the impp,ct of, and the opporsponsor a revolution themselves or force a tunities for, the staple villainies of the revolutionary response from the established Old Adam. order. Andrew Hacker of Cornell Univer* * * * * sity warned about "the contraction of the Why were so many illustrious thinkers corporate constituency" and predicted a so wrong? Or, perhaps simpler, why have Luddite rampage. This scenario concluded we been so reluctant to learn from their withthe feeling that if America did, by one mistakes? "Latest Machines See, Hear, route or the other, successfully manage its Speak and Sing-And May Outthink entry into "The Age of Abundance," the Man" is the headline of a Wall Street result would be a classless world in which all lived in a leisurely upper-middle-class style, devoting themselves to the arts and 'My strategy was to play away public improvements. from the computer's abilities The other line of thought, often found in journals like Argosy, National Enquirer, and steer the chess game into and Popular Mechanics, was that the new slow-paced, stable, balanced brain machines would displace the upper middle class. The writers who held this positions. Whenever I did this second view were impressed with the ma- MacHack's game seemed to chine's potential for autonomy and its become nervous and moody.' inscrutable authoritativeness. ("Harvard Computer Finds English Language Fuzzy" -Science Digest.) While it was not clear Journal story that appeared in June, 1973, that unemployment would be a problem but it could as easily have been the head ("Wanted: 500,000 Men to Feed Comput- on any number of stories over the last ers"-Popular Science), what did emerge • 15 years. What is striking about these stories is was the feeling that everyone would be forced, by the unappealability of the com- the determination of their authors to beputer's decisions, into the essence of the lieve. They seem never to notice the highly lower-middle-class experience, which is to artificial environments or the extremely be ordered about by those "who know simplified nature of the problems which allow the computer programs they describe what they're doing." Nearly 15 years have passed since these to sh9Weven the modest success they have specters first became popular, and clearly to date. Do the authors ever ask why it is we are no further down either of these that assembly line jobs, whose tediousness roads; instead, there has been a perceptible made them famous targets of opportunity loss of conviction that we are on any road for computers, remain virtually untouched by automated hands? at all. The rates of increase in productivity The vatic winds which blew some 15 per man-hour, one of the classic measurements of automation, were no different in years ago were more comprehensible: the sixties than in the fifties, though nearly America had just emerged from the fifties, 200,000 computers were installed during an extraordinary decade. Never before had the last decade. Unemployment has held we delighted in such a rain of innovations roughly stable (at least until the recent with such an immediate and intimate effect

on our daily lives. Television took root everywhere. The Polaroid camera, the Aqualung, the transistor radio, and the birth-control pill came on the market. The hi-fi and stereo industry sprang up. Commercial jet travel became standard. Polio was controlled. The hydrogen bomb, the intercontinental ballistic missile, space satellites, and the computer all were significant public issues, altering patterns of discourse and attention if nothing else. Xerox brought out its first office copier in 1959; the first working model of the laser was announced in 1960. We took these inventions, some boon, some bane, as evidence that a high level of innovation was a settled feature of America, and assumed that that level would, if anything, rise still higher over the decades to come. In that atmosphere no technological achievement seemed beyond us and no forecast too fantastic. Actually, one promise of the "soaring sixties" came spectacularly true-the moon-landing program. But it came to seem increasingly anomalous, not repre\ sentative of our national direction, certainly not emblematic of America's national mood. The sixties was a decade in which apprehensions about the effects of technology became widespread, and glittering inventions ceased to enhance our daily lives. Indeed, aside from the pocket calculator, the introduction of new products has fallen off drastically in the last 10 years. The persistence of the belief that machine intelligence is within our grasp thus becomes all the more curious, since it can draw support from neither specific achievements nor the general pace of technology. The effort to get machines to learn, see, hear, deduce, and intuit-to achieve what is called "Artificial Intelligence," or AIhas received little popular attention, presumably, at least in part, because of this conviction that AI is already a fact. Who, except for the handful of professionals involved, has even a vague sense of why artificial intelligence has proven to be so difficult a task, what the problems are, how they are being >attacked, and what theories have been proposed and abandoned? It seems bizarre that in a culture as interested in psychology and intelligence as ours the questions that have occupied this small community have been so widely ignored. AI researchers are, in a sense, applied epistemologists and are attacking problems which can have considerable public interest, as Piaget, Chomsky, and


Skinner, to mention only three names, have shown. The approach of an AI researcher is different from that of a philosopper or theoretical psychologist, of course. The point of traditional scientific theory is to account for the evidence with a concise structural metaphor. If this metaphor succeeds in explaining a wide range of observations coherently and economically, it is accepted, even if its "real" basis, its actual neurophysiology, remains obscure. AI scientists, on the other hand, try to build devices which will produce some of the behaviors they are interested in. The working assumption is that they will eventually arrive at an understanding of intelligence no less meaningful than that reached through more traditional routes. The popular assumption was rather more simple. It seems to have been that the potential of the machine is within the physical device, as the potential for speaking is in humans, and that it isjust a matter

of learning how to get it going. The actual program-the software-is understood, if, indeed, it is thought of at all, as bearing the same sort of relation to computer operations that cake recipes do to cooks: a guide to the energy and manipulative imagination of an essentially autonomous actor. The U.S. Patent Officehas justified its refusal to patent software by insisting that a program is a "technique," "a mental process," and/or an "idea." The only kind of program the Patent Office will patent is one that has been "wired-in," built as the core of a special-purpose computer that will perform that function and no other. But if the same program is not embodied in a mechanical device, if it is written as one of a large number of programs, to be entered into a general-purpose computer capable of handling any of them, it is not patentable, for it then becomes an "idea." This reasoning, that programs are to computers what ideas are to human brains, is absurd to those who work with

the machines. The tendency to concentrate on hardware abilities, on the machine's memory and speed, emerged with the first computers. An early MIT research computer, for instance, was dubbed "The Whirlwind." That this emphasis arose was natural enough. What computers did and domanipulate a very carefully defined body of information through a narrow range of arithmetic techniques-is unlikely to be very interesting. But their style, their tirelessness and infallibility, was interesting and the stress laid upon these qualities turned them into a cultural phenomenon. This was true, one speculates, because speed and memory, with freedom from error, are the same features humans conventionally use in¡ identifying what they call intelligence. When someone is referred to as having "brains," it usually means that he is never caught in a mistake. It means that he has a memory that absorbs quickly and voluminously, that he can


solve complicated math problems in his head. It certainly means speed; if a person finds himself in the company of those who think consistently faster than he does, that difference is usually taken as one that reflects on his mind as a whole. These qualities are what weigh with those who send for correspondence courses that promise 10 ways to increase brain power. And they count no less at higher levels of society. During Robert McNamara's tenure as Secretary of Defense, his many admirers would often volunteer their observation that his mind was so awe-inspiring as to be almost computerlike. In retrospect one can see several other reasons why computers were bound to become totems. Decisionmakers in a democratic society are forever restive with the convention that their decisions should not appear to be blatantly self-seeking. Now they could use the computer as a kind of Mexican bank-for decisions wherein judgments could appear to have been laundered, or more specifically, bleached, of self-interest and arbitrariness. This "bleaching" effect can, and often does, allow an increase in arbitrariness. One example: The Board of the National Endowment for the Arts has a number of curators on it; curators have a constant headache with artists complaining about the company which their pictures have been made to keep. The National Endowment accordingly funds studies in which artists are asked near whose pictures they would like their paintings to hang. A matrix analysis is done on the preferences and returned to the exhibitors, who hang the paintings by the numbers-with what esthetic results I cannot imagine-and then successfully deflect the inevitable outrage of the painters onto the computer.

* * * * *

Both the obsession with hardware and the need for new sources of authority were important in triggering off and maintaining the computer craze. Equally important, though, was the fact that the authorities, the computer researchers, were in no position to shoot down public misapprehensions as unequivocally, for instance, as a cancer specialist can scotch a faddist cure. There was a misunderstanding between the general public and these scientists that each side, for different reasons, was reluctant to resolve. As ill defined as the word "intelligence" is, in general usage it usually involves pursuing some end for independ nt, autonomous purposes. The discrete activity, whether it

be learning, ordering, remembering, logical thinking, designing, or whatever, often seems less important than this sense that intelligence is master in its own house, that it has free will. Feelings like this are intimately bound up in the everyday habit of assigning responsibility for action to computers, instead of to their programmers. More dramatically, they gave rise to all those fantasies about superbrain coups d'etat, wherein computers "take over for the good of mankind," or plunge nations into war against their will. The essence of the free-will dilemma is that it seems to be impossible for something to be free and undetermined without its being indeterminable as well. It appears to be a contradiction in terms to imagine such a decisionmaking ability being reduced to a series of predictable, cause-andeffect regularities. But postulating such an ability means postulating something that

Men, at least since Aristotle, 'have struggled to convince themselves that the capacity to reason, to draw up deductive syllogisms, is man's distinguishing glory.' is, in scientific terms, inherently incomprehensible. This paradox has never been adequately resolved-Karl Popper called it a nightmare-and it is something of a philosophical running sore to those with a scientific temperament. But few groups of scientists must confront this issue more directly than AI researchers. It is understandably repugnant to them to believe that there lies at the core of their chosen subject some impenetrable mystery, some vitalistic, unknowable spirit thing, a "ghost in the machine." They do not believe this; they understand intelligence as an aggregation of enormously complex abilities which interact in ways even more complex but which are both, abilities and interactions, creatures of natural law. "When intelligent machines are constructed," Marvin Minsky, then director of the MIT Artificial Intelligence Lab, once wrote, "we should not be surprised to find them as confused and as stubborn as men on their convictions about mind-matter, consciousness, free will, and the like. A man's or a machine's strength of conviction about such things teIIs us nothing

about the world, or about the man." So when the dialogue between the general public and the AI scientists began, it flowed from two quite different sets of understanding about the nature of mind. Conceivably the scientists might have sidestepped the whole question by refusing to use the word "intelligence," by saying they found it meaningless and insisting that their work be called by some such term as advanced automation research. But to do so would probably not have worked, and it would have appeared to be a handing over of the term by default to the vitalists. It would have been a tacit admission of a proposition that any scientist, and especially an AI scientist, feels a professional duty to resist. And they have resisted. Marvin Minsky was quoted in Life as calling the brain a "meat computer" ; Herb Simon, the most venerable figure in AI research, said that humans were programed by their genes and environment in the same sense that a computer was programed. The public tended to hear these remarks in its own way, as statements that computers had free will. This confusion involved more than a few lines lifted from public speeches; the whole relationship between the public and computer scientists is shot through with it. A far more significant and substantial example occurred in the 1950s when computers first began to "reason." At least since Aristotle men have struggled to convince themselves that the capacity to reason, to draw up deductive syllogisms, is man's distinguishing glory. Logic (in this strict sense) is useful in only a vanishingly small fraction of the problems encountered in understanding and explaining the world; probably 99 per cent of our thinking is analogical, wherein we satisfy ourselves that some useful similarity exists between that which we already know and that which we do not. But analogies proceed half-consciously at best and can always be disputed-is a pretty girl really like a melody? Logic is explicit, entirely conscious, and promises to settle questions once and for all. It does this by preserving equalities between statements; learning deductive logic is learning how to say nothing that is not a restatement of whatever is given. Once acquiescence is obtained on the initial assumptions, everything else follows inexorably, for, if done properly, what follows and what is given are fundamentally identical statements. Obviously this imposes severe limitations on the usefulness of the techniques,


but when something is demonstrated in problems they can handle will be co-exten- telligence may be, it surely implies an abilthis fashion it is proven beyond dispute. sive with the range to which the human ity to link up with the real world, to pursue some objective or apply a competence over Whoever frames such a statement speaks, mind has been applied." like Euclid, to all succeeding civilizations. In the years that followed a lot of effort at least a small range of natural experience. Thus the central tradition of Western phi- was devoted to progr~ms that played chess An important example of the failure of losophy has been the struggle to reduce as and checkers, found proofs for theorems computer programs to do this might be the many questions as possible to a short list in geometry and symbolic logic, solved automatic zip-code reader; the U.S. Postal of innocuous, self-evident first assump- trigonometric and algebraic identities, Service is eager to buy a machine that can tions, and then to elaborate a series of deri- composed music and poetry, simulated read zip codes [the U.S. equivalent of vations which prove that the philosopher's neuroses. There was even a psychiatrist India's postal pin codes] and addresses. viewpoints are the only ones possible. program, artfully designed to reproduce Yet, after a decade of well-financed work, Leibnitz, who, among many, sought to the evasive quasi-responsiveness that is so the most sophisticated model the service establish a "calculus of human knowledge" distinctive a note in psychoanalysis. When has can handle successfully only 9.5 per which could prove or disprove any propo- these programs were displayed, AI workers cent of the mail. The machine can read 90 sition at all (he blamed his inability to thought of them as achievements in repro- different print fonts and 15 typewriter achieve this on inadequate funding), once ducing one more human activity, while the fonts, but is baffled by mail which does not remarked that if he were successful in his popular understanding was, rather, that fall within the narrow limits of size, print efforts, he would be able, upon the com- the achievement lay in allowing some deep, contrast, envelope flexibility, and decoramencement of a dispute, to declare to his unitary phenomenon one more means of tion, and it cannot read handwriting at all. unfortunate opposite "'Let us calculate, expressing itself. The two sets of definitions * * * * * Over the last 10 years, AI researchers Sir!' and, by taking pen and pencil, we were not only different but mutually antagonistic. However, both sides continued to have become increasingly fascinated and should settle the question." impressed by the fluid adaptiveness which The arithmetic manipulations that form allows humans to interact freely with the the core of computer programs (+, =) world and each other. It may seem idiocorrespond to deductive logic (and, is). Some very complex human syncratic to use the word "intelligence" to In 1957 a program called Logic Theorist mental activities might be refer to abilities like vision and hearing and proved 38 out of 52 theorems from the touch-feedback systems; after all, even aniPrincipia Mathematica. Two years later the programed into a computer. mals are quite skilled at these. But AI devisers of Logic Theorist, Newell, Shaw, Others can never be. 'There workers reply that these abilities are so and Simon, wrote another program, this is simply no serious sense in many thousands of times more complex one called the General Problem Solver, and intricate than a theorem-proving prowhich could deduce the answer to a num- which one can talk about a gram that the claim to the word "intelber of classic cocktail-party brain twisters. computer loving or praying.' ligence" is even stronger. There is, as well, In 1963T.G. Evans wrote a program whose a widespread feeling that these sensory performance on certain geometric analogy tests was comparable to that of 15-year- use the same words, insisting on doing so capabilities are what formed the basis for partially because of that very antagonism, the evolution of cognition in the first place. old children. Vision intuitively seems the most imand the misunderstanding that resulted has * * * * * portant of these senses. Its significance is All these programs seemed, to the AI not been cleared up to this day. The programs just mentioned were all hinted at by its appearance in the root of community at the time, extremely exciting. What they mean by success in their field, activities that would naturally occur to a words like "clairvoyance," "imagination," what they must mean, given the assump- middle-class academic as being intelligent and "insight," and it is clearly crucial to tions they hold, is increasing the number and were an obvious place to begin. There advanced automation projects. For inof humanlike functions, abilities, and ac- were isolated successes, the occasional dis- stance, in 1971, the Japanese Government tivities that a machine can perform. When covery of a proof more elegant than that picked machine vision as the project which a sufficiently large number of the right traditionally taught, a checkers-playing offered the most promise of decisively leapkinds of abilities can be executed, the ma- program which nearly beat the world frogging the U.S. computer industry and set up a $180 million eight-year crash proalways beat its author, chine will be intelligent in every sense. No champion-and other comprehensible way of using the A.L. Samuel. Yet these programs remain- gram to achieve it. The initial work in vision tended to reterm can be imagined. The ability to do ed laboratory curiosities and in time came logic seemed one of the most important of to seem trivial and sterile. The early en- flect the belief that thinking was a higher these activities, and therefore a program thusiasm began to look badly misplaced. order of activity, properly conducted in the which could make deductions appeared to Whatever abilities the programs had could brain, while seeing, a lower order of acbe a giant step. In 1957 Herb Simon him- be produced only in contexts that were tivity, went on in the retina. When the self said, in the flush of triumph that fol- extremely narrow and artificial. It required retina was finished with its processing, the theory went, then and only then would it lowed upon his having written the General an enormous amount of labor to preproProblem Solver: " ... there are now in the cess and define the techniques and informa- hand the results over to the brain, which world machines that think, that learn, and tion which formed their input, and this would interpret them and make the highthat create. Moreover, their ability to do labor had to be repeated, almost always, level executive decisions appropriate to its these things is going to increase rapidly whenever even the most subtle changes in status. This seemed a logical approach to until-in the visible future-the range of the problem were made. Whatever else in- the AI researchers and they adopted it,


more half-consciously than otherwise. ally narrowing the range of possibilities, Some devoted themselves to the "lower" more and more error will be progressively ability, which in this context meant pick- eliminated until we finally arrive at "the ing out lines from a map of light-intensity facts." values. Others worked on the "higher" A shape-identifying vision program was functions, which were expected to reason designed to identify and isolate only those out what the lines meant. Both programs points which lie along the "true" edges of were conceived as having, ideally, great the images, discarding those which are generality and independence. The ambition produced by dirt, decorations, or texture. of those working on line-finding programs Then it would try to combine these points was to devise a set of powerful, universal into lines, endeavoring meanwhile to pick procedures that could be routinely applied out only the significant lines, even if lightto any scene. Similarly, the scene-analyst ing conditions have left them invisible or programmers hoped to write a series of blocked by overlying objects, while not programs that would be general-purpose . being distracted by shadows. Finally, with evaluators, generalizers, analogy makers. all this done-and it would have to be These were the cognitive assumptions; done flawlessly because false information epistemologically the AI researchers, again generated at one levelmakes the operations half-consciously, were "realists." They be- of higher levels totally useless-the malieved the objects that compose the world chine would match a list of the identified are essentially like our perception of them; features of the object with a list of the posthat by their different ways of reflecting sibilities stored in its memory. If it could and absorbing light, things announce them- do so without being confused by viewing selves to the observer, for whom perception angles and distance variations, a correct is essentially a recording process. The eyes identification might be made. are like windows that open up the mind to Over the last 10 years partial solutions a reality totally independent of the ob- to this formidable problem emerged. But server. This theory, realism, is opposed by it was too hard; the process was too ina number of philosophical alternatives (the volved. The conviction began to grow iil extreme of which is solipsism) which hold the profession that no animal would 'see that seeing is an active process which im- as fluidly and responsively as it now does poses identities and qualities on the world if it had to wade through anything so tortuabout it. The AI workers, however, felt ous. The world of perception is a world of more comfortable with a kind of neo- illusion piled on ilIusion, and aggregating Lockean empiricism, which assumed that facts about it in the hope that enough facts each scene has a knowable, retrievable would finalIy point unequivocally to the essence-its "reality"-and that by gradu- "truth" began to seem an impractical

"This model will do the work of four conscientious employees or nineteen relatives."

fancy. To write a "rational" program that would never arrive at any kind of judgment until it had a good reason for doing so was to write a program that would paralyze itself with unrealistically high standards.

* * * * *

A different set of assumptions is now being used in programs that work with essences, expectations that are read into the data if needed. A shape-finding program of this kind would have in its memory a vocabulary of the prototypical, three-dimensional forms that it might reasonably expect to encounter in its pursuit of the immediate task at hand. A minimum of data would trigger off a guess about what was being viewed and then a short list of specific questions, previously programed in the event that this guess was made, would be asked to confirm it. Once that confirmation is received, the program sees what should be there; for instance a flood of detailed, preprogramed expectations is triggered off about what the parts of the figure hidden from the viewer should look like. The flaw in these programs is that they have to be specifically tailored to particular environments; their virtue is that they promise to be more useful within those environments. Facts about shape are not the only ones that can be associated with these prototypical essences. If a program imposes a "typical" bottle shape on, let us say, a perception of "thin neck/sloping shoulders/straight sides," information about the fragility of glass, the likely nature of the contents, the speed with which it can be filled or emptied can be bound in with it. These facts will all be true of the machine's "idea" of bottle, not necessarily of the specific bottle in front of it, so these programs must also be equipped to handle anomalies. Programs built under the old assumptions had no expectations about the world; nothing surprised them. They applied their procedures routinely and passively to ~vhateverwas given to them. This is not true of the newer programs; if something that a new program has decided is a cow turns out not to have an udder, that fact must have been anticipated and have associated with it specific directions on how to test for bulls and horses. The general idea seems an attractive one, if for no other reason than that human beings appear to work in analogous ways. If someone were to drop a glass and it bounced, we would feel a dramatic reaction within ourselves; something would have been violated. Where else lies the ap-


peal of Sherlock Holmes if not in that he continued to look long after his readers were satisfied with typicality of what they saw, and, being so satisfied, stopped looking? What purpose is served by the convention of the topic sentence-usually made redundant by the succeeding text-but as an aid to selecting the right grouping of associated expectations? However, these programs and the approach they embody are quite new, and it is difficult to say how successful they will be. There are a number of people, of whom the best known is Professor Herbert Dreyfus of Berkeley, who believe that they will be no more successful than were those of the sixties. Dreyfus contends that computers will never be able to think, not only because they lack autonomous desire-free will-but because thought itself is not amenable to the step-by-step counting routines upon which digital-computer operations are based. Those who are more optimistic point out that while there were not more than 20 full-time workers in AI in 1963 now there are at least 200; that the hardware has become muclt more sophisticated; and that a consensus has developed about what the important problems are and how they ought to be attacked. MIT hopes within five years to have developed an electronic repairman that can assemble, inspect, maintain, and repair electronic equipment. Stanford University has been doing a lot of work on manipulation and coordinating vision and tactile systems, and is moving rapidly toward automatic building and assembling machines. Natural language comprehension, wherein a human can converse with a computer in everyday English, has been showing especially dramatic progress in recent years and there are some showpiece programs which work slowly but well. A number of private companies, particularly the Xerox Corporation, are increasing their support of their own research programs. So it is at least possible that, sometime during the 1980s, we will see the gradual introduction of programs, which, whether or not we call them intelligent, will be able to react reasonably to significantly complicated situations. If we are to learn anything at all from the history of computers in America, it ought to be extreme care in predicting what computers will mean to the society and the culture. There are some general observations that might be pertinept. The first is that these programs are extremely complex and therefore expensive. Even the simplest takes man-years to write, and they must be specifically tailored

to particular environments. Their introduction will therefore be extremely slow. It is unlikely that any analogue will exist to the payroll programs of the fifties which could flash through whole groups of industries in a single year. Second, if we were underprepared for the first wave of automation, we are, if anything, overprepared for the second. Much of the public believes that computers already possess powers that, even by the most optimistic forecast, they will not have until well into the next century. New achievements are therefore more likely to be greeted with a shrug than with any sense of heightened significance. Third, one cannot be sure to what extent the sheer physical and financial scale of the machines of the fifties contributed to the frenzy that surrounded them, but it seems worth noting that the price of hardware¡ is falling precipitously, and appears certain to continue to do so. It has been estimated

'When intelligent machines are constructed, we should not be surprised to find them as confused and as stubborn as men on their convictions about mind-matter, consciousness, free will, and the like.' that the entire world stock of computers, with an original purchase price of $25,000 million, could be replaced today for $1,000 million. The comparative value of human labor involved in installations is rising correspondingly. Ten years ago programing accounted for one-fifth of the cost of an average installation; by the end of this decade it will be four-fifths. For all these reasons it seems unlikely that these new programs will revive our concern about machines "taking over" to the intensity of the early sixties. Ironically, the success of the artificialintelligence scientists may end in their losing their running battle with the "vitalists." The confusion over machine intelligence arose only because the word sprawls over so many activities. Whether or not one believed that constructing geometric proofs was an intelligent activity in itself or merely expressed an intelligence which fundamentally resided at some deeper level, one had to believe that it was legitimate to involve the word in the first place. The same assumption can be said to be true of such primitive abilities as think-

ing fast, or possessing an accurate memory. But it seems clear that, over the long run, when activities become mechanized, they lose status. This is an ancient dynamic, long antedating computers. Before the camera was invented, perfect reproduction of nature was thought a noble objective in painting, if not indeed the only proper end. When the camera was able to make this ideal routinely available, everyone grew bored and went off to do other things (though it might be mentioned, not before both Sam Morse and Nathaniel Hawthorne had written that surely the camera would leave artists with naught but a purely historical life). The telegraph companies inherited none of the romance which attached to the riders of the Pony Express. Routing, the planning of the most cost-effective truck and freight-car routes, was once a respected job that was thought to require judgment, skill, and experience. That function is now done by computers and. has been for the last 10 years, and I would guess that in all that time not two people in the transportation industries have thought seriously about the computer's showing "skill" and "judgment." Indeed, it seems probable that the computer has had at least a part in the developing conviction expressed most explicitly by, but hardly confined to, the "counterculture," that logical, sequential, cause-and-effect reasoning is not only an undistinguished but even a disreputable ability. Some of the activities that are important to us and our sense of being human could, can, and might be programed; others cannot. To take the extreme case, there simply is no serious sense in which one can talk about a computer program praying or loving. If it continues to be true that to mechanize an activity is precisely to divest it of its mana, to cause humans to withdraw from it emotionally, then the impact of these programs, at least culturally, will be to refine our ideas of human intelligence, to cause those ideas to recede, or advance, into the subjective, affective, expressive regions of our nature. If this happens, we might lose interest in the whole issue of whether machines can "outthink" man, and the use of the term "intelligence" by AI researchers may come to seem increasingly anachronistic and inappropriate the more successful they are. 0 About the Author: Fred Hapgood, a writer for the Harvard News Office. specializes in reporting on the latest developments in science and technology and their impact on mankind.


An eminent Indian science writer discusses the possibility of building computers that can duplicate the highest activities of the brain. He concludes that the quest for synthetic intelligence will be long and arduous because the secret of human wisdom is a primeval mystery. In the words of the unknown writer of the Book of Ecclesiastes: 'The first man knew him not perfectly, no more shall the last find him out.'


T

here is a Turkish proverb that says, "If Allah gives you prosperity, He will give you the brains to go with it." Whether this was ever true of either men or nations is doubtful. And there is doubt whether the affluence of modern technological society has engendered any growth of human mental capacity. It is natural, therefore, that the technological world should dream of securing by artificial means the brains to match the affluence it has already gained. The first person to recognize the need for an enquiry into the synthesis of human intelligence was the celebrated American mathematician Norbert Wiener. His book Cybernetics, published in 1948, called attention to the widespread trend toward automation in industry and predicted that the trend would culminate in the creation of new kinds of machines producing cerebral power instead of muscle power. It is true that there is nothing new in envisaging giant mechanical brains able to take over our "thinking" chores. But what was new was Wiener's demonstration that the vision of such huge robot brains was no longer a quixotic dream. In order to make real and-'respectable what had hitherto been only a science fiction scenario, Wiener had to rely on the fundamental work of a whole galaxy of American ¡mathematicians, theoreticians, neurophysiologists and polymaths like John von Neumann who designed the first successful automatic digital computer (ENIAC) during World War II; C.E. Sha,nnon who invented information theory, the cornerstone of cybernetics; L. Szilard who discovered the link between information and entropy; Walter Pitts and W.S. McCulloch who devised the theory of neural networks in an ambitious bid to simulate the working of the living brain; as well as many other scholars working at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the California Institute of Technology and Bell Telephone laboratories. Thanks to their work as well as his own, Wiener could show that the design of a cerebral machine performing mental tasks is in principle no different from that of any other machine doing physical work. Indeed, a cerebral machine is merely the counterpart, with respect to our natural brains, of those giant tools of today that already multiply a thousandfold the capacity of our brawn. Just as a factory worker with a power

machine can put forth a physical effort equal to a thousand horsepower or more, even though his own muscles provide only an infinitesimal fraction of this, so also we may some day devise means to amplify our I.Q. sufficiently to give us the over-all comprehension we so obviously lack. It is only by such amplification that we can hope to resolve some of the baffling dilemmas that beset the world today, as indeed social scientists, econometricians, operations researchers and students of human engineering have already begun to do in a limited sort of way. They have had a fair measure of success, though most of it is not due to any new design of an intelligence amplifier more discerning than the human brain. It is rather the outcome of vastly improved computational facilities that the giant electronic computers nowadays provide. Because these computers can complete within a few

In biological evolution, organisms 'evolve' into more complex organisms. So why wouldn't it be possible for machines to produce other machines more complex than themselves? hours complex arithmetical calculations that would otherwise take centuries or even millennia to perform, it is entirely feasible now to tackle many economic, social and management problems involving thousands of variables interlocked by as many constraints. But for all its great feats of computation, control and communication, a modern computer cannot create more thought than is put into it in the initial programing. It merely works out the consequences of what has already been supplied to it in the form of programed instructions. It is therefore limited by a sort of conservation law-the law of conservation of thought or instructions. This limitation means that the machine is incapable of originating a new instruction or idea. Is this limitation destined to remain forever? Or will future designers be able to con-

struct automatons able to do their own' thinking, like those in science fiction? The natural question then is simply this: Can we devise more sophisticated machines that can originate new thinking without infringing the law of conservation of instructions, which requires a strict balance between the input instructions of the programmer and the output of the machine? There is no unequivocal answer to the question. It all depends on the meaning we choose to assign to the verb "to think." If we adopt a behavioristic definition of the term, as the English logician A.M. Turing and his followers suggest, we may consider a machine capable of "thinking" if it can be made to answer questions sufficiently well to deceive its human interlocutor into believing that he is conversing with another human being. If we accept such "operational" or "behavioristic" tests of thinking as valid, it is possible-in theory though not yet in practice-to make a machine that can successfully mimic human thought. Turing was the first to design such a machine, since known as the Turing Machine. The basic idea underlying such machines is a denial of what seems eminently plausible. We should normally expect the yield or output of an automaton to be at least a shade less complicated than itself. If an automaton has the ability to construct another automaton, there must be a decrease in complication as we proceed from parent to progeny. For, the parent automaton must contain within itself not merely a complete description of its progeny but a mechanism to produce it. Consequently, some decrease in complexity is to be expected as one automaton makes another. But this expectation is clearly contrary to the most obvious facts of life. Organisms not only reproduce themselves-that is, they give birth to new ones with no decrease in complexity-but they have even produced, during the long billennia of evolution, increasingly complex organisms. This discrepancy between actuality and anticipation is, however, merely an instance of the apparent conflict between the second law of thermodynamics, which inexorably drives all matter toward increasing disorder or "mixed-upness," and the process of biological evolution with its continual unfolding of new patterns of order and organization. I

I


puter existing today. Once devised, they could be made to perform a wide gamut of tasks requiring intelligence rather than rote learning. A machine could, for instance, write sonnets. And having written one, it could be put to a viva voce test to discover whether it really "understood" what it was doing or just wrote it parrotlike without any real "comprehension." Turing suggested that his machine could in fact hold its own against its human interlocutor by sustaining a dialogue of the kind quoted below:

"Well, here it is. The ideal girl for you is five foot four; 36, 26, 36; a real looker, with an M.A. in literature, a sunny disposition, a terrific sense of humor, and a love of good music-classical or jazz."

For example, cellular enzymes receive at birth in a coded form genetic information of great specificity. This enables them to duplicate themselves out of materials present, instead of letting those materials drift into chaos: Turing gave a logically rigorous rationale of all such duplicating processes, whether natural ones of biology or synthetic ones of cybernetics. He showed that any automaton or computing machine that has the minimum proper information-or, more precisely, the minimum proper number of instructions-can simulate any other automaton, however large the instruction repertoire of the latter. In other words, there need be no diminution in complexity as one automaton constructs another. On the other'hand, it may well increase so that the automaton may even be made to reproduce another twice as effective and complex as itself. Let us skip Turing's proof of his theorem and pass on to its most fruitful consequence-the development of a code-instruction system for a computing machine

that causes it to behave as if it were another specified computing machine. Such systems of instruction, which make one machine imitate the behavior of another, are known as short codes or autocodes. In vogue now are many such auto codes-the Ferranti Autocode, Flow-Matic, FORTRAN, and so on-all differing from one another in various ways and yet all mere embodiments of Turing's theorem. They are the props supporting various kinds of automatic programing techniques that have since been perfected to automatize even the task of programing computer instructions. Turing had a clear vision of the vast potentialities of such automatic programing techniques. He predicted that they would be sufficiently perfected by the end of the 20th century to make it possible to program computers with the colossal capacity of a billion bits* -1,000 times larger than the largest com*Bit is the unit used to measure the information content of a message text. or instruction. If the text is transmitted by telegraph in the Morse code. the number of dashes and dots in the code translation is the number of bits of inform ation contained therein. y

lNTERROGATOR: In the first line of your sonnet which reads, "Shall I compare thee to a summer's day?" would not "a spring day" do as well or better? MACHINE: It would not scan. lNTERROGATOR: How about "a winter's day?" That would scan all right. MACHINE: Yes, but nobody wants to be compared to a winter's day. INTERROGATOR: Would you say Mr. Pickwick reminded you of Christmas? MACHINE: In a way. INTERROGATOR: Yet Christmas is a winter's day and I do not think Mr. Pickwick would mind the comparison. MACHINE: I do not think you are serious. By "winter's day" one means a typical winter's day, rather than a special one like Christmas. Even though Turing considered sonnetwriting machines of the future quite capable of debating issues in this manner, he was nevertheless fully aware of the behavioristic fallacy of equating this mind like activity with that of the human mind. As he conceded at the end of his charming essay, "Can a Machine Think?" he had no very "convincing arguments" of a positive nature to support the behavioristic position he advocated. He held that the only really satisfactory support for the conclusion he sought to deduce was the con,struction of a Turing Machine with a billion-bit storage capacity actually playing the imitation game. Although such a Turing Machine is a logical possibility, present-day technology cannot as yet implement the design. The reason is that despite great advances in computer technology we still cannot comprehend the mighty paradox that is the computer-brain comparison. Though in


some respects they are closely allied, in others they are as far apart as stars and satellites. 'Consider, to start with, the resemblances: They are mainly three. First, the computer can be programed to make decisions of the sort that living brains do. Second, both the computer and the brain employ feedback whereby they monitor and correct their own aberrations in a changing environment. Third, both treat their environment-internal as well as external-as a source of "information," which must somehow be communicated over channels that form an integral part of their network before it is "processed." Both, therefore, require a mode of communication that secures optimal information with maximal reliability or minimal interference by vitiations of noise. This is done by resort to redundancy, that is, communicating more information than is strictly necessary either in the form of

duplication of information or surfeit of channels to carry that information. But these threefold resemblanceschoice, feedback and redundancy-which are at work in both the computer and the brain, do not fully warrant our earlier hope of a quick resolution of the mystery of brain function. For, we now find that the divergences diverge much more radically than the coincidences converge. The most conspicuous departure is in respect of methods of storage, recall and processing of information. Because these methods in computer engineering today are primitive vis-a.-vistheir infinitely more complex but unknown analogues of the living brain, the computer has not yet been able to simulate intelligencein other more sophisticated areas such as writing poetry, discovering theorems, composing music, translating literature, playing chess, assessing economic problems, etc., in any meaningful way. The reason we are unable

to exploit computer resources for these activities is that there is a basic difference between computation and any of these intelligent, creative tasks. The difference stems from the fact that while computational problems are amenable to what are called algorisms, other more complexproblems like writing poetry or composing music are not. An algorism for a problem, by the way, is a repetitive routine which, if followed, is guaranteed to yield a solution-assuming that a solution exists. One example is the simple algorism of looking up a word in the dictionary. One scans the list of words in alphabetical order till one finds it. The dictionary provides a set of possible solutions in some order and we test each candidate word in succession till the required one is found. Such a process is comparable to computer treatment even though the word search in a list involves handling non-


numerical symbols. The computer is programed merely to follow the algorism or iterative routine of scanning possible solutions produced by the generator process, to test them in succession, and terminate the operation when it has found the solution. The cOIlJ.puterowes its success in accomplishing such algorismic tasks to its high-speed operation. What is true of computation does not hold for the miscellany of more creative tasks like writing poetry. Although in these cases too, problem-solving processes or routines can be devised, they offer no guarantees of success. Consider, for example, Swift's Lagado device, described in Gulliver's Travels, for writing "books on philosophy, poetry, politics, and so on." Or consider its more modern variantEmile Borel's immortal monkey strumming at random on a typewriter. If a device had the power to recognize and sort out intelligible sentences from the myriad other nonsensical strings of letters in the monkey's incessant outpourings, it could "write" all the extant literature incl}lding the plays of Shakespeare and Shaw. This is not to say that Swift's Lagado device (which enabled the "most ignorant person" to write "books on philosophy, poetry, politics, and so on") is now just around the corner. Quite the contrary. For, in actual practice, no one can produce a single line of Shakespeare in this way, let alone his complete works. Take, for instance, the well-known line from Twelfth Night: "0, Mistress mine, where are you roaming?" This is one particular permutation of 31 letters of the alphabet buried deep in an immensity of others. Written in the compact notation of the mathematician, its measure is the number (26)31, But its truly cosmological size is better revealed when we realize that even if our scanning device screened a million permutations per second, it would still take some 300 million times the putative age of the universesome 10,000 million years-to run through the lot! Nevertheless, the principle of producing intelligence by filtering random casts of letters or words is not wholly illogical, provided the inflationary spiral of permutational possibilities could somehow be checked. But no computer, however rapid, could possibly scan the number of possible solu-

Computers cannot perform the creative feats of the human brain because the brain operates by strange methods bearing little resemblance to the familiar rules of logic and mathematics.

tions that the routine for writing poetry generates, because their number rises exponentially. It is the same with all other more complex problems such as playing chess, recognizing patterns, discovering theorems and so on. The search fails because of the overwhelming number of eligible solutions that have to be tested. Because the computer is not yet able to wean itself away from the tutelage of algorisms, it can handle only such tasks as can be performed by more or less slavish follow-up of prescribed routines or algorisms which do not explode exponentially. The living brain, on the contrary, operates essentially by nonalgorismic methods bearing little resemblance to the familiar rules of logic and mathematics built into the computer. It is therefore no wonder that the latter is hard put to mimic such creative feats of the living brain as are not readily amenable to algorismic routines. All it has been able to do so far is to ape them rather crudely-and that too by the invention of new kinds of highly sophisticated machine languages or codes that are nowhere like those of the living brain. With the failure to make brain models or artificial automatons capable of exhibiting intelligent human behavior, there has now been increasing awareness of our inability to synthesize human intelligence by methods other than plodding with algorismic routines. As a result, participants in the search for thinking machines or machines that amplify our cerebral power are in two minds. The first group believes that major obstacles to the synthesis of each kind of artificial intelligence can be overcome by improving the computer's memory, electronic speed, computational capabilities, and' prodigious informationprocessing prowess. They believe that even

the computer's existi'ng assets have not yet been fully exploited. The second group believes that the secret of the neurophysiological basis of the brain-or more specifically the discovery of its methods of storage, recall, data processing, perception and understanding-must somehow be resolved before significant progress can be made. For these problems are not solely a matter of speed, computation and data processing. To solve them, we must wait for our next breakthrough into the neurophysiological complexity of the human cerebral cortex. Unfortunately, such a breakthrough is not on the horizon. For there is a kind of indeterminacy that acts as a barrier to our understanding of the living brain. The indeterminacy arises from the fact that the more micro our neurological probe, the less macro is our comprehension of the working of the cerebral cortex as a whole. The way around this dilemma is a synthesis of both micro and macro approaches. But the desired synthesis is not likely to be a mere derivation of macro or aggregate effects by some sort of statistical averaging of myriads of micro neurological events. The transformation of trillions of nerve impulses moving helter-skelter ill billions of neural channels inside our brain into the world of color and form that we actually perceive and reason about could hardly be achieved in such a naIve fashion. Nor can mental activity, including the emergence of human intelligence, be sheetanchored to a sort of aggregated upshot of elementary reflexes, those "atoms of behavior," on which incipient ps~chology tried in vain to rear itself. The quest for synthetic intelligence will therefore be long and arduous. For, after all, the secret of human wisdom is a primeval mystery. In the words of the unknown writer of Ecclesiastes: "The first man knew him not perfectly, no more shall the last find him out." 0

About the Author: Dr. Jagjit Singh is one of India's best known science writers whose books include Modern Cosmology, Mathematical Ideas, Language and Cybernetics, and Operation Research. Some of his works have been published in the U.S. by Dover Publications, a prestigious science publishing house, In 1963, he became the first Asian to win UNESCO's Kalinga Prize for popularizing science.


AEROSOLS AND OZONE Will underarm deodorants hasten the end of the world? Yes, if they're sprayed from aerosol cans, according to many American scientists. But so will insect repellants, shaving cream. hair spray, paint-in fact any item in aerosol cans. It's not the active ingredients of these cans that's causing the danger, but the gas that propels the ingredients-usually chlorofluorocarbon-which is alleged to be destroying the protective ozone shield in the earth's stratosphere. It turns out that a layer of . ozone 10 miles up in the stratosphere is a protector of life on this planet; it saves man from the hostile radiation of the sun. How does chlorofluorocarbon weaken the ozone shield? Every time an aerosol can is used, some chlorofluorocarbon diffuses slowly into the stratosphere. There, the sun's ultraviolet rays act on it to produce chlorine atoms, and these in turn break down the ozone. When the ozone shield weakens, the sun's ultraviolet and infrared rays reach man in greater strength, which is believed to increase the incidence of cancer and other cell mutations. Forests, crops, animals and insects might also be affected. Slowly, inexorably, climatic changes may eventually melt the polar ice cap and . usher in another glacial age. Ecology-conscious Americans are discussing these chilling threats to the earth's ecosystem, although to many people the thought that a casual pfft of an underarm deodorant can endanger man's existence seems , incredible. "Can Dry Armpits

Mean World Crisis?" asked the Minneapolis Star recently. If the rising trend in the use of aerosol cans isn't halted, warns Dr. F.S. Rowland of the University of Maryland, the ozone layer will be depleted by 10 to 40 per cent in 50 years. But the trend seems to have been arrested; all the adverse publicity against aerosol cans has begun to take effect. One state, Oregon, has banned their

sale beginning February 1977. A New York aerosol can company recently closed down its plant after sales dropped 40 per cent. And some manufacturers have begun to advertise aerosols \yithout chlorofluorocarbons. Meanwhile, government, science and industry are probing the problem of ozone depletion in all its aspects. Last year the U.S. Government set up an Interagency Task Force. In a report issued a few months ago, the task force has urged curbs on fluorocarbon use , "unless new scientific evidence is found to remove the cause for concern." Researchers are also examining other alleged

threats to the ozone shield, such as jet aircraft and nuclear bombs. A leading American official, Russell E. Train of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, has <,lescribedfluorocarbons as "the world's first truly global environmental problem." He said recently that the U.S. would soon convene a "working meeting" of industrial nations to examine "possible lines of action" to combat the problem. But reports of impending danger to man resulting from diminution of ozone are by no means unanimous. Some experts say that the danger of ozone depletion is smaller and farther off in time than the doomsayers claim. Douglas Davis, a chemist at the University of Maryland, states that the reaction between chlorine and ozone at stratospheric temperatures occurs more slowly than earlier investigators had assumed. Other researchers raise the possibility that nature has its own mechanism for cleaning the stratosphere of chlorine. The widely varying theories about the state of the stratosphere show that it's still an area of scientific darkness. But new light is being shedthanks to the aerosol scare, and the vigilance of ecologyminded Ainericans.

A BEAUTY NAMED SUMMER Summer's the loveliest of all, said the judges at the Miss U.S.A. contest held recently at Niagara Falls, New York. And Summer Bartholomew (top right), responded joyously. The 23-year-old beauty

is a graduate student at Merced Junior College, California. Will Summer win further laurels? Perhaps-when the world's beauties gather in EI Salvador for the Miss Universe contest-next summer.

'AMERICA ON PARADE' IN DISNEYLAND Mickey Mouse, Goofy and Donald Duck, Walt Disney's legendary cartoon characters (below), bring to life the famous painting "The Spirit of '76," by striking a similar pose. The three Disney favorites enact "Spirit of '76" every day at Walt Disney World, Florida, and Disneyland, California, as


MERICANS ARE TALKING

ABOUli

they lead "America on Parade," a colorful spectacle staged as part of the Bicentennial observances. The largest live audience in history-more than 25 million people including two million foreign guests-is expected to view the parade through its 1,200 performances over a 15-month period ending September 1976.

A NOVEL THAT REWRITES mSTORY

"As exhilarating as a deep breath of pure oxygen," is how New$week describes Ragtime, the latest novel by E.L. Doctotow (above). Other critics are equally ecstatic. Readers race through it at one sitting (despite the admonitory epigraph, "It is never right to play ragtime fast"). It's been selected by the Book-of-the-Month Club. It topped the fiction bestseller list for weeks. It's netted a record $1.8 million in paperback rights. And it will soon be made into a film by director Robert Altman (maker of M*A*S*H and Nashville). An experiment in historical fiction, Ragtime captures the ferment of early 20th century America in "a fluid, musical

way that's as original as it is satisfying," says the New Yorker. The action takes place between 1902 and 1917, a period of change and flux in the U.S. and the world: Labor is organizing itself, cinema is evolving as an art form, Einstein and Freud are challenging conventional wisdom in science and sex, war clouds are gathering. The comfortable world of the 19th century is dissolving, and the dissolution swirls around a family that lives atop a hill in New Rochelle, New York. There's Father who manufactures flags and fireworks; Mother who is blonde, beautiful, full-bodied; Mother's Younger Brother, who is lonely and withdrawn; and Little Boy, a big dreamer. (None of the characters are named.) An accident occurs outside their house one day, when an automobile hits a telephone pole. Out of the car steps Harry Houdini, worldfamous magician and conjurer, who has been house-hunting in the neighborhood. Houdini asks Little Boy for a glass of lemonade, magically dissolving the barrier between history and fiction. In later pages, other historical personages flicker before the reader's eyes like interleaved silhouettes. Freud is escorted around America by Carl Gustav Jung; Henry Ford and J.P. Morgan discuss reincarnation and socioeconomic change; Houdini demonstrates the use of an airplane to Prince Ferdinand of Austria-Hungary-just before an assassin's bullet kills Ferdinand in Sarajevo, triggering off World War 1. These personages of the pre-World War I decade cross paths with the fictional New Rochelle family, and two others. There is the family of a poor Jewish

street artist who wanders with his daughter from New York to Massachusetts to Philadelphia and eventually ends up as a Hollywood tycoon. The third family is that of a black ragtime pianist who plunges into . terrorism to wreak vengeance on a group of whites who vandalize his car. By the time the novel ends, many of the characters have died, two have married, and the panorama of an event-tilled er'! has passed before the reader's eyes. How much of the book is based on historical fact, how much on imagination? Says Doctorow: "I've never read that J.P. Morgan and Henry Ford met. They may have. But for me it was absolutely essential that they meet. If you ask whether some things in the book 'really' happened, I can only say:

'They have now.' " Stanley Kauffmann writes in Saturday Review: "The size of Ragtime is in its subject, its depth, its powerful distillations. This book, any page of which may seem simple, is complex and rich." Several eminent critics point out that Doctorow has explored the possibilities of the novel in a w,ayfew others have done. Sometimes his style is filmic: The narrative follows a characte till he meets a second character, then flows off with him-very much as Kurosawa's camera sometimes does. And the form of the book is often musical. "Its lyric tone, fluid structure and vigorous rhythms give it a musical quality that explanation mutes," says Time. It's like ragtime music-rhythmic, melodic, stately.

Daniel "Chappie" James Jr. (below), gets his fourth star to become the first black full general in American military history. Pinning the honors on him are General David Jones,

Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force, and Mrs. James. General James has become head of the North American Air Defence Command (NORAD), a U.S.Canadian military unit.


Art takes many formsat Interlochen each student experiments until he finds the'medium that suits him best. Anita Johnson (far left) thought she wanted to be a painter. After working in a well-equipped studio, she finds that she prefers sculpting. Intent on mastering technique, ceramist Sarah Kuth (left) says: "The atmosphere here is conducive to work." Serious face of dancer (at right) reflects affitude toward her art.

THE PACE IS GRUELING, THE DISCIPLINE SPARTAN, THE COMPETITION FIERCE-AND HUNDREDS OF YOUNG MUSICIANS, ARTISTS AND ACTORS LOVE IT.

Eyes made-up; face tense with anticipation, requires its students to meet professional Indeed, music is the most common form a ballerina ties' back her hair before her ap- standards in these fields while pursuing a full of artistic expression at Interlochen, though pearance onstage. In a studio not far away, a academic course. the range of student activities stretches from sculptor works on the figure of a nude while 'What kind of students come to Inter- acting to weaving. Out of an enrollment of a ceramist bends over a potter's wheel. The lochen? Only the most gifted and strongly roughly 350, more than 300 youngsters study sound of music resounds through corridors, motivated teen-agers can keep up the intense one or more instruments and participate and voices are raised in mock passion as a pace. And the pressure doesn't seem to rattle in the symphony orchestra, band, choir, play is rehearsed. them unduly. A faculty-student ratio of one opera workshop or student-initiated chamber All this must be taking place in some great to five ensures small classes with plenty of in- groups and jazz combos. In addition to conmetropolitan cultural center. In New York? dividual attention, and encourages warm, per- ducting, composing, arranging and orchestraOr San Francisco? Or Minneapolis? Guess sonal pupil-teacher relations. But not all In- tion, courses include the study of music again. The scene of this activity is a 560-hec- terlochen students plan careers in the arts. literature and theory. tare woodland campus set amidst clear lakes Some have already chosen a different field The emphasis on music comes naturally and tall pine trees. It is the Interlochen Arts while others hope their experience here will to the Arts Academy which is an outgrowth Academy in Michigan, a five-year training help them decide. A 15-year-old boy who 'of the long-celebrated Interlochen summer ground for gifted high school students. spends many hours hunched over a keyboard music camp. Started in 1928,the camp was the Founded in 1962, the academy specializes in dreams of becoming a doctor rather than a first of its kind in America and is still perhaps music, drama, dance, and the visual arts, and concert pianist. "I just like music," he says. the most famous, although some 150 summer



AN OUTGROWTH OF MICHIGAN'S FAMOUS SUMMER MUSIC CAMP, THE ARTS ACADEMY IS STILL DOMINATED BY MUSIC, WITH THE GREAT MAJORITY OF ITS STUDENTS PLAYING AN INSTRUMENT OR PARTICIPATING IN A CHOIR, RCHESTRA. BAND, OPERA WORKSHOP, CHAMBER GROUP OR JAZZ COMBO.


Organist Glen Wilson (above) tries his hand at the harpsichord. Cellist Siri Edwards (above left) also studies the guitar and even at the age of 15 shows considerable musical maturity. Scholarship student I-fu Wang (left) worked his way from second violin to first violinist and concertmaster within just one year. Symphony orchestra (right) rehearses for biweekly concert.


DANCE PROGRAMS RANGE FROM CRISP MODERN WORKS AND ROMANTIC OLD FAVORITES TO STUDENT COMPOSITIONS

The rehearsal hall's enormous mirrors reflect intent faces of dancers preparing for work (top). With orchestra in the foreground, ballet troupe ( center) performs the ever-popular "Nutcracker Suite," which contrasts with modern

work, "Lines and Designs" (above). Huge stylized eyes (right) form background for dancers in student ballet titled "Remembrance." Subdued lighting, surrealistic decor, and filmy costumes contribute toward creating dreamlike atmosphere.



DRAMA STUDENTS AMAZE AUDIENCES WITH THE BROAD SCOPE OF THEIR REPERTOIRE WHICH PRESENTS HIGH TRAGEDY AND LOW FARCE WITH EQUAL APLOMB. music camps now exist in the U.S. From late June to late August each year, more than 2,000 students converge on the Interlochen music camp and end their summer session with a series of public performances. Meanwhile the academy's. reputation attracts the finest talent to its regular student body. Its star-studded advisory council and faculty have included such figures as the late Pablo Casals, Leonard Bernstein, Aaron Copland, Isaac Stern, Howard Hanson, Walter Damrosch, and Paul Whiteman. When pianist Van Cliburn visited Interlochen, he said of the students: "They are all excellent musicians. I would recommend several of them right away to any of the major symphony orchestras. " Precisely because they're all so gifted, no one can play the prima donna. As one girl puts it, "If you're good, you're not made a lot of because so many others are good too." Nevertheless competition, encouraged by the academy, is keen. A challenge system requires the player in each orchestra and band to contest the player in the next highest chair at regular intervals. The other students judge who is better. The director of music at the academy explains that "the student has to challenge or move to the end of the section. We're not going to let him sit there and say: 'I like it where I am.''' The highest honor a student may win at Interlochen is the "concerto audition" which entitles the winner to a performance with orchestra. At this concert, tapc recordings are made which are later played over the academy's regular radio broadcasts. The discipline and high standards imposed on Interlochen's music program extend to all its other fields. This is true of its theater course which offers training in cvery aspect of stagecraft: set designing, lighting, make-up, directing and acting. And the academy's repertoire runs the gamut from the old timetested classics to modern experimental plays. The founder of Interlochen, Dr. Joseph Maddy, who died in 1966, once said: "The basic philosophy of Interlochen is promotion of achievement. And the purpose of the camp is to develop the talents of the gifted person to leave him free to make his own choice as to how he uses that gift in his life, either as a career or for personal enrichment throughout 0 the years."

In spirited performances, theater students tackle adult themes. Emotional scenes from "The Miracle Worker" (above and above right) show blind deaf-mute Helen Keller with her teacher Anne Sullivan. Turning to lighthearted revue (left), students prove versatility in song-and-dance skit. Actors must also have backstage skills; careful make-up (right) was essential for successful staging of John Steinbeck's Of Mice and Men (far right).




I

saw the whole thing. I didn't snoop. I didn't have to. They carried on, day after day, right there on the open beach, immediately under our noses. Or at least, under mine, since a nose without a pair of eyes above it isn't much good, and Lansing is blind. We'd sit out most of the day on the porch of the little cottage I'd rented for the summer, Lansing slumped in his chair, hands folded across his stomach. You never knew if he was asleep or not. I'd read, or sew, and there would be the three of them, the young woman and her little boy and the lifeguard, sitting practically under the porch railings, so we could hear every word they said. I guess that as far as they were concerned, Lansing and I were invisible, simply not there, two stuffy old people sitting on a porch. They probably thought, if they gave us any thought at all, that we were husband and wife, rather than mother and son. Other people have thought that. Lansing has gone to seed in the past years, mostly through lack of exercise, I supp,ose, and he's very bald for a man of 35. There's a look-alike quality about us, the kind of look that descends on husbands and wives when they've been married for a great many years. Oddly, it amuses me to augment this. I wear seersucker suits, and white blouses, and I bought a couple of straw hats the first day we came, and made Lansing wear one while I wore the other. So there we sat, two people of indeterminate age, and scarcely determinable sex, in cone-shaped white straw hats, summer suits and dark glasses, while a few yards away the young woman in the yellow bathing suit phiyed with her baby in the sand. Sometimes, when he had fallen asleep in the shade of the striped umbrella, she sat and wrote long letters on blue paper, which as often as not she tore up afterward, and stuffed the pieces in the big beach bag she had. Then she would pull her knees up under her chin and stare out to sea. Sometimes she looked as though she might be crying. I had her sized up pretty well. I knew what would happen, and I was right. The lifeguard stand was off to the left, just a short way away, with a little white rowboat tied to its'base, so if it were needed the lifeguard would have to push it only a foot or two into the water. There were two lifeguards for this stretch of beach, working in shifts, and the young woman spent no more than a couple of days looking lonely and pathetic before one of them noticed her,

and came over to talk to her, and play with the baby. It wasn't five minutes before he was sitting on the blanket with her, and after about 10 minutes they were calling each other Johnny and Rose as though they'd known each other all their lives. It turned out that the little boy's name was Johnny, too. "What a coincidence," said the lif,;:guard. The baby was called after his father, she told him. He was in New York. No he wouldn't be joining them. She was divorced. It was all quite recent, just a week or two ago. She had come away with the baby to sort things out, decide what to do next. "Gee," said the lifeguard. I suppose his expression could be called typically youthful, earnest, sincere, sympathetic-you see I know all the words-but to me it was stupid. I laughed. Nature, playing her fool tricks. It alway~ amuses me. You'd think people would be more alert, would notice themselves more, but I've lived long enough to find out they aren't, and they don't. Anyway, I made some sort of small noise, and Lansing turned his dark-glassed face to me. "They sound nice," he said. "What do they look like?" Sometimes I don't answer Lansing, when he asks me this about people. You wouldn't understand it, if you hadn't lived, year in, year out, with a blind person, as I have. I get a strange feeling. sometimes, not telling him. But this time I did. "Nice? I doubt it. That yellow suit she has on is hardly decent. Her hair's bleached. I can see the roots growing out. The young fellow, the lifeguard? He's one of those college boys, working for the summer. You can't tell one from the other, they're all as alike as peas in a pod, they all need haircuts. Nice? She came down to the beach to pick up a man, and he's it. What's nice about that?" "There's a baby, isn't there?" said Lansing. "Doesn't that make it more-pleasant?" This time, I was silent. Lansing kept his head turned toward me for a moment, a peculiar twist to his mouth, and then he turned away. "Maybe they'll get married, and live happily ever after," he said. On the beach, the girl called Rose got up, and took long-legged strides after the baby, who had wandered a little distance away. She carried him back and set him down on the blanket. "Naughty Johnny," she said. "You stay right here." She hugged him. "I have to watch

him every minute," she told the lif,;:guard. "He's at that age. And all boy. He can hardly walk yet, but if I just turn my back for a second, wowee!" "You see," said Lansing, "she likes her baby." "I'll watch him for you, if you want to go and swim," said the lifeguard. She declined, giggled, finally accepted, pulled on a white rubber bathing cap, and ran down to the water. "The young fellow, big Johnny, he likes the baby too," said Lansing. "Why not?" I asked, sharply. "He's a perfectly ordinary child. Nothing wrong with him." Lansing sighed. \ "Perfectly ordinary, yes. So I gathered." I got up. "I'll make some lemonade." In the kitchen, I wondered if Lansing had been needling me. There had been that sardonic look on his face, but it is always hard to know what Lansing is thinking, or if he thinks about anything at all. Mostly he seems a great blind vegetable, merely existing. But then again, he can come out with a remark that shows he is sharp enough. Perfectly ordinary. To be ordinary is to be perfect, as Lansing knows. I took two glasses of lemonade out to the porch, but Lansing didn't answer me when I spoke, or take the glass I touched against his hand. He had apparently fallen asleep. I sat down with my embroidery. The lifeguard was climbing the ladder to his chair, and the girl and the child were building a sand castle: There should be peace for an hour or so, I thought, unless the child should start to cry. I watched him, playing with his mother in the sand, a perfectly formed male child, no blemish, no scar, no deformity. At that age, 18 months, two years old perhaps, Lansing had been tied to a tree at the end of a long rope, his area of freedom perhaps 12 feet in diameter, carefully cleared of everything that could possibly hurt him. Not that he had any disposition to wander. He was timid, frightened, dependent, his forehead covered with bruises. Years of bitterness rose in my throat. Harold had left me, in spite of our child having been born blind. He gave me money, he took nothing with him, but he said he couldn't stand it any longer, what he called my possessiveness, my tricks. I can't take it any longer, Nettie, Harold said. Find someone stronger than I am, someone who's up to it. But of course I hadn't. This girl on the beach, this


Rose, she was younger than I had been, she would find someone. This Rose, and her healthy baby. Lansing had been born to me late. I really hadn't ever expected to marry, much less have a child. He had been born blind, and the child on the beach could see. "Are they leaving?" said Lansing. The soft chatter of the mother and child had awakened him. They were gathering their things together, she was trying to make him do his share of the work, sending him in search of his toys, his bucket and spade, a red ball. "There it is," she said. "Go and get it, Johnny. See it?" See it, see it, see it. She folded the blanket, and they walked up the beach, pausing beneath the lifeguard's stand to say something, too far away to hear. They climbed the low sand dunes, and disappeared. This was their third day. Later she would come back alone, for an hour or two in the early evening. "Yes," I said. "They've gone." "Quiet, without them," said Lansing, after a moment. "There don't seem to be many people about." He sounded less neutral, more melancholy than usual. "I chose it for that," I reminded him. "You don't care for crowds of people." "Of course," said Lansing, politely. "You were perfectly right." "We could go for a stroll after supper," I suggested. Lansing turned his heavy, pasty face from side to side. He had never seen a quick, negative shake of the head. All his movements were slow and deliberate. "No, no. I'd rather not. But perhaps you'd like to go for a walk, by yourself?" . "And leave you alone? Certainly not. We'll have an early supper and play cheS's afterward."

* * * * *

While I was in the kitchen, preparing the trays, the girl Rose came back to the beach. She sat in the same place as before, the way people do, and the lifeguard, off duty now, joined her. They were talking as loudly as ever, totally unaware, or uncaring of us, as I silently placed Lansing's tray on his knees and sat down with my own. "They'r~ back," said Lansing. "Is she still wearing the hardly decent bathing suit?" She had changed into a light blue cotton dress. She was deeply tanned. "Yes, she's still wearing it," I said. "She got a burn this afternoon. She ought to put something on it." Lansing was silent for a moment, considering. "It's got cooler," he said. "She'll catch cold."

"More fool her." "Rose, you have the strangest eyes," said the lifeguard. "Sort of green." "They are not!" She laughed, a foolish, come-hitherjdnd of laugh. "They are too." The sort of thing that could go on all night. "They're the same color as this. See?" She held up a fold of her skirt to her face. "Yeah. I guess you're right. But sometimes they do look green." "Well, they're not. Blue. True-blue, Dad used to say." "Where's my stick, Mother?" asked Lansing. A sudden panic seemed to have struck him. I watched him. Then, "Right beside your chair, Lansing. Why? Where did you think it was?" With it in his hand, the panic seemed assuaged. He reached out with it, touched the porch railings, rattled them gently. "I don't know," he said, lightly. "I thought I might have lost it, like I did before." I wondered if he knew I had hidden it, that time. I don't know what made me do it. And I didn't really hide it, merely moved it from the side of the chair where he always put it, to the other side. Everything always had to be in exactly the same place, for Lansing. I didn't let him grope for long, just a minute or two, and then I handed the stick to him. Perhaps it was the extravagance of his relief that made me feel rewarded. "Honest," said the lifeguard. "He's the cutest kid I ever saw." , "When did you ever learn to be an expert with kids?" said the girl, Rose. "Got five brothers and sisters," said the lifeguard, and told her all their names. "And I was lifeguard at a summer camp last year. And taking sociology at school. I'd like to find something to do, in that way, you know." "I bet you'd be good at it, too," said the girl. "Yeah, well," said the lifeguard, and shrugged. "It's hard to keep up, with all I have to do. I study, all right, but it's a temptation to go on out with the other guys." "It must be," said Rose. "Oh, yes," said Lansing, softly. He rattled his stick along the railings again, his tray forgotten. When he stands up, I thought, it will fall on the floor. "I think maybe I will take a walk after all," I said. Lansing's face changed, looked suddenly brighter, hopeful. "Well, good for you," he said. I took my tray into the kitchen and then stood in

the doorway. "Half an hour? You're quite certain you'll be all right?" "Of course. I won't move. Where can I go?" I ignored that faint note of irony. I went out the door ofthe cottage, let the screen door slam behind me, and then crept silently back inside. I sat down in a chair just inside the kitchen door, and watched Lansing. He stood up almost immediately, and the tray slid off his lap and fell on the floor. "Oh, damnation!" He tapped his way carefully through the mess of plastic dinnerware and spilled food to the porch railing, and then he leaned his stick against his thigh, and stood with his arms on the railing, looking for all the world like any other man staring out to sea in the gathering dusk, a ridiculous coneshaped straw hat on his head, dark glasses over his eyes. "I'd better go," said the girl, Rose. "Johnny will be asleep by now. The lady in the room next to mine said she'd watch him, but I don't want to leave him too long." "Gosh, no," said the lifeguard. "Though I guess it's a relief to get a bit of freedom, once in a while." "It sure is," said Rose. "I'm crazy about that child, but sometimes I get-you knowkind of lonely?" "I know what you mean," said the lifeguard. "Everyone needs company, once in a while." "Well, see you tomorrow, Johnny," she said. "Funny coincidence, his name being the same as mine," said the lifeguard, and they left the beach together, after some foolishness connected with the towel she'd brought to sit on. The kitchen clock ticked the minutes away. Lansing still stood, apparently staring at the dark sea. Once he pounded the railing with his fist. "Oh, God," he said, so low I could hardly hear him. "Oh, God." Finally he tapped his way back to his chair, and under cover of that slight noise I went to the screen door, slammed it again. and walked without caution over to him. "I'm back," I said. "It wasn't very interesting. Just the sand dunes and the thistles." "I knocked my tray off my lap." "Yes, quite a mess," I said. "But I'll clean it up. I should have taken it from you, but you hadn't finished eating." How many messes had I cleaned up for Lansi,ng. I got a cloth from the kitchen.


"I ought to look where I'm going," said Lansing, and I looked at him sharply. He hadn't come out with that old joke for years. "I see our young couple have gone." I was on my knees before him, wiping up spilled milk. "Or have they retreated into the fastness of the sand dunes?" "They've gone." Lansing tapped his stick on the porch floor once or twice. "You know, I think they'll probably get married." I got to my feet, easily as I always move, despite my age. "You're too romantic, Lansing. She has a child. He just wants an easy girl, for the summer." "Sometimes, Mother, you are curiously coarse," said Lansing, gently. "This is a real love affair we're being shown. Don't you feel that?" rr Shown?" I couldn't help it. Something came out in my voice. There was a long pause. "I think we're talking a lot of nonsense about a couple of cheap youngsters who're after nothing but pleasure," I said, finally. "I think we should go to bed. It's quite dark." "Yes," said Lansing. "It has got dark."

* * * * *

They were there the next day, and the next. The conversation was about the same, except -that it got more intimate, and the lifeguard sat on the blanket more often. He was neglecting his job, the other lifeguard had to blow the whistle for him to take over the chair. Not that he minded that either, he'd sit there, broiling in the sun, for a long time after it was his partner's turn, and then saunter over to him, laughing, blowing his whistle. Young kids, no sense of responsibility. Lansing's stick rattled on the railings, like a warning of some kind, but the young couple never heeded it. Perhaps they never heard it. Sometimes the child would stop whatever he was doing and look up for a moment. "They're playing ball," said Lansing. "Now they're sitting on the sand." It was remarkable how much he could hear, how much he could sense. "I know it's crazy," said the lifeguard. "I know we've only known each other a few days. But it's true." "I don't know," she said. "There's Johnny." "No problem," said the lifeguard. "Hon~ est. I know we can manage. I know we can swing it. Trailers on the campus for married students. I know. a couple who-cute, you know?" After a pause, "Of course, it wouldn't be for long. Just until I get my degree. Then

we'd really be swinging." "I could get ajob too," said Rose. "Johnny could go to nursery school." "Be the best thing in the world for him," said the lifeguard. "He's going to have to get to know other kids, sooner or later. After all, he isn't always going to be-Well. An only child."

talking still. Lansing asked me where they were, and I told him. "Ah, yes," he said. "I can hear them, every minute or so. When the wind blows this way. Only faintly, though. The sea's still making a lot of noise." "The waves are high." I felt stone cold, with a boiling inside me. The lifeguard suddenly wrapped his arms around the girl, and * * * * * There had been a storm in the night. The kissed her. They looked like something in air was clear and fresh, but the waves were the movies. stiB high, and the red flag was up. The life"They're kissing," I said, almost spat. guard seemed to have nothing to do, once "Right out in public." "It's normal," said Lansing. "There can't he'd dug the little boat out of the sand that had washed over it during the storm. Rose be anyone else but us around, not for miles." was wearing a sweater and slacks, and the He kept his face turned toward them, as baby was in one of those zippered-up affairs, though he were watching, his expression a a jacket with a hood attached. They walked strange one, lighted up, pleased. I saw the hand in hand along the wet beach after a baby staggering away from his mother, down while, with the child trotting after. to the water, stooping to pick up shells on "It's the kind of day I like," said Lansing. the way. He too was wearing a sweater, I'd made him "Where's the little boy?" said Lansing, put it on, he always caught cold so easily. suddenly. "Is he with thrm?" "This kind Qfweather. It makes me feel I can "He's watching the breakers," I said. I saw do things, somehow." the wave touch him, heard his laugh on the "What things?" He tapped his stick im- wind, watched him run after the foam as it sucked itself down the sand, saw the next patiently on the floor of the porch. "I don't know. Walk a long way. Run. breaker catch him and toss him in white Dance, even. Get a job, meet more people. water, while his mother stood in the lifeguard's embrace. How do I know? I've never tried anything." "It's not your fault," I said. "How could "I heard a cry," said Lansing. He stood you try what other people do?" up, abruptly. "Where's the baby, Mother?" he "I don't know," said Lansing. "Sometimes asked. I was filled with a strange excitement. I think I might have." "He's picking up shells and rubbish," I "I've done everything I could for you, said. Lansing hesitated for a moment, moving Lansing," I told him. The old worn sentence his head as though he were in pain. Suddenly came out of the rut it had worn in my mind. he gave a strange wail, and vaulted the porch Always, before, Lansing had been subdued railings, and went running, stumbling, across by it. Times he'd wanted to get a job, try the sand. At the same moment the 'lifeguard things he hadn't the strength for. I know you and the girl Rose broke apart and ran down have, Mother, he would say. I know you have. to the water's edge. I saw the lifeguard dive This time he shrugged, ran his stick along into the next breaker and swim furiously about, looking, and then struggle back for the railings. "You've dedicated your life to me. I'm not the boat, while Rose wept and wrung her sure it's the best thing you could have done hands. I saw Lansing, running up and down with it. For either of us. It isn't as if you ever in a curious zigzag fashion, feeling with obvious terror the nearness, the immensity, of had much affection for me." "How can you-? What else could I have the ocean, shouting words that were brought -? Just tell me one time when 1-" Lansing back to me on the wind. "The baby, the baby! Where is the baby?" was silent. The lifeguard and the girl, Rose, with the child wandering behind them, were making About the Author: Olivia Davis has been described their way back, slowly, stopping every two by Choice, a literary magazine. as "a master of the or three minutes to talk, to pick up shells or short story." Reviewing her book of stories, The pebbles. I hated them. Lansing's wonderfully Scent of Apples, it wrote: "This collection normal young couple, with the perfectly whets the appetite for her other works. Perhaps ordinary baby. I watched them walk as far the most chilling story, and one which exemplias the lifeguard stand, and lean against it, fies Davis's technique, is 'The Other Child:"


E ~'N MI S R RTHE PERPLEXED Its forecasts go awry, its solutions never work. The author looks at 'the dismal science' with candor and wit, giving us tips on understanding a subject that nobody loves but none can escape. In this time of fear and trembling over the mysterious ailments of the economy, faith is sinking in the discipline that is supposed to provide cures for such ills. Economicssometimes called "the dismal science," and, more recently, "the plonking science" or "the black art"-has come under blistering attack, not only from outside but also from within the economics profession. It has become urgent that we answer some fundamental questions about this discipline that nobody loves and many actively despise. Is economics necessary? Unfortunately, yes. It is true that the ascent of man, as the late 1. Bronowski describes it, proceeded nicely for several million years (until a couple of hundred years ago) without the assistance of economics. However, the double revolutions of capitalism and industrialism, and the bringing together of huge numbers of producers and consumers into a more or less integrated economic system stirred up curiosity about how the economic system achieved its purposes though uncontrolled and unguided by human hands. The first economists, Adam Smith and his followers, were impressed with how beautifully the system worked-guided as it were by the invisible hand of God. "Leave it alone and all will be well" was the reverent message. But later on, when the system showed signs of breaking down from massive upheavals of

boom and depression, various Mr. Fixits emerged. The greatest of these in the 19th century was Karl Marx, who said that the only way to cure the instability of the admittedly rapidly expanding capitalist systemand to get rid of its beastly injustice to the poor-was to wipe out private ownership of capital. The working class, who created all value, said Marx, should collectively manage their affairs. For years the economics profession stuck with Smith, rejecting Marx as the messenger of dictatorship and inefficiency. Marx won a big one with the Russian Revolution but bourgeois economists said, "Who needs it?" Then with the Great Depression of the 1930s, Smith's leave-it-alone economics went through its own internal intellectual revolution-John Maynard Keynes acting as captain. Capitalism, it appeared, had broken down, as Marx had warned it would; Keynes said it could be saved by having government interfere in the system in a limited way, by pumping up the monetary demand for goods and services to prevent unemployment. This Keynesian approach worked nicely to cure the Great Depression-with the help of massive government spending required to wage World War II. Alas, however, this approach to economic stability bred chronic inflation. And fighting inflation merely by having government reduce total demand bred recession and unemployment. This is where we are now, plagued by

unemployment or inflation or both at the same time. In quest of a solution, economists say economics is the only wheel in town. Noneconomists say, "Some wheel!" but they flock to hear economists analyze and pre-scribe. Society's misery is the economist's good fortune. Even Presidents will not say a word without turning to (and commonly throwing all questions to) economists. President Ford thinks Alan Greenspan knolVs-at least better than he does. While many laymen may be annoyed by economists, other social scientistshate them-for their fame, Nobel Prizes, high fees and ready access to political power. Yet for anyone to meddle in economic issues is to become an economist of sorts. A generation ago, James Thurber and E.B. White asked, "Is sex necessary9" Masters and Johnson have answered, "Non-sex is a form of sex." Non-economics is a form of economics. Economics is necessary. Is economics a science? Yes and no. Economists try to do what all scientists do: observe aspects of the natural or social world; measure them by gathering data; construct theories and models to explain the data, and test the theories against reality to validate or invalidate them. On the whole, however, economists do a poor job at all this. They mostly observe each other's articles.


political or economic motives commonly corrupt both economic analysis and policy.

\

\

\

I

)

Why such incomprehensible language? In every special field, including sports, crime and the stock market, words acquire special meaning to the specialists. Thus, when the economist'talks about "the consumption function," he is not necessarily showing off but simply using a term to describe a specific mathematical relationship-the extra spending on consumer goods that results from extra income. There is no other term in the English language for this concept-unless you prefer "the propensity-to-consume schedule." But it is an important concept. This is not to say that, in talking to ordinary citizens, economists have to use such terms as "consumption function." Indeed, they should not. In talking to the public, the best economists don't need jargon to say what they mean. And jargon often limits, distorts or even poisons the thinking of those who use it all the time. It can readily become a form of fakery or display.

Can the key concepts be simply stated? Let's try. Resources: Anything that can be employed to produce economic goods or provide services-such as arable land, oil, natural gas, minerals, forests, waterfalls and all other kinds of natural resources; human beings with their various strengths, skills, talents and brains; plant, equipment, dams, generators, telephone systems, airports, airplanes, and all other forms of capital goods; mathematics, logic, science, technology and other rather than reality. Their data are poor. Their worthwhile reform might be to outlaw the forms of human' knowledge, some of which ' theories are rigid and simplistic. And they abuse of the decimal point. are embodied in machines, some in the minds never discard them unless an academic or The problem of achieving scientific objec- of people and some stored in libraries, comtivity is worsened for the economist by his puters, etc. Resources are necessarily used government position is at stake. Yet, the weakness of economics as a conscious or unconscious political and social in the production of goods-or, as economists science isn't entirely that of the economists. biases and values. Is he a Republican or a love to say in one of their hoariest cliches, The reality they are trying to analyze and Democrat, a disciple of Marx or Jesus or there is no such thing as a free lunch, or predict doesn't lend itself to orderly and Ayn Rand? Does he identify with the rich, TINSTAAFL. Economic growth: The expansion of these closed systems of analysis, like, say, physics. the poor or the middle class? Does he think The physicist can exclude "outside" distur- that political freedom depends on preserving resources and their capacity to produce more bances, such as national elections or wars, economic freedom and that economic free- goods and services. from the particular system of atoms he is dom is achievable only under capitalism? Scarcity: The gap betwe\?nhuman wants studying. The economist can't really exclude Or does he believe that the great ,corpora- and the means of satisfying them. anythingthat affects the economy. His system tions of mature capitalist societies tend to The age of scarcity is not ending, as John is "open"-open to the storms of political, abridge both political and economic freedom? Kenneth Galbraith suggested nearly two social, technological, psychological and even All such questions are not merely scientific, decades ago in The Affluent Society. On the climatic change. Not being able to predict but political, philosophical and moral ones contrary, because of rapid economic growth and the drain on nonrenewable natural reall such changes, his powers to forecast are as well. It would help if economists made their sources, scarcity may be increasing. To be weak. His very perception of reality is weak; his seemingly hard and precise numbers are political and social values explicit, rather sure, one might end scarcity by reducing soft,synthetic, inaccurate reflections of under- than pretending to a spurious scientism. Un- human wants rather than by trying endlessly lyingevents and moods and tendencies. One fortunately, concealed bi~ses and interested to increase output. But, thrusting aside the


'Is more necessarily better? More tunnels, more trucks, more congestion, more garbage? But is less necessarily better? Less education, less medical care, less orange juice, less wine, less roses?' "limits to growth" issue, the economist sees what government does with the money) and scarcity around him every day, in little things contributing to higher education, the arts, etc. as well as big-in the strain on family budgets Businessmen regard profits as the elixir and government budgets, in people's con- of life and often grow emotional or quasiflicting wants for more income and less work. religious about them. Profits, they say, are the Scarcity is really what economics is all incentive for creativity and efficiency. Profits about. Scarcity and choice. To economize is are the preserver of liberty. Lemuel Boulware, to choose. a retired vice-president of General Electric Opportunity cost: What you give up, in Company, and a titan of tough bargaining making one thing, by not making some- with unions, says, "Profit, property and freething else. dom are inseparable .... Profit benefits the Since resources (with the sole exception of non-owners much more than it does the knowledge) are finite and scarce, you can owners of a business. Profit is even the poor ordinarily satisfy one want only by not satis- man's best friend. It is the greatest engine of fying another want. If you use a field to grow human betterment ever devised by man." oats, you can't use it at the same time to But non-true believers ask whether greater . I grow beans. corporate profits and socIal welfare necesCosts and benefits: What you spend and sarily coincide. If particular companies' purwhat you get. How resources should be used. suit of greater profits means the rapid exIf benefits exceed costs, a particular use - haustion of a scarce resource (such as the soil of resources makes sense, though not as or minerals), society may suffer, they say. much sense as some other use where the bene- Similarly, they add, the search for greater fits would exceed the costs by even more. This profits may influence foreign policy in danprinciple holds true for individuals, for busi- gerous or wasteful ways (as by maximizing nesses (where it is normally measured by arms sales to a foreign country or swelling profits or losses), and for nations and the the production of military hardware for naworld as a whole. tional use or storage). The profit system: Those who think they In short, the cost-benefit ratio of individual understand it are constantly berating those firms, as measured by profits, does not neceswho they think don't. sarily correspond to the cost-benefit ratios Profits are essential to ,capitalism. No busi- for the nation or the world as a whole. ness can survive without some. But that is However, the toughest part of national not to say that any given level of profits is and global decisionmaking is measuring true economically necessary or desirable. Com- costs and benefits; the same resources can be petition is supposed to regulate the rate of shifted to many different uses, and some costs profit of any firm or industry. Profits may be (like the cost of pollution) are disguised or very high for some industry for a period of hard to add up. It is also tough to measure time because of growing demand or tech- potential benefits, such as the benefits from nological breakthroughs, and the high profits clean air, better educated minds, a richer culare supposed to attract new resources to ex- tural scene or peace itself (within cities or pand production in that industry; but profits between nations). in that industry may stay high because of the Practically speaking, even if one has a good existence of monopoly or oligopoly (control idea of the national or global cost-benefit by a few firms). ratios and seeks to shift resources to better Profits help p,rovide capital for business uses, it may be hard to get the people who investment in plant and equipment. Business- control those resources to move them or es can also raise funds by borrowing from allow them to be moved-because of habits banks and from other savers through new or vested interests. A particular company or stock or bond issues, but it helps firms to have region doesn't want to give up its defense some profits to show if they ever expect to orders; a labor union doesn't want to see repeat the process. jobs shifted to another region or country Profits also help pay for research and where the benefits might be larger for society development, which keep the system grow- as a whole, but not for the individual union. ing. They may support socially useful purEconomic system: The setup in any nation poses, such as paying taxes (depending on that determines how resources will be used;

what goods, what services will be produced, and who will get them. A "command" system is one in which the government makes all those major decisions. A "market" system is one in which supply and demand among many firms and individuals, casting their "dollar votes" in the market place, determine the answers. "Mixed" economic systems contain both "command" and "market" elements. Democratic socialism is such a mixture, with emphasis on public goods and social control of business. Communism is basically a command system, capitalism basically a market system, but in all advanced industrial societies (such as the Soviet Union and the United States) each system contains an admixture of the other. Purists-in the communist case, Marxists; in the capitalist case, Milton Friedman, Friedrich von Hayek, Barry Goldwater, perhaps Gerald Ford in his heart of hearts-would like, to the extent possible, to get rid of the disparate element of the other system. Markets: Minisystems (or microsystems) in which particular goods and services are exchanged at a price, with the traders free to swap--or not swap what they have for what they want. Communist systems have markets (such as the market for vodka or shoes) but the state plans and coordinates the (legal) markets. Capitalist systems, in theory, are coordinated by changing prices, costs and profits. Supply and demand: The core concepts of old-style (market) economics; supply is the quantity of a particular good that would be offered at different prices; demand is the quantity of a particular good that would be purchased at different prices. Equilibrium: The market price at which supply equals demand. Sellers are satisfied (in the sense that they are seIling all they want to sell at that price, and would not want to sell more at a lower price) and all buyers are satisfied (in the sense that they are buying all they want at that price and would not want more at a higher price). If the equilibrium price moves up (say, because tastes change and more people want particular goods), more will be producedbecause benefits will tend to exceed costs by a wider margin-and resources will tend to shift to that use. If the equilibrium price moves down, less will be produced as the


cost-benefit ratio for producers is squeezed, and resources shift away to other uses, where the cost-benefit ratios are higher. Similarly, consumers will drop out of a market (or buy less of it) as their own costbenefit ratio declines with a rising price of a particular product. Conversely, they will buy more of a product when its price declines and their cost-benefit ratio improves. This is how a market economy allocates goods and resources. It is also how income is distributed in a market economy-since income is the return to resource owners (including labor), as determined in the market place. You don't have to like it. Competition: The state of a market when suppliers contend for sales, and customers contend for available goods. Competition is considered a good way of keeping suppliers on their toes, and passing benefits along to consumers. Monopoly: Complete control by one seller of the production or sale of a product. Those who praise monopoly say it permits strong firms to do research, to be nice to their workers and to benefit society. Those who damn it say it milks consumers and leads to excessively concentrated political, as well as economic power. Monopolistic competition: The half-way house; where things nor~ally are now in major industries. Ideology: False ideas held by your opponents; rationalization of their interest positions. Economic philosophy: What you believe. Economic efficiency vs. economic equity and other social values:, Lovers of the market system say it is most efficient-that is, gives the greatest output for a given input of resources. But, as we have seen, critics contend that markets do not take account of wider social impacts-such as filth, contamination of water, congestion or depletion of resources-nor provide necessarily for wider social benefitsschools for the poor, parks for city folk, preservation of wild life, growth of knowledge, beauty, love. Further, the critics say markets distribute income unequally, unfairly, arbitrarily (reflecting who got to a country or a resource first, or who chose the right parents). Critics also contend that most markets in highly advanced capitalist countries are dominated by monopolies-hence, are loaded against consumer interests. Defenders of the capitalist system sometimes concede that markets may be imperfect -but if you want a system in which producer interests really dominate those of consumers,

they say, try communism or any other totalitarian system in which the state is the monopoly producer and supplier of everything. Private goods and public goods: Critics of the market system assert that markets are stacked in favor of "private goods" (such as food, autos, cigarettes, hair sprays, soap, etc.) and against public goods (public television, public beaches, clean streets, clean air). Private goods are, favored by the market system because they are easier to produce, package and sell-and hence to make a profit on. Champions of market systems say private goods are what people really want. Critics say they have been brainwashed by advertising. Public goods are slighted by market systems, say the critics, because they are hard to sell to individual customers. Since everyone shares public goods, each individual thinks, "If I don't pay for my share-of the park, say, or public_TV-it won't matter. I won't get less of it. Let somebody else pay who has more money." A system that conditions people to regard private goods as highly desirable personal benefits and public goods as burdens (paid for by taxes) may suffer because of wasted resources and opportunities lost, say the critics of the market. But its champions say public goods are overpraised and overproduced by bureaucrats in any system where they have too much power (whether capitalist or communist). The market, they say, is still a better guide to what the public really wants and a better guarantor of efficiency in its production. Comparative advantage: The doctrine that every nation should specialize in producing what it can do best-and trade for the rest. Just as a high-paid lawyer should not waste his time typing his own briefs (even if he is a better typist than his secretary) or a highpaid doctor should not paint his own house (even if he is a better and faster painter than any painter whom he can hire), a nation should concentrate on what it can do best, given its limited resources. Critics of this argument contend, however, that free trade is a game stacked against labor or poorer nations. Many labor unions in advanced countries claim that free trade undermines wage standards and shifts jobs to low-wage countries; they reject the counterargument of free-trade advocates that a rise in total productivity and output will increase the worker's share of a bigger pie, insisting that many workers thrown out of their old jobs cannot move to the industries with "comparative" advantage. Poor countries also contend that rich, industrial countries have profited unduly and

unfairly from free trade. The prices of industrial goods produced by the rich countries, they say, are fixed by powerful industries, while the prices of their own raw materials and minerals are set in highly competitive world markets to their disadvantage. The developing countries assert that their dependency on foreign markets makes their own economic development hazardous: A shift in world market prices can cripple their growth and inflict misery or death on their people, living at the edge of survival. The most potentially devastating attack on freely competitive international trade of this era stems from the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). The cartel members used their monopoly power to fix prices and cut supply-first by the oil embargo during the recent Middle East war, later by reducing productio~. They quintupled the price of crude oil, causing huge shifts of money to them. OPEC leaders portray themselves as the new redistributors of world wealth from the rich to the poor. The new global struggle over shifting wealth and power could radically transform the system of open international trade that was the goal of the postwar world. Industrial cartels, regional blocs, government-to-government dealings, central planning and control, national drives for autarky (self-sufficiency) may come to dominate world trade and investment. The transition to such a system could be highly disruptive, perhaps disastrous, for world economic growth. Balance of payments: A nation's inflow and outflow of money resulting from its transactions with the rest of the world; it serves as a kind of Richter scale for the shocks of international economic events. Outflows of money go to pay for a nation's imports of goods and services, its transfers or gifts (such as foreign aid) to foreigners and its purchase of short-term or long-term capital assets from foreigners. Inflows result from a nation's exports of goods and services, transfers or gifts from others and the sale of shortterm or long-term capital assets to foreigners. What does it mean to say that a nation has a deficit in its balance of payments? That the buildup of the current claims against it is greater than its current claims against other nations. When a nation has a deficit in its basic balance, the value of its currency tends to fall -as measured by its declining exchange rate, the rate at which its currency exchanges for other currencies. And when a nation has a surplus in its basic balance of payments, the value of its currency tends to rise.


How do we solve the world's problems-money" food, energy, inflation, trade, development? In quest of a solution, economists say economics is the only wheel in town. Non-economists say: 'Some wheel!' With persistent payments deficits, the United States dollar has ,been declining. A cheaper dollar is supposed to spur U.S. exports, curb imports and restore balance. And with payments surpluses, the West German mark has been rising. A dearer mark is supposed to spur German imports, curb exports and restore balance. But a currency rising in value is not necessarily a sign of growing wealth-nor is a currency shrinking in value necessarily a sign of growing poverty. Wealth: In ancient times, B.S. (Before Smith), wealth was regarded as gold and other treasure (money), which monarchs piled up for the power and glory of the state. Mter Smith (A.S.), wealth was regarded as productive economic power: the ability to produce real goods and services. Many people still like the A.S. definition, some still prefer the B.S. definition, but a new concept is emerging in which True Wealth is seen as the Quality of Life. Gold can be measured in tons or dollars and the ability of a nation to produce can be

measured by the GNP, but the Quality of Life is more elusive and subjective. Is more necessarily better? More tunnels, more trucks, more congestion, more garbage? But is less necessarily better? Less education, less medical care, less orange juice, less travel, less wine, less roses? Obviously, it is a new vision of life that many people in advanced societies are seeking, and there is no reason to think that either corporate officials or government bureaucrats can design it (nor "elitist" newspapermen, poets or city planners). Can consumers (or voters) create a Better Life (new wealth) for themselves, or are they condemned to be prisoners of the old market system-moFe or less willing prisoners who don't trust government to do any better? A pretty riddle for philosophers. Progress: Similarly, progress used to mean motion toward greater wealth to be achieved by getting more gold ("Kill the Aztecs!"), or m<;>reland ("Go West, young man!"), more capital ("Build the railroads!"), more tech-

nology ("Build your own computer!"), or more education ("Fill out coupon!"). Now progress has become an uncertain concept. Progress toward what? The good life? La dolce vita? Zero growth? The concept is no longer strictly economic, and economics has no methodology for dealing with it. But people tend to regard the quality issue as less critical or urgent when the whole economic system threatens to break down. Economic stability: There are two main components, stability of prices and stability of output and employment. Aggregate supply: The capacity of a nation's total resources to produce real goods and services. Aggregate demand: All the money people, businesses and governments spend. Instability in a national economy occurs when aggregate demand and aggregate supply get out of whack. InOation: The form instability takes when aggregate demand grows more rapidly than aggregate supply, yanking up the general level


of prices. Inflation may also result from the pressures of labor, industrial monopolies or international cartels, driving up costs faster than productivity. Unemployment: The form instability takes when aggregate demand falls below aggregate supply. Since the demand for labor is a "derived demand"-that is, derived from the demand for goods and services-inadequate demand spellsjoblessness. Unemployment also results from other factors-the lack of education or skills of certain types of workers relative to what employers want or think they want; from job discrimination against blacks or other minorities, the aged, women, etc., and probably from some pay scales or minimum wages set above the productive value of some members of the labor force, such as teen-agers. Urban decay and social unrest are also factors in unemployment. Employers may move their plants away from troubled city centersand workers may be unable to follow them because of inadequate transportation or housing. However, when unemployment increases by the hundreds of thousands or millions, the change is not due to such "structural" or social factors; it's because of the drop of aggregate demand below the potential of the economy (including labor) to produce. Fiscal and monetary policy: Two basic ways of trying to bring aggregate demand into balance with aggregate supply. Fiscal policy: The course of action on government spending, tax rates and, consequently, the size of the government budget's surplus or deficit. Monetary policy: The action or inaction of the Federal Reserve System in changing the supply and cost of money. Stabilization policy: The efforts of the government to use fiscal and monetary policy to get rid of inflation, unemployment or both. The basic rules are simple. If the economy is suffering from inflation, and inflation alone, reduce aggregate demand-by cutting government spending; by raising taxes; by increasing the size of the budget surplus, or at least the surplus the federal budget would show if the economy were at full employment-and by making money scarcer and more expensivefor individuals and businesses to borrow. If the national problem is unemployment, and unemployment alone, increase aggregate demand-by raising government spending, cutting taxes, cutting the federal budget surplus, or increasing the deficit, and making money more plentiful and cheaper to borrow. Simultaneous inflation and unemployment,

or inftump: This requires economic artistry, guessing, improvisation and a sorting out of values and priorities. If you're going to offer advice, you have to decide whether inflation or unemployment is the more serious problem and whether the economy is moving toward worse inflation or worse unemployment. If you decide that inflation is the greater menace, your fiscal and monetary policy should be tilted toward restraint, but if you decide that unemployment is the greater danger and social ill, apply fiscal and monetary stimulus. In the U.S. Republicans (including President Ford) usually prefer restraint; Democrats (including Presidents from Roosevelt to Johnson) usually prefer fiscal and monetary stimulus. But changing aggregate demand, as indicated, is not the whole story. If inflation persists ina time of increasing unemployment you should attack the specific problems that are pushing up wages and prices beyond productivity increases. And you should take actions that will increase productivity (output per man-hour) and expand supply. State of the black art With these relatively simple rules of thumb and a little free-hand improvising and philosophizing, you too can become an economic adviser to Presidents. But, on second thought, perhaps you wouldn't want the job. For the fact is that economics is in a sorry state. It has built up an awe-inspiring body of theory, complete with fancy mathematics, that regrettably has only a tenuous relationship to the realities of politics, business and the complex patterns of conflict and cooperation among individuals and nations. As the mild but iconoclastic economist Kenneth Boulding has put it: "I have been gradually coming under the conviction, disturbing for a professional theorist, that there is no such thing as economics-there is only social science applied to economic problems. Indeed, there may not even be such a thing as social science-there may only be general science applied to the problems of society." Yet those social problems, conventionally called economic, are among the most important that mankind has-and if they are not dealt with they can lead to still more awful problems, the breakdown of societies and wars. Somebody-economists-must try to deal with those difficulties rationally and at the same time cope with the conflicting pressures of special interests, the confused value problems, the turbulent political contests and the uncertain future that engulf economic

decisionmaking. It is no wonder that economists so frequently disagree. The endless differences among them, on both analytical and policy issues, demonstrate the insecure state of their discipline. Many of the disputes, however, stem also from their different values and, consciously or unconsciously, the economic and political interests they represent. Gunnar Myrdal, the Swedish economist who won the Nobel Prize in economics for 1974, is convinced that "problems in the social sciences-not only the practical ones about what ought to be done, but also the theoretical problems of ascertaining the facts and the relations among facts-cannot be rationally posited except in terms of definite, concretized and explicit value premises." Curiousfy enough, Friedrich von Hayek, who shared the prize with Myrdal, regards Myrdal's kind of socialist economics as "the road to serfdom." As St. Thomas Aquinas asked in his Summa Theologica: "Is this one science or many?" The answer would seem to be, certainly at the level of national policy, that economics is not only many sciences but also something more-a branch of statecraft, of political philosophy, in which analytical method and technique cannot substitute for intuition and judgment. John Maynard Keynes, almost certainly the greatest economist of this century, once described the singular difficulties of economics in this way: "Professor Planck, of Berlin, the famous originator of the quantum theory, once remarked to me that in early life he had thought of studying economics, but had found it too difficult! Professor Planck could easily master the whole corpus of mathematical economics in a few days. He did not mean that! But the amalgam of logic and intuition and the wide knowledge of facts, most of which are not precise, which is required for economic interpretation in its highest form is, quite truly, overwhelmingly difficult for those whose gift mainly consists in the power to imagine and pursue to their furthest points the implications and prior conditions of comparatively simple facts which are known with a high degree of precision." In brief, the job of the economist calls for a genius, and genius is as rare in economics as in music, literature, science or any other field-maybe rarer. 0 Aboutthe Author: Leonard Silk, a member of the editorial board of the New York Times, is a wellknown economist. He has written many books, including Forecasting BusinessTrends, The World of Economics, and Contemporary Economics.


RE-EXAMINING

AMERICAN HISTORY

'Old events have modern meanings,' said the poet James Russell Lowell, and this is especially true as the U.S. enters its Bicentennial Year. American historians are sifting through new masses of data to challenge old opinions about the Revolution and other events in t~eir history.

Everywhere in the United States today, the approaching 200th tion of the past is, for a variety of reasons, going on constantly. anniversary of the signing of the Declaration of Independence on For one thing, new data are continuously being unearthed-the private papers of important figures, neglected documents and July 4, 1776, has focused attention on the American Revolution. During the Bicentennial Year, Americans will be, in a sense, the like. Furthermore, new concepts and (especially) new research reliving the Revolution; they will observe and participate in cele- tools, such as the computer, enable historians to ask new quesbrations of many kinds-town-meeting discussions, pageants, TV tions about former times and to analyze enormous masses of programs-to say nothing of what will surely be one of the most evidence previously unmanageable, such as raw census records massive outpourings of oratory of all time. Much of the celebra- and election statistics. In addition, there is the fact that the untion will be essentially antiquarian, with the stress on powdered folding present steadily reveals new perspectives on history, perwigs, antique firearms and quaint costumes; and a good deal will spectives that earlier scholars were blind to. These new ways of also be nostalgic in spirit, harking back to the lost virtues of a seeing the past frequently function to undermine the plausibility simpler, golden age. of accepted interpretations of historical events and trends. Then, too, historical interpretation has a kind of cyclical Some, on the other hand, will be self-congratulatory, and rightly so. Americans have cause to be proud both of the achieve- character. The really interesting historical questions do not have ments of the revolutionary generation and of the way the institu- clear-cut answers-that is why they are interesting. Every effort tions created by the Founding Fathers of the nation have been to interpret complex events involves selection and simplification, preserved and developed by their descendants. But taken as a the weighing of contradictory evidence. Almost any explanation whole, the Bicentennial activities, simple or profound, high- is therefore incomplete and to a degree distorted. Thus, the very minded or partisan or merely commercial, will amount to a mass ' popularity of any view often stimulates historians to consider alreconsideration of what the Revolution means to this generation, ternative views and, as a result, the consensus of opinion tends and in thinking about it Americans will no doubt be thinking over time to swing like a pendulum whose movement inone direcabout the meaning of all U.S. history. It will be a time of re- tion brings into play pressures that eventually turn the trend in trospection and assessment, made more significant by the grave the opposite direction. At the present time, all of these forces are influencing historical economic, political and social concerns of the present day. For professional historians, however, this kind of re-examina- scholarship in the United States. Exactly how the Bicentennial-


tion of the profitability of slavery in ante-bellum America, an issue of enormous importance since, if slavery was not profitable, it might well have died of its own accord if the American Civil War of 1861-65 could have been avoided. In 1958, U.S. historians Alfred Conrad and John R. Meyer made a strong case for the proposition that slavery was economically viable. Using computer-correlated evidence with a free hand, cliometricians Robert W. Fogel and Stanley L. Engerman have recently argued not only that slavery was profitable for the master class, but that the material conditions under which slaves lived and worked in the U.S. southern states were superior to those of industrial workers in the nonslave states of the North. Their book, paradoxically entitled Time on the Cross, caused a furor in historical circles, being attacked both by conventional historians who claim that Fogel and Engerman's evidence is inaccurate or inadequate, and by two other cliometricians, Paul David and Peter Temin, who have questioned the soundness of their statistical techniques. But whether correct or wrong-headed, the argument developed in Time on the Cross is bound to produce further examination of many aspects of American slavery. Another topic of considerable current interest to American historians is social and economic mobility. Their curiosity stimulated by the recent attention paid to the plight of the poor and of minorities in the United States, many scholars have asked the question: "Was America ever really the land of opportunity par excellence?" The result of their inq!Jiries has been first to explode the myth of easy progress from rags to riches. By collecting biographical data about large numbers of successful persons at different periods of time, historians have been able to generalize about what kinds of people have succeeded in America. They have discovered that whether one studies business people, professionals such as lawyers or architects, or political leaders, whether in the 1840sor the 1890sor later, one finds that most of them have come from at least fairly well-to-do families, Protestant in religion and long-established in America, and that the individuals themselves have received far more education than the average person of their generation. Put differently, and allowing for some notable exceptions, relatively few persons of immigrant stock and few Catholics or Jews have made it to the top of the social and economic ladder. On the other hand, the patient analysis of census returns by a number of historians has revealed that in' most periods a very substantial percentage of ordinary unskilled workers, many of them immigrants, have made considerable economic progress in the course of their lives. Data drawn from many parts of the country over many decades show a pattern in which about a quarter of all manual laborers have achieved middle-class status, and in which a still-larger proportion of the children of such people have made the jump from what Americans would call blue collar to white collar positions. Although it is true that these studies tend to confirm the traditional impression that America has been a land of opportunity for the poor, they are nonetheless extremely enlightening, both because they provide solid, mathematical proof of opportunity and because they define the limits of "normal" opportunity. A great deal of similar work has been done with voting statistics. The inspiration for these studies was the research of contemporary political analysts such as Samuel Lubell, who have suggested on the basis of interviews and public opinion polls that modern voters are often more influenced by their own racial, religious and cultural backgrounds and by family tradition than by the political issues over which elections are ostensibly contested. About the Author: John A. Garraty is a professor of American history at Historians such as Richard Jensen and Paul Kleppner have tested Columbia University and a prolific writer whose books include Nature of Biography and The American Nation, a popular textbook in the Uni- these theories against 19th-century data in a number of areas. They have discovered a high correlation between religious affiliated States. He is a past president of the Society of American Historians.

inspired interest in the revolutionary period will affect this scholarship remains to be seen-all we can be sure of is that a great deal will be written over the next decade both about the Revolution and about many other subjects. Analyzing the causes, course and consequences of the Revolution has been a major occupation of American historians since the 18th century. Contemporaries and most people who wrote about the subject in the 19th century tended to blame the rebellion on British tyranny and economically oppressive parliamentary legislation-"taxation without representation" and the limitations imposed by Britain on colonial trade. Then a reaction set in. Historians began to notice, for example, that British mercantilism benefited the colonies in many ways and that the whole imperial system was, if cumbersome and poorly managed, designed to foster the mutual dependence of the mother country and its overseas possessions. More recently, the balance has swung back, some scholars claiming that mercantilism inhibited American economic growth, and others, most notably Professor Bernard Bailyn of Harvard, finding in a careful rereading of the pamphlet literature of the era, strong evidence that the colonists saw themselves as threatened by an insidious British conspiracy to undermine the liberty of Englishmen on both sides of the Atlantic. At the same time, still other historians have stressed the internal aspects of the Revolution, scrutinizing crowd behavior in the colonial towns for evidence of class conflict and attempting to discover how wealth and political power were distributed in American society. These tendencies reveal both the pendulum effect and the influence of current issues (in this case, interest in the poor and the inarticulate) on historical interpretation of that era. But study of the revolutionary period is only one concern of modern American historians. Particularly important work is being done in economic history, work which reflects all the causal forces mentioned above. With development in the 1940s of the concept of gross national product (GNP)-the sum total of all goods and services produced by a nation within a given periodthe whole of the American economic past could be re-examined in order to estimate what the GNP was at different points, and thus better to understand the shape and direction of economic activity. Until the GNP concept itself was formulated, relating it to historical development was literally inconceivable, although the evidence, of course, was always there. Present-day interest in the problems of stimulating the economies of developing nations has led scholars to study particularly 19th-century American economic growth as the premier example of an undeveloped country experiencing unparalleled expansion. A significant new tool for the profession has been the computer, which enabled a new breed of mathematically inclined historians known as "c1iometricians" (after Clio, the muse of history) to manipulate masses of statistics in ways that would have been physically impossible a generation ago. The new economic history is, to say the least, difficult for nonspecialists to understand. The pages of these studies are spattered with tables and graphs and algebraic equations. But the result has been to challenge many long-accepted opinions and to open up large new areas for research. This type of economic history has also interacted with the contemporary attention being given to the history of black people in the United States. First, the cliometricians attacked the ques-


Did British economic policies cause the American Revolution? Was it a class conflict? Or was it, as a rereading of the pamphlets of the era seems to suggest, an American reaction to George III's conspiracy to curb the civil liberties of his subjects on both sides of the Atlantic?

tion and party membership, one far more influential than economic status in determining voting behavior. Investigations of this type also indicate that local issues have tended to be more important to voters than national ones; in general, they lead to the conclusion that historians have paid too much attention to party platforms and the oratory of office seekers, and not enough to the voters at whom these platforms and speeches were aimed in the first place. These are merely illustrations, almost randomly selected, of the wide-ranging character of modern U.S. historical research. Naturally there has been a great deal of interesting work done on the history of American women in recent years, and also on the American Indian, on Mexican-Americans and on other groups whose contemporary position has been subject to controversy and debate. This work, in the main, has not been itself con~ troversial. The research techniques have been conventional, the conclusions not unexpected, though certainly stimulative of much discussion. But one area of study has led to widely varying interpretations and has generated at least as much heat as light: America's role as a world power throughout its history. Before World War II, historians of U.S. foreign policy were divided roughly into isolationist and internationalist schools. They clashed mostly over two questions: the wisdom of American participation in World War I and the character of the American overseas expansion that resulted from the Spanish-American war in 1898. By and large, the internationalists were the more influential, especially in scholarly circles, and one result of the winning of World War II was to increase their domination of the field. But postwar conflicts with the Soviet Union-the Cold War -led to the re-examination of American foreign policy in general and, as time passed, of Cold War policy in particular. In the 1950s, a school of "realists" criticized America's 20th-century Far Eastern policy on the grounds that, because it was based on ideals and high principles (national self-determination and equal trading opportunities in China for all nations), it had failed to give proper consideration to Ameri~a's capacity to defend its interests in the area. By committing itself morally to defend the "open door" policy in China without constructing a fleet capable of holding the door open in the face of determined Japanese resistance, the United States created a situation that led eventually to Pearl Harbor, the realists claimed. A prominent member of the realist school was the diplomat George F. Kennan, author of American Diplomacy: 1900-1950; his view of how to deal with Soviet expansion after World War II-the containment policy-was an outgrowth of this line of reasoning. More recently, however, 20th-century American policy in the Far East and elsewhere has been attacked by what have been popularly called the New Left historians. Actually this group includes writers with many different views; the founder of the school, William Appleman Williams, is not really part of the New Left at all. In The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (1959), Williams coined the term "noncolonial imperial expansion" to characterize American policy toward the underdeveloped world. As he saw it, after the burst of expansion that followed the war with Spain, the United States sought to increase its economic influence overseas without actually taking over any more territory. By doing so, it hoped also to assist in the modernization of "back-

ward" lands. Whereas the realists had considered American policy a failure, Williams insisted that it had been all too successful. He questioned not the motives behind "open door diplomacy," which he conceded to be above reproach, but its unintended resultshence, his use of the word "tragedy" in the title of his book. In it, Williams argues that Secretary of State John Hay's Open Door notes on China, Theodore Roosevelt's Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine in the Western Hemisphere, William Howard Taft's Dollar Diplomacy in the Caribbean and in Asia, while designed to avoid military intervention in these areas and to bring them prosperity and social stability, in practice worked to strengthen already powerful vested interests. This argument, especially as formulated by some of Williams's more radical disciples, was somewhat unhistorical, for it read back attitudes and values into the early 20th century that did not emerge in most parts of the underdeveloped world until after World War II. But the work of these historians has been helpful in calling Americans' attention to some of the indirect results of U.S. policy. New Left diplomatic historians have also devoted much effort to the study of American foreign policy during the Cold War. These historians make their cases partly by the selective use of documents (some of their critics claim by twisting the meaning of documents by quoting them only in part or out of context) and partly by taking Soviet statements at face value. (The relevant Soviet archives are not open to scholars; if we could know as much about Soviet position papers, intra-organizational musings and other records as we do about our own, the New Left historians might sing another tune entirely.) This New Left history is, needless to say, extremely controversial. In my own view, most of it is "bad history" in the technical sense that it is one-sided and deliberately partisan. These authors boldly admit that they write in hopes of influencing their readers' opinions of present-day issues. They search not for absolute truth but for what they call "a usable past." But their work has had a most salutary effect in compelling all specialists in recent U.S. foreign policy to reconsider their underlying assumptions. As I hope this brief survey demonstrates, American historical scholarship is flourishing. To the unsophisticated observer, the field may seem to be in turmoil. Little that is being written is accepted as gospel by all experts; philosophical and technological divisions exist among specialists of every period; the idea of the "definitive" book on any subject has been largely abandoned. But the divisions are healthy. Practitioners and informed readers are coming more and more to believe that all history should be constantly re-examined, and that historical interpretations serve not only to throw light but also to make us aware of what still remains in the dark. 0 The Battle of Monmouth in 1778 (right) was one of the most important engagements of the Revolutionary War. The retreating American troops were rallied by George Washington after a near defeat because of a tactical mistake made by the commanding officer Charles Leeshown on white horse in this painting by Emanuel Leutze. General Washington waves his sword while Lee sits immobile and humiliated. Legend has it that Washington used some of the strongest language in his life when berating General Lee on the field of Monmouth.



CURRENT CINEMA

HOLLYWOOD'S NBW ALITY Where are all those bungling policemen, beautiful dumb blondes, obsequious Negro servants, and fearless cowboys? They're gone. Today's sophisticated U.S. moviegoers want real people, not stereotypes. When I was a child I liked to eat popcorn and go to amusement parks where they had curved mirrors distorting me into a little round boy or a slim, serpentine pinhead. Best of all I liked to go to the movies, where I spent almost every Saturday afternoon watching two full-length features, three cartoons and a serial. For a few pennies I could buy a bag of popcorn. At the time, I did not realize that the images of people and places flashing across the screen were often as distorted as those on the funhouse mirrors. Boys of 10 or 12 in the 1940s did not question for a moment that all cowboys were strong, silent, brave and chivalrous. Or that all American Indians were wild, painted warriors. Movies were made for everyone in those days-the sharp distinction between films for adults and those for children really began in the 1950swhen the pervasiveness of television reduced the American movie audience from some 80 million to 20 million a week. This mass audience was conditioned not to question certain theatrical conventions, much as Shakespearean audiences did not think that a character delivering a soliloquy was crazy because he talked to himself. A major convention was acceptance of stereotypes, a standard mental picture of a type of person or nationality that the audience was expected to recognize from oversimplified, exaggerated characteristics. This cinematic shorthand was not always sinister. Some actors were widely recognized for their familiar and desirable screen personalities. Cary Grant was urbane, witty, sophisticated; Clark Gable was virile, fearless; James Stewart was shy and guileless. A producer who misses those days said recently: "When I cast Clark Gable in a role, I was saved from writing pages of dialogue explaining his character." Some stereotypes, however, were false and

insulting. Irishmen usually drank too much (and invariably were considered very comical). Chinese men ran laundries or waited on tables. French women were immoral. Before World War II, Germans were arrogant and decadent; during the war, they were brutes. Japanese were aloof, mysterious, unemotional. Mexicans were bandits (except in comedies when they took long siestas against adobe walls). Arabs were portrayed as romantics, wearing long robes and riding white stallions. One of Hollywood's most shameful stereotypes was its treatment of the American Negro, usually as a slow-witted servant. Some groups, both black and white, have attempted to prevent movies with insulting stereotypes from being shown in theaters or on television. By the 1950s, moviemakers had become aware of the social injustice perpetrated by such gross caricatures and unconsciously, they created a new black stereotype. Black characters gradually became paragons of all virtue, impeccably tailored, noble and slow to anger, self-sacrificing and either imbued with superior folk wisdom or magnificently educated. Sidney Poitier played numerous roles of this sort, becoming as predictable as Clark Gable or Cary Grant. Since 1965 a series of movies have been produced featuring black private detectives, spies and gangster heroes. Horror movies followed, featuring black vampires and mad scientists. Most of these films follow simplistic formulas which satisfy vicarious needs of an audience, but they do nothing to advance the art of the cinema. More recently, movies like Sounder, a realistic and sympathetic account of black life in the u.S. South during the 1930s, and Five on the Black Hand Side, a comedy highlighting rich black humor, have given indications that filmmakers can portray blacks as human beings with faults and virtues-and above all, individual characteristics. Filmmakers have also changed their por-

trayal of the American Indian. Modern westerns show the provocation that drove Indians to fight to save their homes and land and food supplies; they now focus on the conditions imposed on American Indians by white pioneers and the cavalry. When Hollywood began making movies about the cowboy, producers prettied him up and glorified him so that a real cowboy of the late 19th century wouldn't recognize himself. Some movie cowboys wore fancy shirts- and spotless leather leggings, strummed the guitar as they rode the range and wound up at the close of the picture kissing their faithful horse instead of the sheriff's pretty daughter. Others spent so much time shooting at villains or indulging in monumental fistfights that the audience should have wondered when they made a living. Most real cowboys spent long days for low pay tending huge herds of cattle. That wasn't glamorous enough for movies. Until recently, films glorified the outlaws of the West, too. For example, Billy the Kid was actually a juvenile delinquent, and pro bably a psychopathic killer. Yet on film he was imbued with the more desirable qualities of such flawlessly handsome and thoroughly lovable actors as Robert Taylor, Paul Newman and Audie Murphy. Recent trends toward reality in films and a little study of history resulted finally in casting Michael Pollard, a squint-eyed, bubble-cheeked character actor in a film appropriately titled Dirty Little Billy.

Movies also tended to glamorize gangsters and racketeers of the 1920s and 1930s. These killers, bank robbers and kidnappers were played by such attractive actors as James Cagney, Henry Fonda, George Raft and Spencer Tracy. At the end, they invariably paid for their crimes with their lives (as the Hollywood code required), but they had great fun rubbing out weasel-like competitors and wooing curvaceous women before they


got their punishment. The scripts usually blamed the questionable behavior of these bad men on society, which never gave them a chance, and equated their moral code with that of Robin Hood, robbing the rich to give to the poor. It was not until Bonnie and Clyde was made in 1966 that it was suggested that the "hero's" affection for guns might be connected to his uncertainty about his virility and more important-that when someone is shot, it hurts. Policemen have gone through various cycles of being stereotyped by the movies. In early comedies dating back to the days of silent pictures, police were fumbling, inefficient and stupid. In gangster melodramas, the police had to be stereotyped as ineffective; if they caught the criminal heroes quickly, the movie would end too soon. Also it was the director's intention that the audience should be sympathetic to the crook, a far more romantic figure than a policeman, who was, after all, only a public servant. Real police officers resented the way they were portrayed in films; they made an effort to cooperate with filmmakers encouraging them to be more accurate by lending them police cars and equipment to use in their stories. In the 1960s citizens' concern about crime in the nation was reflected in films. In a few recent, popular police dramas, law enforcement officers have been shown using some of the same shrewd methods that movie gangsters favored 40 years ago-which tends to show that stereotypes can come in and out of fashion. Perhaps the largest group maligned by stereotyped movies is women. The novelist Virginia Woolf once observed, j'Women have served all these centuries as looking glasses possessing the magic and delicious power of reflecting the figure of man at twice its natural size." The distorting mirrors of the movie world diminished the woman even further. In romances, a woman aspired only to win a man, to become a wife and motherthere was never any thought that she might have a career or artistic talent to nurture. And traditionally in films, the man selected or rejected the woman. A woman too bold in attempting to attract men was a vamp or a flirt. She was doomed to lose the hero by picture's end, appearing either villainous or ridiculous. On the other hand, the man who aggressively pursued women, then abandoned them without regret to seek higher goals, was the

,

In the Hollywood of yesteryear, heroes were always men, and women weregorgeous but uncomplicated creatures who lived vicariously through the men in their lives. -

romantic hero. In comedies, married men Decades later, when the nation was enjoying were inevitably henpecked, implying that relative prosperity, movies exposing the they were fools to fall for a woman and be social ills of the past became acceptable. entrapped in the debilitating institution of Now that television has replaced movies marriage. as the main entertainment medium, movies Why did such stereotypes arise? And why are made for a smaller and more sophisticated are they less prevalent today? The answer audience; and because the industry cannot lies in the structure of the movie industry. depend on people automatically going to the Large filmmaking studios flourished until movies, producers must offer more than can television made such ruinous inroads on the be seen at home on television. Bigotry is no business. They turned out about 10 times as longer amusing or entertaining; it is a relic many pictures as the much smaller studios of of the past. Shallow characters reciting hacktoday. The large bulk of them were made hur- neyed speeches no longer draw audiences. riedly-and it was much easier for a screen- Today's moviegoer, younger and more intelwriter to grab a stereotype off the shelf than ligent than when I happily munched popto create a living character. Furthermore, the corn on Saturday afternoons, demands a men who ran the studios believed they had more convincing plot, more genuine emotion. a mystical insight into what "the moviegoing Young people have seen movies on television since earliest childhood; if they go out to the public" wanted. . During the devastating Depression of the movies they want something special-depth, 1930s, a foreigner viewing American film conviction, commitment. So film writers and comedies would have the impression that al- directors and actors are beginning to follow most every family lived in a marble mansion the advice of novelist F. Scott Fitzgerald: complete with swimming pool and servants. "Begin with an individual and you may create In fact, fewer American families thim ever a type. Begin with a type and you have crebefore could afford even the necessities of life ated nothing." at that time-but the filmmakers shrewdly saw that people did not go to the movies to About the Author: Mal Oettinger, a SPAN corbe reminded of their troubles. They wanted respondent in Washington, specializes in theater, to forget them and indulge their fantasies. films. literature and other cultural subjects.


Hollywood used to portray black Americans as familiar and . convenient stereotypes-first as cheerful but slow-witted servants. Later they became cool, intelligent sophisticates, and finally fearsome vampires and superspies. The cowboy of the American West was transformed almost beyond recognition from a hard-working, low-paid ranch hand to a glamorous, dandified adventurer. As the champion of justice, he fought lawless Indians and gunmen.

The outlaws were popular subjects, becoming heroes in their own way while police ineptli buffooned through wild chases, and suave detectives neatly closed every story with a happy ending.


u.s. HONORS "Great directors don't come to town every day, of course, but there's something peculiarly satisfying about watching a distinguished artist who turns out to be a distinguished presence, who literally lives up to his role." The writer is Washington Post critic -Gary Arnold. The director he's writing about is Indian filmmaker Satyajit Ray, who was in Washington last October to launch a retrospective of his films. Ray personally introduced Distant Thunder, the first film in the October 19November 7 series sponsored by the -American Film Institute (AFI). The director appeared before an overflow audience at the John F. Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts, and when he spoke following a thunderous ovation, wrote Arnold, "he confirmed the impression of artistic strength, lucidity and purposefulness conveyed by his work." The response to the man and his work was at once reverent and enthusiastic. Donia Mills of the Washington Star said the premiere of Distant Thunder "is an event eclipsed only by the arrival of the director himself." "Trying to turn other people on to the movies of the great Indian filmmaker Satyajit Ray is a bit like getting up on a soap box to rave about how delicious truffles are," she said. "The flavor i& subtle, the quality is rare, the supply is scarce, and a straight description tends to make it all sound as unappetizing as can be. One simply has to sample them to understand their value." The AFI series afforded Washington audiences the opportunity to sample 17 of Ray's works, including the Apu trilogy and movies from his middle period that have been rarely shown-if at all-in the United States. Founded in 1967, the AFI is a nonprofit organization which serves to advance the art of films and television in America. With headquarters in the Kennedy Center, the AFI has its conservatory-the Center for Advanced Film Studies-in Beverly Hills, California. Ray's color film Distant¡ Thunder is a dramatic reconstruction of the Bengal famine of 1943, seen from the perspective of a Brahmin teacher and his young wife. The Indian director told the Kennedy Center audience that he felt it "necessary" and "proper" to make the film in color

SAlYAJIT RAY

I

Satyajit Ray addresses a press conference in Washington. At left is Michael Webb of the American Film Institute, which sponsored a 20-day retrospective of Ray's films. even though it depicts a grim subject. The famine was not caused by drought, he pointed out, but was manmade-the rice was diverted to feed the troops-and "nature remained beautiful throughout." After seeing the movie, critic Donia Mills wrote: "Surely no filmmaker has ever conveyed to an audience in terms this intimate and _griRping the quiet, furtive despair of people who literally do not know where their next bowl of rice is coming from. One of the great pleasures of Ray's work is the strength and lucidity of his imagery, which is always kept cunningly organic to his themes." Arnold called Distant Thunder a "luminous" film "distinguished by the simplicity of feeling, the economy of expression and the generosity of spirit that have informed Ray's work from the beginning. These attributes are the key to Ray's greatness as a director." And a review by William Canby of the' New York Times said: "Though the film's field of vision is narrow, more or less confined to the social awakening of a young village Brahmin and his pretty wife, the sweep of the film is so vast that, at the end, you feel as if you'd witnessed the events -from a satellite. You've somehow been able to see simultaneously the curvature, of the earth and the insects on the blades of field grass.... Ray has chosen to

photograph the film in rich, warm colors, the effect of which is not to soften the focus of the film but to sharpen it. The course of terrible events seems that much more vivid in landscapes of relentless beauty." In addition to his Washington appearance, Ray introduced his films at the University of California campuses in Berkeley and Los Angeles. He also presented The Golden Fortress, filmed in color in Rajasthan, to the Tagore Society of New York, an organization long active in mirroring the literary and artistic aspects of Indian life. The New York screenings filled the auditorium at Columbia University's Center for International Studies. In an interview just before the first New York screening, Ray said that he hoped to gain wider acceptance for his filmsso popular with Bengalis-among Hindi moviegoers. Concerning the U.S. market for his films, Ray said his Apu trilogy "had a tremendously long run which means to me it had a general appeal beyond the intellectual audiences." "It is difficult to tell," he added, "how the American, public feels about the whole body of my work. I am so rarely in this country. I know there is a growing audience in India for my films. I hope -there is a bigger and more appreciative audience in the U.S. as well." 0


FIVE AMERICANS WIN NOBEL PRIZES

Five Americans have won 1975 Nobel Prizes for their work in medicine, physics and economics. There .are three joint award-winners fur medicine: Dr. David Baltimore, 37, a microbiologist at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Dr. Howard Martin Temin, 40, an expert in oncology (study of tumors) at the University of Wisconsin; and Dr. Renato Dulbecco, 61, who is currently working with the Imperial Cancer Research Laboratory in London. American professors shared the physics and economics awards with scholars from other countries. Joint winners of the award for physics are Professor James Rainwater, 57, of New York City's Columbia University, and Professors Aage Bohr and Ben Mottelson, both of Denmark. A Yale University professor, Tjalling Koopmans, 65, shares the award for economics with Professor Leonid Kantorovich of the Soviet Union. The three Nobel laureates in medicineDr. Baltimore, Dr. Temin and Dr. Dulbecco-are all veteran researchers in cancer. They have been honored "for their discoveries concerning the interaction between tumor viruses and the genetic material of the cell." Their work has helped scientists in their quest for answers to the two dominant questions in cancer research: Can viruses cause cancer? If so, which viruses and which cancers? A spokesman for Sweden's Karolinska Institute, which decides the Nobel awards for medicine, said: "Viruses causing tumors in human beings have not been found," but some link between viruses and certain malignant tumors "appears likely." He added: "Technology to study such a possible relationship is available today,

and the conceptual foundation for the examination of this problem has been provided by the discoveries made by these Nobel Prize winners." Professor Peter Reichard, a member of the Swedish institute, said that the American scientists "have found different effects and circumstances which cause cancer. They have not come up with any new methods for treating cancer, but their discoveries are still considered a giant step in cancer research." They did their research independently. Dr. Dulbecco's work enables scientists to watch the transformation of a normal cell into a cancerous cell. While normal cells have a thin film between them, cancerous cells stick together and climb on to each other, forming a growth. Dr. Baltimore studied what happens if a normal cell gets infected by RNA (the information link between the nucleus and cell material), and found an enzyme that creates virus proteins in the cell. Dr. Baltimore's theory was introduced in 1970 at a cancer congress in Houston. "It met with skepticism at first," said an official of the Karolinska Institute, "but then caused a revolution." Dr. Temin made essentially the same discovery. He found that cells gained certain qualities after an infection from RNA virus. These could lead to the development of tumors. The three Nobel laureates in physics-Professors Rainwater,. Bohr and Mottelson-have been honored for their work on the makeup of the nucleus of the atom and on the fundamental forces locked inside the atom. The components of the atomelectrons, protons, neutrons and othersare too small to be seen even under the most powerful of microscopes. These particles are constantly moving within

the confines of the atom, and the three physics prize winners have made discoveries about what governs this movement. Their work has given nuclear physicists a framework for studying the composition of matter. It could have important applications in the field of nuclear energy. The economics award, won jointly by an American and a Russian, was given for their work on the theory of optimum allocation of resources, which is equally applicable to communist and capitalist economies. Both scholars have applied the tools of mathematics to problems of efficient production in their respective economies, and have come to nearly identical conclusions. The work of Professor Koopmans and Professor Kantorovich has run on independent but parallel lines for several years. Both independently developed the technique of linear programing-which has been used by national planners to . solve the problems of maximizing output, and by individual industries to make more efficient such operations as inventory control and cutting metal parts from steel sheets. Professor Koopmans was one. of the originators of econometrics, a branch of economics that tries to measure economic development and, by using mathematical models that simulate how the economy behaves, attempts to test economic theories. At a news conference, Professor Koopmans expressed delight that he is sharing the award with Professor Kantorovich, whom he has known for more than a decade. The value of the Nobel award is now $143,000. So far, iI1the 75-year history of the Prize, 134 Americans have won 0 awards.


FORD PRESENTS MEDALS TO 13 SCIENTISTS Asserting that the United States needs to apply the spirit of innovation and exploration to every facet of national life, U.S. President Gerald Ford recently awarded the National Science Medal to 13 distinguished American scientists. In a ceremony held in the East Room of the White House, President Ford declared that the nation's future and that of the world "depends on the creativity and the genius of men and women such as these we honor today." The President said that "the nation's commitment to the most fundamental of all inquiries-basic research-has not diminished," and that federal spending in this area will increase by 11 per cent in 1976. Among those receiving the National Science Medal were Dr. Linus Pauling, twice a Nobel laureate, who won his first Nobel Prize in 1954 for his work in molecular chemistry. He was a controversial figure in the 1950s, a period in which the late Senator Joseph McCarthy was conducting investigations of alleged infiltration of U.S. society by communists and those belonging to communist-front groups. In that era Dr. Pauling had also been a critic of American foreign policy and constantly advocated an end to the testing of nuclear weapons. Subsequently, he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize

Dr. Linus Pauling receives a National Medal of Science from President Ford. in 1962. His present research-being conducted with the aid of three federal grants-is investigating the possibility that massive doses of Vitamin C may prevent or cure the common cold, and on the use of Vitamin B-6 to treat schizophrenia. Other medal recipients are: -Nicolaas Bloembergen, Harvard University, for scientific investigations and inventions relating to the interaction of matter with coherent radiation. -Britton Chance, University of Pennsylvania, for his work in cellular and

SUBSCRIBE TO SPAN is available at leading newsstands at Rs. 2.50 per copy. An annual subscription at Rs.18 for 12 issues saves 40 per cent and conveniently borings SPAN to your home or office

HIGHLIGHTS

subcellular physiology. -Erwin Chargaff, Columbia University School of Medicine, for his work on protein synthesis. -Paul Flory, Stanford University·, for his work on the modes of formation and structure of polymeric substances. -William Fowler, California Institute of Technology, for his work o~ the nuclear processes controlling evolution of stars. -Kurt Godel, Princeton University, for pioneering work in mathematical logic. -Rudolf Kompfner, Bell Telephone Laboratories, for work on communication satellites and optical communications. -James Van Gundia Neel, University of Michigan Medical School, for his pioneering achievements in advancing the science of human genetics and discovering the genetic basis of several diseases. -Ralph Peck, consulting engineer, for development of the science and art of subsurface engineering. -Kenneth Pitzer, University of California, for pioneering applications of statistical thermodynamics. -James Shannon, Rockefeller University, for leadership in· biomedical research following his work on kidney function and antimalarial drugs. -Abel Wolman, Johns Hopkins University, for significant improvements 0 in urban water supply systems.

SPAN

OF THE NEXT ISSUE:

• What Makes the United States So American? by T.K. Mahadevan • Building the Alaska Pipeline • An I ndian Poet Discovers Carl Sandburg • Not Only Is God Dead, But Try Getting a Plumber on Weekends' TO SUBSCRIBE, fill out coupon on reverse side and mail to: SPAN Magazine Subscription Service Sundeep, 4, New Marine Lines, Bombay 400 020 Paid subscribers please note: If you change your address, you should also notify SPAN Magazine Subscription Service at the above ·Bombay address.


of that body consciousness which makes every part share the success or failure of the whole. It is clear that once pain is Dear Sir: The discussion with Dr. John lost; different parts of the body may revert Bonica on human pain [August 1975 to competition with each other. Thus, SPAN] is a remarkably successful attempt our very survival depends upon pain." to explain an intricate aspect of our Pricked by a pin, or cutting the skin physiology. While the alleviation of pain with a knife, he was wont (gratefully!) has been a dominant concern of the to say, "Thank God for pain!" human race, the necessity of pain to DR.M.ANANTARAMAN Department of Zoology man (or any animal) is scarcely The New College, appreciated. Dorothy Clarke-Wilson's Ten Madras Fingers for God, a biography of Dr. Paul Brand, discusses the latter aspect. Dr. Brand, who spent a life-time in India developing techniques of reconstructive surgery for maimed and disabled leprosy Dear Sir: I read with great interest patients, put forward the theory that [September 1975 SPAN] Suniti Kumar most of their disabilities were the conse- Chatterji's "tribute" to the late Professor quence of "unconscious self-destruction" W. Norman Brown, whom I had the because of 'the absence of pain. privilege of knowing. I first met Norman Brand said that animals eat up their Brown nearly 20 years ago. I was connected insensitive organs when deprived of the with the University Grants Commission sensation of pain. "It is clear," he asserted, at that time, and Dr. Brown discussed "how important pain must be in the whole with me the draft scheme for setting up pattern of the survival of living organisms the American Institute of Indian Studies. composed of many cells. As soon as In 1957 I visited several universities in pain is lost there seems to be a loss also the U.S. and called on Professor Brown

In Praise of Pain

SPAN ORDER FORM

at Philadelphia. In 1962 I was Danforth Visiting Lecturer in the U.S., and one of the institutions I spoke at was the University of Pennsylvania. Norman Brown was in charge of my program there. One of my lectures, before the Tagore Society, was' on the language problem in India. Being the' son of Christian missionary parents and having lived for many years in his early boYhood in India, Norman Brown was well aware of the danger of a Christian scholar approaching Hinduism with a Christian bias or prejudice. It was perhaps this awareness that made him write after my visit (with my wife) to Philadelphia: "One of the interesting things about the Mathais was that, though Christian, they both showed acquaintance and sympathy with Indian culture and skill in presenting it to Americans." Professor Brown lived a rich and meaningful life. We grieve at his passing away, but it could truly be said that "nothing is here for tears"; we will remember him with "proud thanksgiving." SAMUEL MATHAI Trivandrum

TO: SPAN Magazine Subscription Service Sundeep 4, New Marine Lines Bombay 400 020


Two of the most complex and sophisticated spacecraft er built by the U.S. are now about half way to the mysious red planet. Launched respectively in August and ptember 1975, Viking 1 and 2 are scheduled to land on ars in July and August 1976-a spectacular "scientific t" to America on its 200th birthday. In the artist's cQnption below, the Viking lander is enclosed in its protive aeroshell, about 6,000 meters ove the surface of Mars, with its rachute ready to open. The drawing ove shows the Viking lander about touch down on Mars. The two craft ve been designed to carry out the ost ambitious planetary mission ever tempted. As Dr. Noel Hinners of the ational Aeronautics and Space Ad. .stration says: "In many ways, irig is more complex than the Apolspacecraft that landed men on the .) oon. It will be the most thorough un-

manned investigatiot1 ever conducted on another planet in the solar system.n The landing ite for Viking I will be Chryse, one of the many "ehanne " that geologists b~ lieve must have been cut by running water. Viking 2 witt set down 1,600 kilometers northeast of Viking l. The spacecraft will search for life in two ways. One, by relaying photos of everything they "see." The other, by examining Martian soil in a miniature laboratory. A clawlike hand will scoop up a fistful of soil and dust and feed it to the lab which will examine the samgle for evidence of any living organisms. Other instruments will "sniff" the atmosphere to analyze its chemical composition. What e the odds of their finding life? Says U.S. space scientist Carl Sagan of Cornell University: "The Martian environment is sufficiently -benign that, for all we know, it can support large organisms."



Turn static files into dynamic content formats.

Create a flipbook
Issuu converts static files into: digital portfolios, online yearbooks, online catalogs, digital photo albums and more. Sign up and create your flipbook.