SPAN: October 1973

CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND TBB AMBRICAN DRBAM There are as many definitions of "the American Dream" as there are Americans, but perhaps one of the classic definers of the Dream is artist Norman Rockwell, who depicts both dreamers and Dream in the seven paintings we have assembled at left. The "American Dream" may sometimes be naIvely or unrealistically ambitious ("to save the world" ... or to make all nations capitalist democracies). For the average American worker, the Dream is usually modest: a good job with a good salary so he can save money to buy his own home in a clean, green suburb like the one portrayed in the painting at left.

Millions of American workers have fulfilled this modest dream in an American society which is a complex mixture of capitalism and socialism. This issue of SPAN features two articles analyzing these two "isms" in the United States. In "The Future of Capitalism" (page 2), economist Robert Heilbroner argues that capitalism, far from being selfdestructive as Marx predicted, is healthier than ever in the U.S., Japan, West Germany and most of the other prosperous nations in the world. He reminds us, however, that economic success does not guarantee social harmony.

Capitalist societies face many problems but, ironically enough, they are no longer ideological problems because they are the same problems being faced by Marxist socialist societiesharnessing an awesome technology, fulfilling people's rising expectations.

In "Socialism in America" (page 8), author Michael Harrington discusses the socialist tradition in the United States and how many of the tenets of Marxist socialism have been "co-opted" by American capitalism. He reminds us of the great strength of American unions-and hence of American workers-and how capitalism in the U.S. is evolving toward more, not less, state involvement in the economy.

He mentions the millions of young people in America who are turning away from the profit-motive-as-sole-motive, and how this will help socialism. He feels, however, that socialism in America must not plunge into large-scale nationalization, but instead must build on capitalism's considerable accomplishments.

Whatever the "isms," Americans will always have dreams-however humble or overweening they might seem.

And at the end of the article, Harrington urges humility in what people should expect from socialism. "I am a long shot," he says, "from that old socialist belief in a heavenly kingdom where there would be no problems, where the common cold would be curable. Socialism is a very limited and profound response to a certain number of decidable problems."

So, he might have added, is capitalism.

SPAN 2 8

The Future of Capitalism

by Robert Heilbroner

Socialism in America An interview with Michael Harrington

12 18 21 24

Humanizing the Earth

25

A Timely Look at American Aid to India

28 32

A Heroine of Gotham: Frances Steloff

36

The Game Game

by Dr. Rene J. Dubas

Meeting the Crises in Trade and the Dollar An interview with Peter M. Flanigan

by Krishan Gujral

by Letty Cottin Pogrebin

A Hero of Science: John Bardeen

by William K. Stuckey

by James F. Fixx

42 Front cover: The Federal Reserve Bank in Minneapolis, Minnesota, is built like a bridge, with steel cables slung between two end towers to provide an open plaza below. Designed by Gunnar Birkerts & Associates, it exemplifies the new American architecture illustrated on pages 42-48.

Back cover: The Ooty Garden in Ootacamund is an example of how man has "humanized" the earth by transforming a monotonously green hillside into a garden with flowers, arbors, walkways and pools. Story on page 12.

Managing Editor: Carmen Kagal. Editorial Staff: Mohammed Reyazuddin, Avinash Pasricha, Nirmal Sharma, Krishan Gabrani, M.M. Saha.

Art Director: Nand Katyal. Art Staff: Kuldip Singh Jus, B. Roy Choudhury, Kanti Roy, Gopi Gajwani. Production Manager: Awtar S. Marwaha. Photographic Services: USIS Photo Lab. Published by the United States Information Service, Bahawalpur House, Sikandra Road, New Delhi, on behalf of the American Embassy, New Delhi. The opinions expressed in this magazine do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the United States Government. Printed by Arun Mehta at Vakil & Sons Private Ltd., Vakils House, Sprott Road, 18Ballard Estate, Bombay-400001.

Photographs: Front cover-Robert Phillips. 5-Angus McDougall, courtesy International Harvester World. 13 top-Publix Pictorial Service.

13 bottom-Vishnu Panjabi. 28 bottom-Lisa Larsen, Life. 39-Avinash Pasricha. 41-Yuki Kuniyuki. 44 top-Ralph Knowles. 45-courtesy •.

PPG Industries Inc. 46-Balthazar Korab. Inside back cover-Fred .

Maroon. Back cover-Vishnu Panjabi.

Use of SPAN articles in other publications is encouraged, except when copyrighted.

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TIB rUTURBor CAPITALISM A renowned economist argues that Marx has been proven wrong: Capitalism is alive and well. And as the fervor of ideology wanes, both capitalist and socialist nations will increasingly face the same problems-the energy crisis, feeding a growing population, controlling pollution and other effects of advanced technology, restless youth, new life-styles and the revolution of rising expectations throughout the world.

At left is a microcosm of capitalism's progress and problems.

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as ever a generation so uncertain about its destiny as our own? It seems to me that our foresight is indeed clouded in a way that sets us off from previous generations, at least those of fairly recent times. The cloudiness is not the result of our sheer ignorance-that is more or less a constant throughout history. It results rather from our knowledge. Not because we know too little, but precisely because we have learned too much, it has become singularly difficult to answer with assurance the question: Does capitalism have a future?

Anyone who presumes to discuss the outlook for capitalism, that is, must face the following disconcerting fact: The two most cogent predictions with regard to the future of capitalism have both been tried and found wanting. The first of these -never, perhaps, dominant within the Western world-has always provided a powerful current of thought for those who opposed capitalism. This is the theory, which is basically Marxian in origin, that capitalism is an inherently self-destructive social order.

I need hardly say that history has not confirmed the seemingly irrefutable "logic" of this apocalyptic view of capitalism.

Capitalism teetered in the United States and England, but it did not collapse; and with the exception of Russia, wherever capitalism underwent violent change, as in Germany and Italy, the direction of the movement was to the Right, not to the

Left. Even more disconcerting to the believer in the Marxian drama, when the storm of fascism had passed, capitalism re-emerged in excellent economic health, as witness the post-World War II histories of West Germany and Japan.

What happened to disconfirm the MarxI ian prognosis of the future of capitalism?

Here we begin to encounter those new elements in our knowledge that make present-day prediction so difficult. The first such element is the realization that the industrial working class is not revolutionary in its temper.

Why did the doctrine of the inevitability of class war fail? The reasons are many ..

Primary, of course, is that the economic system did not collapse, so that the pressures of economic misery so vividly described by Marx were slowly alleviated. ext in importance is that the combined economic and technological pressures of an expansive capitalism did not serve to swell, but rather contracted, the numbers of the proletariat, opening the way for' many to join the ranks of white-collar workers. As a result, the political temper and social outlook of the working class became progressively less "proletarian" and progressively more "bourgeois"destroying as a further consequence the unity and discipline that Marx had expected of his revolutionary class. And not least in this array of causes must be placed the disillusion that gradually attached itself to the idea of socialism, as the harsh

'Economic success does not guarantee social harmony. realities of Stalinism brought an end to the hope that the end of capitalism would usher in an instant transition to a new, classless society.

The second of the now-disproven predictions-this one far more widely believed in among Western societies-is the opposite of the first: namely, that some form of capitalism-call it ameliorative, or welfare, capitalism-could continue to sustain and extend its hegemony.

What do I mean when I say this has been disproven? Certainly not that capitalism is incapable of continuing its impressive record of economic growth. Certainly not that capitalism cannot improve the distribution of income, or its provision of social services. What I have in mind is something much more fundamentally shaking, especially for those who hope that the future can be discerned with clarity by projecting the economic trends of the present. It is that economic success does not guarantee social harmony.

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f all the elements of knowledge gained in the past generation I can think of none so radically challenging for the social theorist. Let me present as an instance the case of the United States. Had anyone in the 1930s been told that the U.S. Gross National Product in the early 1970s would surpass a trillion dollars-effectively doubling the real per capita income within the lifespan of the majority of the population then alive-I am sure he would have felt safe in predicting an era of unprecedented social peace and goodwill.

Yet that enormous economic change has taken place and social harmony has not resulted. Economic growth, in other words, did not prove the great solvent for social difficulties. The economic transformation from the conditions of the 1930s to those of the 1970s has not lessened the potential for racial disturbance, has not headed off the explosion of juvenile disorders, the widespread decay in urban amenities, or a serious deterioration in national morale.

Indeed, growth has brought new problems, environmental and other. Nor has such an experience been confined to the United States. Unprecedented growth in France and Germany has not prevented violent outbreaks of dissatisfaction in those countries, particularly among the young. Nor have Sweden or England or the Nether-

.. Growth has brought new problems.'

lands-all countries in which real living pects of reality. The Marxian concept of standards have vastly improved and in governments being "the executive comwhich special efforts have been made to mittee of the bourgeoisie" failed to take lessen the economic and social distance into account the very wide latitude that, between classes-been spared a share of the . from the early 19th century, government expression of profound social discontents. was capable of applying to its task of atThis inability of a "successful" capital- tending to the interests of the economic ism to guarantee social harmony adds ruling classes. And on the other side of more than another neutral element of the ideological divide, those who believed knowledge to our present uncertainty with that the inherent economic tendencies of regard to the future. I think it is fair to say the system should be allowed to work that among the new evidences of social un- themselves out with a minimum of political rest-the drug culture, the cry for parti- interference closed their eyes to the fact cipatory democracy, the alienation of stu- that the governing institutions have always dents, the new sexual morality, the retreat intervened to maintain capitalism as a to the life of the commune-none is con- system in good working order-now stepgenial with or supportive of those attitudes ping in to promote economic activity, now and behavior patterns on which capitalism curbing excessive competition, now estabhas traditionally rested. It is possible, in lishing certain social standards of safety other words, that we stand at the threshold and well-being. of an era in which deep-seated changes in Moreover it is also clear as we look lifeways will undermine capitalism in a back over the history of capitalism, in manner as fatal as the most dramatic pro- particular since World War I, that the letarian revolution might do, although per- range and depth of government penetrahaps less rapidly or romantically. tion into the economic process have undergone a slow, uneven, but in the end, deet the fact that we cannot discern cisive increase. the road ahead does not mean that we are hopelessly lost. On the contrary, his fact has two important effects on our thinking. The first is that the because we are forced to stop, we are in a position to do something that the motorist rise of the political "superstructure" to a cannot-examine the ground beneath us position of much greater equality withand perhaps derive some better idea of the indeed, perhaps superiority to-the ecogeology of the region in which we find nomic base leads to ever greater uncertainourselves. Now, the composition of this ty in our predictions. For whatever our belief as to the outcome of the economic ground, which we will call "capitalism," is considerably different from the idea of mechanism of capitalism-whether, again, it that underlay both the pessimistic and it be conceived as self-destructive or ameloptimistic conceptions of the country iorative-our ability to project a trajectory through which we thought we were travel- for that economic mechanism weakens ing. For in both the Marxian and the when the economic machinery no longer "liberal" views of capitalism-divergent as works "by itself" but is continuously subthey might be otherwise-there was an ject to political direction: Second, and important common belief. In both schools equally clear, the "politicization" of of thought, capitalism wa,s formerly de- capitalism opens all predictions to the scribed as an economic system in which the vagaries of the political process, or of means of production were privately owned social currents such as the changes in lifeand the market-place regulated the main style to which I earlier referred-aspects currents of economic activity. But that was of the social system with respect to which not the important thing: both the apo- we possess no predictive capabilities calyptic and the ameliorative views of whatsoever.

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capitalism saw the economic machinery of the system as dominant, and the political and social accouterments as subordinate.

To begin with, then, let us recognize that both views erected stereotypes of capitalism which ignored important as-

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Right: A giant ladle empties its load of mol- . ten metal in a U.S. steel plant. Both capitalism and socialism, says the author, "are forced ~ to use production 'styles' whose resemblances to one another far outweigh their differences."

'The system we call "capitalism" turns out in' fact to be a family of systems capable Yet with the disappearance of the old stereotypes of capitalism comes an awareness of other aspects of the system that may yet enable us to see some little distance into the surrounding gloom.

For instance, despite the persistence of private ownership of the means of production and the market, the system we call "capitalism" turns out in fact to be a family of systems capable of a very great variation in political and social (not to mention economic) performance: witness the guaranteed lifetime employment offerred by the big Japanese corporations, and on the other hand, the near-indentured labor of the Union of South Africa; the highly developed welfare system of the United States; the ÂŤdolce vita" of Italy and the Calvinist atmosphere of Germany; the effective government of three language groups in Switzerland, and the extreme difficulties encountered in governing two language groups in Canada.

In the face of such a spectrum of political and social structures, it should be clear that it is no longer possible to declare with assurance what constitutes the "pure" model of capitalism. This is certainly not to say that this broad spectrum of capitalist societies does not display common problems or face similar challenges. But if social prognosis is to offer more than a mere wishful projection, it cannot predict how such problems and challenges will be met by arguing in terms of a stereotyped "capitalism" that never quite existed.

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hat, therefore, do capitalist societies have in common? I imagine that you think I will now recite a familiar list of ailments: inflation, unemployment, foreign exchange difficulties, competition, and the like. But the truth is I see little that can' be forecast with regard to this so-standard range of capitalist ills other than that we will cope with them with about the same mixed results of success and failure as we now experience.

Instead, I wish to turn to quite a different set of problems: namely, the deleterious side effects of certain kinds of economic growth. We have all been aware for some time of the specific dangers posed by pollution-generating output. What we are only now becoming aware of is the possibility that pollution may pose a problem of such dire implications that only a global

ceiling on production will assure our very survival.

We do not yet know whether drastic production limitations will in fact be imperative; that depends largely on our ability to develop technologies that will permit the detoxification of certain effluents, the recycling of scarce materials, the efficient use of low-grade minerals, etc. But it seems highly probable that within the lifetime of the present generation a degree of social control will have to be exercised over the level and composition of production that far exceeds anything now known in any capitalist country. Whether the basic institutions of the capitalist mechanismprivate ownership of resources and plants, and the reliance on the market as a main instrument of allocation-would survive such a severe constraint is at least problematical.

But there is a second problem-of equal gravity and of perhaps more certain advent. It is the challenge of rising affluence.

Economic well-being, however little it speaks to the question of social harmony and content, assuredly does bring one consequence: the ability of those who enjoy some degree of affluence to withstand the pressures which underlie the smooth operations of all capitalist and (although less publicized) all socialist systems. For, given the fact that most labor is still monotonous and unrewarding, there is only one answer to the question: "Why do men work?" It is: "Because they have to."

But as the general level of affluence rises, there is a corresponding slow decline in the brute necessity of a search for employment at any price or any place. Already in the United States we see the coexistence of large numbers of "unemployed" youths and unfilled jobs of menial kinds which in a former age would have been quickly filled, or the parallel rise of unemployment among women and unfilled opportunities for domestic labor.

It is no doubt a considerable triumph for a society to reach a level of general affluence at which the unemployed person no longer has to accept gratefully whatever dispensations the market makes available. But we must not hide from ourselves the price of this social victory. That price, very simply, is a vastly increased risk of social breakdown. The extreme vulnerability of all urbanized environments to

work stoppages leaves us exposed to potential catastrophes whose foretaste has been felt in the United States (and elsewhere) when strikes of garbagemen have left city populations exposed to disease, strikes of teachers have allowed outbursts of juvenile misbehavior, strikes of air controllers have paralyzed transportation systems.

Societies have, of course, always been vulnerable to work stoppages if they lasted very long. But in the past, two factors militated against a real test of society's vulnerability. One was the concentration of the work force in the industrial sectors, where the effect of strikes-for example in steel or coal-was cushioned by the presence of inventories on which the public could subsist for a considerable time. And the second was the general poverty of most workers, which greatly hampered their staying power when on strike.

In the urbanized, increasingly affluent setting of today and tomorrow, these safeguards have been greatly weakened. No inventories can be accumulated of the vital social services that sustain city life. Meanwhile the staying power of the work force has been very greatly increased. What then will provide the social discipline once exerted by the harsh pressure of necessity? We do not know. Appeals to conscience and to patriotism, the bribe of ever-higher wages, the intervention of public agencies, the use of troops, the outright militarization of labor are all more than mere possibilities-they have already been used on more than one occasion. I cannot predict which measures will be used in the future by which nations, or what damage will be done to civil liberties or to the union movement as a result. I can only state that as industrial societies move to ever higher levels of affluence, the economic pressures of the marketplace can no longer be counted on to provide its necessary labor as a matter of course.

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hus a consideration of the problems now facing the family of capitalisms brings one to a curious new perspective.

More and more of the kinds of problems to which we find capitalism exposed reach over to affect socialism as well-by which I mean reach over to affect that family of societies that rests on an economic base of ~ public ownership and planning.

Two such problems stand pre-eminently

of a very great variation in political and social-not to the fore. One has to do with the common technologies that are used by all industrial societies, capitalist or socialist. By this I do not mean that there is one and only one way of making steel, electric power, or cloth. A considerable variation in production techniques can be observed from one country to the next. Yet in all industrialized countries, these processes have one characteristic in common-they are organized to achieve a more or less continuous flow of outputs. This in turn requires that there be a continuous flow of inputs, usually applied in the sequential form of mass production, as each commodity is gradually transformed from its original to its final state. Unlike the choice that seems to be available in the institutions of government, in social welfare practices, in life-style in general, when it comes to economic life, mature capitalism and mature socialism are both forced to use production "styles" whose resemblances to one another far outweigh their differences.

This observation is perhaps commonplace. But from it follow consequences of considerable importance. For the presence of a common style of production imposes a common "style" of social organization.

The presence of huge units of production, each requiring internal order and external co-ordination with other huge units (or with final consumers), brings to all industrial societies a common scaffolding of control-mechanisms that surrounds the central structure of production itself. This scaffolding, visible as the ministries, the planning agencies, the corporate headquarters, the regulatory commissions of capitalist and socialist economies, constitutes the economic bureaucracy that is the counterpart of industrial production itself.

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odoubt there is a vast deal of difference between the bureaucracy of a central planning board and that of a cartel or a conglomerate corporation.

But one resemblance nevertheless seems crucial; it is that the industrial process imposes on all who come into contact with it, labor and management alike, a necessity to co-ordinate efforts in ways that must be specified by an industrial bureaucracy. I do not claim that industrial production cannot eventually be decentralized, democratized, personalized -only that efforts to achieve these ends

to mention economic-performance.'

will have to overcome the "imperatives" of mass production, and that this struggle will be no easier for socialist societies than for capitalist ones.

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nother problem is the increasing necessity to establish effective social controls over the generation and application of science and technology in daily life.

We are all aware that we have entered a new era of technological capability of which nuclear energy is only the most spectacular example. Genetic engineering, human transplants, the postponement of death, the conditioning of behavior through electrodes implanted in the brain -all these are either actualities or nearterm possibilities for medical science. No less extraordinary are new developments or possibilities in the technology of personal surveillance, of weather-control, and still other areas.

What marks all technological change to some degree, marks these developments to an exaggerated degree. That is their capacity to work large-scale social change, often in directions that we distrust or fear. To control the effects of these technologies, perhaps to inhibit or forbid their application, will therefore become a major challenge-perhaps the major challenge-for governments of all advanced nations in the future, socialists no less than capitalists.

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rom what I have said it must be clear that I believe we can dimly discern something about the terrain over which all industrial societies will have to make their way. To be sure, this is a "prediction" of a very different kind from that which would tell us the turns and twists of the road on which any particular industrial society will travel. It is one thing to see the obstacles of technology or industrial organization, or the difficulties of ecology or affluence, and quite another to make the guess-for it can only be a guess-that Sweden will succeed and the United States fail, or vice versa; or that the family of socialist nations will surmount the obstacles, while the family of capitalist nations will not.

Capitalism throughout the world is still saddled with the obsolete privileges of inherited wealth, with the dubious force of acquisitiveness as a source of social morale, and with the problems of reconciling pow-

erful vested interests with needed social pQlicies. On the other hand, however, most advanced capitalist governments enjoy some experience with parliamentary forms of government and some subscription to civil rights and liberties. Thereby they provide themselves with channels that may facilitate the necessary restructuring of their economic institutions, and that may serve as safeguards against the abuse of political control.

On the socialist side, we find an array of nations that have the advantage of a socio-economic system stripped of the mystique of the private "ownership" of the means of production and the presumed legitimacy of the uncontrolled workings of the market. On the negative side is the cumbersomeness of their present planning mechanisms, their failure to develop incentives superior to those of capitalism, and above all their still rudimentary realization of political freedom.

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ne last word. Throughout the globe, a long period of acquiescence before the fates is coming to an end. The passivity of the general run of men is waning.

Where there was resignation there is now impatience. Where there was acceptance there is now the demand for control.

The end of acquiescence poses challenges to all societies, but perhaps in particular to those in which the silent operation of the marketplace has traditionally given rise to the illusion that society requires no controls. Thus I believe the ultimate challenge to the institutions, motivations, political structures, lifeways, and ideologies of capitalist nations is whether they can accommodate themselves to the requirements of a society in which an attitude of "social fatalism" is being replaced by one of social purpose. If this pronouncement is too imprecise for those who like their prophecies clearcut, at least it may offer consolation to those who see in such a vision the necessary stimulus to fight for the eventual attainment of a good society, be it capitalist or socialist.

0 About the Author: Robert Heilbroner is Chairman of the Economics Department, Graduate Faculty of the New School/or Social Research, New York City. He has written articles for many magazines, and is the author of many books, among them The Worldly Philosophers.

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Millions of American workers have fulfilled 'the American Dream' of a comfortable life in a society that is a complex mixture of capitalism and socialism. In this article, the editors of 'Business and Society Review' interview Michael Harrington (photo below), noted author and former chairman of the American Socialist Party. Harrington discusses, among many other things, the political power of labor unions in the United States.

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AN INTIIVIIW WITH IIICBAIL BAIIINGTON

QUESTION: You may have read in Business and Society Review that we consider capitalism to be an evolving economic system that has been and must be able to respond to changing needs. It is the mounting pressure on businessmen to act in a socially responsive way, infact, and the growing interest in corporate responsibility that provides a healthy market for a magazine such as ours. I'd be interested in your reaction to our premises.

HARRINGTON: Well, my response is some-

what ambiguous. On the one hand, I disagree with the assumptions of the magazine. On the other, I am delighted that someone is trying to act on them. That is to say, I applaud the good intentions that promote a businessman to act in a "socially responsible" way. I think the desire for business responsibility comes from a very good aspect of the American business community-it comes from conscience-but I don't think this will work in the long run to benefit society.

I think that the fundamental responsibility and justification of business enterprise in a capitalist system is making a profit. That doesn't necessarily mean that you must be a robber baron or that you must always be trying to make a killing. But the rationale for allowing the corporation the tremendous role it plays in our society is that it is economically beneficial to the society, that it generates growth, etc. The rationale is not that corporations are the proper institutions to make decisions on how people should live. There's a danger of arrogating to business too much responsibility. It's at that point that I get sort of pro-Milton Friedman, pro-Hayek, with their statements that it is not the function or right of business to make social decisions.

Indeed, classic Adam Smithian theory as I understand it is against anyone making those decisions; they should be determined by a market. I would agree to the extent that the market functions as a democratic process. Decisions about how to deal with the problem of poverty or how to create a new city, for example, should be made democratically.

The corporation might then well play the part of a subcontractor of the democratic will.

But it should not substitute itself for the democratic will. [See "The Corporation and Society: Two Views" in May-1973.BPAN.-Ed.J QUESTION: If the democratic will were to favor more housing, for instance, do you feel that this would be expressed through the market mechanism rather than through government action as housing sponsorship or housing subsidies?

HARRINGTON: No, not necessarily, be-

cause the pure market mechanism does not always represent the popular will or the interestsof society as a whole. I recall Herbert Gans's book on Levittown, New Jersey-a fascinating book. Herb points out that Levitt's decision about how much money to charge for the housing really predetermined the shape of the community. It really told you what class ratio, what kind of ethnic mix you would get. This is something that should not be left up to the Levitt people. I feel that the public would generally be better served by a somewhat greater amount of low-income housing and a greater amount of minority group housing than a private developer, acting sensibly, would be in favor of. It is the government, expressing the democratic will, which should have the responsibility of defining the social design of a town, leaving the fulfillmentof that design to private enterprise.

-QUESTION: One of the problems seems to be that when that kind of authority rests with the state, a bureaucracy takes over-and it may not represent the will of the people either.

How do you arrangefor a democratic response?

HARRINGTON: From my own point of

view, the tendency toward bureaucratic rule in a society in which the state takes on more and more economic functions is present in any social system. This danger is posed by the very existence of massive state intervention.

At the same time as I say that, I admit I don't have a panacea for dealing with it. My general response is that you can offset the bureaucratic tendency of state intervention if you have a dynamic and vital popular movement which is capable of offsetting it, which is sort of a tautology.

I'm very sympathetic to those theorists who say that total centralized planning has proved to be wasteful, bureaucratic, stupid. But when you look at America, which has both fantastic resources and a democratic position of some vitality, I think that while the problem of bureaucratic usurpation would still be posed, it would be much more manageable.

QUESTION: The traditional distinction between socialism and capitalism had been a very simple one-state ownership of property versus private ownership of property. Do you find this definition sufficient in your analysis of current economic trends?

HARRINGTON: No, I don't. I think right

now, and I find it very marked under President Nixon, the United States is moving more and more toward a system of corporate collectivism. That is to say, the government has the responsibility for macro-economic planning, for achieving levels in effective demand that will yield full employment. The planners don't do it, but they're supposed to be doing it. In carrying out that policy, they make decisions which do not simply affect the aggregate level of production, but actually begin to channel production into one direction or another--capital goods versus consumer goods, for example. I agree with Joseph Schumpeter's comment that capitalism is becoming anticapital. Some of the most effective anticapitalists in the world are big businessmen. Therefore, I would say that the traditional distinction between centralism and what capitalism is evolving into is dissolving.

The distinction is not whether the state intervenes or whether the state owns the means of production. The distinction is whose state.

Is the state basically responsive to the priorities and needs of the corporate minority?

Then if it intervenes in the economy, I think it's terrible, it's the wrong intervention. If the state is responsive to a politically organized democratic majority, then I would say that's socialism.'

QUESTION: You're not concerned as much about ownership, then, as about how decisions are made.

HARRINGTON: Right. A lot of socialists have a sort of ownership fetish. In Socialism, I

refer briefly to a Swedish theory of "func-

tional socialization." That is to say, stop worrying about who's got the stock certificates, which in most cases is one of the least important aspects of a corporate reality.

Worry, rather, about who's deciding where to locate the plant, who's determining the employment policies, the technology, etc.

Socialize the function-Keynes once used the phrase "euthanasia of the rentiers"-not to execute private ownership, but just to progressively strip it of functions.

For example, one reform that has been advocated-I believe by top businessmenis to forget the nonsense of stockholder democracy and allow only certain stockholders, serious stockholders, to vote. My friend Anthony Crosland advocated that in such situations, the United States Government should simply declare itself a significant minority stockholder in everyone of the 500 major companies. It could then exercise that monitoring function that a significant minority stockholder has, challenging the corporation when it comes to social priorities.

QUESTION: To a very is already being done by Ralph Nader, the Project sponsibility, and so forth. effort you support?

HARRINGTON: I'm in

limited extent, this consumer advocate on Corporate ReIs this the type of

a funny position with Nader, since I find his underlying economics very unsatisfying. I disagree with his basics, but I agree with almost all of his specifics. His model is fundamentally a competitive model, sort of a trustbusting model, to which I am not sympathetic. There are a lot of cases where competition is not the answer and where planning or state intervention is.

At the same time, I agree with Nader's insistence on democratizing the corporation, of forcing corporations to take social priorities into account, rather than depending on the noblesse oblige of the present corporate elite.

I think his efforts to organize institutional investors within a corporation and his proposals for a sort of bill of rights for individuals within the corporation, which the United Automobile Workers (UAW) union has adopted, are very good. I think, for example, that an engineer who feels an innovation being produced by the corporation he works for is harmful to the environment should be able to challenge that innovation without personal loss.

Basically, however, Nader is not only content with capitalism, but wants to eliminate barriers to competition so that capitalism can really work. The danger here is that we may end up with what the Germans call a "social market economy." Here it is assumed that there is going to be a large and even dominant private sector where most industries are not nationalized. The state pursues a basically "Keynesian kind of growth policy, stimulating a very large economic pie, leaving the private

'I don't hold to the old socialist idea that you nationalize everything and leap from one societ)

sector where it's sufficient and socially responsible to do an awful lot of the actual work and to benefit profitably. Then the state skims off an increasingly large sum as the pie grows-not an increasingly large portion but an increasingly large sum-which can then be devoted to the workers, the people at the bottom and in the middle, raising up the level of the entire society. I disagree with that.

My feeling is that there is still a basic class antagonism between a state which represents the interests of workers and a corporate elite which has to view benefits for workers as items which increase their costs and lower their profits.

QUESTION: With that rationale in mind, why are you willing to accommodate any private enterprise at all?

HARRINGTON: Because I don't hold to the old socialist idea that there will come a day when you nationalize everything and leap from one society to another. I don't want to destroy the system of production because I want to build on capitalist accomplishments to achieve socialist objectives. For openers, however, I would like to see structural reformsreforms that change the larger aspects of decision-making. I would like to see, for example, an office of the future as part of the Presidency, an annual report of the future, a Congressional debate on the future that would deal with the basic directions of the society.

At the base of this is the fact that people do not have sufficient control over their economic and political condition. Because we do not democratize economic decisions on such we've issues as housing and transportation, made the wrong decisions. We build housing for the rich, we overbuild roads, we underbuild mass transportation.

This results not from the malevolence or the stupidity of the system, but from the basic profit-seeking priorities. I want to make some decisions that are unprofitable.

QUESTION: Much of what you're saying depends on the people's willingness to subordinate their immediate self-interests to benefit the society as a whole. What makes you think that people who presently exhibit a high degree of selfishness will place such a high value on co-operation?

HARRINGTON: One answer, of course, is that in the long run, people will see that the alternative to such co-operation is their own destruction. But even in the shorter run, I see heartening signs. A recent study by Daniel Yankelovich shows that many young people are sick and tired of the profit motive. Inter-

estingly enough they come from middle- and upper-middle-class homes-they are the children of affluence. The working class kids still want into the profit motive, but many of the middle-class kids want out. Yankelovich refers to about 40 per cent of the eight million kids in college who, when they think about their career choices, think about accomplishing something larger than simply making the most money.

QUESTION: It would be interesting to measure the extent to which those students maintained these values three years out of college.

HARRINGTON: Well, there was a very interesting article in The Public Interest written

by Seymour Lipset and Everett Ladd. They went back to the I920s, studying groups of college graduates at five-year intervals. They found that as the graduates got older, almost all of them became more moderate or conservative than they had been in college. But relative to the groups they were succeeding, they were still more radical. That is to say, there was a relative shift toward liberalism.

QUESTION: Do you feel that this shift in values will ever reach the point where co-operation and concern for the welfare of society will supplant immediate self-interest as a motivating force, the type of motivation upon which capitalism is based?

HARRINGTON: Marx was wrong on a number of points, but he had very good insight into others. One of the things he saw clearly was that the working class would become socialist not because it was idealistic, but because it was practical. It would discover that it was in its own self-interest to organize into unions to defend itself against the boss.

When it was discovered that the gains they had won through economic struggle in the plant could be taken away by the political power of the state, they were forced into politics. They mounted a challenge to get a share of the state's power to defend their economic gains. Marx predicted that they would then be forced to see that they would have to change the entire structure of the state, since the state was really designed for capital.

I think that about two-thirds of that scenario has pretty much worked out. But the point I want to emphasize is that Marx had a very healthy respect for self-interest, and he saw it as the prime motive impelling people to socialistic change. I might add that people today realize that the traditional pure model of capitalism and motivation just doesn't apply anymore. The day of Horatio Alger, office boy to president, has pretty much pass-

ed. Things have become much more bureaucratic, hierarchic, structured. As Schumpeter said in Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, capitalism has already destroyed the capitalist ethos. Capitalism no longer really has that sense of private property, that sense of Horatio Alger, and I think that in a way capitalism has been socializing itself.

We're in a state that is increasingly collectivist. The New Deal introduced collectivism in America and brought with it the massive participation of people who had previously been excluded. As a result, the New Deal saved capitalism. Under Lyndon Johnson, reforms became more collectivized. although Johnson was not so extreme. And I think the ideological difference between Mr. Johnson and Mr. Nixon is not that great. Both are corporate collectivizors. I am willing to concede that my ideas may be wrong on many counts, but one thing of which I am absolutely positive is that the 21st century is going to be profoundly collectivist. David Broder, in The Party's Over, made the perceptive observation that Mr. Nixon has probably been the biggest plannifier who has ever occupied the White House. Long-range planning and government control have been coming for years, but they have been stepped up tremendously in the last few years.

QUESTION: You seem optimistic about the general drift of things. Part of your optimism, at least in your book, is based on the faith you have in the labor movement. A lot of people would take issue with that. They don't think that unions are as progressive a force as they once were, in light of some of their exclusionary policies, their attitudes toward tariffs, etc.

HARRINGTON: I think it's a sign of the times that few of my critics rail at me for my general Marxist orientation and socialist theories. Instead, everyone gets terribly upset about my saying the unions are still a progressive force. What they're really saying is that the unions no longer have the elan, the drama, the crusading idealism that the Congress of Industrial Organizations showed in the 1930s. No question about that. At the same time I would argue that if you look at concrete social-political issues, full-employment policies, the social security amendment or poverty programs, the serious political muscle is not that of the churches or the students. It's that of the AFL-CIO and the independent unions. [The AFL-CIO, largest labor organization in the U.S., stands for American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations.]

Now, I've always limited my definition of

to another. I want to build on capitalist accomplishments to achieve socialist objectives.'

the labor movement as a progressive force to domestic issues, where you have an economic self-interest on the part of working people in a full-employment economy. That is where self-interest and the common good really coincide. It's in the interest of the vast majority of AFL-CIO members to press for a better allocation of the social product than is allocated by the profit motive or some sophisticated businessmen. And it is in terms of working class issues that a trade union leader wins his rank-and-file support.

Look at the 1964 Civil Rights Act. President Kennedy did not push fair employment practices because he thought labor would not go along with it, but it was the trade union movement that insisted on putting those provisions in the law. In terms of getting money, institutional support, and political support, the supporters of the Civil Rights Act included a very active labor component.

I would say generally that the labor movement has been good on civil rights issues. It's fallen down where you have exclusionary practices, which tend to be concentrated in that minority of unions which can exercise some kind of control over hiring practices. People often lose sight of the fact that those are very distinctly the minority of American labor unions.

QUESTION: Unions are becoming more and more concerned not only with the amount of work, but with the style and quality of the job.

HOlVdo you view the growing phenomenon of job alienation?

HARRINGTON: The example which comes immediately to mind is that of the assemblyline worker. Working on the production line is lousy. The workers, especially the older ones, want very much to get out. One of the demands which the UA W's rank-and-file leadership picked up was "30 and out"30 years of service and you retire. The companies don't want this. To retire a man with 30 years' experience and 12 or 13 more years of work potential is economically wasteful.

That worker, though, has been in an absolutely miserable situation for 30 years, and that's enough.

QUESTION: You're talking about assemblyline work, Ivhicll is probably an extreme example of misery. What about the corporate executive? He may spend as tough a day as the guy who lvipes off one side of a Ford Mustang 1,000 times a day.

HARRINGTON: The alienation of the executive is a very real thing. Marx talks about it at considerable length. But I think that agonizing over martinis at lunch is better than

wiping off car doors at an automobile plant.

And while the misery of automobile workers may be extreme, there are millions of people in that industry. one of the things J find Parenthetically, interesting is that the sophisticated business press is often more realistic and accurate about many of these issues than anyone else.

I am an avid reader of The Wall Street Journal.

In Toward a Democratic Left, I acknowledge the Journal for providing anticapitalists with indispensable data, rather fairly presented.

I wanted them to know that I appreciate it.

QUESTION: A lot of these issues-the way people relate to their work, a growing degree of alienation-were discussed in Charles Reich's The Greening of America. What was your reaction to that book?

HARRINGTON: It is a good book in many respects. It talks in some ways about collectivism, about the utilization of the power of the state, about domination, manipulation, control, and emancipation. It recognizes that the counterculture's values cannot be attributed to youthful perversion but are portents of the types of changes that are taking place in society.

Its profound limitations, however, are, first, suggesting that with everybody blowing dope and wearing bellbottomed trousers, the system's going to change without any political organization, without any economic alternative. That's not true. You cannot run a society of any complexity on a "countercultural" basis. The liberal, planning, social investments approach has its limitations, but so does Reich's scenario. What fascinates me both as a social critic and as a writer is the enormous success of Reich's book. It sold over 200,000 copies at $7.95 in the middle of a recession of sorts-that's a lot of money.

QUESTION: You and Reich both seem to hold to the same belief, however-that through affluence will come change. What role does the relative affluence in the United States play with regard to impeding or encouraging progress toward a socialist state?

HARRINGTON: Right now, the countries most objectively ripe for socialism are the United States, Russia, and, if you take the Common Market countries as an entity, maybe the United States of Europe. The crucial element is affluence. As I quoted Marx in my book, if you socialize poverty you simply get a redistribution of poverty.

There is no way to socialize poverty and get people to be nice to each other. I am convinced that the economic basis of invidious competition and hatred is scarcity. You can't

proclaim socialist motivations by fiat and decree, as in Cuba, when you don't have the economic preconditions.

When you try to block incentive and self-interest in the absence of abundance, they will come in through a back door. That is essentially what happened in Cuba. They couldn't get people to work by appealing to positive incentives, since that contradicts the official rhetoric; so they increasingly militarized the society.

If you have enough to go around, people might not constantly seek more.

QUESTION: Isn't it possible that people seek affluence not solely for what they can buy but because of the value money has as a status symbol? Competition based on ego satisfactions is not going to be eliminated by making material things available to everyone.

HARRINGTON: Well, we have had institutions in American society which have transcended people's instincts for their own immediate self-interest, ego-motivated or otherwise. The army, for example, and its call upon patriotism-that's motivated people to make supreme sacrifices. One of the questions I've had for years is at what point are we going to be able to have a patriotism of life, in terms of health, in terms of eliminating poverty or eliminating racism, employing a motivation which is equivalent to that used in war.

QUESTION: Even then, yOll run into the conflict of wanting to maintain a high level of production and affluence on one hand, and the antisocial byproducts of high production, such as pollution, on the other.

HARRINGTON: Absolutely. There are certain costs, certain trade-offs involved. But as long as the results are democratically chosen, that's the way it should be. I remind you that from my point of view, democratically achieved decisions are an absolute precondition. I am a long shot from that old socialist belief in a heavenly kingdom where there would be no problems whatsoever, where the common cold would be curable. Socialism is a very limited and profound response to a certain number of decidable problems. It will not 0 solve the problem of death.

About the Interviewee: Michael Harrington, 44, came into national prominence in 1962 when he published The Other America: Poverty in the United States, a book that impressed President Kennedy and contributed much of the intellectual impetus for the U.S. Government's "war on poverty." Prior to this, he was known primarily as a ~ social worker andfor his articles in Commentary andDissent.His latest book is Socialism, described as his "most brilliant and important" work.

Humanizing the Earth The author, an eminent and eloquent environmentalist, reminds us again of the world's growing need for protection of the environment. At the same time he refutes the widespread argument that 'nature knows best.' The world's coal and oil deposits are proofs of nature's 'failure' to recycle huge amounts of organic waste. And the most interesting landscapes are not primeval forests or 'pure nature,' but scenes that man has humanized with farms, pastures, gardens and lakes (photos at right and back cover).

How grey and drab, unappealing and unsignificant, our planet would be without the radiance of life. The surface of the earth would resemble that of the moon if it were not covered with living organisms. Its colorful and diversified appearance is largely the creation of microbes, plants, and animals which endlessly transform its inanimate rocks and gases into an immense variety of organic substances. Man augments still further this diversification by altering the physical characteristics of the land, changing the distribution of living things, and adding human order and fantasy to the ecological determinism of nature.

Many of man's interventions into nature have, of course, been catastrophic. History is replete with ecological disasters caused by agricultural and industrial mismanagement.

The countries which were most flourishing in antiquity are now among the poorest in the world. Some of their most famous cities have been abandoned; lands which were once fertile are now harren deserts.

Disease, warfare, and civil strife have certainly played important roles in the collapse of ancient civilizations; but the primary cause was probably the damage caused to the quality of the soil and water supplies by poor ecological practices. Similarly today, the environment is being spoiled in many parts of the world by agricultural misuse or overuse, by industrial poisoning, and of course by wars.

The primary purpose of the U.N. Conference on the Human Environment held in Stockholm in June 1972 was to formulate global approaches for the correction and prevention of the environmental defects resulting from man's mismanagement of the earth. I shall not discuss the

technical aspects of these problems but rather shall try to look beyond them and present facts suggesting that man can actually improve on nature. In my opinion, the human use of natural resources and of technology is compatible with ecological health, and can indeed bring out potentialities of the earth which remain unexpressed in the state of wilderness.

The disastrous ecological consequences of many past and present human activities point to the need for greater knowledge and respect of natural laws. This view is succinctly expressed by Dr. Barry Commoner in his fourth law of ecology: "Nature knows best." I shall first discuss the limitations of this law.

When left undisturbed, all environments tend toward an equilibrium state, called the climax or mature state by ecologists. Under equilibrium conditions, the wastes of nature are constantly being recycled in the ecosystem, which becomes thereby more or less self-perpetuating. In a natural forest, for example, acorns fall to the ground and are eaten by squirrels, which in turn may be eaten by foxes or other predators; the dead leaves and branches, the excrements of animals, are utilized by microbes, which return their constituents to the soil in the form of humus and mineral nutrients. More vegetation grows out of the recycled materials, Dal Lake in Kashmir (right) and the green and gold farms of Alaska's Matanuska Valley (above right) are examples of how man has humanized the earth. People refer to such scenes as "nature," says Dr. Dubas, even though the hand of man has been instrumental in carving such beauty out of primeval wilderness.

'It is true that many ancient civilizations have ruined their environment and that a similar process is going on now in highly industrialized areas, but this is not inevitable.' thus assuring the maintenance of the ecosystem.

When applied to such equilibrated systems, the phrase "Nature knows best" is justified, but is in fact little more than a tautology. As used in this phrase, the word nature simply denotes a state of affairs spontaneously brought about by evolutionary adaptation resulting from feedbacks which generate a coherent system. There are no problems in undisturbed nature; there are only solutions, precisely because the equilibrium state is an adaptive state. But in a given area, there is usually more than one possible equilibrium state, and thus the natural solution is not necessarily the best or most interesting solution. As I shall illustrate later, the symbiotic interplay between man and nature has often generated ecosystems more diversified and interesting than those occurring in the state of wilderness.

What is surprising is not that natural environments are self-sustaining and generally appear efficient but, rather, that many of them constitute clumsy solutions to ecological problems, even when nature has not been disturbed by man or by cataclysms, and therefore could have been expected to reach the optimum ecological state.

T

hat the wisdom of nature is often short-sighted is illustrated by the many disasters that repeatedly affect plants and animals in their undisturbed native habitats. The repeated population crashes among animal species such as lemmings, muskrats, or rabbits result from the defectiveness in the natural mechanisms which control population size. These crashes unquestionably constitute traumatic experiences for the animals, as indicated by the intense behavioral disturbances which often occur among them long before death. The crashes constitute, at best, clumsy ways of re-establishing an equilibrium between population size and local resources. Judging from the point of view of lemmings, muskrats, and rabbits-let alone human beings-only the most starry-eyed Panglossian optimist could claim that nature knows best how to achieve population control.

Most surprising is the fact that even without environmental changes caused by human interference or accidental cataclysms, nature fails in many cases to complete the recycling processes which are considered the earmarks of ecological equilibrium. Examples of such failures are the accumulation of peat, coal, oil, shale, and other deposits of 0rganic origin. These materials are largely derived from the bodies of plants and other living things that have become chemically stabilized after undergoing only partial decomposition. The fact that they have accumulated in fantastic amounts implies, of course, that they have not been recycled. Paradoxically, man helps somewhat in the completion of the cycle when he burns peat, coal, or oil, because he thereby makes the carbon and minerals of these fuels once more available for plant growth. The trouble with this form of recycling is that the breakdown products of the fuels are so rapidly put back into circulation through

air, water, and soil that they overload contemporary ecological systems.

The accumulation of guano provides another example of recycling failure on the part of nature. This material, now used as a fertilizer, consists of the excrements deposited by birds for millennia on certain islands and cliffs. For example, millions of sea birds use the Chincha Islands off the coast of Peru as a resting place and breeding ground; their droppings, accumulated through centuries, have formed layers of guano from 18 to 30 meters in thickness. Guano, being rich in nitrogen, phosphate, and potash, constitutes an ideal fertilizer, and its accumulation therefore represents a spectacular example of recycling failure. Here again, man completes the recycling process by collecting guano and transporting it to agricultural fields where it re-enters the biological cycle in the form of plant nutrient.

J

ust as it is erroneous to claim that nature has no waste, so it is erroneous to claim that it has no junkyards. The science of paleontology is built on them. Admittedly, the accumulation of solid wastes in technological societies is evidence of a massive failure of recycling for which man is responsible. But this ecological failure is the expression of behavioral characteristics that have always existed in human nature. Like the great apes, primitive man was wasteful and careless of his wastes, and he has remained so throughout history.

The solid waste problem has become grave because we produce more wastes than in the past, and they are commonly of a chemical composition not found in natural ecosystems.

Nature does not know how to deal with these situations that have no precedents in the evolutionary past. The solution to the problem of solid wastes, therefore, cannot be found in the ways of nature. It requires new technological methods and changes in the innate (natural) behavior of man.

Hailstones, droughts, hurricanes, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions are common enough to make it obvious that the natural world is not the best possible world; man is not responsible for these disasters, but he suffers from them as do other living things. Of greater interest, perhaps, is the fact that nature is incapable, by itself, of fully expressing the diversified potentialities of the earth. Many richness'es of nature are brought to light only in the regions that have been humanized: agricultural lands, gardens, and parks have to be created and maintained by human toil.

Until man intervened, much of the earth was covered with forests and marshes. There was grandeur in this seemingly endless green mantle, but it was a monotonous grandeur chiefly derived from its immensity and uniformity. The primeval forest almost concealed the underlying diversity of the earth. This diversity was revealed by man in the process of producing food and creating his civilizations. Since an extensive analysis of the creative transformations of the earth by man would be impossible here, T shall illustrate

it with one single example, namely, that of the part of France where I was born.

Before human occupation, the Ile-de-France was a land without any notable characteristics. The hills have such low profiles that they would be of little interest without the venerable churches and clusters of houses that crown their summits. The rivers are sluggish and the ponds muddy, but their banks have been adapted to human use and their names have .been celebrated so often in literature that they evoke the enchantment of peaceful rural scenes. The sky is rarely spectacular, but painters have created a rich spectrum of visual and emotional experiences from its soft luminosity.

Ever since the primeval forest was cleared by neolithic settlers and medieval farmers, the province of the Ile-deFrance has retained a humanized charm which transcends its natural endowments. To this day, its land has remained very fertile, even though much of it has been in continuous use for more than 1,000 years. Far from being exhausted by intensive agriculture over such long periods of time, the land still supports a large population and a great variety of human settlements.

What I have just stated about the Ile-de-France is, of course, applicable to many other parts of the world. Ever since the beginning of the agricultural revolution during the neolithic period, settlers and farmers have been engaged all over the world in a transformation of the wilderness.

Their prodigious labors have progressively generated an astonishing diversity of man-made environments, which have constituted the settings for most of human life. A typical landscape consists of forested mountains and hills serving as a backdrop for pastures and arable landf, villages with their dwellings, their houses of worship, and their public buildings. People now refer to such a humanized landscape as "nature," even though most of its vegetation has been introduced by man and its environmental quality can be maintained only by individualized ecological management.

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ust as nature has not been capable by itself of giving full expression to its potential diversity, likewise it is not capable of maintaining man-made environments in a healthy state. Now that so much of the world has been humanized, environmental health depends to a very large extent on human care. Swampy areas must continually be drained, forests must be managed, the productivity of farmlands must be maintained by crop rotation, irrigation, fertilization, and destruction of weeds. From historical times, the Campagna Romana has been infested with mosquitoes and malaria every time men have lacked the stamina to control its marshes. Similarly, farmlands that have been economically productive and esthetically attractive for a thousand years are invaded by brush and weeds as soon as farmers neglect to cultivate them. The rapid degradation of abandoned gardens, farmlands, and pastures is evidence that humanized nature cannot long retain its quality without human care.

It is true that many ancient civilizations have ruined their environment and that a similar process is going on now in highly industrialized areas, but this is not inevitable.

Intensive agriculture has been practiced for a thousand years in certain lands without decreasing their fertility or ruining their scenery. Man can create artificial environments from the wilderness and manage them in such a manner that they long remain ecologically stable, economically profitable, esthetically rewarding, and suited to his physical and mental health. The immense duration of certain man-made landscapes contributes a peculiar sense of tranquillity to many parts of the Old World; it inspires confidence that mankind can act -as steward of the earth for the sake of the future.

Lands could not remain fertile under intense cultivation unless managed according to sound ecological principles.

In the past, these principles emerged empirically from practices that assured the maintenance of fairly high levels of humus in the soil. But scientific knowledge of soil composition and texture, of plant physiology, and of animal husbandry is providing a new basis for agricultural management.

During the past century, the sound empirical practices of the past have been progressively replaced by more scientific ones, which include the use of artificial fertilizers and pesticides. Scientific agriculture has thus achieved enormous yields of plant and animal products. Furthermore, experimental studies have revealed that many types of lands can remain fertile for long periods of time without organic manure, provided they are continuously enriched with chemical fertilizers in amounts and compositions scientifically determined.

Efficiency, however, cannot be measured only in terms of agricultural yields. Another criterion is the amount of energy (measured in calories) required for the production of a given amount of food. And when scientific agriculture is judged on this basis its efficiency is often found to be very low. Paradoxical as this may sound, there are many situations in which the modern farmer spends more industrial calories than the calories he recovers in the form of food. His caloric expenditure consists chiefly of gasoline for powering his equipment and of electricity for producing chemical fertilizers and pesticides-let alone the caloric input required to irrigate the land and to manufacture tractors, trucks, and the multifarious kinds of machines used in modern farming.

Needless to say, modern civilizations would be inconceivable if the energy (calories) required by agriculture had to come from human muscles instead of from gasoline and electricity. But it is a fact, nevertheless, that if fossil fuels were to remain the most important source of power, the sheer size of the world population would make it impossible to continue for long the energy deficit spending on which agriculture depends in prosperous industrialized countries.

And there would be no hope of extending these practices to the developing countries, which constitute the largest part of the world.

No matter how the situation is rationalized, the present practices of scientific agriculture are possible only as long as cheap sources of energy are available. After the world supplies of fossil fuels have been exhausted, the modern farmer, like the modern technologist, will become ineffective unless energy derived from nuclear reactions or solar radia-

'After having been for so long frightened by the primeval forest, man has come to realize that its eerie light evokes in him a mood of wonder that cannot be experienced in a garden.' tion can be supplied in immense amounts at low cost.

Thus, the future of land management is intimately bound to the development of new sources of energy, as are all other aspects of human life.

Of the 70,000 million to 100,000 million people who have walked the surface of the earth since Homo sapiens acquired his biological identity, by very far the largest percentage have lived on the man-made lands that have been created since the agricultural revolution.

In every part of the world, the interplay between man and nature has commonly taken the form of a true symbiosis-namely a biological relationship which alters somewhat the two components of the system in a way that is beneficial to both. Such transformations, achieved through symbiosis, account in large part for the immense diversity of places on earth and for the fitness between man and environment so commonly observed in areas that have been settled and have remained stable for long periods of time.

Furthermore, the reciprocal transformations of man and environment have generated a variety of situations, each with its own human and environmental characteristics.

For example, the agricultural techniques, social policies, and behavioral patterns in the various islands of the South Pacific are determined not only by geologic and climatic factors but even more by the cultural attitudes of the early settlers-Polynesians, Melanesians, or Indonesians-and then later of Western and Oriental people who colonized the islands. Cultural attitudes, more than natural conditions, are responsible for the profound differences between Fiji, Tahiti, and the Hawaiian Islands. The Pacific islands were initially settled by different groups of people, and in addition to those early human influences, today exhibit the more recent influences respectively of their English, French, or American colonizers.

The shaping of nature by culture can be recognized in many other parts of the world. As the process of humanization of the earth continues, however, it will increasingly be influenced by the fact that most of the globe will soon be completely occupied and utilized. This colonization process began, of course, long before the days of modern technology.

But the difference is that men now occupy and utilize all land areas except those that are too cold, too hot, too dry, too wet, too inaccessible or at too high an altitude for prolonged human habitation.

According to the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), practically all the best lands are already farmed; future agricultural developments are more likely to result from intensification of management than After humanizing much of the earth, says Dr. Dubos, man is now hankering for the wilderness-for the awesome depth of canyons,for the heights of mountains,for the silence of primevalforests such as the jungle in Hawaii, shown at left.

from expansion into marginal lands. There probably will be some increase in forest utilization but, otherwise, land use will soon be stabilized. In fact, expansion into new lands has already come to an end in most developed countries and is likely to be completed within a very few decades in the rest of the world. A recent FAO report states the probable final date as 1985.

The U.N. Conference on the Human Environment came at a critical time in man's history. Now that the whole earth has been explored and occupied, the new problem is to manage its resources. Careful management need not mean stagnation. In many places, as already mentioned, the interplay between man and nature results in a creative symbiotic relationship that facilitates evolutionary changes.

Man continuously tries to derive from nature new satisfactions that go beyond his elementary biological needsand he thereby elicits the expression of some of nature's potentialities that would remain unrecognized without his efforts.

M

an has now succeeded in humanizing most of the earth's surface but, paradoxically, he is developing simultaneously a cult for wilderness. After having been for so long frightened by the primeval forest, man has come to realize that its eerie light evokes in him a mood of wonder that cannot be experienced in an orchard or a garden. Likewise, he recognizes in the vastness of the ocean and the endless ebb and flow of its waves a mystic quality not found in humanized environments. His response to the thunderous silence of deep canyons, the solitude of high mountains, the luminosity of deserts is the expression of an aspect of his fundamental being that is still in resonance with cosmic events.

As mentioned earlier, nature is not always a good guide for the manipulation of the forces that affect the daily life of man; but undisturbed Nature knows best-far better than ordinary human intelligence-how to make men aware of the cosmos and to create an atmosphere of harmony between him and the rest of creation.

Humanizing the earth thus implies much more than transforming the wilderness into agricultural lands, pleasure grounds, and healthy areas suitable for the growth of civilization. It also means preserving the kinds of wilderness where man can experience mysteries transcending his daily life, and also recapture direct awareness of the cosmic forces from which he emerged.

0 About the Author: Dr. Rene J. Dubos is a medical microbiologist, an experimental pathologist, an ecologist, a humanist. He is presently professor emeritus at the Rockefeller University in New York City. Born in France, he went to the United States to study bacteriology in 1924 and became an American citizen in 1938.

Professor Dubos has written a large number of books, one of which, So Human an Animal, won him a Pulitzer Prize in 1969.

Reprinted from U.S. News & World Report, May 28, 1973, published at Washington, D.C.

MEETING THE CRISES IN TRADE AND THE DOLLAR In this interview conducted by 'U.S. News & World Report' magazine, Peter M. Flanigan, President Nixon's Assistant for International Economic Affairs, discusses world monetary reform, American foreign investment, and the prospects of increasing U.S. trade with the Soviet Union and other nations.

Q. Mr. Flanigan, there has been much worry about the value of the dollar in the world and much talk of a crisis in our trade with other countries. Will the U.S. ever be able to pay its own way in the world again?

A. Yes, when we restructure the international economic system, as President Nixon has suggested in his trade message to the U.S. Congress and in our proposals for monetary reform. Once that happens, we will be in a position to pay our own way.

Q. When will that be? A year-a

decade?

A. That all depends on the progress we make in our international discussions. When the President described the kind of a world that we seek, he said that he wanted an open and equitable trading world, an open investment world, and a sufficiently responsive monetary system to bring our international payments into balance-not in trade alone or bilaterally with each country-but in balance, over all. If the majority of countries work toward the same goal, I assume we'll get there, but I won't try to guess when.

Q. Exactly what power does Mr. Nixon want in order to do what you describe?

A. It's been suggested that, in his trade legislation, the President is requesting unprecedented and sweeping authority. That's nonsense. The President has asked for authority to reduce, eliminate or raise tariffs as part of a trade negotiation. That authority is not very different from that of President Kennedy in 1962, particularly when you consider how much lower tariffs are today.

President Nixon has asked for authority to reduce nontariff barriers, but subject to Congressional approval. So the final authority remains with the Congress. He has asked for authority to retaliate against tariff increases by others, but that's just a refinement of the authority that was granted in 1962, based on experience and new conditions. He has asked

for improvement in our countervailing duty and antidumping laws-laws that are already on the statute books. He's asked for expanded authority to act in a balance-of-payments crisis. He took this kind of action in 1971, but we think that expanded authority of this kind would be appropriate.

So, in general, he is not asking for unprecedented authority; he is requesting changes and improvements appropriate to the real problems we now have. Moreover, it should be remembered that the President is requesting powers that our negotiating partners already have.

Q. What are the problems? How big a deficit do we have to close between income from abroad and outgo?

A. On our basic accounts, the deficit was nine billion dollars in both 1971 and 1972. Prior to that, it had been in the two to four-billiondollar range for some time. This basic balance excludes short-term capital movements.

Q. Do those figures take into consideration investment of money abroad by Americans as well as results of foreign trade?

A. Yes. They balance the income from exports, earnings on investments abroad, money spent here by foreigners, for instance, against what Americans payout for imports, foreign aid, corporate investment, tourists' spending and the like.

Q. How much of that nine-billion-dollar gap was caused by our failure to export as much as we imported in merchandise?

A. That's not necessarily a pertinent question. One might just as well ask how much of it was caused by Government outlays for defense or aid or something else.

We had a nine-billion-dollar basic-balance deficit. We had a seven-billion-dollar deficit in Government outlays. We had a seven-billiondollar deficit in trade. We had a three-billion-

dollar deficit in travel. But we had a six-billiondollar surplus on investment income. We had a two-billion-dollar surplus on services. And we broke even on long-term capital movements. So you can't blame the gap on any single account.

But the account that has swung most and should be easiest to change is trade.

We went from a two-billion-dollar surplus in trade in 1970 to a seven-billion-dollar deficit in 1972.

Q. What is the prospect for turning that trade deficit around this year?

A. Look at it this way: We're doing better on the inflation front than any of our major trading partners. We have increased our productivity substantially in the last couple of years. The dollar is now valued more competitively. Our goods are competitive, and our trading partners-who are themselves moving into an economic boom-should be buying more. So I would think we will sell more, and there will be a substantial swing back toward a trade balance .. , .

Q. Where are we going to do better-in what products?

A. We're probably going to pick up in all of those areas in which we lost ground. You're going to find we're more competitive in manufactured goods, in very high-technology goods, and certainly in agricultural goods.

One of our problems is to gain access to markets for farm products.

Q. We haven't actually lost ground in agricultural goods, though, have we?

A. We haven't lost ground in most exports.

The question is: Have our exports grown as much as they should have?

During the last two years, while our imports were going up 40 per cent, our exports were going up only 15 per cent. We aren't likely to reduce our imports, but the rate of

growth should taper off. So we have to Increase our exports substantially.

Q. Imports, over all, will continue to rise?

A. Yes. It is the purpose of the President's trade bill to contribute to a more open trading world. We think that expanded trade, as long as it's fair trade, is beneficial. And that includes buying more as well as selling more.

The question is: How much more do we buy as compared to how much more we sell?

We'd like to see our imports continue to go up, but see our exports grow faster. Perhaps we can even reverse the record of 1970 to 1972 and have imports increase only 15 per cent while our exports go up 40 per cent. If we did that and got back to roughly the two-milliondollar trade surplus we had in 1970, this ninebillion-dollar deficit in our basic balance of payments would be wiped out.

Q. But don't a good many foreign countries have advantages over us in the cost of labor?

A. The cost of labor is a function of the productivity of labor. After all, we had a fivebillion-dollar trade surplus in 1965. We had the most expensive labor then, but it was also the most productive ....

Q. What is the outlook for imports of raw materials?

A. The market is going to be a major determinant of that. The degree to which we need to import, say, copper is going to depend very much on what the domestic copper price is.

We have significant reserves. Again, the question is: Are they economical?

We are trying to create a trading system that will enable the market to determine where we get these resources and how we pay for them. If we have to import more, we have to be more competitive with our exports.

Q. Do you yet have any evidence that American exporters are beginning to sell much more than they have been?

A. Some, but a greater effort is still needed.

U.S. businessmen are more and more aware of the potential for profit abroad. Obviously, if the market's good at home, they'll tend to concentrate on 'that nearest market. They only have a certain amount of resources, including the resource of their own time. In a country that exports some 50 billion dollars' worth of goods a year, we obviously have some people who know how to sell abroad.

Q. Hasn't one of the trends of the last 10 years or so been that when there was big business to be done abroad, the company produced over there and put less emphasis on exporting from this country?

A. The answer to that question isn't an either/

or proposition. Often you can't sell in a foreign market unless you produce therewhether that's because of barriers to the market, or because transportation is simply too costly, or because you have to be close to the market in order to have the product that appeals to consumers. More and more American companies have gone out aggressively to seek foreign markets and have done so successfully -so successfully, in fact, that the U.S. is accused of practicing, through our multinational companies, a kind of international imperialism.

That's not an accurate name for the activities of our companies abroad. We think it's good for people abroad and it's good for Americans. Our multinationals apparently have increased employment at home faster than other firms have, and they have contributed more to exports than have other companies in this country.

Q. Are we to expect American investment in foreign countries to rise in the '70s as it did in the' 50s and '60s?

A. Certainly not from a percentage-growth point of view.

What is more interesting is that in 1972 more private long-term capital was invested in the United States by foreigners than Americans invested abroad. In other words, we were a net importer of private long-term capital-largely Europeans buying stocks and bonds in this country.

Q. Is foreign investment here increasing this year, too, in an attempt to take advantage of the latest devaluations of the dollar?

A. I don't have any figures yet. There may be a delayed effect while foreigners wait to see what's happening in our stock market, which has been in such turmoil.

Q. Do you see an increasingforeign investment in manufacturing and distribution in this country, too?

A. Yes, I do. I would think that this would be a very attractive market.

Here's another reason: If you had money you wanted to invest anywhere in the world, one of the considerations that would be important to you would be, "What are the chances of nationalization of my investment?"

I can't imagine any country less likely to nationalize than the United States. It's entirely contrary to our principles. And we would be jeopardizing our own enormous investments abroad if we supported nationalization.

We have consistently said to people that we welcome foreign investment here. We're delighted to have people come and put their money here. There are no inhibitions, no barriers, and we think it's a good opportunity.

Q. We have no barriers in this country to a foreign investor?

A. We do prohibit foreign ownership in some sectors like communications media or public utilities, but so do most other countries.

Q. Is this true for state laws, too?

A. There are certainly no state laws that prohibit foreign manufacturing investment in this country.

Q. Mr. Flanigan, why should this country allow a Japanese firm to come in and buy up 51 per cent of a company, while Japan won't allow Americans to do the same thing there?

A. We think that they've been doing themselves a disservice. They are denying themselves the opportunity to benefit by American management and technological know-how.

We think investment makes jobs. The more capital that is invested here, the more we can pay our people.

We are pressing the Japanese to remove their restrictions against our investment in Japan. They recently announced a substantial liberalization effort, but more will be needed, and investors will be watching the results of these efforts ....

u.s.

Q. Getting back to our trade problems, why wouldn't it be simpler to solve our balance-of trade deficit by imposing new restrictions on imports and on the flow of investment money from this country? In other words, what's the rationale for this open-trading, open-investment policy the President has proposed?

A. The rationale is that the standard of living of the American people is benefited by free and fair trade and by more investment abroad.

If we were to restrict imports, history teaches us that a similar restriction would be slapped on us. Exports provide jobs, and so jobs would be lost. In addition, imports provide a wide range of goods that people want at a price they can pay. We don't think it is appropriate to limit the consumer's opportunity to buy.

Q. You say the Administration wants an opentrade, open-investment world. Where is it not open today?

A. We are unable to ship certain u;;ricultural products, where we clearly have a significant comparative advantage. We can grow grains cheaper and better than most of our trading partners. Both the European Common Market and Japan have barriers against certain of our agricultural products.

Japan has the second-largest computer industry in the world. But they call it "an infant industry" and limit our export of computers to Japan.

If you want to buy one of the new mini-

The Soviet Union has 'bought more than a billion dollars' wOfth of our agricultural products.' computers in any U.S. city, many of the models you'll look at will be Japanese. Yet one of the best and most sophisticated is made in this country, and it can't be sold to the Japanese. That is inequitable.

Now, we do a little sinning ourselves in that regard, though we claim we're more sinned against than sinning ....

Q. /fwe ever have free trade around the world, what advantages would the U.S. have?

A. If we move toward a less protectionist world, where do Americans have a real comparative advantage?

Certainly God has blessed us with fertile, temperate-zone acreage in enormous quantities-so much so that we not only can feed our own people and much of the rest of the world, but until this year we had 60 million acres set aside-taken out of production. So one area in which we are enormously productive is the farm.

Secondly, we have unique managerial abilities for the creation of big enterprises. We run them well and competitively. We have learned how to mobilize capital where there must be high investment in order to support high wages.

Q. The other side of the question is: What industries would vanish?

A. "Vanish" is a strong way to put it. But those that wouldn't grow as fast as others are industries that are very highly labor-intensive and in which labor could be bought very cheaply elsewhere in the world.

Q. Textiles and shoes are sometimes mentioned.

A. Textiles is an area. But there's always a tendency to say, "This business is going out of style."

Desk-top calculators is one product where many said: "We can't compete any more.

It's all handwork. It has got to go abroad."

But now it's all done by printed circuits and a very high degree of technology, and manufacture of this product is coming back to the U.S. For ar,'t.her example, Mr. Joseph Wright, chairman vf Zenith Radio, wrote to the President. He said 1970 was a disaster year for his industry. Zenith had just bought a plant in Hong Kong, was building one in Taiwan and was looking at producing sites on the Mexican side of our border. They had concluded from their internal studies that by 1975 three quarters of their production facilities for serving the U.S. market would be outside the United States.

But he said that by virtue of two strong actions taken by the President-(I) action

against dumping in this country, and (2) getting a more realistic value for the dollar in relation to other currencies-Zenith has scrubbed their plans to build any more plants abroad. They were building more facilities here.

They increased their work force in manufacturing here in the United States, and prospects in the consumer-electronic industry were very, very good. American productivity was sufficiently competitive so that they were getting all their growth here, and there was no growth in imports.

Q. Why is it to our advantage to grant ((most favored nation" treatment to Russia, as President Nixon wants to do?

A. There are two answers to that: First, we have begun a dialogue with the Soviet Union, which has certainly reduced the tensions in the world. They point out that they're the second-largest economy in the world and that we don't treat them as well as we do all our other trading partners. And they don't believe that that treatment is commensurate with these negotiations, with this detente.

Secondly, they point out that they have bought more than a billion dollars' worth of our agricultural products, they have contracted for several hundred million dollars' worth of our hjgh-technolo~y productsmachine tools and the like-and if we expect them to continue to buy from us, we have to be willing to allow them to compete on a fair basis in this market.

The President fully understands the concern that's expressed in the Congress about the exit tax in the Soviet Union for people who want to leave. But he does not believe that the proper approach to a solution is through these commercial relations and by denying the Soviet Union most-favored-nation status.

Q. What do the Russians have to sell us?

A. I would leave the answer to that to the ingenuity of American importers. They would find things that we would like to buy.

If the Soviets don't have much to sell us, the granting of most-favored-nation status isn't going to cost much. But it is a matter of importance to them that they not be discriminated against.

Q. Did we make the subsidy on the wheat sold to Russia a quid pro quo in the Vietnam negotiations?

A. Not at all. That was suggested at the time.

When the President came back from Moscow, we did not have any idea that the Russians were going to buy as much wheat as they did.

We had a policy that anybody who exports wheat would get a certain subsidy. To our great surprise, the Russians were over here buying wheat in larger quantities than we knew at the time.

Q. The Russians in this instance showed that they were really shrewder traders than our Government realized. Is that correct?

A. That's correct-which underlines a philosophical precept first stated, I believe, by President Lincoln: that government should only do those things that people can't do for themselves. People can do most of the business things better than governments can do.

Q. Would the U.S. be likely to impose additional restrictions on imports?

A. Our desire is to expand-not restricttrade. However, I would point out that if the President is denied the authority he has requested in this bill, he would have very little authority to impose restrictions when these might be warranted.

Q. Beyond that, might the U.S. pull troops home from overseas if the trade situation doesn't improve?

A. We are not suggesting that. We're not making troops abroad in any sense a quid pro quo for progress on the trade front. But it is true that our ability to maintain the level of expenditures and the balance-of-payments effect of our military effort abroad depends in the long run on our ability to earn money abroad.

Q. In that connection, will the Administration continue foreign aid at the same levels in the years ahead?

A. It's agreed by a majority of the developed countries in the world that we aren't at a point where we can reduce our aid efforts.

We might change the mix between multilateral institutions and bilateral aid.

So one cannot look toward a reduction in foreign aid as a major contributor to the solution of our balance-of-payments problem. It doesn't have a very big effect anyway, by virtue of a lot of it being tied to exports from this country.

Q. Has there been any thought by the Administration of trying to reduce travel overseas

by Americans as a means of balancing our international payments?

A. We don't think that's a good idea. It's not consonant with our philosophy of freedom of individuals. . . .

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TOP U.S. INTELLECTUALS VISIT INDIA A few months ago the American Ambassador to India, Dr. Daniel P. Moynihan, invited several of the most distinguished intellectuals in the United States to visit India in the current academic year and participate in a new USIS series of talks on the general theme of "Modern Society and Traditional Government. " The series was inaugurated on the evening of August 23, 1973, when Dr. Nathan Glazer spoke at the India International Center in New Delhi on "Urban Problems and Government Solutions."

The second visitor in the distinguished speaker series was Norman Podhoretz, who lectured on September 5 at the International Center on the subject of "The Crisis of the American Elite."

(Excerpts from the speeches of Glazer and Podhoretz appear on the following pages.) Scheduled for the future is Dr. Leo Gross, who will address himself to the subject: "Is International Law Responsive to the Needs of Modern Society?" All three of the lectures, of course, are being given in the context of the overall theme chosen by Ambassador Moynihan: "Modern Society and Traditional Government." In explaining the significance of this theme, the Ambassador said: "Through much of the 20th century the American nation mobilized to achieve certain national ends through the means of

Holder of the chair in Education and Social Structure at Harvard University, Professor Nathan Glazer is co-author of two of the most important books in modern sociology: The Lonely Crowd (with David Riesman and Reuel Denney) and Beyond the Melting Pot (with Daniel P. Moynihan).

Dr. Glazer advised the U.S. Governm'ent in both the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations; in the latter he was a member of the White House Task Force on Urban Affairs. He received his doctorate from Columbia University, and is married to an Indian, the former Sulochana Raghavan.

government. These objectives have varied, but most involve to some degree the presumption that the social arrangements of the society were inadequate and needed to be energized or changed by political processes. Such efforts have frequently been resisted on the ground that they will not succeed, an assertion perhaps best put by William Graham Sumner in his aphorism: 'St~teways do not change folkways.' Of late a quite different view has arisen, which holds that the familiar 20th-century proposition has matters reversed, that in fact societies change much more readily than do systems of government, and are frequently well 'ahead' of governments in many crucial matters, such that the real effect of government activity is to retard change. This is a speculative view, which has the merit of suggesting a different axis of argument.

"The object of the lecture series on Modern Society and Traditional Government will be to examine aspects of this new set of questions with particular reference to the United ¡States.

Speakers will not be chosen from one side or another. Most are likely to have mixed or even conflicting views on the subject.

There are at least two sides to the question and more likely 20.

It is, in any event, an interesting and important question which should reward enquiry and debate."

Editor of Commentary, a monthly journal of opinion that is one of the liveliest intellectualforums in the United States, Norman Podhoretz is also one of the leading social and literary critics in America. He has authored two books: Doings and Undoings (a'collection of essays) and Making It (an autobiography). He received B.A. degrees from New York's Columbia University and England's Cambridge University, the latter with first class honors. Cambridge also granted him an M.A. degree in 1957. Podhoretz, who is 43, is married to editor-writer Midge Decter.

One of the world's foremost authorities on International Law, Dr. Leo Gross is Professor of International Law and Organization at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy of Tufts University, Medford, Massachusetts. He is the author of numerous articles for such prestigious publications as the Encyclopedia Britannica and the Harvard Law Review, and has served as consultant to the League of Nations and the United Nations. Dr. Gross received his doctorate from the University of Vienna in 1927. He is an honorary member of the Indian Society of International Law.

For years American urban experts have said that what American cities need is money: money to rebuild the city centers, money for schools, for higher salaries for teachers arid policemen, for relief of the poor, for housing. Strangely enough, this ever popular cry that we need more money to solve our problems is now somewhat muted. It is probably true that there is no solution to our problems without money. But it has turned out that there is no solution to problems 'of urban life with money either ....

*****

Let me make a crude differentiation between two kinds of governmental activities in the city. There are certain urban services and problems which require substantial resources and in which we can find a pretty clear relationship between expenditure and result. If a city is badly lighted or unlighted and one spends money on lighting fixtures, lamps and electricity, the city will be better lighted. If city streets are unpaved and one paves them, the city will be better paved. Let us call these problems technical problems, whose solution is fairly clear and at hand. I do not wish to depreciate the complexities involved in treating such problems-technical complexities, complexities of administration.' But whatever these complexities they fall into insignificance when one considers the second type of urban problems which I will call the social problems. When we deal with technical problems we can assume that a certain expenditure will give a certain result, and we can define success in advance and know how to achieve it. But if our problem is to improve the school achievement of children of certain ethnic and racial groups, to reduce drug use and crime, to reduce the numbers of persons who must resort to welfare for support, then it is by no means clear what the relationship is between expenditure and result. It is by no means clear that more money will mean success. One of our errors in the 1960s was to confuse problems of the second sort with problems of the first sort.

and urban problems in the United States-we must examine the incentive$ and disincentives we build into social programs and see whether we are encouraging people to do the things that contribute to a social problem or the kind of thing that encourages them not to. For example, we are now all convinced in the United States-and Ambassador Moynihan has played a great role in bringing this to public attention-that our welfare system, built on the decent principle that those without means of support should get government aid, has also built into it a disincentive to work, and an incentive to break up families. The disincentive to work exists because on the whole if one earns money, then one's level of government support is reduced. The incentive to break up families exists because the presence of a working and earning husband on the whole makes a woman and her children ineligible for support. ... This is a very oversimplified picture of a very complex problem. If you have read Ambassador Moynihan's book The Politics of a Guaranteed Income, you will see how' oversimplified it is. Yet the principle remains firm: Government cannot easily compel people to work and to support their families if they are not inclined to do so. But it can certainly see that its programs do not provide encouragement to this kind of antisocial behavior ....

Another aspect of our humility before the complexity of social problems is to let people find their own way instead of having the government determine it for them. Our thinking today goes: Why not give people a subsidy and let the private housing market build for them? The private builder has an incentive in making a profit-he will try to build housing that will be satisfactory and that can be rented or sold. He may fail, just as government fails. But he will be more flexible. Building on a smaller scale, he will find that his failure will be less costly-not to him, but to society-than a great public failure ....

*****

When I say social problems are more complicated than technical problems, I mean that human behavior is complex, that our successes in one sphere will inevitably lead to new problems in another. Perhaps most important of all, I mean that in a complex society people are probably the best judge of their own interest, and the role of government must increasingly be to create an environment that permits them to seek their best interest freely. This makes government's job no easier. Indeed it ***** In the field of education we have seen the weight shift from makes it much harder. But I would like to suggest it is the the technical side to the social side. The technical side means direction that we should seek in government today.

0 the provision of schoolrooms, equipment, literate teachers; as long as those are in short supply, social issues get short shrift.

In the U.S. these are in good supply; and it turns out we then have social problems whose nature we cannot yet really divine....

The position I am presenting is not one that says schools can't teach people to read or policemen are not useful against crime.

It is rather a position that says that even though we provide one teacher for every 18 children and one policeman for every 250 citizens (as we do roughly in New York City) we will still have There is one crucial respect in which America is in a seriously problems with reading and crime .... weakened state today, and that is in the condition of its governing We assume that government and its servants can do more elites. In 1960 our intellectual leaders no less than our political than they really can. The fact is that if children learn to read, leaders were sure of themselves. Whether liberal or conservative, it is because in addition to going to school they have parents they knew what they thought and they knew what they wanted to who want them to read, they find it rewarding in various ways. do. Today, if they are liberals, they no longer know what they think If there is a low level of crime, it is not because the police are or what they want to do; and if they are conservatives, they have efficient so much as because there are certain social arrangements lost the confidence of the nation, and no doubt their own confithat make crime unthinkable. Perhaps everyone knows you, dence as well, in their ability to govern .... or everyone is watching you, or there is a group pride that will Consider first the liberals. The liberals were in power in America be hurt if you are caught, and the like. More generally-and from 1960 until 1968. Of the many things they wanted to do, we this is the most important thing we have learned about social may take three major examples. First of all, they wanted-in the

able terms that they cannot with impunity ... ,

be tampered

with lightly or easily or

words of one of John F. Kennedy's campaign promises-to "get the country moving again," that is, to promote economic growth . . . . A second thing the liberals wanted to do was to make the United States into an even more influential presence in international affairs than the country had been before .... A third thing the liberals wanted to do was integrate the black population ....

Now it is striking that in each of these three major areas-the area of economic policy, the area of foreign policy, and the area of social policy-the positions generally called liberal today are very nearly the opposite of what they were when the 1960s began. In the area of economic policy, the new liberalism of 1973 is characterized by an attitude toward economic growth which ranges from the skeptical to the hostile. The emphasis of this new liberalism is on protecting the environment and fighting pollution, and these objectives are not comfortably compatible with economic growth ....

Similarly in the area of foreign policy. Since the late 1930s, liberals have been the party of intervention, the main constituency behind an activist role for the United States in international affairs .... It was liberals who-in the name of the policy of containmentmade the war in Vietnam. But it was also liberals who turned against the war they themselves had made in Vietnam, who led the opposition to it, and who developed many of the arguments against it. ... In the area of social policy too the old liberal clarity is gone. ... Doubts have arisen as to whether integration [of blacks]which is to say assimilation-into the common American culture would really be as desirable as once it so obviously seemed to be.

Perhaps-liberals have begun to say to themselves-the black community would be better offifit were left to its own devices; perhaps the goal should be a relatively autonomous black community in control of its own neighborhoods, of its own schools, of its own culture, of its own destiny. Many younger blacks evidently prefer this path to the path of integration, and their angry opposition to integrationist policies and to the integrationist ethos has cut deeply into liberal confidence on this matter ....

This, then, is the condition of the liberal elite. The conservative elite is also in a state of crisis, but it is a crisis of a rather different kind from the one that afflicts the Iiberals .... Conservatives in America continue to offer not an alternative political philosophy differing radically from liberalism but rather a different kind of person from the one who runs things when liberalism is in command. Conservatives, in other words, offer themselves. We are, they say in effect, better managers than the liberals, and we are more efficient; we can run things better than they can. But in the 1960s conservatives began saying' something else as well. They began saying that liberal rule and liberal policies were tolerating and even encouraging lawlessness and disorder. There were riots in the ghettos, there were uprisings on the campus, there was crime in the streets, and drugs and pornography were sweeping the land. We, the conservatives said, will restore respect for American institutions and we will bring law and order back to the United States.

From this perspective we can see why the Watergate scandal is so serious a crisis for the conservative elite ....

.There is a great discrepancy between the condition of the gove'rning elites of America and the condition of the American people.

The elites are exhausted on the one side and demoralized on the other. The people are vigorous, prosperous, and sensible-stronger and healthier in most important respects than they have ever been before. What does this mean? It means above all else that neither the political nor the intellectual leaders of America are worthy today of the people they presume and offer to lead. And if we ask how such a situation came to pass, I think we will find a good part of the answer in the attitude of the American elites toward the American people. To put the matter bluntly, the American people are neither respected by nor beloved of the American elites. On the Left, among liberals and radicals, the people are thought of and spoken of in the most contemptuous terms. They are constantly being denounced as selfish, as materialistic, as crude, as bigoted, as dolts who are easily manipulated by public relations and advertising. The contempt of the Right for the people is more discreet, less openly expressed. Among conservatives, the people are not so much sneered at as patronized: they are children, innocent, naIve, soft, unable to look after themselves properly and in need of protection from the dangers which surround them but to which they are persistently blind.

Well, the American people are neither selfish barbarians nor helpless children. They are, however, guilty of liking and wanting to preserve and improve the kind of society they already have-the kind of society that used to be called a bourgeois democracy. This is their true crime in the eyes of the American elites. For the American elites have no love for the bourgeois democratic order.

The liberals and radicals among them dream of transforming America into something more nearly resembling a socialist state, and they are furious at the American people for refusing to share in this dream, for refusing to see the light as they, the liberals and radicals, see it. As to the conservatives, they talk as though they believe in the values and institutions which make for a bourgeois democracy, but we can now see that they too have a radical dream: They dream of turning America into something more nearly resembling a Gaullist state; and if they are more saddened than furious at the American people for refusing to share in this dream, they will not, it seems, hesitate to circumvent popular resistance to their own ideas in secret and under cover of falsehood and lies.

As compared with a bourgeois democracy, Gaullism and socialism have one thing in common: They give more power to the ideas of the leadership and less power to the wishes of the people. No doubt it is this which attracts elite groups in every country to one kind of authoritarian polity or another. But the American people will continue to resist the authoritarian dream of the elites both of the Left and of the Right. This means that so long as they continue to work toward the realization of those dreams, the elites will get into trouble ....

The liberal elite in a state of ideological exhaustion and the conservative elite in a state of moral collapse: surely one is justified in saying that a country whose leaders are in such a condition must itself be falling apart. Eliminate the liberals and the conservatives, the Left and the Right, and what is there left to talk about? Two very large elements are left: the institutions of the, country and its people. As to the first, I will say only this: The conservative elite promised to restore respect for American institutions, and in a totally unexpected way it has actually succeeded in doing so. For the countris institutions are now showing in the most unmistak-

America, then, is not falling apart, though it is undergoing a crisis of leadership .... I believe this crisis of leadership may be a sign of health. It is a necessary precondition to the development of a governing elite which follows as much as it leads, and leads precisely out of its superior capacity to articulate and make coherent what the people feel and think and want. If we should ever develop such a leadership-and I think we now have a chance to do so-we might again become to the rest of the world what once upon a time we thought we were: the best living example of what a free people looks like and what liberal democracy means.

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*****

This new SPAN feature presents excerpts from the press-news and feature articles and editorial comment-on India, the United States, and Indo-American relations. We are publishing these press viewpoints because we feel they are significant and of interest to SPAN readers-not because we necessarily agree with them.

In recent weeks, the American press gave considerable coverage to the tripartite settlement by India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. Most papers featured President Richard Nixon's congratulations to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi:

"The United States welcomes this most recent and heartening forward step which strengthens the prospects for a new era of peace, stability and co-operation in the subcontinent. India, Pakistan and Bangladesh have demonstrated both their willingness and their ability to work out problems on their own. The agreement is a tribute to the steadfastness and farsightedness of the leaders of each of these nations."

In an analysis of the agreement,

Charlotte

Saikowski

of the

Christian Science Monitor concluded that: "The stage is now set for further efforts of the two countries as well as the fledgling state of Bangladesh to work out a modus vivendi....

"On a more global scale, development of a modus vivendi on the subcontinent could eventually make possible a more balanced relationship of the great powers there."

Nor was there any dearth of editorial comment on the tripartite agreement. The Kansas City Times h~d strong opinions:

"India has been very much in the wrong and would now like to have her misconduct forgiven if not forgotten. But it is a blot on the record of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's Government that the much belated release of the prisoners cannot expunge.

India dominates the crowded subcontinent as the conqueror of Pakistan and the protector of Bangladesh. Vastly more powerful and more populous than its two neighbors, only India can now lead the way to a peaceful and co-operative relationship for all three countries."

But the Los Angeles Times was cautiously optimistic: "The India-Pakistan agreement. .. is welcome as any equitable adjustment to political realities anywhere in the world must be. It does not mean an end to old antagonisms between the two countries, but it could mean a new beginning under a spirit of peaceful accommodation. " And the Washington Star-News was exuberantly optimistic: "All this is extremely heartening and shows to what extent difficulties and animosities can be overcome when the political will to do so exists. As a consequence, there no longer re!p.ains any obstacle to a more cordial relationship between this country and India."

A New York Times editorial praised the three leaders of the subcontinent for setting an example to other strife-torn regions of the world:

"The peace accord achieved by India, Pakistan and Bangladesh after ... 14 months of on-and-off negotiations represents a triumph of pragmatism over passion in a region where the seeds of emo-

tional conflict are as bitter and deeply rooted as anywhere on earth.

"The depth of these ancient antagonisms makes it too much to hope that the nations of the Indian subcontinent will soon realize the 'durable peace, good neighborliness and co-operation' envisioned by the chief Indian negotiator, P.N. Haksar. Nevertheless, it was remarkable that the three governments could thrust aside suspicion and reach practical accommodations on problems created by the Indian-Pakistani conflict, out of which Bangladesh was born .... Special credit is due to three exceptional leaders-Prime Ministers Zulfikar Ali Bhutto of Pakistan, Indira Gandhi of India and Mujibur Rahman of Bangladesh-who personally intervened when it appeared that the talks might break down. They have contributed an example of pragmatic statesmanship deserving of emulation by the leaders of other embattled states, especially in the neighboring Middle East."

The Washington Post saw a chance for forward movement: "The new agreement in the South Asian subcontinent is cause for deep satisfaction. India and Pakistan have finally resolved the fate of three groups of people who were left in very harsh personal circumstances by the 1971 war and whose respective conditions comprised a major political irritant blocking movement toward better relations ....

"Saluting the new agreement, the White House said that it 'strengthens the prospects for a new era of peace, stability and cooperation in the subcontinent.' Indeed, the temptation is strong to conclude that resolution of these difficult 'human' issues will give the three states of the subcontinent the confidence and impetus to compose their other disputes."

The Minneapolis Tribune termed the agreement as a triumph over man-made tragedies:

"Natural disaster is no stranger to the peoples of South Asia.

All the more reason, then, to acclaim an agreement that promises relief in that region from tragedies created by man. Accords signed in New Delhi ... by officials.of India and Pakistan, with the concurrence of Bangladesh, hold the first real prospect in years for peace on the subcontinent .... " WAITING FOR THE MONSOON The weekly New York Times Magazine gave its many readers a change of pace in reporting on India in a lyrical article titled "Waiting for the Monsoon," by Khushwant Singh, editor of the Illustrated Weekly. Times' readers were offered this insight into differences between Indian and American attitudes:

"An Indian's attitude toward clouds and rain remains fundamentally different from that of the Westerner. To the one, clouds symbolize hope; to the other, they suggest despair. The Indian scans the heavens and if cumulus clouds blot out the sun his heart fills with joy. The Westerner looks up and if there is no silverlining edging the clouds his depression deepens. The Indian talks about someone he respects and looks up to as 'a great shadow,' like the one cast by the clouds when they cover the sun. The Westerner, on the other hand, looks on a shadow as something evil, and refers to people of dubious character as shady types. For him, his beloved is like the sunshine, and her smile a sunny smile." 0

A TIMELY LOOK AT

As Indo-U.S. relations enter a new era, SPAN asked a long-time analyst of those relations to review the history of American aid to India - the nation that has been the largest recipient of U.S . .assistance in the last two decades. Krishan Gujral's article discusses how America's $10,000 million aid has been spent; how 90 per cent of it went into India's public sector to help schoolchildren, farmers, college students and public health efforts. This aid has been more than the combined assistance of all other nations to India in the last 20 years.

In 1890Herbert Wilson, a high-tanking American engineer, visited India to observe the country's world-renowned canal irrigation system, to find out if the system really worked and whether it could be used as a model for irrigating the arid American West.

Predictably, he was cautious and skeptical on arrival. But when he left after a thorough and critical inquiry, he was a different man.

Full of praise for the Indian system, he recommended its adoption by the United States with minor modifications. The U.S. Government, drawing heavily on the Indian experience, established a Federal reclamation program in 1902and set up a network of irrigation canals in its western states. Eventually a vast wasteland was transformed into a highly productive area.

Few people have heard of Wilson's journey, because r~cent years have seen a reversal of the situation-expertise has flowed from the U.S. to India. But that visit might well have been the beginning of friendship, co-operation, and assistance between the two countries.

The history of American financial assistance to India may be said to begin in 1951, a year in which India faced serious famine conditions. The U.S. was the first country to offer assistance: a $189.7 million loan to purchase two million tons of wheat. In time this loan became the nucleus of a massive economic aid program that topped $10,000 million by June 30, 1972. In two decades, India became the largest recipient of U.S. foreign assistance.

The United States was not the only country to offer aid to India.

There were others, 18 affluent nations. But the U.S. share was larger than the combined contributions of those other 18 nations.

Statistically speaking, India utilized a total of $17,790.3 million foreign aid from all nations during 1951-70. Out of this amount, $10,051.5 million, or 56.5 per cent, came from the U.S. and $5,550.6 million, or 31.2 per cent, from the other 18. The balance of $2,188.2 million, or 12.3 per cent, was provided by the World Bank and its affiliates.

After the U.S. and the World Bank, West Germany led the field with 7.6 per cent, followed by the United Kingdom, 6.0 per cent; the U.S.S.R., 5.6 per cent; Canada, 4.4 per cent; Japan, 2.7 per cent; and Italy, 1.1 per cent; with France, Czechoslovakia, Australia, Holland, Yugoslavia, Poland, Switzerland, Belgium, Austria, Sweden, Denmark and Norway, all less than one per cent.

U.S. aid came in three major forms: (1) technical co-operation; (2) agricultural commodities; and (3) bank loans. The technical cooperation program provided grants as well as lent the services of American specialists in various fields: malaria and smallpox eradication, establishment of agricultural and technical universities, development of high-yielding cereals and dairy products, and training of technicians and craftsmen. As many as 3,000 American specialists came to India to share their skills and 6,000 Indians went to the United States to receive advanced training.

Under the PL-480 (Food for Peace) program, which accounted for more than 50 per cent of the total U.S. assistance to India, the United States supplied an enormous amount of agricultural commodities (including nearly 60 million tons of foodgrains) on concessional terms to help fight famine. India purchased these commodities with rupees, not dollars. (See article "A Primer on PL-480 Rupees," September 1973 SPAN.) The Export-Import Bank, a U.S. Government agency to facilitate foreign trade, authorized 31 loans to India totaling $522 million. The loans were in dollars and were repayable in dollars. The rate of interest varied, from 2.5 per cent in 1951, when India borrowed $189.7 million to purchase two million tons of wheat, to 6 p~r cent today, the current standard rate. The Bank has permitted India to defer repayments on several occasions in view of its foreign exchange difficulties.

In terms of money, as against programs, the $10,051.5 million of

U.S. aid fell in four broad categories: (1) grants (not repayable), $2,054.7 million (20.5 per cent of total); (2) loans (repayable in dollars), $3,380.5 million (33.6 per cent); (3) loans (repayable in rupees but convertible into dollars at U.S. Government option), $432.2 million (4.3 per cent); and (4) local currency repayment(a) loans repayable in rupees or dollars at Indian Government option; (b) Cooley Fund loans to private enterprise; (c) amounts under PL-480, Title I, agreements for U.S. Government uses$4,184.1 million (41.6 per cent).

Besides this massive economic aid, the United States sent prompt defense assistance to India when it was involved in border clashes with Communist China in 1962. Giant military aircraft landed at Calcutta's Dum Dum airport with much-needed defense equipment within days of India's request.

The technical assistance part of the U.S. economic aid program ended June 30 this year when the last of the 3,000 American specialists left India-at the request of the Indian Government.

Remaining assistance involves the Food for Peace program, a PL480, Title II, grant under which fobd is given to humanitarian agencies. The main project involves feeding some 15 million children throughout India every day with fortified diets. Other programs relate to Food for Work projects covering small irrigation works, such as dams and bunds. The program costs about $60 million per year.

Then, there is a nonproject loan of $87.6 million which, suspended by the U.S. Government during the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971, was released this year to enable India to make purchases abroad, in the United States or elsewhere. The Government of India is presently using this credit to import fertilizers-in short supply-and certain components for various industrial complexes.

Besides this, the U.S. Government manages an enormous loan program which covers some money given to the private sector but consists mainly of loans to the Indian Government for such projects as power stations and dams for irrigation. The latest in the long series of such loans was the presentation on September 4, 1973, by U.S. Ambassador Daniel P. Moynihan of a check of Rs. 15.1 crores to the Indian Government. This money will help finance the expansion of activities of the Indian Rural Electrification Commission (REC).

The September check was the fourth and last portion of a U.S. grant of Rs. 105 crores to the REC, the agreement for which was signed in July 1969. In making the presentation, Ambassador Moynihan said the U.S. is proud to be associated with the development of rural electrification in India. He said REC is the kind of project worthy of assistance. "If American aid has been partial in any way to anyone section in India," the Ambassador pointed out, "well, we have been partial to the public seGtor.... Ninety per cent of our assistance has gone to it .... Not only has the U.S. been the largest supplier of assistance to India, but we have been incomparably the largest supplier of public-sector assistance. Twentytwo per cent of the public-sector capital that was formed in the 1960s in India came from the United States."

Describing the U.S. assistance program as "a unique relationship" between the two countries, Howard Houston, MinisterDirector of the U.S. Agency for International Development (U.S. AID) Mission in India, says, "I think some of the factors responsible for this are that we are two large democracies and we have been interested in each other for a long time. We didn't use to know each other very well prior to Indian Independence but I think now, during all these years, the United States has had a great' interest in what happens to its fellow democracy. There has been a great friendliness between the two people. I think it bas been a rather unique experience."

He lists three developments as the "proudest achievements" of the U.S. aid program in India: (1) the Green Revolution, (2) malaria eradication, and (3) the participant program. Houston says, "Though there tend to be disparaging remarks, when you actually look at the food production record, it's been an absolute miracle.

When you compare the year 1965 or 1966 with even this year, the food production in India has almost doubled and further the Indian technologists know how to handle the food problem now. It is simply a matter qf managing the distribution of proper seeds and fertilizer, that sort of thing."

He describes malaria eradication as a signal success and points out that as many as a million people died every year before the program was launched in the late '50s. He thinks the participant program, which involved 3,000 American specialists visiting India and 6,000 Indians being trained in the U.S., was an equally successful experiment.

Houston believes that technical assistance should have two objectives-to help the people of other countries to help themselves and, in the process, to transfer technical knowledge from one country to another. "The U.S.," he says, "has achieved both objectives in India."

G.L. Mehta, an eminent Indian economist and former Ambassador to the U.S., shares Houston's views and says: "The United States has been a pioneer in aid policies; it was the first to provide food aid, the first to provide aid against repayment in local currency, and the first to conceive soft terms for aid loans. These are all achievements of which the United States can be proud."

The idea of foreign aid-the concept of one country assisting another country in peacetime-was born in 1947 wlien U.S. Secretary of State George C. Marshall, speaking about war-torn Europe, said: "It is logical that the United States should do whatever it is able to do to assist in the return of normal economic health in the world, without which there can be no politi.cal stability and no assured peace." The aid program itself was born a few months later, on December 9, when President Harry Truman asked the U.S. Congress to authorize the staggering amount oU17,000 million for a four-year European Recovery Program. The program was popularly called the Marshall Plan.

Oncethe war-ravaged economic and social structures in Western Europe had been largely restored, the United States turned its attention to the newly independent nations. It launched a massive economicand techno.logical development program in the early '50s to help these countries improve their standard of living through. better education, health, agriculture and viable self-government.

India was among the first recipients. To date, a total of 127 countries have received a total of $138,000 million under the worldwide U.S. economic assistance program.

Foreign aid has been an indispensable instrument of U.S. foreign policy right since its beginning in the Truman era. It has been adopted as a cardinal principle of U.S. foreign policy by every postwar American President. President Nixon calls it "one of the most important building blocks in erecting a durable structure of peace." He thinks perhaps the most persuasive reason for a strong foreign aid program was set forth by President Franklin Roosevelt in the days shortly before World War II, when Britain needed help.

"Suppose my neighbor's home catches fire," Roosevelt said, "and I have a length of garden hose four or five hundred feet away. Ifhe can take my garden hose and connect it "up with his hydrant, I may help him to put out his fire."

Implicit in Roosevelt's analogy, President Nixon emphasizes, wasthe mutual benefit of giving assistance. For if the fire in question spreads, both neighbors would be in danger. This Rooseveltian logic has continued to characterize U.S. foreign aid policies all

these years. To the successive U.S. governments, foreign aid has been no charity but a judicious mixture of national interest and international altruism. While U.S. aid assists the developing countries achieve economic prosperity, it also serves the U.S. interest in terms of economic health, political stability and world peace.

In the late '60s a new trend appeared in U.S. foreign aid. Until then, development assistance was given to the recipients directly, on a bilateral basis. Tpis often led to U.S. involvement in the activities and policies of the developing countries and necessitated extensive overseas missions to advise governments and monitor programs. The United States wanted to avoid such situations.

When the U.S. was still reviewing its foreign aid policies, several developments took place that substantially changed the international assistance environment. First, the leading industrialized nations began to offer large amounts of assistance to the lowerincome countries. Second, the U.N. and its agencies started lending more money on concessional terms. Third, the lower-income nations themselves made impressive progress and showed an increasing readiness to carry greater responsibility for their own development.

To meet the new situation, the United States shifted its foreign aid policies to place more reliance on multilateral rather than bilateral aid. The U.S. decided to channel the maximum possible economic aid through international lending institutions. John M. Hennessy, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs, says the U.S. Government prefers to use international institutions because they are more "efficient, effective and responsible." However, this does not mean the U.S. has stopped bilateral aid altogether. The American Government believes that bilateral and multilateral aid programs complement each other.

Despite this increasing internationalization- of aid, the United States remains the largest contributor to international development, although other industrialized countries combined now match the U.S. effort. For instance, the U.S. contribution to various international consortia comes to 35 per cent. This includes bilateral aid and U.S. contributions through other organizations such as the WorId Bank and its affiliates.

Present American foreign aid policy can be summed up thus: The U.S., while retaining bilateral aid on a restricted basis, is trying to provide economic assistance primarily through multilateral channels. The idea is to help the U.N. and its agencies assume an increasingly greater responsibility in blending the initiatives of the developing countries and the responses of the developed ones. The aim is to have a truly international donor community with accepted rules and procedures for responding to the initiatives of the lowerincome nations.

To conclude the story of U.S. assistance to India, I would like once again to quote G.L. Mehta, the man who headed India's diplomatic mission in Washington at a time when America's foreign assistance program was taking shape. "Foreign aid," says Mehta, "should be a stimulus to national development and not a soporific. It should help secure economic independence as soon as possible, not perpetuate continuous or increasing reliance on others."

Judged by the way India has put foreign aid to use and the spectacular results it has achieved in certain fields, it may be no exaggeration to say that the U.S. effort has come fairly close to succeeding.

0 About the Author: Krishan Gujral is aformer staff correspondent and writer of The Times of India. He has also written for The Statesman, The Hindustan Times and Amrita Bazar Patrika. At

feature

present he is a feature editor with the U.S. Information Service.

· A HEROINE OF GOTHAM'

F

NCESSTEWFF

The founder of New York City's Gotham Book Mart rose from an obscure and impoverished childhood to become friend and confidante to most of the great men of letters of the 20th century.

A

ShoPkeeper who will be celebrating her 86th birthday this December and whose formal education ended with the fifth grade recently presented her papers to New York University.

That may sound like the greatest ego trip in retailing history until one learns that the donor is Frances Steloff. Her shop is the Gotham Book Mart (GBM), which has been both keystone and touchstone of the literary life of New York City for over half a century.

In its present location on West 47th Street, the GBM is a dusty anachronism on a street of diamond dealers. Amid the surrounding glitter of zircons and neon, the bookshop's dull painted sign quietly proclaims "Wise Men Fish Here." Noticing the store's lackluster interior and its often seedy, always preoccupied patrons, a passerby might not suspect that the Gotham Book Mart is an honest-to-goodness shrine.

Tennessee Williams once worked there as a clerk.

Rudolph Valentino and Natasha Rambova used to rendezvous in the back room.

Henry Miller's S.O.S. notices were posted on the GBM bulletin board, begging for small loans or necessities such as "canned baby food, evaporated milk, lox, vitamin A.... " Edmund Wilson arranged for GBM to pay John Dos Passos's overdue insurance premium-using the original manuscript of Manhattan Transfer as collateral.

Malcolm Cowley tried to bargain down the price on The Witch Cult in Western Europe because the book was to be a present "for E. Hemingway and my budget for presents to him doesn't go over $10."

Conrad Aiken assigned GBM the job of fillingthe shelves in his big house with Russian classics, James, Kipling, Trollope and

Top left: Frances Stelojf Below left: The Gotham Book Mart's 1948 reception for Dame Edith and Sir Osbert Sitwell (seated in center). Clockwise from W.H. Auden (on ladder) are Elizabeth Bishop, Marianne Moore, Delmore Schwartz, Randall Jarrell, Charles Henri Ford, William Rose Benet, Stephen Spender, Marya Zaturenska, Horace Gregory, Tennessee Williams, RichardEberhart, Gore Vidal, Jose Garcia Villa.

Dickens-"the maximum shelving" he could get for $40.

Dame Edith Sitwell made the Gotham her first stop when she visited from London.

Gertrude Stein came in to check on the sales of her books.

Martha Graham borrowed $1,000 from GBM to mount her first dance concert.

Christopher Morley, Buckminster Fuller and William Rose Benet used to meet for lunch in the garden behind the old shopbringing their sandwiches in brown paper bags or ringing a cowbell to summon a meal from an adjoining restaurant.

Marianne Moore and Yevgeny Yevtushenko read their poetry there.

All of them and dozens more wrote letters to the Gotham, ordered books, commented on one another's works, sent Christmas cards, birthday gifts, drawings and photographs to Frances Steloff, autographed their own and each other's first editions or in some other way contributed to the collection that will be known as the Frances Steloff Papers.

Like her bookstore, Frances Steloff had a modest beginning. Born on December 31, 1887, she suffered a miserable, impoverished childhood in Saratoga, New York, sold flowers to the rich summer people in the grand spas and walked barefoot until the first snow.

Her early interest in books was deplored and discouraged by her family.

When Frances Steloff came to New York City in 1907, she took a job selling corsets at Loeser's Department Store in Brooklyn.

During the Christmas rush she was transferred to the book department. That, she says, is when her life began. For the next 13 years she worked in some dozen bookstores.

On January 1, 1920, the day after her 33rd birthday, she opened the first Gotham Book Mart at 128 West 45th Street with borrowed money and less than 200 books. After three frenetic years, the shop was moved to larger quarters at 51 West 47th Street. Before long books were to overflow the shelves, get wedged in on top of standing rows of books, stacked on the floor, piled on counters or stored away. Frances Steloff was determined to carry every title that might ever be requested by her growing clientele of writers, poets and critics.

While her own preferences have always

run to metaphysics and theosophy-her favorites are Gurdjieff, Ouspensky, Krishnamurti, Gandhi and Joel Goldsmith-the shop has become best known for its emphasis on the avant-garde.

"My customers educated my tastes," Frances says to explain her early support of Miller, Joyce, Pound, Eliot, William Carlos Williams, Kay Boyle, Gertrude Stein, Kenneth Patchen, Lawrence Durrell, Anai's Nin and all the "little" magazines that profitmaking or censor-scared booksellers frequently disdained. Writers and poets came to GBM to buy one another's books or to gaze at the display of their own. Frances never returned slow-moving titles to the publishers for fear of wounding delicate artistic egos.

So the books stayed on the shelves or were tucked into the cavernous storage area, lost to memory until recent years when those rare first editions were unearthed to fetch handsome prices.

"She bought all the right things at the wrong time," says a friend of the shop. "And she kept them, unwittingly, until the public imagination caught up with her unerring instincts. " In 1946, GBM made its final move up the block to No. 41, a converted brownstone, where it is still located. The new shop quickly assumed the ambiance of its predecessor-a general clutter of books, paper, furniture and people, a warm welcome for the struggling writer or new poetry review, autographed pictures on the walls, parties for the Sitwells, Dylan Thomas, Jean Cocteau or other GBM favorites and, above all, the electric presence of the heroine, Frances Steloff.

Her eyes are very blue-clear and twinkling when she's pleased; cold and steely when she's cross. Her 86 years entitle her to some vagueness but there is none. Her voice is strong, the tone resolute, the laughter indrawn and breathy, a kind of noiseless giggle.

Her hearing is the one sense that occasionally fails her. But she's a determined listener who insists that a missed statement be repeated.

She never fakes comprehension.

She wears pastel colors. A pink scarf, faded blue apron, amethyst ear clips. Tortoise ~ shell combs hold the long, white hair back from her unlined cheeks. Often she wears a pony tail. Peter Pan collars. Dirndl skirts.

,

Frances Steloff's tastes in reading run to metaphysics and theosophy, including Krishnamurti and Gandhi, but her bookshop has become best known for its emphasis on avant-garde Western literature.

Because she is just over five feet tall, the effect into a valise or briefcase until the whole crate is of a little girl whose wardrobe and acces- had been transported into the United States.

The outbreak of World War II forced sories are simply getting good wear through Miller to return to his native land. In a letter the decades.

She sits, much of the time, where she had from Big Sur, California, in 1944, he comalways sat-in an alcove toward the back of plained that although 17 of his books were the shop where a desk and some bookshelves published here and in England, he had not filled with the works of her favorite mystics earned more than $500 a year since coming home~ He appealed to Frances to post a form a semiprivate partition.

She lives in a two-room apartment in the notice of his personal needs, among them "a front section of the third floor. A goodly por- couple of thermos bottles and a little cart ... tion of the Steloff Papers appear to be scat- with which to haul my groceries and other tered around the living room, on the couch supplies up a steep mile-long road. Am now and on a small dining table laden with sesame carrying them on my back in a laundry bag, candles, sunflower seeds and a jar of organic and have to make several trips sometimes in apple juice. A tiny bedroom is a blur of more one day .... The thermos bottles would save paper and stacks of books under which one me making a wood fire twice a day and thus assumes there is a pallet for the unthinkable save labor of hauling dead'limbs ... the forest is a good half-mile away. Could also use a moments when Frances Steloff tires.

It turns out that the apartment is merely a hatchet, or a light axe. The one I have breaks temporary stop for papers, letters and mag- my back. Also please let your customers know azines. The complete collection is kept in the that I make water colors on the side; they back section of the third floor behind a locked can have them at their own price." wooden door.

Frances recalls supplementing the message "Here is my treasure," she says, turning a on the board with phone calls, letters to Miller key in the lock. fans and frequent dips into the GBM rent The room is so crammed one cannot enter money. without moving boxes or rearranging shopIn one of his letters Miller termed Anais ping bags. The task of â‚Źxcavating the lode, Nin "the one person in the world to whom I labeling the finds and organizing the artifacts, owe everything." Anais Nin too was a Gothabrings the same kind of excitement an arche- mite-both as a buyer and borrower. In a ologist enjoys by digging away at the rem- daisy chain of mutual aid, Nin supported Milnants of Troy. Even more perhaps, for each ler (often by selling her original manuscripts time-yellowed letter Frances reads inspires a at GBM) and Steloff propped up Nin (once flow of reminiscences or a wistful smile. by advancing $100 for the purchase of an old For several decades, Frances Steloff was hand press with which Nin printed 500 copies Henry Miller's sounding board, banker and of Winter of Artifice). bookkeeper. Throughout the 1930s, while In the '30s poverty was a common affliction Miller lived precariously in Europe, his letters among the Gothamites. Bestsellerdom, blockto her dealt frequently with plans to smuggle buster bookclub and paperback deals and his banned books into the United States. Nine bonanza movie contracts were unknown to stalwart patrons of GBM allowed their pri- them. Yet this struggling band was somehow vate addresses to be used as drops for the con- able to rise above personal adversity and protraband packages. In this way, a supply of fessional jealousies-and to do so without Tropic of Cancer) Black Spring and Max and sentimentality. Together several of them the White Phagocytes trickled into the coun- founded the Writers' Emergency Fund in 1941 try. If and when the volumes arrived safely, to lend young writers money with no strings Frances mailed Miller the money for them. attached.

William Carlos Williams put a five-dollar Periodically the books were seized. One crate stopped by Customs had to be rerouted bill in an envelope marked "FOR POOR to Mexico City where they were received by a POETS!" W.H. Auden gave one dollar, Mrs. M. She wrote to Frances: "I will keep Kenneth Patchen donated $10, a generous the books in my dressing room until someone sum for those days. Years later came an ironcalls for them." For several years friends of ical turn of events. The Writers' Emergency Frances, passing through Mexico City, paused Fund was no longer in existence when Patin Mrs. M's dressing room and stuffed a book chen's medical bills reached mountainous pro-

portions, but its founding philosophy remained very much alive. A few of his friends gave a poetry reading to raise money for him. The' friends: Auden, MacLeish, Cummings, Williams and the Sitwells.

Frances says it's no wonder that Patchen was able to write in January 1961: "Now ... o now do we despair for Mankind./But, dear friends, as the light/Of all reason and hope go out,/We can and we must believe/In one another!"

In the winter of 1939, to celebrate the Gotham's 20th anniversary the following year, Frances solicited "appreciations" of avantgardewritersfrom their contemporaries. These were included with a listing of each author's book in print in a catalogue entitled "We Moderns."

Charles Henri Ford refused her request to write on Jean Cocteau but asked if he could contribute a rave about Dylan Thomas.

Edmund Wilson demurred on his assignment to cover Wyndam Lewis but volunteered to boost Nathanael West. William Carlos Williams reminded Frances to include in the catalogue Charles Reznikoff: "one of the best and most intelligent lawyers in the city ... he ought to be killed or made to write more."

Questioning the very concept of the compendium, Allen Tate remarked: "I can't help feeling that the notion of the 'advance guard' is a mistaken one. Four-fifths of the advance guard is really the rear-guard, now as always.

I believe that what we are all interested in is good writing."

In the catalogue, Gertrude Stein was immortalized in the words of Carl Van Vechten: "Gertrude Stein rings bells, loves baskets and wears handsome waistcoats. She has a tenderness for green glass and buttons have a tenderness for her. In the matter of fans you can only compare her with a moving picture star in Hollywood and three generations of young writers have sat at her feet. She has influenced without coddling them. In her own time she is a legend and in her own country she is with honor. Keys to sacred doors have been presented to her and she understands how to open them. She writes books for children, plays for actors, and librettos for operas..

She writes fiction and autobiography and criticism of painters. Each one of them is one. fo For her a rose is a rose and how!"

Ezra Pound on T.S. Eliot: "T. 'POSSUM' S. ELIOT, born 'back of the gas' or compressed brick works in St. Louis of most cultured

Frances Steloff discusses a book review with Dr. Amiya Chakravarty, who was Tagore's literary secretary. Hanging behind Chakravarty is the original of the photo shown on page 28.

never met Joyce. She hasn't read his books or poetry. But intuitively or osmotically she has absorbed his characters, the details of his life and the mood and locales of his books.

She once bought shoes with the brand name parents in 1887 but did not meet Marianne "Joyce" just to own the wrapping paper with until1ater. Listed in the pronounced 'ee-light' the trademark on it.

"Thanks to him the most wonderful people SocialRegister of St. Louis,A.B. Harvard 1910 by which time the fuzz on the freshman's lip came to the back room of my shop. John J. was called his 'Celtic Twilight,' how different Slocum, Padraic and Mary Colum, Thornton from the dewey-eye~ treatment of Yeats in my Wilder, Edmund Wilson, Joyce's sister May, Leon Edel, William York Tindall-they all own University five years before then."

Sherwood Anderson on Faulkner: "Mooncame to talk about Joyce, to puzzle out his light and magnolias in the background for meanings and to feel his spirit." Frances feels Bill.He was simply telling stories of life as be that she was meant to promote his fame and had seen and felt it. He hadn't made it. He in return, she says, "he was responsible for wasn't trying to remake it." the richness in my life."

Despite this richness-of experience, stimEugene Jolas on James Joyce: "He humanwords which ized the secular and sacred heroes of man- ulation and friendship-the Christopher Morley inscribed in a book for kind./He painted the rotations of the wheel his favorite bookseller seem prophetic. oflife./He made a hero out of Time: incessant "For Frances Steloff/Who will never be creation and return./He rebuilt the city across the ages in Finn's multiple metamorphoses'; well off/She's too fond of giving away.... " For six decades Frances Steloff has given He personalized history and mythology./He recreated the genesis and mutation of lan- away much-money, hope, encouragement, affection-but she has happily saved much guage."

Because the Joyce Society met at the Go- too. As a conduit for genius, she has served tham and Frances Steloffwas one of its found- in her own way as a keeper of the record: ers (back in 1947), she has naturally accumu- letters, mementos, scrapbooks, signed photolated a trunkload of James Joyce items. She graphs and the inevitable obituaries.

The Gotham Book Mart was sold in December 1967, to Andreas Brown, an appraiser of rare books and a bibliographer, who is somehow managing to modernize and even improve the shop without disturbing its character. The present inventory is estimated at over a half-million volumes and about 250,000 magazines, booklets and tracts. Frances Steloff remains as consultant.

Six years have shown that it was indeed as smooth a transition as could be wished.

Still, there is the feeling that the heart of the Gotham Book Mart is about to be transplanted-albeit for the good of the body public.

When its history passes into the possession of New York University then, for the first time, GBM's past and present will be severed from one another.

For Frances Steloff, that is a painful operation. She has been meaning to get around to it since 1965when she first gave the University her agreement. Now, she's ready, and the precious papers are sorted and packed. For this final act of "giving away" Christopher Morley would be proud.

0 About the Author: Letty Cottin Pogrebin contributes a monthly column entitled "The Working Woman" to The Ladies Home Journal. She also writes articles for other American magazines.

This quiet American scientist is the only person to win two Nobel Prizes in the same field.

And he just may win a third.

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ince the Nobel Prizes were first awarded in 1900, only one person has ever won two in the same field. Of course, Marie Curie won two prizes, but in different fields-first in physics, then in chemistry. Linus Pauling also has been twice honored-first for chemistry, then for peace.

But to take the prize twice in physics, the queen of the sciences-this was the feat of a rather plain, unimposing man from the chilly flats of the American Midwest. John Bardeen, professor of physics at the University of lllinois, is one of the handful of men who made this century the electronic century. And he may well become the principal technological architect of the next.

In 1956 Bardeen captured the Nobel Prize in Physics for his contribution to the development of the transistor. In December 1972he returned to Stockholm to receive his second physics laurel, this time for his role in unraveling a mysterious phenomenon known as superconductivity.

For the second time in his life Bardeen found himself in the atmosphere of majesty and elegance that always accompanies the awarding of the Nobel Prizes. Trumpet calls, bows and curtsies, ribbons and medals, white ties and tails-these are the sights and sounds of Stockholm during Nobel Week, when those being honored are presented to members of Swedish society. The laureate corps always contains interesting faces for the elite to look at and higWy accomplished hands to shake; 1972was no exception.

Swedisheyes immediately locked on Christian Anfinsen (chemistry, United States), a tall, rugged man with wrinkled yet open features who resembles Spencer Tracy. Then Copyright Š 1973 by Saturday Review Company. First printed in Saturday Review of Science, March 1973. Used with permission.

there was John Schrieffer (physics, United States), cheerful and boyish as an astronaut; Heinrich Boll (literature, Germany), melanch~ly, tortured, humane-the tragic poet; and William Stein (chemistry, United States), paralyzed from the neck down, who flew halfway around the world in a wheelchair to receive his award.

Against such a background of impressive figures, John Bardeen might be easily overlooked. He is a squarish man of medium height, with flat eyes of an indeterminate color-probably blue or brown-covered by outdated plastic-rimmed glasses. At 65 Bardeen is almost bald, with a ring of dull, straight hair about the back of his head. His voice, which he rarely uses, maintains a relentless monotone, changing pitch only when it cracks.

There is nothing sharp or outstanding about him. He is not at all what one expects of a giant of science and technology.

It is the fanatical corps of Bardeeniststhe ex-students, the co-workers, the key silent men in the international Nobel apparatuswho support the legend of Bardeen the scientific giant. What other living man, they ask. has so greatly affected the daily existence of so many human beings? His work on the transistor alone made space exploration and panplanetary communication possible, brought into being an exotic array of sensitive new medical instruments and incredibly fast computers, and opened the way (for better or for worse) for the oncoming digitalized society.

The ultimate McLuhanesque revolutionary device, the transistor made possible cheap radios that spewed not only entertainment but news and education to the isolated and illiterate, from the Arabian Desert to the Amazon basin.

But there is more to the Bardeen ledger of accomplishment. Working with Gulf Oil in the 1930s, Bardeen found ways to read nearly imperceptible magnetic clues in various rocks and soils-clues that indicated where the vast oil pools were. The method remained a tight company secret for decades, but when it finally leaked out, the Bardeen technique was

grabbed by virtually the entire oil industry.

Bardeen also was highly instrumental in the development of the electronic copier, having served as corporate adviser and scientific consultant to Xerox since 1951. Without the high-speed Xerox, the "information explosion" in government, industry, science, and education would have been little more than a small pop.

But this is only Bardeen the inventor, the Thomas Edison of the 20th century. No matter what the impact of technological innovation, fundamental science is always of more interest to the Nobel apparatus, and Bardeen posted an impressive score in this area as well. With the BCS (for Bardeen, Cooper, and Schrieffer) theory of superconductivity, he resolved one of the major problems in pure physics of the century.

In 1913 the Swedes awarded the physics prize to the Dutch scientist Heike Kamerlingh Onnes for his discovery that when certain metals were cooled almost to absolute zero, resistance to electrical flow (the movement of electrons) in the metals all but disappeared.

The supercooled metals were transformed into extremely efficient, almost perfect superconductors of electricity. Kamerlingh Onnes was amazed to find that a single charge of electricity pumped into superconducting metal would race around for hours without losing any of its force. (By the 1960s physicists at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology reported that such a charge would last undiminished for more than a year in certain superconductors.) But Kamerlingh Qnnes could not explain why this phenomenon occurred; nor could a dazzling host of later Nobel laureates-Bohr, Heisenberg, Pauli, Bloch, Landau, Feynman-who were convinced that basic but strange laws of matter were operating here. The activity of electrons in a supercooled metal was the closest thing to perpetual motion that had been observed on earth; it held the promise of endless supPortrait of John Bardeen (right) is by SPAN artist B. Roy Choudhury.

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'For centuries swarms of colorful magicians, c~ackpots, mystics, and inventors scrambl{

plies of electrical energy. Moreover, physicists hoped that the flow of electricity through this super-smooth realm would give them another point of view from which to observe the mysterious, ephemeral electron-the orbiting ghost, now a wave, now a solid particle.

Later on W. Meissner and R. Ochsenfeld discovered another feature of superconductors that suggested a number of genuinely earth-shaking applicatio~s: the entire supercooled metal would repel outside magnetic fields. In other words, if a magnetic material was placed over a superconductor, it would hang there suspended, in an apparent state of levitation.

John Bardeen was born in 1908, about the time that Kamerlingh Onnes was working in Leiden, puzzling over superconductivity and reporting to the small world of physicists that he was producing the coldest laboratory temperatures yet. The son of a professor of anatomy and dean of the University of Wisconsin Medical School, the young Bardeen showed more than an ordinary interest in the educational toys of his day-crystal radio sets, p()pularized chemistry books, the ubiquitous chemistry set. He attended an experimental elementary school in Madison, where he jumped from the third grade straight to the seventh. Shy, but not a loner, Bardeen was exceptionally good in mathematics and exceptionally tight with words; a congenital tremor in his body made it difficult for him to speak. Despite this condition, he won two letters in swimming and was quite proficient at billiards. A walking incarnation of the Midwestern ethicwork hard, be kind, and do right-Bardeen took a black-and-white approach to the most difficultintellectual problems, breaking them into their simplest components and solving them one at a time.

Bardeen had one other interesting characteristic-he was almost always right. He could not always explain how he arrived at the right answer. Ask him for his reasoning in problem solving, and Bardeen will probably respond: "That's the right answer because it is correct."

However, there is nothing mystical about Bardeen's instincts for the right answer. There is no cosmic vision that makes him spin out answers in out-of-the-blue images and alien symbols, in the manner of an Einstein or a Dirac. The mentality is that of an engineer.

Grab a problem, inhale its every detail, and grind it into submission with 20-hour work days.

In fact, Bardeen's first career choice was engineering. Although basic mathematics had its allure, engineering was the place

where the practical problems (as well as the jobs) were. Soon after he left the University of Wisconsin with his master's degree in electrical engineering, Bardeen joined Gulf as a sophisticated oil prospector. By the depression year of 1933 he was making the thenllandsome salary of $6,000 a year.

And then, suddenly, he quit. He announced that he was returning to basic sciencepure quantum physics-and had signed up at Princeton as a doctoral candidate, to live on a graduate student's stipend of a few hundred dollars a year. Bardeen's down-to-earth business colleagues were amazed at this seemingly impractical move. (Of course, hind sight shows this decision to have been very practical indeed.) As for Bardeen, the switch was merely an extension of the work-ethic virtues that had been guiding him all along. Practical engineering techniques were fine for solving everyday problems of life. But in seeking the basic laws that govern matter and energy in the universe, one might find answers to eternal practical problems.

Bardeen's persistence and grasp of fundamental problems of physics soon caught the attention of a very special man at Princeton, Eugene Wigner, one of the first European scientists to flee Fascism for American shores.

He was an intimate of the brilliant mathematician John von Neumann, a leader in early computer development. Wigner is also the brother-in-law of the Cambridge physicist Paul Dirac, who developed the theory of antimatter. Dirac was the youngest man ever to win the Nobel Prize (31 at the time), and other English scientists claim that he is the most brilliant British physicist since Isaac Newton. Aside from his membership in this tiny circle of men who dominated basic physics. Wigner was among the handful of scientists who convinced Albert Einstein to write his famous letter to President Roosevelt that started the development of the first American atomic bomb.

Under Wigner's influence, Bardeen plunged deep into quantum theory, the new physics of the first part of this century that attempted to explain the extremely complex interchanges between matter and energy on an atomic and molecular level. In his flat and uncomfortable manner, Bardeen explains today that his interests quickly focused on superconductivity. not because of its magic. its promise of perpetual motion or levitation, but only because it was the outstanding problem of the day in quantum theory. For centuries swarms of colorful magicians, crackpots, mystics, and inventors scrambled in search of the world of levitation and perpetual motion, but Bardeen found it first, in the name of pure science. To

Bardeen, choosing superconductivity for his life's work was simply the right answer.

Some of Bardeen's early work in superconductivity surfaced in 1941; but when the war came, he put it aside for conventional research in mine warfare and torpedoes. After the war he joined Bell Laboratories in a return to corporate practicality. At Bell Labs, Bardeen spent work-bruised years in the creation of the transistor, ending forever the use of the costly, low-speed vacuum tube.

Bell had appointed MIT-bred William Shockley to head the transistor-development group, but when the crash program was over, the government patent for the ideas behind the transistor was awarded to Bardeen and his now-retired co-worker, Walter Brattain. In 1956 Nobel immortalization came to all three.

Superconductivity, however, was still on Bardeen's mind. As a matter of fact he had left Bell Labs five years earlier, in 1951, for the University of Illinois. A small university town isolated from the nerve-splitting strain of a metropolis, he reasoned, would be the best place for grinding away at the century's major unsolved riddle in physics.

Bardeen was right. It was at Illinois that he and two of his students-Leon N. Cooper, then a postdoctoral fellow, and John L. Schrieffer, then a doctoral candidate-unraveled the supersmooth secrets of the century-old problem. Both students are now themselves professors, Coo~)erat Brown University in Rhode Island and Schrieffer at the University of Pennsylvania. But on December 10, 1972, all three were on the stage of the St. Erik Exhibition Hall in Stockholm to share the Nobel Prize in physics for the development of the theory of superconductivity.

Bardeenists need no more evidence than this to claim that he is also a great teacher.

If so, Bardeen the teacher was often excruciatingly indirect.

"Bardeen would sometimes come into my office and ask how I was doing on the problem, that is, superconductivity," the boyish Schrieffer recalls of his graduate days in the 1950s. "I'd say I was having difficulties here and there, and he would say, 'Hmmm,' walk around a little, and leave. An hour later he might come back, write a couple of things on the blackboard, and leave again."

Bardeen lifted the edge of the blanket, Schrieffer remembers, but the student had to look underneath all by himself. He was the intellectual teaser who could draw students (admittedly already very bright students) to heights of independent creativity.

While Bardeen held the blanket, Cooper and Schrieffer looked under and saw the wonderful secrets of perpetual motion and

in search of the world of levitation and perpetual motion, but Bardeen found it first.'

levitation that resulted in the BCS theory ... and the Nobel Prize. Schrieffer knew they had made the big score the day he took a radically different equation into Bardeen's office. He didn't know whether the equation was right or wrong, but he knew it was interesting. Bardeen looked at it for a couple of minutes, then blurted: "That's the right answer!"

The Swedes waited 16 years to agree with Bardeen the BCS was the right answer. Before it is accorded Nobel status, a theory must withstand long and harrowing tests of time.

But if the Nobel judges waited a long time to recognize superconductivity, few others did. By the time of Bardeen's second Nobel coronation, extremely powerful magnets, small and efficient because their magnetic fields are produced by superconducting currents, were already in wide scientific use and were beginning to have an industrial impact.

Several nations, including the United States, now are experimenting with applications of these magnets in transportation systems. In Japan, for example, a prototype now exists of a commuter train that uses the magneticrepulsion feature of superconductors.

By pairing strong magnets with magnetically repulsive superconducting metals, the trains actually "float," flying-carpet style, over their guideways. Theoretically, such frictionless conditions would permit the trains to achieve speeds of more than 480 kilometers per hour.

Another outgrowth of the BCS theory is the development of scientific instruments that can sense very weak magnetic fields. Such devices have a number of potential applications, especially in medicine. These sensors could chart the almost imperceptible magnetic fields

induced by blood flow in the human body.

"Magneto-cardiograms" would permit comparison of the magnetic profile of the healthy body with that of the sick.

Still closer to reality is the construction of superconducting generators.

Westinghouse recently announced the construction of a prototype of such.a power generator that is expected to provide electricailleeds for entire cities in the mid-1980s. A superconducting generator, the company maintains, could be 10 times smaller than a contemporary generator producing the same amount of power and would cut resistance-induced losses of electricity by two-thirds. Less-powerful versions for ships and auxiliary power stations (such as those used in hospitals) are expected to be operating by the late 1970s.

The potential of superconductivity is enormous. In Champaign-Urbana, the Illinois prairie town dominated by Bardeen's university, a bright small-featured, cheerful fellow named Jim Bray is giving a lunchtime lecture to his fellow graduate students in physics.

Bray's sharpness obviously establishes him as a Bardeen student-Bardeen always gets the best, thanks to his Nobel reputation and to the network of the physics culture.

Bray puts equations on the black-board, while the other students eat their sandwiches.

He refers to tentative experiments in metallurgy involving a union between the metals niobium and titanium, plus the addition of one very thin metallic layer. He makes a reference to having checked the "Soviet literature" to see what the Russians are doing in Bray's own research area. John Bardeen, a member of the audience, points to an equation on the blackboard and remarks that he

SUPERCONDUCTIVITY: BCS, or Microscopic, theory of superTheconductivity,for which John Bardeen won his second Nobel Prize in physics, is a long and complex exercise in quantum mechanics. In simple terms, however, it can be described as follows: Electric flow in a conductor begins when a change in potential causes electrons to break away from' their parent atoms and fly alone through the metal. Under normal circumstances, however, this is not a smooth flight. The electrons are buffeted about by shock waves (phonons) caused by the vibrations of nearby atoms and are continually crashing into one another. These waves and crashes produce a resistance to the free and perpetual flow of electrons.

Classical theories of physics held that as CODducting metals grew colder and colder, atomic vibration would slow down and resistance would decrease. At absolute zero, it was reasoned, reo

doubts the Soviets have anything like that.

The discussion is about something that Bardeen regards as a 100-to-l shot. Bray, like Cooper and Schrieffer before him, is a graduate student working on a problem that interests him, of course, but that also is of primary interest to Bardeen. Even if the attempt 'fails, as Bardeen thinks it might, Bray will be assured of a bright career.

Bray is talking about a room-temperature superconductor.

At the moment it takes a bit of doing to milk superconductivity of its. technological advantages. Just reaching the near-absolute zero transition temperatures requires large investments in extremely expensive refrigerating equipment. Supercool is costly, and even if it made endless amounts of electrical power cheaply available, the transition of current through supercool underground pipes would require many closely spaced refrigeration stations along the way.

But at room temperature, the BCS perpetual motion-levitation machine, the eternally balanced and flowing river of energy, could perhaps fuel this planet forever, bringing economic and political revolutions in its wake.

Hthe 100-to-l shot is achieved, it is possible that John Bardeen will return once again to Stockholm for his third Nobel Prize.

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About the Author: William K. Stuckey is well qualified to write about the Nobel Prizes. He has interviewed a dozen Nobel judges and many Nobel Prize-winners as research for the many articles he has written on this subject. He has also written a TV documentary dealing with the "power and politics" of the Nobel Prize-awarding establishment.

A PRIMER

sistance would disappear completely.

Early in this century Kamerlingh Onnes conducted experiments that contradicted one element of this picture. Several degrees above absolute zero, although the atoms were still vibrating, resistance disappeared anyway. It was found that only certain metals display this superconducting property and that the critical temperature (the temperature at which resistance disappears) is different for each metal. Part of BCS theory allows prediction of just which metals will be superconductors at these extremely low temperatures.

But resistance caused by atomic vibration is not the only interference electrons must contend with. They also are attracted by nearby atomic particles and thus slowed down or diverted in their path. Normally, atoms are neutral in charge, due to a balance of protons and electrons. But when atoms lose an ~lectron -as they do when

electrical flow begins-they become positively charged iOlls. Since oppositely charged particles attract, the free-flying negatively charged electrons are normally pulled toward the ions, resulting in a change in path or even a collision.

In superconductors, however, as the BCS theory explains, a special type of mating between electrons prevents them from being drawn off course by positive ions. In the BCS view, one electron pairs with a second electron somewhere in the conducting metal. These electrons have the same momentum and same speed but spin in •. opposite directions. In the quantum world, the matching momentum dictates that electrons will fly toward each other (although they will never collide, since they have the same charge). The attraction between these electrons overcomes the attraction of nearby positive ions anci permits the electrons to flow on virtually forever.

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OR, WBAT YOU CAN LIARN PROII AN OOBI Making games is one of the things Americans seem to do well-witness the fact that the game industry grosses $300 million a year.

Increasingly, the games deal with u.s. social, economic, political and environmental problems.

cent of all games are bought during November and December), it seems appropriate to take a close look at what the games business is all about. day in 1970 a game inventor approached William F. OneDohrmann, the vice-president in charge of research and

development for the Parker Brothers game company in Salem, Massachusetts, with a free-form game called Oobi. Oobi was a omewhere within every game inventor is a frustrated school- red, egglike, hollow container, decorated with big, friendly eyes, master. Let a man start to dream up a game and before he and it bore these words: "I'm Oobi. I contain a message to can say, ÂŤLudo; ergo sum," his busy brain is stocking it, like another human being. Please further my journey an inch, a foot, some intellectual trout pond, with moral precepts, esthetic or a mile. Add a note, if you wish. Then help me to the next nice person like yourself." In the back was a slot, and on the preachings, scholarly morsels, words to live by.

Most inventors, like most of the game companies they invent bottom was a place to write an address. "It was a message-in-afor, weed out such uplifting elements in the belief that a good bottle game," says Dohrmann, who is 39 years old and who, game is mostly for fun, not self-improvement. But plenty of others like Oobi, has big, friendly eyes, "and I loved it as soon as I burden us with such instructional oddments as these, taken ver- saw it. We spent three hundred thousand dollars to test-market batim from something called The Lib Game: "Mter a demand it on the West Coast. Some of our dealers thought we were is made ... the Male Chauvinist spokesman gives his team's side crazy, but we told them, 'Okay, we know this is far out, but we'll and indicates whether the Chauvinists are willing to give in to the take back any you don't sell, so you can't lose.' " Parker packaged the little eggs three to a plastic-and-carddemand. The Uppity Women may respond briefly to this, and then the Liberal Male team presents its position. Again, the Up- board container and offered them to the world. Dohrmann does pity Women can respond, and then the Conservative Chicks give not enjoy recalling what happened next: "I thought Oobi was something that would catch the new spirit of the country-the their view.... " Games of that sort, for reasons that are fairly clear, have never greening of America, a feeling of love, that sort of thing. Well, it sold well, so their intended beneficiaries seldom get much in the failed miserably. It's got to be our most spectacular flop. The few way of educational benefits. But other games in fact do some¡ people who did buy Oobi would invariably hand them to airline powerful teaching. (A San Francisco woman once inherited stewardesses, and after a while the stewardesses were all groaning $10,000.She knew nothing about investing, but she had played and saying, 'Here comes another creep with his goddamn Oobi.' " Monopoly. She bought four houses, sold them later to buy a The Oobi illustrates one of the most curious aspects of a curihotel, and today is worth a cool million.) With another Christmas ous business: Even though the game industry in the U.S. grosses game-buying season approaching, therefore (in the U.S., 50 per some $300 million a year, practically no one in it pretends to

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nymous with trivia. Rather, he says, "We ... call the category 'The real fun of a game is in the deals 'play' one of the most fundamental in life." Play, he thinks, does that take place off the board.... Look not merely arise out of culture but is an integral, inseparable part at what happens in Monopoly-half of culture. If this is so, then a society's games, and its attitudes toward those games, may tell a great deal about its people. the game is interactions between players That, as it turns out, seems to be precisely the case. In the beas they try to wipe each other out.' ginning America's games were invariably designed to point out a moral. The first American board game, for example, The Manknow in advance what will sell or why. Consider, for example, the sion of Happiness (1843), was described by its publishers as "an invention of one of the world's all-time best-selling games. In 1933 instructive, moral, and entertaining amusement." Similarly, A an unemployed heating engineer named Charles Darrow dropped Game of Christian Endeavor, designed in 1896 for the express by the Parker offices with a game he hoped Parker would buy. He purpose of building character in the young ("Its moral tone will explained that he had dreamed the game up to take his mind off commend itself to all those who desire to place in the hands of the problems of the Depression and had found that his friends their children a game teaching the good results sure to follow an enjoyed playing it. One thing he himself especially liked about upright life"), sent the player on a trip from Home Influence to the game, he said, was that it had been inspired by a pleasant Honest Honored and Upright Citizen. Along the way were such vacation he and his wife had once had in Atlantic City and that it adventures as Takes Flowers to Sick-Go to Sincerity; Considerto therefore had a lot of streets and properties named after places ate to Old People-Go to Church; and Stubbornness-Go Jealousy. there. The game, he said, was called Monopoly.

Perhaps the first really fundamental change in the history of The Parker people treated Darrow politely enough, but after playing his game a few times they wrote him a letter saying that American games occurred in 1883 when 16-year-old George S. there were exactly 52 things wrong with it. To begin with, they Parker spent $40 to print 500 sets of a game he had developed. said, it was too complicated; no one would be able to figure out The game, called Banking, was the prototypical 20th-century how to play it. Then, too, it took too long to play; who ever heard American game: .one got his reward not in terms of joy in the of a game that lasted four or five hours? And it just wasn't like next world but in terms of money in this one.

With the exception of a few hardy perennials most contemother games; it was too unfamiliar, too strange.

Chastened but stubborn, Darrow managed to place a number porary games don't last long. Often introduced with thousands of his sets in stores in Philadelphia. They sold well, and soon of dollars of television advertising, they live brief, glorious lives Parker Brothers sought him out and belatedly made a deal. To- of two or three years, then disappear as suddenly as they arrived. day some 70 million sets of Monopoly have been sold, and it Game companies continually try, hoping against hope, to come up with some game that will exactly mesh with the elusive needs continues to be the backbone of the entire Parker empire.

Monopoly is not alone in its brisk sales. There are signs, in of the human psyche. In pursuit of this goal the industry has fact, that we are on the brink of a boom and that soon we will turned up a substantial body of lore on what makes games sell. have more games-and more expensive games-than have existed Recently the research and development director of an American since the Egyptians invented checkers five thousand years ago. game company tried to codify this lore, drawing up a ready guide On the U.S. market at this very moment, according to one zealous for anyone hoping to strike it rich by inventing his own game: compilation, are some 28 sports games, ranging from Computa- • The rules and scoring must be simple. matic Baseball ($34.95) and Rose Bowl Computerized Football • The game must permit the use of skill, strategy, and bluffing, ($6.95) to The Great Downhill Ski Game ($5), Tennis Anyone? even though chance may be a factor. ($10), and Odyssey, which offers not only baseball, football, and • The game must have humor; it must be fun to play. hockey but also auto racing, handball, rifle shooting, skiing, table • The game can't end too quickly or take too long to play. tennis, regular tennis, and volleyball ($99.95).

• The game must contain elements of daring or risk.

There are children's games, adult games, topical games, simu- • The game must permit players to remain relatively equal for lation games, educational games, and games so hybrid that they most of its duration, so that each player can continue to feel fit no identifiable category There are ecology games, women's lib he has a chance to win. A player should be able to catch up desgames, and even-surely some sort of nadir-games about wel- pite losses early in the game. fare. Furthermore, as a result of President Nixon's trip to China, • The game must have tension and suspense. indications are that we are in for a shower of China games. A • The game must look appealing.

A few companies have tried to make games out of current decade ago the game business in the United States was shuffling along at a mere $75 million or $100 million a year. By the end of issues like welfare and women's lib-but most of the big ones the 1970sit will very likely have increased by more than tenfold, shy away from them. Instead, they tend to subscribe to the philosophy expressed some years ago in a cheerfully revealing bookto one billion dollars.

Is there reason for this, other than the industry's armor- let entitled 75 Years of Fun: The Story of Parker Brothers, Inc.: "Playing games is fun, and no one would suggest that they have piercing marketing acumen? Some people think so. "Maybe people today feel safer in their homes than in the streets," says any other purpose, even though many games instruct and uplift one old-time gamesman. "Or maybe people are just withdrawing while entertaining. They divert attention from the cares of daily living and the troubled world." from reality."

His hypotheses, only partly facetious, are buttressed by John Huizinga's 1944 classic, Homo Ludens: A Study of the Play Ele- Aboutthe Author: James F. Fixx is the author of Games for the Superment in Culture. Huizinga argues that games are in no way syno- intelligent. He was until recently Articles Editor of Audience magazine.

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ay in and day out, game inventors, bearing some two thousand creations a year, make their way to a gray, clapboard 19th-century factory in Salem. For Salem is the ancestral home for Parker Brothers, which, while only second in total sales (behind Milton Bradley, with its Battleship, Concentration, The Game of Life, etc.), nonetheless sells Monopoly, the world's most spectacularly successful game. Parker only publishes about 20 games a year-dismal odds, but the inventors keep coming.

Once a game has been submitted to Parker Brothers, top executives play it, looking for bugs, ambiguities in the rules, and other problems. "We find the same drawbacks over and over again," says Bill Dohrmann, who presides over a swarm of designers and is, one gathers, nicely recovered from his Oobi disaster.

"Most people don't know what's been done and what hasn't been done. Or a game may look fine but be totally unmarketable; it just can't be made cheaply enough. And some themes are ones practically no one would be interested in. Take cross-country skiing. Right now cross-country skiing is getting big, and I'll guarantee that within the next couple of months we'll get a game based on it. Some games are too intellectual. And some are just dumb and crude."

No game is signed up by Parker Brothers until every executive has played and approved it. ("We play, games a lot here," says Randolph P. Barton, Parker's executive vice-president. "We even cheat and connive.")

If a game looks like a good possibility for publication, it undergoes a close scrutiny by Parker's 60-year-old president, Edward P. Parker ("Eddie"), who has some arresting ideas about games, Not all of them are shared by others in the industry. "People like to clobber their best friends without actually doing them any damage," he said recently. "That's the basis for practically every successful game." Parker says what he looks for: "People want choices in their games. They want to think that if they make the right choices they can win the damn thing. There's still got to be an element of chance, of course, so the family dunce can turn out to be a genius every once in a while. But skill-making the right judgments-has got to enter into it, too. Another thing I'm interested in when I first playa game is seeing what goes on between the players. I have a theory. It's that the real fun of a game is in the deals that take place off the board. The equipment we provide is merely the means to that. Look at what happens in Monopoly-half the game is interactions between players as they try to wipe each other out."

Parker has still another theory, this one perilously close to corporate heresy. It is that Monopoly, his most important game. is far from perfect. "I still agree with our original judgment that it takes too long to play," he says. "And another fault with Monopoly is that some players are eliminated before the game is over. That's wrong, A game should end at the same time for everybody."

One game tested by the Parker executives in 1971 is a battery-operated plastic owl called Screech! It was submitted as a haunted-house card game, was originally called Goblin Problem, and was intended to be played in the dark by children five to 10 years old. Eddie Parker, recalling a failure of a few years ago called Witch Pitch, which also involved a haunted house, liked the game but was troubled. "We didn't want another haunted house," he says. "Buyers have awfully long memories, and we were afraid we'd bomb again.

So it suddenly occurred to me: why not change the house to an owl?" Today Screech! tastefully owlized, is doing fine.

Parker Brothers is concerned with how well their games play.

Some games need more work than others. One day last year, for example, Dohrmann dropped by the office of one of his industrial designers, a burly bear of a man named Arthur Venditti. Venditti, who wears a look of rumpled competence, was tinkering with a model of Phil and Tony Esposito's Action Hockey, which Parker Brothers was rushing to get ready for Christmas, 1973.

"It still isn't right," said Venditti, who came to Parker four years ago from Sylvania, where he was involved with automotive lighting design.

Dohrmann picked up a magnet and held it under the plastic hockey board, moving one of the players about until he finally tapped the puck into a goal. "Let's give it a try," he said.

Venditti took another magnet and held it above the board, resting on the sheet of clear, rigid plastic that formed the game's top. He and Dohrmann, using quick, flicking motions, played briskly for two or three minutes. The game looked like fun, "I still feel we need a little more magnetism," said Dohrmann when they had stopped. "It's okay when you're skating around in practice; but as soon as play starts, I don't feel I have control."

"I know what you mean," said Venditti. "But the hockey player only weighs eight-and-a-half grams now. I can't figure out what's the matter. And did you notice how the players sometimes bind between the top and the bottom? I've got a lot of work to do."

Dohrmann got up and, as he left, flashed a smile at Venditti.

Venditti, staring at Phil and Tony Esposito's Action Hockey, did not smile back. In America games sell best in the North, especially where there is plenty of bad weather, and least well in the Deep South, where there is less discretionary money. There are, however, some odd little pockets here and there. One is Salt Lake City, in Mormon country, where games do especially well because, as Eddie Parker puts it, "there are so many restrictions in other aspects of life." Another is the Bible Belt, where Rook, with its cards numbered from one to 14, sells well, presumably because regular cards are frowned upon and the kids' Rook cards can be used for a little clandestine, Saturday-night poker.

Games, it seems, have some curious destinations and uses, But where do they come from in the first place?

'There are adult games, topical games, simulation games, educational games, ecology games, women's lib games, and even-surely some kind of nadir-games about welfare.' s a Chinese cook and a Filipino houseboy hover near the lunch table and a chauffeur stands by, Marvin Glass eats lunch and talks about games. Glass is a wispy, elfin man (only five foot five in his monogrammed chameleon-green polo shirt) who is America's top game designer. His house, in Evanston, Illinois, not far from Lake Michigan, is, let us say, Chinese Tudor.

Made over from a former coach house, it has a cobbled, semicircular drive, a heated, free-form pool in the courtyard, and, flying from staffs atop the roof, a vast fluttering of more or less medieval banners. There is a high, intimidating fence and in the front door an enormous brass lock with a key the length of your forearm.

Inside there are quantities of large, mostly metal sculpture and on the walls a number of paintings by Dali, Chagall, Picasso, and Renoir and a carved coat of arms that in the 1730s belonged to the Prince of Wales. Glass has ordered a second coat of arms, one that once belonged to Henry VIII, but it has not yet arrived.

Though married five times, at the moment he dwells here in solitary splendor.

Glass, 57, is a warm, intelligent, likable man. "A game," he is saying, "is role playing. It's a drama. It takes you out of the situation you're living in and puts you in a new one. A game applies, therefore, more to the libido than to the superego. It's a fantasy, not a teaching machine."

He is as qualified as anyone to speculate on such things. Involved with games since the early 1940s, he has invented more of them than has any other person in history (among them: Upset, Hands Down, Tip-It, Skittle Horseshoes, the Aurora Derby, Bops 'n Robbers, and Rock 'Em-Sock 'Em Robots). Furthermore, he was responsible a decade ago for a major turning point: a game called Mouse Trap, published by Ideal Toys. Before Mouse Trap, games were primarily two-dimensional-they were played on a flat board, as chess, checkers, and Monopoly are. Glass designed a flamboyantly three-dimensional game, one worthy of Rube Goldberg, in which gears mesh, a steel pellet bounces down a flight of stairs, a diver springs into a tub, and finally a cage falls to trap a plastic mouse. "Mouse Trap was a breakthrough," says Glass. "It was the very first game to sell more than three hundred thousand copies in a year."

Today, on the strength of achievements like Mouse Trap, Glass employs some 70 people, 10 of whom earn more than $100,000 a year. Designing games, as he describes it, is a bit like psychoanalyzing one's society: "A good designer has to read everything, go to the theater, be aware of society's hopes and trends."

Glass munches a sparerib and sighs, perhaps fretting about his next million-dollar idea. But he must not allow himself to talk about it. "We work in a very secretive sort of business," he explains. "A good game can be worth millions. All the people who work for me are bonded, and anyone who comes into my place has to sign a secrecy agreement. The secrecy syndrome in this business has almost reached the point of paranoia."

Glass graduated from the University of Chicago in 1941,

A

having majored in psychology (his main interest was in psychology as an instrument of merchandising). Fearful that no one would hire him, he went into business with a former SearsRoebuck art director and a Russian painter, making displays for stores. One day a manufacturer asked if they could invent a game, and they dreamed up the successful, if not exactly fabled, Tiny Town Theater, which used comic-strip characters to people its stage.

Glass sensed he might be on to something. Maybe, he thought, there was some money to be made here. But what to do next?

"I had been reading Roman Catholic theology," he recalls, "because I happened to be interested in it at the time, and I noticed that the Catholics put out a lot of magazines and newspapers.

Then one day I was looking at one of those little weather housesthey work on a piece of catgut that lets one figure come out if the weather is going to be good and another if it's going to rain.

So I got the idea for making a little chapel. On one side was Saint Barbara, the saint who protects you against wind and rain, and on the other was the Sacred Heart of Jesus. I wrote an ad-it was a whole page of copy and was full of purple religious prose and malapropisms-and put it in the Catholic publications. Nothing happened for about 10 days. Then three mail trucks pulled up at the door, and suddenly I was up to my neck in orders and money.

I was 24 years old, and I made my first million dollars that way."

Glass struggled along for a decade or more as the only fuIltime free-lancer in the business, building his staff to 14 people.

Then, in the mid-1950s Ruth Handler, the president of Mattei, had a revolutionary idea: why not advertise toys on television?

Boom times arrived with a rush. "I became greatly in demand," says Glass, "not because I was necessarily so good, but because I was the only organization in the business."

Glass gets up from the lunch table, moves into the living room, sits down on a couch amidst the metal sculpture and the assorted masterpieces, and at length reveals that there is another side to his yearnings. "I'd like to invent games that really mean something," he says. "For example, I'd like to invent a game about the problem of representative government and its fragilities and the dangers it's beset by, I would call it Freedom, and it would be boring, and nobody would publish it."

Perhaps the closest Glass has come to that is a game called Happiness, which Milton Bradley published in late 1971. "It's really a modern-day Monopoly," he says. "It's based on the idea that money won't make you happy. It has elements like faith, health, and knowledge. Maybe its fatal weakness is that you don't beat your opponents down in it; one of my men called it a sermon in cardboard."

For the industry's future Glass foresees more expensive games and a greater reliance on electrical and mechanical devices. There will also be more games in a new and costly category: the socalled family game, examples of which are still top-secret but will be out soon. "Families are going to play games together more and more," he says. "And these games are going to cost plenty$70, say, where only a short time ago a manufacturer wasn't charging more than $10 for any single game. Maybe it's games that will keep the family together; everything else has failed." D "Dirty Water" and "Smog" (right) are among the many new American games designed to educate their players in the complexities of current environmental, social, economic and political issues in the U.S. today.

N AMERICAN ARCHITECTURE To be different, to build or to shape the physical environment in a way that will leave a lasting imprint-this is the aspiration that drives many of today's architects.

With the availability of new materials and technologies, and of clients more willing to experiment, professional architects have a freer hand than their predecessors.

Office buildings are rising higher and breaking out of the normal rectangular pattern. Museums and churches are undergoing basic changes. Plazas are moving indoors.

Color is used abundantly (see front cover). Structural engineering is no longer hidden: How buildings are braced against the wind is dramatized externally. All these innovations are adding fresh architectural vitality to the American city and countryside.

Powerful in its simplicity, Christ Episcopal Church (left), in Tacoma, Washington, is an outstanding example of the new architecture. The building strongly states its place in the contemporary world, both in architectural as well as in ecclesiastical terms. Entrances to the church, from an open-sided court or directly from the street, are through an enclosed vestibule. Architect Paul Thiry left the concrete unfinished, relieving its bare surface only by horizontal incisions at well-studied intervals.

The 45-foot-high cross is also of reinforced concrete.

Long concrete vaults form the

Kimbell Art Museum in Fort Worth, Texas (above and top).

This highly original structure by architect Louis 1. Kahn is also extremely functional. Five of the vaults are closed to make up galleries, offices and storage space. The sixth is open on one side, forming an outdoor portico. The semicircular vaults are split to adrnit light from above, providing a warm, natural illumination for the interiors that are undisturbed by piers, columns and windows.

All these measures result in an almost poetic atmosphere for visitors to the museum.

Perfect symmetry of this Norfolk,

Futuristic model (opposite page,

Virginia,convention hall (left) is mirroredin a placid reflecting pool.

The building is used for sports events, concerts and conventions, and seats up to 12,000 persons. It is part of a four-unit complex designed

by The Williams and Tazewell Partnership. An underground garage, exhibit hall and theater complete the quartet. The convention hall dominates the area with its elegant concretedome, flying buttresses, andglass walls in aluminum frames.

above) demonstrates the new "esthetic of survival" architecture.

Ralph Knowles, a professor at the University of Southern California, has worked out an elaborate model for "low-energy architectural systems"buildings designed to conserve heating and cooling energy through computerassisted design and placement.

Architect Knowles says: "What we are thinking about now is not an esthetic of form, space and structure.

It is an esthetic of survival."

NEW AMERICAN ARCHITECTURE

Bold standout against the conservative gray of New York's Wall Street area is a new 32-story tower (above), the first office building in the city designed by I.M. Pei & Partners.

Called "88 Pine Street," the structure is clad with aluminum curtain wall in a striking, repetitive column-andbeam style. Twenty-jive-foot expanses of thick plate glass within 28-foot structural spans contrast with the crisply sculptured, dazzling-white exterior "skeleton" to give the building its distinctive personality.

NEW AMERICAN ARCHITECTURE

Mirrored glass and aluminum walls reflect the wooded surroundings of the International Business Machines (IBM) headquarters building (above) in Warwick, New York. It is part of a complex of buildings designed by architects Gunnar Birkerts & Associates.

The structures were added to the hilly, forested terrain with a minimal disturbance of the natural beauty.

Y-shaped tree columns supporting buildings are a distinctive feature of the IBM manufacturing complex (right) in Boca Raton, Florida.

First-floor offices are set back to create a covered walk. A pattern of vertical and horizontal projections provides wall strength and shade for the windows. The architects were Marcel Breuer and Robert F. Gatje.

NEW AMERICAN ARCHITECTURE

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The chairman of the board of Transamerica once complained that "nobody knows us from Adam." Since completion of a new office building in 1972 (left), Transamerica has been provided with a lasting image. It is now housed in a 48-story pyramid that stands out against the San Francisco skyline. Architect William Pereira's revolutionary design provides for windowless protrusions on opposite sides, and a spire which contains mechanical equipment and space for telecommunications gear.

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Cascading falls and quiet pools characterize the Auditorium Forecourt (right) in Portland, Oregon. Made of cast concrete slabs, this terraced water garden is a natural invitation to sit, clamber, wade and splash one's feet. The unique "fountainscape" was created by architect Lawrence Halprin who has been described as "a man in love with water."

Halprin is an example of a new type of architect concerned with total environment.

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