SP GUIDE PUBLICATIONS
February-March 2011
Volume 8 No 1
SP’s
AN SP GUIDE
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IN THIS ISSUE
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ROUNDUP
T h e O N LY j o u r n a l i n A s i a d e d i c a t e d t o L a n d F o r c e s
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PAGE 4 Meeting the Challenges The Army Aviation is the arm of the future, a force-multiplier which can tilt the balance in any future conflict Lt General (Retd) B.S. Pawar
INTERVIEW
‘Army Aviation Corps is the
Arm of the Future’
PAGE 6 Past, Present and the Future
PHOTOGRAPHS: Abhishek / SP Guide Pubns
SP’s Land Forces (SP’s): What is the role of the Army Aviation? ADG Army Aviation (ADG): Army Aviation operates in the ground regime, therefore it is virtually a component of the land power. This cardinal tenet defines Army Aviation’s role as an element of the ground forces. In the future battle field, Army Aviation will be at the forefront, shaping the battle space by projecting the force, sustaining the force and delivering decisive combat power at critical times anywhere in the battle field by direct fire, by launching air assaults or by directing artillery fires. Its focus is to enhance ground mobility and exploit manoeuvre. It accelerates the tempo of operations while remaining an integral part of the combined arms team. Aviation assets are “force multipliers” that provide the formation commanders with the capability to conduct missions across the entire range of military conflict.
Armaments used in helicopters can be broadly classified into three categories, namely rapid firing automatic machine guns, rocket projectiles and guided missiles Air Marshal (Retd) B.K. Pandey PAGE 10 A Long Way to Go The three services are progressing on the path of acquiring networked capabilities individually with no coherent framework for joint service enterprise information architecture Lt General (Retd) V.K. Kapoor
SP’s: Is the Army Aviation Corps (AAC) self-sufficient in terms of infrastructure like helicopter bases, overhaul, maintenance, spares, etc? ADG: Army Aviation has come a long way since its raising in 1986. The exponential growth in terms of equipment has also lead to simultaneous development of infrastructure to house, operate and maintain the assets. Well-trained manpower from the Corps of Electronics and Mechanical Engineers (EME) is providing dedicated technical support for maintenance of all types of helicopters in our inventory. The chain of logistics support established by the Aviation branch of the Corps of Ordnance is functioning efficiently. Army Aviation today is selfsufficient and capable of techno-logistically supporting its operations. In keeping with the envisaged capability development plan, the plans for upgrading and modernising existing infrastructure are also in place.
PAGE 15 Seeing Through Darkness
R&D is being undertaken globally to enhance the reach, improve the resolution and reduce the weight of night vision devices in order to provide a better edge to own side Lt General (Retd) P.C. Katoch PLUS A Candid Review Tackling Airborne Threats Insecurity Rising First / TecKnow Unmanned Machines at War Helicopters in Combat Operations Looking Back at 2010 News in Brief
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SP’s Land Forces team comprising Jayant Baranwal, Editor-in-Chief, and Lt General (Retd.) V.K. Kapoor, Editor, interviewed Major General P.K. Bharali, Additional Director General, Army Aviation. The General’s dynamism and passion for his Corps was perceptible in his demeanour and in the free and frank discussion that ensued.
Lethal Combination SP’s: Could you elaborate on the operational philosophy? Does it include integration with other services? ADG: Precise and incisive firepower, speed and manoeuvrability in the third dimension and close integration with the other arms of the army make the Corps the ultimate force multiplier in the hands of the field commander. Army Aviation operates in the TBA as a com-
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INTERVIEW
period of new acquisitions. How do you plan to maintain them in the interim period? ADG: Chetak and Cheetah helicopters have been in service of the nation for a long time and have proved themselves in all forms and shown excellent performance, under varied terrain and weather conditions. Cheetah helicopters have been the ‘Saviours of Siachin Glacier’. Technology in respect of these helicopters is no doubt old and we are aware of the increasing challenges of maintenance of these machines. Between Hindustan Aeronautics Limited and us, adequate measures have been put in place to ensure that these helicopters remain maintainable. However, it remains a challenge.
bined arms team, expanding the ground commander’s battle- field, principally in space and time. The employment philosophy is thus focused on integration and synchronisation of aviation manoeuvre with the ground manoeuvre to shape the TBA as per the plans of the field force commander thus fulfilling the tenets of manoeuvre warfare. In consonance with joint operations doctrine, Army Aviation is also integrated with other services and can be task organised to support the sister services, should the situation so demand. SP’s: What role is the Army Aviation Corps performing in the ongoing low intensity conflict in J&K and the North East region? Is this role intended to be expanded in the future? ADG: Helicopters by virtue of their inherent speed, mobility, firepower and versatility, make an ideal platform to be employed in low intensity conflict. Army Aviation assets have been gainfully employed for quick insertion of troops with enormous success in the ongoing counter-terrorist operations. Surveillance, both visual and electronic, delivery of essential combat loads, establishing aerial command post for better command and control, swift and life-saving casualty evacuation are other operational tasks carried out routinely by Army Aviation. In addition we have the ability to augment fire support, which significantly influences the close fight. The growth of Army Aviation will result in its role being more and more multi-faceted. SP’s: Is there any role for Army Aviation Corps in asymmetrical warfare and homeland security? ADG: The basic characteristic of the helicopter allows it to operate from point-to-point without the requirements of any intricate infrastructure. It also has excellent slow speed handling characteristic and can maintain time on station, on required basis. These can be exploited by the field force commander in all types of warfare. The Indian Army trains and prepares to meet any eventuality be it for conventional warfare or a national emergency. We too are prepared to play our part, be it for asymmetrical warfare or homeland security. SP’s: If India were to acquire a rapid reaction capability for the plains and the mountains, what would be the role of AAC and how does the Dhruv fit in due to its capability to carry up to 14 personnel? ADG: The ability of the helicopters to overcome terrain friction provides mobility to the force for rapid application at a given point, making it an inseparable component of the force. Any force of this nature would require synergised employment of all available resources. To that extent the helicopters of Army Aviation Corps, to include armed helicopters will invariably form part of such operations. Enhancement of tactical/operational lift capability is being factored into the long term capability development plans in view of the envisaged nature of operations in the future battlefield both in the plains as well as the mountains.
Combat Helicopter SP’s: Have you acquired attack helicopters and if so, are your pilots fully capable of operating them? ADG: Army Aviators have gained rich experience by operating the weaponised version of Cheetah helicopter called ‘Lancer’. This experience will enable smooth transition and adaption to any other combat helicopter platform that is inducted into the Army Aviation inventory. Besides flying skills, intimate understanding of ground operations and situational awareness of the TBA would be of prime importance. Army Aviators, by virtue of inherent training regarding operations of the Army, are ideally suited to operate attack helicopters.
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SP’s: What are your modernisation plans and how are they progressing? ADG: The modernisation plan of all the three services is underway and the army’s own plan meshes well with the overall plan. Army Aviation, per se, has been under modernisation, since its raising and the pace has been in sync with the overall growth of the army. Besides, the ‘Lancer’ helicopter, ALH (Dhruv) has been in service with the Army Aviation for over 10 years. There are a few more modernisation projects in the pipeline. SP’s: The Chetak and Cheetah fleet is obsolete and considering the long gestation
“Army Aviation operates in the tactical battle area (TBA) as a combined arms team, expanding the ground commander’s battlefield, principally in space and time”
Glorious History of Army Aviation Corps
A
rmy Aviation Corps will celebrate its silver jubilee on November 1, 2011. The Corps has a place of pride in the pantheon of the Indian Army’s arms and services—and with good reason, since few can claim to have made so great an impact, in such stark contrast to their numbers, as the Army Aviation Corps. Aviation has a certain mystique and aviators exude an indescribable elan which flows out of careful selection, rigorous training and an ethos of professionalism which is the real key to aviation operations. Year 1942 saw the inception of the Army Aviation wing of the RAF in India and the first Indian Air Observation Post flight was raised in August 1947. The Air Observation Post remained a small and elite arm throughout the 1950s and on the eve of the 1965 war, the Air Observation Post comprised of only one Squadron and four Flights. The IndoPak Wars of 1965 and 1971 were fields and skies of glory for this small band of the winged warriors and aviators made a name for themselves with their innumerable acts of valour and gallantry in the skies. While the Chetaks were inducted in the Army in March 1969, the first of the Cheetas were inducted in 1971. The Army Aviation Corps came into being on November 1, 1986, and was immediately inducted into “Operation Pawan” which was a crucial test for the newly formed Corps. In more ways than one, it was truly Army Aviations’ baptism by fire and they responded with pride and elan. With the Chetak helicopters taking on the logistic tasks, the Cheetahs christened as Ranjits, operated aggressively mounted with their medium machine guns. The Siachen Glacier has been the final frontier for the Army Aviation Corps. Routinely operating at 20,000 feet and above on the extreme fringes of its flight envelope, the Cheetah helicopter has been carrying out yeoman service as the workhorse of the glacier. The Army Aviation Corps has singularly been responsible for saving hundreds of lives, besides providing life-sustaining logistic support while operating constantly at super high altitudes—a feat unparalleled by any other Army in the world. Operation Vijay was Army Aviation’s finest hour when so much was rested on the wings of a motley group of a few good men. Their professionalism, grit, courage and tactical skills and sterling performance was recognised with two Squadrons receiving the Chief of Army Staffs’ Unit Citations, two Vir Chakras and innumerable other gallantry awards. The year 2001 saw the raising of the first advanced light helicopter (ALH) Sqn in Army Aviation. The ALH nicknamed as ‘Dhruv’ has changed the face of operations in Army Aviation and has already given a major boost to the tactical capability of Army. With the rapid operational growth of Army Aviation, keeping in pace with the ongoing modernisation process of the Army, the helicopter profile of Army Aviation in future will undergo a major change. On nearing completion of 25 glorious years on November 1, 2011, the Army Aviation Corps is riding the crest of the Revolution in Military Affairs. Without doubt this is the arm of the future—one whose potential is now only being realised and exploited.
SP’s: Is your training infrastructure adequate including simulators? ADG: Army Aviation has a full-fledged training infrastructure in the form of the ‘Combat Army Aviation Training School’ at Nasik, Maharashtra. This institute has been the alma mater for all army aviators and has been churning out highly professional and confident ‘soldiers in the sky’ for many years now. It has been a successful model, and plans are on to make it even more self-reliant by allocating dedicated helicopters and technical crew for the same. We are also utilising the services of the Indian Air Force for training of our aircrew as part of the larger concept of integration and jointmanship among all the three services. Simulators are an economical and highly effective method of imparting training. Army Aviation has also made a modest beginning in this regard. However, there is handsome scope for enhancing the same. SP’s: Are you facing any shortage of pilots due to greener pastures in civil aviation? ADG: The manning pattern and age profile required for Army Aviation is such that lateral absorption into the civil aviation sector, if any, does not affect its growth and operations. There is no doubt that a number of pilots, who are the mainstay of the rotary wing sector of civil aviation in India, are stalwarts from Army Aviation. The Corps draws its pilots from all arms of the Army, at a much younger age profile.
Arm of the Future SP’s: What are the career prospects for officers and men of the AAC? Does this cause any concern among the ranks? ADG: Army Aviation is an elite corps. It has carved a ‘niche’ for itself in the Army and has been identified as the ‘Arm of the Future’ by our brass tacks. The promising young officers of all arms are highly motivated to be a part of this reckonable force. The career prospects in Army Aviation are equally bright. The pro-rata vacancies allotted to Army Aviation are at par, with the rest of the Army. The lateral absorption into civil aviation sector further ensures faster cadre mobility resulting in greater satisfaction level in the select ranks. SP’s: What do you think is the future of civilian helicopter industry in India and any suggestions to improve it? ADG: Considering the rate at which the Indian economy is growing, the civil helicopter industry in India is poised for a massive growth. The civil helicopter industry in India needs to exploit potential in the uncharted domain of police force, aeromedical evacuation, disaster management and logistics supply chain in remote/inaccessible areas. It also needs to strengthen its current operations in tourism, pilgrimage, offshore/onshore exploration, coal mining, election campaigning, corporate flying and communications etc. India needs to further establish itself as a frontline production/maintenance hub of spares for helicopters, to cater to regional needs of South and South East Asia and even for the West and Middle East Asia, in collaboration with world leaders from European, American and Russian helicopter Industry.
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>> A R M Y A V I AT I O N
E
D I T O R I A L
In our view, the year 2010 will go down as a year of scams and inertia in defence procurement, adversely affecting military preparedness for future conflicts. Despite the oft repeated, stale and solicitous statements of the political leaders, the fact remains that not only are we loosing our combat edge against our adversary in the west, but we are also becoming vulnerable to military adventures by our adversaries on both flanks. The ability to deter opponents, which is a cumulative affect of military capability and political will, is important and necessary to avoid wars which would waste India’s energy and divert it from the path of inclusive development. India faces a variety of military challenges to national security, which include the threats and challenges from traditional adversaries and a multiplicity of challenges which could be grouped under low intensity conflicts operations (LICO). Additionally, there are a large number of security parameters peculiar to our geography which have to be factored into the military planning process in order to derive the structural and organisational changes and the modernisation focus.
Lt General J.P. Singh, Deputy Chief of the Army Staff, in a recent interview with the CLAWS Journal, gave an insight into the capabilities that the Army is acquiring. He said, “The critical capabilities that are being enhanced to meet challenges across the spectrum, include battlefield transparency, battlefield management systems, night-fighting capability, enhanced firepower, including terminally guided munitions, integrated manoeuvre capability to include self-propelled artillery, quick reaction surface-to-air missiles, the latest assault engineer equipment, tactical control systems, integral combat aviation support and network-centricity.” A well thought out list for modernisation and transformation, but how much have we achieved and how fast are we progressing? It seems that all our planners, both civil and military are quite aware of the conceptual aspects of national security and military preparedness and at various security related seminars, they are able to hold forth the subjects of their choice with consuming eloquence. But alas, the truth is that the situation on the ground has changed only marginally. The
last decade or so has been disastrous for the defence services. They have been starved for new weapons and equipment. Except for promises and issuance of large number of requests for information (RFIs), which never seem to get translated into procurement action, nothing is in the pipeline. In war good military strategy and operational art demands that we maximise the strategic returns available from a given amount of tactical effort or conversely minimise the tactical effort needed to attain strategic objectives of war. This will necessitate induction of new technologies and state-of-theart weaponry to wage future conflicts. This special issue carries the interview of ADG Army Aviation and the focus of the articles is on army aviation, unmanned aerial and ground systems.
Lt General (Retd) V.K. Kapoor PHOTOGRAPH: SP Guide Pubns
Meeting the Challenges The Army Aviation is the arm of the future, a force-multiplier which can tilt the balance in any future conflict
Indian Army’s ALH and Lancer
n LT GENERAL (RETD) B.S. PAWAR
www.spslandforces.net
T
he case for the raising of Army Aviation Corps (AAC) dates back to 1963 when General J.N. Chaudhary, the then Chief of the Air Staff stressed the requirement while discussing the issue with the Select Body on Aviation headed by J.R.D. Tata. General Chaudhary pointed out that helicopters, with their rapid development in design and ability to carry sophisticated weapons had become a potent factor in the land battle. He further opined that efforts at increasing the firepower and mobility of the Army would not be complete without an aviation element comprising of light, medium and heavy helicopters organic to it. The Expert Committee on Aviation also recommended immediate creation of an Army Aviation Corps for the Army. Because of the political and bureaucratic apathy towards defence matters, it took 23 years of persistent efforts to finally break from the Air Force and become an independent Corps of the Army in 1986. The organisation of AAC sanctioned was nowhere near as envisaged in 1963 and continues to
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remain so even today, lacking the wherewithal to be a full-fledged AAC.
Force Structure Despite the AAC becoming a full-fledged arm of the Army in 1986, its growth has been haphazard and the Corps continues to be plagued by many infirmities. Foremost amongst these is the opposition of the Air Force, whenever the question of expansion of the role of Army Aviation comes up for discussion. Essentially, the opposition relates to turf with the Air Force holding on to those assets that logically must come under the ambit of the Army. Today, the AAC has the largest number of helicopters amongst the three services, majority being of the reconnaissance and observation class (Chetak and Cheetah). Despite this, it has very few helicopters to carry out a number of extremely specialised roles in the tactical battle area. While the induction of the light utility helicopter (ALH) has commenced, the medium and heavy lift helicopters, which form the core of the tactical lift capability, continue to be with the Air Force. Hence, the dependence of the Army on the Air Force for tactical move-
ments continues to be near total. A similar situation exists with regard to attack helicopter units, which despite being an integral part of the land battle, remain with the Air Force. Their optimum employment in such a scenario is not possible in the present set up. The Army’s requirement of small fixed-wing aircraft in limited numbers for important roles like command and control, aerial communication hubs, logistics including casualty evacuation and communication flights,
For dominating the tactical battle space of the 21st century, the Army must go beyond fielding light observation and light utility helicopters and the control of attack helicopters by proxy
is not acceptable to the Air Force. And all this, despite the fact that the Indian Navy, the Coast Guard and even central police forces like the Border Security Force have fixed-wing aircraft in their inventory. A survey of military aviation organisations, within and outside the country reveals the inadequacies of our Army Aviation. At present Army Aviation assets are inadequate for the size of the Indian Army and the tasks it is required to perform. The expansion of the AAC is therefore imperative. The Army Aviation should possess a mix of light fixedwing aircraft and all categories of helicopters including attack helicopters/gunships for various roles like reconnaissance, surveillance, combat fire support, airborne command posts, combat service support, special operations and logistics. Army Aviation needs to develop organisations that enhance aviation capabilities to support the concepts of operations of field commanders. The force structure should be tailored to meet evolving operational requirements. In addition, aviation organisations should include appropriate maintenance and logistical support elements required to sustain the force.
A R M Y A V I AT I O N << Army Aviation Employment Philosophy In the future, short notice, short duration and the high intensity non-linear battlefield, with deeper and wider combat zones and emphasis on depth battle, the Army Aviation on account of its ability to quickly engage, disengage and regroup in the battle zone will greatly assist the field force as a force-multiplier. The primary mission of Army Aviation is to fight the land battle and support ground operations. Its battlefield leverage is achieved through a combination of reconnaissance, mobility and firepower that is unprecedented in land warfare. Army Aviation as the manoeuvre force in the third dimension is the centrepiece of the land force operations. Reconnaissance, attack, utility and cargo helicopters complemented by light fixed wing and support services like the air traffic control and logistics are all required to support the Army in its range of military operations. Army Aviation’s greatest contribution to battlefield success is the ability it gives the commander to apply decisive combat power at critical times virtually anywhere on the battlefield. This may be direct fire from aviation manoeuvre units or the insertion of overwhelming infantry forces or artillery fires delivered into combat by air assault. This versatility is the very essence of Army Aviation. However, there are two areas of concern which need to be taken care of in order to ensure effective and successful use of Army Aviation assets in the tactical battle area. These are the air defence and air space management. Suppression of the air defence by defensive measures or a combination of offensive and defensive capabilities would be essential to ensure unhindered employment of the third dimension in support of ground forces. Air space management in the tactical battle area is a very crucial aspect and requires detailed planning and coordination to ensure optimum utilisation of all weapon systems operating in the tactical area. One of the major challenges facing the armed forces is counterinsurgency operations. While the use of helicopters for these operations has been restricted to troop carriage, logistics, surveillance and casualty evacuation, we have been reluctant to use the gunships/attack helicopters because of collateral damage. This could be of concern in build up areas, but in remote mountainous terrain and jungles this option needs to be looked at by the Army and the drills evolved accordingly.
“The Fennec is our most advanced helicopter, fully compliant with the quality requirements of the Indian Army and the Air Force. It is a military certified and combat proven helicopter and the most powerful version in the Fennec family. In fact, it is the only helicopter that has a successful track record while the other helicopters in its class are still experimental. In terms of manufacturing capacity, more than 300 Fennec/Ecureuil helicopters are manufactured every year. Given a production rate of approximately 1 helicopter a day, we are today best geared to deliver the 197 units required by the Indian Armed Forces at the earliest. We are very happy with the Fennec’s performance during the recent trials and are confident that it is the rightful successor of the Cheetah and Chetak”. – Rainer Farid, Vice President Sales, Asia Pacific, Eurocopter
battle area up to a company minus force at the critical juncture of the battle. The Dhruv helicopter is all-weather, night capable, twin-engine machine with state-of-the-art avionics. The availability of this resource will give additional tactical capability to the field commanders in planning and execution of their operational planning. In the medium lift category, the Air Force continues to stonewall all attempts of the Army to acquire a suitable helicopter in the 10-12 tonne class. At the same time they are not prepared to let go of the MI-17 helicopters held with them. These are at present being refurbished for night operations and additional MI-17IV are being acquired for replacing the ageing MI-8 helicopters. This capability is basically required for intra-the-
PHOTOGRAPHS: Abhishek / SP Guide Pubns
Modernisation of Army Aviation Despite 24 years since its formation and break from the Air Force, the Army Aviation continues to remain a reconnaissance and observation force. The helicopters held in its inventory (Chetak and Cheetah) are vintages and need immediate replacement. Trials for their replacement are in the final stage. French Eurocopter and Russian Kamov are in fray. The replacement of the ageing Cheetah and Chetak helicopters is crucial and needs to commence at the earliest. Any further delay on this programme will have disastrous consequences on security. In the light utility category, induction of the Hindustan Aeronautics Limited manufactured Dhruv (ALH) has commenced. Three units have already been raised and are operational, having been orated at the level of Corps. A total of seven such units are planned for induction, each having 10 helicopters. This gives the capability to the field force commander to move within the tactical
Growth and modernisation must proceed simultaneously to complement each other
atre move of reserves and equipment including ammunition and for special operations. The HAL is looking at the feasibility of a joint venture with a foreign vendor for a 10-12 tonne class multiple purpose utility helicopter, but very little progress has been made in this regard so far. The Army needs to pursue this approach more vigorously to acquire this class of helicopters. Attack helicopters/Gunships: Today, this is the weakest link in the capability of the AAC. The meager resources held two units of attack helicopters—MI-25 and MI-35, though under the nominal command of Army, are in fact manned, controlled and operated by the Air Force. However, these helicopters of Russian origin are vintage, though a certain amount of upgrade has been carried
Cheetah and Lancer at the Army Day celebrations
out to make them night capable. The trials for their replacement are currently on. In fray are state-of-the-art modern day attack helicopters like the American Apache Longbow AH 64D, the Russian Ka-50 and MI-28 (Havoc). All of these are dedicated modern attack helicopters and their induction will result in a quantum jump in the capability, notwithstanding the ownership issues. In this context, the development of the light combat helicopter (LCH) by the HAL is a milestone achievement. The LCH aims to gatecrash the exclusive club of the state-ofthe-art light attack helicopters which includes Eurocopters Tiger, Bells AH 1Z super cobra and Chinas ultra secret Zhisheng 10 (Z10). The LCH is a derivative of the ALH and weaponised ALH. The LCH is required to operate at high altitudes, a capability which will be a distinct advantage over others. Two test flights have already been carried out this year and it is likely to enter service by 2014. Armed ALH/gunship: The armed ALH is already at an advance stage of development. Trials to test the weapon systems are currently ongoing. While not a typical attack helicopter, it has an array of comparable weapon systems to include guns, rockets, airto -air and air-to-ground missiles, along with a modern sighting system and relevant sensors. In addition, the Army Aviation already holds in its inventory the Lancer (Cheetah gunship) capable of firing gun and rockets, a very potent and effective weapon system for counterinsurgency operations. Infrastructure development: While we have talked about the main equipment, there is also an urgent requirement to build suitable infrastructure and have it in place to absorb the new equipment and organisations. Support services like airfields, air traffic control, met equipment, maintenance equipment, etc, would also need upgradation and refurbishing. Lastly, the most important facet, the training facilities for the training of air crew and ground crew need modernisation. The importance of simulators for this purpose cannot be overemphasised. A modest start was made with the installation of the fixed-base Cheetah Simulator in 2005 at the Combat Army Aviation School at Nasik. Currently, the HAL in a joint venture with a Canadian firm has come up with a full motion simulator for training of ALH pilots. Its exploitation is yet to begin, but simulators are the way forward for future training methods as they save cost and time. With regards to its organisation, the force structure should be tailored to meet evolving tactical requirements. The concept of Army Aviation Brigades at Command/ Corps level is an imperative. The present concept of aviation base put in place this year is ill conceived and needs to be rectified. In addition, aviation organisations should include appropriate maintenance and logistical support elements required to sustain the force. The Army Aviation needs to play a vastly enhanced role in land operations in the coming years. This is only possible if the arm grows, both quantitatively and qualitatively. For dominating the tactical battle space of the 21st century, the Army must go beyond fielding light observation and light utility helicopters and the control of attack helicopters by proxy. The need is to create a dedicated and fully capable AAC. Resistance from the Air Force will persist, but the Army will have to take a firm and unambiguous stand for its legitimate and logical demands. While the modernisation process has commenced, it is woefully slow and needs to be fast tracked. The Army Aviation is the arm of the future, a force-multiplier which can tilt the balance in any future conflict. The growth and modernisation must proceed simultaneously to complement each other and due priority would be given by the powers that be. A quote from Alvin Tofler sums up the existing situation— “The illiterate of the 21st century will not be those who cannot read and write, but those who cannot learn, unlearn and relearn”.
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ARMAMENTS
Past, Present and the Future Armaments used in helicopters can be broadly classified into three categories, namely rapid firing automatic machine guns, rocket projectiles and guided missiles PHOTOGRAPHS: Abhishek / SP Guide Pubns, Mark Holloway
n AIR MARSHAL (RETD) B.K. PANDEY
T
he range of armament employed on the helicopter since its emergence as a combat platform whether as an armed helicopter or an attack helicopter can be broadly classified into three categories, namely rapid firing automatic machine guns, rocket projectiles and guided missiles. Over the years, all three have continuously evolved turning the relatively slow moving, docile machine into a formidable combat platform. Despite the advancements in accuracy and lethality of air-to-surface guided weapons, of varying calibre, the machine gun still retains its importance and preferred against a variety of targets such as personnel, soft skin vehicles as also thinly protected armoured fighting vehicles.
Hellfire mounted on AH-64 Apache
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Machine Guns: Light & Heavy The 7.62mm calibre, six-barrel M134 light machine gun was developed in the 1960s by General Electric in response to the requirements of the US Army for a weapon with an extremely high rate of fire for defence suppression in the tactical battle area. On account of overheating problems, the rate of fire in terms of rounds delivered every minute had to be reduced from 7,000 to 4,000. During the last nearly five decades, the M134 has undergone a process of evolution, the thrust of the changes being higher levels of reliability though at a lower rate of fire. Garwood, an Arizona-based company, now offers a stainless steel gun with titanium components and chrome-lined barrels. With an in-built facility to select the rate of fire between 3,000 and 4,000 rounds per minute, the gun is designated as the M134G and is employed on the Bell UH-I, Sikorsky UH-60 series and the Boeing MH-6 Little Bird. In the heavy category were machine guns of 12.7mm or 0.5-inch calibre such as the single-barrel pod mounted FN Herstal M3/Gau-21 employed on the AgustaWestland AW101 and the Bell OH-58D. It has a rate of fire of 1,025 rounds per minute. There is also the triple barrel 12.7mm Gau-19/A with a rate of fire of 1,000 or 2,000 rounds per minute from General Dynamics Armament and Technical Products used on HH/MH-60G helicopters. The 20mm threebarrel M197 cannon also from General Dynamics has been de-rated to fire 650 rounds per minute for mounting in the chin turret on the Marine Corps Bell AH-1W/Z and on the AgustaWestland A129CBT. The higher calibre single-barrel 30mm M230 Chain Gun developed by Alliant Techsystems (ATK) is mounted externally on the Boeing AH-64 Apache. With a capacity of 1,200 rounds, the M230 fires 625 rounds per minute. With the evolution of the machine gun came the realisation that for helicopter mounted machine guns, very high rates of fire were neither required nor tenable on account of technical limitations and that small calibre ammunition is equally effective. Also, on the heavier machine guns or cannons, the rate of fire being still lower, a singlebarrel option served the purpose equally well.
Rockets The earliest rockets to be fired from helicopters were unguided and provided an effective option for strike against high value or fortified ground targets. The popular ones amongst these were the 68mm Sneb from Thales/TDA armaments, the 70-mm Hydra-70 from General Dynamics and the CRV7 series from Mag-
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Hydra-70 Rocket launcher mounted on AH-64 Apache
ellan/Bristol Aerospace. The accuracy and effectiveness of unguided rockets was later substantially enhanced through add-on laser guidance kits that help the rocket home on to the intended target. Such conversion kits available today include the direct attack guided rocket (DAGR) from Lockheed Martin, the advanced precision kill weapon system from BAE the Elbit Star. TDA armaments is meanwhile working on a laser-guided Sneb 68mm under the designation Syrocot. Laser homing kits not only provide a much higher level of accuracy but also a low-cost option. In collaboration with Emirates Advanced Investments, Raytheon is developing the Talon for the Middle East market. Trials of the Talon have been carried out on Boeing Apache AH-64D and Bell OH-58D. Equipped with the Raytheon laser seeker head, subsequent batches of the weapon system will be manufactured in the UAE.
Future developments will need to address not only increased effectiveness of the guided weapons systems but also focus on a range of technologies to accord the missile systems multi-role capability, longer life and lower life-cycle cost
To fill the gap between larger, more expensive guided missiles and the current family of unguided rockets, Alliant Techsystems (ATK) in collaboration with Elbit Systems Limited of Israel, has in 2009, successfully tested the 70mm guided advanced tactical rocket (GATR), a semiactive laser guided rocket. Test fired from a Bell OH-58D and Sikorsky UH-60 Black Hawk, the weapons system employs advanced acquisition, tracking, and guidance algorithms and has demonstrated a sub-metre CEP. It is expected to offer a range of over eight km from a helicopter operating at low altitude and the guided rocket has the capability to lock on to the target either before or after launch. The propulsion system of the rocket and the mid-body warhead is made by ATK while Elbit provides the laser guidance equipment. Equipped with a smart fuse, the weapon is effective against stationary and moving targets including thinly protected armoured vehicles. As per Eric Isaacson, Director, Rocket Programmes, ATK, the GATR is quite suitable for integration with Boeing’s Apache attack helicopter as also other similar platforms from Eurocopter. The rocket combines combat-proven performance, a very low smoke signature and the reliability of an ATK-produced propulsion system, similar to that provided by the company for the innumerable rockets supplied to the US Army. ATK will be fielding the GATR as a low-cost option to meet with the requirements of the US Army against stiff competition from other players such as Lockheed Martin, Raytheon and Thales. ATK is conscious of the level of competition but is nevertheless optimistic.
Guided Missiles The objective of aerial missions in war is to achieve objectives rapidly with minimum
casualties to own side and least collateral damage. Progressing beyond the add-on laser guidance kits, the thrust in the development of guidance systems for helicopterlaunched missile systems has focused on integral autonomous guidance systems capable of providing devastating accuracy and facilitating use of smaller warheads at lower cost and lower collateral damage. Research has focused on reduction in the weight of missiles through use of advanced materials, longer stand off ranges for enhanced safety of the launch platform and true “fire and forget” feature that would obviate the need for continued guidance after launch as also the need for the launch platform to venture into hostile air defence environment. On account of operational compulsions, combat helicopters need to operate at low altitudes and hence standoff ranges as compared with fixed-wing platforms, are significantly lower. Guidance systems that enable the air-to-surface missiles to home on to the target with high accuracy are based on laser, infrared, optical systems or signals from GPS. The most commonly employed air-toground guided weapon has been the antitank guided missile (ATGM) which have also been used against a wide variety of reinforced targets. The Raytheon BGM-71 Tow series both wire-guided and wireless with ranges up to 4,000 metres, have perhaps been the most widely used ATGM of western origin in the 25 to 35 kg weight category. The 4,000 metres range MBDA Hot-3 will be used initially on Eurocopter Tiger helicopters in the French and German Armies. As an alternative, the 49-kg MBDA Pars 3 LR that employs imaging infrared guidance would also be available for the Eurocopter Tiger of the German Army. This missile has a range of 6,000 metres as also a fire-and-forget capability. Closer home, the armed version of the Hindustan Aeronautics Limited produced advanced light helicopter Dhruv will be equipped with a new version of the Nag anti-armour missile developed by the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO). This 42 kg weapon system with a fibreglass airframe will employ imaging infrared for homing on to target and is said to have a range of 7,000 metres. The thrust towards the development of smaller warheads has been further inspired by the recent experience of the US forces in Afghanistan with the Lockheed Martin AGM-114 Hellfire. Meant essentially for use against armour, in the absence of suitable alternatives, the Hellfire was widely employed against personnel and other smaller or low value targets resulting in high collateral damage. In a counterinsurgency scenario, prolific use of the Hellfire, especially against unsuitable targets proved to be not only overkill, but expensive and counterproductive as well.
The Future Future developments will need to address not only increased effectiveness of the guided weapons systems but also focus on a range of technologies to accord the missile systems multi-role capability, longer life and significantly lower life-cycle cost. Guidance systems are shifting from command guidance to automatic command to line of sight wherein acquisition and tracking of target would be automated paving the way to launch multiple missiles simultaneously against an array of targets.
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ARMY AIR DEFENCE
A Candid Review With China’s grand design to become a regional hegemon en route to becoming a global power, there is no choice but to modernise India’s defence forces rapidly. But there has been only empty rhetoric without much progress. PHOTOGRAPH: Anoop Kamath
DRDO’s Akash
n LT GENERAL (RETD) NARESH CHAND
T
he security environment in India’s neighbourhood has been deteriorating for quite sometime and with China’s grand design to become a regional hegemon en route to becoming a global power, there is no choice but to modernise India’s defence forces rapidly. Regrettably there has been only empty rhetoric without much progress. A large number of request for information (RFI) and request for proposal (RFP) have been issued, but without any concrete result. A candid review of Army Air Defence (AAD) equipment will prove this point.
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Current AAD Scenario AAD is holding systems with varying timeframes, ranging from the oldest 40mm L70 gun which is more than four decades old to the youngest Tangushka which is about 15 years old. The majority of the remaining guns and missiles are about 20-30 years old. Actually the vintage of these systems is much more in their country of origin. Thus in all respect, they are either obsolete or have reached obsolescence. Meanwhile, the air threat has been becoming more critical with the fifth generation fighters looming in the horizon and unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAV) becoming a reality. With this backdrop, the current AAD picture is rather dismal. L/70 gun system: L/70 is the mainstay and has been the war horse of AAD since
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1964. It was to be completely replaced by 2000. But there is no progress. Defence Research and Development Organisation’s (DRDO) effort also kept its replacement at a limb for about two decades. Not many gun systems are currently available, but a possible choice is Skyshield of Rheinmetall Defence which has an effective range of four km and rate of fire of 1,000 rounds per minute. It can be matched with any fire control radar and the most redeeming feature is its advance hit efficiency and destruction technology (AHEAD) ammunition which contains 152 heavy tungsten metal, spin stabilised sub-projectiles and ejected by a time fuze. It is claimed to be very effective against small targets. The same system can replace ZU-23mm twin-barrel guns if found suitable and reduce the inventory. The gun was to be upgraded but details are not known. However, upgrading or adding new fire control radar will have no effect as the rate of fire is very low to match the current and the future air threat. Schilka system: It is a highly mobile system for supporting armour formations and is in service since the early 1970s. Its successor was Tangushka, one regiment of which was procured, but there have been many twists and turns for buying additional mounts. The result is that the AAD is stuck with limited equipment, which does not meet the current operational requirement. One possibility is to take dispensation for ‘single vendor’, and procure more numbers of Tangushka mounts. The Indian Army has issued another RFI in June, but
there are not many such systems available. Thus the response would not be very encouraging, thereby delaying the modernisation process. Quick reaction SAM (QR SAM) system: The current system is OSA-AK which is a highly mobile system for the defence of armour formations. This system is more than 20 years old and needs to be replaced. DRDO’s effort to develop Trishul system did not succeed and a fresh RFP is likely to be issued shortly. It is very difficult to predict the timeframe of procurement. Possible choices could be Israel’s Spyder, Raytheon’s Hawk XXI which is a more advanced and compact version of Hawk PIP-3 upgrade integrated with a swanky new 3D MPQ-64 sentinel radar. The missiles are upgraded MIM-23K standard with an improved blast-fragmentation warhead that creates a larger lethal zone. Raytheon’s other system is surfacelaunched advanced medium-range air-to-air missile (SLAMRAAM) which is the land version of air-to-air missile which has recently been inducted into the US Defence Forces. Other systems are Russia’s TOR M-1 which has a range of 12 km and Aster15 with a range of about 30 km which seem to fall in the category of either less or more range than required. There are reports that DRDO is having a joint venture with MBDA for Mica missile calling it Maitre (friendship) under a short-range SAM (SR-SAM) system programme for replacing QR-SAM system. Medium range SAM (MR-SAM) system: Kvadrat is the current system which
is more than 35 years old and has the technology of the early 1960s. Thus an RFP has been issued but later on withdrawn due to poor response. DRDO’s Akash has not succeeded in mobile role and so the Indian Air Force has procured limited numbers to replace the ageing Pechoras. The Indian Army has followed suit in buying some for important strategic tasks. But additional procurement appears to be through a joint venture of the DRDO and IAI of Israel. The contenders could be Russia’s BUK-M1, Aster30, Patriot Advance Capability-3 (PAC3). The PAC3 system incorporates many changes to the ground equipment and the missile, and is fielded in incremental steps, called Configuration 1, 2, and 3 PAC3/Configuration. The ultimate PAC3/Configuration 3 includes upgrades to the radar (now designated AN/MPQ-65) to increase detection in high-clutter environments, and to improve discrimination of closely spaced objects (better decoy recognition). Patriot is the obvious front runner as it is war proven; has hit to kill technology; can engage aircraft, helicopters, UAVs, cruise and tactical ballistic missiles deployed with 10 nations including the US. Shoulder Fired SAM systems: The current system is Igla, which is also in service with the Indian Navy and the Indian Air Force. It was to be replaced with a latest version called Igla-M which had a better ‘approach mode’ capability, but it did not fructify. Some current systems are Starstreak of UK, Stinger Block 2 of the US and the Mistral of France.
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Tackling Airborne Threats The Raytheon-Kongsberg team will offer India a set of solutions, or system of systems, tailored to each requirement
n SANJAY KAPOOR
ware and software simplifies the challenges of training and sustainment across the air and missile defence forces. The Raytheon-Kongsberg team will offer India a set of solutions, or system of systems, tailored to each requirement. A network of sensors supplying data to this common command and control architecture provides a single correlated air picture (SCAP) that
enables positive airspace and battle management, integrating and optimising weapon systems performance. C2 integration with multiple adjacent sensors and higher-echelon units, as well as the Indian Integrated Air Command and Control Systems defence structure, will ensure a robust and effective air defence architecture. Digital communication network links all
T
he Indian Ministry of Defence has not yet released the requirement for quick reaction surface-to-air missile (QRSAM), and hence it would be premature to specify an exact solution. However, some insights can be provided into the approach that the RaytheonKongsberg team will take in response to any requirement released by India. Airborne threats today are many and varied. They range from the familiar high speed fixed wing fighters and bombers to hovering helicopters, low radar cross section cruise missiles, loitering unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), and lethal tactical ballistic missiles (TBM). Combine this broad array of threats with the wide range of assets to be protected, and the force commander faces a daunting challenge. The capabilities required to protect a manoeuver force are different from those required to protect a port, population centre or an airbase. The capability required to defeat a large fighterbomber is significantly different from that required for a TBM. It is for this reason that the Raytheon-Kongsberg team will offer India a set of solutions, or system of systems, tailored to each requirement. The key to a successful air defence solution is to employ a layered air defence strategy (Figure 1) that incorporates a mix of weapons systems in order to counter this diverse air threat. Advanced countermeasure capabilities and multi-dimensional saturation attacks require a defensc in depth. The RaytheonKongsberg concept for an air defence system for Indian armed forces offers an integrated air defence system, providing point, area and manoeuver force defence with common sensor coverage and an integrated command and control (C2) architecture. Based on open hardware and software architectures, this C2 design will incorporate existing capabilities of the Indian armed forces and will easily add new capabilities in the future, regardless of the manufacturer. The fire distribution centre (FDC) configured as battery mobile command post (BMCP) is the centerpiece in this state-of-theart C2 system that utilises extended communications and data link capabilities. The unique battalion net data link (BNDL) established between the FDCs provides improved combined sensor coverage and increased ECM survivability. The netting of FDCs enables complete situational awareness by creating and exchanging a local air picture (LAP), air space control measures and integration of external recognised air pictures (RAP); consequently producing a single correlated air picture (SCAP). The FDC C2 solution represents the latest in modern military air defence technology based on open architecture standards. This open architecture enables continuous system capabilities evolution through the addition of elements and modules, as new technology becomes available, providing unlimited future growth potential. This C2 element can be easily and quickly reconfigured to control operations at all levels of command from basic fire unit through battalion, regiment, brigade, or division (Figure 2). Commonality of hard-
air defence elements into a fully integrated system, as well as communication interfaces with adjacent and higher echelon commands. This robust architecture allows each node on the net to be digitally connected thereby overcoming terrain obstacles, and minimising the effects of combat losses of an individual node. Capabilities are mixed and organisations are designed to meet specific
TBM LRSAM Engagements Patriot
Fighter Engagement Zone
Fighter-Bomber Altitude MRSAM Engagements Hawk XXI
QRSAM/SRSAM Zone Hawk XXI & SL-AMRAAM
VSHORAD Zone Stinger
Cruise Missile
UAV
TBM
Cruise Missile
Range Figure 1: Layered air and missile defence capabilities can be mixed to meet multiple mission requirements and defeat the complete array of threats
Brigade BOC Higher Echelon Unit (HEU)
o8 Up t
sub
nits te u a n i ord
Battalion (Regimental) Operations Centre (BOC)
O R
EW Surveillance Radar(s)
O R
Up to 8 Fire Distribution Centres (FDC)
Figure 2: Integrated command & control (c2) provides an accurate picture of the battlespace and robust control of the available forces
Single Vehicle Sentinnel
Hawk in Desert Storm
EMCP Vehicle Options
EMCP Fixed Facility
Self Propelled Hawk Figure 3: All system elements can be mounted on a wide range of platforms
HUMCWAR
missions and defeat the entire range of threats faced by the force. These tailored capabilities will have many characteristics in common. First, a multi-spectral suite of sensors employing state-of-the-art technology for detection and tracking of low radar cross-section and low altitude targets. Given line of sight, target acquisition can occur at ranges well in excess of that required to support specific target engagements. Using a combination of radio frequency (RF) radars, electrooptical (EO), and infrared (IR) sensors, in vehicle mounted or elevated platforms, this suite of capabilities provides a robust detection and tracking capability that even the most sophisticated threats will be unable to defeat. The effectors offered to meet these requirements will also consist of a wide range of capabilities. The ranges will vary from the very short range stinger class missile, the short- to medium-range SL-AMRAAM missile, the medium range Hawk and evolved sea sparrow missile (ESSM), to the long-range Patriot missile. Missile guidance options are a mix of passive, semi-active, active, and trackvia-missile (TVM) guidance. The final missile mix will be selected to defeat the specified threat in support of the required mission. With all the capabilities, the mobility of the platforms are adaptable to meet the specified requirements. Employment on wheeled or tracked vehicles is available and as shown in Figure 3, been demonstrated in numerous configurations. In summary, the solutions available from the Raytheon-Kongsberg team will provide a robust air and missile defense capability that can be tailored to meet the complete array of specified requirements across the Indian armed forces and defeat the full spectrum of threats. The writer is Vice President, Patriot Programs, Raytheon Integrated Defense Systems
1/2011
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T EC H N O LO GY
A Long Way to Go It is disconcerting to note that the three services are progressing on the path of acquiring networked capabilities individually with no coherent framework for joint service enterprise information architecture. What is required is to establish agencies and agents for implementation within each service and for effective tri-service architecture. PHOTOGRAPH: US Army
US future soldiers in action
l l
Joint/Integrated organisations Joint concepts and a joint doctrine to fight future conflicts l Induction of new technologies l Network enabled platforms [tanks, ships, aircraft, etc] l Attitudinal change to accommodate the concept of NCW
Integrate New Technologies as War Fighting Systems
n LT GENERAL (RETD) V.K. KAPOOR
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I
n dealing with technical vocabulary, the first step is to get past the definitional aspect. Network-centric warfare (NCW) is a concept of operations that generates increased combat power by networking sensors, decision-makers and shooters to achieve shared awareness and synchronised activity. NCW uses information for the benefit of the war fighters in peace and in war. The military calls it situational awareness, which implies awareness regarding terrain (including objectives/targets), enemy, and own forces. This information is passed from the sensors deployed on the ground, at sea, in the air and in the space (satellites, unmanned aerial vehicles, aircraft, radars, etc) through broadband digital communication networks to frontline units and the decision-makers in the rear in real/near real timeframe, thus making the battlefield transparent and reducing the response time. Network-centric operations have also been described as high tempo; precise, agile style of manoeuvre warfare focused on effects based operations (EBO) that derive their power from robust networking of geographically separated entities. EBO themselves are coordinated sets of actions directed at shaping the behaviour of friends, foes and neutrals in peace, crises and war. This implies timely, appropriate and skillful use of all or selected element(s) of national power which include political/diplomatic, economic, technological, social, psychological, information/media and military among others. Timely sharing of information and intelligence, results in increased speed of command, higher tempo of operations, greater lethality and increased survivability. In essence, therefore, NCW advocates and enables integration and “jointmanship” in which the three Services, in the Indian context, are lagging behind despite all their diplomatic eloquence from time to time. The final aim is to achieve strategic (political) objectives of war with the least amount of tactical effort which incidentally is also the essence of “operational art”. Hence jointness and integration together with innovative operational art are
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vital parameters of this type of warfare. At the national and military strategic levels, we are continuing to underplay and ignore these issues. Our so called jointness is neither functional nor formalised.
Challenges Related to Net-centric Environment The threat to India from traditional adversaries requires preparation and readiness for high intensity conventional conflicts which are likely to be rare. In the near and midterm, the armed forces are more likely to fight non-traditional conflicts involving counter-terrorism on land, at sea or in the air; proxy wars supported and encouraged by adversarial neighbours; and home-grown insurgencies as part of India’s turbulent internal security situation. Additionally, the armed forces may be called upon to stabilise the volatile strategic environment around India through a benign presence and if required through force projection. Force may also have to be projected to secure our offshore assets, island territories, assets and Indian diasporas abroad, and to assist friendly nations when invited. Hence, the nature of wars, in the future, is going to compel us to think big, but only with smaller, more manoeuverable, more precise, more agile forces and above all integrated forces. This will come about because technology will allow large forces to be replaced by ‘precision’ and ‘information’ highlighting the time factor as the critical issue. A major challenge lies in the realm of our currently well defined command and control structure which would need a review because in a net-centric environment (NCE) the military guideline of ‘one up and two down’ may not remain relevant. Moreover, the dividing line between strategic, operational and tactical levels will meet the same fate because the nature of net-centric operations will allow prosecution of operations in a simultaneous and non-linear manner, throughout the battle space, thus hastening the process of achieving the strategic aims and objectives of war. Another challenge is that while the three services are modernising their respective networks and suitable gateways are being
catered for limited integration at appropriate levels, the communication networks existing currently do not allow the type of inter-operability required. The completion of the defence communications network (DCN) will help in this regard if effective tri-service architecture is well conceived, developed and put into place by a suitably designated team of operational and technical experts of the three services.
Conducting Network-Centric Operations The four fundamental requirements (capabilities) for conducting network centric operations are networked communications, information sharing, advanced information technologies such as agents and decision support algorithms and networked-enabled platforms [vehicles, tanks, ships, aircraft and other weapon systems]. The Indian armed forces are neither integrated nor do they possess these capabilities, regardless of some “standalone” capabilities existing within each service. Our desire to acquire the capabilities is laudable, but if we wish to move along this path of an Indian RMA, then our promises must be backed by agencies and agents for implementation. The military instrument of network-centric warfare will have to be forged on suitably integrated organisations, new technologies, joint concepts and doctrines, and joint training and joint communication architecture. Hence, the important issues that the Services need to examine in far greater details are: l Jointly evolved communication architecture
The Indian armed forces have a long way to go to achieve a capability for net-centric warfare despite the fact that the ‘strategic moment’ for change had arrived
Technology, which is one of the principle factors that drives the change in the method of war fighting is one of the most important components of NCW. India is facing an entirely new technology era, generated through advancements in the field of miniturisation, digitisation, material science, biotechnology, sensor technology, stealth, communications and information technology. India needs to integrate new technologies as warfighting systems for which the requirement is to first evolve a new joint warfighting doctrine and concepts of joint warfighting and then decide upon the weapons and other systems to suit the former. Employment of fully integrated task forces in the future would require, in the first instance, introduction of three key technologies. The first one involves long-range precision firepower on the pattern used by the Americans in the Gulf War, the war in Kosovo and in Afghanistan. The strikes which were carried out from naval platforms, passed through the medium of air, were guided by space based assets, and struck land targets. In the Indian context also there will be a variety of platforms. Networking of the firepower resources of the three services will ensure optimum effect on the target while the choice is left to the integrated force commander to use the most appropriate and the most effective weapons. The second dominant technology trend is in the field of integrative technologies. The advances in the field of communications, computers, command and control, information and interoperability (C4I2) have provided the military a capability to view the battle space as one composite whole and thus targets can be tackled jointly or singly by any weapon of any service, which is within range. Interoperability will be the essence for the different C4I2 systems of the three Services. The third most important field relates to intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) that will keep track of enemy and own forces movements through advanced sensors and platforms like aircraft, UAVs, and satellites assisted by global positioning systems (GPS). These advances are making the battlefield more transparent and the wars more precise. Some of the key technologies, from the point of view of surveillance, in a net-centric environment are synthetic aperture radar (SAR) and hyper spectral imaging (HIS) and a combination of the two in a number of satellites would enable surveillance capability through all 24 hours. Positioning of as little as four manoeuvrable satellites over a selected geographical area could provide battle damage assessment every six hours over a 24-hour period. Other advances in space technology such as transmission of huge amounts of data by vehicles like the transformation satellite system (TSAT) would enable the dissemination of large packets of data such as HIS pictures. Today, it takes a few minutes to receive, typically 500 MB data [one scene]
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T EC H N O LO GY
from satellites. In the future with TSAT, at data rates of 10 to 40 GBPS, it would take less than a second to transmit
Nine Steps in the RMA Process The military analysts have established that RMAs of all kinds, of any magnitude, and in any period are likely to share a common structure with common structural-functional dynamics. Colin S. Gray in his seminal work on RMAs—“Strategy for chaos: Revolution in military affairs and evidence of history”, explains nine steps in the RMA process which could assist the Indian military in coordinating and improving their integrated NCW project. Step 1: “Preparation” implies that RMAs occur following lengthy periods of reform and extensive preparatory work is necessary. Step 2: “Recognition of challenge” explains that RMAs occur for a wide variety of reasons judged important. They are a manifestation of radical political-strategic reorientation which in our case was provided by the Kargil conflict. Step 3: “Parentage” which means RMAs should be successful in requiring political clout or the patronage of those with political clout. A case in point is of the information-led RMA of 1990s in the US where Andrew W. Marshall was the intellectual parent and patron who was keenly supported by the Secretary of Defence William J. Perry and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff William A. Owens. Step 4: “Enabling spark” implies that an RMA like NCW has to be constructed by revolutionary effort and for this a vital “enabling spark” is needed which may be individuals or vital inventions. Step 5: “Strategic moment” spells out that RMAs typically contain a “strategic moment” which reveals, as in a flash of brilliance, new and exciting strategic possibili-
ties. Such moments by themselves may not be the main event but they provide the hint of what may be feasible. Step 6: “Institutional agency” explains the need for RMAs to have agencies and agents for implementation. These include appropriate military organisations and with suitable military cultures, joint doctrines and innovative operational concepts derived through “operational art” and intensive training. Step 7: “Instrument” describes that not only do the RMAs have to be conceived and forged but their military instruments also have to be procured. Regardless of the potency of the military instrument, it has to be of a size which is appropriate for executing operational concepts in the Indian context. Step 8: “Execution and evolving maturity” clarifies that the only test that really counts, in the pragmatic world of strategy, is the detailed consequences of the use of the RMA i.e. its trial by combat. This step essentially refers to the military and strategic effectiveness achieved by implementing the RMA. Step 9: “Feedback and adjustment” must have the potential of fuelling a complete renewal of the RMA cycle. The nine steps explained above are just an analytical tool and could be termed as a conceptual tool kit for understanding an RMA process such as the NCW. It needs reiterating that the NCW phenomenon involves much more than mere networked communications. In fact, it involves a totality of systems which can be abbreviated as command, control, communications, computer, intelligence, interoperability, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4I2SR). Our armed forces would do well to study this phenomenon carefully and conduct the developmental process through tri-service integrated inquiry, research and analysis to arrive at contextual frameworks and structures for NCW. This is also an area where
Timely sharing of information and intelligence results in increased speed of command, higher tempo of operations, greater lethality and increased survivability our strategic convergence with the United States must help us in obtaining the technologies that we lack through direct transfer or through joint development projects.
The Approach to Implementation The cost and complexities of such a project will not allow all platforms of the Indian military to be network-enabled simultaneously and hence priorities will have to be laid down. As far as the Army is concerned, priority should be given to offensive formations as these may be called out at short notice to deal with developing crises. Selected offensive formations should be network-enabled in the first instance. Let us take the example of mechanised infantry division group [a future thought]. In such formations, 100 per cent command and control and combat vehicles will be network-enabled, while troop carrying, repair and recovery vehicles and logistics vehicles may be networked selectively. The key factor should be that when networked even 60 to 70 per cent solutions should deliver a capability that far outstrips the sum of its parts. This will also happen when ground, air and naval platforms are networked and placed under inte-
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grated commands. The Army must also think of flatter organisations as both the nature of future wars and future technologies suggest such a solution. While each Service should plan to conduct intra-service trials for their respective C4I2SR systems, inter-service developments should be conducted apace. I recommend an inter-services team of dedicated professionals from the General Staff, with one or two technical hands along with scientists of the DRDO, at the level of Colonels and equivalents under a two star General/Admiral/ Air Marshal, be formed immediately to look into all aspects of interfacing and interoperability under the aegis of the Integrated Defence Staff. As far as an inter-services “test bed” is concerned, the integrated Andaman & Nicobar Command could be nominated. They should have under them the tri-service military instrument of “force projection” comprising operational formations of all three services. This experience, after due modifications, can later be applied to other force levels on the continental land mass of India or for other contingencies outside the Indian boundary limits. It is quite disconcerting to note that the three services are progressing on the path of acquiring networked capabilities individually with no coherent framework for joint service enterprise information architecture. Currently, the Indian armed forces have a long way to go to achieve a capability for net-centric warfare despite the fact that the ‘strategic moment’ for change had arrived. Hence, what is required is to establish agencies and agents for implementation within each service and for effective tri-service architecture. The cost of transformation will be formidable and hence tri-service organisational synergy and prioritisation of resources will be vital aspects of development. Military and political awakening and acceptance to bring about this change is also a fundamental necessity.
CYBER SECURITY
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F I R ST O F A SE R I ES O F A RT I C L ES TOWA R DS A C Y B E R SECU R I TY ST R AT EGY
Insecurity Rising As a country, we are yet to grasp the significance of cyber warfare. There is no cohesive policy for cyber security at the national level. PHOTOGRAPH: af.mil media gallery
n LT GENERAL (RETD) P.C. KATOCH
T
he Frankenstein of ‘cyber security’ or rather ‘cyber insecurity’ is striking fear across the lengths and breadths of the globe. Cyberspace has become a major potential landscape of insecurity, courtesy hackers, phishing, malware, botnets, bing, ghostnet, conficker, stuxnet, logic bombs, EMP attacks and the like. While experts and governments grapple with the problem, it is well acknowledged that critical infrastructures including distribution systems of electric power transmission, water, oil, gas and the like are very much susceptible to cyber attacks. A major vulnerability has emerged in the use of Internet. It is use of Internet that made Wikileaks possible. Without the Internet, Wikileaks would not have managed to propagate such classified information at this massive scale. On the other hand, penetration of Internet is fast becoming an instrument of exercising operational art. It is for such reasons that China has mastered control of the Internet as part of her cyber security policy. The general belief in India is that relevance of cyber security is mainly in the defence sector. This is a myth. Economy of a country in the modern era has a lot to do with security of Information and Communication Technology (ICT), which in turn is heavily dependent on cyber security especially when cyber attacks have the potential to kill or maim critical infrastructure. Technology, management procedures, cyber laws, organisational structures, cyber security culture, skills and competence of human beings are some of the factors around which cyber security revolves. If our economy is to grow exponentially and if India is to attain its desired position in the comity of nations, we need a coherent approach to cyber security. For such coherent approach, a National Strategy for Cyber Security needs to be defined in sync with international norms. Such a strategy should be supported with operational organisational structures and a roadmap to develop the necessary cyber security culture. We are at a nascent stage of developing a policy response to the threats of cyber spying, if not cyber war, and it would be useful to track developments elsewhere and keep mapping the related capabilities and weaknesses of corresponding Indian institutions.
Cyberspace and Cyber War Future battlegrounds will undoubtedly be inclusive of cyberspace. Cyber warfare has no defined boundaries. I is all pervasive, more penetrating and detrimental and by far much more complex than conventional warfare. Its manifestations include attacks on critical infrastructure, equipment and weapon system disruptions, web vandalism, penetrative data gathering or cyber espionage, distributed denial-of-service attacks, compromised counterfeit hardware, etc. With various surveys assessing that over a hundred countries are developing ways to use the Internet as a weapon and target financial markets, government computer systems and utilities, cyberspace would naturally become the battlefield of choice in not only gaining information superiority but also global supremacy. The past two years (2009-10) saw the US electrical grid being penetrated by allegedly the Chinese. Similarly, the US oil companies Marathon Oil, ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips were the targets of cyber attacks. Registries in 13 European countries were
US Cyber Command
forced to shut down on account of cyber attacks on the European Union’s Emissions Trading Scheme. Such attacks highlight the vulnerability of the critical infrastructure including the vital energy sector due to their connection and interdependence of their information systems with the Internet. The US and surely other countries have been exercising simulated cyber attacks against her critical infrastructure including power grids, communications systems and financial networks in order to arrive at a suitable response roadmap. The major problem is pinpointing the origin of the cyber attacks with all the advantages such attacks have in terms of unpredictability, timing, stealth and anonymity, all of which make threatening retaliation extremely difficult. Such retaliation is doubly difficult sans the means to establish whether the cyber attack(s) is statesponsored or the act of pranksters. How would you define such acts as an act of war or how can you judge that these attacks are a prelude to actual war? Global escalation of cyber attacks and continuing penetration of scores of networks has far outpaced the research in finding suitable deterrent. The spate of cyber attacks indicates one of the objectives is to gather information and test vulnerabilities of actors, networks and infrastructure. Such mapping of the web and accumulated information would help identify cyber warfare targets and refine attack techniques for use at opportune time to paralyse the adversary’s critical infrastructure. The-
Hackers take full advantage of poor programming on a website and install malware that infects the visitors
most attractive channel of attack is the Internet. Hackers take full advantage of poor programming on a website and install malware that infects the visitors. Website builders generally do not include adequate security in design philosophy which leads to exploitable flaws. The originators of cyber attacks could be the States or their arms (like intelligence agencies—both military and civil), defence forces or hackers employed as information and cyber warfare actors/warriors to inflict disruption, map adversary’s capabilities and assess one’s own capacity to attack whenever conflict situations arise. Besides industrial espionage in cyber space that has been ongoing for several decades, cyber attacks can also be politically motivated.
Cyber Security Cyber warfare has emerged as a potent threat both in conventional and non-conventional/asymmetric war scenarios. Hacking spearheading cyber attacks and cyber terrorism have become daily occurrences globally. Conventional war can actually be won in the fifth domain even before the war is declared, much ahead of commencement of hostilities. The power to take control/interfere with the adversary’s networks, not only affects the latter’s defence potential but can actually cripple a nation, bringing almost everything to a standstill. Security is vital since methods of cyber attacks have become more complicated and sophisticated. In India, cyber attacks have been experienced by the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO), Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), National Informatics Centre (NIC), military establishments, defence installations, nuclear installations, Ministry of External Affairs, Ministry of Home and Dalai Lama’s Secretariat, to name a prominent few. Lack of cyber security can cause critical loses in system data and information, resulting in failure of weapon systems, curtailed military activity, shutting
down of satellites and GPS, power cuts, cessation of communications, freezing of stock exchanges and other service interferences. Lack of cyber security can actually permit global catastrophes through cyber attacks. In cyberspace, information gets instantly conveyed to servers around the world. Though the signals are impersonal, they connect the real world. It is not possible to achieve cyber security by individual experts or even by countries/governments independently. It is for the latter reason that groups of countries are aiming to develop partnerships for achieving regional cyber security. The importance of public-private partnership and the need to increase cyber security awareness requires little elaboration. The phenomenon of cyber attacks has affected all parts of the globe; from the most advanced to the developing counties. Absolute cyber security is a myth as security is a challenge, it is dynamic and manifests in newer forms. The threat today is to cripple a nation in all its manifestation and covers a broad spectrum which includes infrastructures like railways, national power grid, national information grid, aviation, surface transport, nuclear/atomic centres, the financial institutions and their networks, defence installations and their networks— today’s security dimensions are quite different from the erstwhile conventional ones. Lack of evolving requisite cyber security deterrent, since ‘prevention’ was found to be ineffective has led experts to advocate ‘preemption’ albeit this is at present sans the legal cover and is facing absurdity of preemption in the face of foolproof evidence. Offensive Information Dominance is the new buzzword and enormous amounts of finances and resources are being poured into this to achieve perfection/ near perfection. It goes without saying that this implies invading foreign computers and networks, not that it will provide foolproof security to own side; damage to both sides is inevitable in the
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CYBER SECURITY
event of cyber attack(s)/ counter attack(s) in varying degrees. We must be able to prevent cyber attacks and if this happens, contain them and effect swift recovery. Malware embedded in both software and hardware including at manufacturing stage can prove grave risks to national security. We must develop foolproof mechanisms to check our system for malware, a capability that is non-existent in the country today.
Defining Cyber Security Strategy Over the years there have been suggestions to evolve deterrence for cyber warfare. However, the problem is identifying the actors that are perpetuating cyber attacks. While conceptually deterrence is of great importance, how can we apply the theory of deterrence to the cyber domain? Whom do you attribute cyber attacks to especially when cyber attacks are not bound geographically and yet have global reach? While we may not be able to attribute the source accurately, would we be able to do so in case of cyber war by our adversaries? Should a nation go in for pre-emption, especially when dependence on cyberspace is becoming vital? Should securing cyberspace not be our main objective and in order to achieve this objective, should not all the components of the nation go proactive to control the Internet and develop a comprehensive understanding of cyber warfare? Evolving a cyber security strategy should essentially begin with a threat assessment and having defined and understood the threats; arrive at a strategy to mitigate those threats. The assessment of threats should include both the military and civil domain and cover the short–, medium– and longterm threat scenarios. Axiomatically, these will need to be periodically reviewed since
fast paced technological developments can be unpredictable. Today, vulnerability in the domain name system (DNS) can already hit foundations of the Internet, allowing the hackers to reroute users to any website or block them. Servers can be systematically killed. The functionalities of malwares are growing in numbers, performing more stealthily and increasing in complexity. Security of networks would include basic physical protection, partitioning and protecting network boundaries with firewalls, having workstation firewalls, basic host security to include port lockdown and minimising running services and access control lists. Measures for controlling access to devices and systems should include user authentication for network devices, centralised authentication and methods and securing network data with encryption and authentication; secure access protocols and refining and instituting basic practices for network security. Of vital importance is to address the enhanced risk of the society due to increasing interdependence on Information Technology (IT) in curtailing leakage of information and preventing penetration in order to protect critical infrastructure. Keeping in mind the increasing vulnerabilities on account of the IT explosion due focus needs to be given towards development of technol-
We are at the nascent stage of developing a policy response to the threats of cyber spying, if not cyber war
F I R S T
Malware embedded in both software and hardware including at the manufacturing stage can prove grave risks to national security
process, engineering requisite resistance into a system ab initio adds little to the overall cost. Given the incapacitating potential of these weapons, we need to develop such capability indigenously. Finally, across the world, developed nations focus their efforts on making their cyberspace more secure and adopt strategies for it, we need to examine the nuances of these strategies and see what can be adapted in the Indian context. This would be covered in the next part of this series.
ogy to ensure security. The US has adopted an unambiguous Offensive Cyber Warfare Policy. We must do likewise and make ‘cyber dominance’ an essential component of our war doctrine. In 2008, the Russia-Georgia conflict became a defining event in network warfare. As per reports, altered Microsoft software was fashioned into cyber weaponry and hackers collaborated on the US-based Twitter, Facebook, and other social-networking sites to coordinate the attack on Georgian digital-based targets. A striking revelation for the researchers was how quickly a common citizen could be transformed into a foot soldier in a cyber conflict. The cyber attacks were carried out by civilians with little or no direct involvement by the Russian government or military, aimed to disable the Georgian government, banks and media outlets. We need to guard against such threats. Other than hackers/cyber attacks, our networks will face serious threats even from non-nuclear electro magnetic pulse weapons and microwave weapons even before the battle is joined. E-bombs are a real threat now. Although, electro-magnetic pulse and high pressure microwave hardening by retrofitment is a very expensive
Create a National Cyber Command
will also allow Joint Tactical Air Controllers to forward exact locations of the enemy to fighter pilots for an air strike. At only 12 ounces, the Warrior-X system automatically alerts the individual of hostile small arms fire and accurately localises the shooter’s position, allowing for a rapid, informed, and coordinated
Quick & Reliable Boomerang Warrior-X is smaller, light weight, and integrated with tactical vests
B
ritish soldiers now have a new device which can pinpoint the exact position of enemy snipers 1,000 yards away. The device Raytheon’s Boomerang Warrior-X is a cost-effective compact dismounted shooter detection system. The detector’s powerful acoustic processing technology evaluates the enemy position by determining the target’s coordinates on a small screen with an arrow indicator. Simultaneously, it bleeps a warning into a headset connected to the device. The small square-shaped detector
Cyber warfare provides the means to conduct attacks and weaken enemy capabilities even before the declaration of war. The world of cyber-security is faced with certain asymmetries. Hacking is easier than defending. To defend its universe of websites, any government requires three things— an appreciation for the challenge it faces, determination to address the challenge, and good counsel on how to address the challenge. If the first two are absent, the third is almost irrelevant. As a country, we are yet to grasp the significance of cyber warfare. At present, there is no cohesive policy for cyber security at the national level. As our dependence on cyberspace increases, who will control and ensure security of the vast networks at the Centre, state, military and civil establishments? These needs to be defined, an appropriate organisation created and made responsible for it. While creation of at least a unified Cyber Security Task Force at the Services level needs to come up in requisite dimensions at the interim level, creation of a National Cyber Command to include a Tri-Service Cyber Command on the lines of the US Cyber Command appears to be an inevitable move. Both need to progress concurrently.
response. The system works in both urban and mountainous terrain, without the need for user input. Its ability to quickly and reliably identify the location of enemy firing locations provides the intelligence necessary to minimise threats and avoid human casualties. Incoming shot announcements are heard from either a built-in speaker or through an earpiece. The light-weight visual display provides range, and azimuth of the hostile shooter. As the individual moves, the system automatically compensates for the individual’s motion and continually updates the threat’s location on the display. Advanced shot recall technology is built into the system’s computing technology for rapid after action review or to update bearing and location to a previous shooter’s location while an individual manoeuvres in an engagement area. Boomerang Warrior-X provides the same reliability, features, and advanced product benefits as the widely fielded vehicle-mounted Boomerang III system—significantly smaller, light weight, and integrated with tactical vests.
PHOTOGRAPHS: Raytheon
PHOTOGRAPH: BAE Systems
T E C K N O W
For Multi-role Worldwide Operations www.spslandforces.net
BAE Systems Bv206S can move in extreme terrain and weather conditions
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n service with Swedish, French, German, Italian and Spanish Armies and under evaluation by other armies, the Bv206S armoured all-terrain vehicle can move in extreme terrain and weather conditions. Available in various configurations, it can be used to transport 12 combat equipped soldiers and can safely get through into areas where most other vehicles and aircraft cannot go. BAE Systems Bv206S is designed for multi-role worldwide operations and is an ideal concept for rapid deploy-
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ment tasks, peace enforcement, peacekeeping and humanitarian aid programme. The Bv206S vehicle is a further development of the successful Bv206, and is designed to meet tough military requirements for extreme mobility under ballistic protection in all climates, with high reliability and low maintenance cost. The Bv206S is designed for air transportation in aircraft like C-130, C-17, CH-47, and CH-53 helicopters and is amphibious with minor preparation.
NIGHT VISION
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Seeing Through Darkness Research and development is being undertaken globally to enhance the reach, improve the resolution and reduce the weight of night vision devices in order to provide a better edge to own side PHOTOGRAPH: ITT Defense
more common as their light amplification technology uses the small amount of ambient light like moon/stars light and converts this light energy (photons) into electrical energy (electrons). These electrons pass through a thin disk that’s about the size of a small coin and contains more than 10 million channels. As the electrons go through the channels, they strike the channel walls, releasing thousands of more electrons. These multiplied electrons then bounce of a phosphorous screen which converts the electrons back into photons, letting you see an impressive night time view even when it’s really dark. To understand thermal imaging it is important to understand that infrared (IR) can be split into three categories; first, near IR with wavelengths from 0.7 to 1.3 microns, or 700 billionths to 1,300 billionth of a meter; second, mid-IR with wavelengths ranging from 1.3 to 3 microns; third, thermal IR with wavelengths ranging from three microns to over 30 microns. Near IR is closest to visible light. Both near-IR and mid-IR are used by a variety of electronic devices, including remote controls. Thermal IR occupies the largest part of the infrared spectrum. The key difference between thermal IR and the other two is that thermal IR is emitted by an object instead of being reflected off it. IR light is emitted by an object because of
ITT Night Vision manufactures a variety of multifunctional night vision binoculars and other equipment for both aviation and ground systems
n LT GENERAL (RETD) P.C. KATOCH
T
he term night vision device (NVD) usually refers to a complete unit, including an image intensifier tube, a protective and generally waterresistant housing, and some type of mounting system. Many NVDs also include sacrificial lenses, IR illuminators and telescopic lenses. A vital ingredient of battlefield transparency is the ability to see by night. The side that can see better by night will have greater advantage. Research and Development (R&D) is being undertaken globally to enhance the reach, improve the resolution and reduce the weight of night vision devices in order to provide a better edge to own side. The Indian Army too has night vision devices (NVDs) on its inventory in various categories and quantities albeit ideal equipping both in terms of quantity and quality are still a far cry. Say, for example, the hand held thermal imagers (HHTIs) that are in high concentration in insurgency afflicted areas like Jammu & Kashmir and which are yet to reach infantry battalions of strike
corps in sufficient numbers. The philosophy for night vision accessories too needs refining if we are to learn from the mistakes of the past. For example, when the HHTIs were first imported from Israel and France only one charger per four HHTIs were procured. This created major problems with widely dispersed deployments in Jammu & Kashmir and forced the infantry to improvise chargers, which may have caused inadvertent damage to the equipment. Another example was of artillery which went in for numerous laser target designators but only one charger that was kept centrally at the School of Artillery and every time charging was needed, individual designators had to be flown in and out. Additionally, our Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and public sector undertakings (PSUs) are way behind in the field of NVDs compared to their foreign counterparts, whose night vision products are bulkier and of lesser resolution.
Inside the NVD NVDs are of two types—image intensifiers and thermal imagers. Image intensifiers are
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PHOTOGRAPH: Rpoptics
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NIGHT VISION PHOTOGRAPHS: Photonis, Qioptiq, Sagem
what is happening at the atomic level. Most thermal imaging devices scan at a rate of 30 times per second. They can sense temperatures ranging from 20 degrees Celsius to 2,000 degrees Celsius and can normally detect changes in a temperature of about 0.2 degrees Celsius. Thermal imaging devices are generally ‘uncooled’ or ‘cryogenically cooled’. The uncooled ones are more common wherein the IR detector elements are contained in a unit that operates at room temperature. These devices are noiseless, activate immediately and have inbuilt batteries. Cryogenically cooled devices have the elements sealed inside a container that cools them to below zero degree Celsius. The advantage of such a system is the incredible resolution and sensitivity thesult from cooling the elements. Though more expensive and more susceptible to damage from rugged use, these systems enable a soldier to see whether a person is holding a gun more than 300 metres away. Unlike the traditional ones, most night-vision equipment which uses image enhancement technology, thermal imaging is great for detecting people or working in near-absolute darkness with little or no ambient light.
The Photonis Group is a global business serving the photo-sensor technology needs of world-leading customers in the areas of night vision, industry and science and Medical Imaging
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Generation Chain NVDs are generally being classified into four categories albeit with differing —some classify them as generation 0, 1, 2, 3 and 4 (yet to be defined) while others classify them as Generation 1, 2, 3 and 4. Advanced version of Generation 3 is also being referred to as Generation 3 Ultra. Since the image intensifier tube (IIT) is the heart and soul of the NVD, classification of the NVD depends on what type of IIT is used in the particular device. The generation chain of NVDs has progressed as under: l Zero Generation: These comprised basically of sniper scopes that came into use during World War II and the Korean conflict though these were not true image intensifiers in the real sense. These scopes were image converters, which required a source of invisible IR light mounted on or near the device to illuminate the target. l First Generation: The sniper scopes of zero generation were succeeded by “starlight scopes” developed during the early 1960s for use in Vietnam. These were actual image intensifier devices. In these devices, three IIs were connected in series, making each unit longer and heavier than future night vision units. This equipment produced an image that was clear in the centre of the field of view. However, it suffered from large optical distortion around the periphery. The first generation equipment was also subject to “blooming or “halo effect” —loss of the entire night vision image, parts of it, or small parts of it, due to IIT overloading by a bright light source wherein the entire night vision scene, or parts of it, become much brighter, “whiting out” objects within the field of view. l Second Generation: Development of the micro channel plate (MCP) in late 1960s ushered the second generation NVDs. The second generation tubes are high quality with exceptional brightness and resolution. Each tube has a micro channel plate, multi-alkaline photocathode with built-in power supply. The MCP accelerated and multiplied electrons substituting coupling of three IIs of the first generation. This enabled reduction of the IITs, enabling design of smaller night vision goggles and hand-held devices. The MCP also provided much more robust operation when bright lights entered the field of view though same trialkali photocathode was used in the IIT as in first generation devices. l Third Generation: Fielded in the early 1980s, these devices saw two major technological improvements; First, Gallium
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Merlin-SR (short range) by Qioptiq is a lightweight night vision adaptor for military and law enforcement operators who want to retain the use of their existing day scopes
Moskito is the newest multifunction handheld from Vectronix AG, subsidiary of Sagem Group, incorporating a laser rangefinder, image intensifier, digital compass, inclinometer and internal GPS. This electro-optical product combines all essential day and night viewing, measuring and geo-location functions into one compact and user friendly device.
Accessories for night vision need to provision in a manner that users have no need to look over their shoulders Arsenide (GaAs) photocathode; second, ion barrier coating to the MCP. This generation was implemented to reflect the change in the photocathode; tri-alkali replaced with GaAs. The third generation image IITs are of high quality. They have a micro channel plate, GaAs photocathode, and a completely self-contained integral high-voltage power supply. These third generation tubes provide a combined increase in resolution, signal to noise ratio and photosensitivity over tubes with a multi-alkali photocathode. The GaAs photocathode increases the tube’s sensitivity to light from the near-infrared range of the spectrum, enables it to function at greater detection distances and improves system performance under low light conditions. Application of a metaloxide ion barrier to the MCP increases the life of the image tube. The operational life of third generation tubes is in excess of 10,000 hours, compared to that of second generation tubes which is about 2,000 to 4,000 hours. Over the years, there have been significant improvements within the third generation NVDs that are loosely being referred to as third generation ultra. l Fourth Generation: In 1998, gated filmless technology was created by removing the ion barrier film and “gating” the system power supply. The technology demonstrated substantial increases in target detection range and resolution. The filmless micro channel plate provides a higher signal-to-noise ratio than standard third generation IITs, resulting in better image quality under low-light conditions. An auto-gated power supply further improves image resolution under high light conditions and a reduced halo effect that minimises interference from bright light sources. The reduced Halo maximises the effectiveness of the night vision device in dynamic lighting conditions such as those experienced, for example, in night operations in urban areas. The primary difference between the second and third generations is the photocathode. The second generation uses a multi-alkali photocathode while third generation uses gallium arsenide. The latter provides a significant increase in photo response and tube life. Other differences in performance are image tube resolution, tube gain and signal to noise ratio. The third generation devices offer greater clarity but are more expensive than the second generation devices. While the second generation NVDs work well in most situations, third generation NVDs achieve high performance in all conditions. Smart technology, designed according to the latest computer technology, now provides the user total control in the high-tech industry of night vision.
Choosing NVDs While choosing NVDs, three important performance parameters that need to be borne in mind are—signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), resolution and modular transfer function (MTF) and lifetime. SNR is by far the most important parameter for an image intensifier. It is a measure of the light signal reaching the eye divided by the perceived noise as seen by the eye. For night vision devices it is measured at a light-level of 108 ulx. The value of the SNR determines the resolution at very low lightlevels. Therefore, the higher the SNR, the betcontinued on page 22
Image Intensifier Tubes
www.photonis.com
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UNMANNED GROUND VEHICLES
Unmanned Machines at War With modern warfare increasingly moving towards an era of complex technologies such as stealth and network-centricity, there is an increasing trend amongst modern land forces to evolve themselves into lighter and more responsive forces that are at once lethal and survivable PHOTOGRAPH: Abhishek / SP Guide Pubns
ROV Daksh, developed by the DRDO in Pune
n SANJAY KUMAR
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ACHINES HAVE ALWAYS been known to supplement human efforts in diverse walks of life. However, the quest for intelligent machines by armed forces across the globe is aimed at reducing human interface with machines on the battlefield. With modern warfare increasingly moving towards an era of complex technologies such as stealth and networkcentricity, there is an increasing trend amongst modern land forces to evolve themselves into lighter and more responsive forces that are at once lethal and survivable. Intelligent machines are useful strategic assets as they can be used for a variety of land operations including search and rescue missions, surveillance, carrying additional loads (mules) and self-contained killing machines.
www.spslandforces.net
Low Visibility While unmanned aerial vehicles or ‘drones’ have been around for quite sometime and these are also increasingly becoming norms with a growing number of air forces around the world, unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) are yet to make their presence felt on the battlefield with the same force as their aerial counterparts. Despite their low visibility, UGVs have proved their combat worth in Afghanistan and Iraq by saving precious human lives. With their ability to see the threat around the corner, UGVs are proving themselves as an important asset for the soldier by increasing his personal safety and enabling him to neutralise the threat quickly and accurately without too much of collateral damage. The terrorist attack of 26/11 in Mumbai is a case in point to underline the importance of combat UGVs for the special operations forces. If the special operation forces that were used during 26/11 attack only had access to military robots, equipped with laser cameras and machines guns, the operations could have resulted in fewer casualties and completed much earlier than they
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did. Following the dastardly terrorist attack on the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York on September 11, 2001, ground robots fitted with laser cameras saved many innocent lives that remained trapped under the debris of fallen twin towers. Later, during the Afghanistan war, the US army used Talon UGV effectively to gather useful intelligence about Al-Qaida operatives hiding in the Tora Bora caves near the Pakistan-Afghanistan borders. Inputs gathered from Talon were subsequently used for mopping up of terrorists hiding in those caves.
Alternatives to Human Soldiers Robots, including unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs), have many valuable attributes that will aid and complement soldiers on the battlefield. They are well suited to perform routine and boring tasks. They are fearless and can work tirelessly 24x7 without knowing hunger or fatigue. They do repetitive tasks with speed and precision. They can be designed to avoid or withstand enemy armaments and to perform specific military functions. Robots can reduce casualties by increasing the combat effectiveness of soldiers on the battlefield. More importantly, they don’t demand salaries and perks. The US military’s success with unmanned combat systems, especially on the battlefields in Afghanistan and Iraq has galvanised global focus towards research, development and purchase of unmanned systems in order to add them to the fabric of their armed forces. It is estimated that currently there are about 50 countries, including India that are pursuing robotic technologies for their armed forces. As the modern warfare becomes increasingly irregular in nature and the threat of terrorism remains globally rampant, there is growing demand for technologies that help keep human soldiers including other law enforcing personnel, out of harm’s way.
Indian Scene Sundaresh, the Chief Controller, Research and Development (R&D), Armament and
Combat Engineering, DRDO, recently announced at Avadi, Chennai, that 20 indigenously developed, remotely operated vehicles (ROVs) are currently being tested by the Indian Army. The ROV, Daksh, developed by the DRDO in Pune, is the first stepping stone for 1.1 million strong Indian Army aiming towards employment of unmanned systems across the entire future battle spectrum. DRDO’s two-foot Daksh is a batteryrun robot which can be remotely operated from a distance of 500 m. It weighs 350 kg and can raise an object weighing 20 kg from a distance of 3 m. It is reported that Daksh has a robotic arm which can lift improvised explosive devices (IEDs) even from a congested place, examine the same with its Xray component for verifying whether it is an IED device and it can diffuse the explosive by using the in-built water-jet disrupter. The robot can even move up the stairs for assessing dangerous objects. There is however another version of Daksh that can work in a nuclear, biological and chemical environment. The next stage in development is ‘robotic mules’, part of the Army’s ambitious modernisation programme for the future infantry soldier as a system (F-INSAS)’ aimed at reducing the logistic burdens for the foot soldiers of the Indian Army. These remotely-controlled robotic mules will also carry automated-weapons to launch concentrated firepower on the enemy. The Indian foot soldiers are notorious for carrying 20-30 kg extra weights than their counterparts in technologically advanced armies. However, these soldiers can perform much better in terms of mobility, agility and fire power with the equivalent of a mechanical mule following behind them.
Leaders in Technology Currently, the US and Israel are the front-runners in robotic technologies insofar as the use of robots for military purposes is concerned. The US military is believed to have around 7,000 UAVs and 12,000 UGVs in its inventory for different operations. SWORDS,
MARS, and WARRIORS are some of the combat UGVs that have been employed successfully by the US military in theatres like Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq. The Israeli military too is using the Guardium, a groundbased robots, to patrol along the Gaza and Lebanese borders. The Guardium is essentially an armoured off-road golf cart with a suite of optical sensors and surveillance gear. It was put into the field for the first time 10 months ago. Given the huge enthusiasm that robotics has generated worldwide, especially among various armed forces that the time is not too far when fighter jets and main battle tanks will become fully automated military robots. Taking the lead in robotics for military applications, way back in 2003, the US had launched the most ambitious project ever for Army modernisation, the future combat system (FCS), envisioning new brigades equipped with new manned and unmanned vehicles linked by an unprecedented fast and flexible battlefield network and aided by various pieces of other gear. The FCS has since been curtailed to Army Brigade Combat Team Modernisation Programme either because funds are not available or because the programme looks too far away.
Innovation Is the Key Robotics is still a nascent science in India. The use of robotics in the Indian military, particularly in the Indian Army, is almost negligible. However, robotic technology holds great significance for security personnel. Deployment of robots to perform sentry tasks at key locations which are vulnerable to suicide terrorist attacks would substantially reduce physical risks to security personnel at the first point of contact with terrorists. India’s present security challenges require keeping constant surveillance all along the border including the most inhospitable Siachen Glaciers. The spread of red-wing extremism across 220 districts in India, especially the use of IEDs by the leftist guerillas has already taken a heavy toll on the security forces in terms of casualties. As the leftist guerrillas are determined to fight protracted conflicts with the security forces, it makes great sense to develop robots which can also fire guns. It would be prudent to keep the robots in the first line of fire, especially in terrains which are difficult to negotiate. Robotics is a dual-use technology with tremendous potentials for commercial spinoffs. The young scientific community in the country needs to be encouraged in taking up R&D on futuristic military technologies. India has huge scientific talent spread across the length and breadth of the country. Competitions need to be encouraged, especially among young students. The student robotic competition held recently at Avadi is a laudable step to usher in key innovations for military purposes. The DRDO perhaps would do well by holding student competitions annually, simultaneously, raising the bar of the competition as well as increasing the prize money. Even if there are no winners in a particular year, competitions still need to be held. Students and other private entrepreneurs who participate in such events would at least build upon their previous experiences and come out with something better next time around. The writer is an experienced researcher and military analyst.
S P E C I A L F E AT U R E
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Vladislav V.Mentschikov, Director General, Almaz-Antey Air Defense Concern
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Automated control systems SenezhM1E, Rubezh-ME, Baikal-1ME, PPRU-M; Air defence radar stations 96L6E, 6C19M2, 9C15MV3, Gamma-DE, GammaC1E, Kasta-2E2; Ground reconnaissance radar stations Zoopark-1, Credo-1, Fara-1, meteorology system Ulybka; Ship-borne air defence systems: Rif-M, Shtil-1, Klinok;
Integrated missile systems Kalibr-NKE, Kalibr-PLE, as well as other defense items from the whole range of the Concern manufactured products. Concern is entitled to be engaged in independent foreign trade activity in particular carrying out negotiations and signing contracts on after-sale service/ maintenance of manufactured and previously delivered armament and defence equipment. n
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Almaz-Antey Russia’s answer for secure skies
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lmaz-Antey Air Defense Concern was created in 2002 and currently has more than 50 enterprises making it as one of Russia’s leading holding defence companies and the world’s major supplier of air defence systems. According to the top 100 annual rating of the US-based Defense News Weekly the Concern’s place is among top 30 largest defence companies in the world. One of the latest Concern developments is S-400 Triumph long-range new generation ADS which became operational in August 2007. After upgrading this system will become the major weaponry for the Russia’s aerospace defence concept for a number of years. Nowadays Almaz-Antey Air Defense Concern is involved in the development of the future common system of anti-aircraft and anti-missile weapons of the fifth generation and in the implementation of the Concept of the aerial-space defence of the Russian Federation. Concern has a wage export potential with an existing portfolio around $6 billion. The Almaz-Antey-made ADS have been operated by more than 50 countries in South East Asia, Middle East, Europe, Africa and Latin America. The list of arms and military equipment being offered for export by Almaz-Antey includes the following items: – long-range air defence systems S-300
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PMU2 Favorit, S-400 Triumph and S-300VM (Antey-2500); Medium-range air defence systems: Buk-M1-2, Buk-M2E; Pechora-2A; Short-range air defence missile systems Tor-M1, Tor-M2E;
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AT T A C K H E L I C O P T E R S
Helicopters in Combat Operations With the ALH WSI and the LCH being indigenously developed by HAL and likely to enter service in the coming years, the Indian armed forces will have formidable and state-of-the-art armed helicopters in their kitty—a useful force-multiplier which can turn the tide in battle PHOTOGRAPH: Indian Army
n LT GENERAL (RETD) B.S. PAWAR
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rmed helicopters or combat helicopters can be classified into two categories i.e. the armed helicopters/gunships and the modernday dedicated attack helicopters (AH). Both are military helicopters, wherein the armed helicopters are normal utility, cargo or reconnaissance modified with weapon mounts for defence against enemy fire from the ground as well as air and for attacking targets on the ground. The purpose of modification could be field expediency and the need to maintain helicopters for missions that do not require weapons. On the other hand, the AH is specifically designed and built to carry weapons for engaging targets on ground and air with special emphasis on anti-tank role. The weapons include machine guns, cannons, rockets and guided missiles for air-to-ground and air-toair engagement. Modern-day AH have two main roles of providing direct and accurate close air support for ground troops and antitank role to destroy enemy armour. Specialised armed helicopters flying from ships at sea are equipped with weapons for anti-submarine and/or anti-shipping operations.
www.spslandforces.net
The Concept of Arming Helicopters The concept of arming helicopters evolved with the French during Algerian and first Indo-China wars (1954-62) in the form of modified armed helicopters. The first use of armed helicopters by USA in large-scale combat operations was in Vietnam. Until Vietnam conflict, military helicopters were mostly used for troop transport, observation and casualty evacuation. These helicopters while flying missions often came under heavy fire resulting in the need for arming them. The Huey UH-IC troop transporter was modified with stub wings attached to its fuselage and kitted with machine guns and rockets. The other helicopters modified as armed helicopters were the Sikorsky and Chinook CH-47. This was a quantum jump from the manned door fitted machine guns of the earlier versions of armed helicopter. During the 1960s, the Soviet Union also felt the need for armed helicopters and modified the military Mi-8 troop transport helicopter with weapon pods for rockets and machine guns. This subsequently led to the development of a dedicated armed helicopter/gunship, the Mi-24, which saw active action in Afghanistan during the 1980s. India had earlier Mi-8 and Ranjeet (modified Cheetah helicopter), fitted with machine guns fired from the side doors. At present, the Mi-17 and Lancer (Cheetah helicopter) are modified for armed role capable of mounting guns and rockets. With the armed helicopter/gunship concept battle proven, began the development of dedicated AH with the primary aim of engaging tanks. The late 1970s/early 1980s saw the advent of AH like the American Apache (AH 64A) and upgraded Huey Cobras (AH 1), the Soviet MI-24 and the Italian Mangusta (A-129). While some questioned the relevance of these dedicated AH due to increased cost over gunships, the 1991 Gulf War put at rest these doubts. Fleets of Apaches and Huey Cobras dominated Iraqi armour in the open desert during the war. In fact the Apaches fired the first shots of war destroying early warning radars and SAM sites with Hellfire missiles. The Soviet operations in Afghanistan
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Cheetah helicopter in Siachen
during 1979-89 saw the emergence of the Mi-25/ Mi-35 AH, a variant of the Mi-24. We have in our inventory the Russian Mi-25/ Mi35 AH which are vintage, though certain amount of upgradation has been carried out to make them night capable.
Types of Armament Systems The most common weapons are machine guns and rockets for use against soft targets on the ground and for self-defence while transporting troops over conflict areas. While armed helicopters have mostly used direct firing weapons with bombs considered more appropriate for fixed-wing aircraft, certain armed helicopters have successfully lent themselves to use with heavy bombs. The US Army used the Chinook helicopters for dropping bombs to clear landing zones and saturate base camps and infiltration routes during Vietnam War. Armed helicopters today can also be fitted with mine dispenser/mine clearance systems. The mine dispenser system is fitted on the US Black Hawk 139. The system is composed of racks on both sides of the helicopter for up to 40 canisters. Each canister contains six anti-tank and one anti-personnel mine. The rapid airborne mine clearance system is another armament sub-system where the intended targets are naval mines. The system comprises of a single modified, 30mm cannon for targeting and neutralising the mines in depth and is fitted on the US Navy Black Hawk helicopter. On the other hand, the AH carries guns, rockets and guided missiles both air-toground and air-to-air. The gun is normally a 20mm/30mm weapon and is located in the chin of the helicopter. The gun provides suppressive ground fire while the AH carries out its anti-tank mission. The unguided aerial rockets complement the short-range gun and the long-range anti-tank missiles. The rockets are cheap and effective as an area weapon. The rockets can also be used to attack and destroy soft ground targets that are not vulnerable to anti-tank missiles like depots and anti-aircraft gun sites. In emergent situations, they could also be used in the air-to-air role. Today, there are rockets with sub-munition warheads which can disperse a number of grenades/bomb lets over specified target areas. The air-to-air missile system is basically to counter the threat from other AHs and is more of a defensive armament system. The anti-tank guided missile is the main punch of the AH. The advent of fire and forget missiles is the greatest asset of the AH which increases its lethality. The Hellfire missile on the Apache
AH is in this class. The carriage of the armament and type will depend on the mission and area of operations. The armed helicopters will have to be fitted with countermeasures suite to include radar and missile detectors, infra-red jammers and chaff and flare dispensers, depending on the degree of threat perceived for their own defence and survival.
Modern Attack Helicopters AH 64D: The American apache longbow (AH 64D) demonstrates many of the advanced technologies being considered for deployment on future AH. The longbow apache AH is an upgraded version of the AH 64A Apache and is the most sophisticated AH in the world today. The Longbow AH has a radar dome atop the main rotors, which facilitates firing of Hellfire missiles in full fire and forget mode, allowing the AH to stay masked behind terrain as it acquires and engages targets. The earlier Apache had to pop up to scan the battlefield leaving it exposed or rely on target data from other sources such as scout helicopters. The Longbow armament consists of a 30 mm cannon, 70 mm rockets, longbow Hellfire missiles and Stinger/ Sidewinder air-to-air missiles. It has the Honeywell integrated helmet and display sighting system with state- of-the-art countermeasure sensors. Ka-50 and Mi-28: The Russians have also developed the state-of-the-art AH in the Ka-50 and MI-28. This decision was taken after their experience in Afghanistan with the Mi-24 AH, which was basically an armed helicopter and hence not suited for a typical AH role. The Ka-50 is the world’s first coaxial, single-seat AH. The Mi-28, on the other hand, is roughly equivalent of the Apache Longbow but without command and control linkup. The Mi-28 has a 30mm chain gun, Ataka anti-tank guiding missile and rocket pods for S-8 and S-13 rockets. The Ataka is an improved version of the Vikhr anti-tank guided missile fitted on the Mi-25/ Mi-35 AH. It also has in its armament the Igla/ Vympel air-to-air missiles. The other dedicated AH operating are the Italian Augusta Westland AW129 (Mangusta), Bell helicopter’s Viper (the latest version of Huey Cobra) and Eurocopter’s Tiger.
Indian Scenario Advanced light helicopter (ALH): It also known as the Dhruv and is already in service with the armed forces. The Army Aviation Corps has four units of ALH fully operationalised and operating in different sectors
including high altitude. The weaponised version of the ALH called the ALH weapons systems integrated (ALH WSI) is currently undergoing weapons integration. The weaponised version is fitted with the more powerful Shakti engines being manufactured by Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL) in collaboration with the French Turbomeca. This engine has also been trial evaluated for high altitude operations on the utility ALH. Basically, the ALH WSI is a new generation armed helicopter duly modified for fitment of all types of weapon sub-systems which can be fitted on a modern-day AH. The ALH WSI has a 20mm gun turret, 70mm rockets and the Mistral air-to-air missile. The integration firing for the above sub systems has already been successfully carried out. However, the anti-tank missile Helina, the air version of NAG being developed by the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) is still not ready. To meet the interim requirement, the Army is scouting in the world market for a suitable missile. The Helina once developed is stated to be a fire and forget missile with seven km range and would compare with the Hellfire missile. The ALH WSI will carry eight anti-tank guided missiles, four air-to-air missiles or four rocket pods for 70mm rockets and a 20mm gun, making it a formidable armed helicopter. Light combat helicopter (LCH): The HAL has also embarked on the development of the light combat helicopter. The LCH is using the technology of the ALH and its configurations, except the fuselage which is streamlined and suitably modified for tandem seating of pilot and weapons system operator with adequate armour protection. The weapons and systems will be the same/similar to the ALH WSI. The above approach has an inherent advantage as most of the critical systems have been proven either on the ALH or the ALH WSI. An indigenous AH like the LCH is a step in the right direction as it can be tailored to suit the terrain and climatic conditions of our area of operations. The first flight of LCH took place on March 29, 2010, and the AH is likely to enter service by 2014. The LCH once fielded should compare well with Eurocopter’s Tiger, Italian Mangusta and Bells Huey’s Cobra.
Future Conflicts Armed helicopters and dedicated AH will be extremely relevant in future conflicts which will be short notice, short duration and high intensity with emphasis on depth battle. The 9/11 bombings and subsequent American foray in Afghanistan has put this class of helicopters in centre stage due to their inherent characteristics. The battle proven Apaches from their anti-tank role in Iraq have got into infantry support role against the Taliban in Afghanistan. However, whatever may be the weapon systems and capabilities of these helicopters, their vulnerability to ground fire is a major concern in their employment. Proper planning and coordination can take care of these aspects and enable effective employment even in extremely hostile environment. The use of armed helicopters in counterinsurgency operations can pay rich dividends as they facilitate carriage of troops as well as suitable weapons for use against insurgents/ terrorists. Both the armed Mi-17 and Lancer have been used in some operations though to a limited extent due to concern for collateral damage. The Mi-17V currently being acquired by the air force is capable of armed role.
AFGHAN WAR
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Looking Back at 2010 There is cause for satisfaction as one surveys the course of the battle in 2010. The stage is being set for some crucial choices to be made in the Afghan campaign and these could well hinge around the US response to Pakistan’s continued sanctuary support to the Afghan Taliban. n MAJOR GENERAL (RETD) G.D. BAKSHI
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HE YEAR 2010 WAS crucial for the final outcome in Afghanistan. President Barack Obama finally approved a half-way surge. Instead of the 60,000 troops asked for by the US Army, he provided some 40,000 additional troops in two waves. There were two major changes in the military leadership. Special Forces Commander Lt General Stanley McChrystal was brought in to replace Lt General McKiernan. McChrystal tried to convince the US and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) forces to operate without close air support and hence reduce collateral damage and civilian casualties. This led to serious disquiet amongst the US and NATO troops, who were highly uncomfortable with the idea of operating without the advantage of responsive air power. The initial offensive in Marjah encountered stiff resistance and resulted in heavy US and NATO casualties, which raised political alarm in the US and Europe. General McChrystal made some very outspoken remarks about the political leadership and this was utilised to remove him from the command. General Petraeus, the hero of the Iraq campaign, was virtually demoted from Theatre Commander to lead the campaign in Afghanistan. He was the author of the ‘clear, hold and build’ strategy. His assumption of command saw the restoration of close air support (largely by attack helicopters) and after several delays, the resumption of the long heralded assault on Kandahar (Operation Dragon Strike). The centre of gravity of the Taliban had been correctly estimated and instead of melting away, they have stood up and fought in the hope that by 2011, the US-ISAF forces would withdraw anyway. This has resulted in fairly heavy attrition, which forced some semblance of peace offers from the Taliban. Convinced that they had won this war, the Pakistanis refused to launch the coordinated attack on North Waziristan (which was supposed to coincide with the Kandahar offensive) on the plea of the floods and the Indian bogey. This toned down the effect of the US offensive in Kandahar. However, the greatest anti-climax came with the US President’s announcement that the date for handing over charge to the Afghan National Army (ANA) had been put off to 2014. The threat of a resumption of Al Qaeda/Lashkar-eToiba (LeT) attack on American/European targets was responsible for this perceived shift in strategy. The attack on the European targets has already commenced, with the latest terrorist strike in Sweden. This prompted the NATO allies to endorse the 2014 withdrawal deadline and even promise to stay engaged (economically, at least) in Afghanistan well beyond that date. This has come as a considerable shock to the Taliban and Pak Military-ISI complex. Their military thinking is invariably coloured by a high degree of subjectivity. They were fully convinced that come 2011 and the US and its allies would cut costs and run. They were keenly anticipating a Taliban victory. This sudden volte-face could affect the Taliban’s morale. It leads one to speculate whether the US announcement of withdrawal of deadline was a deliberate deception exercise. Even if it was unintended, the end result has been the same. It stirred up the Taliban’s hopes to an unreal-
istic level and has now dashed them rudely. General Kayani and the Pak MilitaryISI Complex were dreaming of a complete victory of their Taliban protégés in Afghanistan. There was a quixotic air of triumphalism in Islamabad. In fact, they were almost dictating the terms of surrender to their American interlocutors. Pakistan’s zero-sum game could prove to be its final undoing. The Pakistani military is highly subjective in its estimates and habitually tends to overreach far beyond its capabilities. The key factor, however, would now hinge upon the US and European stamina to absorb the casualties. Frankly, if they do not want a resumption of terrorist strikes on their homelands, they have very little option left, but to persist with their engagement in Afghanistan. The two major offensives of the year 2010 in Afghanistan are:
election in Marjah was below 18 per cent (it was generally 40 per cent in other areas). This clearly highlighted the failure to pacify the area and effect administrative penetration of the population. Nevertheless, the major gain of this battle has been to bring the Taliban to battle and hopefully impose significant attrition.
The Kandahar Offensive The second phase of the American offensive was anticipated in June, in the key Taliban stronghold of Kandahar. However, the Taliban’s unexpected resistance in Marjah delayed the launch of this operation. The Afghanistan government anticipated heavy civilian collateral damage and was dead set against this assault. Therefore, this was converted to a Military Civic Action Programme called Operation Hamkari (Dari for “coopera-
levels, only offensive air support can tilt the balance, especially if the window of operations is so limited and the sensitivity to casualties is so high. Unlike the Marjah operations, the Kandahar offensive was launched quietly by the end of August. Reportedly, operations had commenced in Mehla Jat (South West of Kandahar) in the last week of August. These were followed by operations in the neighbouring areas of Kandahar, to include Argandhab, Zhari (birth place of Mullah Omar) and Panjwaye districts. These led to fierce fighting in the vineyards, pomegranate orchards and over 10 feet high fields of marijuana. A brigade of the US, 101 airborne divisions commenced operations in the Zhari district along with an Engineer Battalion to clear mines/IEDs and 18 US soldiers were killed in these operations. The PHOTOGRAPH: www.ng.mil
A security forces member in Afghanistan’s Paktia province
The Marjah Offensive As part of General Petraeus’ clear, hold and build strategy, the US had launched a major offensive in the Helmand province of Afghanistan in February this year. Taking a leaf from the Pakistani military offensives in Swat and South Waziristan, it was a well advertised operation that was announced in the media, weeks before its launch. Little attempt was made to hide the preparations with the hope that news of the coming major offensive would induce the Taliban to melt away and thus conserve the US casualties. Surprisingly, the Taliban stood up and fought. Helmand is the key poppy growing area and hence was critical for the Taliban. The town of Marjah was cleared by a major heliborne assault. However, the Taliban seeped right back and the much hyped government in the box could not consolidate itself in the wake of the military operations. The resistance in Marjah was far higher than anticipated and the NATO and ISAF troops took heavy casualties. As a result, troops could not be lifted for the Kandahar operations as per the original schedule. Despite the major effort, the turn out for
tion”). General McChrystal had tried to restrict civilian collateral damage by curtailing the employment of air power. This had led to a sharp increase in US/ISAF troop casualties and considerable resentment in the rank and file of the US Army/Marines. It appears that the new Commander, General Petraeus was forced to restore close air support (largely in terms of attack helicopter sorties) and in general restore the use of air power to sustain troop morale and operational effectiveness. The military force to insurgent ratio is not adequate in Afghanistan. With these force
The year 2010 was crucial for the final outcome in Afghanistan. President Barack Obama finally approved a half-way surge.
newly arrived 22 Armoured Regiment lost five men on August 30, 2010 to a roadside IED blast. The main offensive was launched on October 2, 2010. Hard fighting ensued. The fact that the Taliban did not roll with the punch but put up pitched battles, indicates the significance it attaches to this key opium producing terrain that funds its operations. Therefore, it provides a major opportunity for the US forces to inflict high levels of attrition on the Taliban. General Petraeus has stated that the operations launched in Kandahar are more nuanced. He is optimistic that these will force the Taliban to negotiate with the Afghan government and in fact, he cited the attempts by high level Taliban leaders to reach out to the Afghan government. The problems, however, are twofold—the heavy casualties the US/NATO troops are taking in the heavily mined terrain and the political pressures on the Obama Administration to end the Afghan engagement as announced in July 2011. General Petraeus knows he cannot ask for more troops (which are certainly needed). He has been asking for more time. The withdrawal in July 2011, therefore, is likely to be
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AFGHAN WAR PHOTOGRAPH: US Air Force
The second phase of the American offensive was anticipated in June, in the key Taliban stronghold of Kandahar
US soldiers in Helmand province, Afghanistan, during Operation Helmand Spider
very cosmetic/token in nature. In fact, President Obama has clearly indicated that the date for handing over the charge to the ANA is 2014. The NATO allies have endorsed this and in fact, have promised to stay engaged (economically, at least) for well beyond that date. They fully realise that any precipitate withdrawal would well be seen as victory of the Taliban. The American/ISAF strategy is to put sufficient military pressure to force the Taliban to the negotiating table. General Petraeus said, “Negotiated peace agreements are ultimately the way the CI efforts have been concluded.” However, a public declaration of a withdrawal deadline incentivises the insurgents to stay the course and hold on. It fails to let the military and psychological pressure build up and in a way defeat the very purpose of the surge. Helmand and Kandahar, however, have been identified correctly as the key centres of gravity of the Taliban. These are key narcotic markets and bomb producing areas. Their concerted engagement will yield good results. However, the US/NATO will have to be prepared to pay the cost in terms of casualties. This is the American Achilles Heel. Hence, the US is increasingly getting impatient of the Pakistani sanctuary support to the Afghan Taliban. Accordingly, 140 miles to the North of Kandahar, the US/NATO attack helicopters had crossed in hot pursuit and claimed to have chased and killed some 30 insurgents of the Haqqani Group. A Pakistani post at Torkham was attacked
and three Pakistani troops were killed and three injured. Pakistan, in turn, reacted strongly and even stopped US/NATO supply convoys and tacitly encouraged attacks on these convoys to underline its resentment. The floods had given it a very viable excuse to put off the long sought offensive in North Waziristan, which was to coincide with the Battle of Kandahar. There are credible reports of Al Qaeda’s preparations for 26/11 type attacks on European cities. The United States has warned that any attack on its homeland will lead to serious retaliation and has apparently drawn up a contingency list of 150 insurgent camps/targets in Pakistan that will be hit in such an eventuality. Leon Panetta, the CIA Chief, recently visited Afghanistan and Pakistan and then made a surprise visit to India. The jihadi groups are observing radio silence and that is ominous. In the light of all these developments, the outcome of the ongoing offensive in Kandahar will be crucial to the final outcome in Afghanistan. The Americans will have to go beyond the existing ambiguity and clearly decide on their response to Pakistan’s persistent provision of sanctuaries and support to the Afghan Taliban (especially the Haqqani, Hekmatyar and Mullah Omar groups). The Americans are also seeking help from Russian and Central Asian countries to develop alternative routes of supplying their forces in Afghanistan. This will reduce their critical dependence on Pakistan, for logistical support. The European countries should be encouraged to explore alternative routes via Iran, and more closely engage the state and other regional powers like India and Russia to influence the final outcome in Afghanistan. There is cause for satisfaction as the stage is being set for some crucial choices to be made in the Afghan campaign and these could well hinge around the US response to Pakistan’s continued sanctuary support to the Afghan Taliban. The author is a well known military analyst
Continued from page 16 PHOTOGRAPH: Selex Galileo
ter the ability to resolve image details under low light-level conditions. The SNR is related to the specific design of the tubes. MTF is the maximum line density on a target that can be resolved by a human eye and is expressed in line pairs per mm (lp/mm). A more objective performance indicator is given by the modulation transfer function (MTF). High MTF values at low spatial frequencies provide—like for the XD-4 tubes—sharp images with a good contrast. The lifetime of image intensifier is an extremely important parameter for night vision applications. A number of different definitions are used depending on the manufacturer. All image tubes provide a green illuminated picture and no night vision tube is similar to another. All tubes have different cosmetics in terms of small spots or specs, photocathode colouring or a chicken wire effect from the micro channel plate. Most cosmetics are only noticed during viewing in high light situations such as viewing with the daylight filter on in a lit room. Most commercial and military systems are thoroughly tested by manufacturers to ensure reliability.
www.spslandforces.net
Required Philosophy We need to review our night vision philosophy. Conflict situations including when countering terrorism and in asymmetric warfare conditions will provide fleeting targets including in poor light conditions and darkness. Every soldier, particularly the fighting arms, must be able to observe and fire. Enhanced night vision goggles (NVGs) that use digital imagery to improve mobility and situational awareness under all lighting conditions are required for overcoming battlefield obscurants that would generally hinder vision. These should be helmet-mounted systems that digitally combine video imagery from a low-light-
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Nimos Night Mobility Subsystem: Nimos is a modular, lightweight, helmet mounted display (HMD) integrated with a low light level digital TV for soldier night mobility
level visible sensor and an un-cooled longwave infrared sensor onto a single colour display located in front of the soldier’s eye. Till such time that NVGs are procured to required levels, voids should be filled with monocular night vision that can also double up as night sight of individual weapon of the soldier. Digital technology should provide improved image quality. Application of advanced technology should aim at using NVDs for shooting around corners, reading maps, and laser designation, etc incorporating sensor technology used in thermal weapon sights. All weapons (individual and crew served) must have NVDs to enable function as by day. Similarly, adequate NVDs are required for spot and area surveillance and for laser designation of targets in order to optimise use of smart ammunition. Accessories for night vision need to provision in a manner that users have no need to look over their shoulders.
Enhanced Capabilities Future conflict situations demand that we provide the wherewithal to our soldiers to observe and fight in poor light/darkness, including through rain, fog, mist, snow, sandstorms, blizzards, as effectively as by day. Digital technology should provide improved image quality and enhanced capabilities to meet battlefield conditions. We need to refine our night vision philosophy and equip the Army accordingly. The paucity of night vision devices even with the National Security Guard (NSG) was quite apparent on national television. We required NVDs for all our security forces countering terrorism and insurgencies yesterday. The Indian Army must take the lead, fill up the voids in night vision and exploit digital fusion technology, benefitting the war-fighters and help them succeed in their mission.
News in Brief US TO DEPLOY NEW INTELLIGENCE DRONE IN AFGHANISTAN The US military plans to deploy a new intelligence drone in Afghanistan, which military experts say will allow the US troops to monitor much larger operational theatres than before. The airborne surveillance system is called Gorgon Stare and will be able to transmit live video images of physical movement across an entire town. The system consists of nine video cameras mounted on a remotely piloted aircraft, which can transmit up to 65 live images to soldiers on the ground or to analysts tracking enemy movements. By contrast, the current air force drones today shoot video from a single camera over a narrow area. Gorgon Stare will be looking at a whole city, so there will be no way for the adversary to know what we’re looking at and we can see everything.
NORTH KOREA UPGRADES MILITARY CAPABILITY North Korea has increased the number of its special warfare forces and battle tanks over the last two years as part of efforts to improve both conventional and asymmetrical military capabilities against South Korea, according to Seoul’s latest Defence White Paper. The Ministry of National Defense here released the biennial defence report reviving the description of the North Korea as an “enemy” in six years. The description follows a series deadly provocation from North Korea, including the sinking of a South Korean patrol ship in March and shelling of a border island in November. According to the 2010 Defense White Paper, the number of North Korean special warfare forces has increased by 20,000 to 2,00,000. The special operations troops could infiltrate the South through underground tunnels or by AN-2 aircraft to strike major targets or assassinate key figures in the South. The North is
also thought to have increased the number of its tanks by 200 to about 4,100 for the past two years, the White Paper says. The White Paper confirms that the North has deployed a new battle tank, named “Pokpung-Ho” (storm) apparently based on the Soviet-built T-72, and dubbed as M-2002 as the tank is presumed to have been rolled out in 2002. Agency for Technology and Quality, an affiliate of the Defense Acquisition Programme Administration, the Pokpung-Ho is known to be armed with either a newly developed 125mm or 115mm main gun. The tank would also be mounted with a 14.5mm KPV anti-aircraft machine gun. The total number of North Korean troops remains unchanged at about 1.19 million, the Paper says, but the North has added four new divisions and one brigade. In addition, the Paper noted, Pyongyang has 2,500 to 5,000 tonnes of chemical weapons, presumably stored across the country. Concerns about the North’s nuclear weapons programme deepened last month, when Pyongyang, which conducted two nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009, revealed a uranium enrichment facility to a visiting US scientist. The uranium enrichment programme could give the North a second route to build a nuclear bomb.
INDIA MAY ACQUIRE 22 AH-64D BLOCK III APACHE HELICOPTERS
9-13 February Aero India 2011 Air Force Station Yelahanka, Bengaluru, India www.aeroindia.in 20-24 February IDEX 2011 ADNEC, Abu Dhabi, UAE www.idexuae.ae 28 February - 1 March Border Security 2011 Sheraton Hotel Balkan, Sofia, Bulgaria www.smi-online.co.uk 8-9 March International Seminar-cum-Exhibition on Military Modernisation Manekshaw Centre, New Delhi, India www.ciionline.org 14 - 17 March Soldier Modernisation Asia Amara Sanctuary Resort Sentosa, Singapore www.soldiermodasia.com 23 - 25 March Future Artillery 2011 Olympia Conference Centre, London, UK www.future-artillery.com
Editor Lt General (Retd) V.K. Kapoor
ISRAELI DEFENCE FORCES TEST TROPHY ACTIVE DEFENCE SYSTEM The Israeli defence forces have successfully tested the abilities of the trophy active defence system by firing anti-tank missiles at a manned Merkava 4 tank. The military training exercise was conducted with kinetic missiles without warheads, which simulate the missile’s path, so that the system will intercept and destroy aerial threats. Trophy uses special radars and sensors to identify various threats, such as incoming missiles, and launches a special explosive to neutralise them. It is expected that the system will be integrated into all units and be fully operational in the comiwng months. The trophy active tank defence system has been jointly developed by Rafael, Elta and GD.
IRAQI ARMY AVIATION RECEIVES FIRST COMBAT HELICOPTERS The Iraqi Army Aviation Command has received its first three Bell-407 armed training combat helicopters from the US Government. The Bell-407 armed helicopters have been designed to fire Hellfire air-to-ground missiles, and are also equipped with intelligence and data-link capabilities. The aircraft will be used to train Iraqi Army pilots to fly the Bell-407, which is scheduled for delivery over the next 18 months. The Iraqi Army has prepared two instructor pilots to develop a cadre that would operate and maintain the helicopter fleet. Iraq has also ordered another 27 armed Bell-407s for the Army’s 21st Squadron, with deliveries scheduled for 2011 and 2012.
ARMY OPTS FOR 124 MORE MBT ARJUNS
>> SHOW CALENDAR 7-10 February International Armoured Vehicles 2011 ExCeL Centre, London, UK www.internationalarmouredvehicles.com
Publisher and Editor-in-Chief Jayant Baranwal
The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified the US Congress on December 22 of a possible foreign military sale (FMS) to the Government of India of various engines, equipment, weapons, training, parts and logistical support for a possible Direct Commercial Sale of 22 AH-64D Block III Apache helicopters. The complete package is worth approximately $1.4 billion (`6,300 crore). The Government of India has requested proposals from several foreign suppliers, including the United States, to provide the next generation attack helicopter for the Indian Air Force. In this bid, the Government of India is yet to select the Boeing-United States Army proposal. This notification is being made in advance so that if the BoeingUS Army proposal is selected, the United States might move as quickly as possible to implement the sale.
INDIAN ARMY TEST FIRES TWO PRITHVI-II MISSILES The Indian Army has successfully test-fired two nuclear-capable Prithvi-II ballistic missiles from the integrated test range at Chandipur, Odisha. The missiles, which have a strike range of 350 km, were mounted on a mobile launcher and testfired from launch complex-3 in the integrated test range. The two indigenously developed surface-to-surface missiles have already been inducted into the armed forces. They are capable of carrying a payload of 500-1,000 kg and can deceive anti-ballistic missiles. The test-firings were part of routine user trials conducted by the personnel of the Strategic Force Command.
In a major thrust to the indigenisation programme, the Army decided to place a fresh order for an additional 124 MBT Arjun Mark2 tanks. This followed the success of the indigenous tank in the gruelling desert trials in the first quarter of this year. The 124 tanks now being ordered are over and above the existing order of an equal number of MBT Arjun Mark-I placed with the Heavy Vehicles Factory, Avadi.
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Assistant Group Editor R. Chandrakanth Senior Technical Group Editor Lt General (Retd) Naresh Chand Contributing Editor Air Marshal (Retd) V.K. Bhatia Sr. Copy Editor & Correspondent Sucheta Das Mohapatra Assistant Correspondent Abhay Singh Thapa Assistant Photo Editor Abhishek Singh Contributors India General (Retd) V.P. Malik, Lt General (Retd) Vijay Oberoi, Lt General (Retd) R.S. Nagra, Lt General (Retd) S.R.R. Aiyengar, Air Marshal (Retd) Vinod Patney, Major General (Retd) Ashok Mehta, Major General (Retd) G.K. Nischol, Brigadier (Retd) Gurmeet Kanwal, Brigadier (Retd) S. Mishra, Rohit Sharma Chairman & Managing Director Jayant Baranwal Administration & Coordination Bharti Sharma, Survi Massey Senior Art Director Anoop Kamath Design Vimlesh Kumar Yadav, Sonu Singh Bisht Sales & Marketing Director Sales & Marketing: Neetu Dhulia Head Vertical Sales: Rajeev Chugh SP’s Website Sr. Web Developer: Shailendra P. Ashish Web Developer: Ugrashen Vishwakarma Published bimonthly by Jayant Baranwal on behalf of SP Guide Publications Pvt Ltd. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, photocopying, recording, electronic, or otherwise without the prior written permission of the publishers. Printed in India by Kala Jyothi Process Pvt Ltd © SP Guide Publications, 2011 Annual Subscription Inland: `600 • Overseas: US$180 Email: subscribe@spguidepublications.com Letters to Editor editor@spslandforces.net For Advertising Details, Contact: guidepub@vsnl.com neetu@spguidepublications.com rajeev.chugh@spguidepublications.com SP GUIDE PUBLICATIONS PVT LTD POSTAL ADDRESS Post Box No 2525, New Delhi 110 005, India Corporate Office A 133 Arjun Nagar, Opp Defence Colony, New Delhi 110 003, India Tel: +91(11) 24644693, 24644763, 24620130 Fax: +91 (11) 24647093 Regd Office Fax: +91 (11) 23622942 Email: guidepub@vsnl.com
VICE ADMIRAL D.K. JOSHI TAKES OVER AS CISC Vice Admiral D.K. Joshi has taken over as the Chief of Integrated Defence Staff to Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee (CISC) from Air Marshal S.C. Mukul. Earlier Vice Admiral D.K. Joshi was Commander in Chief of Andaman and Nicobar Command. Vice Admiral Joshi is a specialist in anti-submarine warfare and a graduate of the staff course from Naval War College, USA. He is also an alumnus of the National Defence College, New Delhi and College of Naval Warfare (NHCC). He has commanded three frontline units in the Western Fleet viz. the Missile Corvette Kuthar, the Kashin Class Destroyer Ranvir and the Aircraft Carrier Viraat.
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SP’s LAND FORCES 23
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