BACKGROUND

analysis of the impact of COVID-19 crisis on security policy and activities of multilateral organisations (the United Nations (UN), European Union (EU) and NATO). These case study analyses are based on a GoogleTM search for the first 100 website hits in English using the search terms “Country AND covid19 AND (military OR army OR security)” for the period 01 January to 31 July 2020 augmented by a detailed review of press releases by the Ministries of Defence for each country or each organisation. The results section summaries the findings from each of these components with the detailed data being presented in the Annexes. The conclusions section interprets the results section from the following perspectives: threats to international security, threats to internal security, impact on health security, impact on defence and security operations, contribution of armed forces to national responses, lessons for international/national responses, implications for future military medical capability.

BACKGROUND

The potential impact of a pandemic on the stability of the international system was acknowledged in the 2013 NATO Strategic Foresight Analysis (ACT, 2013) within the trend of ‘human networks’. The report forecast that ‘a pandemic will increase instability in weaker states while wealthier, more stable states will be likely to focus resources and efforts to protect their own population. Ensuing tensions, competition for medical resources, treatment and vaccines, coupled with the possibility of uncontrolled migration, could produce instability along and within NATO’s border’. The 2014 outbreak of Ebola in West Africa provided a case-example of the impact of the outbreak of a high threat epidemic disease on the affected countries and the requirement for global co-operation in both the local response and mitigation of the risk to global health (Kamradt-Scott et al, 2016). International armed forces were an essential component of the humanitarian response. The multiple roles played by the armed forces of the affected countries (Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone) provides a case-example of the types of military contribution to national crisis response to a pandemic (Sandy, J). The 2017 version of NATO Strategic Foresight Analysis reflected the international experience of the 2014 Ebola outbreak by stating ‘the impact of a major pandemic would be globally destabilizing and could leave affected nations extremely vulnerable to external intervention’ (ACT, 2017).

NATO has placed an increased emphasis on civil preparedness and national resilience over the last decade as the risk of inter-state conflict between military peers has increased. At the 2016 Warsaw Summit, NATO Heads of State committed to enhance resilience, improve civil preparedness, and prepare for defence against chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) threats (including improving the ability to deal with mass casualties, NATO, 2016). This was reinforced through a common set of new proposals to implement the 2017 NATO-EU Joint Declaration that aimed to bolster resilience by strengthening cooperation on civil preparedness, medical evacuation (MEDEVAC), mass casualty incidents, and population movement (NATO, 2017). The 5th progress report, published in June 2020, highlighted the impact of the COVID-19 crisis on EU Member States and NATO Allies but also identified areas of mutual collaboration in the response including ‘countering disinformation and hostile propaganda; potential logistics support in facilitating the delivery of assistance; responding to cyber threats; exploring the implications of the crisis on respective operational engagements in theatres’ (NATO, 2020). However, apart from a short paragraph on staff co-ordination between NATO and EU medical staff, this report makes no mention of the impact of COVID-19 on international security or military operations or progress on the resilience of the EU or NATO to deal with mass casualties – all of which have been the hallmark of the COVID-19 crisis.

All the instability situations (including pandemics) listed in the 2018 NATO Framework for Future Alliance Operations have the potential to cause mass casualties (ACT, 2018). Whilst the document stresses the importance of resilience to recover quickly from strategic shocks or operational setbacks, there is no mention of mass casualties or the strategic capabilities and capacity required to meet the resulting demand for healthcare. The COVID-19 crisis has demonstrated an initial lack of strategic resilience within the health systems of EU Member States and NATO Allies. The response has required a massive expansion of capacity (e.g. civil-military temporary hospitals, procurement of additional respiratory ventilators, increase in the healthcare workforce) and transformation of ways of working (e.g. widespread introduction of personal protective equipment for clinical staff, video clinical consultations, closure of non-COVID-19 clinical services etc). Most of these changes would also have been necessary in response to a major conflict, especially if it had included CBRN weapons. Thus, it could be argued that insufficient emphasis had been placed on analysing the civil-military capability and capacity requirements for a response to global health threats compared to other emerging and traditional security and defence threats. This includes a relative lack of understanding of the interdependencies between the civil and military health systems within EU Member States and NATO Allies. However, this report will show how these issues have been addressed during the response to the COVID-19 crisis.