OVERCOMING THE POC CHALLENGE

 Ensuring access to assistance  Collecting data and analyzing the threats to civilian populations  Providing support to especially vulnerable groups  Witnessing and documenting human rights abuses  Referring victims to services  Separating civilians from armed actors through relocation or evacuation  Negotiating cease-fires  Engaging with authorities and armed actors to remedy or redress harm.

As NATO missions begin to adopt a formal PoC framework, protection agencies will be key stakeholders to engage at the global and country level. CIMIC officers will play a special role in improving civilmilitary relations in the post-Afghanistan context. Human rights groups will continue to press NATO for high standards of accountability. NATO should be prepared to engage with these stakeholders, and to welcome their input for improving operational effectiveness.

NATO’s emerging concept on PoC can play a major role in overcoming notable failures of the past. This paper has considered historic case studies showing that NATO’s role in protecting civilians is not new, but has already been tested by numerous conflicts. Whether NATO’s role has been remedial (in Bosnia), pre-emptive (in Libya) or a sustained engagement (in Afghanistan), PoC considerations have played a significant role in the scope and purpose of NATO missions and in determining the ultimate outcome of events.

Like the UN, NATO missions may be limited by their mandate. However, NATO’s comparative advantage over the UN approach centers on its use of force, which has both positive results (defeating perpetrators) and negative consequences (civilian harm). Tactics for minimizing harm while using force should continue to be an important operational consideration for all NATO members.

Where NATO intervenes along the spectrum of conflict will largely determine how the PoC is applied. For example, mitigating harm (MH) may not be possible if preventative action has been delayed and significant casualties have already occurred (in Rwanda). Contributing to a safe and secure environment (SASE) will not happen if there is no mandate for post-conflict stabilization. The future of facilitating access to basic needs (FABN) during conflict depends on the ability of NATO to coordinate with humanitarian agencies that have the principal mandate for this work.

Therefore, NATO should consider its approach to PoC as an evolutionary one, taking steps toward the goal of protecting civilians, while being open to adapting its approach in partnership with key stakeholders. PoC encompasses a broad set of challenges that military forces cannot address on their

own. Humanitarian protection agencies have considerable expertise that NATO can leverage. Sustained engagement with local communities, national authorities, and international actors is a fundamental requirement for success.

NATO should also recognize that not all pillars of protection are equal. Protection from physical harm is the foundation upon which other pillars of protection should be established. The right to life is the most basic of all human rights. When NATO conducts airstrikes in densely populated areas, civilian casualties should be assumed. Trends toward the urbanization of conflict and the use of civilians as human shields by non-state actors will only increase the likelihood of casualties. Setting the expectation that civilian casualties will occur can lead to a predictable, institutional response. CIVCAS should be integrated into the planning and conduct of all NATO operations.

As the case studies have shown, gaps in political will can also lead to protection failures. NATO should raise protection concerns in talks with regional organizations including the European Union, African Union, and Arab League. NATO should also engage in a strategic dialogue with the UN to ensure that its efforts are mutually reinforcing. As the Warsaw Summit policy states, protecting civilians is important for the continued credibility and legitimacy of NATO. Protecting civilians is not an easy objective, but with NATO’s advanced military and police capabilities, it can overcome the challenge.

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