NATIONAL COALITION ON GAS FLARING AND OIL SPILLS IN THE NIGER DELTA
OIL SPILLS IN THE NIGER DELTA: REFLECTIONS AND CONCERNS ON JIV AND COMMUNITY INTERESTS
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Acknowledgments Cordaid (Catholic Organization for Relief & Development Aid) BUILDING FLOURISHING COMMUNITIES
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Research Team IBABA SAMUEL IBABA Dr. Ibaba Samuel Ibaba is a Senior Lecturer with the Department of Political Science, Niger Delta University, Bayelsa State, Nigeria. He is presently the Ag. Director, Centre for Niger Delta Studies of the same institution. Ibaba holds a PhD in Development Studies, researches on conflict analysis and resolution, peace building and sustainable development, with the Niger Delta as region of interest. Dr. Ibaba has co-authored and published several books and articles/papers on these areas amongst which are, Natural Resources, Conflict, and Sustainable Development: Lessons from the Niger Delta, published by Routledge (New York, USA) in 2012, a single author book entitled Niger Delta: Constraints and Pathways to Development, published by Cambridge Scholars Publishing (London), also in 2012; and a co-authored book entitled Trapped in Violence: Niger Delta and the Challenges to Conflict Resolution and Peace Building, published by the University of Port Harcourt ( Nigeria) Press in 2013. LAWRENCE DUBE Lawrence Dube is a Ph.D Researcher in African History at the University of Port Harcourt. He works with Centre for Environment, Human Eights and Development where he leads the Governance Team. His areas of interests are Business and Human Rights, Conflict Transformation and Peace Building, Governance and Security. TRACY ADOLE Tracy Adole is an environmentalist and the Project Officer, National Coalition of Gas Flaring and Oil Spills in the Niger Delta (NACGOND), Port Harcourt. She graduated from the University of Benin, (2006) with a BSc First Class Honours in Microbiology and an MSc in Environmental Assessment and Management from the University of East Anglia, UK, (2011). She has significant experience in environmental studies/work, having worked as Research Officer/Acting Registrar, Uptonville Oil and Gas Institute, in the area of flood and environmental management using Geographic Information System (GIS) and as Programme coordinator for an NGO, Poverty Alleviation for the Poor Initiative (PAFPI) in the area of environmental management and sustainable development. She is a Prince 2 registered Practitioner and a facilitator and consultant to Longhall Consulting, on Project Management.
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Table of Content Title……………………………………………………………………………………………………
i
Copyright ………………………………………………………………………………………………
ii
Acknowledgement…………………………………………………………………………………….
iii
Research Team………………………………………………………………………………………..
iv
Table of Content………………………………………………………………………………………
v
List of Figures and Tables……………………………………………………………………………
vi
Summary......………………………………………………………………………………………….
vii
List of Abbreviations and Acronyms……………………………………………………………….. viii 1.0 Introduction……………………………………………………………………………………….
1
2.0 The Vulnerability of Oil Infrastructure in the Niger Delta……………………………………
2
3.0 Oil Spills in the Niger Delta……………………………………………………………………...
3
4.0 The JIV……………………………………………………………………………………………
7
4.1 Who takes part in a JIV?...............................................................................................................
7
4.2 The JIV Procedure…………………………………………………………………………….….
8
5.0 The Concerns……………………………………………………………………………………...
9
6.0 NACGOND in JIVs: The Observable Trends…………………………………………………..
10
7.0 Towards a New JIV Policy and Practice………………………………………………………..
12
References……………………………………………………………………………………………..
14
………………………………………………………………………………………….
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List of Tables
Table 1: Volume of Oil spills and Quantity…………………………………………………………. 4 Table 2: The Impact of Oil spills on the Environment and Agriculture…………………………... 6
List of Figures
Figure 1: Bodo -West Fire Incident JIV……………………………………………………………...
10
Figure 2: Otumara -EscravosTrunklineJIV ……………………………………………………......
10
Figure 3: Disuse 24" Alakiri
- Bonny Pipeline JIV …………………………………………………. 11
vi NACGOND JIV POLICY BRIEF
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Summary Oil spillage, a common occurrence in the Nigerian oil industry is caused by factors ranging from equipment failure, corrosion, sabotage and human error. In Nigeria, there is a state policy on compensatory payments for damages caused by oil spills. A Joint Investigation Visit (JIV) is usually carried out to identify the cause of an oil spill, its impact and by extension value of damaged properties. Generally all JIVs conducted by oil companies have been without participatory involvement of civil societies until National Coalition on Oil Spill and Gas Flaring in the Niger Delta (NACGOND) commenced advocacy engagements with the oil companies and regulatory agencies. However, only Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) has openly allowed external stakeholders such as NACGOND to participate as “observer'' in its JIV process, after series of national and international engagements with the coalition. Although, a step in the right direction, there are still lots of concerns observed by NACGOND during JIVs. The majors ones are, the role of oil companies and security agencies in securing pipelines oil installations, assets integrity management, method of determining the total volume of oil spilled and regulatory agencies role in JIVs and clean up and remediation activities. A number of recommendations were made by NACGOND towards a new JIV policy and practice, to help reduce the distrust between oil companies, regulatory agencies and local communities, ultimately leading to a more environmental sustainable Niger Delta.
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List of Abbreviations and Acronyms
AI
Amnesty International
CEHRD
Centre for Environment, Human Rights and Development
DPR
Department of Petroleum Resources
FME
Federal Ministry of Environment
GDP
Gross Domestic Product
HSE
Health Safety and Environment
JIV
Joint Investigation Visit
JTF
Joint Task Force
NACGOND
National Coalition On Gas Flaring And Oil Spills In The Niger Delta
NDES
Niger Delta Environmental Survey
NGO
Non-Governmental Organization
NOSDRA
National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency
ROW
Right of Way
RSME
State Ministry of Environment
SPDC
Shell Petroleum Development Company
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1.0 Introduction Oil spillage, a common occurrence in the Nigerian oil industry is caused by factors ranging from equipment failure, corrosion, sabotage and human error. Although oil spillages are not limited to the Nigerian oil industry alone, the frequency of occurrence, the insignificant volume of spilt oil that is usually recovered and state policy on compensatory payments for damages caused by oil spills makes the case different in Nigeria. Oil companies make frequent attempts to convince affected communities that what is considered is not the volume spilt, but the area covered by the spill. It is our view however that the volume spilt is equally important, since that determines the dept and lateral spread of the hydrocarbon beneath the surface. In Nigeria, the rates for compensation are fixed by the state, and because these rates are not reviewed regularly, they are usually out of sync with reality; meaning that oil spill victims are in most cases short changed or paid less than the value of what they lose. Furthermore, compensation is not paid for oil spills caused by sabotage, no matter the damages caused to third-parties from this activity, and irrespective of who induced the spillage. Section 115 (c) of the Oil Pipelines Act (cap 338) provides that: “…the holder of a license shall pay compensation (i) to any person suffering damage (other than on account of his own default or account of the malicious act of a third person) as a consequence of any breakage from the pipeline or an ancillary installation, for any damage not otherwise made good.” This makes the identification of the causes of an oil spill a critical factor in the determination of compensatory payments. Accordingly, it is usually the first step the oil industry and other stakeholders take when a spill occurs. In this regard, the oil companies and other stakeholders usually embark on Joint Investigation Visit (JIV), to identify the causes of an oil spill, its impact and by extension value of damaged properties. In the wake of massive oil spills across the Niger Delta region, civil society organizations and communities have intensified pressures and campaigns for government to prevail on oil companies to clean up the environment and pay adequate compensation to the host communities, but this has remained a mere dream as a result of the controversies surrounding JIV participation and reporting. Generally all JIVs have been without participatory involvement of civil societies until NACGOND commenced advocacy engagements with the oil companies and regulatory agencies. Until now, communities have been in the dark on the outcome of JIVs as oil companies with the support of regulatory agencies and security operatives, sometimes carry out JIVs without the participation of the host communities, and even when
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NATIONAL COALITION ON GAS FLARING AND OIL SPILLS IN THE NIGER DELTA
communities participate, the JIV report is not presented in a transparent, participatory and inclusive manner. In numerous cases, we have been told that communities were asked to sign a blank report form. In addition, the choice of community representative has also been a contentious issue, as oil companies' agent or local contractors with vested interest are sometimes chosen to participate on-behalf of the communities. This raises questions about the objectivity and conflict of interest. The outcomes of JIVs have become controversial due to the high incidence of spillages reportedly caused by sabotage, in contrast to those caused by equipment failure or human error. For example in 2002, the Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR) blamed 88 percent of oil spills on equipment failure ( Ibaba and Olumati, 2009). If this was truly the case, then at what point did the oil companies undertake major turn-around maintenance of their equipment and facilities to warrant a huge drop in operational spills? Furthermore, Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) blamed 66.2 percent of spillages it recorded between 2003 and 2007 on sabotage (SPDC, 2008). This period understandably corresponds with the period of militant insurgency in the Niger Delta creeks. However, this has subsided for about four years already, how come oil companies are still blaming most of the spills on sabotage when most of the facilities that DPR blamed for earlier spills have not yet been replaced? It is incongruence's of this kind that makes it hard for oil producing communities to accept post JIV figures churned up and put in the public domain by oil companies. Not even the present high incidence of oil theft has convinced oil producing communities and other stakeholders that non-operational factors are responsible for most of the oil spills in the region. The perception is that the oil companies now hide under oil theft to deny oil spill victims compensatory payments. Significantly, the present trend of JIV reports blames oil spills on oil theft. Given that oil spillages and compensatory payments are critical factors in the Niger Delta conflict, it is important to provide a framework for JIVs that would make the outcome acceptable to all stakeholders. 2.0 The Vulnerability of Oil Infrastructure in the Niger Delta The Niger Delta is located in the southern part of Nigeria, and has the Atlantic Ocean as its southern boundary, while it shares its eastern boundary with Cameroun (NDES, 2004). The region is the mainstay of Nigeria's oil and gas industry, which contributes 40 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 90 percent of total earnings and 87 percent of gross national income (Akinola, 2010, pp.55-56). The region is dotted with over 250 oil fields, 5284 on- and off-shore wells, 7000 kilometers of oil pipelines, and 275 flow
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stations, hosted by about 1,500 communities (Lubeck et al., 2007:5; Adeyemo, 2002: 13). The high incidence of oil spills and oil theft indicates that these infrastructures are vulnerable due to factors including but not limited to: The paradox of wealth and poverty in the region which has created discontent and aggression against the oil industry; Poor oil industry and community relations; Poor maintenance of oil infrastructure by oil companies; Poor surveillance and security of oil infrastructure. 3.0 Oil Spills in the Niger Delta The Niger Delta environment has experienced several oil spills. Available data indicate that a total of 9,107 oil spills were recorded between 1976 and 2005 alone (Nwilo and Badejo, 2008:1222). Between 2003 and 2007, the Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) alone recorded 1,243 oil spills (SPDC, 2008). These incidents resulted in the spilling of oil into the environment, with the attendant damage to the ecosystem. Between 1976 and 2005 for instance, a total of 3,121,909.8 barrels of oil was spilt into the environment (Nwilo and Badejo, 2008: 1222). Significantly, about 70 percent of spilt oil in the region is not recovered (Adeyemo, 2008: 62). Although controversies have arisen on whether these oil spills are caused by sabotage or oil production related activities, this does not matter to the environment as the effects are the same. Table 1 provides information on volume of oil spilled and quantity recovered.
3 NACGOND JIV POLICY BRIEF
NATIONAL COALITION ON GAS FLARING AND OIL SPILLS IN THE NIGER DELTA Table 1: Volume of Oil spills and Quantity Year
No. of oil Spills
Qty Spilled ( barrels)
Qty Recovered ( barrels)
% Recovered
1976
128
26,157.00
7,135.00
27.3
1977
104
32,879.00
1,703.01
5.2
1978
154
489,294.00
391,445.00
80.0
1979
157
694,170.00
63,481.20
9.1
1980
241
600,511.00
42,416.83
7.1
1981
238
42,722.00
5,470.20
12.8
1982
252
42,841.00
2,171.40
5.1
1983
173
48,351.30
6,355.90
13.1
1984
151
40,209.00
1,644.80
4.1
1985
187
11,876.60
1,719.30
14.5
1986
155
12,905.00
552
4.3
1987
129
31,866.00
6,109.00
19.2
1988
208
9,172.00
1,955.00
21.3
1989
195
7,628.16
2,153.00
28.2
1990
160
14,940.00
2,092.55
14.0
1991
201
106,827.98
2,785.96
2.6
1992
378
51.187.96
1,476.70
2.9
1993
428
9,752.22
2,937.08
30.1
1994
515
30,282.67
2,335.93
7.7
1995
417
63,677.17
3,110.02
4.9
1996
430
46,353.12
1,183.02
2.6
1997
339
81,727.85
NA
NA
1998
399
99,885.35
NA
NA
1999
225
16,903.96
NA
NA
2000
637
84,071.91
NA
NA
2001
412
120,976.16
NA
NA
2002
446
241,617.55
NA
NA
2003
609
35,284.43
NA
NA
2004
543
17,104.00
NA
NA
2005
496
10,734.59
NA
NA
Source; Adeyemo, 2008, p. 64; Uba, 2008,p. 28; Emuedo, 2011, pp. 25-26
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NATIONAL COALITION ON GAS FLARING AND OIL SPILLS IN THE NIGER DELTA
Pollution arising from oil spills destroys soil nutrients, crops, economic trees, farmlands and marine life, and this has impacted on the local economies largely based on farming and fishing; leading to occupational displacement/disorientation, and forced migration. When spills occur, farmlands, forests, and bodies of water are rendered useless. Similarly, oil spills have contaminated and destroyed mangrove forests that are important for sustaining local communities. It is instructive to note that total recovery for an oil spill impacted land takes as long as 10 to 15 years (Singh et al., 1995:51; Akpofure et al., 2000:49). The impact of agriculture is noted in Table 2.
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Table 2: The Impact of Oil spills on the Environment and Agriculture Object/ Area of Impacted /
Nature of Impact
Outcome of Impact
Agricultural Land/ Soil Fertility:
Spilt oil seeps into the soil, and
(a) Displaces farmers
Land i s the most critical component
pollutes farmlands. This lowers soil
(b) Reduces crop yield, agricultural
of the means of production for the
fertility and hinders the proper
output, and farm income
rural dwellers who engage in
growth of plants
(c) Instigates rural-urban migration
Usefulness to the Local Economy
fishing. Plant growth and
(d) Results in loss of farmland
agricultural out-put is predicated on the quality of the soil in terms of its availability Mangrove Forest/Swamp:
The
mangrove swamp provides breeding
Spilt oil spreads into the mangrove
(a) Displaces fishermen
and destroys marine life, as it
(b) Reduces fish catch and income
ground for over 60 percent of marine prevents them f
rom receiving
of fishermen
adequate oxygen for survival
(c) Instigates rural-urban migration
Crops/ Economic Trees: Crops and
Spilt oil destroys crops and
(a) Displaces farmers
economic trees such as cassava,
economic trees
(b) Reduces crop yield, agricultural
species, attachment points for valuable oysters, and is also the concentration point of periwinkles
yam, plantain, rice, sugar cane, oil
output, and farm income
palm, coconut, pineapple, sweet
(c) Instigates rural-urban migration
potato, and rubber provide a life support system, through income and employment, generation Creeks, Rivers, and Streams:
(a) Loss of fishing grounds
Serves as fishing grounds which
(b) Displaces fishermen
support he fishing occupation that is
(c) Reduces fish catch and income of
a source of income, employment and
fishermen
protein nutrient
(d) Instigates rural-urban migration
NDES, 2004, p.272; Wilcox, 2010, pp. 15-17, UNDP, 2006, P. 84-85
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The JIV The immediate response to an oil spill incidence, as required by Nigerian regulatory law, in order to ascertain the cause of spill, is the Joint Investigation Visit (JIV). The operating company is expected to report all oil spill incidences to the Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR), and National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency (NOSDRA), after which there is a JIV to the spill site. The following are the primary objectives of a JIV:
To independently access and determine the cause (s) of oil spill
To determine the volume of oil spilt and the extent of damage done to the impacted area
To enable regulatory agencies allocate responsibility for the oil spilt
To provide the basis for assessing the damage caused by the oil spill and payment of compensation for damages to victims/claimants; in the case of operational spills.
To give a clear picture of oil spill management, clean up and remediation by oil companies
To give stakeholders an understanding of the nature and integrity of oil company assets and installations.
Ultimately, the outcome is to establish whether compensation should be paid or not. If the spill is caused by equipment failure, the operating company will be compelled to pay compensation to the impacted community or communities, but if it is due to sabotage, the company will be absolved of any responsibility. This provision is outlined in Nigeria's 1990 Oil Pipelines Act, which provides that: “The holder of a license shall pay compensation … to any person suffering damage (other than on account of his own default or on account of the malicious act of a third person) as a consequence of any breakage of or leakage from the pipeline or an ancillary installation, for any such damage not otherwise made good.” This provision of the law underpins the contentions between oil companies and their host communities over the outcome of JIV reports. 4.1 Who takes part in a JIV? The oil spill JIV team comprises of representatives of regulatory agencies; the operating company; surveillance contractor; representatives of the affected community (usually drawn from among the youth groups and Community Development Committees); security operatives (mostly the Nigerian army or Joint Task Force (JTF)) and the clean-up contractor. The following regulatory agencies have been active in most recent JIVs organised by the SPDC Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria (SPDC).
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1.
The National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency (NOSDRA): This is a specialised agency
of the Federal Ministry of Environment. NOSDRA was established in 2006 to address oil spill issues, including implementation of a national oil spill contingency plan, prevention of future oil spills and remediation of past oil spill damage. 2. The Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR): The DPR supervises all petroleum industry operations, including enforcing safety and environmental regulations. 3. The State Ministry of Environment where the oil spill is located also participates in JIV processes. The duty of the JIV team is to investigate the cause of the spill and to jointly agree and sign the JIV report that confirms the cause of the spill, the volume of oil spilt, the nature of the environment and the area impacted by the spill. However, there is a conflict of interest dictated by the leading role oil companies play in oil spill investigations. It makes the process vulnerable to severe manipulation and corporate malpractices by oil companies. Of all the international oil companies operating in the Niger Delta, only SPDC, so far, allows external stakeholders to participate in its JIVs. Even with this, Amnesty International and a local NGO, Centre for Environment, Human Rights and Development (CEHRD) have reported that SPDC repeatedly influences the outcomes of JIVs and also doctors the reports in her favour to avoid any penalties (AI & CEHRD, 2013). 4.2 The JIV Procedure There is no uniform procedure for conducting Joint Investigation Visits (JIV) as there is currently no national legislation defining the conduct of JIVs. Procedures differ among the oil companies, and they are usually very secretive. Besides, there have been several claims that the reports are doctored to suit the interest of the operating company, and are not made public most times. Moreover, of all the oil companies, only SPDC has openly allowed external stakeholders such as the National Coalition on Oil Spill and Gas Flaring in the Niger Delta (NACGOND) to participate in its JIV process, after series of national and international engagements with the coalition. So the procedures recorded in this report are based on the practices common to SPDC in their JIV operations. The procedure is as follows:
Notification of regulatory agencies of the oil spill incidence by the operating company
Fixing of date and invitation of stakeholders for Joint Investigation Visit
Arrival of stakeholders at the spill site
HSE briefing and introduction of all stakeholders
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Clearing of the spill site by the clean up contractor
Commencement of the JIV process
Repair of the damaged asset
Signing off the JIV form by designated stakeholders
Conclusion of the JIV
5.0 The Concerns The current JIV process has however been a subject of controversy between the oil companies and oil producing communities in the Niger Delta region. Lack of a standardized guideline on JIVs leaves oil companies to operate with a fragmented opaque approach. It is known that all the major oil producing companies have their different JIV procedures, but generally these procedures are not transparent and they are not inclusive of communities impacted by oil spills. It has been alleged that oil companies use security forces to exclude communities from the JIV process. There are also claims that oil companies do not fill JIV form on the spot after the investigation, but rather ask the representatives of the impacted community to sign the signature page and thereafter take the JIV form to their offices and return a final report in their favour. Hence, communities have been at a loss in JIV reporting because their lack of inclusion has meant that oil companies use JIV reports to escape responsibility and deny communities justice (AI and CEHRD, 2013). Amnesty International reported in a 2009 report “that companies appear to exact significant influence over the investigation into oil spills”. The report stated that it is the company that designates causality after oil spill Joint Investigation Visits have been conducted, and there is no means of challenging their assessment, which makes the system open to abuse (AI & CEHRD, 2013). This is one practice that the oil companies have used to rob communities of their rights during oil spill investigations. In a recent study, AI and CEHRD (2013) noted that the JIV process is heavily dependent on the oil companies: they decide when the investigation will take place; they usually provide transport to the site of the spill; and they provide technical expertise, which the regulatory bodies lack. Given the provisions of the national legislation (Oil Pipelines Act, 1990) which absolves oil companies of blame if oil spill is caused by sabotage or oil theft, the oil companies have found it comfortable to tag virtually all oil spill cases as oil theft activities, because the information contained on the JIV form is very important to them since it is the basis on which decisions whether communities will be paid compensations 9 NACGOND JIV POLICY BRIEF
NATIONAL COALITION ON GAS FLARING AND OIL SPILLS IN THE NIGER DELTA
or not are made (AI & CEHRD, 2013). Although oil theft and illegal refining have led to several oil spill cases, the oil companies have failed to answer questions regarding the security, safety and integrity of their assets. It is on this note that the current JIV process has been seriously condemned as faulty by several local and international stakeholders. 6.0 NACGOND in JIVs: The Observable Trends NACGOND has been engaging with oil companies and regulatory agencies since 2011 seeking to end oil spills and gas flaring in the Niger Delta region through advocacy, evidence based research, media campaign and participation in oil spills investigations. Of all the oil companies, SPDC has been the only company that has extended invitation to NACGOND as an external stakeholder to participate in oil spills investigation involving their facilities. In 2013, NACGOND participated in several JIVs in SPDC operational areas across the Niger Delta region and has noted a trend. The following has been observed so far.
Figure 1: Bodo-West Fire Incident JIV 
Figure 2: Otumara-Escravos Trunkline JIV
There is a prevailing trend of oil theft across the Niger Delta. To this end, in some of the JIVs monitored by NACGOND the cause of spill was linked to oil theft activities. This calls for serious action because the nature and pattern of oil theft activities leaves a lot to be desired considering the role of oil companies and security agencies in securing pipelines oil installations.

Oil companies have succeeded in shifting the blame of oil spills from pipeline integrity to oil theft, so it is now fashionable to blame all oil spill cases on oil theft and ignore calls for the repair and proper management of their assets.
2 The JIVs involving NACGOND had in attendance: National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency (NOSDRA); State Ministry of Environment (RSME); Surveillance Contractors; Community Representative; The Nigerian Police; Joint Task Force; SPDC Staff and Contractors; Right Of Way (ROW) contractor; Representative of NACGOND
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The ease at which oil theft activities are carried out on supposedly well maintained and monitored assets calls for scrutiny.
The total volume of oil spilled has remained an issue of controversy between SPDC and host community stakeholders. In all the JIVs monitored, SPDC did not disclose the quantity of oil spilled at the site nor the method used in calculating volume.
There is no regulatory oversight during clean up and remediation activities. All claims to the latter rely only on the information provided by the oil company concerned.
Several unused assets remain un-decommissioned all over the Niger Delta, causing oil spills and environmental damages.
Figure 3: Disuse 24" Alakiri - Bonny Pipeline JIV
SPDC uses double standards in her response to oil spills. Oil spills caused by equipment failure are usually concealed or reported late, while those caused by oil theft are quickly reported.
Secret pre-visit actions on some spill sites before incidents are reported, like in the Bodo spills in June 2013.
Oil companies and security agencies have not done enough to address the problem of insecurity of oil installations.
Despite the presence of the JTF and surveillance contractors, oil theft has remained rampant. This raises serious concerns about the integrity of the JTF and surveillance contractors.
There are serious concerns across communities and among civil society that the JTF, surveillance contractors and, perhaps, some SPDC staff are in collusion in the business of oil theft.
The problem of environmental pollution and livelihood depletion has been neglected by government and regulatory agencies. It is safer now to blame everything on oil theft. 11 NACGOND JIV POLICY BRIEF
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There has been no proper clean-up of impacted sites despite promises and claims to the contrary.
The management style of SPDC and their community relations programme lacks the confidence of host communities and this has repeatedly created distrust and friction between host communities and the company over the security of its assets and installations.
SPDC's direct service contract policy which mandates the hiring of surveillance contractors alienates some host communities, and thus the latter claims it cannot be held responsible for the security of oil company assets.
There has been slow response time and ill preparedness of SPDC especially in terms of nonavailability of equipment at spill site which has resulted in rescheduling of JIVs or inconclusive JIVs.
Community representatives in JIV teams lack the knowledge and competence to be involved. This makes them to sign JIV forms even when the outcomes do not capture the reality.
7.0 Towards a New JIV Policy and Practice After an extensive review of NACGOND JIV activities and also reports from other researches, the following are advised:
There should be a systematically defined national JIV policy, formulated through an inclusive process involving all stakeholders. This should come as an act of parliament, in addition to the proposed NOSDRA Bill, and should address the gaps observed in the different JIV policies and procedures of the oil companies. To strengthen the JIV process, the government should make adequate provisions for it in the PIB that is before the national Assembly, including penalties for operators that default on the process. At the moment, very little attention is paid to oil spills in the PIB and nothing is mentioned regarding Joint investigation Visits. A stringent legislation on the JIVs processes and reporting is needed to put oil companies in check against all forms of malpractices during and after oil spill investigations and reporting. The legislation should also empower communities to assert their rights during oil spill investigations, and enhance the role of civil society stakeholders to engage more with oil companies during oil spills. This legislation should specify the qualifications/competence level of community members who should be involved in JIV. Where such persons are not available in the community concerned, credible consultants, NGOs, or government agencies should be made to represent community interests.
Regulatory agencies should set the guideline for the Joint investigation visits and reporting. All activities relating to the date of oil spill, cause of oil spill, quantity of oil spilled and the size of the 12 NACGOND JIV POLICY BRIEF
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impacted area should be closely monitored and directed by NOSDRA.
The integrity of the affected assets should also be ascertained during JIVs, so as to also determine amongst other things, if poor integrity contributed to assets damage when it is a case of third party actions.
Regulatory agency should also monitor all clean up and remediation activities on impacted sites to ensure that they are in line with regulatory standards.
The government should provide the agency with all the resources needed to ensure the agency takes the lead during JIVs in an independent and transparent manner.
NOSDRA should set up an oil spill emergency response platform where community members can reach it via mobile telephone to report cases of oil spills.
Host communities should be more assertive and responsive to oil spills and Joint Investigation Visits. Communities that are well represented and socially inclusive can engage properly during JIVs, hence, communities should make efforts to train individuals/or group of persons to have the competence to be effectively involved in the JIV process.
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References Adeyemo, A.M., (2002). The oil industry, extra-ministerial institutions and sustainable agricultural development: A case study of Okrika LGA in Rivers State, Nigerian. Journal of Oil and Politics, Vo.2, No.1, pp. 60 -78. Adeyemo, A.M (2008). Environmental policy failure in Nigeria and the tragedy of underdevelopment of Niger Delta Region, Inaugural Lecture No. 63, University of Port Harcourt. Akinola, S.R., (2010). “Restructuring the public sphere for social order in the Niger Delta through polycentric planning: What lessons for Africa”. Asian and African Studies, No. 9, 55-82. Akpofure, E. A., Efere, M. L & Ayawei, P. (2000). Oil spillage in Nigeria's Niger Delta: Psychomorphological and empirical overview. International Association of Impact Assessment (2), Opulence Environmental Services Ltd, Psycho-Morphological Learning Exchange Network. Amnesty International (2009). Nigeria: Petroleum, Pollution and Poverty in the Niger Delta. London, June. Amnesty International & CEHRD (2013). Bad Information: Oil Spill Investigations in the Niger Delta. November 7. Emuedo, C.G.O (2011), Oil and environmental despoliation: Implication for food and health security in the Niger Delta, Paper presented at International Development Research Council (IDRC), Think Tank Initiative (TTI) & Center for Population and Environmental Development (CPED) Workshop on Confronting the Challenges of Development, Environmental Management and Peace Building in the Niger Delta: Beyond the Amnesty, July 28-29, 2011, Benin, Edo State, Nigeria. Ibaba S. I. & Olumati, J.C. ( 2009). Sabotage induced oil spillages and human rights violation in Nigeria's Niger Delta. Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa, Vol. 11, No. 4, pp. 51-65. Lubeck, P.M. Watts, M.J. & Lipschutz, R. (2007). Convergent interest: U.S. energy security and the “securing” of Nigerian democracy. Internal Policy Report. Washington: Center for International Policy, NDES (Niger Delta Environmental Survey) (2004). Phase II Report. Nwilo, P.C & Badejo, O.T. ( 2008). Impacts and management of oil spill in Nigerian coastal environment, Conference Proceedings, International Conference on the Nigerian State, Oil Industry and the Niger Delta, Organized by the Department of Political Science, Niger Delta University, in Collaboration with the Centre for Applied Environmental Research, Department of Geosciences, University of Missouri Kansas City, USA, March 11-13, Yenagoa, Bayelsa State, Nigeria, pp. 12171232.
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