Cross Border Trade Compliance: Background

MADISON HASTINGS

I. United States Trade Statutes

Congress contributes to the formation of U.S. trade policy pursuant to its constitutional authority over tariffs and foreign commerce. Through the Trade Act of 1974 and the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Congress delegated some aspects of its constitutional authority to regulate foreign commerce to the President. Pursuant to these acts, the President, based on agency investigations, may impose import restrictions to address specific concerns. See U.S. Trade Policy: Background and Current Issues, https://crsreports.congress.gov/ product/pdf/IF/IF10156 and Escalating U.S. Tariffs: Timeline, https://crsreports.congress. gov/product/pdf/IN/IN10943.

The Trump administration differs from prior administrations on trade policy. One way it proceeds differently is by placing emphasis on the trade deficit as an indicator of “unfair” foreign trade practices that impact U.S. industries. To address this issue, the Trump administration proposed and imposed tariffs and restrictions based on investigations under U.S. trade laws, including one—Section 232—that has been used infrequently by prior administrations. The trade laws used for most of the Trump administration trade actions are Sections 301, Section 201, and Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. See U.S. Trade Policy: Background and Current Issues, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/ IF/IF10156.

A. Section 232 of the Trade Expansion

Act of 1962

This statute allows the President to adjust imports through tariffs or quantitative restrictions (quotas) if the Department of Commerce finds products are imported in such quantities or circumstances as to “threaten to impair U.S. national security.” The Section 232 investigation on aluminum and steel products provided for 10% tariffs on a specified list of aluminum imports, effective indefinitely. The tariffs imposed on aluminum imports affect all countries except Australia, Canada, and Mexico. For Argentina, quantitative import restrictions were imposed in place of tariffs. Tariffs on aluminum imports became effective March 23, 2018. This section provides for 25% tariffs on a specified list of steel imports. The tariffs imposed on steel imports affect all countries except Australia, Canada, and Mexico. For Argentina, Brazil, and South Korea, quantitative import restrictions are imposed in place of tariffs. Tariffs on steel imports became effective March 23, 2018. The Trump administration also initiated a Section 232 examination on autos and auto parts but missed its 2019 deadline for imposing such tariffs. Currently, no tariffs are in effect on autos and parts, pending negotiations. See Escalating U.S. Tariffs: Timeline, https://crsreports.congress.gov/ product/pdf/IN/IN10943 and Section 232 Auto Investigation, https://crsreports. congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10971.

B. Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974

This statute allows the USTR to suspend trade agreement concessions or impose import restrictions if it determines a U.S. trading partner is “violating trade agreement commitments or engaging in discriminatory or unreasonable practices that burden or restrict U.S. commerce.” Section 301 investigations were launched against China. On July 6, 2018, the United States imposed a Stage 1, 25% tariff on 818 Chinese imports. On August 23, 2018, the United States imposed a Stage 2, 25% tariff on an additional 279 imports. On September 24, 2018, in response to Chinese retaliatory tariffs, the United States imposed a Stage 3, 10% tariff that was increased to 25% on 5,733 more imports. On August 14, 2019, the USTR released a two-part plan to impose 10% tariffs on approximately $300 billion of imports. The first part of this plan, stage 4A, will take effect on September 1, 2019. The second part of the plan, stage 4B, will take effect on December 15, 2019. See Economic and Trade Agreement Between the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/ files/files/agreements/phase%20one%20 agreement/US_China_Agreement_Fact_ Sheet.pdf.

II. United States Relations with China

The background to the Section 301 actions against China started with the March 2018 Section 301 report by USTR on China’s Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property and Innovation. In 2017, the National Security Strategy described China and Russia as seeking to “challenge American power, influence, and interests, attempting to erode American security and prosperity.” This evaluation started the Trump administration Section 301 investigation and the now prolonged trade war. See https://ustr.gov/ sites/default/files/Section%20301%20 FINAL.PDF.

This trade battle with China has large implications for both countries. In 2018, in terms of goods, China was the United States’ largest trading partner, third-largest export market and largest source of imports. China is also the largest foreign holder of U.S. Treasury securities. See U.S.-China Trade and Economic Relations: Overview, https:// crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/ IF11284. U.S. exports of goods and services to China totaled $178.0 billion (7.1% of total exports) in 2018, while imports from China amounted to $558.8 billion (17.9% of total imports). As a result, the overall bilateral deficit was $380.8 billion, up $43.6 billion (12.9%) from 2017.

The recent trade relationship between the U.S. and China reveals an increase in competition and decrease in cooperation. The rising friction is attributed not only to the more confrontational inclinations of the Trump administration, but also to China’s more assertive behavior under President Xi Jinping. On August 5, 2019, the U.S. Treasury Department labeled China a currency manipulator for the first time in a quarter century. To pressure China to change its economic practices, the United States also imposed tariffs on U.S. imports from China under Section 301. Almost all imports from China were scheduled to be subject to additional tariffs by the end of 2019. See U.S.-China Relations, https://crsreports. congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45898.

U.S. tariff increases and China’s retaliatory tariffs have reordered global supply chains. These tariffs have heavily impacted farmers and manufacturers. The trade war remains unresolved as of February 2020, although there has been a Phase One Settlement with China as of January 15, 2020. See https://ustr.gov/sites/default/ files/files/agreements/phase%20one%20 agreement/Phase_One_Agreement-Ag_ Summary_Long_Fact_Sheet.pdf. As a result of the trade war, Mexico and Canada by the end of 2019 had passed China to become the largest trade partners of the United States. See https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/ statistics/highlights/top/top1912yr.html.

III. United States Sanctions

The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the U.S. Department of the Treasury administers and enforces economic and trade sanctions based on U.S. foreign policy and national security goals against targeted foreign countries, regimes, end users, terrorists, international narcotics traffickers, those engaged in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, human rights abuses, corruption, and other threats to the national security, foreign policy or economy of the United States. There are at least eleven countries covered by ongoing OFAC Sanctions programs as of February 2020. See https://www.treasury.gov/resourcecenter/sanctions/Programs/Pages/Programs. aspx. However, the list of countries and other targets can and does change rapidly. This is because OFAC also has targeted sanctions aimed at individuals and companies owned or controlled by, or acting for or on behalf of, targeted countries, as well as individuals, groups, and entities engaged in the national security threats See https://www.treasury. gov/about/organizational-structure/offices/ pages/office-of-foreign-assets-control.aspx. Collectively, these individuals and companies are called Specially Designated Nationals (SDNs). The assets of such companies and individuals are blocked and U.S. persons are generally prohibited from dealing with them. See https://www.treasury.gov/resourcecenter/sanctions/SDN-List/Pages/default. aspx.

All U.S. persons must comply with OFAC regulations. OFAC further encourages all exporters to maintain a rigorous risk-based compliance program. See https://www. treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/ Documents/framework_ofac_cc.pdf.

A. Selected Country Sanctions: the

Venezuela Sanctions

On December 18, 2014, President Obama signed the Venezuela Defense of Human Rights and Civil Society Act of 2014 into law. This Act required the Executive to impose targeted sanctions on certain persons determined to be responsible for significant acts of violence or serious human rights abuses against antigovernment protesters in Venezuela. On March 8, 2015, President

Obama issued Executive Order 13692, invoking the authority of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act and the National Emergencies Act (IEEPA) and the National Emergencies Act. OFAC issued the Venezuela Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 591, to implement the Act and Executive Order 13692 pursuant to authorities delegated to the Secretary of the Treasury. See https://www.treasury.gov/resourcecenter/sanctions/Programs/Documents/ fr80_39676.pdf. Executive Order 13692 prohibits dealings in “[a]ll property and interests in property that are in the United States, that hereafter come within the United States, or that are or hereafter come within the possession or control of any United States person” with any delineated persons. See https://www.treasury.gov/resourcecenter/sanctions/Programs/Documents/ fr80_39676.pdf. Any violation that involves any property or interest in blocked property is “null and void and shall not be the basis for the assertion or recognition of any interest in or right, remedy, power or privilege with respect to such property or property interest.” See https://www.treasury.gov/resourcecenter/sanctions/Programs/Documents/ fr80_39676.pdf.

B. Russia Sanctions.

Unless otherwise authorized or exempt, transactions in the United States or by U.S. persons are prohibited if they deal in property or interests in property of an entity or individual listed on OFAC’s SDN List. An entity will also be blocked if it is fifty percent (50%) or more owned, whether individually or in the aggregate, directly or indirectly, by one or more persons whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to any part of 31 C.F.R. Chapter V, regardless of whether the entity itself is listed. Sectoral sanctions are imposed on specified persons operating in the Russian economy identified by the Secretary of the Treasury through Directives. Directive 1, as amended, prohibits the following transactions by U.S. persons and within the United States: (1) all transactions in, provisions of financing for, and other dealings in new debt of longer than 30 days maturity or new equity of persons determined to be subject to Directive 1, their property, or their interests in property; and (2) all activities related to debt or equity issued before September 12, 2014, that would have been prohibited by the prior version of Directive 1 (which extended to activities involving debt of longer than 90 days maturity or equity if that debt or equity was issued on or after the date a person was determined to be subject to Directive 1).

Directive 2, as amended, prohibits transactions by U.S. persons and within the United States involving the financing, or otherwise dealing in new debt of longer than 90 days maturity of the persons subject to Directive 2, their property, or their interests in property. Directive 3 prohibits transactions by U.S. persons and within the United States involving financing, or otherwise dealing in new debt of longer than 30 days maturity of the persons subject to Directive 3, their property, or their interests in property. Directive 4 prohibits the following transactions by U.S. persons and within the United States: providing, exporting, or re-exporting, directly or indirectly, goods, services (except for financial services), or technology in support of exploration or production for deep-water, Arctic offshore, or shale projects that have the potential to produce oil in the Russian Federation, or in maritime area claimed by the Russian Federation and extending from its territory, and that involve any person subject to Directive 4, its property, or its interests in property.

OFAC may authorize categories of activities and transactions otherwise prohibited by issuing a general license. On a case-by-case basis, OFAC considers applications for specific licenses to authorize transactions that are neither exempt nor covered by a general license. A request for a specific license must be submitted to OFAC’s Licensing Division. See https://www.treasury. gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/ Documents/ukraine.pdf; see https://www. treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/ Programs/Pages/ukraine.aspx.

IV. Export Controls

A. Export Administration Regulations

The Department of Commerce – Bureau of Industry and Security as well as the State Department oversee the Export Administration Regulations (EARs) program. The scope of the EARs is dual use products and export of goods that could compromise national security. To comply with the EARs, an exporter must check denied parties lists, determine ECCN if needed, and apply for a license, if required. See https://www.export. gov/article?id=Export-Control-Regulations; http://www.bis.doc.gov.

B. International Traffic in Arms Regulation

The Directorate of Defense Trade Controls of the State Department oversees the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITARs) program. ITARs control the sales of items used for military purposes. To comply with the ITARs, an exporter must check

whether its products for export are on the U.S. Munitions List, determine if a license is required, and contact its local Export Assistance Center. See https://www.export. gov/article?id=Export-Control-Regulations; see www.pmddtc.state.gov; www.buyuse.gov.

V. InvestmentRelated Controls

Oversight of investment into the U.S. takes place through the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS). The Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018 (FIRRMA) expanded jurisdiction of CFIUS to address certain growing national security concerns. FIRRMA also modernized CFIUS review processes to enable more timely and effective review of covered transactions in

seven ways.

First, FIRRMA broadens the purview of CFIUS by adding to the review of mergers and acquisitions of U.S. firms four new types of covered transactions. These include: (1) a purchase, lease, or concession by or to a foreign person of real estate located in proximity to sensitive government facilities; (2) “other investments” in certain U.S. businesses that afford a foreign person access to material nonpublic technical information in the possession of the U.S. business, membership on the board of directors, or other decision-making rights, other than through voting of shares; (3) any change in a foreign investor’s rights resulting in foreign control of a U.S. business or an “other investment” in certain U.S. businesses; and (4) any other transaction, transfer, agreement, or arrangement designed to circumvent CFIUS jurisdiction.

Second, FIRRMA provides for an abbreviated filing process for the voluntary disclosures through a new “declarations” procedure. This procedure could result in shorter review timelines by CFIUS and allow some discretion to require parties to file before closing a transaction. Third, FIRRMA expands the CFIUS review period from thirty to forty-five days and allows an investigation to be extended for an additional fifteen-day period under extraordinary circumstances. Fourth, FIRRMA strengthens requirements on the use of mitigation agreements, including the addition of compliance plans to inform the use of such agreements. Fifth, FIRRMA grants special hiring authority for CFIUS and establishes a fund for collection of new CFIUS filing fees.

Sixth, FIRRMA delays “the applicability of some of the bill’s most significant provisions until [eighteen] months following enactment of FIRRMA or [thirty] days after the Secretary of the Treasury publishes in the Federal Register a determination that the necessary regulations, organizational structure, personnel, and other resources are in place to administer those provisions, whichever is sooner.” Finally, FIRRMA authorizes CFIUS to conduct pilot programs to implement any authority provided under the bill. See https://www.treasury.gov/ resource-center/international/Documents/ Summary-of-FIRRMA.pdf.

VI. Anti-Boycott Regulations

The United States opposes restrictive trade practices and boycotts by foreign countries against what it considers to be friendly countries. This anti-boycott position is implemented pursuant to the Export Administration Act of 1979 (EAA), enforced by the Bureau of Industry and Security of the U.S. Department of Commerce. U.S. persons may not take certain actions “with the intent to comply with, further, or support an unsolicited foreign boycott.” Prohibitions include: refusing to do business with a boycotted or blacklisted entity; discriminating against, or agreeing to discriminate against, any U.S. person on the basis of race, religion, sex, or national origin; and furnishing information about business relationships with a boycotted country or blacklisted entity. Any “U.S. person”, as defined under the regulations, must notify the U.S. Department of Commerce upon receipt of a request to comply with an unsanctioned foreign boycotted country or blacklisted entity. See https://www.export. gov/article?id=Antiboycott-Regulations.

VII. Import Relief Laws: Anti-Dumping & Countervailing Duty Laws

Title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930 contains the U.S. version of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty laws. Antidumping (AD) and Countervailing Duties (CVD) address what is regarded as unfair trade practices. The laws provide relief to U.S. industries and workers that are “materially injured” or threatened with injury due to the dumping of imports of like products sold in the U.S. market at less than fair value (below the cost of production or home market prices) or subsidized by a foreign government and thus lower in price due to such subsidies. The AD and CVD laws are administered by two agencies. The U.S. International Trade

Commission, an independent, quasi-judicial agency, determines whether U.S. industry suffered material injury due to dumping or subsidies.

The International Trade Administration of the Department of Commerce evaluates the AD or CVD petition, decides whether to initiate an investigation, determines whether dumping or subsidies exists, and calculates the amount of dumping or subsidy and the duty to be imposed in response. If an investigation results in affirmative determinations, an order is issued directing U.S. Customs and Border Protection to collect the duties imposed on imported merchandise that has been dumped and /or subsidized. In AD cases, the remedy for injury is an additional duty placed on imported merchandise to offset the difference between prices in foreign and U.S. markets. In CVD cases, a duty equivalent to the amount of subsidy is placed on imports.

Supporters of these laws argue their necessity in shielding U.S. industry and workers from unfair competition. Supporters also argue that the laws increase public support for additional trade liberalization measures. Opponents suggest these laws create inefficiencies in the world trading system by “artificially” raising prices on imported merchandise. AD and CVD duty order—which are granted for five years—are subject to review. This review, including judicial review, can result in upward or downward adjustment of the dumping or subsidy margin. Review can also result in continuation or revocation of an order. During the anniversary month of the publication of an order each year, an interested party may request a review. At the end of the five years, AD and CVD orders must undergo a “sunset” review. This review determines whether dumping or subsidies would likely continue or resume if the order is revoked. Review is also conducted to determine whether injury to the domestic industry would likely continue or resume. See Trade Remedies: Antidumping and Countervailing Duties, https://crsreports. congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10018.

VIII. Preferential Trade Laws

A. Generalized System of Preferences

U.S. trade preference programs, including the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), provide an opportunity for the world’s poorest countries to escape poverty by gaining duty free access to the U.S. market. Established by the Trade Act of 1974, the GSP promotes economic development by eliminating duties on thousands of products imported from one of 120 designated beneficiary countries and territories. See https://ustr.gov/issue-areas/ trade-development/preference-programs/ generalized-system-preference-gsp. Eligibility for GSP access –at the country level and the product level—is subject to review annually by the Office of the United States Trade Representative. See https://ustr. gov/sites/default/files/GSP-GuidebookSeptember-16-2016.pdf#page=16.

B. The African Growth and Opportunity

Act

On May 18, 2000, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) was signed into law in Title 1 of the Trade and Development Act of 2000. https://www.trade.gov/agoa/ index.asp. AGOA offers tangible incentive for African countries to open their economies and build free markets. See https://www. trade.gov/agoa/index.asp. The President of the United States is authorized to designate a country listed in section 107 of AGOA as a “beneficiary sub-Saharan African country “if the President determines the country meets certain eligibility requirements.” See https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/ the-press-office/2011/10/25/presidentialproclamation-african-growth-andopportunity-act. The beneficiary subSaharan African countries presently include: Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cabo Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, South Sudan, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. See https://www. trade.gov/agoa/pdf/2018%20US-SSA%20 Trade%20Summary.pdf.

IX. United States Free Trade Agreements

The United States has fourteen free trade agreements in force with twenty countries as of February 2020. See U.S. Trade Policy: Background and Current Issues, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/ pdf/IF/IF10156. There are bilateral free trade agreements with Australia, Bahrain, Chile, Columbia, Israel, Jordan, South Korea, Morocco, Oman, Panama, Peru, and Singapore. See https://ustr.gov/tradeagreements/free-trade-agreements. There

are two regional free trade agreements with countries in the central American region (CAFTA-DR) (including Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and in North America (USMCA) with Canada and Mexico). See https://ustr.gov/tradeagreements/free-trade-agreements/unitedstates-mexico-canada-agreement/agreementbetween.

Candidate and then President Trump expressed hostility towards U.S. free trade agreements negotiated by other presidents. He argued that they contribute to U.S. trade deficits and hurt U.S. workers. For these reasons, President Trump quickly took steps with regard to U.S. free trade agreement policy that completely altered the approach taken by the previous administration. First he withdrew the U.S. from the TransPacific Partnership (TPP) in January 2017. The TPP would have put the U.S. at the center of a twelve-country megaregional free trade agreement. The U.S. led the TPP negotiations for the five years it took to reach the agreement signed by President Obama in 2016. The eleven other TPP countries went on to ratify and put into force the renamed Comprehensive and Progressive (CPTPP) Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership in 2018.

Second, President Trump also negotiated select modifications to KORUS, the free trade agreement with South Korea. Finally, President Trump insisted on a renegotiation of the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The USMCA replaced NAFTA when it was passed by the House in late 2019 and the Senate in early 2020. See https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-tradeagreements/united-states-mexico-canadaagreement/agreement-between.

A. NAFTA.

The 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement initiated a new generation of U.S. free trade agreements and provided the model for later U.S. FTAs and played a role in shaping multilateral trade negotiations. Under NAFTA, tariffs were completely eliminated progressively. All duties and quantitative restrictions, with the exception of those on a limited number of agricultural products traded with Canada, were eliminated by 2008. See https://ustr.gov/ trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/ north-american-free-trade-agreement-nafta.

B. USMCA

The USMCA—the renegotiated NAFTA—kept large portions of NAFTA in place while changing rules regarding intellectual property, the rules of origin, investment dispute settlement, state to state dispute settlement, and labor rights and dispute settlement connected to them. See https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/freetrade-agreements/united-states-mexicocanada-agreement/agreement-between. The USMCA addresses digital trade and stateowned enterprises. The agreement increases North American content requirements for vehicles. It expands market access in agriculture. At the same time, the USMCA reduces U.S. obligations in areas such as investment and government procurement. See U.S. Trade Policy: Background and Current Issues, https://crsreports.congress. gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10156.

C. U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreement

The Joint Committee under this free trade Agreement supervises implementation of the Agreement and review of overall trade and investment relationship. The Agreement establishes committees on goods, agriculture, sanitary and phytosanitary matters, and financial services. It also establishes subcommittees on labor and environment. See https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/freetrade-agreements/australian-fta. Australia was part of the TPP negotiations.

D. U.S.-Bahrain Free Trade Agreement

This Agreement generates export opportunities for the United States and creates jobs for U.S. farmers. The Agreement supports Bahrain’s economic and political reform and enhances commercial relations. See https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/freetrade-agreements/bahrain-fta.

E. U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement.

This Agreement eliminates tariffs and open markets, reduces barriers for trade in services, provides protection for intellectual property, ensures regulatory transparency, guarantees nondiscrimination in the trade of digital products, commits the Parties to maintain competition laws that prohibit anticompetitive business conduct, and requires effective labor and environmental enforcement. See https://ustr.gov/tradeagreements/free-trade-agreements/chile-fta. Chile was part of the TPP negotiations.

F. U.S.-Colombia Trade Promotion

Agreement

This Agreement is a comprehensive free trade agreement that provides elimination of tariffs and removes barriers to U.S. services, including financial services. It also includes important disciplines relating to customs administration and trade facilitation, technical barriers to trade, government procurement, investment, telecommunications, electronics commerce, intellectual property rights, and labor and environmental protection. See https://ustr.

gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/ colombia-tpa.

G. CAFTA-DR (Dominican Republic-

Central America Free Trade Agreement)

This Agreement is the first free trade agreement between the Untied States and Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic. CAFTA-DR promotes stronger trade, investment ties, prosperity, and stability throughout Central America and the southern border of the United States. See https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-tradeagreements/cafta-dr-dominican-republiccentral-america-fta.

H. Israel Free Trade Agreement

This first U.S. free trade agreement provided the foundation for expanding trade and investment between the U.S. and Israel due to its reduction of barriers and promotion of regulatory transparency. See https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-tradeagreements/israel-fta.

I. Jordan Free Trade Agreement

This first U.S. free trade agreement with a Middle East country, other than Israel, continues to facilitate an extensive economic partnership between the United States and Jordan. See https://ustr.gov/ trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/ jordan-fta.

J. KORUS, Korea-U.S. Free Trade

Agreement

This Agreement reduces and, in most cases, eliminates tariff and non-tariff barriers between South Korea and the U.S. on manufactured goods, agricultural products, and services. It provides rules for investment and intellectual property rights and commits both countries to maintaining certain worker and environmental standards. KORUS was recently renegotiated in 2018. See https://fas. org/sgp/crs/row/IF10733.pdf.

K. Morocco Free Trade Agreement

This Agreement supports significant economic and political reform in Morocco and provides for improved commercial opportunities for U.S. exports by reducing and eliminating trade barriers. See https:// ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-tradeagreements/morocco-fta.

L. Oman Free Trade Agreement

This Agreement promotes economic reform, generates export opportunities for U.S. goods and service providers, solidifies Oman’s trade liberalization and strengthens intellectual property rights protection and enforcement. See https://ustr.gov/tradeagreements/free-trade-agreements/oman-fta.

M. U.S.-Panama Trade Promotion

Agreement

This Agreement will support American jobs, expand markets and enhance U.S. competitiveness. See https://ustr.gov/ uspanamatpa/facts.

N. Peru Trade Promotion Agreement

This Agreement eliminates tariffs and removes barriers to U.S. services, provides a secure, predictable legal framework for investors, and strengthens protection for intellectual property, workers and the environment. See https://ustr.gov/tradeagreements/free-trade-agreements/peru-tpa. Peru was part of the TPP negotiations.

O. Singapore Free Trade Agreement

This Agreement provides for a Joint Committee that reviews the overall trade and investment relationship between the United States and Singapore. See https://ustr.gov/ trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/ singapore-fta. Singapore was part of the TPP negotiations.