Maritime Menace

Strategic Vision vol. 5, no. 29 (October, 2016)

China’s maritime militia poised for a larger role in regional disputes

Monika Chansoria

The amphibious assault ship USS America (LHA 6) conducts flight operations while underway to Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) 2016.

photo: Demetrius Kennon

As China becomes increasingly forceful in the maritime realm with multiple maritime disputes in its so-called near seas, the focus primarily remains restricted on the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and its naval modernization. However, a lesser-known and rarely discussed sea force that is surreptitiously being developed by China is its maritime militia. This is an armed mass group of military-trained personnel constituting a reserve force mandated mainly to support the PLA-Navy (PLAN). The maritime militia is a well-organized and -trained irregular force composed mostly of recruits from the fishing industry in villages in coastal Chinese provinces. Chinese publications such as the Hainan Daily have outlined the role of the maritime militia to “include collecting maritime information … and contributing to sovereignty defense in the South China Sea.”

The Chinese government and the PLA have begun granting greater credence to this irregular maritime force by means of extensive financial support and grants. Most of China’s maritime militia is made up of local fishermen. According to China Fisheries Authority, the total number of fisherman in China was nearly 21 million in 2013, making it the highest globally. The proportion of fisherman in the maritime militia has registered a tenfold increase over the past two years, from less than 2 percent in 2013 to more than 20 percent in 2015. This is in addition to the nearly 439,000 motorized fishing vessels that can operate at sea in conjunction with the Beihai Fleet, Donghai Fleet, and Nanhai Fleet, which the PLAN commands.

Augmented power

State-controlled publications from Beijing have acknowledged that China’s maritime militia works alongside the PLAN “to strengthen its combat capability and operational requirements.” Take for instance the Beihai City Military Command of the PLA in the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region (in South Central China, which borders Vietnam): By absorbing veterans from the Navy and experienced sailors, the Beihai maritime militia, in particular, is equipped for various missions including transport, reconnaissance, and emergency equipment repair in areas with a strong shipbuilding industry. This enables the city’s maritime militia to play a vital role in various maritime drills organized by the PLAN. The maritime militia receives frequent training, and possesses advanced skills for carrying out missions at sea, as opposed to those in the less active coastal militia. Andrew Erickson, a professor at the US Naval War College, underlines the significance of the maritime militia being distinct from both China’s coastal militia (which is shore-based) and its naval reserve, although some coastal militia units have been transformed into maritime militia units. Not unexpectedly, China has begun downplaying the role of its maritime militia insofar as asserting claims over multiple maritime disputes and “rights protection” issues are concerned. What does not go unobserved, however, is the maritime militia’s activities and training in the strategically important, southernmost province of Hainan and Sansha City (which ostensibly administers vast island groups and the surrounding waters in the South China Sea).

Apart from administering Sansha, Hainan is home to the Yulin Naval Base and its submarine bunker, along with a host of conventional and nuclear submarines. The Maritime Militia, established in July 2013, came close on the heels of PRC President Xi Jinping’s momentous visit to the remote fishing village of Tanmen in Qionghai County when he toured Hainan Province in April 2013.

The trip proved instrumental in boosting the growth of the militia in Hainan. The local government, party, and the PLA jointly produced legislation in 2014 to fund local counties’ efforts to recruit maritime militia personnel. Additionally, the prefecture-level city Jiangmen, in the southeast Chinese province of Guangdong (bordering Hong Kong and Macau) is organizing sea-operation exercises for local militiamen to notch up their combat capabilities.

Growing might

In addition to the developments mentioned above, further insight into China’s strategy can be gleaned from China’s 2015 White Paper on Military Strategy— the first ever exclusively on China’s military strategy—which delves into the development of civil-military integration (CMI). China’s objective is to forge further ahead with CMI by diversifying the forms and expanding and elevating the scope and levels of integration, thereby resulting in an all-element and cost-efficient CMI pattern. The key sectors in which CMI will likely get accelerated are infrastructure, key technological areas and major industries, weaponry and equipment from national defense industries, and outsourcing of logistical support to civilian support systems.

What is most significant is the acknowledgement by the Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, for “joint building and utilization of military and civilian infrastructure and joint exploration of the sea… and shared use of such resources as surveying and mapping, navigation, meteorology.”

Competing interpretations

China seeks to closely knit national defense mobilization by enhancing education in national defense and boosting the awareness of the general public. This was evident when the Chinese Foreign Ministry released an official “Position Paper of the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Matter of Jurisdiction in the South China Sea Arbitration Initiated by the Republic of the Philippines” on 7 December, 2014.

The act of releasing an official Position Paper on the eve of the December deadline set by the International Tribunal was apparently effectual in two ways: first, it expounded on why the tribunal does not have jurisdiction over this case; and two, it reiterated China’s position of not participating in the case. However, the verdict of the Tribunal at The Hague concluded that, to the extent China had historic rights to resources in the waters of the South China Sea, such rights were extinguished to the extent they were incompatible with the exclusive economic zones provided for in the Convention. The Tribunal also noted that, although Chinese navigators and fishermen, as well as those of other states, had historically made use of the islands in the South China Sea, there was no evidence that China had historically exercised exclusive control over the waters or their resources.

Finally, the Tribunal concluded that there was no legal basis for China to claim historic rights to resources within the sea areas falling within its claimed nine-dash line.

In addition to active PLA ground forces, China’s military reserve force comprises 600,000 men and women, as per former Chinese Minister of National Defense, Liang Guanglie, who provided these figures during an interview with Xinhua on 29 December, 2010.

Seen from space, Scarborough Shoal offers a brilliant spectacle. Unfortunately, it may become the next flashpoint in the South China Sea.

photo: NASA

Founded in 1983, the PLA Reserve remains a key component of China’s national defense. The combining of the militia and the reserve service system happened in 1984 following a stipulation of the Military Service Law. According to China’s White Paper on National Defense in 2008, the reserve force primarily comprises the militia and has been organized into reserve-service divisions and regiments.

The 2008 White Paper chronicled that the Central Military Commission began to confer military ranks on reserve officers only in April 1996, following which the Law of the People’s Republic of China on National Defense, promulgated in March 1997, specified that China’s armed forces consist of the active-duty force and the reserve force of the PLA, the People’s Armed Police Force, and the militia.

Synergistic forces

The 2008 White Paper acknowledged that after 25 years of buildup and development, the reserve force has become “an important component of the national defense reserve.” The charter of the National Defense Reserve is to conduct training and “maintain social stability” during peacetime, with the possibility of being transferred to active duty during war. Reserve soldiers include all militia, demobilized soldiers, and specialized technical personnel; and reserve officers include demobilized officers and soldiers, college and university graduates, and civilian cadres.

The reserve force implements the orders and regulations of the PLA, and is incorporated into the PLA’s force structure. In peacetime, it is led by the provincial military districts or garrison commands, and during wartime, after mobilization, it is commanded by the designated active unit or carries out combat missions independently.

China will almost certainly continue to build its reserve forces and increase their proportion in the PLAN, the PLA Air Force, the Strategic Rocket Force, and combat support forces. More specifically, the naval reserve is mainly composed of reconnaissance, mine-sweeping, mine-laying, radar observation, communications, and other specialized forces. These developments, if collated and reviewed collectively, highlight that China is concentrating heavily, in terms of resources and capabilities, towards the South China Sea, as it becomes the locus of a brewing conflict between China and contending claimants— Malaysia, Vietnam, Brunei, the ROC, Indonesia, and the Philippines, especially following the verdict of the International Tribunal that left China mortified and feeling cornered internationally.

“The role of the maritime militia in the seizure of the Scarborough Shoal from the Philippines in 2012 is well acknowledged.”

Undermining efforts

Seeking to exploit the rules of engagement with regular international naval forces, Chinese merchant ships and fishing boats have often been sighted around artificial islands being built by China, including Subi Reef in the South China Sea. These ships appear to be manned by civilians who are in fact part of the maritime militia that takes orders directly from the PLAN. China has been employing its maritime militia units more frequently in the past few years during numerous skirmishes in international waters. The role of the maritime militia in the seizure of the Scarborough Shoal from the Philippines in 2012 is well acknowledged. Subsequently, the maritime militia also aided the Chinese coast guard and navy in preventing Vietnamese maritime vessels from approaching an oil rig that China stationed near the contested Paracel Islands in 2014.

In addition, fishing vessels that are reported to be part of this maritime militia have similarly contested a US naval ship as it sailed close to the Spratly Islands in October 2015. Against this backdrop, it would not be hard to imagine that the maritime militia will be employed more fervently, and potently, by the PLAN, as a quasi-civilian force that would be effective in asserting Chinese presence and claims without attracting direct military conflict with the involved players.

The verdict of the international tribunal has left China embarrassed, defeated, and feeling cornered internationally. The role of the maritime militia will certainly grow in the future. By virtue of building three airstrips on the Spratly Islands, the PLA is upping the ante to buttress its claims over the South China Sea, and the region is likely to witness greater politico-strategic rivalry given that the United States has deployed warships on missions in the region to counter a perennially assertive China.

It is rapidly becoming evident that great-power diplomacy does not always remain limited to soft-power initiatives. Rather, it is a deft mix of hard tactics rolled up to yield policy pronouncements. Stemming from this construct, China’s approach and take on the South China Sea is gradually, yet firmly, becoming far more inflexible.

It is only a matter of time until the maritime militia will become a critical and vital support organ for the PLAN, along with the coast guard, in a combined naval strategy to advance China’s position in multiple maritime disputes in the East China Sea and South China Sea, whilst simultaneously bolstering China’s naval presence and role in the Indian Ocean Region at large.

US Navy sailors of Patrol Squadron 46 load a P-3 Orion aircraft with AGM-65F MAVERICKS Air to Surface Missiles prior to a sinking exercise (SINKEX).

photo: Justin Fisher

Dr. Monika Chansoria is a Resident Fellow at the Sandia National Laboratories, in the United States. She can be reached for comment at cedex@live.com