Strengthening Relations

Strategic Vision vol. 8, no. 40 (February, 2019)

US-Taiwan relations improve in face of mounting Chinese military threats

Shao-cheng Sun

President Donald Trump and First Lady Melania Trump arrive in China on 8 November, 2017.

photo: Shealah Craighead

The state of US-China relations has undergone dramatic changes under the Trump Administration, and this has repercussions for Taiwan security. As a staple of her administration’s China policy, Republic of China (ROC) President Tsai Ing-wen promised to maintain the status quo, and refused to accept the “1992 Consensus.” Beijing responded strongly by halting all official cross-strait communication, and has since adopted a more coercive diplomatic and military stance against Taiwan. Since President Tsai came to office, Taiwan has lost five diplomatic allies. Taiwan’s Military also stated that the increase in People’s Liberation Army (PLA) military activities near Taiwan and PLA military modernization pose an “enormous threat to security in the Taiwan Strait.”

The Varyag under tow in Istanbul. China purchased the former Soviet carrier from the Ukraine in 1998 for about US$20 million and renamed it Liaoning.

photo: US DOD

Though Chinese President Xi Jinping had intended to improve relations with the Trump administration, the trade war, the South China Sea disputes, and continued arms sales to Taiwan have caused US-China tensions to escalate. In particular, Chinese measures in response to the US-China trade war were supposed to hurt Republicans in states vulnerable to Chinese retaliation during the November US mid-term election. However, the results show that this did not happen: The election outcome gives Trump little incentive to soften his tough trade strategy against China.

Last year saw US-China military frictions rise. In May, the US withdrew an invitation to the Chinese military to take part in 2018 Rim of the Pacific Exercise (RIMPAC). In October, the Chinese government denied a US warship permission to visit Hong Kong. In the same month, the US military accused a Chinese warship of unsafe maneuvers after a near collision with a US destroyer in the South China Sea. As US-China relations have deteriorated, and China’s persistent military threat against Taiwan has increased at the same time, the Trump administration has enhanced US-Taiwan military cooperation as a means to ensure Taiwan’s capacity for self-defense.

Xi Jinping has asserted that China will never allow any political party, in any form, to separate any part of Chinese territory from China. The distrust and division that marks the relationship between China and Taiwan has further widened. Public opinion surveys show a growing sense of Taiwanese identity. In a 1992 survey conducted by the Election Study Center at National Chengchi University, 25.5 percent of respondents in Taiwan said they identified as Chinese, 17.6 percent said they identified as Taiwanese, and 46.4 percent said they identified as both. In the same survey conducted in 2018, only 3.5 percent of those polled said they identified as Chinese, 55.8 percent said they identified as Taiwanese, and 37.2 percent said they identified as both. Clearly, the Taiwanese identity has been on the rise.

Youth outreach

The Chinese government fears that younger Taiwanese are moving away from believing in the One China principle, and this fear has led to increased efforts in the PRC’s youth outreach. Beijing is aware of the stagnant economic conditions in Taiwan, especially for its youth, and seeks to entice them with economic incentives such as “31 measures” (19 relating to social and employment issues and the remaining 12 relating to business issues) employment opportunities. Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council remarked that the measures are Beijing’s efforts to “buy” Taiwanese political support.

The Chinese government has taken diplomatic measures to push the ROC government to accede to a one China policy. Beijing has adopted a more concerted effort to restrict Taiwan in the international arena. Taiwan was not accepted as an observer at the September 2016 assembly meeting of the International Civil Aviation Organization. This was followed by Taiwan’s delayed invitation to attend the World Health Assembly (WHA). In 2017, Chinese authorities began to demand that foreign corporations treat Taiwan as part of China. By August 2018, five countries (Sao Tome and Principe, Panama, Dominican Republic, Burkina Faso, and El Salvador) had shifted diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing, leaving a mere 17 countries that maintain diplomatic relations with Taipei.

In 2016, Chinese leaders began to lose hope for a peaceful unification, and they are now considering military measures against Taiwan. In order to send a warning to the Trump and Tsai administrations against improving US-Taiwan security relations, the Chinese government has greatly increased its military coercion against Taiwan, which includes both verbal intimidation and saber rattling. Xi Jinping told US Defense Secretary Jim Mattis during a visit to Beijing in June that Beijing was committed to peace, but could not give up “even one inch” of territory that “the Chinese ancestors had left behind.” Wei Fenghe, China’s Defense Minister, stated in November 2018 in Beijing that, “Taiwan is China’s core national interest... If anyone tries to separate Taiwan from China, the People’s Liberation Army will take military action at all costs.”

China has also stepped up flights of strategic bombers and fighter jets around Taiwan in 2018.

The United States Navy’s 7th Fleet flagship USS Blue Ridge (LCC 19) arrives for a port visit in Otaru in Hokkaido, Japan.

photo: Ethan Carter

After members of the US Congress recommended that the US Navy pay a port call in Taiwan, Chinese embassy official Li Kexin stated that such a visit would prompt China to take Taiwan by force. In terms of saber rattling, the PLA’s naval ships have sailed through the Taiwan Strait, including sending the Liaoning aircraft-carrier to the east coast of Taiwan. After demonstrating the largest display of naval forces in the South China Sea in April, 2018, China announced that it would immediately conduct live-fire drills in the Taiwan Strait. China has also stepped up flights of strategic bombers and fighter jets around Taiwan in 2018.

US Maj. Gen. John Wharton welcomes ROC Lt. Gen. Ho An-chi to the US Army Research, Development and Engineering Command.

photo: US DOD

Robust partnership

The Trump administration has put countering Chinese military rise at the forefront of its national defense strategy, and one part of this effort is to enhance security relations with Taiwan. The Tsai administration has devoted efforts to make the most of security cooperation with the United States to deter China from encroaching on Taiwan. The US-Taiwan partnership has become more robust through the Taiwan Travel Act (TRA) encouraging high-level visits, the National Defense Authorization Act, and increasing sales of defense arms.

The TRA, signed by Trump on March 16, 2018, could enhance the US government’s unofficial relationship with Taiwan. The TRA declares that “the US Government should encourage visits between officials from the US and Taiwan at all levels,” including “cabinet-level national security officials, general officers, and other executive branch officials.” After TRA passed in the Senate, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Alex Wong visited Taiwan and met with President Tsai, stressing that the US relationship with Taiwan “has never been stronger.”

‘Golden Swordsmen’ of Patrol Squadron 47 conduct flight operations during a coordinated exercise with the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force.

photo: Keven Flinn

In August 2018, President Trump signed the 2019 National Defense Authorization Act. This legislation states the United States should strengthen defense cooperation with Taiwan; support Taiwan’s acquisition of defensive weapons through foreign military sales, direct commercial sales, and industrial cooperation; improve the predictability of arms sales to Taiwan; promote joint military exercises; expand military exchanges and joint training; and send medical vessels to visit Taiwan.

Self-defense capability

Under the Taiwan Relations Act, the US provides defense articles and services to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability. In June 2017, the US announced the sale of US$1.42 billion in defense articles and services to Taiwan, including MK-48 6AT Heavy Weight Torpedoes, AGM-154 Joint Standoff Weapons, and AGM-88 High-Speed Anti-Radiation Missiles. In 2018, the US approved the sale of spare parts for F-16 fighter planes and other military aircraft worth up to US$330 million. The Pentagon said the sale is required to maintain Taiwan’s “defensive and aerial fleet.” President Trump has also allowed defense firms to sell components to Taiwan for its submarine program.

On 31 December, 2018, US President Donald Trump signed the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act (ARIA) into law. In face of a growing threat from China, the ARIA advocates increased US engagement in the Indo-Pacific region and strengthened support, including arms sales, for US allies and partners like Taiwan. The act supports regular arms sales to Taiwan and to enhance the economic, political, and security relationship between Taiwan and the United States. Taiwan’s Presidential Office responded that the ARIA demonstrates the US commitment to Taiwan’s security, and supports closer Taiwan-US relations.

In reaction to China’s increasing military pressure against Taiwan, former US Secretary of Defense James Mattis stated that the US military remains steadfastly committed to working with Taiwan and to providing it with the defense articles necessary, consistent with the obligations set out in the Taiwan Relations Act. Since the beginning of 2018, Taiwan US relations have shown significant improvement. The National Defense Authorization Act suggests that the US should strengthen Taiwan’s military power. US National Security Advisor John Bolton has suggested recommendations to enhance the political relationship between the US and Taiwan that include receiving Taiwanese diplomats officially at the State Department, upgrading the status of US representation in Taipei from a private institute to an official diplomatic mission, and allowing the most senior US officials to visit Taiwan to transact government business.

In face of the mounting Chinese military threat, the Taiwan military is also developing new capabilities for asymmetric warfare to counter China’s military threat. Areas of emphasis include offensive and defensive information and electronic warfare, shorebased mobile missiles, unmanned aerial systems, and critical infrastructure protection.

In order to maintain Taiwan’s security, the ROC government should consider the following recommendations. Since cross-strait relations will continue to worsen and China’s military pressure against Taiwan will continue to increase, at least for the next two years, Taiwan security-related organizations and officials should frequently and comprehensively engage with their US counterparts to deepen cooperation and exchanges. Second, with the suspension of official cross-strait relations, miscalculation and distrust between the two governments has greatly increased. Therefore, the role of think-tanks, academic institutions, and scholars related to cross-strait affairs has become important. These track-II mechanisms should be encouraged by both Taipei and Beijing to decrease the potential for conflict. Third, while US-Taiwan security relations have greatly improved in recent years, Taiwan’s government should keep a very low profile. Otherwise, it would surely trigger a negative response from Beijing. The Taiwanese government should continue to lobby the US government to help Taiwan participate in international activities. At the same time, the US should remind Beijing not to take aggressive military action against Taiwan nor to block Taiwanese participation in international organizations.

Deployed in the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1958 , the Nike Hercules was the first anti-aircraft missile system Washington sold Taipei.

photo: Winertai

Shao-cheng Sun is an assistant professor at The Citadel. He specializes in China’s security, East Asian affairs, and cross-strait relations. He can be reached at ssun@citadel.edu