Party Policy

KMT should insist on strategic focus toward United States and China

Charles Yang

Whereas the DPP prioritizes the relationship with Washington, the KMT has endeavored to smooth relations with the PRC.

photo: ROC Gov

Recently, a series of policy changes by the governments of the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have forced the Kuomintang (KMT) to establish new policies toward those nations. During the administration of former President Ma Yong-jeou, the KMT claimed that the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan should maintain good relations with the PRC, Japan, and the United States at the same time. At that time, the relationship between these countries was relatively harmonious. However, for the United States, the PRC’s comprehensive national power is threatening America’s leadership position in the world. According to the Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community in 2019, competition with the PRC has become an ideological battle. US President Donald Trump has launched a trade war with the PRC, and is asking America’s allies to pick sides. For the PRC, besides responding to a series of challenges from the United States, the call to pursue unification with Taiwan is growing apace with the rising tide of Chinese nationalism.

According to the strategic triangle theory, players in triangular relationships will notice each other’s policies and their acts will cause a domino effect. What are Washington and Beijing’s new policies toward the ROC? As a possible ruling party, Should the KMT orient its new policies toward the US or PRC? What is the best course of action for the KMT? This article will analyze current US and PRC policies toward the ROC. Second, the KMT should insist on peaceful policies toward the two countries. Therefore, the KMT should appoint a delegate to the US, support the spirit of free trade, Act and the Six Assurances. The best effect of those and help the Taiwanese people understand that the acts until now is reminding the PRC that the US can KMT’s policies increase their right to choose.

According to the Worldwide Threat Assessment in In response to the US, the PRC has responded with 2019, the US believes that the PRC is seeking to as- a new bundle of carrots and sticks for Taiwan. Since sert China’s model of authoritarian capitalism as an 2016, Beijing has persuaded six of the ROC’s 23 dipalternative development path abroad, exacerbating lomatic partners, most recently Burkina Faso and El great-power competition that could threaten inter- Salvador, to switch recognition to the PRC. In addinational support for democracy, human rights, and tion, the “31 incentives” were officially announced by the rule of law. It is not only about economics, but the PRC’s Taiwan Affairs Office, and they have been also a complete challenge to the US. The US has tak- put into practice in many provinces and cities. In en several steps to contain the PRC, and it is asking 2019, China’s President Xi Jinping delivered a speech its allies to pick sides. For example, to commemorate the 40th anniversaUS Secretary of State Mike Pompeo ry of issuing Message to Compatriots has cautioned allies in central Europe in Taiwan. In this speech, Xi talked that deploying equipment made by about the relationship between naChinese telecom giant Huawei would tional unification and the Chinese make it more difficult for Washington dream of rejuvenation. It shows Xi’s “to partner alongside them.” He has new sense of urgency for unification, called on US allies to exclude PRC vendors on national security grounds.

For Taiwan, the US government has sought to strengthen relations with several measures. These include the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, the Taiwan Travel Act, and the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018. The real impact of those initiatives may only become clear after several years. After all, many things should have been done under the Taiwan Relations Act and the Six Assurances. The best effect of those acts until now is reminding the PRC that the US can play the Taiwan card. In response to the US, the PRC has responded with a new bundle of carrots and sticks for Taiwan. Since 2016, Beijing has persuaded six of the ROC’s 23 diplomatic partners, most recently Burkina Faso and El Salvador, to switch recognition to the PRC. In addition, the “31 incentives” were officially announced by the PRC’s Taiwan Affairs Office, and they have been put into practice in many provinces and cities. In 2019, China’s President Xi Jinping delivered a speech to commemorate the 40th anniversary of issuing Message to Compatriots in Taiwan. In this speech, Xi talked about the relationship between national unification and the Chinese dream of rejuvenation. It shows Xi’s new sense of urgency for unification, despite there being no clear timetable.

Another point is that Xi proposed that China and Taiwan conduct democratic consultation on cross-strait relations and the future of the nation, and establish an institutional arrangement for peaceful development of cross-strait relations. Political parties and all sectors on both sides of Taiwan Strait may recommend representatives to conduct extensive, in-depth democratic consultation on the basis of the common political foundation of upholding the 1992 Consensus and opposing Taiwan independence.

KMT leaders have expressed different reactions in response to these new developments. According to KMT Chairman Wu Den-yih, who was interviewed by Voice of America on 24 January, 2019, there is no such thing as pro-US or pro-China for the KMT. Rather, the KMT’s policy is to be “amicable to Beijing, friendly to Tokyo and close to the US,” while at the same time seeking to establish friendship with South Korea and European nations. Another KMT leader, Wang Jin-pyng, claimed on 15 January, 2019, that “there is no 92 Consensus.” His latest opinion is that the 92 Consensus can give the PRC “face” and give Taiwan “ambiguous space” to maneuver. Eric Chu, the mayor of New Taipei, has not showed his hand on this issue yet. When he visited the Freeman Spogli Institute at Stanford University in February, he said his position on the trade war between the United States and the PRC is that Taiwan will cooperate with the two countries and establish a more responsible and sustainable economic order with them.

A big challenge for Taiwan is that China is the biggest market in the world, and Taiwan’s economic performance is not good. At the same time, China is too close and its government claims sovereignty over Taiwan. On the other hand, the United States is not powerful, and it does not emphasize its global interests to the degree that it did in the Cold War. In addition, in negotiations between Seoul and Washington on sharing defense costs, the United States asked that South Korea shoulder more of the cost of maintaining American bases on their soil. This suggests that Taiwan needs higher military expenditures. It is not easy for Taiwan to choose a position. However, when Chinese nationalism rears its head in the PRC, and the United States asks its allies to pick sides, it becomes that much harder for Taiwan to maintain old policies.

Influence of Chinese nationalism

Student leaders of the Legislative Yuan occupation agreed to leave after the KMT promised to enact a new law to monitor trade deals with China.

photo: Artemas Liu

The position of the DPP is clear and consistent: it always leans toward the United States. This decision ignores the interests of China-based Taiwanese businessmen, and the influence of Chinese nationalism. In addition, it is doubtful that markets in Southeast Asia, Australia, New Zealand, and India— which are included by the Tsai administration’s New Southbound Policy—can replace China’s.

Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co., Ltd’s Fab 5 building in Hsinchu Science Park. Many of Taiwan’s firms are heavily invested in China.

photo: Peellden

In view of recent developments, the pivot position is Taiwan’s best option in the strategic triangle theory. It is unnecessary for Taiwan to pursue the wing position. Cross-Strait relations are a special relationship, even if the hardest DPP leaders who support Taiwan independence cannot admit it. For example, Taiwanese statesman and independence activist Koo Kwang-ming once claimed that the relationship between Taiwan and China should be a “brotherly-like” relationship. The ROC should show concern for the feelings of Chinese citizens.

There are several things that the KMT, which supports the 92 Consensus and hopes to be a pivot, can do. First, the KMT should appoint a delegate to the United States. This would show the degree to which the party emphasizes the US relationship. Second, the KMT should support the legal rights of any company in international trade, including PRC vendors such as Huawei. Taiwan should protect its own important companies, such as Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co., Ltd., Largan Precision Co., Ltd., and LandMark Optoelectronics Corp., which do business with companies from numerous countries. Third, do not mention policies which balance the influence of the United States, the PRC, and Japan at the same time any more. Balancing or bandwagoning is a policy dichotomy that fails to capture the nuances in the trilateral relationship. For example, the ROC welcomes any friendly policies from any country, but it will not compromise on sovereignty issues for any peaceful reason. In the East and South China seas, the ROC would not also seek any country to balance the influence of the PRC and Japan.

Last but not least, the KMT should help the Taiwanese people to understand that the KMT’s policies increase their right to choose in the future. The DPP’s policies, which lean toward the United States, actually limit Taiwan’s options. This is not only an interest issue, but also about subjectivity. After the Sunflower Movement, subjectivity has become the main pursuit of Taiwanese young people. Policies which limit options are not a policy which can pursue subjectivity.

Charles Yang is a graduate of National Taiwan University’s Graduate Institute of National Development.He specializes in the political-economic development of China. He can be reached at d88341003@ntu.edu.tw