11 minute read
Rising Sun
Strategic Vision vol. 8, no. 42 (June, 2019)
Japan assumes expanded role in Indo-Pacific region under Shinzo Abe
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Nguyen Vo Huyen Dung
A Japanese landing craft, air cushion approaches Langham Beach, Queensland Australia, July 16, during Exercise Talisman Saber 2019.
photo: Whitney C. Houston
In recent years, international relations in the Asia-Pacific have become extremely complicated due to the rise of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The revival of Quad 2, India’s Act East Policy, the promotion of Japan’s soft power, and strategic adjustments by US President Donald Trump, with its new focus on the “Indo-Pacific” (as opposed to the formulation “Asia-Pacific,” espoused by the previous administration) are just some of the major developments. The US Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) Strategy is contributing significantly to shaping and dominating the structure as well as the power balance in the region.
As a member of the US-Japan alliance, Japan is actively confirming its role in the FOIP strategy. With certain successes of the Abenomics policy, the Cool Japan policy, and the decision to reinterpret Article 9 of the 1947 Constitution, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s administration is striving to take advantage of opportunities as well as to ease certain challenges when facing global and regional complex movements.
Warships of the US Navy and the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force conduct training as part of Exercise Keen Sword.
photo: Jacob Moore
The term “Indo-Pacific” was first introduced by Indian strategist Gurpreet S. Khurana in 2007 and then later was used in turn by Abe in 2007 and former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in 2011, and was included in Australia’s Defense White Paper in 2013. However, it was only when Trump used the term in his opening speech at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Forum in Da Nang, Vietnam, as well as during his two-week Asia tour in November 2017, that this term was once again became officially noticed and widely used. In May 2018, just before the Shangri-La Forum, the United States announced the renaming of the Pacific Command to the Indo-Pacific Command, which added emphasis to America’s Indo-Pacific strategy.
Subjective and Objective
Among the issues affecting the introduction of the FOIP strategy, there are two main factors—the subjective and the objective—that should be considered. The subjective factor is the role of the United States and its impact on the US-Japan alliance. The implementation of the FOIP strategy will not only ensure a stable, free, and democratic United States, but also maintain its position at the leading super power. Meanwhile, the objective factor is directly related to the rise of China, especially the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
It can be said that China’s belligerent moves and complicated regional changes have forced the US to strengthen and expand its alliance network instead of focusing on bilateral alliances (US-Japan, US-Korea) as before to indirectly counter China’s ambitious policies and strategies. These are also the main and most important targets of the FOIP strategy of the Trump administration, with the three main pillars of economy, governance, and security.
Under Abe, Japan has a shared interest with the United States in upholding the FOIP strategy. In August 2007, in his speech to the Indian Parliament, Abe described the strategic link between the Indian
President of Russia Vladimir Putin and President of the United States Donald Trump speak on the sidelines of the 2017 APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting.
photo: Kremlin.ru
Ocean and the Pacific Ocean. This could be seen as the initial idea of Japan’s FOIP strategy and, through this, Abe affirmed that, “with this wide, open, broader Asia, it is incumbent upon us two democracies, Japan and India, to carry out the pursuit of freedom and prosperity in the region.”
Developed and Expanded
Five years later, when Abe returned to the position of Japanese prime minister in 2012, he once again invoked this strategy when referring to the formation of a security diamond in the Asia-Pacific: the implication of the revival of Diamond Quadrilateral with Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QSD). By November 2017, phrases like “Security Quadrilateral” and “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” were reiterated by Abe during President Trump’s visit to Japan just before the APEC High-Level week. With the success of Abe’s last re-election, the FOIP strategy is expected to be further developed and expanded by both countries during the implementing process.
With the launch of the FOIP strategy, the Indo-Pacific region promises to see significant changes. It will see a strong, free, and proactive economic development of nations, an increase in defense investment and cooperation between countries, as well as the return of the QSD. In addition, the region will witness escalating tensions from China’s BRI and the US FOIP strategy. This may indirectly produce an arms race, with China on one side, and the United States and its allies on the other. The Indo-Pacific region will therefore be significantly impacted, and it is also the time when major powers and alliances will demonstrate their role and influence in the region.
Japan has a chance to define its positive role in the economic context. According to the Asian Development Bank, in 2017 the Asia-Pacific region accounted for 42.6 percent of global GDP, major economies in the region also have diversified their participation in production networks, contributing to one-third of global exports.
Potential Growth
In addition to the indicators that show potential growth, complicated movements with hidden risks challenge regional peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific and the broader Indo-Pacific, have made it proJapanese PM Shinzo Abe gressively more difficult to secure the regional security structure. In this context, with a positively recovering and growing economy and considerable soft-power influence, Japan’s opportunities to identify and enhance its position in the region are huge.
Warships from the United States, India, Japan, and the Philippines transit the international waters of the South China Sea on 5 May, 2019.
photo: Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force
The FOIP strategy and the increasing role of large countries in the Indo-Pacific region will create favorable conditions for Japan in particular, and the Japan-US alliance in general, to become more active in adjusting security policies and cooperation strategies—especially in the field of security and defense—to expand the scope and scale of their impact in the region. This will have an effect of the distribution of regional power and directly involve those large countries in the process of shaping the Indo-Pacific security structure.
Japan and other countries in the region share common risks and interests in the South China Sea. Japan is the world’s third-largest economy, and it will have certain opportunities and advantages in the power race compared to other countries in the region, especially given the growth of the Japan Coast Guard. Japan’s policy towards the South China Sea is clear and consistent in terms of international cooperation contributing to improving law enforcement capacity and maintaining peace and self-assurance at sea.
Facing Challenges
Countries along the South China Sea such as Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia are the main partners supporting the construction of a maritime legal capacity to help these countries strengthen their law enforcement capabilities at sea. This will obviously strengthen Japan’s ties with these countries in particular and Southeast Asia in general, which will greatly promote Japan’s role as a regional and global power. It can be said that the structure of the Indo-Pacific region requires consensus among major countries, and Japan is taking an important role in shaping the region.
Japan’s role in the FOIP strategy also faces a number of challenges. Japan’s first challenge is to adjust Article 9 of its pacifist Constitution. Although Abe has always advocated a reinterpretation of the Japanese Constitution to fit the current situation, this ambition will be a significant challenge for Abe’s government, and may result in indirect difficulty in the implementation of Japan’s defense and security activities. However, even when Japan succeeds in adjusting Article 9, which will formally recognize the role of the Japan Self Defense Forces as a true military force, this move will inevitably encounter opposition from South Korea and China.
Personnel from the US Air Force and the Japan Air Self Defense Force discuss operations during an exercise at Iruma Air Base, Japan.
photo: Machiko Arita
Japan’s defense budget has increased continuously for the past five years under Abe, and is currently the eighth-largest defense budget in the world. Japan has begun to develop its own defense industry and will likely become a stronger militarily power. This could push Northeast Asia into an arms race as countries increase spending on defense. If this oc- curs, the possibility for other countries in the region to pursue the development of nuclear weapons may well increase.
A service member with the Japan Self Defense Force on a simulated reconnaissance mission of exercise Talisman Sabre 19 in Australia on 21 July, 2019.
photo: Tanner Lambert
Writing the Rules
The second challenge is the rapid rise of China and its growing economic, cultural, and especially military influence. The development and modernization of the Chinese military along with its national security strategies in recent years have forced Japan and other countries to make strategic adjustments. In a 2015 interview with The Wall Street Journal, former US President Barack Obama opined, “If we don’t write the rules, China will write the rules out in that region.”
Clearly, China’s geopolitical and strategic rise is the biggest challenge for Japan in the region. In addition, North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs, as well as increased Russian activities in the Far East, will also be potential challenges affecting the balance of power in the Indo- Pacific region.
The third challenge lies in the long-term alliance with the United States, especially as the Trump administration uses slogans such as America First, and once warned Japan about the instability in trade relations between the two countries. Japan is truly the cornerstone of the FOIP strategy, and the US-Japan alliance plays a very important role in Japan’s security strategies in the region. Therefore, improving trade relations to ensure the healthy maintenance of this alliance will also be one of the challenges that Japan must face and overcome in the future.
The final challenge is that as Japan increasingly asserts itself and adopts a more important role, it will unintentionally reduce its dependence on the American security umbrella, the US-Japan alliance will be affected to one degree or another. The FOIP strategy will therefore also be affected and the challenge now for Japan is how to improve its position in the region and at the same time not affect the implementation of the FOIP strategy.
US Defense Secretary James Mattis meets with his counterparts from Japan, Takeshi Iwaya (left), and South Korea, Jeong Kyeong-doo (right).
photo: Lisa Ferdinando
Japan’s years-long effort to increase both its hard power and soft power, particularly under Abe, has provided the country with a great opportunity to assert its role and position as a comprehensive power in the region. However, Japan will also certainly face challenges, including the existing limitations of the decision to reinterpret Article 9. New opportunities and new challenges will be set for Japan, which means that greater effort will be required to timely and proactively address new regional movements and trends.
In a speech in Brussels in February 2016, Japanese Ambassador to the European Union Keiichi Katakami said that Japan’s military forces plan to play a more active role in self-defense, peacekeeping and conflict prevention. Clearly, Japan is determined and ready to change its image and position in the region and in the world. In other words, Japan will no longer just be a passive international actor, standing outside the political and security games while concentrating solely on trade and development assistance. In contrast, Japan will be more actively involved, with a greater role and influence in the process of forming a regional structure, particularly through the FOIP strategy. Therefore, the development of military forces and investment in defense will be one of the top priorities of Abe’s administration in addition to economic development, stability, and social security assurance.
ASEAN Ties
Japan will also strengthen relations with Southeast Asian countries, as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) plays an important role in regional affairs. Last June, the 34th ASEAN Summit held in Bangkok, Thailand, adopted the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, affirming ASEAN’s immutable principles and setting orientations for ASEAN’s conduct in its relations with other countries.
This not only reflects ASEAN’s ability to cooperate and unite in responding to external challenges and changes, but also delivers ASEAN’s message to the world about its support for a peaceful, stable, and prosperous Indo-Pacific region. Moreover, ASEAN Outlook will also orient its behavior with the regional cooperation strategies and initiatives of major countries, which certainly include the FOIP. Therefore, this will create a springboard for ASEAN to further promote its leading role in Indo-Pacific region.
At the same time, Japan will also advocate building multilateral relations and reinforcing the foundation for security cooperation—an important framework for maintaining peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region.
In short, the FOIP is expected to provide a strategic framework for its member countries, which currently include the United States, Japan, India and Australia, to promote cooperation. Japan faces opportunities and challenges that will change its regional and global role through this regional connectivity agenda.
Economic strength can promote Japan’s political position, but only military strength can allow Tokyo to truly become a political power. This is, of course, not welcomed by many countries, especially China. On the other hand, although Japan does seek to use the FOIP to counter China’s growing influence via the BRI, the more important goal is to build a peaceful, free region marked by democracy, stability, and prosperity. Therefore, the FOIP strategy is not expected to directly prevent or oppose Chinese investment in infrastructure through the BRI, but it will keep up the pressure and force China to respect international laws and rules during the investment process. Obviously, that pressure will only work if it comes from countries that receive this investment.
A Japanese Defense Force soldier mans his turret on Kings Beach in Bowen, Queensland, during Exercise Talisman Saber 2019.
photo: Whitney C. Houston
Nguyen Vo Huyen Dung is a lecturer and head of the International Relations Division at the Faculty of International Studies at the University of Foreign Language Studies, University of Danang, Vietnam.
