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STF Feature: OPERATION PLUTO
Operation Pluto (PIPELINE UNDER THE OCEAN): PART 2: THE HAMEL PIPE, THE BLITZ & IMPLEMENTATION
BY BILL BURNS & STEWART ASH
In the last issue we described the development of the 2” (inches) H.A.I.S. Cable, but before we continue with its story it should be noted that, early in its development, an alternative approach to its role in Operation PLUTO was introduced and worked on in parallel.
On behalf of the Petroleum Division, Bernard J Ellis, Chief Engineer of the Burmah Oil Co, was dealing with the H.A.I.S. Cable programme, and when he saw that the cable was extremely stiff in short lengths but flexible and easily manageable in long lengths, he suggested that a steel pipe could also be used for PLUTO, as he had seen samples of small diameter pipes that were also flexible when handled in long lengths in the oilfields. He would later team up with Harry A Hammick, Chief Engineer of the Iraq Petroleum Co, to develop the project.
THE HAMEL PIPE
A prototype of Ellis’s pipe design was fabricated by J. & E. Hall of Dartford. The mild steel pipe, with a wall thickness of 0.212” (5.4mm) and an internal diameter of 3½” (89mm), was produced in 30ft (9.14m) lengths, and these were joined together by A J Welding Ltd. This prototype quickly proved that this pipe had sufficient wall thickness to handle the necessary pump pressure, it could be bent round a wheel of 30ft diameter and pulled off again, remaining relatively straight without kinking, and sections could be flash welded together to provide any required length. However, with this bending diameter it could not be handled like cable and stored in a cableship’s tanks. One reason for this was that the conventional coiling process results in a complete twist being introduced into each turn. Although this twist is removed while uncoiling during laying, the steel pipe would not tolerate this treatment. Ellis, therefore, suggested that a large wheel mounted on trunnions on the deck of a Hopper Barge, with its lower portion protruding into the sea through the hopper doors, could be utilised to deploy the pipe. An alternative approach, also adopted, was a huge floating drum like a gigantic cotton reel, capable of carrying any quantity of pipe likely to be required.
Model tests of the floating drum concept were carried out at the National Physical Laboratory’s tank at Froude in Worcester. These tests confirmed that such a vessel could be towed at sufficient speed without yawing. In a witty play on words, this floating drum (vessel) was given the name HMS Conundrum, or ‘Conun’ as it became known. Preliminary work confirmed that the pipe could be laid up on the drum and pulled off without kinking. The sections could be welded together with absolute reliability; so long lengths could be carried and laid by either the wheel and barge or the Conun system. Although there was no previous experience as to how a bare mild steel pipe would lie and behave on the seabed, it was calculated that it would have at least a six-week operational life. As the H.A.I.S. Cable was as yet unproven, and there was significant concern as to whether there would be sufficient supplies of lead available to complete the H.A.I.S. programme and meet the operational targets, having a complementary method, even if it was short-lived, was considered desirable, and so it was decided to proceed with this approach in parallel. This pipe was given the codename ‘Hamel’ after Hammick and Ellis, although after the war Ellis successfully asserted his claim that he was the sole inventor. Two factories were set up at Tilbury to manufacture, store and then wind the Hamel Pipe onto drums. A Hopper Barge, later called HMS Persephone, was converted to carry the drum, and a Conun was also constructed.
The contract for pipe manufacture was awarded to Stewart & Lloyd, and this company also undertook to act as agents of the Petroleum Division to oversee the design and construction of the pipe. Subsequently the company took on the management of the Tilbury factories. At the same time, the Director of Naval Construction took responsibility for fitting out HMS Persephone, the design of the Conun, and the supervision of its construction by Messrs Orthostyle.
The two adjacent factories were constructed at Tilbury to manufacture 40ft (12.2m) lengths of 3½” diameter mild steel pipe and then weld them into 4,000ft (1,219m) lengths. While being welded, the pipe was pushed down 4,000ft conveyor channels then thrown off on to a storage rack. Pending completion of the Tilbury factories, a few miles of 3½” steel pipe was hand-welded in Portsmouth Dockyard and wound on to Persephone’s drum for preliminary trials. These were entirely successful, and the work was completed by April 1943, so that both the H.A.I.S. Cable and Hamel Pipe had successfully completed their main trials programmes by the Spring of that year.
It was realised very early in the Hamel Pipe trials that it was not flexible enough be used at the shore ends. It could not be deployed quickly enough, especially at the French end, where the operation would be under heavy enemy fire. For the Hamel Pipe to be used, the shore ends would have to be H.A.I.S. Cable. However, this would reduce the diameter of the pipe at both ends from 3½” to 2”, causing a significant reduction in throughput. A 3” diameter H.A.I.S. Cable was needed, at least in short lengths, if the Hamel Pipe was to deliver its maximum potential.
THE 3” H.A.I.S. CABLE
The success achieved by the Bristol Channel dress rehearsal had already led to the consideration of increasing the diameter of the core of the H.A.I.S. Cable to 3”. This dimensional change had been suggested as it would offer a significant increase in capacity that would reduce the number of cables needed to reach the required supply target. The requirement for a 3” cable to provide the shore ends for Hamel Pipes added to reasons for progressing this design modification.
The design of the new cable was similar in most respects to the 2” cable, with the exception of the increased tube diameter, and the steel tapes were increased to 22mm in thickness to deal with the greater hoop stress that the cable would have to withstand. The final overall diameter of this cable, after armouring, was about 4.5”. Work on the 3” tube design commenced at the Woolwich Works in September 1943 and in parallel, the coupling design was adapted. New designs were developed for the 3” cable, with a modified version to fit the ends of the 3½” Hamel Pipe.
A CHANGE OF COURSE
On 23 April 1943, full scale production of both solutions had been authorised by the Petroleum Division and the Chiefs of Combined Operations. They then handed responsibility of the operational stage of PLUTO to the Petroleum Warfare Department under its Director General, Major-General Sir Donald Banks (1881-1975), K.C.B., D.S.O., M.C., and Force PLUTO, specially organised by the Admiralty under the command of Captain John Fenwick Hutchings (1885-1968), C.B.E., D.S.O., Royal Navy. The Quartermaster General visited the Watermouth Bay station on 24 April to see the H.A.I.S. Cable system in operation, and on 29 April he visited the Hamel factories in Tilbury, then proceeded to Henley’s factory in Gravesend and the Siemens works at Woolwich to see production of the 2” H.A.I.S. Cable. At Woolwich, he also saw HMS Holdfast loading a length of 2” H.A.I.S Cable. From his observations he decided that no further lengths of 2” cable should be made, and that 3” cable, then undergoing Works tests, should be thoroughly trialled in order to maximise the opportunity of obtaining the advantage that the 3” cable would provide, almost trebling the throughput of the 2” cable.
During June and July 1943, recommendations were made by the Quartermaster General’s Petroleum Committee, and confirmed by the Chiefs of Staff Committee, that Operation PLUTO should be made a high priority. Up to this point the plan had only conceived a pipeline from Dungeness to Boulogne, but now a second line from the Isle of Wight to Cherbourg was added. Plans were put in place for pumping stations of 3,500 and 3,000 tons per day to be built at Dungeness and Sandown on the Isle of Wight, respectively. Unknown to the members of the Operation PLUTO teams, this was an indication that the D-Day landings were being planned for Normandy.
ISLE OF WIGHT TO CHERBOURG CROSSING
The decision to lay a pipeline from the Isle of Wight to Cherbourg would require much larger quantities of cable and pipe, and so arrangements were made to increase British manufacture as much as possible, but also to obtain 140nm (260km) of cable from the USA. In addition, it was planned to duplicate the Tilbury factories for welding, storage, and winding Hamel Pipe in the USA. An American Army proposal had also been developed for laying cross-Channel lines, but when the progress made in the UK with the H.A.I.S. Cable and the Hamel Pipe was seen by ‘Ike’, General Dwight David Eisenhower (1890-1969), Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force in Europe, he decided to abandon the American scheme and concentrate on helping the British programme by supplying cable to the UK design and providing additional pumping and auxiliary plant from the USA.
The Isle of Wight to Cherbourg route involved a sea-crossing of about 70nm (130km), instead of the 26nm (48.4km) originally visualised. This made necessary the provision of larger cableships and the use of the Conun, which would be loaded till the axles were awash. Following a successful trial lay of the 3” H.A.I.S. Cable, Operation PLUTO obtained three more ships to be converted and fitted with cable gear by the Director of Naval Construction. HMS Algerian was to carry 30nm (56.7km) of 3” cable, and the other two, HMS Latimer and HMS Sancroft, were to carry 100nm (185km) of 3” cable, weighing about 6,400 tons. Six Thames barges were also converted and equipped to handle the shore ends. In addition, a large number of auxiliary vessels were added to the Operation PLUTO fleet.
Tests using a model Conun at the National Physical Laboratory showed that it could be handled when loaded with 70nm of Hamel Pipe, provided that two of the largest class of Ocean Rescue Tugs (the Bustler) were used ahead, and a smaller tug astern for steering. The production of five more Conuns was then put in hand. When fully loaded with 70nm of Hamel Pipe, each Conun weighed 1,600 tons, or the equivalent of a Royal Navy Destroyer.
ENEMY ACTION
The development and manufacture of the H.A.I.S. Cable and the Hamel Pipe, together with the conversion of vessels and the construction of Conuns, was completed in just over two years. This would have been an exceptional achievement in peacetime, but it was carried out in what appears to have been complete secrecy. Given the number of organisations that had to collaborate, it is impressive that the Germans did not get wind of Operation PLUTO or its objectives. However, there was a war going on, and as explained in the last issue, throughout the development programme and right up to the end of the war, London was the target of bombing raids. All the major Operation PLUTO manufacturing sites were on the River Thames at Gravesend, Tilbury and Woolwich, close to major docks, and thus obvious targets. The Luftwaffe’s general approach to bombing raids on London was to gather their planes in the North Sea off the Thames Estuary or in the Channel off Folkestone, then follow the river or the A20 main road respectively into London. In both cases the Siemens Brothers Works at Woolwich was directly in the firing line.
Although Siemens Brothers was predominantly a British company, at the start of the war its German counterpart still held a large equity stake, and there were still a few German-born employees. The two companies had continued to collaborate on development programmes right up to the outbreak of war, and thus the Nazis knew all about Siemens Brother and its products, so the Woolwich Works became a specific target. This can be confirmed because of a unique photograph discovered by Allied troops when they liberated the Luftwaffe Headquarters in Belgium.
The image above shows as a thick red line that outlines the Works at Woolwich with great accuracy. The index at the bottom of the photograph gives descriptions of the various types of buildings and in some cases information of what they were used for. None of these footnotes refer to Operation PLUTO or the H.A.I.S. Cable. There is no doubt that the Nazis considered the Siemens Brothers Works an important target, and while all three sites had to deal with German air raids, the Siemens Works probably suffered more than the other two.
When war was declared on 3 September 1939, the Siemens Brothers factory site covered some 35 acres (14 Hectares) and employed over 10,000 people. The first air raid on London took place on Saturday 7 September 1940 and commenced at 17:00 that evening. The following account is taken from Siemens Brothers’ official reports:
Around 5,000 employees were working that Saturday afternoon. There was no indication of anything abnormal, and when the sirens sounded, an established routine was quietly followed. Air Raid Precautions (ARP) personnel reported to their stations, and all other employees evacuated to the shelters, as they had done on many previous occasions without any incidents. However, on this occasion the sirens were followed quickly by the roar of enemy bombers, and out of the blue evening sky flecked with fleecy white clouds, hundreds of enemy bombers supported by hundreds of fighters weaving around them came in a steady stream from the southeast, and almost immediately a rain of bombs commenced to fall on the Surrey Docks and Woolwich Arsenal. The crash of falling bombs was continuous, and within five minutes high columns of black smoke began to rise from that district, which appeared to be blazing over its whole area. No fewer than sixteen high-explosive bombs fell inside the boundaries of the Siemens Works and caused very great damage.
This was the start of what became known as the ‘Blitz,’ a bombing campaign that continued with decreasing intensity until the end of the war. In October 1945, a plan of the Works was marked up with the number of High Explosive (HE) missiles of various types that landed on the site, and their locations. In addition, the incendiary bombs that were dropped on the premises were scattered in such large numbers that it was impossible, after the first thousand, to keep accurate records of their location, but their general distribution was indicated on the plan. Although a great number of land mines were dropped in the Woolwich area, only one landed on houses, in Hardens Manorway, 50 yds (45m) to the west of the Works, shown in the plan with a parachute attached.
In addition to the bombs recorded within the Works, in the later stages of the war three V1 rockets, known as ‘Doodlebugs’, exploded in the River Thames north of the Works, and two V2 rockets later exploded in mid-air above the Works.
During the war, the Woolwich site was hit on no less than twenty-two occasions, and the research department in Blackheath was also damaged by HE and incendiary bombs. After 7 September 1940, the bombing of London continued with great intensity for a continuous period of 90 nights. Records show that these intense air raids by bombers only lasted for a period of six months, but occasional heavy raids persisted throughout 1941. Once the Battle of Britain was won, the daylight raids ended, and although night raids followed into 1942, they grew gradually weaker and proved far less accurate, so very few HE bombs were dropped within the Works. The night raids continued spasmodically until the start of the V1 flying bomb attacks, which commenced on 13 June 1944. They continued day and night until they were replaced by V2 rockets, the first of which hit London on Friday 8 September 1944, and the V2 attacks continued until the launch sites in mainland Europe were final overrun by Allied troops at the end of March 1945.
There were, of course, many bombs, flying bombs and rockets that landed in close proximity to the boundaries of the Siemens Works, and although these caused only limited blast damage to the Works, they did cause serious stoppages in production by interfering with utility services such as gas, water, electricity and telephone. Apart from the incidents that occurred in and around the factory, production was also adversely affected when there were attacks on the district as a whole, or when enemy planes were over the Works, as many thousands of man-hours were lost through the employees having to take cover in the Works air raid shelters. A further disruptor was injuries to employees and damage to their houses in the local area. Remarkably, the Siemens Works got though the war with only three fatalities and one serious injury, which required the amputation of a leg.
Despite all this enemy action, the H.A.I.S Cable development and manufacture was successfully completed in time to meet the finally required milestone of Operation PLUTO.
PUMPING STATIONS, STORAGE TANKS & CAMOUFLAGE
Diesel-driven reciprocating pumps, each capable of handling about 180 tons per day, had been ordered in large 1945 Site Plan showing the Locations of Dropped Bombs numbers for the pumping stations. However, with the increase in capacity required by the longer crossing, it was decided that centrifugal pumps with a capacity of 1,100 tons per day, powered from the electrical grid, should also be installed, in order to reduce the number of operating and maintenance staff required.
Anglo-Iranian undertook the supervision of the construction of the pumping stations and storage tanks. This involved civilian contractors, the RE, RASC, and the Pioneers Corp. The RASC was effectively a Bulk Petroleum Company specially trained for the operation. The Petroleum Board constructed the land lines and Force PLUTO laid a large number of H.A.I.S Cables and Hamel Pipes across the Solent to provide redundant lines to the main pumping station on the Isle of Wight. These installations were an ideal opportunity to train the personnel of the large force that was being assembled as well as to develop and trial the ships and their equipment. During these operations, it was established that the cable and pipe could withstand all reasonable end tensile pulls, but that both would be severely kinked and damaged if allowed to hang vertically from the laying vessel, or if they were run back upon.
Unlike many war secrets, Operation PLUTO could have been given away very easily. If the Germans had got hold of such information as ‘A petrol pipe like a hollow submarine cable across the Channel,’ the project might well have foundered. Clearly, the pumping stations and storage tanks might easily be identified by air reconnaissance, so much effort was put into camouflage techniques to reduce the risk of discovery and attack, so the pumping station construction was put under the supervision of a Camouflage Officer. Any plant which might be seen from the air was moved into position under the cover of darkness, and existing buildings such as an old fort, bungalows, garages and one that was disguised as an ice cream shop, were all used as pump houses. Control photographs were taken at regular intervals by the RAF to reduce the risk of discovery. These precautions were often expensive and time-consuming but were successful, which was proven by the absence of any known attempts by the enemy to interfere with the pumping process during the entire period that PLUTO was operational.
THE INSTALLATION OF THE PLUTO NETWORK
Full-scale trials were made with the Conun in the River Thames in February 1944, and in Bournemouth Bay in April 1944, during which the technique for towing the Conun at up to 7 knots was perfected, and the decision was taken to moor the drum at the beginning of her run and haul in the H.A.I.S. Cable shore end length by means of a warp pulled in by a plough traction engine. The far-end H.A.I.S. Cable would then be laid out parallel to the shoreline and subsequently pulled in from the beach. However, both these methods proved difficult to accomplish and an alternative approach would later be adopted.
As is well known, the D-Day landings, codenamed ‘Operation Neptune,’ took place on three beaches (Gold, Juno & Sword) in Normandy on 6 June 1944. The original plan was to capture Cherbourg by D-Day + 8, but due to stout German resistance this was not achieved until 27 June. Because of the extensive damage in capturing Cherbourg and the need to clear the harbour of mines, the start of Operation PLUTO was delayed. The code name for the route from the Isle of Wight was ‘Bambi,’ and the first H.A.I.S. Cable was laid by HMS Latimer from Shanklin Chine on the Isle of Wight to the tip of the Cherbourg Peninsula in just 10 hours on 12 August. However, the cable failed when an escorting destroyer caught it with its anchor and damaged it beyond repair. A second effort was made by HMS Sancroft two days later. This too failed when the pipe became wrapped around the propeller of the support ship, HMS Algerian. An attempt to lay Hamel pipe instead failed on 27 August when it was discovered that barnacles had attached themselves to the bottom of HMS Conundrum 1, in such large quantities that it was prevented from rotating. The barnacles were scraped off, and another attempt was made a few days later, but the pipeline broke about 29nm (54 km) out from Shanklin Chine. Eventually overcoming these problems, a H.A.I.S. Cable was successfully installed on 22 September, which was quickly followed by a Hamel Pipeline, on 29 September They were followed in the next few weeks by another H.A.I.S Cable and Hamel Pipeline. Two 3” H.A.I.S. Cables and two Hamel Pipelines with H.A.I.S Cable shore ends were laid on this route. Each of them was 70nm (129.87km) in length and the average time taken to lay each of the H.A.I.S Cables was around 10 hours. Petrol was pumped through these pipelines to support the Allied advance along the Channel Coast to Boulogne and Calais.
The advance of the Allied Armies into Belgium and Holland was so fast that it became essential to shorten the lines of supply, and so further pipelines were run across the Channel on the original planned route from Dungeness to Boulogne. This route was codenamed ‘Dumbo,’ and the lines from Dungeness were run to a beach inside the outer harbour at Boulogne. This saved vital time by obviating the need to clear the heavily mined beach at Ambleteuse that had previously been chosen as the landing point. This change to the route involved a longer run, 23nm (42,6km) with a more difficult approach, but a technique of laying the main lengths of H.A.I.S. Cable over the stern and dropping the ends onto the seabed was devised. These ends were to be picked up later by the shore-end barges and coupled to the shore end cables at a suitable state of a later tide, and then the shore ends were landed. Once this had been perfected, lines were laid and commissioned without incident. The first H.A.I.S Cable on this route was laid by HMS Sancroft on 26 October and pumping began the same day. The average time of laying the H.A.I.S Cables on this route was only five hours. By December 1944, four 3” and two 2” H.A.I.S. Cables had been laid on this route, plus nine 3⅛” and two 2” Hamel Pipes, with H.A.I.S. Cable shore-ends, had also been laid.
As explained earlier, the method of pulling in the Hamel Pipe shore ends from the Conun had proved difficult, if not impossible, both in trials and on the Isle of Wight to Cherbourg lines. This issue was resolved by winding onto the Conun short lengths of H.A.I.S. Cable coupled to the beginning and end of each length of Hamel Pipe. These tails were led and followed respectively by a special floating wire. The Conun could then be handled like the cableship laying each tail on the seabed for the barges to recover the floating wires. They could then couple the pipes’ cable tails to the shore-end cables and deploy
Force PLUTO was responsible for the installation of the line to above the low-water mark on each shore, and the RE and RASC then connected the ends with steel pipe to the valves and filters provided on the pump delivery lines in the UK and, at the far end, to valve manifolds. Main and group control rooms were set up, with telephone communication between themselves and the pump houses, and to the opposite receiving terminals. These locations were provided with diagrams on their walls on which the control officers could use coloured discs on hooks to indicate the direction of flow of oil, the pumps and lines in use, etc., at any time.
As explained in the September issue, the couplers contained bursting discs to contain water under pressure in the H.A.I.S. Cables during the laying operation and until the sections were connected together. When a H.A.I.S. Cable line was ready for commissioning, a pump was started at the UK end and the rate of rise of pressure was monitored and recorded. The rate of rise was slow at first, but when it reached 400psi (27.6 bar) the first disc was broken, and the pressure was seen to fall. It then began to slowly rise again until the next disc burst. This process was repeated at each disc until the liquid began to flow at the far end and this was then confirmed to the pump house, via a direct telephone line from the receiving terminal.
Once the Boulogne station had been established Bambi was shut down on 5 October 1944. Each of the 3” lines run from Dungeness were capable of delivering about 400 tons a day, or 120,000 gallons. These lines were supplied and installed sufficiently quickly to keep ahead of the capacity required to be pumped from Boulogne into the French interior. The total length of the pipelines laid on the Boulogne route was 500nm (928km), which provided a total capacity of more than 4,500 tons, or 1,350,000 gallons, per day, and 1,000,000 gallons a day were pumped across the Channel for some weeks.
There was a valve manifold system on the beach at Boulogne, with a tank at beach level, that provided facilities for test purposes, but the flow was usually taken direct through three lines of 6” Victaulic jointed pipe up to tanks of 1,200 tons capacity on the cliffs north of Boulogne.
As the Allied Armies advanced, the lines were extended inland through 6” Victaulic pipelines. Eventually, petrol could be pumped from Boulogne to Calais, Ghent, Antwerp, and Eindhoven, then across the Rhine at Emmerich. From Cherbourg the route was extended to Alençon and Chartres, then south of Paris to Chalons-Sur-Marne, into Luxembourg, crossing the Rhine at Mainz, and part way to Frankfurt. The pipeline’s terrestrial extensions were constructed under the control of the Quartermaster General to the Allied Forces, General Sir Thomas Sheridan Riddle-Webster (1886-1974). The final joint was completed on 10 April 1945.
Dumbo continued to operate until it was finally shut down on 7 August 1945. In total, over 172 million gallons were delivered over PLUTO and its extensions by the end of the Second World War!
SIEMENS’ FINAL CONTRIBUTION
Production of the 3” H.A.I.S. Cable continued at the Woolwich Works until September 1944. By then, Siemens had completed the manufacture of a number of operational lengths of the 2” & 3” H.A.I.S Cable. One of the longest sections of 3” cable was 35nm (85km) and weighed over 2,200 tons when the core was filled with water. The factory coil for this was 10ft (3m) high and 65ft (19.8m) in diameter. The space required for coiling such long lengths necessitated the erection of a special building, with extra-strong cable sheaves and hauling equipment located in the roof. A long, counterpoised steel arm was designed and fitted to facilitate the handling of this extremely heavy cable.
Altogether, Siemens manufactured and delivered over 200nm (371km) of 2” & 3” H A I S. Cable to the Petroleum Warfare Department. Some 280 couplings were supplied, and with each set of two couplings a complete equipment set of special tools was provided, together with numbered spare parts, to facilitate the rapid trimming of the cable ends and fitting of the couplings.
The part of the Works secured for the manufacture of the H.A.I.S Cable was in the northwest part of the site on the River Thames. In peace time, this was the power cable production area and ideally suited for the manufacture of the H.A.I.S. New facilities were built in 1943, in which to house the large coils of cable and the secure area had its own air-raid shelters, shown in Red on the plan below,
There is no doubt that Operation PLUTO, as a whole, was pivotal to the liberation of Northern Europe by the Allied Armies in 1944-45. Together with superior manpower and the hard-won control of the skies, PLUTO was the third key pillar in the Allied victory. Without adequate fuel supplies, no matter how successful the military campaign, the Allied forces would have quickly reached the limits of their logistical supply chain, and would have been forced to dig in. Had Operation PLUTO not happened, the advances inland after D-Day would have bogged down in a new ‘Western Front’ much closer to the beachheads, and this would have bought the Germans vital time to prolong the war.
German military strategists understood that the enormous, highly mechanised Allied armies would have a voracious appetite for fuel. They assumed that this demand could not be met unless major Channel ports were captured in which bulk tankers could be docked to supply the forces. This is why the German garrisons at Channel ports such as Cherbourg were instructed to hold out until the bitter end, and why, towards the end of the war, Antwerp became the focus of V1 and V2 rocket attacks. Without timely intelligence of the project, which was never forthcoming, the German High Command could not have anticipated the massive quantities of piped fuel that PLUTO delivered. Therefore, alongside its incredible engineering achievements, the measures taken to keep Operation PLUTO secret were vital to its success.
The contribution made by the employees of Siemens Brothers to Operation PLUTO, in such difficult and dangerous circumstances, was a major contributory factor to its success, and their courage and skill should never be forgotten.
The Siemens Brothers factory was shut down in 1968, making over 8,000 employees redundant. The secure area of the Works, where the H.A.I.S Cable was manufacture, was demolished to make way for the construction of the Thames Barrier, and since 1982 the Barrier Control Building has stood in the centre of this area. Since 1968, some of the site has been redeveloped but the vast majority has lain idle; however, the owners of part of the site, Royal London, are working with property developer, U + I plc, to regenerate the 5 acres to the northwest of the remaining site, between Faraday Way and Bowater Road, in a project called The Faraday Works. This is adjacent to the area where the H.A.I.S Cable was manufactured, and U + I has undertaken to commemorate this import historical event in the redesign of this area. STF
BILL BURNS is an English electronics engineer who worked for the BBC in London after graduation before moving to New York in 1971. There he spent a number of years in the high-end audio industry, during which time he wrote many audio, video, and computer equipment reviews, along with magazine articles on subjects as diverse as electronic music instruments and the history of computing. His research for these articles led to a general interest in early technology, and in the 1980s he began collecting instruments and artifacts from the fields of electricity and communications. In 1994 a chance find of a section of the 1857 Atlantic cable inspired a special interest in undersea cable history, and soon after he set up the first version of the Atlantic Cable website <https://atlantic-cable. com>, which now has over a thousand pages on all aspect of undersea communications from 1850 until the present.
Bill’s interest in cable history has taken him to all of the surviving telegraph cable stations around the world, and to archives and museums in North America and Europe. He has presented papers on subsea cable history at a number of conferences, and in 2008 he instigated and helped organize the 150th Anniversary Celebration for the 1858 Atlantic cable at the New-York Historical Society. Most recently, in 2016 he was involved with the celebrations in London, Ireland and Newfoundland to mark the 150th anniversary of the 1866 Atlantic cable.
Since graduating in 1970, STEWART ASH has spent his entire career in the submarine cable industry. He joined STC Submarine Systems as a development engineer, working on coaxial transmission equipment and submarine repeater design. He then transferred onto field engineering, installing coaxial submarine cable systems around the world, attaining the role of Shipboard Installation Manager. In 1986, he set up a new installation division to install fibre optic submarine systems. In 1993, he joined Cable & Wireless Marine, as a business development manager and then move to an account director role responsible for, among others the parent company, C&W. When Cable & Wireless Marine became Global Marine Systems Ltd in 1999, he became General Manager of the engineering division, responsible for system testing, jointing technology and ROV operation. As part of this role, he was chairman of the UJ Consortium. He left Global Marine in 2005 to become an independent consultant, assisting system purchasers and owners in all aspects of system procurement, operations, maintenance and repair.
Stewart’s interest in the history of submarine cables began in 2000, when he project managed a celebration of the 150th anniversary of the submarine cable industry. As part of this project, he co-authored and edited From Elektron to ‘e’ Commerce. Since then, he has written and lectured extensively on the history of the submarine cable industry. From March 2009 to November 2015, he wrote Back Reflection articles for SubTel Forum. In 2013 he was invited to contribute the opening chapter to Submarine Cables: The Handbook of Law and Policy, which covered the early development of the submarine cable industry. To support the campaign to save Enderby House—a Grade II listed building—from demolition, in 2015 he wrote two books about the history of the Telcon site at Enderby Wharf on the Greenwich Peninsula in London. The first was The Story of Subsea Telecommunications and its Association with Enderby House, and the second was The Eponymous Enderby’s of Greenwich. His biography of Sir John Pender GCMG The Cable King was published by Amazon in April 2018.
REFERENCESSiemens’ Part in the Design of the HAIS Cable and Coupling, Siemens Brothers, 26 June 1945Official Record of Damage By Enemy Action to Woolwich Works, Siemens Brothers, October 1945Operation Pluto: A paper read to the Royal Society of Arts, A C Hartley, 14 November 1945Development of the HAIS Cable, Siemens Brothers Engineering Bulletin No.224, January 1946
Siemens Brother 1858 – 1958, J. D, Scott, published by Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 7 Cork St. London W1, 1958
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The authors would like to thank Anthony Chapman and Linda Richardson for giving them access to the documents listed in ‘References’, and for permission to reproduce the images used in these articles. We would also like to thank Clive Jefferys for his advice on the strategic benefits of Operation PLUTO and the German bombing campaigns during the Second World War.
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