ARAS & TOKTAS: AFGHANISTAN’S SECURITY
AFGHANISTAN’S SECURITY: POLITICAL PROCESS, STATE-BUILDING AND NARCOTICS Bulent Aras and Sule Toktas Dr. Aras is a professor at the Department of International Relations, Isik University. Dr. Toktas is an assistant professor at the Department of International Relations, Isik University.*
and opposition to narcotics, would have the potential to address the Afghan security situation. This new security understanding needs to tolerate a certain degree of insecurity to achieve progress in state-building and to appropriate an inclusive and integrative approach to the reconciliation of both human security and state security. Progress in the political process, mobilization of the masses behind state-building, and prioritization of human security are all required for rethinking Afghanistan’s security. Establishing political authority and constructing a state instrument would increase trust, which would contribute to stability.1 The lack of political institutions necessary for stability encourages the interference of individuals and groups with “special” interests, at both the state and societal levels.2 Stability is not only a prerequisite for the development of the political process and security within the country; it is also a risk to security, as it would require the involvement of groups and factors in the political process that might hinder security itself. Solving the security-stability dilemma becomes a precondition for human and state security, despite the difficulties presented in conflict-laden Afghanistan.
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nterest in the security of Afghanistan is largely dominated by fear that the country’s instability will trigger conflicts in neighboring regions from Kashmir to Chechnya. It is often argued that the key to providing security is to fortify the U.S.-led international troop positions in Afghanistan and increase the number of Afghan security personnel. In a similar vein, it is estimated that 200,000250,000 national and international security personnel would be needed. Considering the U.S. military involvement in the Iraqi quagmire, the deployment of such a large number of troops is neither realistic nor possible. Even in a scenario that assumes these troops would be deployed in Afghanistan, it is highly questionable that the security problem would be resolved. Therefore, a change in the security paradigm is needed. The current situation in the statebuilding process, based on the guidelines set forth in the Bonn Agreement, requires the precondition of sustained stability, followed by sustained security. In this article, we argue that a new security paradigm, based on the gradual establishment of a political process, state-building © 2008, The Authors
Journal Compilation © 2008, Middle East Policy Council
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First, we deal with the complications encountered during the formation of the state and its political institutions, as well as with the narcotics problem. Second, we explore the possibilities of building security and stability in Afghanistan. We hold the view that Afghan security could be provided by establishing state institutions, advancing the political process and addressing the narcotics problem. Our proposal for managing progress in these processes through the critical thresholds between security and stability will open new horizons in rethinking Afghanistan’s security.
been fighting each other in a kind of civil war since 1989. The Bonn Agreement did not recognize the Taliban government, nor did it invite reformist groups within the Taliban to the meeting. Additionally, the Bonn process did not have an agenda for the reconciliation of the differences among various adversaries.5 The agreement sets out a time schedule for the establishment of political institutions; yet there are ambiguities regarding how steps are to be taken within the schedule. The attempts by Afghan groups and external powers to establish a political authority in a new country are definitely positive. However, the Bonn Agreement delegates the task of installing the institutions to a limited group, and the groups participating in the Bonn process would not be sufficient to confer legitimacy on the political authority. Former Algerian Foreign Minister Lakhdar Brahimi, the representative of former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, emphasized the link between representation and the decisions taken in the meeting — in other words, the legitimacy issue inherent in the Bonn process. Brahimi stated that, upon the founding of a legitimate and representative government in Afghanistan at the Bonn meeting, nobody would question whether the Bonn Agreement represented the actual Afghan people or even remember the participants in the meeting.6 With this most optimistic appraisal, the nine-day meeting was certified as the arena for resolution of a conflict that had been going on for 23 years. The Bonn Agreement is a statedominated roadmap for providing security in Afghanistan.7 Security in this context refers to solving political, economic and security problems and sustaining peace
THE BONN FRAMEWORK The Bonn Agreement has determined the political roadmap of Afghanistan since the removal of the Taliban from government in 2001. The Bonn initiative aimed for reconciliation on temporary regulations until permanent government institutions could be established.3 The meeting was conducted under the auspices of the United Nations, but the resulting agreement has mostly been shaped by the influence of the United States. The Bonn Agreement first laid out a political authority that would determine a transitional government. The primary task of this government was to hold the general elections that would form the assembly and the government within two and a half years.4 The Bonn Agreement is not a peace treaty between the parties to the civil war in Afghanistan: the Taliban and the American-backed Northern Alliance. Rather, it has been a convention embraced by the American-led Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and the parties that won the war against the Taliban. In fact, the victorious parties that participated in the meeting had
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through a state-centric approach. Security the fragmented nature of Afghan politics, was postponed until the aftermath of stateevery group has had different expectations building, when the newly established and reservations regarding the future; no political authority would deal with it in a single group has had control. This is why systematic manner. In this sense, governing none of the groups have been fully supportduring the transition period has been hard ive of the process, and some may have for Hamid Kharzai.8 A Qandahari Pashtun been totally against it. from an influential family, he returned to Afghanistan with the support of the United CONSTITUTION States to unite the country against the The current constitution is the sixth Taliban regime. In the Kharzai-led transisince 1932, when Amanullah prepared the tion period, three important portfolios were first one. It went into effect on January 26, allocated to the most powerful group within 2004, after being ratified by the People’s the Northern Council and Alliance’s Shura-yi approved by Nazar (SuperviPresident Kharzai. The Pashtuns prefer a strong sory Council of the It introduced a unitary and centralized state; North): defense to bicameral presithe Tajiks want to have more Yunus Qanuni, dency, an Islamic power in the central internal affairs to legal system, Gen. Mohammed jurisdiction over government; and the Hazaras Fahim and foreign legislation by a and the Uzbeks demand affairs to Abdalla Supreme Court, a decentralized regional Abdalla. strong central government and the The Bonn government and process attempted broad language recognition of their identities. to expand reprerights for minorisentation as much ties. As the ultias possible. In due course, an emergency mate objective of the Bonn process was assembly — Loya Jirga — was founded, the establishment of permanent governand Kharzai became the president of the mental institutions, it was seen as a social Islamic State of Afghanistan for two years. contract that would provide the stability the It was only after long negotiations, on June country needed most. 19, 2002, that Kharzai was able to form a Only after long and tiresome negotiacabinet. Many members of the assembly tions was the presidential system included criticized it for being ineffective in selecting in the constitution. The president was the new administrative officers. What’s granted the authority to appoint cabinet more, the newly founded ruling elite was ministers who were not members of the 9 not inclusive. The presumption that its Assembly.10 The non-Pashtun Afghans, legitimacy problems would be resolved who had doubts that the presidential over time with the implementation of a system would permit their full representagradual plan actually put the entire process tion, were faced with a legislature comprisat the risk of a single option for success. In ing two chambers: the House of Elders
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(Meshrano Jirga), consisting of appointed members, and the House of the People (Wolesi Jirga), consisting of elected members. The House of the People was to consist of representatives from various ethnic groups, proportionate to the size of their populations. Representing a step back from the 1964 constitution, which had allocated more seats to Pashtun-dominated regions,11 the make-up of new legislature reassured the non-Pashtun masses, who expected an increase in the seats allocated to them. In addition, the new constitution provided that 25 percent of the members of the House of the People and 16 percent of the House of Elders would be women, with a quota of at least two women representatives per electoral district. The Islamist bloc did not object to the female quota; however, their demand that the president be a man was rejected.12 The new constitution emphasized that no legislation could contradict the principles of Islam. It also established a Supreme Court to certify the constitutionality of laws, presidential provisions and international treaties.13 There were fears that the Supreme Court would resemble the Iranian Guardian Council, which also interprets the Iranian constitution and may reject parliamentary bills deemed incompatible with the constitution. Such authority granted to the Supreme Court involves the risk of blocking the legislature or decelerating the legislative process. Another aspect of the durability and stability of the political system is the issue of a super-Afghan identity. No matter what contribution the Bonn Agreement and its aftermath have made to the construction of a national identity, the current situation is far from delineating an Afghan identity. Every ethnic group has asserted its definition of an
Afghan identity based on its own criteria. Such ethnic assertiveness is also evident in the competition over the administrative structure. The Pashtuns prefer a strong unitary and centralized state; the Tajiks want to have more power in the central government; and the Hazaras and the Uzbeks demand decentralized regional government and the recognition of their identities. Although the new Afghan constitution did not involve federalism or regional authority in accordance with the demands of the Hazaras and the Uzbeks, it contains articles that recognize cultural and linguistic diversity within the country. The previous constitution, promulgated in 1963, recognized Pashtu and Dari (Afghan Persian) as the official languages and included an article requiring the government to develop and promote the Pashtun language.14 In contrast, the new constitution is a pluralistic one. Article 16 regulates the language to be used in the public sphere. During the meetings to prepare it, attempts to favor Pashtu over Dari were met with suspicion among Dari-speaking Tajiks, who feared that the issue of language could be used to remove Tajiks from state offices. Despite the fact that Article 16 specified Pashtu and Dari as the official languages of the state from among the various languages spoken in the country, Pashtu has been preferred over Dari in state institutions and public offices.15 Some members of the Northern Alliance wanted Turkic languages (Uzbek and Turkmen) to be recognized as official. These groups also criticized use of the term “Afghan,” because of its association with the Pashtun identity, and offered “Afghanistani” instead. In a similar vein, they demanded that the word “Afghani” to
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refer to the national unit of currency be changed. These discussions resulted in Article 16 setting forth the Turkic languages (Baluchi, Pashai, Nuristani or Pamiri) as the third official language in regions where the majority of inhabitants speak them. The state was given the role of adopting and implementing effective plans for strengthening and developing all the languages of Afghanistan. By the same token, Article 16 allowed publications and radio and television broadcasting in all languages spoken in the country. As a result of the provisions regarding linguistic diversity, the new Afghan constitution recognized both ethnic plurality and political unity. As Article 4 stated: “The nation of Afghanistan is comprised of the following ethnic groups: Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara, Uzbek, Turkmen, Baluch, Pashai, Nuristani, Aymaq, Arab, Kirghiz, Kizilbash, Gujur, Brahwui and others….The word Afghan applies to every citizen of Afghanistan…”16
not serve the goals of representation and legitimacy to the fullest extent, they would provide a mechanism for state-society relations. If citizenship is considered one of the fundamental components of the bond between the individual and the state, elections provide an essential dynamic. During elections, polling is organized, voters are registered and identification cards are prepared. Through election campaigns, a discourse takes place on the importance of elections, political participation and representation, and civic virtue is cultivated. All in all, the process indirectly creates a citizenship bond between society and the state.19 At the beginning of 2004, a closedparty-list, proportional electoral system was the method suggested for the 34 historical electoral districts of Afghanistan. One of the proposals, presented as the best of the worst, was for single nontransferable voting within the simple-majority system inherited from British rule. Yet the proposal was met with suspicion, as it would not be suitable for the situation in Afghanistan.20 Several nongovernmental organizations, international groups and UNAMA (United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan) pointed to the negative consequences of a simple-majority electoral system. For instance, the International Crisis Group released a report on the deficiencies that a simple-majority system based on single nontransferable voting may cause for a new democracy.21 On January 17, 2005, 35 of the 40 officially approved political parties declared that they supported a proportional electoral system with party listing. In the same month, the three candidates in the presidential elections besides Kharzai — Rashid Dostum, Yunus Qanuni and Mohammed
PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS In post-conflict situations, holding democratic elections is usually the first task on the agenda. Free and competitive elections are of primary importance in legitimating the new government and its decisions, which are assumed to be contributory to the environment for peace.17 It was in this context that the question of which electoral system would be chosen was handled. During the lengthy and exhaustive discussions, the proportional electoral system was frequently cited as the most suitable system for Afghanistan because it would bring about a stable party system and therefore a more balanced relationship between the legislative and executive powers.18 Proponents of this model argued that, although elections might
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Muhakik — denounced the nontransferable single vote and joined with those who supported a proportional electoral system with party listing.22 Despite these denunciations, the nontransferable single vote was chosen. This was due to the need for a stable party system, on the one hand, and the mistrust towards political parties, on the other. It was complemented by suggestions for voting for particular candidates rather than parties. The biggest obstacle facing the elections was the security of the electorate. In the elections of the Emergency Loya Jirga — the transitional people’s assembly was formed before the general elections with the task of regulating the transitional period — serious security problems occurred, and armed groups occupied some of the ballot centers. Similar problems were expected in the general elections. The Bonn Agreement envisaged the democratization of the warlords as the final stage.23 Democratization, in this context, referred to the resolution of the security-stability dilemma by the armed groups renouncing violence, diminishing their differences through the political process, and entering free and competitive elections. On September 18, 2005, despite an insecure environment, nearly 7 million Afghans used their political right to vote in the most liberal and just general election in Afghan history. Women were half of the electorate. In the single-ballot direct elections, 249 members of the House of the People (Wolesi Jirga) and, through indirect elections, the House of Elders (Meshrano Jirga) were elected. The Afghan general elections showed that, even in the midst of the worst security conditions and other political problems, elections could be held successfully. In the
House of the People, 33 identifiable political parties, groups and alliances are represented. Although Kharzai took 55 percent of the votes in the 2004 presidential elections, the heterogeneous groups who supported him in the 2005 general elections received only one third of the seats. 24 The elected assembly reflects the contemporary Afghan picture very well.25 The groups that form the Islamic bloc took 65 of the seats. Although this bloc is united under the idea that the legislative and executive powers should be collectivized in a single body in accordance with a conservative interpretation of Islam, due to the multiethnic and fragmented structure of Afghan politics, it is split into various groups and subgroups. The groups under the leaderships of Abdul Rasul Sayyaf and Burhanuddin Rabbani supported Kharzai, but proponents of Yunus Qanuni remained in opposition. From time to time, the Shiite Hazaras, who follow a more moderate interpretation of Islam, support this bloc. In the Assembly, there are 43 representatives who define themselves as progressive; 13 liberal democrats; and 20 representatives from the National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan, which is a secular-oriented party under the leadership of Abdul Rashid Dostum. The same House hosts 24 criminal gang members, 40 commanders who have relations with the militias, 17 drug smugglers and 19 representatives who have been accused of serious war crimes. Almost half the members of the House are composed of mujahideen who had fought against the Soviet invasion.26 The 2005 general elections may be considered a success story, yet there are deficiencies to be expected in a postconflict situation. For example, since
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literacy rates among the Afghan population are very low (21 percent for women and 51 percent for men), the nontransferable single-vote system and the several-pageslong ballot caused difficulties.27 Despite the low literacy rates, the elections brought women representatives into the assembly. In addition to those women candidates who were placed at the top of the listings, where their election would be guaranteed, 18 other women candidates won seats in the assembly. For example, in the western part of the Herat region, Fauzia Gailani won a majority of the votes, far outpolling the male candidates. In the province of Farah, Malali Joya, who courageously stood against the warlords, came in second. The votes given to Joya can be seen as a reaction to traditional male candidates, who were considered proponents of war or were involved in corruption.28 Although the political impact of women members of the parliament cannot be measured in the short term, their presence illustrates enhanced political participation in sharp contrast to the Taliban government.
opium farmers. The Taliban government had concluded that it would not be economically wise to eliminate the opium traffic, as it was one of the backbones of the economy and was widespread. Even when the Taliban declared drug cultivation illegal in 2000-2001 under international pressure, the country’s opium stocks were so high that their share of GDP would not have changed for a long time.30 Afghanistan provides 75 percent of the heroin in the global market and 95 percent of the heroin in the European market. Opium cultivation has been increasing in Afghanistan every year. In interviews conducted with the elderly from the Herat region, it was commonly stated that weather was a greater obstacle than legal measures against opium cultivation.31 UN statistics confirm this trend, showing that opium production increased by 49 percent in 2006 relative to the previous year.32 Assertive policies are needed to assess the reasons behind the widespread cultivation of opium and why the transition to legal agricultural crops is impossible.33 In the post-Taliban period, the reconstruction of the country dominates the agendas of both domestic politics and the economy. More than 70 percent of the population still lives below the poverty level. Theoretically, legal agricultural goods such as saffron, fruit and grain production can be promoted and subsidized to combat opium cultivation. Yet, there are structural factors specific to Afghanistan that make it a fertile ground for illegal agriculture. These can be categorized in two ways.34 First, the country’s small-scale banking credit system operates through opium agriculture. Opium production, technically, is resistant to weather conditions. In addition, it has pricing stability.
THE NARCOTICS PROBLEM Hamid Kharzai has emphasized that the opium trade has become a worse cancer than terrorism and even worse than the 1979 Soviet occupation.29 The opium business is a widespread phenomenon that previously involved the Taliban and the Northern Alliance. Except for during 1994 and 1995, when the Taliban were fighting fiercely to install a fundamentalist regime, the Taliban government had gradually become involved in drug trafficking. At the beginning of Taliban rule, opium cultivation was tolerated. Then, a tax under the name of “Islamic alms,” at a rate of 10-20 percent, started to be collected from the
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Having ties with international drug networks, the local drug traffickers prefinance opium production by providing all the farmers’ needs for the following year. Furthermore, they prepay for the next year’s harvest with goods, food and clothes, all of which can be worth substantial amounts during the cold winters. Second, legal agricultural production necessitates substantial pre-financing, as irrigation and fertilizer are quite costly in Afghanistan’s tough geography and climate. In the case of fruit growing, steps such as timely harvesting, storage in cold warehouses and delivery to the market without price fluctuation are required. The production of opium does not necessitate special conditions. Furthermore, since it is a light product in terms of weight, the harvest can easily be transported. Most of the time, traffickers purchase opium in the form of raw material directly from the farmers.35 The number of people involved in drug production and trafficking in Afghanistan is unknown. The UN Office on Drugs and Crime estimates that nearly 7 percent of the Afghan population directly benefits from drug trafficking.36 This figure includes neither seasonal workers and their families employed by the drug traffickers nor those who contribute indirectly (i.e., the importers of the vehicles used in production and transportation), the real-estate agents or middlemen, and the pension, coffee-house and guest-house owners who provide service to traffickers. A lively economy is clearly visible in the opium-production areas of Afghanistan, owing to an increase in the demand for real estate and the consequent rises in prices. This creates inflationary pressure and disrupts the exchange market. Needless to say, the
money derived from drugs creates wealth that can easily be turned into political power, thus endangering the legitimacy of the political process. Who is involved in drug trafficking? The question is vital for the struggle against groups related to al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Crime networks receive commissions in return for services such as security and protection, which they provide to the opium producers and shippers. Other actors work in the process of transforming opium into drugs. Another group of actors deals with money laundering. In the post-Taliban period, it became risky to utilize groups affiliated with al-Qaeda in drug trafficking, and there has been a tendency to recruit new groups outside the al-Qaeda circle for trafficking and smuggling. Drug bosses have refrained from drawing a reaction from the U.S.-led occupation forces and have tried to cut links with al-Qaeda, if there were any. Still, there are certain groups affiliated or related to al-Qaeda that take part in the drug business. For instance, there is evidence that Juma Khan, one of the sponsors of al-Qaeda in Beluchistan, owns a shipping fleet for the transportation of Afghan drugs from Karachi to the world market. Additionally, the number-one drug baron of Afghanistan, Bashir Nurzai, admitted, after being caught in New York in April 2005, that al-Qaeda members were used in drug trafficking.37 Although this has certain advantages, considering the organization’s knowledge and experience in Afghan geography, money laundering systems and their own international network building, it is risky. There is a fierce hunt for members of the organization and the Taliban by the occupation forces, which puts alQaeda at a comparative disadvantage. There are various methods to combat
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opium cultivation and narcotics problems in Ministry of Interior and penalizing state Afghanistan. The international pressure officials who are involved in drug networks during Taliban rule has been replaced by a without consideration of their political and ethnicties.40 combined effort of occupation and local Afghan forces in the post-Taliban period to fight against trafficking. Analysts argue RETHINKING AFGHAN SECURITY that a threefold strategy is at stake.38 The The problem of security in Afghanistan is not caused only by the resistance within first stage is the use of the relationships among the U.S. forces, local warlords and the country. In the current situation, the increasing security problems every year anti-al-Qaeda groups against drug barons. It has to be mentioned, however, that impair the state-construction process. For among the local allies of the United States, example, in the year 2005, attacks increased by 20 percent, coalition forces there are some groups that are involved in drug trafficking. The second stage is the casualties increased from 58 to 129, total casualties reached 1500, and new tactics deployment of the anti-narcotics police of Afghanistan with — such as suicide attacks and reeffective means With the acknowledgement of and lethal assaults. mote-controlled roadside bombings The third stage of the fact that the narcotics — appeared.41 The the strategy problem in Afghanistan cannot involves the situation worsened be solved in the short term, the in 2006 and 2007. solution to be issue can be reframed as a obtained at the end One has to of the statecontextualize the problem of security and building process.39 security problem in development. This threefold Afghanistan within strategy is closely the broader framerelated to the work of stateobjectives of reinforcing the creation of the building, regional conflict, international drug Afghan state and its security structure. In trafficking and intervention by neighboring addition to this strategy, other measures are countries. possible. For example, with the acknowledThe Afghan people have been divided gement of the fact that the narcotics into three groups under the impact of the problem in Afghanistan cannot be solved in complex security problem. The first group the short term, the issue can be reframed is living with the threat of the Taliban, as a problem of security and development. which still persists despite American Barnett Rubin, who suggests revisiting the attempts to annihilate the regime. It is reported that people living in Kandahar former question, proposes measures such as the development of the rural regions that apply to Taliban courts for solutions to their grow opium and other agricultural goods, disputes. In the southern and southwestern road construction, installation of wareparts of the country, the Taliban continue to houses and cold-storage depots for perishexecute “government collaborators.” able goods such as fruit, reforming the NATO and coalition forces have not
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attained any success beyond suggesting that the people continue to support the government.42 The second group consists of the masses that neither want the Taliban nor are satisfied with the existing government. They feel hopeless about the future; they have lost their trust in government and do not have confidence in its capacity to resolve persistent problems. They believe that the NATO and coalition forces — the distrusted foreigners — not only make things worse in Afghanistan by intervention but also do not contribute to the statebuilding process. A majority of the country’s population falls into this category. The third group, formed by those with confidence in the Afghan government, has been actively participating in the reconstruction of the country. This group is composed of state officials, reconstructionplan executives, and participants in political processes. Although it is difficult to identify homogenous groups in Afghanistan, this picture represents the security perceptions of the Afghan people. The most suitable way to win over the people who have lost trust in government and hope for the future is to make continuous and substantial progress in state-building and the creation of permanent political institutions within the framework of the Bonn Agreement. Every failure damages expectations and hopes, and therefore risks the success of the entire process. The solution to the dilemma of security and stability lies in the fact that the majority of the people in Afghanistan do not want the Taliban regime to return. This is illustrated by the active participation of the public in the constitutional process as well as the general elections. Thanks to this fact, two requisites appear to be vital to
overcoming the obstacles blocking the objectives of the Bonn process. First, the security problems must be solved, before they get worse and make people yearn for the Taliban period. Second, people must become involved in the reconstruction of the country so that they benefit from the stability process, even though backsliding will occur. This relationship should be determined by a balance between hope for the future and the benefits that the current situation may offer for as large a number of people as possible. The establishment of an effective state structure is possible with the end of conflict, economic development and the replacement of the opium-based economy. The main task of the Afghan government is to keep this long-term objective on the agenda while retaining the confidence of the people. The long-term strategy, which may be considered unrealistic for Afghanistan’s current weak institutional structure, can be accomplished by political maneuvers that aim at controlling the security-stability dilemma in the short-term. The Afghan government needs to restructure itself to deal with the most vulnerable institutions, namely the Ministry of Interior and the judiciary.43 The lack of trust in these institutions activates tribal structures and local legal systems. Additionally, the rumors that the Afghan government is engaged in drug trafficking and other illegal activities and that the judiciary takes bribes to adjudicate decisions cause people to question the capability of the Afghan government and its legitimacy. The importance of building reliable permanent institutions and a functioning political system and prohibiting illegal networks, local warlords and crime gangs becomes critical at this point.
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Providing security while trying to establish stable state institutions is not an easy mission. Besides the structural barriers, there are nomadic and settled tribes living in regions that have not yet been encompassed by the political authority or who want to continue to live outside the scope of state institutions. Historically, there had always been several rulers, small-scale local leaders, tribal confederations, and warlords coexisting in the region.44 In such a context, trying to form a Weberian state structure that collectivizes the legitimate use of violence in the hands of the political authority becomes a challenging objective. The reorganization of the Afghan government in accordance with a more effective management of the security situation would gradually solve the problems of a unitary state structure and would lead to the emergence of a state mechanism. The common theme among state officials at the ministries in Kabul is their recognition that a step-by-step approach is key to state construction. Yet, one of the biggest problems during reorganization is human capital. Currently, it is hard to find qualified personnel and harder to keep them. Specialists and other qualified personnel usually choose to work in international organizations operating in Afghanistan, as they offer better salaries and working conditions. Those recruited to state offices encounter ambiguities regarding job security since the country’s general security is under threat. What’s more, most of the labor demanded from state officials is merely to save the day — and the days are very long in Afghanistan’s harsh political and economic conditions.45 As discussed above, there is a need for a strong state in Afghanistan to accelerate economic development, increase welfare,
reduce poverty, end violence, strengthen peace and diminish the interference of regional actors. Security and good governance are closely related to the country’s economy. In the current situation, the Afghan economy is functioning with the engagement of a small number of economic actors and to a large extent by international assistance. The political process encounters difficulties in carrying out economic development. In order to ensure societal support, the government needs to include the masses in the game by showing them how they would definitely benefit in the post-Taliban period. For this, the masses must be convinced that both the economic pie and their share of it will grow over time. Speedy economic development is the most practical, concrete and convincing tool. Therefore, the economy based on international assistance should be transformed into sustainable development that incorporates national dynamics. Economic progress and development are also necessary for the establishment of the security institutions. In the words of the spokesperson of the Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mahmoud Saikal, taxes should increase by three to four times to finance around 50,000 soldiers as well as an effective police force.46 The reconciliation of security and stability in Afghanistan is possible not only by restructuring and reforming government institutions but also by developing new policies that would integrate the majority into the political process. The irreconcilable groups within the al-Qaeda and Gulbuiddin Hekmatyar groups should be isolated and eliminated while the remaining players within the same groups could be accommodated and brought in. It is at this point that political amnesty appears as an effective
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tool. Yet, it has to be stated that amnesty is a means that must be used carefully and delicately. By increasing participation and legitimacy, a more dynamic and encompassing structure could emerge. In a similar vein, some of the problematic groups — such as the warlords, the entrepreneurs affiliated with them and various militias — could be recognized as legal actors and be recruited into the army. The process begins by providing stability and is followed by formation of a security structure and steps ensuring that the security institutions behave in accordance with their primary duty. What is required is the diffusion of political authority among the public. Such diffusion could be operational, recognizing some of the groups as legitimate actors, integrating them into the political and economic system, and transforming them over time. After integrating opposing, resisting or intimidating groups into the political processes, a tolerant structure should be created so that these groups can voice their criticisms or exhibit their dissatisfaction peacefully within the boundaries of the legal system. These groups should transform within the domain of the constitution and the legal system, but at the same time, there should be continuous efforts to ensure that they do not reverse the progressive process by destruction or rebellion. In a similar vein, even partial participation is noteworthy for institutions that provide stability. Hesitation to participate or conditional participation has to be acknowledged as normal and natural and, more importantly, supported. Some groups that participated in the constitutional referendum in order not to be left out of the power game may continue their resistance. Although these groups may see their
participation in the referendum and their continued resistance as a strategy of killing two birds with one stone, the actual situation is that they in some way or another have been attracted to participate in the political processes. Partial participation has started to be seen as an opening for the reconciliation of differences over time and as a tool kit for dynamism during the formation and preservation of the processes. The above considerations are on the agenda of coalition forces and local Afghan security forces. Three auxiliary issues would help the successful implementation of the agenda strategically.47 First, augmenting security is possible only after a series of security-providing actions. Therefore, the endeavors to provide security should complement each other; one security measure should not block another. Second, before getting in touch with the warlords, the decision as to which warlords are to be isolated and which strengthened should be well calculated. Every disorganized or unsystematic contact with warlords would only empower them. Tentative alliances with warlords should be designed in light of a long-term strategy. Third, in a setting where fierce security measures are needed, running security operations without supplying adequate security personnel and munitions is an absolute risk.48 CONCLUSION The long-term objective for Afghanistan is to strengthen the state structurally and to set mechanisms in place that would prevent it from working only for narrow or factional interests. It can be argued that a strong state might not always prioritize human and societal security but would
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instead impose an arbitrary government. Such a risk can be minimized by an approach that would safeguard human security along with state security. The case of Afghanistan illustrates that hard security policies are postponing if not altogether destroying stability, which is essential for the establishment of political authority and hence the state. A new approach is required that will treat security within a broader and more flexible understanding. Within the medium of an enhanced security conceptualization, short-term insecurity can be tolerated in the name of stability. It is of utmost importance to speedily establish mechanisms that would build trust towards the state and political institutions in the eyes of the masses in Afghanistan. Although this may be too optimistic since
there is little evidence of stability, security and harmony within the country, there is potential for the dilemma between security and stability to be successfully governed through critical thresholds. This new approach on security would forestall crime networks or even state authorities from instituting links with foreign elements and decrease the tensions and conflicts within the country. In the 200-year history of Afghanistan, what has been lacking has been the above-described understanding of security. In this sense, handling and governing human, societal and state security together in a holistic way should be persistently defended. It is only through such political will that security can become possible and open new ground for breakthroughs in Afghanistan.
* This article is part of a broader research project funded by TUBITAK and Isik University. We would like to thank TUBITAK, Isik University, the Center for Strategic Studies at the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The ideas expressed here belong solely to the authors. 1 Caroline Hartzell, Matthew Hoddie and Donald Rothchild, “Stabilizing the Peace after Civil War: An Investigation of Some Key Variables,” International Organization, Vol. 55, No. 1 (March 2001), pp. 183-208. 2 Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (Yale University Press, 1968). 3 Kevin K. Frank, “Democracy and Economics in Afghanistan: Is the Cart before the Horse?” Mediterranean Quarterly, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Winter 2006), p. 103. 4 United Nations Security Council, Agreement on the Provincial Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishment of Permanent Government Institutions, S/2001/1154, December 5, 2001. 5 Barnett R. Rubin, “Crafting a Constitution for Afghanistan,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 15, No. 3, (July 2004), p. 7. 6 Ibid. 7 Jonathan Goodhand, “From War Economy to Peace Economy: Reconstruction and State Building in Afghanistan,” Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 58, No. 1 (October 2004), p. 170. 8 Barnett R. Rubin, Ashraf Ghani, William Maley, Ahmed Rashid and Olivier Roy, Afghanistan: Reconstruction and Peace Building in a Regional Framework, KOFF Peacebuilding Reports, 1, Center for Peacebuilding of the Swiss Peace Foundation, Bern, 2001, p. 178. 9 From the interview that co-author Bulent Aras conducted with Wahidullah Furmuli, director of the Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs European Section on April 21, 2006, in Kabul, Afghanistan. 10 Rubin, 2004, op. cit., p. 12. 11 Ibid. 12 Ibid., p. 15. 13 Ibid. 14 The 1964 Afghanistan Constitution, retrievable at http://www.afghan-web.com/history/const/ const1964.html
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From the interview that co-author Bulent Aras conducted with Yasin Rasuli, senior specialist at the Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs Strategic Research Center on April 22, 2006, Kabul, Afghanistan. 16 The 2004 Afghanistan Constitution, retrievable at http://www.afghanan.net/afghanistan/constitutions/ constitution2004.htm. 17 Beatrice Pouligny, “Promoting Democratic Institutions in Post-Conflict Societies: Giving Diversity a Chance,” International Peacekeeping, Vol. 7, No. 3 (2000): pp. 17 - 35. 18 Andrew Reynolds, “The Curious Case of Afghanistan,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 17, No. 2 (April 2006), p. 116. 19 Pouligny, op. cit. 20 From the interview that co-author Bulent Aras conducted with Prof. Dr. Hamidullah Faruki, president of the Afghanistan Chamber of Commerce, on April 19, 2006, in Kabul, Afghanistan. 21 International Crisis Group, Afghanistan: From Presidential to Parliamentary Elections, Asia Report 88, November 23, 2004. 22 Reynolds, op. cit., p. 110. 23 Thomas H. Johnson, “Afghanistan’s Post-Taliban Transition: The State of State-Building after War,” Central Asian Survey, Vol. 25, No. 1-2 (March - June 2006), p. 13. 24 Reynolds, op. cit., p. 114. 25 Ibid., p. 112. 26 Ibid. 27 From the interview that co-author Bulent Aras conducted with Ambassador Aziz Arianfar, director of the Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs Strategic Research Center, on April 22, 2006, in Kabul, Afghanistan. 28 Reynolds, op. cit., p. 114. 29 John Lancaster, “Karzai Vows to Combat Flourishing Afghan Opium Trade,” Boston Globe, December 10, 2004. 30 Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Afghanistan: When Counternarcotics Undermines Counterterrorism,” Washington Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 4 (Autumn 2005), p. 56. 31 From the interview that co-author Bulent Aras conducted with a security specialist at UNAMA, who wants his name to be kept confidential, on April 23, 2006, in Kabul, Afghanistan. 32 Barnett R. Rubin, “Saving Afghanistan,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 86, No. 1 (January - February 2007), p. 65. 33 From the interview that co-author Bulent Aras conducted with Prof. Dr. Hamidullah Faruki, president of the Afghanistan Chamber of Commerce, on April 19, 2006, in Kabul, Afghanistan. 34 Felbab-Brown, op. cit., p. 57. 35 Ibid. 36 UN Office on Drugs and Crime, 2004 World Drug Report Vol 2: Statistics, 2004, p. 206. 37 Felbab-Brown, op. cit., p. 60. 38 Felbab-Brown, op. cit., p. 68. 39 Ibid. 40 Rubin, 2007, op. cit., p. 68. 41 Operation Enduring Freedom, “Coalition Military Fatalities by Year: Operation Enduring Freedom,” 2007, retrievable at http:icasualties.org/oef. 42 Goodhand, op. cit., p. 164. 43 Rubin, 2007, op. cit., p. 76. 44 For a similar argument, see Christian Parenti, “Afghanistan: The Use and Abuse of a Buffer State,” New Political Science, Vol.30, No.1 (2008). 45 From the interview that co-author Bulent Aras conducted with Hikmet Cetin, who served as NATO’s senior civilian representative in Afghanistan, on June 14, 2007, in Istanbul, Turkey. 46 From the interview that co-author Bulent Aras conducted with the spokesperson of the Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs Mahmoud Saikal on April 19 2006 in Kabul, Afghanistan. 47 Larry P. Goodson, “Bullets, Ballots, and Poppies in Afghanistan,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 16, No. 1 (January 2005), p. 27. 48 Goodson, op. cit., p. 27.
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