Book Review on Ethnicity and Immigration

Book Reviews

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Allies with the Infidels, the Ottoman and French Alliance in the Sixteenth Century

By Christine Isom-Verhaaren London: I.B. Tauris & Co, 2011, 274 pages, ISBN 9781848857285, £52.20.

Christine Isom-Verhaaren’s book is not a history of the Franco-Ottoman alliance in the 16th century; rather its aim is to show how the Ottomans and French of the time saw this alliance, which has so often been presented by later historians as exceptional and shameful, and why its real meaning and historical context were misunderstood. Chapters one to five describe what she calls the “traditional historiography”. In consequence what she says is not always new for Ottomanists and the book is clearly meant for a broad Anglophone readership.

The main point in the first five chapters is that Charles V’s, the Holy Roman Emperor, anti-French propaganda against the impious collaboration of a Christian king with a Muslim sovereign was so successful that this Imperial view was accepted at face value in the 20th century, even in French historiography. French (and Ottoman) sources show a different version of those facts compared to the Imperial presentation, but they were not taken into sufficient account even in France, where the interest in the subject waned in the 17th century, while a taste for beautiful prose created a gap between the antiquarians’ work on sources and a literary and philosophical history which despised them. This gap began to disappear in the 19th century, but by then it was too late as the Ottoman Empire had become so feeble that it seemed shameful and humiliating to imagine a 16th century France needing the Sultan’s help.

Chapter one summarizes how the Ottoman Empire became a crucial element in the balance of powers after the fall of Constantinople. The petty Italian states made use of the great powers, France and Spain but also the Ottoman Empire, to solve their internal affairs. This was enhanced by the rivalry of the French and the Holy Roman Empire in Italy and by the unprecedented power of Charles V, whose world imperial ambitions compelled the encircled French to seek the help of a strong ally. This was not new as the Italian states’ policies had already paved the way for France’s Francis I to contact the Ottomans.

Chapter two removes another misconception of the relationship between Christian Westerners and the Muslim Ottomans in the “traditional historiography.” Chapter five argues that it is anachronistic to think in terms of ethnicity about so-called (by historians) “foreigners” employed by 16th century sovereigns as the important point at the time was the fidelity to an individual prince. We can’t but agree.

But IsomVerhaaren perhaps underestimates the weight of religion as she herself reminds us by saying that becoming a Catholic in France or a Muslim in the Ottoman Empire was necessary to make a career. What is more, it would not have been advisable to renounce Islam in Istanbul (“Religion as an element of political identity could be changed when the need arose”, p. 58). The similarities between France and the Ottoman Empire seem a bit

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over blown: the kul system had nothing in common with the employment of Christian aristocrats coming from another European country; the renegades in North Africa are a very different case as well. Chapter three deals with Cem, a brother of Bayezid II who was compelled to flee the empire in 1482 and spent 13 years in Europe. She rightly writes that this famous affair provoked a growth of the Ottomans’ presence in European diplomacy, and that the Franco-Ottoman alliance of the 1530s was the result of an old process. After some pages about Cem’s life and its political meaning, she summarizes the vâkı‘ât-ı Sultân Cem, a biography of the prince by a man who travelled with him which gives a first-hand account of the events and a unique description of France and Italy at the end of the 15th century. The text is well known, but available only in Turkish or in French.

This section stresses that its author wanted to show Cem’s piety, and was critical of the Christian society, although some individuals were seen as good.

Chapter four is based on French sources (published in the 19th century) and two important Ottoman chronicles, one of which is still unpublished. Although its existence was well known, this book is the first to make a thorough use of it. Criticizing the “traditional historiography,” the author reminds us of important facts: the joint campaign of 1543-44 was the consequence of years of Franco-Ottoman collaboration; while the French initiated the collaboration, the Ottomans were not their puppets; the Ottomans spared the French and their lands, Provence did not suffer from their wintering in Toulon and they paid for what they took; there were tensions between the allies, particularly for the French as they were not as organized 196

as the Ottomans hoped and, which was worse, proved to be unable to use the opportunity, but the French did profit from Ottoman help.

Chapter five develops the themes presented in the introduction about the historiography, and analyzes the views of the protagonists: the matter-of-fact point of view of the Ottoman chronicles, the Habsburg propaganda especially from Paolo Giovio, and the French answer asserting that one had the right to seek help against one’s enemies.

Why did the Habsburgs win the propaganda war? The argument presented in the first five chapters seems convincing. Nevertheless, one could add some perspectives or questions. Giovio’s success is probably not only due to political manipulations. He wrote a well-written comprehensive history and this surely contributed to its wide diffusion, even in France. Giovio could not have been convincing if his arguments had been of no value as even if he had lied about Ottoman depredations, the public apparently was willing to accept them as true. As for the religious argument, the French tried to reply, a fact which proves that the Habsburgs’s thesis was echoed in European opinion. Had Louis XI not refused to let any Muslims come to France?

Even if mentalities had changed during the following decades, and even if collaboration with Muslim powers was not a new phenomenon, and even if the presence of Barbarossa in Marseilles inspired more curiosity than terror in 1543, the cooperation with Muslims against Christians could be embarrassing, at least for some. As far as the 19th century French historiography is concerned, I wonder if the feeling of superiority that was insisted upon is enough to explain why some his-

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torians told a history which was partly in contradiction with sources published by French scholars. One probably should as well take into account philhellenism and

the Romantic movement to explain why the Turk’s villainy was taken for granted.

Nicolas Vatin, CNRS, EPHE, Paris

The Muslim Empires of the Ottomans, Safavids, and Mughals

By Stephen F. Dale Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010, 347 pages, ISBN 9780521870955.

The comparative study of empires is undoubtedly one of the fastest growing fields since the end of the Cold War. Dominic Lieven was among those who paved the way with his Empire: The Russian Empire and its Rivals (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), which was followed with some later additions such as Karen Barkey’s Empire of Difference: The Ottomans in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008) and Jane Burbank and Frederic Cooper’s Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010). Indeed the field of empires is so vast that the combinations and permutations of comparative studies are endless.

What has been forgotten through this latest wave of comparative empire studies is the standard comparison between the triplet empires of the Ottomans, Safavids, and Mughal. All were land-based, “early modern” empires where a variant of Islam was claimed as the dominant religion and blueprint for a polity. Marshall Hodgson’s term “gunpowder empires” that together constituted an “Islamicate” has until recently been the predominant association that comes from such a comparative framework. Stephen Dale, professor

at Ohio State University and a specialist in Mughal history, has reintroduced this comparative framework with his The Muslim Empires of the Ottomans, Safavids, and Mughals, and in so doing has written a solid primer on the three “Muslim” empires for students and scholars alike.

Dale explains early on why Hodgson’s “gunpowder empires” is not a satisfactory term to link these three state formations.

He claims that, while gunpowder was crucial to Ottoman power against Europeans and others, it was not as integral to Safavid or Mughal trajectories of empire. Specifically, he maintains that “The suggestive idea that firearms triggered fundamental changes in the organization of a particular Muslim empire is often alluded to but rarely demonstrated in a systematic fashion, and has not yet been applied to these three states” (p. 6). Neither does he favor the term “early modern,” arguing that it is vague and many of the supposed hallmarks of an “early modern state” are not unique to those empires. Dale further differentiates his study from Hodgson’s with his self-proclaimed focus on political history (using a treatment of individual rulers as a stylistic device) and the “aristocratic elite” (p. 7) rather than on the militaryfiscal systems. Dale offers “a short histo-

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ry of culturally related and commercially linked imperial entities from their foundation, through the height of their power, economic influence and artistic creativity and then to their dissolution” (p. 7).

Out of a total of eight chapters, the first three proceed chronologically, and the remaining take up aspects of culture and change from the respective Golden Ages of the three empire to their demise.

Chapter one sets up the geographic scene and historical background to the Mughal, Safavid, and Ottoman empires, focusing on India, Iran, and Anatolia from the 10th to the 16th century. Chapter two looks at the rise of these “Muslim empires,” and chapter three explores the legitimacy of monarchs and institutions of empires (undoubtedly an important distinction for each of these empires in different ways).

Chapter four turns to the economies of the three states around 1600, chapter five looks at imperial cultures, and chapter six moves from culture to the question of profane and sacred empires. Chapter seven looks at imperial culture in the Golden Ages and finally, chapter eight ends with a consideration of the different kinds of collapse of all three empires in the 18th century and divergent struggles to reconstitute power in all three regions in the course of the 19th century.

While one would not want to take issue with the content of Dale’s book—indeed it is a solid, engaging, and thoughtful treatment of three related and complex histories—it is nevertheless useful to contem-

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plate the pros and cons of grouping these three empires, to the exclusion of all others, into a comparative framework. Certainly the concept of a “Muslim world” can be a valid one, and Dale demonstrates very convincingly the many common cultural-philosophical and religious-political paradigms, references, and trends across South, Central, and Western Asia in these centuries. And yet, in framing the study as a look at the world that was “lost” to Muslims in the 18th, 19th, and 20th centuries, Dale, perhaps unwittingly, contributes to the “What went wrong?” line of reasoning set out by Bernard Lewis in the wake of September 11, 2001 and much disputed since then. It separates off these three empires, neglecting the very real connections they could have had with China, for instance, and the common origins but very different outcome in Russia, for example. While it is more than admirable to display the complexity behind two-dimensional stereotypes of Islam prevalent today, in cordoning off these three empires, whether to call them “gunpowder,” “early modern,” or “Muslim” is to imply that their history is essentially different from the non-Islamic empires around them. Nevertheless, this book is very useful, not just as a course book for students, but for scholars of one or another of these three empires to get a sense of how the issues and patterns in one compare to those of the others.

Christine Philliou, Columbia University

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Turkey: A Short History

By Norman Stone Thames & Hudson, 2011, 192 pages, ISBN 9790500251750.

Early on in this slim account of 1,300 years’ of Turkish history, Norman Stone suggests: “If you are Turkish you have to ask what you owe to: (1) the ancient native Turkish tradition; (2) Persia; (3) Byzantium; (4) Islam; (5) what sort of Islam; and (6) conscious westernization.” It would be far-fetched to imagine that every modern Turk self-consciously ratiocinate these things and comes up with their own credit-debit account of historical heritage.

This book’s major strength, however, is to demonstrate the lesser-appreciated continuities—as well as sudden changes— that do make up so much of Turkish history. The Ottoman Empire, Stone tells us, initially saw itself as an inheritor of both the Seljuk Turk and Byzantine Greek traditions. Until the conquest of Constantinople in 1453, for example, the Ottomans had thrived as a cavalry-based nomadic “military empire” in the Seljuk tradition; indeed, the plan of the Topkapı Palace they built soon after the conquest—with its modest, low-rise pavilions and courtyards—deliberately imitates the tented headquarters of a nomadic Turkish chieftain. On the other hand, Mehmet II (the conqueror of Constantinople) spoke fluent Greek and was “in effect set upon retaking the eastern Roman Empire that Justinian had made great in the sixth century.”

There is also the fact that, at the time of the taking the city, the population of the Ottoman lands was 75 percent Christian.

A more self-confidently “Ottoman” identity developed in the 15th century, particularly under Selim I (known to

us rather unflatteringly as “the Grim”, though a more accurate translation of the Turkish “Yavuz” is “stern” or “tough”).

His capture of much of the Arab peninsula—in particular the Holy Places of Mecca and Medina—inevitably made the Ottoman Empire more overtly Islamic, and it was during his reign that the Ottomans claimed the Islamic Caliphate from the withering Mameluke state in Egypt.

It was also around this time that the Ottoman sultans began to emphasize splendor and grandiosity as their distinctive characteristic, adopting titles such as— amongst many others—“Marcher Lord of the Horizon” and “Shadow of God on Earth”. We associate this grandiosity with the apogee of Ottoman power, especially the long rule of Süleyman I (the Magnificent), stretching from 1520 to 1566. During Süleyman’s reign, the empire won a series of blistering military victories and the Ottoman territories reached their largest extent. Süleyman wasn’t just a charismatic general of genius, however, but also a formidable organizer of the state machine, known in Turkey to this day as “Kanuni”, or “law-maker”. “Süleyman’s reign”, Stone writes admiringly, “mark[s] a synthesis of empire: Rome for the law and organization, Islam for the inspiration, Central Asia for the military.”

Nevertheless, things were set to change.

It’s true that a light burns brightest in the moments before it extinguishes, but what happened to the Ottoman Empire after the age of Süleyman wasn’t so much a swift extinguishing, but rather an extraordinari-

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ly drawn-out decline, lasting until the 20th century.

Stone poses a central question at the beginning of the book: “To what extent was the success of the Ottomans based on Islam, or would you read this the other way round, and just say that the Ottomans were successful when their Islam was not taken too seriously?” You needn’t necessarily answer this question entirely one way or the other. It is true, however, that hand in hand with the long decline of the Ottoman Empire went an Islamic intellectual retrogression, symbolized by the 18th century closure of mathematics and engineering schools and the broader atrophying of scientific enquiry. It’s also true that, throughout its existence, the empire depended not only on taxes levied on non-Muslim minorities to maintain its impressive bureaucratic machine, but also for the bulk of those conscripted into the elite Janissary guards, and even for Grand Viziers (who often held the real power, as opposed to their often ineffective sultans).

Christians and Jews increasingly kept the Ottoman economy going over the 18th and 19th centuries, inevitable when Islam forbade the earning of interest on debts.

The “capitulations”—favorable terms offered to Europeans to do business in Ottoman territory—also gradually came to symbolize the stranglehold in which the western European powers were beginning to hold the Ottomans. Initially intended as a sensible method to stimulate trade with outsiders (the product of a self-confident and outward-looking state), they eventually became notorious as humiliating terms which the Europeans exploited to gain further leverage over the declining eastern power. The Ottomans didn’t feel able to abolish the capitulations until World 200

War One, when their empire became as reckless and destructive as great empires tend to do when staring down the barrel of extinction.

Before publishing this book, Stone had already gained some notoriety for his contrarian views on the Armenian “incidents” of 1915-17, and there is no Damascene moment to report here. He characterizes what happened to the Armenians of the Ottoman Empire as just one strand of a theme that was common throughout the Ottoman lands in the late-19th and early20th centuries. At around the same time as the Turks were massacring Armenians, for example, Muslims were themselves being forcibly expelled and subject to atrocities in the Balkans and the Caucasus; Greeks and Armenians were each also committing their own crimes against Muslim Turks. Thus, Stone seems to think that the Turks’ only problem is one of PR. It was the same story, he argues, during the 19th century, when Greeks and Turks traded barbarities on the Aegean and liberal British sympathy—dazzled by the fashionably romantic Hellenism of the time—sided with the Greeks. If what happened to the Armenians is genocide, Stone says, then so too is what was visited upon the Muslim population of the Balkans and in the territories of the Russian Empire.

It’s true that crimes against the Muslims of the Ottoman Empire receive comparatively little attention from western historians, and Stone is right to highlight them. But what happened to the Armenians really was something altogether different. Comparisons with Nazi Germany won’t do, but it’s an indisputable fact that hundreds of thousands of Armenians did die. “Deportations” is a suitably vague term to describe the deliberate massacre of

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many, the accidental death of some, and the forced resettlement of many others.

The debate will continue (perhaps “rage on” is better) as to the motives and effects of Ottoman policy in eastern Anatolia.

There’s surely no doubt, however, that the emptying of all significant Christian minorities from Turkish lands was indeed considered convenient by the Young Turk regime—whether all the killings were deliberate or not—and it set about achieving this by whatever means necessary. Does Stone honestly believe that what happened was a legitimate response to Armenian terrorist activity, as he suggests here?

In his zeal to put forward the unpopular Turkish case, he no doubt goes much too far, and he does the same elsewhere.

In the preface, he makes the bizarre assertion that “it’s not really for an outsider to comment” on the state of contemporary Turkish politics. Perhaps this argument makes more sense when you’re a professor in the History Department at Ankara’s Bilkent University. Would he say the same about the United States, I wonder? If not, would he not then be guilty of the same kind of relativism that he’s doubtless critical of elsewhere? The claim seems dou-

bly odd when he does, in fact, go on to make a number of extremely contentious pronouncements about modern Turkey.

Shorn of the Kurds, we’re blithely told, the country would become “a Greece and perhaps even a sort of late Byzantium.”

Almost as bafflingly, the military coup of 1980—as a result of which 650,000 were arrested, countless tortured or killed, and the seeds sown for the future bloody Kurdish conflict—is limply presented as “the most interesting of all Turkey’s coups” in which “the casualties were very few in number”.

Perhaps what Stone meant when suggesting that “it’s not for an outsider to comment” was really “it’s not for an outsider to criticise”. In which case, more’s the pity. As Kant observed, you show a friend most respect by adopting a policy of sensitive but unswerving honesty, trusting that they are mature enough to respond to such honesty with dignity and equanimity.

If Stone had recognized this, his observations on Turkish history—particularly the more recent—would have carried more weight.

William Armstrong

The Influence of the European Union on Turkish Foreign Policy By Özlem Terzi Surrey: Ashgate Press, 2010, 172 pages, ISBN 9780754678427.

Özlem Terzi’s book analyzes the impact of the European Union membership process on the “alleged transformation” of Turkish foreign policy, particularly during the last few decades. The author reviews the existing literature on Europe-

anization and shows how several political thinkers and theoreticians have elucidated the basic parameters of the foreign policy of the European Union, particularly with regards to the non-member states and candidate countries. The author focuses on the

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normative power of the European Union in shaping world politics and tries to show how the EU has managed to change the course of Turkish foreign policy in the last few years.

To a great extent, however, the book fails to give a convincing account of how Turkish foreign policy has changed or has recently been influenced by the EU. After analyzing the Turkish-US special relationship and alliance during the Cold War years, the author argues that today the EU seems to be taking the place of the US as the agenda setter of Turkish foreign policy. Indeed, this is highly debatable as the AKP governments have also been very reluctant in the last few years to change the direction of Turkey’s main foreign policy goals to make them more in line with those of the EU. One can see this with regards to the progressively preserved nationalist tone (and the current deadlock) on the Cyprus issue; in the highly hesitant steps for solving the Kurdish problem; the ongoing stalemate with regards to the delimitation of the territorial waters, national airspace, exclusive economic zone, and Flight Information Regions (FIR) disputes (and grey zones, and the demilitarization of the islands) with Greece in the Aegean; and the currently strained relations with Armenia. As several analysts have argued, the AKP governments’ intentions in the Middle East still greatly follow the pathways of the American foreign policy or are still greatly influenced by the decisions of Washington.

Another argument of the book is that today, to a large extent, Turkey has been leaving aside its security-oriented concerns in the region and transforming itself into a soft/civilian power like the EU. Yet this is also highly debatable, and one can question 202

the validity of this argument by looking at the recent crisis between Turkey and Israel, as well as the tensions arising from the South Cypriot administration’s decision to start oil exploration in the Mediterranean, and the regular (though legitimate) Turkish military operations in northern Iraq (as well as the recent possible intervention scenarios in Syria). Hence, the argument that underlines Turkish foreign policy’s transformation towards being less security oriented, and the decreasing importance of high politics for Turkey, is highly controversial. Furthermore, with regards to the policy decisions concerning “high politics”, one can still say that the decisions are still taken at the elite level in Turkey and the full civilianization of the regime is also highly debatable. The latest progress reports of the European Commission also show that with regards to the real civilianization of the regime, it has only been slowly implemented by the AKP government. For example, with regards to giving further cultural and political rights to minorities in the country (Kurds, non-Muslims, etc.) and about the decentralisation of state structures, the AKP has taken only few steps.

For decades, civil society involvement in political decisions were minimal in Turkey as the central authorities were cautious of NGOs as most of them were considered potential threats to the modernist reforms. However, during the Cold War years, re-constructed and greatly strengthened conservative groups in Turkey also did not help the flourishing of critical views in the society and the development of a fully plural civil society. Therefore, the civilian transformation of the country and the Turkish foreign policy argument needs further research to be proven. Sim-

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ilar to the Cold War years, we see that “fear” has still been constructed, particularly for justifying foreign policy decisions regarding such issues as the Cyprus problem, the problems about European Union membership, and terrorism. The narratives about the decline of Ottoman Empire and the Turkish independence war are still being told. That said, the EU accession process has partly influenced the civilianisation of the country. There is no doubt that Ankara’s foreign policy decisions are now more entangled with that of Brussels. However, Turkish foreign policy has started to place itself within the EU’s broad foreign policy agenda without changing its major courses.

Without a doubt, this book is a timely contribution to the discussions about the changing nature of Turkish foreign policy, particularly with regards to the Middle East and the so-called Arab Spring.

Yet, the author needs to be clearer on how the EU has changed the broad picture of Turkish foreign policy, which was strongly shaped during the Cold War years. Finally, the author has to be more convincing about how Turkey left aside or transformed its security concerns that are still greatly unresolved within its own borders.

Levent Kirval Istanbul Technical University

Kurds of Modern Turkey: Migration, Neoliberalism and Exclusion in Turkish Society

By Cenk Saracoglu New York: Tauris Academic Studies, 2011, 256 pages, ISBN 9781848854680, $92.

As the Kurdish question in Turkey has yet to be solved, the question itself does not remain constant but rather it is dynamic and revolves around the political, economic, and social transformations within Turkey. Metaphorically speaking, one of the ‘bright’ sides of the ongoing conflict between the Turkish state and the Kurdish rebels has been that the violent conflict between the two parties has been hitherto secluded from the social space and it has not spread into a societal conflict between the civilian Kurdish and Turkish communities. In other words, there has not been a total and a systematic anti-Kurdish campaign towards Kurdish communities in western Turkey even in the most vio-

lent days of the conflict, such as in the 1990s. Is this ‘soothing’ dimension of the Kurdish question changing nowadays?

Cenk Saracoglu turns our attention to this societal dimension of the Kurdish question in western cities of Turkey where he observes the social transformations in the urban space since the 1980s with regards to the issues of neoliberalism, migration and ethnic tensions.

In this ethnographic field study, Saracoglu conducts in-depth interviews with 90 middle-class people in Izmir. On the basis that these interviewees express antiKurdish sentiments, “this study seeks to analyse how middle-class people in Izmir construct and perceive ‘the migrants’ as

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a distinct and homogenous group, designate them as ‘Kurds’ and identify their ‘Kurdishness’ through certain stereotypes and labels” and “the main objective of this study is to trace the social roots of this specific form of ethnicisation” (p. 9).

He coins the notion of “exclusive recognition”, the central concept of his study, which provides the theoretical framework for the anti-Kurdish sentiments among middle-class Izmirlis (people from Izmir) within the specific form of ethnicisation of migrants from eastern Turkey.

Exclusive recognition has four premises. First, Kurds are recognized as a homogenous and distinct community within the anti-Kurdish sentiments of middleclass people of Izmir. Second, the cognitive world of middle-class Izmirlis excludes Kurds through the use of pejorative labels such as “ignorant,” “cultureless,” and “separatist people” . Third, the construction of the pejorative labels used towards Kurds occurs within the urban public space through everyday interactions.

Last but not least, interestingly, middleclass Izmirlis do not embrace antagonistic sentiments to other ethnic groups in the city (p. 26). Overall, “exclusive recognition is a social phenomenon; it expresses a judgment about the social world, it is shared by many people in similar social settings, and it shapes the social practices of individuals” (p. 35).

Saracoglu’s research seeks to shed light on the social origins of exclusive recognition in Izmir. Interestingly, he argues that the anti-Kurdish discourse does not stem from the nationalist discourses of the state or any other mass political movement but rather takes place in everyday city life where middle-class Izmirlis and Kurds encounter each other. At first glance, his ar204

gument does not make sense since he seems to neglect the structural factors which actually shape the cognitive world of middleclass Izmirlis that make them stigmatize Kurds with pejorative labels. However, as he goes on in his argument, he actually tries to place urban social life and its triggering effect of exclusive recognition into the larger historical and social context.

Accordingly, he addresses three national dynamics: the neoliberal transformation of the Turkish economy since the 1980s and its effects on social inequality, the ongoing conflict between the PKK and the Turkish army in southeast Turkey, and the resulting migration from the east where people suffer from economic and physical insecurity. In the larger context, the ethnicisation of the Kurds is not about ethnicity or driven by official nationalist discourses per se but is about the socioeconomic transformation of Izmir since the 1980s due to the infiltration of neoliberalism. The neoliberal transformation of the Turkish economy has led to harsher living conditions in western cities where Kurdish migrants could not escape from spatial and socio-economic segregation. This has shaped the perceptions of relatively well-off middle-class (who have formal jobs and pay taxes) people in Izmir in the way that Kurds are seen as order-breakers, invaders, disrupters of urban life, and benefit-scroungers. Overall, he argues that “it is not migration per se, but internal migration within the context of neoliberalism and political conflict, which contributed to the emergence of exclusive recognition in the everyday life of western Turkish cities” (p. 79). Besides, he does not argue that urban social life is the main cause or origin of exclusive recognition but rather “urban social life is the ‘site’ or ‘locus’

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where ethnicisation of the migrant Kurds takes place and is reproduced” (p. 69).

The last two chapters of the book deal with the larger picture of Saracoglu’s analysis stating that exclusive recognition is an ideology and a form of cultural racism which is more class-based than ethnic-based. Within that context, one of the major questions is whether exclusive recognition is a reflection or extension of the official nationalist discourse of the Turkish state. Yet, Saracoglu claims that exclusive recognition and nationalism have external and contingent relationship: they can exist without one another (p. 181).

He explains that Turkish nationalism has denied the existence of Kurds, while exclusive recognition considers Kurds a distinct and homogenous ethnic group.

Besides, the interviewees do not express any antagonistic sentiments to other minority groups in Izmir such as Greeks and Jews. Therefore, he concludes that “exclusive recognition is qualitatively different from the positions of the state or existing nationalist parties, which are based on ‘non-recognition’ and ‘assimilation’” (p.

5).Thus, the social origins of exclusive recognition cannot be linked to the nationalist discourses of the state.

Thinking about the counterfactual reasoning, I wonder whether middle-class Izmirlis would still ethnicise the Kurdish migrants the way they do without the existence of an internalized framework of the official nationalism of the state. I would agree that the urban social space is the site where exclusive recognition occurs and is constantly produced and that such production is embedded within the specific social and historical context. However, I believe that Saracoglu neglects the structure within structure. If exclusive recognition is

fed by his argument of the three national factors (the structure), he does not see that those three national factors come into being within the larger structure, which is the top-down national construction of the modernist, westernized, secular and Turkish-oriented (both culturally and linguistically) image of society and citizen.

The city of Izmir where he conducts his ethnographic study well reflects of such values as Saracoglu points out that “the majority of people living in Izmir have embraced modernist and secular values of the republican era” (p. 142). Such values are all embedded within the official nationalist discourse of modern Turkey. In other words, all the links of causation that Saracoglu draws are materialized within those idealized images of Turkish society as a project of the Republican Kemalist intelligentsia. Therefore, I am still not convinced that exclusive recognition and the official nationalist discourse are mutually exclusive phenomena. Rather the way I see their relationship is mutually complementary. This raises the question of whether Izmir would be a case of sampling error in which some other western cities might show different results. For instance, there is a growing segment of the middle-class among observant Muslims in Turkey, especially in Istanbul.

Would those middle-class people from Istanbul express different views from those in Izmir? Would secularism be a variable in the rise of exclusive recognition? My question is that it would be more illuminating if we could know about the religious background of the interviewees.

Overall, Saracoglu’s study is very insightful where the Kurdish question is considered at the intersection of changes in political economy and migration circles from

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east to west. One of the important contributions of this study to the literature of the Kurdish question would be that it shifts the attention from a nationalist perspective to cultural racism. This means that we are

not experiencing nationalist antagonisms in western cities of Turkey but that instead cultural racism might be on the rise.

Serhun Al, The University of Utah

Activists in Office: Kurdish Politics and Protest in Turkey

By Nicole F. Watts Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 2010, 214 pages, ISBN 9780295990491, HB, $60, PB $25.

Most of the recently published books on the Kurdish problem in Turkey focus on the armed struggle and the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). Watts, however, offers a much-appreciated alternative approach. “Pro-Kurdish political parties” (p. xvii), or what she also calls “challenger parties” (p. 16), “have made themselves matter and… have impressed their ideas and agendas on reluctant and often repressive states” (p. x). “The central argument of this book is that… pro-Kurdish elected officials and party administrators engaged [as]… ‘loudspeaker systems’ for the transmission of highly contentious information politics that challenged the narratives of security, identity, and representation promoted by Turkish state institutions….

They [also] tried to construct a competing ‘governmentality’ and new collective Kurdish ‘subject’ in cities and towns in the southeast” (p. 13).

Following a useful introduction, Watts’s first chapter examines how Kurdish activists in the 1960s and 1970s initially began to use electoral politics to further Kurdish cultural recognition and political reforms. “The passage of the new 1961 constitution led to fractures within the rul206

ing elite and the granting of new rights and freedoms that expanded the range of permissible politics” (p. 31). This was the era of the 49ers such as Musa Anter, Yusuf Azizoglu’s New Turkey Party, and, most seminally, the Workers Party of Turkey (TIP) and “its promises of socioeconomic reform and its more open stance on the Kurdish issue” (p. 38). “TIP helped a new generation of Kurdish political elites learn how to play the political game, provided them with a network of alliances and contacts, and gave them access to an array of material, ideological, and human resources they could use to mobilize popular support” (p. 49).

Serafettin Elci served as minister of public works in one of the Ecevit cabinets and famously ‘defamed’ himself by ‘revealing’ that “there are Kurds in Turkey. I am also Kurdish” (p. 44). Mehdi Zana, the husband of today’s famous Leyla Zana, was elected as the independent mayor of Diyarbakir in December 1977.

“His campaign and tenure in office constitutes one of the most important early examples of the use of local government to promote a Kurdish rights agenda and to assert a new kind of local representa-

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tion” (p. 46). However, after the September 1980 coup, “Zana went from the mayor’s office to prison, jailed along with thousands of other elected politicians and activists” (p. 48).

Chapter two analyzes how the first proKurdish party, the Halkın Emek Partisi (the Peoples’ Labor Party, HEP), entered the Turkish political system in 1990. Although Turkish law supposedly prohibited political parties based on race or religion, numerous changes in domestic and international politics still provided new opportunities for pro-Kurdish party activism: President Turgut Ozal’s “civilianization” (p. 88) of the state, the Gulf War in 1991 and creation of a Kurdish safe haven in northern Iraq, and Turkey’s full application to what became the EU were three important examples.

HEP was banned on July 14, 1993, but it was followed by other pro-Kurdish parties including the DEP (banned in June 1994), HADEP (banned in 2003), and DTP (banned in December 2009). “This cycle of formation-closure-formation meant that pro-Kurdish parties maintained an uninterrupted presence in the Turkish political system in years to come” (p. 69).

These “pro-Kurdish parties were adamantly secular in both ideology and social composition” which “to some degree reflected the outlook of the parties’ core leadership: urban, middle- and lowermiddle-class men and women who had gained status and political capital through professional and civic activities” (pp. 7071). They all occupied a position between “the Turkish center-left and the Kurdish national movement” (p. 73).

Chapter three analyzes how “entering electoral and party politics brought proKurdish activists unprecedented access to a range of resources that could be appro-

priated and used to advance the interests of the parties and the movement” (p. 93).

“Most legal parties in Turkey receive on the order of 50 to 70 percent of their annual income from the state” (p. 78). “Election to municipal office also provided access to city budgets that could be managed in ways that promoted pro-Kurdish parties and the pro-Kurdish agenda” (p. 79).

Funds also became available from the EU once Turkey became a candidate country in 1999. Furthermore, “election to the Turkish parliament provided pro-Kurdish deputies with parliamentary immunity from prosecution, which gave them considerably more protection for expressing their political opinions than movement supporters outside the Parliament had” (p.

81). “Because there was no pro-Kurdish party representation in the Parliament between 1994 and 2007, pro-Kurdish mayors in Turkey inherited the role played by pro-Kurdish parliamentarians” (p. 82).

Chapter four details how Turkish officials sought to prevent pro-Kurdish parties from gaining and using state resources. Despite coordination problems, government coercion often proved effective.

“Pro-Kurdish… party administrators and activists were shot, prosecuted, jailed, beaten, fined, and threatened. Parties were closed, party offices bombed, and party property confiscated by the state” (p. 94).

After 1999, moreover, state judicial coercion “became particularly onerous” (p.

121). “In June 2007, Sur mayor Abdullah Demirbas, was removed from office… after a unanimous ruling by the Turkish Council of State declared that providing municipal services in both Turkish and Kurdish was illegal” (p. 117). The “politics of polarization and violence promoted by both state authorities and the PKK made

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it very difficult for the parties to distance themselves from the PKK and to establish an alternative base of authority” (p. 121).

Still pro-Kurdish parties won local offices across the southeast in the local elections of 1999, 2004, and again in 2009.

Chapter five describes how pro-Kurdish parties sought to “attribute… the PKKstate conflict to the state’s antidemocratic legal framework, military policies, and Turkish nationalist ideology” (p. 140).

Chapter six “argues that pro-Kurdish parties and officials used the resources of local office to try to establish an alternative Kurdish governmental presence and to construct a new Kurdish subject or collective community” (p. 142), “creating the illusion of a Kurdish national state. In fact, they [the pro-Kurdish parties] were still legally bound by the rules constructed

by Turkish authorities” (p. 160).

In the conclusion, Watts assesses the result of the pro-Kurdish parties’ attempts to work within the system and offers a short evaluation of their electoral record.

“Although the parties did not position themselves as competitors to the PKK and maintained close links to the group, their participation in politics nonetheless provided new depth to the Kurdish movement’s organizational leadership” (p. 164).

She concludes that “pro-Kurdish parties’ consistently high performance at the ballot box, in other words, put pressure on other parties to make concessions to Kurdish national demands” (p. 172). The author also says that “many voters in the Kurdish-majority regions of the southeast are sympathetic to demands for democratization and economic development but do not want independence or a political arrangement that would impede their ability to work and live in other parts of Turkey” (p. 177).

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Watts’s study stops in 2009 and so does not cover the much-heralded, but failed, Kurdish Initiative of 2009 and the increased support for the new pro-Kurdish BDP in the national elections held on June 12, 2011. Her study still holds relevancy, however, because clearly the Kurdish movement in Turkey, including the still dominant PKK, will increasingly pursue the more legal political path she elucidates. These pro-Kurdish party victories, however, were achieved by running as independents, not formally as parties, because the required 10 percent threshold of all votes cast was impossible for a pro-Kurdish party to achieve. Therefore, it would have been useful for Watts to explain how running as independents in Turkish elections overcomes this barrier.

Watts might also have brought in the work of the new, very important Komo Civaken Kurdistan (KCK), or Kurdistan Communities Union, an umbrella PKK organization supposedly acting as the urban arm of the PKK and clearly complementing and/ or competing with the pro-Kurdish parties. Despite her frequent mention of the PKK, Watts still might be questioned for not fully appreciating just how much the PKK really is the voice of Turkey’s mobilized ethnic Kurds.

Her study, at times repetitious, might also have drawn upon some of the useful data gathered by the progressive Turkish think tank TESEV, the prescient work of Professor Ihsan Dagi, and the annual EU Progress Reports on Turkey. Nevertheless, her study is well documented, and concludes with a bibliography and an index.

Michael M. Gunter, Tennessee Technological University and Megatrend International University of Vienna

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The European Union and Central Asia Edited by Alexander Warkotsch London: Routledge, 2011, 206 pages, ISBN 9780415562362.

In this timely volume, Alexander Warkotsch gathers a variety of authors from different backgrounds who work and research Central Asia to produce an empirically well-sustained analysis of the policies and practices in the European Union’s (EU) approach towards the area. Warkotsch, an associate researcher at Würzburg University in Germany, has a strong research record on Central Asia, which together with the regional and EU expertise of the authors makes this volume an important contribution to studies about EU relations with Central Asia. In fact, this is an underresearched area and there are few studies attempting at grasping the dynamics underlying these relations. The volume coordinated by Neil Melvin1 (2008) was perhaps the first attempt at systematizing these relations, looking at the dilemmas the EU faces resulting from the development of closer cooperation in economic, security and political terms with Central Asian states while remaining loyal to its normative approach of promoting democratization, securing the protection of human rights and strengthening social justice. Michael Emerson and Jos Boonstra’s study2 (CEPS, 2010) departs from the 2007 EU strategic document and brings a strong regional dimension to the study of EU’s engagement and how it mixes with other actors very much present in the area, including China, Iran, Russia, Turkey and the United States.

Bringing a new contribution to studies in this area, this edited volume analyzes the EU approaches towards Central Asia through the programs and policy initia-

tives designed in Brussels and how they are implemented in the field. This study has three goals: first, to understand the strategic interest of the EU in the area; second, to unpack how policy initiatives and agreed guideline for actions are translated into concrete action and responses to local needs; and finally, to formulate policy recommendations directed at enhancing the EU’s effectiveness in Central Asia. Also having as a point of departure the 2007 The EU and Central Asia: Strategy for a New Partnership framework document, the book is divided in two main parts. The first is a detailed exploration of the EU-Central Asia contextual cooperation setting and the instruments available for advancing the goals as defined in the strategic document of 2007. The chapters in this part describe the EU’s late involvement in the area, explaining the drafting of the strategy and describing it as seeking a “balanced bilateral and regional approach” (p. 12) that “marks a significant step towards a regionally more fitted approach” (p. 29). They also explain the EU instruments, documental and operational ones, ranging from partnership and cooperation agreements to the special representative. Political and security issues emerge as a common trend in all these chapters when setting the context for these relations, highlighting common issues in the agendas of both the EU and the Central Asian states, including the fight against international terrorism and organized crime, migration and border management, democracy and good governance, and energy matters. The authors agree that these are areas

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where opportunities for cooperation exist, though they also point out the difficulties in changing these opportunities into concrete projects and common action. In fact, attention is drawn to the EU’s “zero impact” (p.

18) in the region, and to the difficulties in articulating the EU’s attempts at a regional approach with the development of bilateral relations that tend to raise local perceptions about unequal treatment (p. 29). The much differentiated nature of regimes and approaches, with the normative, good governance socialization approach of the EU and the authoritarian-style of ruling in all Central Asian states, make it complex to define common ground for action.

The second part of the book is thematically organized, following the main lines of action identified in the 2007 EU document,3 thus analyzing in a detailed way the policy-practice equation and how this gains substance on the ground. The chapters focus on security assistance and border management; human rights, democratization and good governance; youth and higher education; economic development and trade; energy cooperation; water and environmental sustainability; and inter-cultural dialogue, thus analyzing the main issues identified in the comprehensive strategic document. In a well-informed way, these chapters discuss the EU’s actions towards addressing the main goals in these different issue areas, highlighting opportunities, identifying challenges, and suggesting further steps for enhancing cooperation. In the EU’s security agenda, all these issues assume fundamental relevance and there is a wide acknowledgment of the need for engaging in dialogue and translating this into concrete projects, but as these contributions suggest there is still a long way ahead for the empowerment of a stra210

tegic relationship between the EU and the countries in Central Asia.

The volume would gain from a tighter and more substantial introduction given the richness of the content developed throughout. The main issues listed in the introduction as framing the rationale for this volume, highlighting the nature of the regimes in the area and EU competition with other actors in Central Asia, do not reflect the cross-cutting issues that are discussed, as well it does not provide a contextualization of the EU as a particular actor, how it deals with the communitarian versus intergovernmental dimensions of these issues, and how it will explore the differentiated models of development that underpin the attempts at consolidation of these relations. The issues identified as conferring importance to Central Asia in EU policies, namely the area’s energy potential, the war on terrorism, with Afghanistan assuming a central role, and the closer geographic proximity to the region resulting from EU enlargement seem reductionist in face of the issues raised and the dynamics discussed in the volume. Also, a conclusion wrapping up the main findings and main recommendations would be extremely useful, especially for policy makers.

Maria Raquel Freire Faculdade de Economia da Universidade de Coimbra, Portugal Endnotes 1. Melvin, Neil, Engaging Central Asia: The European Union’s New Strategy in the Heart of Eurasia.

Brookings Institution Press, 2008 2. Emerson, Michael and Boonstra, Jos, Into EurAsia: Monitoring the EU’s Central Asia Strategy. Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), 2010.

3. Emerson, Michael and Boonstra, Jos, Into EurAsia: Monitoring the EU’s Central Asia Strategy. Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), 2010.

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Producing Islamic Knowledge, Transmission and Dissemination in Western Europe Edited by Martin van Bruinessen and Stefano Allievi Milton Park: Routledge, 2011, 196 pages, ISBN 9780415355926.

This collection of essays bridges the gap between arguments that emphasize the role of Islamic communities and the individualization of religious authority in the literature on Muslims in Western Europe. The editors propose to focus on the process by which Islamic knowledge— “whatever Muslims consider to be correct or proper belief and practice”—is produced through the interaction of religious authorities, lay Muslims, and their European context. There are two common themes that connect all the articles: the religious market model and the localization of Islam in Europe.

The religious market model provides the common framework through which classical (e.g. imams, scholars, sheiks) and emerging religious authorities (e.g. professionals, cyber-counselors, intellectuals), the suppliers of Islamic knowledge, compete to draw more followers who demand and consume this knowledge. Van Bruinessen rightly notes how non-discursive forms of knowledge, such as disciplining practices, are as important as discursive forms. Moreover, the various essays illustrate how the suppliers and consumers of Islamic knowledge are inextricably connected and shape each other.

The solid empirical grounding of the essays illustrates how classical authorities still play a significant role among Muslims while the authors recognize the rising role of new media technology in producing new religious authorities. They address issues concerning imam training as well

as cyber-scholars such as Amr Khaled and Yusuf al-Qaradawi. The religious market model serves as a useful heuristic tool to frame the diversity of Islamic actors and their competitive relationship in a democratic setting such as Western Europe given the recent limitations on pro-violence voices. However, the market analogy has its limits because it connotes a utilitarian relationship between givers and takers, which ignores the highly symbolic and sacred aspects of the religious field.

This collection’s most important contribution to the literature is in its detailed examination of how slowly but surely Islamic knowledge is localized in Western Europe. For instance, chapter five demonstrates how even in traditional and nonpolitical movements such as the Deobandi school in Britain the process of addressing questions of their local constituency and training imams locally for pragmatic purposes is on its way. The distinctions between “European” and “country-oforigin” oriented experts even within each movement are carefully documented. The experts trained and socialized in Europe emphasize activities that serve not only “Muslim interests” but also “the wider society” through “commitment in civic life” as Muslim citizens, as in the case study of the local religious leader Larbi Kechat in Paris (p. 68, p. 108). Localized Muslim leaders focus on activities that contribute to the larger society such as the prevention of drug abuse referring to the concept of the “common good” in the Islamic tra-

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dition. In other gatherings, the organizers aim to bring Muslims and non-Muslims together to discuss, without preaching, questions in public life concerning religion in secular life or the integration of immigrant populations. The commonality in all the processes of localizing Islam in Europe involves the shift of activities from “bonding” to “bridging” activities.

These activities introduce Muslim minorities as an integral part of the larger society who are concerned about common problems and seek a shared future.

Moreover, the youth of Muslim origin are mobilized to gain leadership positions in Islamic movements. The new generation of young men and women activists seeking Islamic knowledge, both Muslimborn and converts, make their own concerns and needs as the priorities of the Islamic movements they join. Morgahi’s article demonstrates how the South Asian Barelwi school’s affiliated Minhaj-ul Quran movement’s youth branch in the Netherlands provides interactive production of religious knowledge in university settings, unlike their parents who prefer didactic setting of the mosques for their activities. The fuzla who are the directors of the religious centers of the movement make interpretations unacceptable to many traditional Barelwi scholars, for example that men do not need to cover their head during prayers or downplaying the distinction between Shia and Sunnis.

Caeiro’s article on the production of fatwa in Europe shows how even traditionally trained scholars utilize the principles of Islamic law-making such as the fiqh of priorities (fiqh al-awwaliyyat), seeking middle-ground (wasatiyya), facility (taysir), and need (darura) among others to address the concerns of their audience 212

such as questions on the marriage of a woman convert to Islam and the political participation of Muslims in Europe. These examples of localization indicate that both the social reality of Islamic activism on the ground and the legal repertoire of the Islamic tradition contribute to the making of European Islam.

The last article of the collection by Sedgwick on the synthesis of Traditionalism, a European philosophical movement connected with Sufism, is a unique contribution to the literature on the production of Islamic knowledge. Sedgwick’s expertise on this intellectual movement is reflected in how he ties the story of sophisticated and differentiated ideas with that of its producers and carriers. He unravels the Maryamiyya order and their intellectual members worldwide, a movement that had a secret existence until recently. Although the movement is limited to intellectuals, its impact has global reach through the writings of its members including Martin Lings and Seyyed Hossein Nasr. This story goes beyond the predominant discourse on Muslim immigrant integration in Western Europe. It exemplifies the ongoing exchange of ideas in the Mediterranean through the centuries. This story would be welcome by all Muslims and non-Muslims alike who believe in a true dialogue of civilizations.

This volume has few shortcomings compared to its contributions to an expanding literature on how Islam becomes European. For instance, although Allievi recognizes the impact of what indigenous Europeans say about how Islam influences the way Muslims produce Islamic knowledge (p. 29), this is not adequately addressed in the articles, which focus on Islamic authorities and their localization.

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Few articles make suggestions on future lines of research but a conclusion chapter that would make an overall assessment would have been useful. However, this cutting-edge work with its comparative and ethnographically rich material is a guide in itself for any researcher

and provides a fresh perspective with its accessible language for the general reader interested in the future of Islam in Europe.

Ahmet Yükleyen University of Mississippi

Thinking Through Islamophobia: Global Perspectives Edited by S. Sayyid and AbdoolKarim Vakil London: Hurst and Company, 2010, 320 pages, ISBN 978185065-9907.

Thinking Through Islamophobia contains 27 essays examining the concept of Islamophobia through discussions that cut across continents and disciplines. The papers were originally developed for the 2008 workshop on this topic organized by the Center of Ethnicity and Racism Studies at the University of Leeds. Together the chapters provide a deep and comprehensive understanding of the history, impact and breadth of Islamophobia, even while their authors disagree on the utility and credibility of the term. Readers of the complete text will begin to appreciate the wide range of limitations on the life of Muslims imposed by the security lens through which Muslims have been viewed since 9/11 and by their historical “outsider” image in societies where they are represented as “the other”. However, readers with only time to consider one or a few chapters may initially find it difficult to choose among the sociological, political, historical and philosophical selections that are focused on Russia, China, Turkey, Thailand, India and individual European states, including Britain, Belgium and the Netherlands. But a common thread runs

through the chapters in that each seeks to clarify a specific aspect of anti-Muslim bias. Readers beginning the collection at any point will pick up this theme.

Terms central to understanding specific aspects of Islamophobia are developed in these chapters from a variety of perspectives by different authors. Conceptual facets of the problem that are contextualized both geographically and historically include, among others, racialization ( Vakil, p. 43, Meer and Modood, p. 74) and cultural racism (Meer and Modood, p. 83), images of gender subordination (Bano, p. 135), the “problemitisation of the Muslim presence” (Sayyid, p. 1, Vakil, p. 33); “micro inequities” (Khan, p. 88), images of “moderacy” (Tyrer, p.

105), “state level ‘dialogue’ with Muslim communities” (Birt, p. 123), perceptions of an inherent threat posed by Muslims (Hasimi, p. 131), and “moral panics” (Seddon, p. 199). Appadurai’s phrase “fear of small numbers” (Moors, p. 157) is developed as it applies to the politicization of “face veiling” by a small minority of Muslim women in the Netherlands. The impact of the neoconservative

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narrative in globalizing Islamophobia is explained (Hasimi), and the special historical circumstances of Islamophobia in Russia (Tlostanova), Turkey (Aktay), and China (Yi) are provided.

The collection will be appreciated by a wide and varied audience. Reading the complete text will leave students and scholars of minority/majority group relations feeling as if they had attended the conference that provided the book’s origins. The papers are fresh and appear to have been developed in a stimulating and collaborative environment. General readers searching for useful vantage points

from which to evaluate public policies relating to Muslims’ life chances in contrast to those of their non-Muslim neighbors will find guidance here. Political leaders willing to reconsider the securitization of policies related to immigration and religious practice will come away from this text with a greater awareness of the talent lost to states where suspicion and distrust of Islam make it difficult for Muslims to fully engage in the societies in which they make their home.

Pamela Irving Jackson Rhode Island College

Global Security Watch: The Caucasus States

By Houman A. Sadri Santa Barbara, California: Praeger, 2010, 270 pages, ISBN 9780313379802.

Global Security Watch: The Caucasus States by Professor Houman A. Sadri of the University of Central Florida is an important addition to the Praeger series that has produced insightful studies on countries such as Iran, Russia and Turkey. Professor Sadri, an active participant in the International Studies Association’s (ISA) Post Communist States in International Relations group, is a committed scholar of the region. In the past few years he has published papers and book chapters on energy politics and on the regional relations of the states of the Caucasus and Caspian Sea basin. In the present work, Professor Sadri focuses attention on the states of the South Caucasus region (Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia, the newly independent states of the former USSR), examining the domestic milieu of each actor, as 214

well as their regional relations and the role of major powers, which, in the context of this work are defined as the European Union, Russia and the United States. The primary argument of The Caucasus States is that neither the “clash of civilizations” thesis (propounded in the early 1990s by the late Samuel Huntington), nor arguments saying there is a New Cold War (or new “Great Game”) fits with contemporary regional realities. On the contrary, in Professor Sadri’s view, it is a confluence of factors (notably, historical, geopolitical, resource, demographic and religious) and actor interests that best explains the situation of the South Caucasus.

The Caucasus States, like other entries in the Global Security Watch series, is designed to survey important security issues of the region, principally from a ‘widen-

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er’ perspective, that is, a perspective that goes beyond the traditional emphasis on military and political dynamics to include dimensions such as the economic and societal (this perspective is seen in the work of scholars like Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver). In the first chapter, Professor Sadri introduces the framework for the study (separatism, internal instability, and international rivalry) and his major arguments. Next, he provides an overview of the security context of the region, accurately identifying the conflicts involving Abkhazia and South Ossetia (in contemporary Georgia), and Nagorno-Karabakh (between Armenia and Azerbaijan) as the “most salient” problems for regional security.

The next set of chapters gives an overview of the security situation of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia. In these chapters, Professor Sadri discusses the pre-Soviet and Soviet-era political history of each country, important contemporary political, economic, socio-cultural, resource, military-security factors, and, foreign relations, which include not only the interrelationship of the three South Caucasus states but relations with other key regional actors like Iran and Turkey as well as with the global powers. Professor Sadri follows with a brief concluding chapter that summarizes the major security issues of the region. Next, the reader is reintroduced to aspects of the “clash of civilizations” thesis as applied to the South Caucasus. Several appendices follow, which include chronologies of the three principal states, leaders’ biographies, and other important political and legal documents. The book includes several charts, maps and photo reproductions, which are well placed and not overdone.

I find The Caucasus States to be very well organized, and lucidly written with up-to-date information on the three countries of the region. Professor Sadri incorporates the works of important authors, and utilizes them well. For a number of reasons, the Caucasus region, along with Central Asia, is arguably one of the most challenging areas for study. Professor Sadri provides much insight to readers as he skillfully navigates the maze of actors, factors and interests that, at once, make the South Caucasus region unique, but at the same time an inseparable component of major power relations. Professor Sadri provides a thoughtful, balanced treatment of the three countries, and demonstrates care in his treatment of volatile conflicts like Abkhazia/South Ossetia and NagornoKarabakh, as well as the longstanding Armenian genocide issue.

Professor Sadri’s examination of various key actors is one of the strongest contributions of the book. In each of the case studies, the important role of individual and national actors historically and contemporarily is clearly illustrated (from Levon Ter-Petrossian in Armenia to Mikheil Saakashvili in Georgia). In addition, Professor Sadri pays attention to the important and increasing role of military alliances and international organizations like the CIS, GUAM, NATO, OSCE and the SCO. Iran and Turkey, which Professor Sadri notes are actors that “represent two different models for political development” for the region, are necessarily featured in The Caucasus States. Any serious study of the regional relations of the Caucasus states must include these two important players. Moreover, this means that given the interests and foreign partnerships that Iran and Turkey maintain,

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it is necessary to include Russia and the United States in any serious study of the region as well.

Speaking of (national) interests, it is this factor that best explains the affairs of the Caucasus, and is the strongest argument against the relevance of the “clash of civilizations” thesis for the region. Using the context of relations between Armenia and Iran, Professor Sadri notes on page 88: “[these ties reflect] a pragmatic consideration of shared history and geopolitical realities”. This applies to the region as a whole—from the lasting implications of the period of Soviet rule, and Russia’s heavy influence in the region’s energy security environment two decades after the collapse of the USSR, to conflicts within Caucasian states over borders and differences in perspective regarding relations with Russia (e.g., Western versus Eastern Armenians, pg. 83), and the web of “opposing triangular alliances” that, at times, has set Armenia, Iran and Russia against Azerbaijan, Turkey and the United States (p. 57). Professor Sadri discusses all these issues, and he pays attention to the dynamic of potential NATO membership for former Soviet republics. In addition, he examines the impact of the ongoing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq on the South Caucasus region.

I would offer two minor critical observations, and these have no bearing on Professor Sadri’s sound framework.

First, I believe the study would have been

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well served by offering more discussion on the potential role of China in the region. Not only is China on a global hunt for energy resources (this is well known), but the country is connected to Russia and the region through its association with organizations such as SCO. Moreover, China, like Russia, is very wary of the growing US/Western military presence in the Caucasus and Central Asia. What do these developments mean for the future of China’s relations with the Caucasus and Central Asia? Second, I believe the book would have benefited by offering more discussion on the interests of the United States (President Obama’s Administration) in Georgia in contemporary times (circa early 2010).

In conclusion, The Caucasus States is an informative and effective survey of the South Caucasus security environment after the Cold War. Professor Sadri has derived a framework for studying the region that is appropriate for navigating and understanding the maze of actors, interests and issues that make up this vital area of the world. The Caucasus States is an ambitious work about a region that boasts very complex problems and relationships.

Professor Sadri has done well in pulling together these elements in this readable volume. I enthusiastically recommend this book.

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Gregory Hall Morehouse College, Atlanta

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Years of Blood: A History of the Armenian-Muslim Clashes in the Caucasus, 1905-1906

By Mammad Said Ordubadi Reading: Ithaca Press, 2011, 201 pages, ISBN 9780863723902.

The first decade of the 20th century represents a very significant though turbulent period in the history of the Caucasian peoples. Not only had the region been shaken by the impacts of the drastic political changes taking place in the three neighboring empires—Russia, Iran and the Ottoman Empire—it had also become a scene of inter-communal violence due to the escalating tension between Armenians and Muslims of the Russian Caucasus. Although both communities had already been greatly influenced by the revolutionary ideas and movements of late 19th century, the real revolution for them had actually started with the bloody clashes in Baku in February 1905. The so-called Muslim-Armenian War of 19051906 was particularly influential on the national awakening of the Muslim Azeris as the Armenian community had already been very much organized as a result of the activities of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnaksutyun) that was founded as early as 1890.

The celebrated Azeri historian Mammad Said Ordubadi’s Years of Blood: A History of the Armenian-Muslim Clashes in the Caucasus, 1905-1906 provides a very detailed and fresh depiction of the tragic events that took place between the Armenians and Muslims in the Russian Caucasus at the beginning of the 20th century. The book is an outstanding contribution to the field due to its reliance on firsthand data collected from original sources, including around 250 letters of correspon-

dence directly sent to the author by both Muslims and Armenians. It describes the bloody clashes that had spread all over the Caucasus in the course of a few years with very striking details—most of which were probably unknown to the readers. Here, it is important to indicate that the author does not focus on only one city or town, but includes stories from a larger region that includes Baku, Yerevan, Nakhcievan, Shusha, Ganja and Tbilisi, along with many others. The detailed descriptions of the local political intrigues, brutally murdered people, plundered shops and burnt houses not only give a shuddery feeling to the readers, but also helps them appreciate the extent of Ordubadi’s historical research which took almost two years to finish.

It is interesting to note that Ordubadi’s book was actually published in 1911.

However, since it did not meet the requirements of the official Soviet ideology, it was not until its second publication in 1990 that scholars of the field could learn about Ordubadi’s first-hand impressions of the 1905-1906 incidents. The book has become increasingly popular in post-Soviet Azerbaijan, especially after the escalation of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

Considering that the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is still unresolved despite the two decades that have passed since the demise of the Soviet Union, the translation of Ordubadi’s book into English can be regarded as a timely move in terms of anticipating the historical causes of the ongoing

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enmity between contemporary Azerbaijan and Armenia.

Years of Blood is in general a collection of detailed depictions of the ArmenianMuslim clashes that are clearly documented with personal letters, speeches and eyewitness accounts of both the Armenian and Muslim people. In this regard, the book is based on plenty of data rather than the author’s direct thoughts or assessments about the events. However, in the introductory chapter Ordubadi expresses his belief that there had been four major causes behind the escalation of tension between the two communities: a) provocative activities of the Armenian Dashnaktsutyun Party, b) indifference of the Russian authorities due to their preoccupation with the Russian revolution of 1905, c) the Muslims’ lack of knowledge and education as well as their ignorance about the real designs of the Armenians, and d) the Armenian nationalists’ strong desire for autonomy from both Russia and the Ottoman Empire.

Ordubadi claims in the Years of Blood that he kept an equal distance from both the Muslims and Armenians and “tried to describe accurately and without bias the events which took place for nationalist reasons.” Despite this, the readers will probably conclude that Ordubadi generally puts the real blame for the incidents on the shoulders of the Armenians. The author acknowledges that many Armenians along with Muslims lost their lives and property during the clashes, but he definitely has more sympathy and understanding towards the Muslims. In many parts of the book, he claims that Muslims protected their Armenian neighbors from looting and slaughter although the Armenians failed to reciprocate this noble behavior. At one point, he expresses his appreciation of the Muslims 218

by writing the following sentences: “Long live my merciful brothers! Glory to them because they spread the fame and might of Islam... Long live our honest and merciful mothers! May they live long and bring up merciful children.” Such expressions inevitably make the readers question the impartiality of the author in judging the real nature of the incidents. However, it should be kept in mind that Ordubadi himself was a Caucasian Muslim who witnessed the 1905-1906 tragedies. Therefore, he was probably very much influenced by the prevailing atmosphere of terror caused by the Armenian groups against the Muslim towns and villages. The clues of this terror may be traced in his narration of an interesting speech delivered by an Armenian leader to the Muslim people where he threatened them with “punishment by Dashnaksutyun troops” in case they failed to follow the Armenian leadership for eventual autonomy from Russia.

Ordubadi believes that “along with the Russian and Caucasian press, European and American publications speak heatedly and exhibit the closest interest in these events and their causes. We should also know that the articles published in the foreign press are full of contradictions and differences.” In this regard, despite its sympathy with the pains of the Muslims rather than the Armenians, Years of Blood is still a very significant historical survey that allows the readers to find out the real causes, main issues, evolution and consequences of the Armenian-Muslim clashes of the 1905-1906 period. Particularly this last point makes this rigorous study a must-read for both students and scholars of Caucasian history.

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Emre Erşen, Marmara University

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Ethnicity, Migration and Enterprise

By Prodromos Panayiotopoulos Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, 237 pages, ISBN 9780333710470.

Under the impact of globalization, and despite increased calls for diversity to be recognized, universal citizenship rights that safeguard individual rights and freedoms fall short of grasping diversity. International migration and minority issues are contributory facets of this process.

Citizenship has become susceptible to international migration and the minority issues, and the relationship established with the nation-state in the form of membership or belonging has gotten disrupted.

States are now compelled to develop new policies to deal with the consequences of international migration and the challenge of minority groups.

Citizenship, which is an operative arena of these new policies, is functional to counter the challenges posed by globalization and the incorporation of individuals and groups, including immigrants and minorities, into the society. For minority groups, not only legal rights and constitutional provisions, but also a wide range of public policies are required in the process of recognition and accommodation of distinctive identities and for the needs of ethnic, cultural and religious groups. The meaning of citizenship for immigrants, however, is closely related to “life strategies” like sequential plans and actions in the process of migration. There are several factors at play in determining the nature of life strategies, which include whether the receiving society is for permanent or temporary settlement, the duration of stay, kinship ties with countries of origin, documented or undocumented status of

immigrants, and their qualifications and positions in the labor market.

The enterprises established by ethnic/ racial minority and migrant groups with their growing numbers are illustrative of the new facets of the urbanization process in many city and metropolitan settings. Thus, they are at the center of the discussions on ‘globalization from below’ and ‘globalization from above’ and ethnic adaptation in local markets and informal economies.

Ethnicity, Migration and Enterprise is an exploration of these discussions by the use of case studies on enterprises founded by minority and migrant groups.

The book is an in-depth investigation of ethnicity, migration and enterprise, which incorporates the mega-meta-theories of modernization and globalization, and their critiques by using the sample cases of Turkish immigrants in Germany, Chinese entrepreneurs in Europe and the USA, Cuban and Mexican Hispanic minority groups in the USA, and the Polish and Central and Eastern European immigrants in the UK. There are several ethnic groups—immigrant or minority, newcomer or old settler—under scrutiny in the study.

The author presents a critical review of the academic and institutional research on migration and emergent enterprises among these different groups. Each chapter of the book is allocated to a single migrant/minority group under investigation, together with an introduction and a conclusion on the relevance and explanatory capacity of mega-meta theories to explain the phenomenon of rising ethnic migrant enterprises in

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local economies both in terms of growing numbers and potential contribution. The author, successfully in a considerably short book, makes an overview of the impact of ethnicity on the (re)distribution of wealth across borders of territorial, mental, ethnic and cultural in nature.

The study illustrates that far from the nationalistic and xenophobic jargons of “immigrants/minorities take our jobs!”, the actual situation evidenced by several academic and institutional research is the contrary: the enterprises of ethnic groups, minority or immigrant, create job opportunities and benefit the local economies.

What’s more, the study shows that entrepreneurship has become a form of life strategy for among ethnic groups in globalized economies. Employment in informal economies via enterprises are side effects or, with a different formulation, the economics of multiculturalism. Another major contribution that the study makes to the literature on migration, minorities and citizenship is its focus from ‘below’.

Examining the local circumstances, such as relating different minority and migrant groups to each other rather than exclusively focusing on their vulnerable relationship to the majority, is a substantial

divergence from the conventional studies on migration and minorities.

The author brings further light on the relationship between class and ethnicity which are the two major sociological determinants of social mobility and their integration under the influence of international migration and minority issues. The citizenship debate encompasses the enterprises founded by migrant and minority groups. Yet, one cannot keep him/herself from thinking about the relationship between gender, ethnicity and class in the situations of international migration and minority. In other words, the functioning of the asset gap between different ethnic groups and economic classes, as shown by the author, might be indicative of a parallel gap between the genders of the same ethnicity. The discrepancies between women and men, both among the same ethnic group and between various ethnic groups, might contribute to our understanding of the relationship between ethnicity, migration and enterprise. In addition, the valuable data that the author provides on the experiences of ‘new immigrants’ and ‘old immigrants’ is useful. Şule Toktaş, Kadir Has University

Islam and the Veil: Theoretical and Regional Contexts Edited by Theodore Gabriel and Rabiha Hannan London: Continuum, 2011, 204 pages, ISBN 9781441187352.

No matter how many attempts there have been to clarify the significance of the Islamic veil it remains a hotly contested issue. In Western civilizational discourse it is taken to be a symbol of women’s oppres220

sion and, beyond that, of Islam’s inability to grant gender equality and so of its followers’ unsuitability for membership in the countries of secular/Christian Europe. In an ironic transformation of its literal mean-

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ing as a curtain or screen to preserve modesty by segregating the sexes, the hijab has become, for its critics, the flag of an Islamist insurgency. There is no denying that in some contexts the decision by some women to wear the veil has political implications, but these seem less about imposing theocracy in France or Germany or Britain or Switzerland than about demanding recognition for the religious beliefs and practices of members of minority populations who often experience social and economic discrimination because of their religion.

This book, a collection of articles from the University of Gloucestershire’s annual Islam conference, is another effort at clarification. In this case, the presumed audience is British; most of the authors are based in the United Kingdom and the material they draw on comes from there.

In addition, there are several papers that examine the sources (theological and historical) for the belief that modesty requires women to cover their heads (and sometimes their faces).

The goal of the book is to challenge the notion of a singular, unchanging Islam and to replace it by demonstrating the diversity of interpretation and practice among Muslims, past and present. The authors of the articles differ in their readings of the Qur’an and of the hadiths that have implemented its teachings over the centuries.

They differ, too, about whether or not, and how much, Muslims should adapt to the habits of the countries to which they have immigrated. Some argue that veiling is not necessary for the achievement of decency, modesty and propriety, insisting that “conforming to local custom in terms of dress is an ancient characteristic of Muslim communities” (p. 77). Others emphasize the importance of maintaining

Muslim identity (and so the need to cover and wear loose clothing) in hostile environments. Some wonder why it is women, but not men, who must maintain gender separation: “Does the social anthropology of a desert climate impact so much on Islamic practice that it dictates the dress of half of its adherents, even after a millenium?” (p.

101) Some suggest that veiling enables the desexualizing of public space and so creates a safe and comfortable environment for women. One of the authors regrets the narrowing of the original egalitarian vision of the Qur’an: “there is no doubt the Qur’an sees women as equal members of the human race, with an equal spiritual presence, equal accountability before their Lord… equal free will and freedom of conscience… equal liability for their dealings with other human beings, and an equal responsibility to obey divine commandments” (pp. 115-16). Another attributes this most recent narrowing to the writings of Sheikh Sayyid Abu’l-A-‘la Mawdudi (1903-1979), the founder of Jamaat-iIslami in 1941 (pp. 36-47). This kind of historicizing gesture dominates the essays in the book; even the textual exegesis of Qur’anic passages relating to the hijab by a part-time imam insists on the importance of “culture and context” (p. 80).

For all the diversity of views, there is a common theme. The headscarf or veil is most often the choice of the women wearing it. They do so as a matter of dignity and respectability and they are not (in most cases) forced to do so. The veil is a “metaphor for an interior state of modesty” (p. 56) and it commands respect in public places. It offers protection from unwanted sexual advances (in this it recalls the class origins of the custom in the time of the Prophet when free women distinguished

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themselves from slaves by covering their heads and bodies). The veil signifies its wearers’ aspiration to piety and it signals an identity that is at odds with what are taken to be Western standards that are indecent and promiscuous. The authors emphasize that wearing the veil is a personal right, a human right of conscience and freedom of religion. One of the essays is sharply critical of the European Court of Human Rights’ decisions supporting various states’ (including Turkey’s) outlawing of headscarves in schools and other public places (pp. 156-60). The contention of its author, as of many of the other authors in the volume, is that no threat is posed to the security or democracy of European nations by their pious Muslim populations. The articles based on interviews with hijab wearers show that their religious practice is consistent with their patriotism. They are at once French or British (or Canadian) and Muslim; the only conflict with these identities is the one imposed externally by state interference with their religious practice.

Since it is their aim to counter the political hysteria that often surrounds discus-

sions of headscarves and the other public aspects of Islamic religious practice, the book neglects some problems that need also to be discussed. These include the instrumentalization of Islam by political leaders whose aims differ from the majority described in these pages (I think of Islamist: Why I Joined Radical Islam in Britain, and What I Saw Inside and Why I left by Ed Husain (2007)); questions about whether there ought to be limits to religious accommodation by secular states and what these might be; and finally, questions about the sources of Islamophobia and how to address it. This book assumes that “objective” information (p.

3) can help lay to rest the virulent attacks on Muslims that have focused on women wearing veils. But can it? I’m not sure it is enough. What books like this one can do is provide those of us hoping to counter Islamophobia with more and better information. Islam and the Veil, despite lots of repetition and the unevenness of its essays, is a welcome addition to that effort.

Joan W. Scott Institute for Advanced Study (USA)

The Narrative of the Occident

By Georg Schmid Frankfurt am Main, Peter Lang, 2009, 468 pages, ISBN 9783631575628.

Georg Schmid’s The Narrative of the Occident was published by Peter Lang in 2009. The book consists of nine chapters; in the first four chapters the author discusses theories and methods with which a civilization, essentially the Occident, narrates and represents itself. The following chapters 222

deal with the ways through which social perceptions are made and remade with the aid of rival or friendly paradigms. There are two insertions among the chapters: “Excursus A” (pp. 235–264) discusses the visual mechanisms and films which aided and extended the narrative of the Western

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civilization. “Excursus B” (pp. 353–378), entitled “Aviation Annotations,” deals with the aviation industry in the Western world as success stories. The details of several (Airbus and Boeing) aircraft models and their characteristics according to pilots, and the rivalry between the two companies are not spared! The load of unnecessary details and irrelevant issues for this insertion and in fact for the rest of the whole book makes the reading extremely painful.

Narratives, the author argues, as practiced by the Occident cannot be limited to mere narrations in the literal sense (p. 97), but rather they are “collective and unconscious self-portrayal.” While highlighting some of the issues in the narrative practices of the Occident, Schmid laments that Nazi ideology “assigned the position of the eternal culpable to the Jews” (p. 126).

Schmid explains the reasons and sources of this “anti-Semitic lore” (p. 132) in the narratives and modern practices of the Occidental world throughout several chapters of the book.

Georg Schmid describes his perspective as multilayered as opposed to being leftist or rightist. But his position seems to be lost when regarding several challenges emerging in the modern world, especially those against the dominant narrative of the Occident. He tries justifying unsympathetic narratives and practical actions of the Occident against its opponents but fails to demonstrate a balanced view of the challenges to the Occident or its major paradigms within a multilayered framework, be it coming from within or in the form of another rising power, such as China.

According to the author, the Occident, after fixing some of its shortcomings, can, if not should, continue to dominate the underprivileged and underdeveloped,

the women, the colonized, the communist and the Muslim. From this perspective, Schmid’s work can easily be considered a European echo of the earlier assertions of Bernard Lewis and to a certain degree Samuel Huntington.

As a firm believer in the Occident, Schmid tries to offer ways to overcome the challenges that the Occidental civilization is facing. Challenges from within as well as outside are discussed in detail. While overcoming deep rooted anti-Semitism will take care of the split “I” to re-constitute the spirit of the Occidental narrative.

The issues revolving around the environment, which the modern Occident created, can also be fixed. For Schmid, even the ever increasing challenge presented by the rising powers, primarily China, can be overcome. The challenge of Islam however, the author feels, requires bigger attention and collective effort to defeat. Schmid seems to have internalized concerns of the inflamed post 9/11 approaches to the Islamic world, at times in a radical way.

Schmid’s dislike of Arabs and their tribalism urges him to call Westerners together for unified effort against Islamic fundamentalism and to defend human rights (p. 427). At times, he even resents the fact that the Occidental narratives have sometimes turned their attentions towards the Orient. He seems bewildered by this unnecessary interest; in a way Schmid argues for a pure and strong Orientalism without the knowledge of the Orient. This kind of promotion of an Occidental narrative, immune from every foreign effect and remote to all sorts of positive interactions, cannot even be found in the critiques of the late Edward Said towards Orientalism.

M. Akif Kireçci, Bilkent University

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