GEOPOLITICS

A RESURGENT CSTO?

For long dismissed as a poor imitation of NATO, the CSTO has grown in ambition over the past few years.

Mary Kavita Dominic is a Policy Research Associate with the Synergia Foundation. She is a Rhodes Scholar from Oxford University.

With Kazakhstan engulfed by mass protests, the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) has emerged from the ash heap of history to “restore order” in the country. The Russia-led security bloc did not hesitate to provide assistance when President KassymZhomart Tokayev issued a call for help. Of course, many regional observers were taken by surprise, as this was the first time in its 30-year history that the organisation exercised collective security powers to militarily intervene in a member state.

Predictably, the events in Kazakhstan have triggered speculations about Russia extending its reach in Central Asia through a military alliance of ex-Soviet states. The growing chaos in Afghanistan, spurred by the withdrawal of U.S troops, has only fuelled these conjectures even further. It remains to be seen if the CSTO will indeed move beyond its image as a ‘symbolic anti-Western body’ to exercise more powers in the coming years.

A TEPID HISTORY

The timing of the CSTO actions in Kazakhstan is significant, as 2022 marks the 30th anniversary of the Collective Security Treaty. As can be recalled, the defence pact had been signed by members of the Commonwealth of Independent States in 1992, when the Soviet Union collapsed, and the Warsaw pact was dissolved. Ten years later, the member-states had declared themselves a full-blown military alliance, leading to the formation of the CSTO. istan, Kyrgyzstan, Armenia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. Like NATO, it is based on the principle of collective defence, whereby an attack on one member state is taken as an attack on the entire alliance.

Critics, however, write it off as a paper tiger, owing to its repeated failure to come to the aid of member states. For instance, in 2010, when Kyrgyzstan’s acting premier appealed for help to control the clashing Kyrgyz and Uzbek ethnic mobs in his country, the organisation had not intervened in the situation. Similarly, it had rebuffed Armenia’s appeal for assistance during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in 2020.

Given this reality, there is much scepticism about the effectiveness of CSTO, even among regional players. The organisation has very few deliverables to speak of besides periodic military exercises and roundtable discussions on political/military issues. In fact, many member states view it as a mere forum to negotiate the purchase of discounted weaponry from Russia. It is no surprise, therefore, that

With the looming prospect of a war in Ukraine, Russia may have sensed this as an opportunity to show off the might of the CSTO. Through its swift deployment of troops, it has sought to demonstrate the Kremlin’s readiness to muster force when former satellite states drift away from its sphere of influence. Only time will tell whether the CSTO will indeed be instrumentalised by Moscow to tip more such regional events in its favour.

the recent intervention in Kazakhstan has captured global headlines.

THE KAZAKH INTERVENTION

Belying its history of inaction, the CSTO has been prompt in deploying peacekeepers to Almaty this time around. In doing so, it has invoked Article 4 of the security pact, which permits interventions in the event of any aggression against member states. To trigger this clause, however, Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev had to argue that the country was under siege from “foreign-trained terrorist gangs” - a standard narrative used to scapegoat protesters around the world.

The very next day, around 2500 military personnel were fl own into the Central Asian country to protect strategic facilities, comprising troops from Russia, Belarus, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Armenia. Naturally, the question uppermost in everyone’s minds was why the organisation had exercised its collective security provisions, especially in the context of a domestic political clash. According to some experts, it might have been an attempt by Russia and Belarus to prevent these popular protests from spreading like wildfi re across the entire region. After all, leaders like Putin and Lukashenko can ill-aff ord to have any more pro-democracy movements or ‘colour revolutions’ that undermine the legitimacy of their rule.

Moreover, with the looming prospect of a war in Ukraine, Russia may have sensed this as an opportunity to show off the might of the CSTO. Through its swift deployment of troops, it has sought to demonstrate the Kremlin’s readiness to muster force when former satellite states drift away from its sphere of infl uence. Only time will tell whether the CSTO will indeed be instrumentalised by Moscow to tip more such regional events in its favour.

A MORE PROACTIVE CSTO?

Since its very inception, the CSTO has been envisioned as a counter to NATO’s eastward expansion. Within Eurasia, it not only ensures that the Moscow-accommodating administrations remain in power but also secures them from Western and Chinese encroachments. Moreover, it allows Russia to expand its military facilities in member countries while vetoing other foreign bases in the region.

With the recent Taliban takeover in Afghanistan, the CSTO has been provided with an additional opportunity to exert its infl uence. Given the humiliating withdrawal of U.S. and NATO forces from the country, it can portray itself as a superior security force in the region. Apprehending this, perhaps, Washington is visibly jittery about the latest intervention in Kazakhstan. For it, the deployment of Russian troops is reminiscent of the Soviet Union’s intervention in the domestic aff airs of Warsaw Pact countries.

This is why Secretary of State Antony Blinken has expressed concern over the possibility of troops lingering on in Kazakhstan. As articulated by him - “one lesson of recent history is that once Russians are in your house, it is sometimes very diffi cult to get them to leave”. The peacekeepers who are still deployed in the breakaway regions of Georgia and Moldova are often cited as cases in point, as they have been there since the 1990s.

In this context, all eyes will be on the CSTO to see if it plays a more proactive role in the region. Already, the organisation has been growing in ambition since the late 2000s. For instance, in December 2010, it had adopted new rules on interventions, which allowed the bloc to deploy peacekeepers in dealing with domestic unrest. Similarly, it had held its fi rst joint peacekeeping exercise in 2012 under an ‘anti-terror’ framework. With the recent deployment of troops in Kazakhstan, analysts are now portending a more active presence of the organisation in regional aff airs.

KAZAKHSTAN CSTO alliance

The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) is an alliance made up of Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan. Kazakhstan invoked Article 4 of the Treaty on January 5. The CSTO peacekeeping force totals about 3,600 people

2,500 DEPLOYED TO KAZAKHSTAN

= 10 troops

MILITARY SPENDING 2020,% OF GOVERNMENT SPENDING 11.4% 30.8% 16.7% 4.6% 4.5% 3.3%

Russia $61.7bn

Belarus $844.5m

Source: CSTO, SIRPI

America $634m Kazakhstan $1.7bn Kyrgyzstan $127.5m

Tajikistan $80.4m

SYNERGIA FOUNDATION

Assessment

Apart from Russia, the members of the CSTO are military featherweights and either singly or collectively do not pose any signifi cant threat to the U.S. or its NATO allies. It is only the Russian military might that is propping up this organisation.

There is a possibility that the CSTO will merely function as a ‘protective integration’ tool, while ostensibly serving a military purpose. In other words, it might restrict itself to fostering a culture of collective political solidarity (especially among autocratic nations), as opposed to serving as a defence mechanism against truly external threats. If this is indeed the case, then it will be in line with an ongoing global trend, whereby regional organisations bolster autocratic regimes and illiberal values under the garb of sovereignty.

For Russia, the intervention signals the ability of the bloc to quickly mobilize forces if the regimes favoured by Moscow are under threat. It is also an opportunity to fl ex its muscles, amidst a border dispute with a recalcitrant Ukraine.