The Taiwan Weekender is a weekly political e-newsletter that curates a list of top headlines from Taiwan and the world every Sunday. It also provides the latest updates on financial news and offers bite-sized analyses on select issues.
The one-year issue marks the anniversary of the online publication, which debuted on September 26, 2021. In one turbulent year’s time, The Taiwan Weekender has covered the escalation of cross-strait tensions, the war in Ukraine, and all things great and small in domestic politics.
Looking forward, the Taiwan Weekender will continue to keep its subscribers informed on the latest news on a weekly basis.
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TAIWAN WEEKENDER ONE YEAR ISSUE Table of Contents
LEAD STORY
FEATURES
2022 Local Elections: The Age of the Young Politician
26
CROSS-STRAIT Cross-Strait
Crossroads The status quo is deteriorating past a
point of no return – so what can Taiwan do?
Exclusive profiles on young candidates running for city councilors in the six special municipalities:
29
INTERNATIONAL Europe’s Winter of Discontent Eight months into Russia’s war in Ukraine,
Europe will soon face its biggest reality check.
08 TAIPEI CITY Chen You-cheng: Neihu
Born and Raised
11 NEW TAIPEI CITY Cho Kuan-ting: The Sprint to City Council
32
FINANCE Silicon Shield Conondrum Can Taiwan maintain
its semiconductor
superiority amid a bifurcating world order?
14 TAOYUAN CITY Ling Tao: KMT’s
Young Politician
17 TAICHUNG CITY Wu Pei-yun: Third
Time’s a Charm
20 KAOHSIUNG CITY Chang Bo-yang: The Anti-Han Prince
23 TAINAN CITY Chou Chia-wei: The
Political Apprentice
3
MISCELLANEOUS 01 03 04 05 07 41 43
About Table of Contents Meet the Editors Lead Story Candidate Map Acknowledgments Subscribe
35
DOMESTIC
POLITICS What can a Taiwanese Independent Lawmaker Contribute to the World?
Rebranding the KMT in Turbulent Times Has the Kuomintang abandoned its pro- China label and proven itself as “consistently” pro-American?
TAIWAN WEEKENDER ONE YEAR ISSUE Meet the Editors
T
he Taiwan Weekender was founded by Eric Yui and Hiro Fu. They are from Taipei, Taiwan. The two met at the University of California, Berkeley, where they studied political science. They have always been passionate about international affairs and Taiwanese politics.
ERIC YUI FOUNDING EDITOR
Eric Yui is a graudate student at the Harvard Kennedy School, pursuing a Master’s degree in public policy. He graudated from UC Berkeley in 2019 with a major in political science. He is also the founding editor of the Taiwan Perspective.
HIRO FU FOUNDING EDITOR
Hiro Fu is a news reporter based in the San Francisco Bay Area. He graduated from UC Berkeley in 2022 with a double major in political science and media studies and a minor in journalism. He is also a freelance journalist. His work can be found on The Diplomat and The News Lens International.
Photo credit: Timo Volz / Unsplash 4
TAIWAN WEEKENDER ONE YEAR ISSUE 2022 Local Elections
2022 LOCAL THE AGE OF POLITICIANS
by Hiro Fu
I
t’s election season in Taiwan, and it’s quite hard to miss. Inescapable billboards of candidates with their thumbs up, politicians shaking hands in farmer’s markets, and widely distributed tissue packets: such are the constants of a Taiwanese election.
The four parties represented in the Legislative Yuan have all rallied in support of the amendment. The proposal cleared the Legislature with unanimous support, an uncommon feat, especially for a constitutional amendment.
While the local elections this year may feature a lot of the same campaign tactics, and even many of the same faces running for reelection, this election cycle also sees the rise of many young, first-time candidates.
Before the amendment is ratified, 50 percent of Taiwan’s eligible voters will have to turn out to vote in favor of the amendment. Voter turnout was 74.9 percent in the 2020 general elections; turnout was under 70 percent across Taiwan in the 2018 local elections.
While the young politicians may not possess the same practical experience as the incumbents they face, they are often charged with the righteous indignation– yet also youthful optimism– to change the face of Taiwanese politics.
The 2022 local elections are not only a stage for this generation’s young politicians to prove their worth, but an invitation for youth across the country to become politically active.
Taiwan’s nine-in-one local elections will be held on November 26. Voters across the country will be electing representatives at various levels of local governments, from neighborhood chiefs, city and county councilors, to heads of the largest municipal governments.
On the same day, voters will decide on a referendum to lower the voting age from 20 to 18. The referendum on the proposed constitutional amendment will require support to pass a 50 percent threshold, or 9.65 million votes.
For reference, President Tsai Ing-wen was re-elected in 2020 with 8.17 million votes. Without bipartisan support, the referendum may fail at the ballot. 5
At the ballot, voters are not only presented with the choice to include a younger generation in the country’s political discussion but also directly support younger candidates running for office.
The Taiwan Weekender interviewed city council candidates from the six special municipalities– the major cities in Taiwan. The candidates come from various political parties, including the major Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and Kuomintang (KMT), as well as third parties on the rise: Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), New Power Party (NPP), and Taiwan Statebuilding Party (TSP).
The profiles of the candidates not only catalog their budding political careers but trends seen in this election cycle. The following are some recurring themes observed from the interviews.
Youth-Friendly Initiatives All the candidates interviewed were chosen to represent their parties after some form of a nominating process. For the DPP and KMT, primaries were held via telephone
ELECTIONS: THE YOUNG S
TAIWAN WEEKENDER ONE YEAR ISSUE The Age of the Young Politicians
Photo credit: UDN
polling for most districts. The smaller third parties also launched various search efforts to recruit like-minded candidates.
Across the parties, there seemed to be a consensus to include young candidates in the 2022 roster. This was especially evident for the century-old KMT, which announced that first-time candidates under the age of 35 would receive a 100 percent boost in their poll numbers.
The DPP continued its youth-friendly policy from the 2018 elections, adding 20 percent for first-time candidates under the age of 35.
While smaller third parties did not propose similar initiatives to increase youth inclusion, it’s important to note that the compositions of these relatively newer parties are already much younger than the major parties.
“Metabolism”
More than half of the candidates described the 2022 elections as a metabolic process, in which the political system allows new blood to replace older candidates, in turn, generating new energy.
The 2022 elections should be seen as a continuation of this political metabolic process. With young candidates introduced into the system, new solutions and issues concerning young families across the country are brought to the table.
The Hen Effect
In the races to capture the special municipalities, parties have nominated their best mayoral candidates. Parties with mayoral candidates also hope to obtain a significant number of seats in the city council to govern more easily.
As a result, mayoral and city council candidates have been seen campaigning together during this election cycle, with superstar mayoral candidates leading the flock as its “hen.”
A related concept that has been brought up is the “spillover effect,” which describes seemingly unrelated variables impacting one another. In this cycle, the mayoral hen’s popularity has been seen to influence that of the city council candidates.
However, the opposite has also been true: when mayoral candidates faced controversies, the city councilors would also be adversely affected.
This reference is not new. This process began in 2018 Third Parties
when young politicians first gained momentum in local elections following the 2014 Sunflower Student Movement. Apart from the DPP and KMT, voters can vote for candidates The NPP, which was founded and staffed by many of its participants found success during the 2018 local elections.
from a range of smaller third parties. These candidates may not have the resources of the major parties but have campaigned twice as hard to be seen and heard.
In 2020, DPP Legislator Lai Pin-yu, who was a student activist during the Sunflower Movement, was elected to the The NPP was founded in 2015, emerging from the Sunflower Legislative Yuan at the age of 29, becoming the youngest Movement. It found success in the 2016 and 2018 elections, legislator in Taiwan’s history. 6
TAIWAN WEEKENDER ONE YEAR ISSUE 2022 Local Elections positioning itself as a legitimate alternative to the old politics of the major parties. However, a number of party heavyweights have since left the party, citing ideological differences.
The TPP is on the rise. Founded by Taipei Mayor Ko Wen-je in 2019, the party quickly obtained five seats in the Legislative Yuan. It has nominated two mayoral candidates and one magistrate candidate. In Taipei, former deputy mayor Huang Shan-shan is running as an independent, but she is largely seen as affiliated with the party.
The TSP is a hardline pro-independence party. Former Legislator Chen Po-wei, who has now left the TSP, was the party’s single representative in the Legislative Yuan. The party has strong roots in Kaohsiung, where it contributed to the recall effort against former Mayor Han Kuo-yu.
giving the DPP a simple majority in the Legislative Yuan. The urgency to vote for the ruling DPP was further driven by Beijing’s crackdowns on Hong Kong since 2019.
In 2022, cross-strait relations have further deteriorated. U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan in August. This was followed by unprecedented military drills deployed by the People’s Liberation Army around Taiwan.
Given the heightened tensions across the Taiwan Strait, candidates were surprised to find that the cross-strait issue was not a talking point that resonated with the electorate.
Cross-Strait Issue
Some candidates suggested that voters are suffering from political fatigue after constantly hearing about an inevitable invasion for the past two years; others claimed that Chinese military drills have become normalized. A DPP candidate pointed out that voting against China would mean voting against the KMT, which they’ve already done repeatedly.
The 2020 national elections were largely seen as Taiwan’s stand against China, re-electing President Tsai Ing-wen and
As a result, most candidates have focused their platforms on bread-and-butter issues to appeal to independent voters.
CITY COUNCIL CANDIDATES NEW TAIPEI CITY
DEMOCRATIC
PROGRSSIVE
PARTY
TAIWAN
TAIPEI CITY PEOPLE’S
PARTY
CHO KUAN-TING
CHEN YOU-CHENG KUOMINTANG
TAOYUAN CITY
NEW
POWER
PARTY
LING TAO TAINAN CITY
CHOU CHIA-WEI
7
DEMOCRATIC
PROGRSSIVE
PARTY
TAIWAN
STATEBUILDING
PARTY
TAICHUNG CITY
WU PEI-YUN KAOHSIUNG CITY
CHANG BO-YANG
TAIWAN WEEKENDER ONE YEAR ISSUE Chen You-cheng: Neihu Born and Raised
TPP TAIPEI CITY COUNCILOR CANDIDATE
CHEN YOU-CHENG: NEIHU BORN AND RAISED
TAIWAN WEEKENDER ONE YEAR ISSUE Taipei City
C
hen You-cheng, aged 36, is running for Taipei city councilor in Neihu District, representing the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP).
While most young candidates in this election cycle come with prior political experience, few can match Chen’s early start in politics– he has been an assistant to former Taipei City Deputy Mayor Huang Shan-shan since he was 12.
24 years ago, Huang ran for city councilor in Neihu for the first time; she would go on to serve six consecutive terms as a city councilor. In her first election, she was elected with the highest number of votes in Taipei.
That same year, a young boy could be seen holding Huang’s microphone at events, passing out tissue packets at the market, and wearing her yellow election vest everywhere he followed her– that boy was Chen.
Chen grew up in a single-parent household. His mother worked as a realtor, which meant she was often busy. With no one to look after Chen on weekends, she dropped him off at Huang’s newly established campaign office to help out, where she knew he’d be kept busy and looked after.
“Who knew that helping out Huang would last for 24 years?” Chen said.
Together, Huang and Chen have seen eight elections. This year, they’ll both be running as candidates in Taipei city, with the former employer for mayor and Chen for city council.
“Out of all the new candidates, I’m perhaps one of the most experienced,” Chen said, citing his decade of service in Neihu, which includes up to 10,000 local cases involving negotiations, meetings, and legal consultation. These are the very services that city councilors are expected to offer.
While Chen said elected office was never part of his plan, this changed after he was offered a position by Taipei Mayor Ko Wen-je at the newly-established TPP as a spokesperson in 2019. Prior to this, Chen had no party affiliation.
In TPP, Chen has seen the party invest in youths, talent, and professionalism. In 2020, the party was the first to vet candidates for its list of at-large legislators via “audition.” While major parties often listed career politicians and special interest representatives, the TPP fielded its candidates based on merit.
“Even if they were young, even if they were just someone in their field, as long as they were outstanding enough, the TPP subsidized their election deposit,” Chen said, adding that in 2020, “the TPP wasn’t playing around– we were for real.”
Every summer and winter break, from middle school to high school, Chen would intern at Huang’s, becoming more and more involved with the daily proceedings at the city councilor’s office. When Chen studied law at Aletheia University, he interned at Huang’s legal clinic, which offered free consultation to her constituents. After Chen graduated, his first job was becoming Huang’s political aide.
TAIWAN
PEOPLE’S
PARTY
CHEN YOU-CHENG
9
TAIWAN WEEKENDER ONE YEAR ISSUE Chen You-cheng: Neihu Born and Raised The same model is applied to the local elections this year, with the TPP nominating candidates from a pool of local applicants that possesses unique experiences and shares their values. In Keelung, a TPP city councilor candidate famously listed her part-time experience at a McDonald’s on her resume.
Chen is among the many young, new candidates that the TPP has nominated this cycle. With an abundance of local experience and party involvement as a spokesperson, he was a natural pick for the heated contest in Neihu.
The Neihu-Nangang electoral district has historically been regarded as more of a pan-blue stronghold. Former KMT Legislator Lee Yen-hsiu served five consecutive terms as a city councilor and one term as a legislator. Of course, this changed when DPP Legislator Kao Chia-yu flipped the district out of the blue in 2020.
“In the past, there were more pan-blue supporters than those pan-green, and the bases of support were very clearcut,” said Chen, “but Legislator Kao’s victory surely disrupted this pattern, in addition to the solidified threeway mayoral race between blue, white, and green this year.”
While the outcome of Chen’s city council bid is separate from that of the mayoral race, there is an undeniable link between a party’s city council candidates and its mayoral candidate– the media has dubbed this connection as the “hen effect,” with mayoral hens leading chicks to victory.
Huang is running as an independent, but she is largely recognized as the TPP’s hen in Taipei, as she aims to continue Ko’s legacy in Taipei. For Chen, having his former employer as the hen is doubly beneficial: not only knowing the lead candidate on a personal level but also gaining a former Neihu-Nangang representative's full-hearted endorsement.
“What they call the spillover effect is quite visible here,” said Chen, when describing how Huang’s candidacy relates to his, “because she is like a sun, and those that stand by her are in direct sunlight, visible to all.”
While direct exposure can be helpful to first-time candidates, it can also put them under the spotlight for topical issues such as the age-old traffic congestion problem at the Neihu Technology Park. Huang and her opponents have each proposed their solutions, but Chen is perhaps the most invested in Neihu’s problem, and also the most candid.
“The KMT city government planned the area for industrial use originally, only to designate it as a science park later,” said Chen, “so all of a sudden, we’re seeing over two times the people and traffic stuck in this area. No matter who leads the city, the problem can’t be solved immediately.”
Chen proposed a few fixes that may mitigate the traffic, but he said that the source of the problem is ultimately tied to unresolved issues such as the proposed relocation of Taipei Songshan Airport and highway management, issues that require coordination with the central government.
Also included in Chen’s platforms are solutions for housing justice, childcare, elderly care, environmental impact, and more issues that young adults may face in the city. His hope is for those like him, who are born and raised in this city, to be able to afford and strive in life.
10
TAIWAN WEEKENDER ONE YEAR ISSUE New Taipei City
CHO
KUAN-TING: THE SPRINT TO CITY COUNCIL
DPP NEW TAIPEI CITY COUNCILOR CANDIDATE
Cho was nominated by the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) to run for one of ten seats in the district. The party’s nomination was determined by an inter-party primary conducted via telephone polling, through which six candidates were nominated out of seven. Cho led the polls with a 22% support rate; the runner-up lagged behind at 18%.
Cho said during an interview, that even though he swiftly and successfully obtained the party’s nomination, “the real sprint lies ahead.”
Though this is Cho’s first bid for elected office, he is no stranger to politics. He graduated from the National Chengchi University with a Bachelor’s in Public Administration. After graduating, his first jobs were in print media, working at the Commonwealth Magazine and Liberty Times News, before becoming a legislative aide.
At the Legislative Yuan, Cho worked for former legislator Lin Chialung, quickly becoming an important asset to the rising politician. Lin would later be elected as Taichung mayor for one term, during which Cho served as the chief of the city’s Information Bureau at the age of 28. He was the youngest chief of any municipal department to be appointed.
When Lin was tapped by President Tsai Ing-wen as the Minister of Transportation and Communications in 2019, Cho served as his chief of staff. He later resigned in 2019 to support his wife, former independent legislator Hung Tzu-yung, in her reelection campaign.
CHO KUAN-TING
ho Kuan-ting, aged 36, is one of the 17 candidates running for city councilor in New Taipei City's largest electoral district, the Tucheng-Shulin-Sanxia-Yingge district, which has a population of 620 thousand.
DEMOCRATIC
PROGRESSIVE
PARTY
C
TAIWAN WEEKENDER ONE YEAR ISSUE Cho Kuan-ting: The Sprint to City Council
With almost a decade of experience in public administration, Cho made the surprising decision to step temporarily away from politics to catch his breath. In 2020, Cho enrolled in the Master of Public Affairs program at the University of California, Berkeley. He obtained his degree during the pandemic and returned to Taiwan in 2021.
In Taiwan, Cho was faced with a dilemma. With his political resume, it wouldn’t have been hard to land a respectable position in the party or even the central government. But he chose differently.
“At that point, I thought to myself, if I’m able to apply all my experiences from working in the local, central, and legislative branches towards serving my hometown, this would be something worth running for,” said Cho.
Cho was born and raised in Yingge, New Taipei City. Though his work in politics has brought him to other parts of the country, he still feels an undeniable connection with his hometown, for which he believes much more can be achieved.
Though Cho’s motivation to run for office is to serve his hometown, he admits that on a personal level, he sees this election as a challenge for himself in this chapter of his life– his decade of experience in public administration, the education he earned, and all that defined him put to the test at the city council race. 12
TAIWAN WEEKENDER ONE YEAR ISSUE New Taipei City When asked if age was a consideration in his decision to run for office, Cho disagreed.
He analyzed that in his electoral district, with a total of 10 city councilor seats available, each city councilor would only need to obtain seven or eight percent of the vote. Thus, the district has historically provided younger politicians with as many opportunities as veteran politicians.
“I became a first-level supervisor at 28,” Cho said, referring to his role as the chief of Taichung City’s Information Bureau. “If we want to talk about being a young politician, I’m now 36, and that’s not very young anymore.”
Though being young seems to be all the rage in politics in the 2022 elections, the label of a “young politician” may easily connote inexperience. Similarly, Cho represents a party known for investing in the younger generation.
“If you have what it takes, the DPP is a party that is willing to give you the opportunity and a platform,” he said, adding that, unlike other parties, age is only a part of what makes a good candidate.
Cho believes that at the age of 36, he retains the drive of a younger politician, but also possesses the political preparedness to effectively serve his hometown.
Cho is not only confident in his abilities, but that his party will see victory in New Taipei City, which has been under KMT governance for almost 17 years, from former mayors Chou Hsiwei and Eric Chu to incumbent mayor Hou You-ih.
“Let’s be honest, Mayor Hou You-Yi has had 12 years, as deputy mayor and then mayor, to make improvements to New Taipei City, and he’s done everything he can. So you really can’t expect anything more from him,” said Cho.
Cho cited a few issues that have not been addressed by the city, including its overworked police force, its lack of progress in city planning, and outdated basic infrastructure, all of which would require a more experienced and effective government.
With his former employer, Lin Chia-lung, running for New Taipei City mayor, Cho believes that the DPP will have to play as a team– to lay out the best policy initiatives to convince citizens that this team is better equipped to govern.
“I hope to become a brave voice that speaks up for the people,” Cho said, regardless of which mayoral candidate wins.
He believes that for New Taipei to improve, the city council should not act as a mere echo chamber for the city government, but as a strong supervisor that weighs substantive results over patting oneself on the back.
Facing a 17-candidate race, Cho remains unfazed. With the drive of a young politician, the experience of a veteran, and a mouth as sharp as his mind, Cho is surely a force to be reckoned with in not only the sprint that lies ahead but in the New Taipei City Council and the many battlegrounds that are sure to lie ahead of him. 13
Photo credit: NOWnews
TAIWAN WEEKENDER ONE YEAR ISSUE Ling Tao: KMT’s Young Politician
LING TAO: KMT’S YOUNG POLITICIAN
KMT TAOYUAN CITY COUNCILOR CANDIDATE
TAIWAN WEEKENDER ONE YEAR ISSUE Taoyuan City
L
ing Tao, aged 32, is running for Taoyuan city councilor in the Taoyuan District, representing the Kuomintang (KMT).
“In my district, 12 city councilors will be elected from a pool of 27 candidates– my only advantage is that my name only has two characters,” Ling jokes, but that is far from his only advantage.
Ling is one of three candidates nominated in his district to run for city councilor through the KMT’s primary conducted via phone polling. He emerged as the frontrunner with a 100.642 percent rating, benefitting from the party’s youth-friendly initiatives, which doubled his initial 20-point lead.
Though the century-old KMT has a reputation of being unapproachable to aspiring youths, Ling’s early political career is perhaps one of several exceptions in the party.
Ling became politically involved in 2011, during his senior year at the National Chengchi University. After hosting a series of intercollegiate debate competitions, he was recruited by President Ma Ying-jeou’s reelection campaign. There, he worked on the campaign’s youth policy initiatives.
After Ma was reelected in 2012, Ling ran for the KMT Youth League director. The director of the KMT’s youth department has a reserved voting seat in the party’s central committee, allowing Ling direct involvement in the party’s decisionmaking body.
In 2014, Lin was presented with the opportunity to join the staff at the Presidential office, but he took up the offer to join the New Taipei City government instead. Former New Taipei Mayor Eric Chu, who is now the KMT Chairman, invited Ling to serve as his confidential secretary for any department of his liking.
“Most people assumed that I would choose the Information Department, or Tourism and Travel,” said Ling, suggesting that those departments were more obvious resume-builders, “but I knew that I wanted to join the Civil Affairs Department.”
At the Civil Affairs Department, Ling saw first-hand the implementation of policies and how they impacted every aspect of a citizen’s life: from birth, family, faith, conscription, marriage, to death. He said that it was a different perspective for a policymaker who was once involved at the national level.
In 2016, Ling was the recipient of the party’s Dr. Sun Yat-Sen Scholarship, which subsidized his education at Cornell University, where he obtained his Master’s in Public Administration. He returned to Taiwan in 2019 and worked on former employer Eric Chu’s bid for the presidential nomination in the KMT’s closed primaries.
Though Chu lost the party’s presidential nomination to former Kaohsiung Mayor Han Kuo-yu, Ling stayed on his staff as spokesperson, seeing his way to the position of party chairman in 2021. Ling was later appointed as the head of the Culture and Communications Committee, the youngest to ever hold the position.
Ling’s 11-year political career thus far has been marked by a series of unexpected decisions– joining the KMT, selecting the Civil Affairs Department at New Taipei City, and staying on to serve the Chu office– that has led him to the 2022 race, where he finds himself returning to his hometown in Taoyuan.
LING TAO
15
KUOMI
TAIWAN WEEKENDER ONE YEAR ISSUE Ling Tao: KMT’s Young Politician “I’ve seen policymaking, and I’ve seen city governance,” Ling said, “but can I now act as a representative for the people and hold our government accountable? This is a role I have yet to play.”
Elected office may lie ahead for Ling, but the role of holding the government accountable is a well-rehearsed act for him. Since Ling announced his candidacy in March, he has been seen on political talk shows, at KMT press events, and on social media, criticizing the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) on its national and local agendas.
On the local end, Taoyuan has become a heated battleground during this election cycle. With Mayor Cheng Wen-tsan unable to run for reelection after his second term, the race in the special municipality had already been watched closely, even before waves of plagiarism scandals forced the DPP’s original candidate Former Hsinchu Mayor Lin Chih-chien to bow out.
Photo credit: ETtoday
“DPP’s biggest problem is Lin. All the people who backed Lin; those who put up billboards with him had to have them removed. All their endorsements have come boomeranging back at them. So now when they accuse others of academic plagiarism, they have nothing to stand on,” Ling said.
The KMT has also had its own fair share of controversy in Taoyuan, with Premier Simon Chang seen as an “airlifted” candidate, a carpetbagger with no prior experience with the constituency. Ling acknowledged this but said that once campaigning began, everyone saw that Chang was the best candidate for the party.
“Chang, like me, is also a fellow Cornell alumnus. We share a vision for Taoyuan, ” said Ling, “from its development, education, globalization, and future.”
Ling believes that the city requires more substantial supervision, citing the collapsed roof at the Bade Civil Sports Center during a recent earthquake, which he sees as the city government’s oversight. He also hopes to improve the city’s connectivity through transportation and city planning, as well as quality-of-life issues such as education.
Ling sees the 2022 election cycle as “metabolic,” not only as a chance for change in representation but as an opportunity for youths to play a more dominant political role. This is the moment his generation has been preparing for, and Ling– young, prepared, and ready to take on the challenge– has answered the call, defying notions of his party being youth-unfriendly.
INTANG
16
TAIWAN WEEKENDER ONE YEAR ISSUE Taichung City
NPP TAICHUNG CITY COUNCILOR CANDIDATE
WU PEI-YUN:
THIRD TIME’S A CHARM
W
TAIWAN WEEKENDER ONE YEAR ISSUE Wu Pei-yun: Third Time's a Charm u Pei-yun, aged 30, is running for Taichung city councilor in Nantun District, representing the New Power Party (NPP).
Unlike most candidacies in this election cycle, this will be Wu’s third attempt at elected office. Wu’s first election was in 2018 for city councilor, initially losing by nine votes. This outcome was disputed in court. After a recount, Wu still lost by eight votes.
In the 2020 legislative election, Wu was placed eighth on the NPP’s list of at-large candidates. With the departure of party heavyweights such as Legislator Freddy Lim and Former Legislator Hung Tzu-yung, as well as the rise of third-party alternatives, the NPP was only able to obtain three seats.
Given not one, but two setbacks at the ballot, courage doesn’t begin to describe the tenacity Wu demonstrates by running once again– in the same district she lost in 2018.
“Was I disappointed, was I dismayed by the results? To be honest,” she said, “those emotions were unavoidable, but I knew that the road of politics requires an even higher degree of determination. My defeat from four years ago opened new doors for me.”
Prior to 2018, Wu studied to become a pharmacist. Like many her age, 2014 became a political watershed moment. During the student-led Sunflower Movement, she served in the medical center, where she patched up those who were injured in the pursuit of democracy.
After the movement, Wu became involved in student leadership at the China Medical University, where she studied. As student council president, she worked to enhance the rights of fellow students, pushing back against what she saw as injustices.
“As a student, I never imagined entering politics,” Wu said. After graduating, she worked as a pharmacist, yet politics came calling all the same. In 2017, she took up an offer to join the NPP with the very minds behind the Sunflower Movement.
Shortly after joining, Wu quickly became involved in Taichung. She was deeply unsatisfied with local representatives who missed out on meetings, wasted time at the city council sessions, and misused taxpayer dollars. This pushed her to run for city councilor in 2018, but what awaited her was yet another disappointment.
“Only when I ran for office, did I discover that the election culture in Taiwan was rooted deeply in traditional brokers and local factions,” Wu said, vowing to one day defy these unjust obstacles.
As a political outsider, Wu lacked the finance local politicians invested in fostering long-term ties. As the youngest candidate in Taichung during that cycle, she found that even getting her name out posed a higher threshold for young and inexperienced politicians from a minor party.
“We may not have the popularity and resources like other candidates, but we started walking on our own two feet, giving public talks and putting our platforms forward,” she said, “for all those who were willing to give us a chance.”
Riding the wave of the Sunflower Movement, the NPP’s grassroots strategy in 2018 was largely successful, seeing the rise of many young local politicians. Wu’s efforts were also reflected in the Taichung race, but she ultimately fell short of victory.
NEW
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WU PEI-YUN
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TAIWAN WEEKENDER ONE YEAR ISSUE Taichung City Four years later, much has changed– for better and for worse. Wu represents the same party in the same district, but even by her own admission, the NPP has seen many of its former allies jump ship. However, more have joined its ranks, with 90% of its members being youths by Wu’s own estimate.
“If the ideals we stand by remain strong, the NPP still has a part to play in Taiwan’s future,” said Wu, proposing policies in childcare, labor rights, housing justice, climate, and defending Taiwan’s sovereignty.
Wu is not at all shy when calling out undemocratic, and even “dicatorial” aspects, of the major political parties, be it in the Kuomintang (KMT) or the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). She believes that the NPP can find common ground with major parties but should never compromise its values.
Apart from a willingness to nominate young candidates, the NPP also provides ambitious youths like Wu various support in stepping into politics. The party assists its candidates in fundraising to meet the election deposit– in Wu’s case, NT$200,000– required by the Central Election Commission.
Furthermore, Wu said that the party’s legislative caucus acts as each candidate’s “brain trust,” providing their knowledge and experiences with national legislation to help guide their local platforms. When elected, these local proposals can in turn connect with the party’s efforts at the national level.
In Nantun district, Wu sees young families moving in every day, and even more beginning to recognize her from her 2018 run and her continued service in Taichung. This gives her hope.
“It’s really been tough,” Wu said with a chuckle when reflecting on campaigning thus far, “and I’m not playing the sympathy card.”
Wu wants voters to see that Taiwanese politics is not only a meaningless two-party battleground, but young people such as those found in the NPP, even when lacking in resources, have not given up their vision to bring forward a more just society in Taiwan.
This is the same grit that Wu continues to demonstrate each day as she campaigns for the third time.
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Photo credit: UDN
TAIWAN WEEKENDER ONE YEAR ISSUE Chou Chia-wei: The Political Apprentice
CHOU CHIA-WEI: THE POLITICAL APPRENTICE DPP TAINAN CITY COUNCILOR CANDIDATE
TAIWAN WEEKENDER ONE YEAR ISSUE Tainan City
C
hou Chia-wei, aged 30, is running for Tainan city councilor in the North District and West Central District, representing the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP).
Tainan has not seen a change in power since 1936, and the polls suggest that the city will remain a DPP stronghold this cycle. Given the party’s significant incumbent advantage, most of its candidates are running for reelection– Chou stands out as a young, first-time candidate.
In Chou’s district, six city council seats are up for election. In the past, the DPP and the Kuomintang (KMT) have split these six seats evenly with longtime city councilors repeatedly running for reelection. In this cycle, KMT City Councilor Hsieh Lung-chieh will be running for mayor, while another KMT incumbent is stepping down. The DPP in turn nominated four candidates.
“The party wanted to run somebody that’s relatively younger and possesses more professionalism than the KMT candidates we’re seeing,” said Chou, explaining the DPP’s decision to nominate him in an attempt to claim an additional seat in the district.
While the DPP is known for supporting young and aspiring politicians, Chou’s road to being nominated in Tainan was no easy path.
After graduating from the National Cheng Kung University in 2015, Chou joined the office of Legislator Lin Chun-Hsien. Chou sees himself as a political “apprentice” to Lin, who was once an apprentice to the former mayor of Tainan and current Vice President William Lai. They are all members of the party’s New Tide faction.
While political lineages are common in Tainan, and even other parts of Taiwan, Chou said that such lineages bounded by non-familial ties are much rarer. Of the 1,686 candidates for city and county councilor, at least 353 come from political families– that’s nearly 21 percent.
“Starting a campaign from zero, a lot of constituents could find me on the streets, in the parks, and anywhere we could be seen,” said Chou, “just so they know that we have a new candidate in this race.”
Despite Chou’s years of local service under Lin, his low recognizability in a district largely dominated by incumbents and political families proved to be a challenge for a newcomer like himself. He came in fourth out of the five candidates in the party primary held for his district, narrowly defeating another firsttime candidate by 2.8 percent.
After the primaries, the DPP put into place campaign strategies that helped to introduce their new candidate. All four city council candidates are 21
CHOU CHIA-WE
DEMOCRATI PROGRESSIV regularly seen stumping for one another at events. This is especially beneficial for Chou, as his fellow runners are all incumbents that come with name recognition.
“Unlike the KMT, our party works as a team,” said Chou, having experienced a change in popularity after campaigning as a group. This is one of the key differences that he believes will determine whether the party will obtain its fourth seat this year.
“I recently turned 30, and I want to take advantage of the energy and ambitions that come with my age to better serve my community,” said Chou, citing age as a personal factor that may set him apart from the opponents’ old politics.
Another factor is his legal background. While Chou stepped into politics right out of college, he also studied and practiced law. He believes that his candidacy has much to do with the sense of duty that comes with being a lawyer, but also with the injustices he saw in practicing law.
TAIWAN WEEKENDER ONE YEAR ISSUE Chou Chia-wei: The Political Apprentice “Everywhere I go to campaign, their candidates are always there too,” Chou said, “but I’m also motivated by the energy they bring to this election. I think the DPP, NPP, and TSP share a relationship that is characterized by improvement through competition.”
As for the TPP, Chou observed that its supporters in Tainan are often those from the pan-blue camp, which places the party in competition with the KMT. Chou believes that even though the DPP and KMT are still the major competitors in Tainan, the KMT and its aging voter base are the most affected by younger candidates from third parties.
“I've taken part in four elections now,” said Chou, referring to his past roles in legislative campaigns, “voters’ acceptance of young politicians is rising each year. In the past, age is seen as equivalent to experience, but over time, people seemed to realize that if we never give younger candidates the chance to gain the experience we expect them to have, we’ll always be stuck with the same politicians.”
Chou sees this reflected in the North and West Central districts, which can be considered the city’s cultural and educational hub. Its elderly community members, new immigrants, and young business owners are always eager to give new candidates a chance.
EI
IC
VE PART Y
Chou aims to improve the standard of living in his district through his platforms on transportation, education, and elderly care. Photo credit: LTN
“People seek my legal consultations when they’re in trouble, and that’s usually when the situation is already quite dire,” said Chou, “but I’ve always wondered if I could tackle the source of their legal problems at the legislative level.”
Of the 10 candidates vying for the six city council seats in the district, only three have studied law. Chou hopes that age and professionalism are traits that constituents consider when casting their votes. However, these are also traits that third parties such as the New Power Party (NPP), Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), and Taiwan Statebuilding Party (TSP) associate with.
When asked if the rise of third parties in Taiwan’s political environment alarmed candidates of the ruling party, Chou admitted that the passion that these smaller parties campaign with has mounted some pressure on the DPP, but he welcomes the challenge. 22
TAIWAN WEEKENDER ONE YEAR ISSUE Kaohsiung City
TSP KAOHSIUNG CITY COUNCILOR CANDIDATE
CHANG BO-YANG: THE ANTI-HAN PRINCE
C
TAIWAN WEEKENDER ONE YEAR ISSUE Chang Bo-yang: The Anti-Han Prince hang Bo-yang, aged 31, is running for Kaohsiung city councilor in Sanmin District, representing the Taiwan Statebuilding Party (TSP).
Chang is perhaps more notoriously known by Kuomintang (KMT) supporters as being one of the “Four Anti-Han Princes,” the group that spearheaded the successful recall of former KMT Mayor Han Kuo-yu.
Though Chang is often seen on political talk shows, avidly defending Taiwanese sovereignty with his quickwittedness and fast-talking, it’s hard to imagine that politics was not Chang’s original calling and that his involvement came in gradual progression.
Photo credit: Apple Daily
Chang was born in Pingtung to a Hakka family. He first set foot in Kaohsiung when he attended the National Kaohsiung University of Applied Sciences, from which he graduated with a degree in engineering.
His political rite of passage first came when he was still a student, becoming involved in the Anti-Media Monopoly Movement, which protested the pro-China Want Want Group’s attempt to purchase China Network Systems, the second-largest cable television provider in Taiwan.
Though extremely passionate about political affairs, Chang pursued a job in engineering based in Kaohsiung after graduation. It was only until seeing the Sunflower Student Movement erupt in 2014 did he join the TSP as an unpaid volunteer, inspired by the party’s strong commitment to Taiwanese independence.
The TSP is a hardline pro-independence party that positions itself as more radical than the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in seeking Taiwanese independence. The party was founded in 2016.
seeds of discontent among the citizens of Kaohsiung.
In 2018, the former Kaohsiung Mayor emerged as the dark horse candidate that won the Kaohsiung race for the KMT. Four months after assuming mayoralty, his eyes were set on the presidential race, sowing the seeds of discontent among the citizens of Kaohsiung.
As a party volunteer, Chang would attend to his engineering job during the day, and at night, ride his scooter to the TSP headquarters based in Kaohsiung’s Sanmin District. There, he delivered brochures, moved equipment, and chauffeured party members.
Chang, the TSP’s media coordinator at the time, was naturally a strong critic of the KMT’s populist mayor. He joked that he was Han’s “number one fan,” committing to memory Han’s daily routines and each of his unfulfilled campaign promises. When political and civil groups began their grassroots mobilization against Han in January, Chang became the party’s face in the recall effort.
“From a volunteer who only knew how to fold flyers and set out chairs, I listened to every speech, learned the party’s discourse, and bit by bit, began to write my own speeches,” Chang said. His abilities did not go unnoticed by the party, which tasked him with writing social media posts.
“The petition involved three groups: WeCare Kaohsiung, Citizens Mowing Action, and the TSP,” Chang explained, “but the recall process was going to take 168 days, and if we did not provide a face to this movement, everyone would only ever remember Han’s face. We weren’t going to let Han dictate this recall.”
After five years of volunteering, Chang’s party affiliation deepened in January 2019, thanks to one man– Han Kuo-yu.
With the Four Anti-Han Princes, Chang removed Han from Kaohsiung, but he says that his work is not done.
In 2018, the former Kaohsiung Mayor emerged as the dark horse candidate that won the Kaohsiung race for the KMT. Four months after assuming mayoralty, his eyes were set on the presidential race, sowing the
“Why was Han able to rise? Because people were politically lazy,” Chang said, “just like with Donald Trump, Rodrigo Duterte, and other strongman politicians, people wanted charismatic demagogues to make decisions for us instead of focusing on what the city actually needed.” 24
TAIWAN WEEKENDER ONE YEAR ISSUE Kaohsiung City With 128 candidates running for 65 city council seats in Kaohsiung, the TSP, composed of mostly young, first-time candidates, has a new strategy. It has marketed the party as a brand, as a seal of approval for each and every one of its candidates– TSP henceforth will be synonymous with the qualities of boldness, outspokenness, and being close to the people.
This is not unlike the New Power Party’s (NPP) strategy in 2018, following the Sunflower Movement, when the party was founded by the very leaders of the movement. Voters who supported NPP candidates then often knew quite little about individual candidates, but because they believed in what the party stood for, cast their votes for its candidates.
For the primarily residential Sanmin district, where Chang has lived for over a third of his life, he aims to revitalize the commercial area around the train station, improve its sports center, and increase Hakka representation. Chang also looks forward to a pan-green majority in the city council, where the TSP and the DPP will continue to safeguard democracy.
Though the upcoming elections determine local representation, Chang reminds all that Taiwan’s democracy is always at stake– even when voters become unforgettable, Chang and the TSP will be there.
TAIWAN
STATEBUILDING
PARTY Chang believes that the recall was a wake-up call for Kaohsiung citizens, one that is sorely needed again in 2022 with the Chinese threat being more present than ever.
“The political atmosphere is eerily cold in Kaohsiung this election cycle,” observed Chang. He pointed out that over the two years since the 2020 elections, citizens have voted three times in Han’s recall, the subsequent mayoral by-election, and a failed attempt to recall city councilor Huang Jie.
With the mayoral competition being “too predictable,” he said, suggesting that incumbent DPP Mayor Chen Chi-mai will be reelected, little attention is paid to the Kaohsiung race because voters are suffering from political fatigue.
Chang worries that voters are engrossed by political spectacles such as academic plagiarism and family scandals when they should really be considering the implications of this election cycle. The political laziness Chang saw in 2018 was slowly making its way back into the electorate, and the TSP is the bulwark against the coming crisis. 25
CHANG
BO-YANG
TAIWAN WEEKENDER ONE YEAR ISSUE Cross-Strait
CROSS-
STRAIT
CROSSROADS
The status quo is deteriorating past a
point of no return – so what can Taiwan do? by Eric Yui xx
TAIWAN WEEKENDER ONE YEAR ISSUE Cross-Strait Crossroads
I
t was merely seven years ago when leaders from either side of the Taiwan Strait met face-to-face for the first time since the Chinese Civil War, with Cross-Strait ties having seemingly moved away
from the high stake tensions of the 1990s and potentially towards gradual rapprochement. Yet with Beijing’s growing authoritarianism and crackdown on democratic rights in Hong Kong, coupled with the election of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)’s Tsai Ing-wen and the collapse of the “92 Consensus” in the years that followed, trust across the two sides of the Strait completely fell apart, and current worsening Sino-U.S. ties are further catalyzing it into what is fast becoming the most volatile period for Cross-Strait relations to date.
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While the Washington-Taipei dynamic shift vis-a-vis Beijing began during the Trump era, it was the U.S. Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan this August and the PLA’s subsequent response that marked the clearest turning point for the start of a “new normal” for the Taiwan Strait.
President Biden had at that point already publicly vowed to “defend Taiwan militarily” from a Chinese attack on three separate occasions, while Congress was getting ready to pass the “Taiwan Policy Act” which would significantly elevate Taiwan’s non-official ties with Washington.
Beijing’s war of words and unprecedented military exercises thus seemed like a necessary knee-jerk reaction to remind Washington of its red lines while satisfying the nationalistic hawks at home.
Yet by firing missiles over Taiwanese airspace, some which landed within Taiwan’s exclusive economic zone, and increasing the amount of sorties that violated the Strait’s median line, Beijing had also seized the opportunity to speed up its salami-slicing tactic of diluting Taiwan’s de-facto sovereignty, greatly assisted by both Washington and Taipei’s relatively muted response.
It’s important to note, as China Hands in D.C. quickly pointed out, that this doesn’t indicate that Pelosi’s visit accelerated Beijing’s timeline for invading Taiwan, since the main determinant factors are still the PLA’s capability for an invasion (which it has not fully reached) and Taiwan’s declaration of de-jure independence (which it has not done), but it certainly strengthened Beijing’s determination to achieve unification, therefore weakening its tolerance for the “status-quo” and its care for the opinion of the Taiwanese, much like Hong Kong in 2019.
Handout A P /
Xi Jinping’s opening speech at the 20th National Party Congress further emphasized Beijing’s growing selfconfidence and conviction to shape Cross-Strait affairs based on its own will.
The language used was noticeably more forceful in comparison to 2017; a greater emphasis was placed on stopping “foreign interference”, and gone is the mention of the “92 Consensus” (appearing once in the full written report), signaling that Beijing is caring less about Taiwan’s say on Cross-Strait matters and instead thinks more in the larger context of Sino-U.S. relations.
Talk on reunification evolved from “the wish of the Chinese people” (共同願望) in 2017 to “a necessary requirement” (必然要求), and “never giving up the use of force” was mentioned for the first time in an opening speech, implying that the use of force is no longer seen as a mere “last resort”, but also an instrument to coerce the island into negotiating a “peaceful reunification.”
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TAIWAN WEEKENDER ONE YEAR ISSUE Cross-Strait Xi’s reshuffle of the top positions within the CCP, most notably within the military, also sends strong signals on Taiwan. 72-year-old Zhang Youxia, one of the few generals with actual combat experience, was promoted to first-vice chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) despite his age, while He Weidong, former head of the Eastern Theater Command and the mastermind behind the military drills around Taiwan following Pelosi’s visit, was promoted to second-vice chairman of the CMC, signaling that Beijing is shifting to a combat-ready posture, especially for any potential Taiwan Strait contingencies.
Over at the Taiwan Affairs Office, Director Liu Jieyi and other prominent figures well-received by the Taiwanese community in the Mainland, were all snubbed from the Central Committee, potentially making way for more hawkish officials and killing the KMT’s hopes of filling the vacuum for Cross-Strait dialogue.
All this points to the simple notion that the status-quo, which the majority of Taiwanese people have for decades grown accustomed to, has become unsustainable and likely reached a point of no return. This doesn’t warrant hasty predictions of invasion dates that have begun floating around, but it’s nonetheless a legitimate concern that both Taiwanese leaders and the general public should begin taking more seriously.
Taiwan must prevent itself from becoming a mere backseat passenger amid worsening Sino-American ties by taking a more proactive approach in shaping its narrative on Cross-Strait affairs, beyond just rhetoric. With the 92 Consensus now buried into the pages of history, the leadership in Taipei needs to become more vocal in seeking new ways of preserving long-term peace and resuming dialogue with Beijing, not just mentioning it once a year during the Double Ten national address.
At the same time, it needs to take a page from Ukraine and begin a serious reorganization of its military thinking. Besides adapting to the concept of asymmetrical warfare, more focus needs to be made on public preparedness, both psychologically and in training, such as extending the 4-month conscription period and not hiding key details of the PLA’s aggressions (such as missiles flying over Taiwan’s airpace) from the public.
Most crucially, Taiwan needs to find national unity to stand firm on sovereignty and identity, moving past the outdated and oversimplified “pro-independence” and “pro-unification” labels in domestic politics and instead focusing on debating real issues that can strengthen the country’s competitiveness, while also ensuring that Taiwan’s interests are prioritized when dealing with either Washington or Beijing.
With Cross-Strait relations now at a crossroads, Taiwan must take fate into its own hands and secure the future that its 23 million inhabitants truly desire.
Xinhua
AFP
Huizhong Wu / AP
Office of the President, ROC (Taiwan) 28
TAIWAN WEEKENDER ONE YEAR ISSUE International
EUROPE’S
WINTER OF
DISCONTENT
Eight months into Russia’s war in Ukraine,
Europe will soon face its biggest reality check.
by Eric Yui
Photo credit: Andreas Rentz / Getty Images 29
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TAIWAN WEEKENDER ONE YEAR ISSUE Europe’s Coming Winter of Discontent
hen Putin launched his unprovoked invasion of Ukraine earlier this February, few believed Kyiv would last long; even fewer would have believed that Ukrainian forces would be on
the counteroffensive just some eight months later.
Yet Ukrainian resilience, coupled with a healthy dose of Western support, has made it today’s reality, and Russia now finds itself scrambling to gather more than 300,000 conscripts in hopes of slowing Ukraine’s advances.
It’s a fairy tale story for the headlines, but the mood in Europe is far from jolly as it heads into a long winter. Soaring inflation, an imminent energy crisis, and the prospect of nuclear war all threaten to fracture the longneeded unity that Europe and NATO had found at the start of the war, with the resolve of the West’s support to Ukraine soon to face its biggest test.
Europe was already facing an energy conundrum prior to the war, with extreme weather caused by climate change and the global supply shock resulting from the Covid-19 pandemic leaving the continent with its lowest gas storage levels in a decade just last October.
While this winter season is looking to be slightly warmer and storage levels are comfortably on target sitting in the 90% range, Europe won’t have last year’s benefit of Russia’s increased gas supply (some via its pipelines in Ukraine) this time around, instead having to deal with Moscow’s 88% cut in gas exports and the indefinite closure of the Nord Stream pipeline.
Leo Correa/AP
Optimists may be correct in pointing out that even for nations like Germany, which relied on Russia for 40% of its natural gas imports prior to the war, can afford to seek pricier alternatives and stave off Moscow’s energy blackmail, but it’s also important to remember who will be footing the bill once the days turn cold.
With households across the continent already hurting from skyrocketing inflation, even a slight uptick in energy bills will be extremely detrimental for the nonwealthy.
An IMF report from this summer found that the poorest 10% in Europe pay, on average, over 10% of their budget on their energy bills, with Britain at 17% and the Czech Republic reaching 18%.
Daniel Leal/AFP
So while leaders across Europe can surely and righteously stand up to Putin’s extortion for Ukraine’s sake, whether or not they’ll be able to withstand the wrath of their constituents, as Britain’s Liz Truss failed to do so, is still to be seen.
The wealth disparity between EU members will also once again be put in plain view, further testing the resolve of European unity towards the war.
John MacDougall/AFP 30
TAIWAN WEEKENDER ONE YEAR ISSUE Europe’s Winter of Discontent Yet the biggest challenge might not even be from within the content. "We have not faced the prospect of Armageddon since the Cuban Missile Crisis,” said U.S. President Joe Biden during a funraising event in New York last month, signaling growing security concerns in D.C. over the war. Biden has reportedly even begun publicly discussing potential “off-ramps” for Putin.
Just this month, a New York Times report revealed that the White House was aware of discussions in Moscow in mid-October over deploying a tactical nuclear weapon in Ukraine.
While further reports suggest a divide between officials who believe the credibility of intent, with some saying Putin himself was not aware of these discussions, it nevertheless shows growing concern that Russia may resort to irrational means as it begins to increasingly feel cornered on the battlefield.
One week after proclaiming the annexation of four Ukrainian territories, Moscow lost the key city of Lyman, lost significant ground to Ukraine’s counteroffensive in Kherson, and had the prized bridge linking Crimea and Russia, which also serves as the key supply route for the frontlines, partially destroyed in a blast reportedly carried out by Ukrainian elements.
Just last week, its Black Sea Fleet was met with a barrage of attacks from bomb drones. With Pyongyang expected to be on the verge of resuming nuclear tests, it wouldn’t be far-fetched to assume that Moscow could be encouraged to follow suit with its own test in the Black Sea, opening a nuclear Pandora’s box.
Washington’s posture could thus likely begin to soften after the midterm elections next month, especially if Republicans end up winning back control of both the House and Senate.
GOP members have begun questioning and vowing to cut back the amount of military and financial aid going Kyiv’s way as the United States faces record consumer prices and a likely recession next spring.
With American public concern for the war in Ukraine dropping drastically since spring, Republicans projected for a sweeping victory in the midterms, and Biden’s determination to prevent any nuclear confrontation, it would not be surprising if the White House ends up scaling back the intensity of its support to Ukraine come next year.
Even as the West begins to shift their attention towards away from the battlefield and back onto their own domestic quandaries, make no mistake that they will still continue to provide Kyiv with military, financial, and logistical aid “for as long as needed,” albeit in a gradually smaller magnitude, to prevent an outright Russian victory.
With Ukrainians determined to reclaim their rightful territory with momentum now on their side and Putin prepared to resort to any means necessary to preserve the legitimacy of his reign, the war will likely enter a prolonged stalemate. Whether it’s negotiations that break the standoff— or some catastrophic event seeking to shift the tide— will be up to the wisdom of all parties involved.
At this rate, it’s anyone’s guess how this all ends.
Photo credit: Alex Wong / Getty Images
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TAIWAN WEEKENDER ONE YEAR ISSUE Finance
SILICON
SHIELD
CONUNDRUM
Can Taiwan maintain its semiconductor
superiority amid a bifurcating world order? by Eric Yui
TAIWAN WEEKENDER ONE YEAR ISSUE Silicon Shield Conundrum
T
he supply shock of the Covid-19 pandemic led the world to an epiphany: that Taiwan’s dominant semiconductor industry had become an indispensable component in which today’s techreliant economies simply could not thrive without. It’s a blessing many have come to call the island’s “silicon shield,” a guardian angel that ensures protection from Western powers fearful of losing this key for prosperity.
Yet this very epiphany is also slowly becoming Taiwan’s curse. As both Washington and Beijing seek to economically and technologically decouple from one another amid the dawn of a new Cold War, a new wave of economic protectionism has begun to take hold, led by the paranoia of needing to achieve selfsuffieciency.
Since day-one of the Biden administration, Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo warned about the dangers to the U.S. posed by the Asian monopoly on semiconductors.
Jemal Countess / Bloomberg
This August, Washington took action with the passage of the CHIPS act in Congress, which is set to allocate $52 billion worth of subsidies to firms in the semiconductor industry, including foreign companies manufacturing in the United States, in an effort to close the gap towards Asian chip powerhouses such as Taiwan.
While the U.S. holds a plurality of the world’s
semiconductor market share at 47% (as of 2020), it’s nevertheless a step back when compared to the peak years of the late 90s to early 2000s, when America held over 50% of the industry’s market.
More importantly, the foundry portion of the market has been increasingly dominated by Taiwan, which in 2021 had a 63% share (54% of it held by TSMC), with America’s biggest representation, Global Foundries, at a meager 7% .
In terms of cutting edge manufacturing, Intel firmly led the industry with its 22nm process in 2011, but by 2016, both Samsung and TSMC took the lead as they began production of 10nm nodes, whereas Intel would be stuck at 14nm until post-2019.
By this year, both Samsung and TSMC are already looking to begin production of the 3 nm process. Having been left in the dust, Intel’s Paul Gelsinger began frantically looking for ways to respond, chief among them actively seeking for more subsidies from the federal government, hence the CHIPS act.
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Apple Daily
TAIWAN WEEKENDER ONE YEAR ISSUE Finance
Washington also began incentivizing (or pressuring, depending how you look at it) the biggest players to set up shop within the United States, with TSMC pledging a $12 billion plant in Arizona and Samsung a $17 billion fab in Texas.
Beyond just securing high-end chips production within its borders, the U.S. sees all this as a necessary countermeasure to China’s rising chipmaking capabilities.
Yet moving its advanced manufacturing process stateside is also the polar opposite of costeffectiveness, as TSMC founder Morris Chang has repeatedly pointed out, while further transfer of production for even smaller processes could erode the effectiveness of the “silicon shield.”
Reports that American military simulations suggested evacuating key TSMC personnel and destroying the fabs in the event of a Chinese invasion doesn’t help shore up confidence either.
Moreover, although the Chinese market accounts for just 10% of TSMC’s revenue, the company still maintains a sizeable presence on the Mainland, having poured nearly $3 billion to expand its 28nm fab in Nanjing in 2021 with the aim of increasing production to 40,000 wafers a month by mid-2023.
Taiwanese chip companies across the board also made up 36% of the $430 billion worth of semiconductors imported by China last year, highlighting how crucial the market remains to Taiwan despite political tensions across the Strait.
Saul Loeb / AFP While Beijing indeed lags far behind the top dogs for the most advanced chips, it is quickly catching up in the mass production portion of the industry (chips above 14nm), with 31 fabs planned to be built between 2022 and 2024.
Chinese orders for chip making equipment rose 58% in 2021, marking its second consecutive year as the largest market for that industry, meaning that Beijing is seriously aiming to solidify its domestic production capabilities to lessen the amount of leverage at Washington’s disposal (à la Huawei) and meet its “Made in China 2025” plan.
There’s little doubt that Taipei and TSMC will end up having to tow the Washington- line regardless, with the geopolitical stage becoming ever more volatile and America’s security guarantee growing more vital, so Taiwan must actively seek ways to maintain its strategic advantage.
Whether it’s investing in research of new materials for future semiconductor processes, such as pyrite or gallium nitride, or expanding Taiwan’s command in key future industries like quantum computing and AI, it’s time the island began fortifying its next shield.
It explains why policymakers in D.C. are also planning a new strategic “Chip 4 Alliance” that would bring together all the key players into its fold, namely Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea, and the why the Commerce Department recently announced a new set of drastic bans on chip exports, all aimed at decimating Beijing’s chipmaking ambitions.
This all leaves Taiwan in a rather awkward spot. On one hand, it’s an opportunity for unprecedented technological cooperation and integration with Washington that further highlights the island’s strategic importance at a time when Beijing is ramping up its threats and rhetoric.
Photo credit: Shutterstock 34
TAIWAN WEEKENDER ONE YEAR ISSUE Domestic Politics
What can a Taiwanese Independent Lawmaker Contribute to the World? by Hiro Fu
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TAIWAN WEEKENDER ONE YEAR ISSUE What can a Taiwanese Independent Lawmaker Contribute to the World?
SANTA CLARA, Calif. – In a small private gathering of Taiwanese community members in Northern California on June 28, Taiwan’s independent lawmaker Freddy Lim took the stage with the swagger of a rockstar. Of course, that’s how many came to know “Freddy,” the internationally-famous death metal rockstar turned politician.
Microphone in one hand, the 46-year-old lawmaker spoke passionately and exclusively in the Taiwanese Hokkien language, easily charming the crowd with anecdotes from his recent trip to the Copenhagen Democracy Summit and Washington D.C.
“I’m so happy to share with you, both old friends and new, all the things we have accomplished internationally, and I look forward to your questions,” said Lim, genuinely inviting the crowd to interact with him.
In the dimly lit restaurant, there was laughter, intense nods of approval, waves of applause, but surprisingly no cameras. In fact, Lim’s Califronian leg of his trip flew largely under the radar of major media outlets.
Unlike recent U.S. visits from prominent Taiwanese figures belonging to major political parties– Vice President Willaim Lai in January and KMT Chairman Eric Chu in June– independent lawmakers such as Lim visibly lacked the platform and weight of a party.
Yet Lim does not see his position as an inconvenience. Rather, being an independent lawmaker has given Lim an edge in determining his own policy direction, unburdened by party politics, and the chance to be more outspoken when it comes to opposing Chinese aggression and promoting Taiwan.
Recalling an anecdote from his time in Europe among other Taiwanese lawmakers, Lim said he found it refreshing to be able to call out China’s actions in front of an international audience when even his proindependence colleagues gave pause.
“From the perspective of Taiwan’s ruling party (DPP), its representatives must maintain a balance between their administrative duties and their ideals,” said Lim, “but as an independent lawmaker, I can at least voice our vision– to communicate this vision with our international friends."
The vision that Lim refers to is ultimately the normalization of Taiwan’s status as an internationally recognized state. Lim believes that this is a vision he shares with the DPP, but members of the ruling party may have to abide by a more moderate party line. Therefore, he sees it as his obligation to speak out for Taiwan.
To realize this vision, Lim believes that increased Taiwanese inclusion, U.S.-Taiwan relations, and human rights advancement are all pieces to the same puzzle. By bringing Taiwan’s experiences on fighting against Chinese human rights abuses– through the help of allies such as the U.S.– to the international stage, liberal democracy across the world can be further advanced.
“From Copenhagen to Washington, everyone has been interested in China’s neo-authoritarianism and undermining of democratic countries,” Lim said. He observes that what was once a cross-strait issue is no longer just a national security problem for Taiwan, but an issue of geopolitical stability and international significance.
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TAIWAN WEEKENDER ONE YEAR ISSUE What can a Taiwanese Independent Lawmaker Contribute to the World?
Of the allies that Taiwan has reached out to, Lim believes that advancining U.S.-Taiwan relations through democratic values they hold in common is especially vital.
Lim and DPP lawmaker Hung Sun-han joined legislators from 28 countries along with U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi at the eighth World Parliamentarians’ Conventions on Tibet. The event took place on Capitol Hill, where Lim also visited the offices of multiple members of Congress.
It was there that Lim invited the House Speaker to Taiwan, which was an offer Pelosi accepted two months later, when her Taiwan visit redefined the status quo of the U.S.-China-Taiwan relations.
During the media frenzy that first followed rumors of the Pelosi visit, the Tsai Ing-wen administration remained largely silent until the House Speaker touched down in Taipei, which was then welcomed with great fanfare.
This paralleled Lim’s observations on limitations of what the administration can freely express, which is contrasted by Lim’s statement, “Taiwan is a democratic country. We have the right to welcome any friend who supports us.”
Lim sees U.S.-Taiwan relations only as a beginning. Through Taiwan’s contributions on human rights, he hopes to seek out more like-minded partners who will in turn see Taiwan as an inalienable member of the liberal world order.
As a lawmaker back home, Lim has been active in Taiwan’s Foreign and National Defense Committee and the Parliamentary Human Rights Commission, proposing stronger support for Hong Kongers, Tibetans and Uighurs against Chinese oppression.
He has also continued his work in international outreach despite being an independent, such as representing Taiwan at the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China.
Lim says that the focus of the two years left in his term will be on a Taiwanese version of the Global Magnitsky Act, as well as other human rights assistance to the people of Hong Kong, Tibet, and Xinjiang.
Through legislation, and increasing the awareness of human rights issues domestically, Lim hopes to further connect Taiwan with like-minded democracies in the global human rights movement.
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TAIWAN WEEKENDER ONE YEAR ISSUE Domestic Politics
Rebranding the KMT in Turbulent Times Has the Kuomintang abandoned its pro-China label and proven itself as “consistently” pro-American? A version of this article was published on The Diplomat.
by Hiro Fu
Photo credit: Ann Wang / Reuters
TAIWAN WEEKENDER ONE YEAR ISSUE Rebranding the KMT in Turbulent Times
“We are here. We are back,”
said Eric Chu, the chairman of the opposition Kuomintang (KMT) in a speech given to the U.S.-based party members during a banquet in northern California in June 2022.
“The KMT’s pro-American stance has never changed since the founding of the party. The KMT is not only friendly with the U.S. but is more capable of communication and coordination on cross-strait relations to avoid war,” Chu said.
While the century-old KMT had long been criticized as a party stuck in the past, the chairman’s 12-day trip to the U.S. in June signaled a possible shift in the party’s discourse and outlook. Two months later, the KMT finds itself circling back to the precarious position of teetering on the tightrope between China and the U.S. once again, with a different trip to Xiamen, China.
The main purpose of Chu’s U.S. trip in June was to attend the plaque unveiling ceremony at the KMT’s reopened liaison office in Washington, which in itself was already a symbolic expression of U.S.-friendliness. Critics across the aisle called the trip one of “amending” the party’s soured relations with the U.S. after years of pushing an anti-American line.
The KMT’s role in backing a 2021 referendum against ractopamine pork imports, largely from the U.S., has often been cited as clear evidence of the party’s distrust of the country. Coupled with the KMT’s many instances of close association with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the pro-China and anti-America label has stuck.
In response to the criticism, Chu pointed fingers back at the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), rebuking the party’s “yearslong smear campaign” against the KMT in Washington, D.C. The KMT shut down its Washington office in 2008 when it re-took the presidency; the DPP, meanwhile, opened its own office in the U.S. capital in 2013.
According to KMT Vice Chairman Andrew Hsia, who was part of the delegation, Chu’s mission includes demonstrating commitment to U.S. ties and dispelling lies that “the party is anti-American” by stepping up communication with U.S. politicians, local media, and think tanks.
Regardless of what the party claims, the pro-Chinese and anti-American label has been one that the KMT has struggled to shake. This was most evident in 2020, when President Tsai Ing-wen’s landslide reelection was interpreted as the Taiwanese taking a stand against pressure from Beijing.
Using the media and official platforms provided to him as the opposition party chairman, Chu repeatedly stressed in the U.S. that the KMT has been consistently prodemocracy, pro-America, and pro-stability.
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“We are a pro-U.S. party – forever.” Chu said in his speech at the Brookings Institution on June 6, “we are not the socalled anti-U.S. party. That is totally wrong.”
Chu began his speech by describing the many changes in the international environment during what he calls “turbulent times.” From the rise of populism and Brexit, the China-U.S. trade war under the Trump administration, to the more recent COVID-19 pandemic and Russian invasion of Ukraine, what has not changed, as Chu claims, is the KMT’s pro-U.S. stance.
According to the chairman’s speech, the KMT has not only been pro-U.S. and supportive of democracy and peace, but has been deeply misunderstood after being mischaracterized by the media and other political players.
Of course, the narrative pitched by Chu runs contrary to the many instances in which the KMT has acted inconsistently with the values of its founder. Most notably missing from Chu’s cherry-picked history lesson on the party is 30 years of martial law under the KMT regime in Taiwan during the White Terror.
Similarly swept under the rug are the KMT’s party members who closely associate themselves with the CCP and support the cause of “reunification.” Former KMT chair Hung Hsiu-chu had just visited Xinjiang and praised
China’s “anti-terrorism” efforts in the region in May.
TAIWAN WEEKENDER ONE YEAR ISSUE Domestic Politics The party leadership could attempt to dismiss its proChinese members as mere outliers, but the reverse could as easily be true – pro-American members may be in the minority. Despite Chu’s attempt to set the record straight, his grasp on the party can be tenuous at times, which is only further complicated by his hopes to maintain communication and coordination with China.
The single, consistent narrative the KMT put forward was quickly put to the test only two months later, after U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s Taiwan visit.
the public that plans to meet with Chinese officials would be revealed beforehand– the same night, the KMT announced that Hsia would be meeting with a Chinese official.
Hsia met with Zhang Zhijun, head of China’s Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits, and Chen Yuanfeng, deputy head of China's Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO). Hsia later reported to the public that he expressed Taiwan’s concerns over Beijing's military drills and that such actions contradicted peaceful cross-strait development.
On August 2, Pelosi landed in Taiwan, becoming the highest-ranking U.S. official to visit since former House Speaker Newt Gingrich in 1997. The high-profile visit, though anticipated, signaled a major development for U.S.-Taiwan relations but also meant a necessary disruption to the cross-strait status quo.
While the ruling party and the MAC continued to pan the trip as one that harmed Taiwanese interests, Chu came to the Vice Chairman’s defense, saying that the KMT “going (to China) even when being criticized demonstrated a true love for Taiwan.” Former President Ma Ying-jeou similarly commended Hsia’s visit for actively preventing war via cross-strait communication.
Though there was reportedly some pushback from KMT traditionalists, key party figures including Chu joined other political parties in Taiwan to welcome the House Speaker’s two-day trip. Across the Taiwan Strait, Beijing announced an unprecedented series of live-fire drills a day after Pelosi’s departure.
At the height of what many worried to be the “Fourth Strait Crisis,” KMT Vice Chairman Andrew Hsia, who was also part of the June delegation in Washington, announced that he would be leading a “fact-finding” trip to China. He explained that the pre-arranged trip would focus on meeting with Taiwanese living in China.
Hsia’s controversial trip was not only met with disapproval from the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) and harsh criticism from across the aisle, but young politicians from within his party questioned the timing and sensitivity of the trip.
Though Hsia had claimed that the visit was aimed to enhance social interactions across the strait, he was ambiguous when asked about whether he planned to meet with Beijing’s representatives. Chu also assured
On August 24, during a meeting of the KMT’s Central Standing Committee, Chu offered a more conservative approach in “pro-U.S., Japan-friendly, and peace with Mainland,” which aimed to somewhat rationalize the otherwise contradictory actions taken by the party. Chu has since maintained this narrative when speaking about the party’s efforts in developing cross-strait relations, balancing out an emphasis on China with what is perhaps sees as a multi-faceted approach.
However, this is far from the consistent pro-American narrative the KMT promised the world in Washington. As difficult as it was for the KMT to convince Taiwanese and Americans in June, the “turbulent times” Chu described then have only escalated.
The KMT’s rebranding efforts may still be underway, with the discourse evolving as the party attempts to find a footing in garnering the public’s support, appeasing traditionalists, and differentiating itself from the ruling party.
How the KMT hopes to balance these priorities that may seem often-times contradictory lies in solving the equally paradoxical narratives it has put forward. 40
Photo credit: Tseng Shiya / Unsplash
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The Taiwan Weekender would like to thank its subscribers for their continued support throughout the past year. This newsletter community has grown from small friend circles to reach readers worldwide.
The Taiwan Weekender would also like to acknowledge all the candidates featured in this publication for taking interviews during their campaign season. The inclusion of candidates from different political parties across the country offers readers different perspectives on Taiwanese politics.
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