5 Wittgenstein

awareness of the experience is primal to our knowledge of it and is somehow given to us before our understanding of it.

The snare that Travis tries to avoid is Idealism. In Idealism, objects of knowledge are dependent on the person perceiving them. The lamp, as an object I know, is completely dependent on there being a figure that can know the lamp as a lamp— it is dependent on me. Travis thinks the Myth of the Given is not a myth and cannot be avoided.

McDowell says Travis’s idea is impossible for it falls into the Myth of the Given— this is no surprise. Travis says McDowell’s idea is impossible, for it creates a representationalism picture of understanding that removes itself from the world—it is another form of idealism. The justification for their respective ideas comes from demolishing each other.

Wittgenstein proposed the following paraphrased idea. When learning to read, the letters first appear on the page as random squiggles punctuating the space of the page. Their meaning to the new reader is only a barrier to understanding. As the reader gains familiarity with the symbols and eventually words, their experience of the page transforms and infuses with new meaning. This is the role of concepts within understanding. The issue these two philosophers disagree on consists of where the meaning of the word is located. For McDowell the two experiences of the page are fundamentally different, the person who can’t read has a different experience of the page vs those who can. These experiences constitute different mental states and beings in the world. For Travis, the intake of squiggles on a page is the same in both cases—it is only after the reader has learned their meaning and taken in the squiggles that concepts are then applied. The perception of the page has not changed for either philosopher.

It is worth noting the difference between experience and perception. Experience does not equal perception. In both instances (before the ability to read vs after) the perception of the page has not changed in that the mechanical way in which the agent sees the page is the same. The light hits their eyes and transmits signals to the brain etc. The experience of the page changes in these two instances. Perception does not necessitate the use of concepts—and this is what Travis is getting at in a circuitous way. A person can perceive that which they do not have concepts for—such as body language before concepts of body language. A person can tell intent to harm

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