DIY Bio: The National Security Challenges of Citizen Science

in the bioeconomy have surpassed investments made by the United States. In 2019, private investors alone in China provided $14.4 billion for the Chinese bioeconomy compared to the United States total investment of $10.4 billion (Cumbers, 2020). In (BY) investing heavily in the bioeconomy, China has also acknowledged the importance of protecting biological data. Many of the recent Five-Year Plans have prioritized the strengthening of the country’s cybersecurity infrastructure. In the latest addition of the plan, strengthening cybersecurity was given the highest priority, further demonstrating China’s willingness to invest in not only the bioeconomy, but cybersecurity for the biological sciences. In 2014, China established the Cybersecurity Administration of China, which is dedicated to security and control of the Internet. Three years later, in 2017, the Cybersecurity Law was enacted, which requires personal information and other important data that is collected and/or generated in China to be stored within the country’s borders (KPMG, 2017). This law also requires that network operators agree to government-led security checks and that cyber equipment or cybersecurity products cannot be sold without security certificates (KPMG, 2017). In coordination with this law, the Chinese government has also created and enforced numerous regulations to prevent and punish the sharing of certain types of data. For example, in late 2018, the Ministry of Science and Technology began enforcing regulations that forbid the sharing of citizens’ genetic information, even for the purposes of collaborative research (Cyranoski, 2018). Data sharing was even further restricted in 2020, when the Cybersecurity Administration began requiring a national security review for the procurement of products or services. Part of the review examines the potential of leakage of important data. Most recently, following the use of CRISPR by a Chinese scientist to edit the genes of twins in order to make them resistant to HIV, China has begun drafting new regulations to strengthen cybersecurity for the biological sciences. The yet-to-be-implemented regulations set restrictions for gene editing in humans and enhance safety regulations around biotechnology (Cryanoski, 2019). Chinese investment in the bioeconomy and cybersecurity combined with the United States’ lack of investment, threatens to leave the United States trailing China in a centrally important element of biodefense.

DIY Bio: The National Security Challenges of Citizen Science

Do-it-yourself, or DIY, bio is a citizen science phenomenon that has increased in popularity throughout the world. It now exists on almost every continent, but it began as an official movement in Boston in 2008 (Landrain et al., 2013). Those who comprise the DIYbio world are interested in biological and life sciences research, but they often do not have formal training in scientific institutions. Instead, they are amateurs or “hobbyists” (Landrain et al., 2013). DIYbio is founded on the idea that science should be easy and accessible to individuals who are interested in it and that knowledge and equipment should be open source (Delgado, 2013). Today, there are more than 50 DIYbio spaces (labs) in the United States and more than 30,000 members of the American DIYbio community (Kolodziejczyk, 2017). Individuals across the spectrum from academia to private industry have noted the potential of DIYbio. There is a belief among some that DIYbio could help further biological innovation by having individuals who can think outside the traditional academic box. DIYbio is seen by many as a way to increase scientific innovation,

creativity, and science literacy among the general public. Additionally, there has been no shortage of money for startup incubators in the DIYbio realm (Labiotech.eu, 2018). This effort to remove the biological sciences from formal institutions and education is not popular with everyone, however.

There are concerns about the biosafety challenges that arise from the DIYbio community because they have “...little to no formal training in safety and ethics” (Kolodziejczyk, 2017). Low-cost equipment that is easy to obtain has helped those in the DIYbio community gain access to laboratory supplies that used to be reserved only for institutional labs (Delgado, 2013). That, combined with an increasing amount of open-source academic literature, has raised concerns among some that there is not sufficient regulation of the DIYbio community. Singapore and a few other countries have considered requiring biohackers and other members of the DIYbio community to go through ethics training and receive a license before they can participate in any DIYbio work. Despite these discussions, no policy action has yet been taken to regulate the community in Singapore or elsewhere in the world. In the United States, the FBI has taken the lead in engaging the DIYbio community to promote the safeguarding of science. Rather than developing a set of requirements and regulations (the FBI is not a regulatory body), the FBI has served to educate and raise awareness to empower the DIYbio community to be vigilant for potential misuse or exploitation of biological research and to develop partnerships to foster reporting to the FBI of any suspect activity (Tocchetti & Aguiton, 2015). Connecting the network of DIYbio with the FBI and building trust in that relationship allows the national security community to lessen the risk of DIYbio, though those that support DIYbio believe that the risks have been exaggerated. Understanding the community and addressing synthetic biology risks, whether in DIYbio or in formal institutions, is still an area in need of development (Gronvall, 2018).