Ratanlal & Dhirajlal’s Law of Crimes by Justice U.U. Lalit

125 YEARS’ OF READERSHIP

First Edition 1901

Second Edition 1903

Third Edition 1904

Fourth Edition 1907

Fifth Edition 1909

Sixth Edition 1911

Seventh Edition 1914

Eighth Edition 1917

Ninth Edition 1921

Tenth Edition 1926

Eleventh Edition 1928

Twelfth Edition 1930

Thirteenth Edition 1933

Fourteenth Edition 1936

Fifteenth Edition 1940

Sixteenth Edition 1943

Seventeenth Edition 1948

Eighteenth Edition 1953

Nineteenth Edition 1956

Twentieth Edition 1961

Twenty-first Edition 1966

Twenty-second Edition 1971

Twenty-third Edition 1987

Twenty-fourth Edition 1997

Twenty-fifth Edition 2002

Twenty-sixth Edition 2007

Twenty-seventh Edition 2013

Twenty-eighth Edition 2018

Twenty-ninth Edition 2023

Thirtieth Edition 2025*

*Until the Twenty-Ninth Edition, this book was based on the erstwhile Indian Penal Code, 1860. With the enactment of the New Criminal Laws which are effective from July 1, 2024, the Thirtieth Edition is now based on the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023.

Price : ` 14995 (For a set of Four Volumes)

Law stated in this book is updated till date Case Laws reported till 1st February, 2025

Thirtieth Edition : March 2025

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CHAPTER III

GENERAL EXCEPTIONS

14. Act done by a person bound, or by mistake of fact believing himself bound, by law 531

15. Act of Judge when acting judicially 537

16. Act done pursuant to judgment or order of Court 542

17. Act done by a person justified, or by mistake of fact believing himself justified, by law 544

18. Accident in doing a lawful act 564

19. Act likely to cause harm, but done without criminal intent, and to prevent other harm 569

20. Act of a child under seven years of age 584

21. Act of a child above seven and under twelve years of age of immature understanding 586

22. Act of a person of unsound mind 590

23. Act of a person incapable of judgment by reason of intoxication caused against his will 649

24. Offence requiring a particular intent or knowledge committed by one who is intoxicated 654

25. Act not intended and not known to be likely to cause death or grievous hurt, done by consent 661

26. Act not intended to cause death, done by consent in good faith for person’s benefit 667

27. Act done in good faith for benefit of child or person of unsound mind, by, or by consent of guardian 674

28. Consent known to be given under fear or misconception 679

29. Exclusion of acts which are offences independently of harm caused 686

30. Act done in good faith for benefit of a person without consent 688

31. Communication made in good faith 693

32. Act to which a person is compelled by threats 695

33. Act causing slight harm 701

Of Right of Private Defence

34. Things done in private defence 709

35. Right of private defence of body and of property 722

36. Right of private defence against act of a person of unsound mind, etc. 746

37. Acts against which there is no right of private defence 749

38. When right of private defence of body extends to causing death 780

39. When such right extends to causing any harm other than death 803

40. Commencement and continuance of right of private defence of body 805

41. When right of private defence of property extends to causing death 812

42. When such right extends to causing any harm other than death 820

43. Commencement and continuance of right of private defence of property 825

44. Right of private defence against deadly assault when there is risk of harm to innocent person 833

CHAPTER IV

OF ABETMENT, CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY AND ATTEMPT

Of Abetment

45. Abetment of a thing 842

46. Abettor 865

47. Abetment in India of offences outside India 876

48. Abetment outside India for offence in India 878

49. Punishment of abetment if act abetted is committed in consequence and where no express provision is made for its punishment 879

50. Punishment of abetment if person abetted does act with different intention from that of abettor 896

51. Liability of abettor when one act abetted and different act done 898

52. Abettor when liable to cumulative punishment for act abetted and for act done 905

53. Liability of abettor for an effect caused by act abetted different from that intended by abettor 908

54. Abettor present when offence is committed 911

55. Abetment of offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life 922

56. Abetment of offence punishable with imprisonment 926

57. Abetting commission of offence by public or by more than ten persons 931

58. Concealing design to commit offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life 937

59. Public servant concealing design to commit offence which it is his duty to prevent 941

60. Concealing design to commit offence punishable with imprisonment 946

Of Criminal Conspiracy

61. Criminal conspiracy 951

Of Attempt

62. Punishment for attempting to commit offences punishable with imprisonment for life or other imprisonment 1006

CHAPTER V OF OFFENCES AGAINST WOMAN AND CHILD

Of Sexual offences

63. Rape Vol. 2 S. 63

SECTION PAGE

64. Punishment for rape Vol. 2

65. Punishment for rape in certain cases Vol. 2

66. Punishment for causing death or resulting in persistent vegetative state of victim Vol. 2

67. Sexual intercourse by husband upon his wife during separation Vol. 2

68. Sexual intercourse by a person in authority Vol. 2

69. Sexual intercourse by employing deceitful means, etc. Vol. 2

70. Gang rape Vol. 2

71. Punishment for repeat offenders Vol. 2

72. Disclosure of identity of victim of certain offences, etc. Vol. 2

73. Printing or publishing any matter relating to Court proceedings without permission Vol. 2

Of criminal force and assault against woman

74. Assault or use of criminal force to woman with intent to outrage her modesty Vol. 2

75. Sexual harassment Vol. 2

76. Assault or use of criminal force to woman with intent to disrobe Vol. 2

77. Voyeurism Vol. 2

78. Stalking Vol. 2

79. Word, gesture or act intended to insult modesty of a woman Vol. 2

Of offences relating to marriage

80. Dowry death Vol. 2

81. Cohabitation caused by man deceitfully inducing belief of lawful marriage Vol. 2

82. Marrying again during lifetime of husband or wife Vol. 2

83. Marriage ceremony fraudulently gone through without lawful marriage Vol. 2

84. Enticing or taking away or detaining with criminal intent a married woman Vol. 2

85. Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty Vol. 2

SECTION PAGE

86. Cruelty defined Vol. 2

87. Kidnapping, abducting or inducing woman to compel her marriage, etc. Vol. 2

Of causing miscarriage, etc.

88. Causing miscarriage Vol. 2

89. Causing miscarriage without woman’s consent Vol. 2

90. Death caused by act done with intent to cause miscarriage Vol. 2

91. Act done with intent to prevent child being born alive or to cause to die after birth Vol. 2

92. Causing death of quick unborn child by act amounting to culpable homicide Vol. 2

Of offences against child

93. Exposure and abandonment of child under twelve years of age, by parent or person having care of it Vol. 2

94. Concealment of birth by secret disposal of dead body Vol. 2

95. Hiring, employing or engaging a child to commit an offence Vol. 2

96. Procuration of child Vol. 2

97. Kidnapping or abducting child under ten years of age with intent to steal from its person Vol. 2

98. Selling child for purposes of prostitution, etc. Vol. 2

99. Buying child for purposes of prostitution, etc. Vol. 2

CHAPTER VI

OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY

Of offences affecting life

100. Culpable homicide Vol. 2

101. Murder Vol. 2

102. Culpable homicide by causing death of person other than person whose death was intended Vol. 2

103. Punishment for murder Vol. 2

104. Punishment for murder by life-convict Vol. 2

105. Punishment for culpable homicide not amounting to murder Vol. 2

106. Causing death by negligence Vol. 2

107. Abetment of suicide of child or person of unsound mind Vol. 2

SECTION PAGE

108. Abetment of suicide Vol. 2

109. Attempt to murder Vol. 2

110. Attempt to commit culpable homicide Vol. 2

111. Organised crime Vol. 2

112. Petty organised crime Vol. 2

113. Terrorist act Vol. 2

Of hurt

114. Hurt Vol. 3

115. Voluntarily causing hurt Vol. 3

116. Grievous hurt Vol. 3

117. Voluntarily causing grievous hurt Vol. 3

118. Voluntarily causing hurt or grievous hurt by dangerous weapons or means Vol. 3

119. Voluntarily causing hurt or grievous hurt to extort property, or to constrain to an illegal act Vol. 3

120. Voluntarily causing hurt or grievous hurt to extort confession, or to compel restoration of property Vol. 3

121. Voluntarily causing hurt or grievous hurt to deter public servant from his duty Vol. 3

122. Voluntarily causing hurt or grievous hurt on provocation Vol. 3

123. Causing hurt by means of poison, etc., with intent to commit an offence Vol. 3

124. Voluntarily causing grievous hurt by use of acid, etc. Vol. 3

125. Act endangering life or personal safety of others Vol. 3

Of wrongful restraint and wrongful confinement

126. Wrongful restraint Vol. 3

127. Wrongful confinement Vol. 3

Of criminal force and assault

128. Force Vol. 3

129. Criminal force Vol. 3

130. Assault Vol. 3

131. Punishment for assault or criminal force otherwise than on grave provocation Vol. 3

SECTION

132. Assault or criminal force to deter public servant from discharge of his duty Vol. 3

133. Assault or criminal force with intent to dishonour person, otherwise than on grave provocation Vol. 3

134. Assault or criminal force in attempt to commit theft of property carried by a person Vol. 3

135. Assault or criminal force in attempt to wrongfully confine a person Vol. 3

136. Assault or criminal force on grave provocation Vol. 3

Of kidnapping, abduction, slavery and forced labour

137. Kidnapping Vol. 3

138. Abduction Vol. 3

139. Kidnapping or maiming a child for purposes of begging Vol. 3

140. Kidnapping or abducting in order to murder or for ransom, etc. Vol. 3

141. Importation of girl or boy from foreign country Vol. 3

142. Wrongfully concealing or keeping in confinement, kidnapped or abducted person Vol. 3

143. Trafficking of person Vol. 3

144. Exploitation of a trafficked person Vol. 3

145. Habitual dealing in slaves Vol. 3

146. Unlawful compulsory labour Vol. 3

CHAPTER VII

OF OFFENCES AGAINST THE STATE

147. Waging, or attempting to wage war, or abetting waging of war, against Government of India Vol. 3

148. Conspiracy to commit offences punishable by section 147 Vol. 3

149. Collecting arms, etc., with intention of waging war against Government of India Vol. 3

150. Concealing with intent to facilitate design to wage war Vol. 3

151. Assaulting President, Governor, etc., with intent to compel or restrain exercise of any lawful power Vol. 3

152. Act endangering sovereignty, unity and integrity of India Vol. 3

153. Waging war against Government of any foreign State at peace with Government of India Vol. 3

SECTION PAGE

154. Committing depredation on territories of foreign State at peace with Government of India Vol. 3

155. Receiving property taken by war or depredation mentioned in sections 153 and 154 Vol. 3

156. Public servant voluntarily allowing prisoner of State or war to escape Vol. 3

157. Public servant negligently suffering such prisoner to escape Vol. 3

158. Aiding escape of, rescuing or harbouring such prisoner Vol. 3

CHAPTER VIII

OF OFFENCES RELATING TO THE ARMY, NAVY AND AIR FORCE

159. Abetting mutiny, or attempting to seduce a soldier, sailor or airman from his duty Vol. 3

160. Abetment of mutiny, if mutiny is committed in consequence thereof Vol. 3

161. Abetment of assault by soldier, sailor or airman on his superior officer, when in execution of his office Vol. 3

162. Abetment of such assault, if assault committed Vol. 3

163. Abetment of desertion of soldier, sailor or airman Vol. 3

164. Harbouring deserter Vol. 3

165. Deserter concealed on board merchant vessel through negligence of master Vol. 3

166. Abetment of act of insubordination by soldier, sailor or airman Vol. 3

167. Persons subject to certain Acts Vol. 3

168. Wearing garb or carrying token used by soldier, sailor or airman Vol. 3

CHAPTER IX

OF OFFENCES RELATING TO ELECTIONS

169. Candidate, electoral right defined Vol. 3

170. Bribery Vol. 3

171. Undue influence at elections Vol. 3

172. Personation at elections Vol. 3

173. Punishment for bribery Vol. 3

174. Punishment for undue influence or personation at an election Vol. 3

SECTION PAGE

175. False statement in connection with an election Vol. 3

176. Illegal payments in connection with an election Vol. 3

177. Failure to keep election accounts Vol. 3

CHAPTER X

OF OFFENCES RELATING TO COIN, CURRENCY-NOTES, BANK-NOTES, AND GOVERNMENT STAMPS

178. Counterfeiting coin, Government stamps, currency-notes or bank-notes Vol. 3

179. Using as genuine, forged or counterfeit coin, Government stamp, currency-notes or bank-notes Vol. 3

180. Possession of forged or counterfeit coin, Government stamp, currency-notes or bank-notes Vol. 3

181. Making or possessing instruments or materials for forging or counterfeiting coin, Government stamp, currency-notes or bank-notes Vol. 3

182. Making or using documents resembling currency-notes or bank-notes Vol. 3

183. Effacing writing from substance bearing Government stamp, or removing from document a stamp used for it, with intent to cause loss to Government Vol. 3

184. Using Government stamp known to have been before used Vol. 3

185. Erasure of mark denoting that stamp has been used Vol. 3

186. Prohibition of fictitious stamps Vol. 3

187. Person employed in mint causing coin to be of different weight or composition from that fixed by law Vol. 3

188. Unlawfully taking coining instrument from mint Vol. 3

CHAPTER XI

OF OFFENCES AGAINST THE PUBLIC TRANQUILITY

189. Unlawful assembly Vol. 3

190. Every member of unlawful assembly guilty of offence committed in prosecution of common object Vol. 3

191. Rioting Vol. 3

192. Wantonly giving provocation with intent to cause riot-if rioting be committed; if not committed Vol. 3

193. Liability of owner, occupier, etc., of land on which an unlawful assembly or riot takes place Vol. 3

SECTION PAGE

194. Affray Vol. 3

195. Assaulting or obstructing public servant when suppressing riot, etc. Vol. 3

196. Promoting enmity between different groups on grounds of religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, etc., and doing acts prejudicial to maintenance of harmony Vol. 3

197. Imputations, assertions prejudicial to national integration Vol. 3

CHAPTER XII

OF OFFENCES BY OR RELATING TO PUBLIC SERVANTS

198. Public servant disobeying law, with intent to cause injury to any person Vol. 3

199. Public servant disobeying direction under law Vol. 3

200. Punishment for non-treatment of victim Vol. 3

201. Public servant framing an incorrect document with intent to cause injury Vol. 3

202. Public servant unlawfully engaging in trade Vol. 3

203. Public servant unlawfully buying or bidding for property Vol. 3

204. Personating a public servant Vol. 3

205. Wearing garb or carrying token used by public servant with fraudulent intent Vol. 3

CHAPTER XIII

OF CONTEMPTS OF THE LAWFUL AUTHORITY OF PUBLIC SERVANTS

206. Absconding to avoid service of summons or other proceeding Vol. 3

207. Preventing service of summons or other proceeding, or preventing publication thereof Vol. 3

208. Non-attendance in obedience to an order from public servant Vol. 3

209. Non-appearance in response to a proclamation under section 84 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 Vol. 3

210. Omission to produce document or electronic record to public servant by person legally bound to produce it Vol. 3

211. Omission to give notice or information to public servant by person legally bound to give it Vol. 3

SECTION PAGE

212. Furnishing false information Vol. 3

213. Refusing oath or affirmation when duly required by public servant to make it Vol. 3

214. Refusing to answer public servant authorised to question Vol. 3

215. Refusing to sign statement Vol. 3

216. False statement on oath or affirmation to public servant or person authorised to administer an oath or affirmation Vol. 3

217. False information, with intent to cause public servant to use his lawful power to injury of another person Vol. 3

218. Resistance to taking of property by lawful authority of a public servant Vol. 3

219. Obstructing sale of property offered for sale by authority of public servant Vol. 3

220. Illegal purchase or bid for property offered for sale by authority of public servant Vol. 3

221. Obstructing public servant in discharge of public functions Vol. 3

222. Omission to assist public servant when bound by law to give assistance Vol. 3

223. Disobedience to order duly promulgated by public servant Vol. 3

224. Threat of injury to public servant Vol. 3

225. Threat of injury to induce person to refrain from applying for protection to public servant Vol. 3

226. Attempt to commit suicide to compel or restrain exercise of lawful power Vol. 3

CHAPTER XIV OF FALSE EVIDENCE AND OFFENCES AGAINST PUBLIC JUSTICE

227. Giving false evidence Vol. 3

228. Fabricating false evidence Vol. 3

229. Punishment for false evidence Vol. 3

230. Giving or fabricating false evidence with intent to procure conviction of capital offence Vol. 3

231. Giving or fabricating false evidence with intent to procure conviction of offence punishable with imprisonment for life or imprisonment Vol. 3

232. Threatening any person to give false evidence Vol. 3

233. Using evidence known to be false Vol. 3

SECTION PAGE

234. Issuing or signing false certificate Vol. 3

235. Using as true a certificate known to be false Vol. 3

236. False statement made in declaration which is by law receivable as evidence Vol. 3

237. Using as true such declaration knowing it to be false Vol. 3

238. Causing disappearance of evidence of offence, or giving false information to screen offender Vol. 3

239. Intentional omission to give information of offence by person bound to inform Vol. 3

240. Giving false information respecting an offence committed Vol. 3

241. Destruction of document or electronic record to prevent its production as evidence Vol. 3

242. False personation for purpose of act or proceeding in suit or prosecution Vol. 3

243. Fraudulent removal or concealment of property to prevent its seizure as forfeited or in execution Vol. 3

244. Fraudulent claim to property to prevent its seizure as forfeited or in execution Vol. 3

245. Fraudulently suffering decree for sum not due Vol. 3

246. Dishonestly making false claim in Court Vol. 3

247. Fraudulently obtaining decree for sum not due Vol. 3

248. False charge of offence made with intent to injure Vol. 3

249. Harbouring offender Vol. 3

250. Taking gift, etc., to screen an offender from punishment Vol. 3

251. Offering gift or restoration of property in consideration of screening offender Vol. 3

252. Taking gift to help to recover stolen property, etc. Vol. 3

253. Harbouring offender who has escaped from custody or whose apprehension has been ordered Vol. 3

254. Penalty for harbouring robbers or dacoits Vol. 3

255. Public servant disobeying direction of law with intent to save person from punishment or property from forfeiture Vol. 3

256. Public servant framing incorrect record or writing with intent to save person from punishment or property from forfeiture Vol. 3

257. Public servant in judicial proceeding corruptly making report, etc., contrary to law Vol. 3

SECTION PAGE

258. Commitment for trial or confinement by person having authority who knows that he is acting contrary to law Vol. 3

259. Intentional omission to apprehend on part of public servant bound to apprehend Vol. 3

260. Intentional omission to apprehend on part of public servant bound to apprehend person under sentence or lawfully committed Vol. 3

261. Escape from confinement or custody negligently suffered by public servant Vol. 3

262. Resistance or obstruction by a person to his lawful apprehension Vol. 3

263. Resistance or obstruction to lawful apprehension of another person Vol. 3

264. Omission to apprehend, or sufferance of escape, on part of public servant, in cases not otherwise provided for Vol. 3

265. Resistance or obstruction to lawful apprehension or escape or rescue in cases not otherwise provided for Vol. 3

266. Violation of condition of remission of punishment Vol. 3

267. Intentional insult or interruption to public servant sitting in judicial proceeding Vol. 3

268. Personation of assessor Vol. 3

269. Failure by person released on bail bond or bond to appear in Court Vol. 3

CHAPTER XV

OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE PUBLIC HEALTH, SAFETY, CONVENIENCE, DECENCY AND MORALS

270. Public nuisance Vol. 4

271. Negligent act likely to spread infection of disease dangerous to life Vol. 4

272. Malignant act likely to spread infection of disease dangerous to life Vol. 4

273. Disobedience to quarantine rule Vol. 4

274. Adulteration of food or drink intended for sale Vol. 4

275. Sale of noxious food or drink Vol. 4

276. Adulteration of drugs Vol. 4

SECTION PAGE

277. Sale of adulterated drugs Vol. 4

278. Sale of drug as a different drug or preparation Vol. 4

279. Fouling water of public spring or reservoir Vol. 4

280. Making atmosphere noxious to health Vol. 4

281. Rash driving or riding on a public way Vol. 4

282. Rash navigation of vessel Vol. 4

283. Exhibition of false light, mark or buoy Vol. 4

284. Conveying person by water for hire in unsafe or overloaded vessel Vol. 4

285. Danger or obstruction in public way or line of navigation Vol. 4

286. Negligent conduct with respect to poisonous substance Vol. 4

287. Negligent conduct with respect to fire or combustible matter Vol. 4

288. Negligent conduct with respect to explosive substance Vol. 4

289. Negligent conduct with respect to machinery Vol. 4

290. Negligent conduct with respect to pulling down, repairing or constructing buildings, etc. Vol. 4

291. Negligent conduct with respect to animal Vol. 4

292. Punishment for public nuisance in cases not otherwise provided for Vol. 4

293. Continuance of nuisance after injunction to discontinue Vol. 4

294. Sale, etc., of obscene books, etc. Vol. 4

295. Sale, etc., of obscene objects to child Vol. 4

296. Obscene acts and songs Vol. 4

297. Keeping lottery office Vol. 4

CHAPTER XVI OF OFFENCES RELATING TO RELIGION

298. Injuring or defiling place of worship with intent to insult religion of any class Vol. 4

299. Deliberate and malicious acts, intended to outrage religious feelings of any class by insulting its religion or religious beliefs Vol. 4

300. Disturbing religious assembly Vol. 4

301. Trespassing on burial places, etc. Vol. 4

SECTION PAGE

302. Uttering words, etc., with deliberate intent to wound religious feelings of any person Vol. 4

CHAPTER XVII OF OFFENCES AGAINST PROPERTY Of theft

303. Theft Vol. 4

304. Snatching Vol. 4

305. Theft in a dwelling house, or means of transportation or place of worship, etc. Vol. 4

306. Theft by clerk or servant of property in possession of master Vol. 4

307. Theft after preparation made for causing death, hurt or restraint in order to committing of theft Vol. 4 Of extortion

308. Extortion Vol. 4 Of robbery and dacoity

309. Robbery Vol. 4

310. Dacoity Vol. 4

311. Robbery, or dacoity, with attempt to cause death or grievous hurt Vol. 4

312. Attempt to commit robbery or dacoity when armed with deadly weapon Vol. 4

313. Punishment for belonging to gang of robbers, etc. Vol. 4 Of criminal misappropriation of property

314. Dishonest misappropriation of property Vol. 4

315. Dishonest misappropriation of property possessed by deceased person at the time of his death Vol. 4 Of criminal breach of trust

316. Criminal breach of trust Vol. 4 Of receiving stolen property

317. Stolen property Vol. 4 S. 317

Of

cheating

318. Cheating Vol. 4

319. Cheating by personation Vol. 4

Of fraudulent deeds and dispositions of property

320. Dishonest or fraudulent removal or concealment of property to prevent distribution among creditors Vol. 4

321. Dishonestly or fraudulently preventing debt being available for creditors Vol. 4

322. Dishonest or fraudulent execution of deed of transfer containing false statement of consideration Vol. 4

323. Dishonest or fraudulent removal or concealment of property Vol. 4

Of

mischief

324. Mischief Vol. 4

325. Mischief by killing or maiming animal Vol. 4

326. Mischief by injury, inundation, fire or explosive substance, etc. Vol. 4

327. Mischief with intent to destroy or make unsafe a rail, aircraft, decked vessel or one of twenty tons burden Vol. 4

328. Punishment for intentionally running vessel aground or ashore with intent to commit theft, etc. Vol. 4

Of criminal trespass

329. Criminal trespass and house-trespass Vol. 4

330. House-trespass and house-breaking Vol. 4

331. Punishment for house-trespass or house-breaking Vol. 4

332. House-trespass in order to commit offence Vol. 4

333. House-trespass after preparation for hurt, assault or wrongful restraint Vol. 4

334. Dishonestly breaking open receptacle containing property Vol. 4

CHAPTER XVIII OF OFFENCES RELATING TO DOCUMENTS AND TO PROPERTY MARKS

335. Making a false document Vol. 4

336. Forgery Vol. 4

SECTION PAGE

337. Forgery of record of Court or of public register, etc. Vol. 4

338. Forgery of valuable security, will, etc. Vol. 4

339. Having possession of document described in section 337 or section 338, knowing it to be forged and intending to use it as genuine Vol. 4

340. Forged document or electronic record and using it as genuine Vol. 4

341. Making or possessing counterfeit seal, etc., with intent to commit forgery punishable under section 338 Vol. 4

342. Counterfeiting device or mark used for authenticating documents described in section 338, or possessing counterfeit marked material Vol. 4

343. Fraudulent cancellation, destruction, etc., of will, authority to adopt, or valuable security Vol. 4

344. Falsification of accounts Vol. 4 Of property marks

345. Property mark Vol. 4

346. Tampering with property mark with intent to cause injury Vol. 4

347. Counterfeiting a property mark Vol. 4

348. Making or possession of any instrument for counterfeiting a property mark Vol. 4

349. Selling goods marked with a counterfeit property mark Vol. 4

350 Making a false mark upon any receptacle containing goods Vol. 4

CHAPTER XIX

OF CRIMINAL INTIMIDATION, INSULT, ANNOYANCE, DEFAMATION, ETC.

351. Criminal intimidation Vol. 4

352. Intentional insult with intent to provoke breach of peace Vol. 4

353. Statements conducing to public mischief Vol. 4

354. Act caused by inducing person to believe that he will be rendered an object of Divine displeasure Vol. 4

355. Misconduct in public by a drunken person Vol. 4

Of defamation

356. Defamation Vol. 4

SECTION

Of breach of contract to attend on and supply wants of helpless person

357. Breach of contract to attend on and supply wants of helpless person Vol. 4

CHAPTER XX REPEAL AND SAVINGS

358. Repeal and savings Vol. 4

Statement of Objects and Reasons to Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 Vol. 4 Notes on Clauses Vol. 4

246th Report on Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 - Parliamentary Standing Committee on Home Affairs - Observations/ Recommendations - At a glance Vol. 4

Speech of Honourable Minister of Home Affairs and Minister of Cooperation (Shri Amit Shah) in Lok Sabha on 20-12-2023 Vol. 4

Appendix : Provisions of other Acts Referred to in Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 Vol. 4

Appendix : Statement of Objects & Reasons to Indian Penal Code, 1860 Vol. 4

SUBJECT INDEX TO VOLUME 1 i

S. 101

Murder.

BHARATIYA NYAYA SANHITA, 2023

101. Except in the cases hereinafter excepted, culpable homicide is murder,––

(

a) if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death; or

(

b) if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused; or

(

c) if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death; or

(

d) if the person committing the act by which the death is caused, knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death, or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and commits such act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid.

Illustrations

(

a) A shoots Z with the intention of killing him. Z dies in consequence. A commits murder.

(

b) A, knowing that Z is labouring under such a disease that a blow is likely to cause his death, strikes him with the intention of causing bodily injury. Z dies in consequence of the blow. A is guilty of murder, although the blow might not have been sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause the death of a person in a sound state of health. But if A, not knowing that Z is labouring under any disease, gives him such a blow as would not in the ordinary course of nature kill a person in a sound state of health, here A, although he may intend to cause bodily injury, is not guilty of murder, if he did not intend to cause death, or such bodily injury as in the ordinary course of nature would cause death.

(c) A intentionally gives Z a sword-cut or club-wound sufficient to cause the death of a man in the ordinary course of nature. Z dies in consequence. Here A is guilty of murder, although he may not have intended to cause Z’s death.

(d) A without any excuse fires a loaded cannon into a crowd of persons and kills one of them. A is guilty of murder, although he may not have had a premeditated design to kill any particular individual.

Exception 1. Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, whilst deprived of the power of self-control by grave and sudden provocation,

CH. VI : OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY S. 101

causes the death of the person who gave the provocation or causes the death of any other person by mistake or accident:

Provided that the provocation is not,––

(a) sought or voluntarily provoked by the offender as an excuse for killing or doing harm to any person;

(b) given by anything done in obedience to the law, or by a public servant in the lawful exercise of the powers of such public servant;

(

c) given by anything done in the lawful exercise of the right of private defence.

Explanation.—Whether the provocation was grave and sudden enough to prevent the offence from amounting to murder is a question of fact.

Illustrations

(

a) A, under the influence of passion excited by a provocation given by Z, intentionally kills Y, Z’s child. This is murder, in as much as the provocation was not given by the child, and the death of the child was not caused by accident or misfortune in doing an act caused by the provocation.

(

b) Y gives grave and sudden provocation to A. A, on this provocation, fires a pistol at Y, neither intending nor knowing himself to be likely to kill Z, who is near him, but out of sight. A kills Z. Here A has not committed murder, but merely culpable homicide.

(

c) A is lawfully arrested by Z, a bailiff. A is excited to sudden and violent passion by the arrest, and kills Z. This is murder, in as much as the provocation was given by a thing done by a public servant in the exercise of his powers.

(

d) A appears as a witness before Z, a Magistrate. Z says that he does not believe a word of A’s deposition, and that A has perjured himself. A is moved to sudden passion by these words, and kills Z. This is murder.

(

e) A attempts to pull Z’s nose. Z, in the exercise of the right of private defence, lays hold of A to prevent him from doing so. A is moved to sudden and violent passion in consequence, and kills Z. This is murder, in as much as the provocation was giving by a thing done in the exercise of the right of private defence.

(

f) Z strikes B. B is by this provocation excited to violent rage. A, a bystander, intending to take advantage of B’s rage, and to cause him to kill Z, puts a knife into B’s hand for that purpose. B kills Z with the knife. Here B may have committed only culpable homicide, but A is guilty of murder.

Exception 2.—Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender in the exercise in good faith of the right of private defence of person or property, exceeds the power given to him by law and causes the death of the person against whom he is exercising such right of defence without

S. 101 BHARATIYA NYAYA SANHITA, 2023 1550

premeditation, and without any intention of doing more harm than is necessary for the purpose of such defence.

Illustration

Z attempts to horsewhip A, not in such a manner as to cause grievous hurt to A. A draws out a pistol. Z persists in the assault. A believing in good faith that he can by no other means prevent himself from being horsewhipped, shoots Z dead. A has not committed murder, but only culpable homicide.

Exception 3. Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, being a public servant or aiding a public servant acting for the advancement of public justice, exceeds the powers given to him by law, and causes death by doing an act which he, in good faith, believes to be lawful and necessary for the due discharge of his duty as such public servant and without ill-will towards the person whose death is caused.

Exception 4. Culpable homicide is not murder if it is committed without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and without the offender’s having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner.

Explanation.—It is immaterial in such cases which party offers the provocation or commits the first assault.

Exception 5 Culpable homicide is not murder when the person whose death is caused, being above the age of eighteen years, suffers death or takes the risk of death with his own consent.

Illustration

A, by instigation, voluntarily causes Z, a child to commit suicide. Here, on account of Z’s youth, he was incapable of giving consent to his own death; A has therefore abetted murder.

OVERVIEW OF SECTION 101

COMPARATIVE STUDY OF PROVISIONS OF BNS & IPC

SECTION ANALYSIS AT A GLANCE

COMMENTS

General (see para 101.1)

Scope (see para 101.2)

Culpable homicide vis-à-vis murder (see para 101.3)

- Distinction explained (see para 101.3-1)

Whether ‘culpable homicide’ or not? (see para 101.4)

“Except in the cases hereinafter excepted” (see para 101.5)

‘Act by which death is caused is done with intention of causing death’ [Clause (a)] (see para 101.6)

- Illustrative cases (see para 101.6-1)

‘Act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause death of the person to whom the harm is caused’ [Clause (b)] (see para 101.7)

- Illustrative cases (see para 101.7-1)

‘With the intention of causing bodily injury...sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death’ (see para 101.8)

- ‘Intention of causing bodily injury to any person’ (see para 101.8-1)

- ‘Bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death’ (see para 101.8-2)

- Illustrative cases (see para 101.8-3)

‘If the person committing the act…is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability cause death, or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death’ (see para 101.9)

- ‘Without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death’ (see para 101.9-1)

- Illustrative cases (see para 101.9-2)

Exceptions holding culpable homicide not amounting to murder (see para 101.10)

Death of person giving grave and sudden provocation, or mistaken/ accidental death of any other person giving such provocation [Exception 1] (see para 101.11)

- ‘Provocation’ (see para 101.11-1)

- Grave provocation (see para 101.11-2)

- Sudden provocation (see para 101.11-3)

- Heat of passion (see para 101.11-4)

- Words and gestures (see para 101.11-5)

- ‘Whilst deprived of power of self-control’ (see para 101.11-6)

- Reasonable man—test of ‘grave and sudden provocation’ (see para 101.11-7)

- ‘Causes the death of the person who gave the provocation’ (see para 101.11-8)

- ‘Causes the death of any other person by mistake or accident’ (see para 101.11-9)

BHARATIYA NYAYA SANHITA, 2023

- Burden of proof (see para 101.11-10)

- Proviso (see para 101.11-11)

- Illustrative cases (see para 101.11-12)

Exceeding right of private defence [Exception 2] (see para 101.12)

- Burden of proof (see para 101.12-1)

- Right not available to aggressors (see para 101.12-2)

- Illustrative cases where right of private defence exceeded (see para 101.12-3)

- Illustrative cases where right of private defence held not exceeded or held not available (see para 101.12-4)

Public servant exceeding power [Exception 3] (see para 101.13)

- ‘Believes to be lawful and necessary’ (see para 101.13-1)

- ‘Without ill-will’ (see para 101.13-2)

- Quantum of force and violence used (see para 101.13-3)

- Orders of superiors (see para 101.13-4)

- Unlawful and illegal acts are not protected (see para 101.13-5)

- Killing under threat (see para 101.13-6)

- Illustrative cases (see para 101.13-7)

Death caused without pre-meditation in a sudden fight [Exception 4] (see para 101.14)

- Ingredients (see para 101.14-1)

- ‘Fight’ (see para 101.14-2)

- ‘Sudden fight’ (see para 101.14-3)

- Free fight (see para 101.14-4)

- ‘Sudden quarrel’ (see para 101.14-5)

- ‘Premeditation’ (see para 101.14-6)

- ‘Undue advantage’ (see para 101.14-7)

- ‘Cruel or unusual manner’ (see para 101.14-8)

- Who is provocator or assaulter is immaterial [Explanation] (see para 101.14-9)

- Illustrative cases (see para 101.14-10)

Exception 1 vis-à-vis Exception 4 (see para 101.15)

Death caused by consent [Exception 5] (see para 101.16)

- Statutory illustration (see para 101.16-1)

1553 CH. VI : OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY S. 101

- Valid consent, illustrations (see para 101.16-2)

- Invalid consent (see para 101.16-3)

- Non-applicability (see para 101.16-4)

COMPARATIVE STUDY OF PROVISIONS OF BNS & IPC

Corresponding provision

Section 101 of BNS corresponds to section 300 of IPC

Comparison of provisions of BNS and IPC

Section 101 of BNS

Section 300 of IPC Murder.

101. Except in the cases hereinafter excepted, culpable homicide is murder,––

(

a) if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death; or

(

b) if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused; or

(

c) if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death; or

(

d) if the person committing the act by which the death is caused, knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death, or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and commits such act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid.

Illustrations

(a) A shoots Z with the intention of killing him. Z dies in consequence. A commits murder.

Murder.

300. Except in the cases hereinafter excepted, culpable homicide is murder, if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or—

Secondly—If it is done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused, or—

Thirdly—If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or—

Fourthly—If the person committing the act knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and commits such act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid.

Illustrations

(a) A shoots Z with the intention of killing him. Z dies in consequence. A commits murder.

(b) A, knowing that Z is labouring under such a disease that a blow is likely to cause his death, strikes him with the intention of causing bodily injury. Z dies in consequence of the blow. A is guilty of murder, although the blow might

BHARATIYA NYAYA SANHITA, 2023

Section 101 of BNS

(

b) A, knowing that Z is labouring under such a disease that a blow is likely to cause his death, strikes him with the intention of causing bodily injury. Z dies in consequence of the blow. A is guilty of murder, although the blow might not have been sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause the death of a person in a sound state of health. But if A, not knowing that Z is labouring under any disease, gives him such a blow as would not in the ordinary course of nature kill a person in a sound state of health, here A, although he may intend to cause bodily injury, is not guilty of murder, if he did not intend to cause death, or such bodily injury as in the ordinary course of nature would cause death.

(c) A intentionally gives Z a sword-cut or club-wound sufficient to cause the death of a man in the ordinary course of nature. Z dies in consequence. Here A is guilty of murder, although he may not have intended to cause Z’s death.

(

d) A without any excuse fires a loaded cannon into a crowd of persons and kills one of them. A is guilty of murder, although he may not have had a premeditated design to kill any particular individual.

Exception 1 Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, whilst deprived of the power of self-control by grave and sudden provocation, causes the death of the person who gave the provocation or causes the death of any other person by mistake or accident:

Provided that the provocation is not,––

(a) sought or voluntarily provoked by the offender as an excuse for killing or doing harm to any person;

(b) given by anything done in obedience to the law, or by a public servant in the lawful exercise of the powers of such public servant;

Section 300 of IPC

not have been sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause the death of a person in a sound state of health. But if A, not knowing that Z is labouring under any disease, gives him such a blow as would not in the ordinary course of nature kill a person in a sound state of health. Here A, although he may intend to cause bodily injury, it not guilty of murder, if he did not intend to cause death, or such bodily injury as in the ordinary course of nature would cause death.

(c) A intentionally gives Z a sword-cut or club-wound sufficient to cause the death of a man in the ordinary course of nature. Z dies in consequence. Here, A is guilty of murder, although he may not have intended to cause Z’s death.

(d) A without any excuse fires a loaded cannot into a crowd of persons and kills one of them. A is guilty of murder, although he may not have had a premeditated design to kill any particular individual.

Exception 1.—When culpable homicide is not murder.— Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, whilst deprived of the power of self-control by grave and sudden provocation, causes the death of the person who gave the provocation or causes the death of any other person by mistake or accident.

The above exception is subject to the following provisos :—

First—That the provocation is not sought or voluntarily provoked by the offender as an excuse for killing or doing harm to any person.

Secondly—That the provocation is not given by anything done in obedience to the law, or by a public servant in the lawful exercise of the powers of such public servant.

Thirdly—That the provocation is not given by anything done in the lawful exercise of the right of private defence.

Section 101 of BNS

(c) given by anything done in the lawful exercise of the right of private defence.

Explanation.—Whether the provocation was grave and sudden enough to prevent the offence from amounting to murder is a question of fact.

Illustrations

(

a) A, under the influence of passion excited by a provocation given by Z, intentionally kills Y, Z’s child. This is murder, in as much as the provocation was not given by the child, and the death of the child was not caused by accident or misfortune in doing an act caused by the provocation.

(

b) Y gives grave and sudden provocation to A. A, on this provocation, fires a pistol at Y, neither intending nor knowing himself to be likely to kill Z, who is near him, but out of sight. A kills Z. Here A has not committed murder, but merely culpable homicide.

(c) A is lawfully arrested by Z, a bailiff. A is excited to sudden and violent passion by the arrest, and kills Z. This is murder, in as much as the provocation was given by a thing done by a public servant in the exercise of his powers.

(

d) A appears as a witness before Z, a Magistrate. Z says that he does not believe a word of A’s deposition, and that A has perjured himself. A is moved to sudden passion by these words, and kills Z. This is murder.

(

e) A attempts to pull Z’s nose. Z, in the exercise of the right of private defence, lays hold of A to prevent him from doing so. A is moved to sudden and violent passion in consequence, and kills Z. This is murder, in as much as the provocation was giving by a thing done in the exercise of the right of private defence.

Section 300 of IPC

Explanation.— Whether the provocation was grave and sudden enough to prevent the offence from amounting to murder is a question of fact.

Illustrations

(

a) A, under the influence of passion excited by a provocation given by Z, intentionally kills Y, Z’s child. This is murder, inasmuch as the provocation was not given by the child, and the death of the child was not caused by accident or misfortune in doing an act caused by the provocation.

(

b) Y gives grave and sudden provocation to A. A, on this provocation, fires a pistol at Y, neither intending nor knowing himself to be likely to kill Z, who is near him, but out of sight. A kills Z. Here A has not committed murder, but merely culpable homicide.

(

c) A is lawfully arrested by Z, a bailiff. A is excited to sudden and violent passion by the arrest, and kills Z. This is murder, inasmuch as the provocation was given by a thing done by a public servant in the exercise of his powers.

(

d) A appears as a witness before Z, a Magistrate. Z says that he does not believe a word of A’s deposition, and that A has perjured himself. A is moved to sudden passion by these words, and kills Z. This is murder.

(

e) A attempts to pull Z’s nose. Z, in the exercise of the right of private defence, lays hold of A to prevent him from doing so. A is moved to sudden and violent passion in consequence, and kills Z. This is murder, inasmuch as the provocation was given by a thing done in the exercise of the right of private defence.

(f) Z strikes B. B is by this provocation excited to violent rage. A, a bystander, intending to take advantage of B’s rage, and to cause him to kill Z, puts a knife into B’s hand for that purpose.

BHARATIYA NYAYA SANHITA, 2023

Section 101 of BNS

(f) Z strikes B. B is by this provocation excited to violent rage. A, a bystander, intending to take advantage of B’s rage, and to cause him to kill Z, puts a knife into B’s hand for that purpose. B kills Z with the knife. Here B may have committed only culpable homicide, but A is guilty of murder.

Exception 2.—Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender in the exercise in good faith of the right of private defence of person or property, exceeds the power given to him by law and causes the death of the person against whom he is exercising such right of defence without premeditation, and without any intention of doing more harm than is necessary for the purpose of such defence.

Illustration

Z attempts to horsewhip A, not in such a manner as to cause grievous hurt to A. A draws out a pistol. Z persists in the assault. A believing in good faith that he can by no other means prevent himself from being horsewhipped, shoots Z dead. A has not committed murder, but only culpable homicide.

Exception 3 Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, being a public servant or aiding a public servant acting for the advancement of public justice, exceeds the powers given to him by law, and causes death by doing an act which he, in good faith, believes to be lawful and necessary for the due discharge of his duty as such public servant and without ill-will towards the person whose death is caused.

Exception 4 Culpable homicide is not murder if it is committed without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and without the offender’s having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner.

Explanation.—It is immaterial in such cases which party offers the provocation or commits the first assault.

Section 300 of IPC

B kills Z with the knife. Here B may have committed only culpable homicide, but A is guilty of murder.

Exception 2.— Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, in the exercise in good faith of the right of private defence of person or property, exceeds the power given to him by law and causes the death of the person against whom he is exercising such right of defence without premeditation, and without any intention of doing more harm than is necessary for the purpose of such defence.

Illustration

Z attempts to horsewhip A, not in such a manner as to cause grievous hurt to A. A draws out a pistol. Z persists in the assault. A believing in good faith that he can by no other means prevent himself from being horsewhipped, shoots Z dead. A has not committed murder, but only culpable homicide.

Exception 3.— Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, being a public servant or aiding a public servant acting for the advancement of public justice, exceeds the powers given to him by law, and causes death by doing an act which he, in good faith, believes to be lawful and necessary for the due discharge of his duty as such public servant and without ill-will towards the person whose death is caused.

Exception 4.—Culpable homicide is not murder if it is committed without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and without the offenders having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner.

Explanation.— It is immaterial in such cases which party offers the provocation or commits the first assault.

Exception 5.— Culpable homicide is not murder when the person whose death is caused, being above the age of eighteen years, suffers death or takes the risk of death with his own consent.

Section 101 of BNS

Exception 5 Culpable homicide is not murder when the person whose death is caused, being above the age of eighteen years, suffers death or takes the risk of death with his own consent.

Illustration

A, by instigation, voluntarily causes Z, a child to commit suicide. Here, on account of Z’s youth, he was incapable of giving consent to his own death; A has therefore abetted murder.

Section 300 of IPC

Illustration

A, by instigation, voluntarily causes Z, a person under eighteen years of age, to commit suicide. Here, on account of Z’s youth, he was incapable of giving consent to his own death; A has therefore abetted murder.

SECTION ANALYSIS AT A GLANCE

Culpable homicide committed under any of the four specified circumstances is murder, unless the case falls in any of the five exceptions provided in section 101 (see para 101.5)

Murder

Culpable homicide is murder,––

(a) if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing Death [See Statutory illustration (a) below]; or (see para 101.6)

(b) if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused [See Statutory illustration (b) below]; or (see para 101.7)

(

c) if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death [See Statutory illustration (c) below]; or (see para 101.8)

(d) if the person committing the act by which the death is caused, knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death, or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and commits such act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid. [See Statutory illustration (d) below] (see para 101.9)

Statutory Illustrations of murder

(a) A shoots Z with the intention of killing him. Z dies in consequence. A commits murder.

(b) A, knowing that Z is labouring under such a disease that a blow is likely to cause his death, strikes him with the intention of causing bodily injury. Z dies in consequence of the blow. A is guilty of murder, although the blow might not have been sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause the death of a person in a sound state of health. But if A, not

S. 101

BHARATIYA NYAYA SANHITA, 2023 1558

knowing that Z is labouring under any disease, gives him such a blow as would not in the ordinary course of nature kill a person in a sound state of health, here A, although he may intend to cause bodily injury, is not guilty of murder, if he did not intend to cause death, or such bodily injury as in the ordinary course of nature would cause death.

(

c) A intentionally gives Z a sword-cut or club-wound sufficient to cause the death of a man in the ordinary course of nature. Z dies in consequence. Here A is guilty of murder, although he may not have intended to cause Z’s death.

(

d) A without any excuse fires a loaded cannon into a crowd of persons and kills one of them. A is guilty of murder, although he may not have had a premeditated design to kill any particular individual.

Statutory exceptions to definition of offence of murder

EXCEPTION 1 - ACT DONE UNDER GRAVE AND SUDDEN PROVOCATION WHICH DEPRIVES OFFENDER OF HIS POWER OF SELF-CONTROL—

Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, whilst deprived of the power of self-control by grave and sudden provocation, causes the death of the person who gave the provocation or causes the death of any other person by mistake or accident.

Whether the provocation was grave and sudden enough to prevent the offence from amounting to murder is a question of fact.

The provocation is not,––

(a) sought or voluntarily provoked by the offender as an excuse for killing or doing harm to any person;

(b) given by anything done in obedience to the law, or by a public servant in the lawful exercise of the powers of such public servant;

(c) given by anything done in the lawful exercise of the right of private defence. (see para 111.11)

Statutory illustrations to exception 1

(

a) A, under the influence of passion excited by a provocation given by Z, intentionally kills Y, Z’s child. This is murder, in as much as the provocation was not given by the child, and the death of the child was not caused by accident or misfortune in doing an act caused by the provocation.

(

b) Y gives grave and sudden provocation to A. A, on this provocation, fires a pistol at Y, neither intending nor knowing himself to be likely to kill Z, who is near him, but out of sight. A kills Z. Here A has not committed murder, but merely culpable homicide.

(

c) A is lawfully arrested by Z, a bailiff. A is excited to sudden and violent passion by the arrest, and kills Z. This is murder, in as much as the

1559 CH. VI : OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY S. 101

provocation was given by a thing done by a public servant in the exercise of his powers.

(

d) A appears as a witness before Z, a Magistrate. Z says that he does not believe a word of A’s deposition, and that A has perjured himself. A is moved to sudden passion by these words, and kills Z. This is murder.

(

e) A attempts to pull Z’s nose. Z, in the exercise of the right of private defence, lays hold of A to prevent him from doing so. A is moved to sudden and violent passion in consequence, and kills Z. This is murder, in as much as the provocation was giving by a thing done in the exercise of the right of private defence.

(

f) Z strikes B. B is by this provocation excited to violent rage. A, a bystander, intending to take advantage of B’s rage, and to cause him to kill Z, puts a knife into B’s hand for that purpose. B kills Z with the knife. Here B may have committed only culpable homicide, but A is guilty of murder.

EXCEPTION 2 - DEATH CAUSED BY OFFENDER EXERCISING RIGHT OF PRIVATE DEFENCE IN GOOD FAITH BUT EXCEEDING THE POWER GIVEN TO HIM BY LAW

Culpable homicide is not murder if— the offender in the exercise in good faith of the right of private defence of person or property, exceeds the power given to him by law and causes the death of the person against whom he is exercising such right of defence, without premeditation, and without any intention of doing more harm than is necessary for the purpose of such defence. (see para 101.12)

Statutory illustration to exception 2.

Z attempts to horsewhip A, not in such a manner as to cause grievous hurt to A. A draws out a pistol. Z persists in the assault. A believing in good faith that he can by no other means prevent himself from being horsewhipped, shoots Z dead. A has not committed murder, but only culpable homicide.

EXCEPTION 3 - PUBLIC SERVANT OR PERSON AIDING PUBLIC SERVANT EXCEEDS POWERS GIVEN TO HIM BY LAW AND CAUSES DEATH BY DOING AN ACT WHICH HE, IN GOOD FAITH, BELIEVES TO BE LAWFUL AND NECESSARY FOR THE DUE DISCHARGE OF HIS DUTY

Culpable homicide is not murder if— the offender, being a public servant or aiding a public servant acting for the advancement of public justice, exceeds the powers given to him by law, and causes death by doing an act which he, in good faith,

S. 101

BHARATIYA NYAYA SANHITA, 2023

1560

believes to be lawful and necessary for the due discharge of his duty as such public servant, and without ill-will towards the person whose death is caused. (see para 101.13)

EXCEPTION 4 - A COMMITTED WITHOUT PREMEDITATION IN A SUDDEN FIGHT IN THE HEAT OF PASSION UPON A SUDDEN QUARREL

Culpable homicide is not murder if it is committed without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and without the offender’s having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner.

It is immaterial in such cases which party offers the provocation or commits the first assault (see para 101.14).

EXCEPTION 5 - WHEN THE PERSON WHOSE DEATH IS CAUSED SUFFERS DEATH OR TAKES THE RISK OF DEATH WITH HIS OWN CONSENT.

Culpable homicide is not murder when the person whose death is caused, being above the age of eighteen years, suffers death or takes the risk of death with his own consent (see para 101.16).

Statutory illustration to exception 5.

A, by instigation, voluntarily causes Z, a person under eighteen years of age to commit suicide. Here, on account of Z’s youth, he was incapable of giving consent to his own death; A has therefore abetted murder.

COMMENTS

101.1 General

Section 299 defines the offence of culpable homicide. This section says when culpable homicide amounts to murder. In the Penal Code ‘culpable homicide’ is used as a generic term, and is exhaustively sub-divided into two species, namely, culpable homicide amounting to murder (section 300, clauses 1, 2, 3, 4) and culpable homicide not amounting to murder (section 299 and Exceptions to section 300). According to Sir Fitz-James Stephen, the definitions of ‘culpable homicide’ and ‘murder’ are the weakest parts of the Code as they are defined in terms closely resembling each other.

Cour132 states that:

“It will be observed that this section fastens the special requirements of murder upon the definition of culpable homicide. It then excepts from its comprehension five cases which it treats as culpable homicide. The simple course would probably have been to define “homicide” first and then to define both “culpable homicide” and “murder”. The result then would have been the same and the classification of the two offences would have obviated the circuit which renders the two offences by no means easy of comprehension.”

132. The Penal Law of India (1996), Vol. III, p. 2251.

101.2 Scope

Section 300 deals with murder. It does not define “murder”. Section 299 explains “culpable homicide”. This section sets out circumstances when culpable homicide amounts to murder and when it does not amount to murder. Murder is an aggravated form of culpable homicide.133 The existence of one of the four conditions turns culpable homicide into murder while the special exceptions reduce the offence of murder again to culpable homicide not amounting to murder.134

In Queen v. Sheikh Bezu, 135 Peacock, C.J., observed:

“It does not follow that a case of culpable homicide is murder, because it does not fall within any of the exceptions in section 300. To render culpable homicide murder, the case must come within the provision of clause 1, 2, 3, or 4 of section 300.”

An offence cannot amount to murder, unless it falls within the definition of culpable homicide; for this section merely points out the cases in which culpable homicide amounts to murder. But an offence may amount to culpable homicide and yet may not amount to murder.

Culpable homicide has been defined under section 299. Whoever causes death of someone by way of an act caused intentionally or with the knowledge that such act is likely to cause death can be said to have committed, the offence of culpable homicide punishable under section 302. The Apex Court in Jagriti Devi136 has held that expression “intent” and “knowledge” postulates the existence of a positive mental attitude of different degree. The ingredients of culpable homicide amounting to murder, therefore are: (i) causing death intentionally and (ii) causing bodily injury which is likely to cause death.137 In deciding the question whether culpable homicide amounts to murder, it will be erroneous to convict the accused of murder, simply because there is nothing to bring him under any of the exceptions reducing the offence to one not amounting to murder, and it is the duty of the Court to consider, in the first place, whether the element or elements which constitute the offence of murder, as defined in this section, exist.138

101.3 Culpable homicide vis-à-vis murder

Under the scheme of the Code, ‘culpable homicide’ is genus and ‘murder’ its specie. Every ‘murder’ is ‘culpable homicide’ but not vice versa. 139 Speaking generally, ‘culpable homicide’ sans ‘special characteristics of murder’ is ‘culpable homicide not amounting to murder’. For the purpose of fixing punishment,

133. Per Hidayatullah, J, in Anda AIR 1966 SC 148, 150: 1966 Cri LJ 171 (SC).

134. State v. Rayavarapu Punnayya AIR 1977 SC 45: 1977 Cri LJ 1 (SC): (1976) 4 SCC 382: 1976 SCC (Cri) 659; Behari AIR 1953 All 203: 1953 Cri LJ 565 (All).

135. (1867) 8 WR (Cr) 47: 51 Beng LR (Sup Vol) 753 (FB).

136. AIR 2009 SC 2869.

137. Rakesh Kumar 2018 Cr LJ 2319 (HP).

138. Pasput Gope v. Ram Bhajan Ojha (1897) 1 CWN 545; Attra (1891) PR No. 9 of 1891; Seikh Pyao (1883) PR No. 27 of 1883.

139. Veeran (2011) 11 SCC 367. See also Pappu (2009) 11 SCC 472; Daya Nand (2008) 15 SCC 717: 2008 Cri LJ 2975; Ram Pal Singh 2012 Cri LJ 3765 (3769) (SC).

2023

proportionate to the gravity of this generic offence, the Code recognises three degrees of culpable homicide:

Culpable homicide of the first degree—This is the gravest form of culpable homicide which is defined in section 300 of IPC as ‘murder’;

Culpable homicide of the second degree—This is lower or lesser form of homicide not amounting to murder as defined in section 299 of IPC. This is punishable under the first part of section 304 of IPC;

Culpable homicide of the third degree—This is the lowest type of culpable homicide. This is punishable under the second part of section 304 of IPC.140

The degree of probability of death determines whether a culpable homicide is of gravest, medium or the lowest degree.141 Thus, culpable homicide includes graver offence which amounts to ‘murder’ and lesser offence which doesn’t amount to murder. For the purpose of punishment, the court has to examine facts and find out whether the offence falls or doesn’t fall under the definition of murder.142

In the leading case of State v. Rayavarapu Punnayya, 143 speaking for the Supreme Court, Sarkaria, J., stated:

“It emerges (from the scheme) that whenever a court is confronted with the question whether the offence is “murder” or “culpable homicide not amounting to murder”, on the facts of a case, it will be convenient for it to approach the problem in three stages. The question to be considered at the first stage would be, whether the accused has done an act by doing which he has caused the death of another. Proof of such a causal connection between the act of the accused and the death leads to the second stage for considering whether that act of the accused amounts to “culpable homicide” as defined in section 299. If the answer to this question is prima facie found in the affirmative, the stage for considering the operation of section 300, Penal Code is reached. This is the stage at which the court should determine whether the facts proved by the prosecution brings the case within the ambit of any of the four clauses of the definition of “murder” contained in section 300. If the answer to this question is in the negative the offence would be “culpable homicide not amounting to murder”, punishable under the first or the second part of section 304, depending, respectively, on whether the second or the third clause of section 299 is applicable. If this question is found in the positive, but the case comes within any of the exceptions enumerated in section 300, the offence would

140. State v. Rayavarapu Punnayya AIR 1977 SC 45: 1977 Cri LJ 1 (SC): (1976) 4 SCC 382: 1976 SCC (Cri) 659. See also Kishore Singh AIR 1977 SC 2267: 1977 Cri LJ 1937 (SC): 1977 SCC (Cri) 656: (1977) 4 SCC 524; Morcha AIR 1979 SC 80: 1978 Cri LJ 1710 (SC): 1979 SCC (Cri) 241: (1979) 1 SCC 161; Abdul Waheed Khan (2002) 7 SCC 175; Ruli Ram (2002) 7 SCC 691: 2002 Cri LJ 4337 (SC): AIR 2002 SC 3360: (2002) 7 JT 267; Lallan Rai (2003) 1 SCC 268: AIR 2003 SC 333: 2003 Cri LJ 465 (SC): (2003) 1 Crimes 314 (SC): (2002) 9 JT 334; Balkar Singh 2009 Cri LJ 2980 (SC).

141. Laxminath AIR 2009 SC 1383 (1385).

142. Somling R. Patrigida 2012 Cri LJ (NOC) 189 (Bom) (DB): Cri A. No. 1321 of 2003, dated 18-8-2011.

143. AIR 1977 SC 45: 1977 Cri LJ 1 (SC): (1976) 4 SCC 382: 1976 SCC (Cri) 659.

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still be “culpable homicide not amounting to murder”, punishable under the first part of section 304, Penal Code.”144

The court, however, rightly added:

“The above are only broad guidelines and not cast-iron imperatives. In most cases, their observance will facilitate the task of the court. But sometimes the facts are so intertwined and the second and the third stages so telescoped into each other, that it may not be convenient to give a separate treatment to the matters involved in the second and third stages.”145

101.3-1 Distinction explained - The academic distinction between ‘murder’ and ‘culpable homicide not amounting to murder’ has vexed the courts for more than a century. The confusion is caused, if courts’ losing sight of the true scope and meaning of the terms used by the legislature in these sections, allow themselves to be drawn into minute subtractions. The safest way of approach to the interpretation and application of these provisions seems to be to keep in focus the keywords used in the various clauses of sections 299 and 300.146

The distinction between these two offences is very ably set forth in Reg v. Govinda. 147 In that case, the accused knocked his wife down, put one knee on her chest, and struck her two or three violent blows on her face with the closed fist, producing extravasation of blood on the brain and she died in consequence. The Court held that there being no intention to cause death, and the bodily injury not being sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the offence committed was not murder but culpable homicide.

The distinction between sections 299 (culpable homicide) and 300 (murder) can well be demonstrated with the help of the following chart148:

SECTION 299 (CULPABLE HOMICIDE)

A person commits culpable homicide, if the act by which the death is caused is done—

SECTION 300 (MURDER)

Subject to certain exceptions , culpable homicide is murder, if the act by which the death is caused is done—

INTENTION

(a) With the intention of causing death [Illustration (a)]

(1) With the intention of causing death [Illustration (a)]

144. State v. Rayavarapu Punnayya AIR 1977 SC 45, 51-52: 1977 Cri LJ 1 (SC): (1976) 4 SCC 382, 388-89: 1977 SCC (Cri) 659.

145. State v. Rayavarapu Punnayya AIR 1977 SC 45, 51-52: 1977 Cri LJ 1 (SC): (1976) 4 SCC 382: 1977 SCC (Cri) 659. See also Kishore Singh, supra.

146. State v. Rayavarapu Punnayya AIR 1977 SC 45, 49: 1977 Cri LJ 1 (SC): (1976) 4 SCC 382, 386: 1976 SCC (Cri) 659; Kaleguru Padma Rao (2007) 2 SC 551 (SC).

147. (1876) 1 Bom 342, 344-346.

148. Reg v. Govinda, supra. See also Settu (SC) (22-8-2006); Shankar Narayan Bhadolkar 2004 Cri LJ 1778 (SC): AIR 2004 SC 1966: (2004) 2 Crimes 498 (SC): (2004) 3 JT 211; State v. Rayavarapu Punnayya AIR 1977 SC 45: 1977 Cri LJ 1 (SC): (1976) 4 SCC 382: 1976 SCC (Cri) 659; Behari AIR 1953 All 203: 1953 Cri LJ 565 (All).

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(

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b) With the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death [Illustration (b)]

(2) With the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause death of the person to whom the harm is caused [Illustration (b)]

(3) With the intention of causing bodily injury to any person, and the bodily injury to any person, and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death [Illustration (c)]

KNOWLEDGE

(

c) With the knowledge that…the act is likely to cause death [Illustration (c)]

(4) With the knowledge that the act is so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause death, or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death [Illustration (d)]

From the above chart, it becomes clear that—

Clause (a) of section 299 corresponds to clause (1) of section 300 of IPC.

Clause (b) of section 299 corresponds to clauses (2) and (3) of section 300 of IPC.

Clause (c) of section 299 corresponds to clause (4) of section 300 of IPC.

The words italicised mark the differences between ‘culpable homicide’ and ‘murder’.

The position emerges as under:

“Except in the cases hereinafter excepted”.—Section 300 of IPC begins with these words. They mean that culpable homicide will not amount to murder if the case falls within any of the exceptions mentioned in the section.

Intention to cause death: Clause (a) of section 299 and clause (1) of section 300 of IPC.—Causing of death by doing an act with the intention of causing death is a culpable homicide amounting to murder, unless the case falls within any of the exceptions of section 300 of IPC. Illustration (a) to section 300 of IPC demonstrates this aspect.

Intention to cause bodily injury likely to cause death: Clause (b) of section 299 and clause (2) of section 300.—Culpable homicide falling under clause (b) of section 299 of IPC may amount to murder under clause (2) of section 300 of IPC if two additional requirements must be fulfilled, viz. (i) the offender knows of the likelihood of causing death; and (ii) such likelihood of causing death is to the person to whom the

harm is caused. “The distinguishing feature of the mens rea requisite under clause (2) is the knowledge possessed by the offender regarding the particular victim being in such a peculiar condition or the state of health that the internal harm caused to him is likely to be fatal, notwithstanding the fact that such harm would not in the ordinary course of nature be sufficient to cause death of a person in normal health or condition.”149

Illustration (b) of section 300 clarifies this position.

Intention to cause bodily injury likely to cause death: Clause (b) of section 299 and clause (3) of section 300.—The difference between clause (b) of section 299 and clause (3) of section 300 is one of degree of probability of death resulting from the intended bodily injury. It is the degree of probability of death which determines whether the culpable homicide is of the gravest, medium or the lowest degree. The word “likely” in clause (b) of section 299 conveys the sense of ‘probable’ as distinguished from a mere possibility. “The distinction is fine but real, and, if overlooked, may result in miscarriage of justice.”149 (Emphasis supplied). The words “bodily injury ..... sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death” mean that death will be the “most probable” result of the injury having regard to the ordinary course of nature. This position is illustrated by illustration (1) to section 300.

Clause (2) and clause (3) of section 300: Distinction.—A comparison of clauses (3) and (2) of section 300 indicates that whereas in clause (3), the person to whom the harm is caused is not spoken of at all, he is particularly mentioned in clause (2). The inference is irresistible that some peculiarity of the person harmed was intended by the Legislature to be within the knowledge of the accused in clause (2).150 (Emphasis supplied) Knowledge of probability of death: Clause (c) of section 299 and clause (4) of section 300.—Clause (c) of section 299 and clause (4) of section 300 both require knowledge of the probability of the act causing death. Clause (4) is not intended to apply to cases in which a person intends to inflict an injury likely to cause death because the section speaks of knowledge and not intention. Such knowledge, however, must be of a high degree of probability. The following factors are relevant under this clause: that the act is imminently dangerous; that in all probability it will cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death; and that the act is done without any excuse for incurring the risk.

149. State v. Rayavarapu Punnayya AIR 1977 SC 45 (49-50): 1977 Cri LJ 1 (SC): (1976) 4 SCC 382: 1976 SCC (Cri) 659.

150. Behari AIR 1953 All 203, 206: 1953 Cri LJ 565 (All).

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“Usually it [clause (4)] applies to cases in which there was no “intention of causing death or of causing any bodily injury.” (Emphasis supplied)151

In Govinda, 152 comparing sections 299 and 300, Melvill, J., stated:

“(a) and (1) show that where there is an intention to kill, the offence is always murder. (c) and (4) appear to me intended to apply (I do not say that they are necessarily limited) to cases in which there is no intention to cause death or bodily injury. Furious driving, firing at mark near a public road, would be cases of this description. Whether the offence is culpable homicide or murder depends upon the degree of risk to human life. If death is a likely result, it is culpable homicide, if it is the most probable result, it is murder.

The essence of (2) appears to me to be found in the words which I have underlined. The offence is murder, if the offender knows that the particular person injured is likely, either from peculiarity of constitution, or immature age, or other special circumstances to be killed by an injury which would not ordinarily cause death. The illustration given in the section is the following:—

‘A, knowing that Z is labouring under such a disease that a blow is likely to cause his death, strikes him with the intention of causing bodily injury. Z dies in consequence of the blow. A is guilty of murder, although the blow might not have been sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause the death of a person in a sound state of health.’

There remain to be considered (b) and (3), and it is on a comparison of these two clauses that the decision of doubtful cases . . . must generally depend. The offence is culpable homicide, if the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is likely to cause death; it is murder, if such injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The distinction is fine, but appreciable. It is much the same distinction as that between (c) and (4), already noticed. It is a question of degree of probability. Practically, I think, it will generally resolve itself into a consideration of the nature of the weapon used. A blow from the fist or a stick on vital part may be likely to cause death; a wound from a sword in a vital part is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.”

As regards (c), Peacock, C.J. observes in Gora Chand Gopee:153

“There are many cases falling within the words section 299 ‘or with the knowledge that he is likely by such act to cause death’ that do not fall within the 2nd, 3rd or 4th clause of section 300, such for instance as the offences described in sections 279, 280, 281, 282, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288 and 289, if the offender knows that his act or illegal omission is likely to cause death, and if in fact it does cause death. But, although he may know that the act of illegal omission is so dangerous that it is likely to cause death, it is not murder, even if death is caused thereby, unless the offender knows that it must in all probability cause death, or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or unless he intends thereby to cause death or such bodily injury as is described in clause 2 or 3 of section 300.

As an illustration, suppose a gentleman should drive a buggy in a rash and negligent manner, or furiously along a narrow crowded street. He might know that he was

151. Behari AIR 1953 All 203, 206: 1953 Cri LJ 565 (All).

152. (1876) 1 Bom 342, 344-46.

153. (1866) 5 WR (Cr) 45, 46: Beng LR (Sup Vol) 433, 451-452 (FB).

likely to kill some person, but he might not intend to kill any one. In such a case, if he should cause death, I apprehend he would be guilty of culpable homicide not amounting to murder, unless it should be found as a fact that he knew that his act was so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause death or such bodily injury, & c., as to bring the case within the 4th clause of section 300. In an ordinary case of furious driving, the facts would scarcely warrant such a finding . . . If a man should drive a buggy furiously, not merely along a crowded street, but intentionally into the midst of a crowd of persons, it would probably be found as a fact that he knew that his act was so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause death or such bodily injury, c., as in clause 4, section 300. From the fact of a man’s doing an act with the knowledge that he is likely to cause death, it may be presumed that he did it with the intention of causing death, if all the circumstances of the case justify such a presumption; but I should never presume an intention to cause death merely from the fact of furious driving in a crowded street in which the driver might know that his act would be likely to cause death. Presumption of intention must depend upon the facts of each particular case. Suppose a gentleman should cause death by furiously driving up to a Railway Station. Suppose it should be proved that he had business in a distant part of the country, say at the opposite terminus; that he was intending to go by a particular train; and that he could not arrive at his destination in time for his business by any other train; that at the time of the furious driving it wanted only two minutes to the time of the train’s starting; that the road was so crowded that he must have known that he was likely to run over some one, and to cause death. Would any one under the circumstances presume that his intention was to cause death? Would it not be more reasonable to presume that his intention was to save the train? If the Judge or jury should find that his intention was to save the train, but that he must have known that he was likely to cause death, he would be guilty of culpable homicide not amounting to murder, unless they should also find that the risk of causing of death was such that he must have known, and did know, that his act must in all probability cause death, & c., within the meaning of clause 4, section 300. If they should go further, and infer from the knowledge that he was likely to cause death, that he intended to cause death, he would be guilty of murder, and liable to capital punishment.”

Plowden, J., in Barkatulla, said:

“It may be useful here to point out that the Indian Penal Code contemplates that when an act is culpable homicide, whether amounting to murder, or not amounting to murder, by reason of the act being done with the knowledge described in clause 3 of section 299 (or with the knowledge described in clause 4 of section 300, which knowledge satisfies the definition of clause 3 of section 299), an intention to cause death or to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death must be present. When intention of either kind co-exists with the knowledge described, the knowledge merges in the intention, and a higher degree of guilt is imputable. That the degree of guilt is higher when a murderous intention exists (which intention seems to be deemed to import the specified knowledge), and is lower when the knowledge is unaccompanied by such intention, seems a necessary inference from the language of section 304 as to punishment.”154

154. (1887) PR No. 32 of 1887, p 65. See also the observations of the same learned Judge in Sheikh Pyao (1883) PR No. 27 of 1883.

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1568

The distinction lies between bodily injury likely to cause death and a bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The distinction is fine but real and if overlooked may result in miscarriage of justice. Only the intention of causing the bodily injury coupled with the offender’s knowledge of the likelihood of such injury causing the death of the particular victim is sufficient to bring the killing within the ambit of this clause. The difference between section 299 and clause (3) of section 300 is one of the degree of probability of death resulting from the intended bodily injury. The clause (4) of section 300 would be applicable where the knowledge of the offender as to the probability of death of a person or persons in general as distinguished from a particular person or persons, being caused from his imminently dangerous act approximates to a practical certainty, such knowledge on the part of the offender must be of the highest degree of probability, the act having been committed by the offender without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid.155

“Putting it shortly, all acts of killing done with the intention to kill, or to inflict bodily injury likely to cause death, or with the knowledge that death must be the most probable result, are prima facie murder, while those committed with the knowledge that death will be a likely result are culpable homicide not amounting to murder.”156

“The distinction between culpable homicide (section 299) and murder (section 300) has always to be carefully borne in mind while dealing with a charge under section 302. Under the category of unlawful homicides fall both cases of culpable homicide amounting to murder and those not amounting to murder. Culpable homicide is not murder when the case is brought within the five exceptions to section 300. But even though none of the said five exceptions are pleaded or prima facie established on the evidence on record, the prosecution must still be required under the law to bring the case under any of the four clauses of section 300, to sustain the charge of murder. If the prosecution fails to discharge this onus in establishing any one of the four clauses of section 300, namely, firstly to fourthly, the charge of murder would not be made out and the case may be one of culpable homicide not amounting to murder as described under section 299.”157 The distinction between the offences of culpable homicide and murder is the presence of special mens rea which consists of four mental attitudes in the presence of any of which the lesser offence becomes greater. These attitudes are stated in section 300 as distinguishing murder from culpable homicide not amounting to murder.158

155. Budhi Lal 2009 Cri LJ 360 (SC).

156. Per Straight, J, in Idu Beg (1881) 3 All 776, 778.

157. Kishore Singh AIR 1977 SC 2267: 1977 Cri LJ 1937 (SC): 1977 SCC (Cri) 656: (1977) 4 SCC 524.

158. Subhash Shamrao Pachunde (2006) 1 SCC 384.

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In Anbazhagan v. State Represented by the Inspector of Police AIR 2023 SC (Criminal) 1275 the court held that as under:

Distinction Between Intention and Knowledge under IPC

Intention:

Intention is the aim or xed purpose to achieve a speci c result. It goes beyond mere foresight and involves the desire to achieve a particular end through purposeful action.

Intention can only be inferred from the surrounding circumstances, such as the nature of the weapon, location of injuries, and the acts of the accused.

Knowledge:

Knowledge refers to the awareness that certain harmful consequences are likely to follow from an act.

While a person may foresee the consequences of an act, knowledge alone does not equate to intent. A person may act with knowledge but without intending the consequence.

Intention requires more than just knowledge; it involves a purposeful act to bring about a speci c outcome.

Relevance of Mens Rea (Mental Element):

Both intention and knowledge are forms of mens rea but differ in scope:

Intention involves a deliberate plan or desire to cause a result.

Knowledge involves awareness but may not include a desire to achieve the result.

Inference of Intention from Knowledge:

In certain cases, knowledge of probable consequences may give rise to a presumption of intent, particularly if the consequences are natural and foreseeable from the act.

Application to Offences like Culpable Homicide and Murder:

Culpable homicide under section 299 of IPC requires either intention or knowledge.

Murder under section 300 of IPC requires a higher degree of intent, distinguishing between:

Intended harm likely to cause death, and Knowledge that the act is likely to cause death without necessarily intending the consequence.

Conclusion

The framers of the IPC deliberately used intention and knowledge as separate terms, highlighting the qualitative difference between

BHARATIYA NYAYA SANHITA, 2023

them. Intention requires purposeful conduct to achieve a speci c end, while knowledge is merely awareness of likely consequences. Courts must carefully analyze facts and circumstances to determine whether the mental element in a given case constitutes intent or knowledge, affecting the classi cation of the offence.

The Court observed as under:

21. Intention, which is a state of mind, can never be precisely proved by direct evidence as a fact; it can only be deduced or inferred from other facts which are proved. The intention may be proved by res gestae, by acts or events previous or subsequent to the incident or occurrence, on admission. Intention of a person cannot be proved by direct evidence but is to be deduced from the facts and circumstances of a case. There are various relevant circumstances from which the intention can be gathered. Some relevant considerations are the following:—

The nature of the weapon used.

The place where the injuries were inflicted.

The nature of the injuries caused.

The opportunity available which the accused gets.

22. In the case of Smt. Mathri v. State of Punjab AIR 1964 SC 986, at page 990, Das Gupta, J has explained the concept of the word ‘intent’. The relevant observations are made by referring to the observations made by Batty J. in the decision Bhagwant v. Kedari, ILR 25 Bombay 202. They are as under:—

“The word “intent” by its etymology, seems to have metaphorical allusion to archery, and implies “aim” and thus connotes not a casual or merely possible result-foreseen perhaps as a not improbable incident, but not desired but rather connotes the one object for which the effort is made and thus has reference to what has been called the dominant motive, without which, the action would not have been taken.”

(Emphasis supplied)

23. In the case of Basdev v. State of Pepsu AIR 1956 SC 488, at page 490, the following observations have been made by Chadrasekhara Aiyar J.:—

“6. ...Of course, we have to distinguish between motive, intention and knowledge. Motive is something which prompts a man to form an intention and knowledge is an awareness of the consequences of the act. In many cases intention and knowledge merge into each other and mean the same thing more or less and intention can be presumed from knowledge. The demarcating line between knowledge and intention is no doubt thin but it is not difficult to perceive that they connote different things. Even in some English decisions, the three ideas are used interchangeably and this had led to a certain amount of confusion.”

(Emphasis supplied)

24. In para 9 of the judgment, at page 490, the observations made by Coleridge J. in Reg. v. Monkhouse (1849) 4 COX CC 55(C), have been referred to. They can be referred to, with advantage at this stage, as they are very illuminating:—

“The inquiry as to intent is far less simple than that as to whether an act has been committed, because you cannot look into a man’s mind to see what was

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passing there at any given time. What he intends can only be judged of by what he does or says, and if he says nothing, then his act alone must guide you to your decision. It is a general rule in criminal law, and one founded on common sense, that juries are to presume a man to do what is the natural consequence of his act. The consequence is sometimes so apparent as to leave no doubt of the intention. A man could not put a pistol which he knew to be loaded to another’s head, and fire it off, without intending to kill him; but even there the state of mind of the party is most material to be considered. For instance, if such an act were done by a born idiot, the intent to kill could not be inferred from the act. So if the defendant is proved to have been intoxicated, the question becomes a more subtle one; but it is of the same kind, namely; was he rendered by intoxication entirely incapable of forming the intent charged?”

(Emphasis supplied)

25. Bearing in mind the test suggested in the aforesaid decision and also bearing in mind that our legislature has used two different terminologies ‘intent’ and ‘knowledge’ and separate punishments are provided for an act committed with an intent to cause bodily injury which is likely to cause death and for an act committed with a knowledge that his act is likely to cause death without intent to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, it would be proper to hold that ‘intent’ and ‘knowledge’ cannot be equated with each other. They connote different things. Sometimes, if the consequence is so apparent, it may happen that from the knowledge, intent may be presumed. But it will not mean that ‘intent’ and ‘knowledge’ are the same. ‘Knowledge’ will be only one of the circumstances to be taken into consideration while determining or inferring the requisite intent.

26. In the case In re, Kudumula Mahanandi Reddi AIR 1960 AP 141, also the distinction between ‘knowledge’ and ‘intention’ is aptly explained. It is as under:— “Knowledge and intention must not be confused.

17. ...Every person is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his act until the contrary is proved. It is therefore necessary in order to arrive at a decision, as to an offender’s intention to inquire what the - natural and probable consequences of his acts would be. Once there is evidence that a deceased person, sustained injuries which were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the person who inflicted them could be presumed to have intended those natural and probable consequences. His offence would fall under the third head of section 300 of IPC.

18. ...A man’s intention has to be inferred from what he does. But there are cases in which death is caused and the intention which can safely be imputed to the offender is less grave. The degree of guilt depends upon intention and the intention to be inferred must be gathered from the facts proved. Sometimes an act is committed which would not in an ordinary case inflict injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, but which the - offender knows is likely to cause the death. Proof of such knowledge throws light upon his intention.

19. ...Under section 299 there need be no proof of knowledge, that the bodily injury intended was likely to cause death. Before deciding that a case of culpable homicide amounts to murder, there must be proof of intention sufficient to bring it under section 300. Where the injury deliberately inflicted is more

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than merely ‘likely to cause death’ but sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the higher degree of guilt is presumed.”

(Emphasis supplied)

It has been further observed therein as under:— “26. ...Where the evidence does not disclose that there was any intention, to cause death of the deceased but it was clear that the accused had the knowledge that their acts were likely to cause death the accused can be held guilty under the second part of section 304 of IPC. The contention that in order to bring the case under the second part of section 304 of IPC. It must be brought within one of the exceptions to section 300 of IPC is not acceptable.”

(Emphasis supplied)

27. Thus, while defining the offence of culpable homicide and murder, the framers of the IPC laid down that the requisite intention or knowledge must be imputed to the accused when he committed the act which caused the death in order to hold him guilty for the offence of culpable homicide or murder as the case may be. The framers of the IPC designedly used the two words ‘intention’ and ‘knowledge’, and it must be taken that the framers intended to draw a distinction between these two expressions. The knowledge of the consequences which may result in the doing of an act is not the same thing as the intention that such consequences should ensue. Except in cases where mens rea is not required in order to prove that a person had certain knowledge, he “must have been aware that certain specified harmful consequences would or could follow.” (Russell on Crime, Twelfth Edition, Volume 1 at page 40).

28. This awareness is termed as knowledge. But the knowledge that specified consequences would result or could result by doing an act is not the same thing as the intention that such consequences should ensue. If an act is done by a man with the knowledge that certain consequences may follow or will follow, it does not necessarily mean that he intended such consequences and acted with such intention. Intention requires something more than a mere foresight of the consequences. It requires a purposeful doing of a thing to achieve a particular end. This we may make it clear by referring to two passages from leading text-books on the subject. Kenny in his Outlines of Criminal Law, Seventeenth Edition at page 31 has observed:—

“To intend is to have in mind a fixed purpose to reach a desired objective; the noun ‘intention’ in the present connexion is used to denote the state of mind of a man who not only foresees but also desires the possible consequences of his conduct........ It will be noted that there cannot be intention unless there is also foresight, since a man must decide to his own satisfaction, and accordingly must foresee, that to which his express purpose is directed.... Again, a man cannot intend to do a thing unless he desires to do it.”

(Emphasis supplied)

29. Russell on Crime, Twelfth Edition, 1st Volume at page 41 has observed:—

“In the present analysis of the mental element in crime the word “intention” is used to denote the mental attitude of a man who has resolved to bring about a certain result if he can possibly do so. He shapes his line of conduct so as to achieve a particular end at which he aims....... Differing from intention, yet

CH. VI : OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY S. 101

closely resembling it, there are two other attitudes of mind, either of which is sufficient to attract legal sanctions for harm resulting from action taken in obedience to its stimulus, but both of which can be denoted by the word “recklessness”. In each of these the man adopts a line of conduct with the intention of thereby attaining an end which he does desire, but at the same time realises that this conduct may also produce another result which he does not desire. In this case he acts with full knowledge that he is taking the chance that this secondary result will follow. Here, again, if this secondary result is one forbidden by law, then he will be criminally responsible for it if it occurs. His precise mental attitude will be one of two kinds- (a) he wouldprefer that the harmful result should not occur, or (b) he is indifferent as to whether it does or does not occur.” (Emphasis supplied) Anbazhagan v. State Represented by the Inspector of Police. AIR 2023 SC (Cri) 1275

In N. Ramkumar v. State Rep. by Inspector of Police, AIR Online 2023 SC 703, the Court outlined the factors distinguishing murder under Section 302 IPC from culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 IPC. The Court emphasized that determining the presence or absence of intent and premeditation is key. A few guiding principles include:

Guilty intention vs. Guilty knowledge:

Murder under Section 302 requires speci c intent to kill or in ict injuries suf cient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. Section 304 Part II applies when the act is done with knowledge that death is likely to occur, but without intent to cause death.

Single Injury and Sudden Fight:

Even a single injury can result in a murder conviction if it was intended and suf cient to cause death (Clause 3 of Section 300 IPC).

However, sudden quarrels or acts committed in the heat of passion without premeditation may fall under Section 304 Part II.

The Court observed as under:

“In the case of Basdev v. State of Pepsu AIR 1956 SC 488 at page 490 the following observations have been made:

“Of course, we have to distinguish between motive, intention and knowledge. Motive is something which prompts a man to form an intention and knowledge is an awareness of the consequences of the act. In many cases intention and knowledge merge into each other and mean the same thing more or less and intention can be presumed from knowledge. The demarcating line between knowledge and intention is no doubt thin but it is not difficult to perceive that they connote different things. Even in some English decisions, the three ideas are used interchangeably and this has led to a certain amount of confusion.”

BHARATIYA NYAYA SANHITA, 2023

16. It requires to be borne in mind that the test suggested in the aforesaid decision and the fact that the legislature has used two different terminologies ‘intent’ and ‘knowledge’ and separate punishments are provided for an act committed with an intent to cause bodily injury which is likely to cause death and for an act committed with a knowledge that his act is likely to cause death without intent to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, it would be unsafe to treat ‘intent’ and ‘knowledge’ in equal terms. They are not different things. Knowledge would be one of the circumstances to be taken into consideration while determining or inferring the requisite intent. Where the evidence would not disclose that there was any intention to cause death of the deceased but it was clear that the accused had knowledge that his acts were likely to cause death, the accused can be held guilty under second part of section 304 of IPC. It is in this background that the expression used in Indian Penal Code namely “intention” and “knowledge” has to be seen as there being a thin line of distinction between these two expressions. The act to constitute murder, if in given facts and circumstances, would disclose that the ingredients of section 300 are not satisfied and such act is one of extreme recklessness, it would not attract the said section. In order to bring a case within Part 3 of section of 300 of IPC, it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury which in the ordinary course of nature was sufficient to cause death. In other words, that the injury found to be present was the injury that was intended to be inflicted. This Court in the case of Pulicherla Nagaraju @ Nagaraja Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh AIR 2006 SC 3010 has observed:

“Therefore, the court should proceed to decide the pivotal question of intention, with care and caution, as that will decide whether the case falls under section 302 or 304 Part I or 304 Part II. Many petty or insignificant matters - plucking of a fruit, straying of cattle, quarrel of children, utterance of a rude word or even an objectionable glance, may lead to altercations and group clashes culminating in deaths. Usual motives like revenge, greed, jealousy or suspicion may be totally absent in such cases. There may be no intention. There may be no premeditation. In fact, there may not even be criminality. At the other end of the spectrum, there may be cases of murder where the accused attempts to avoid the penalty for murder by attempting to put forth a case that there was no intention to cause death. It is for the courts to ensure that the cases of murder punishable under section 302, are not converted into offences punishable under section 304 Part I/II, or cases of culpable homicide not amounting to murder, are treated as murder punishable under section 302. The intention to cause death can be gathered generally from a combination of a few or several of the following, among other, circumstances: (i) nature of the weapon used; (ii) whether the weapon was carried by the accused or was picked up from the spot; (iii) whether the blow is aimed at a vital part of the body; (iv) the amount of force employed in causing injury; (v) whether the act was in the course of sudden quarrel or sudden fight or free for all fight; (vi) whether the incident occurs by chance or whether there was any premeditation; (vii) whether there was any prior enmity or whether the deceased was a stranger; (viii) whether there was any graveand sudden provocation, and if so, the cause for such provocation; (ix) whether it was in the heat of passion; (x) whether the person inflicting the injury has taken undue advantage or has acted in a cruel and unusual manner; (xi) whether the accused dealt a single blow or several blows. The

above list of circumstances is, of course, not exhaustive and there may be several other special circumstances with reference to individual cases which may throw light on the question of intention. Be that as it may.”

17. This Court in the case of Pratap Singh @ Pikki v. State of Uttarakhand (2019) 7 SCC 424 :(AIR 2019 SC 3419) had noticed that the deceased-victim had suffered total 11 injuries and had been convicted for offences under section 304 Part-II/ section 34 of IPC apart from other offences. It was noticed that some altercation took place and the groups entered into scuffle without any premeditation and convicted accused for the offence punishable under section 304 Part-II/section 34 of IPC. Taking into consideration that the appellants therein were young boys and had served sentence of more than three years and five months and there was no previous enmity, persuaded this Court that the quantum of sentence is excessive and accordingly sentenced them to the period already undergone for the offence under section 304 Part-II/section 34 of IPC by observing thus:

“27. We do find substance in what being submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant and in the first place, it is to be noted that the trial Court, while awarding sentence to the appellant has not made any analysis of the relevant facts as can be discerned from the judgment (pages 96-97 of the paper book) dated 12th January, 1998. Even the High Court has not considered the issue of quantum of sentence. From the factual position which emerge from the record, it is to be noticed that they were young boys having no previous enmity and were collectively sitting and watching Jagjit Singh night. On some comments made to the girls sitting in front of the deceased, some altercation took place and they entered into a scuffle and without any premeditation, the alleged unfortunate incident took place between two group of young boys and it is informed to this Court that the appellant has served the sentence of more than three years and five months. Taking into consideration in totality that the incident is of June 1995 and no other criminal antecedents has been brought to our notice, and taking overall view of the matter, we find force in the submission of the appellant that the quantum of sentence is excessive and deserves to be interfered by this Court.”

18. In the case of Deepak v. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in (2018) 8 SCC 228 : (AIR 2018 SC 3568) it came to be noticed by this Court that incident had taken place in the heat of the moment and the assault was by a single sword blow in the rib cage was without any premeditation and incident had occurred at the spur of the moment, and thus inferred there was no intention to kill and as such the offence was converted from section 302 of IPC to section 304 Part II of IPC and the appellant was ordered to be released forthwith by sentencing them to the period of conviction already undergone. It was held:

“7. On consideration of the entirety of the evidence, it can safely be concluded that the occurrence took place in the heat of the moment and the assault was made without premeditation on the spur of time. The fact that the appellant may have rushed to his house across the road and returned with a sword, is not sufficient to infer an intention to kill, both because of the genesis of the occurrence and the single assault by the appellant, coupled with the duration of the entire episode for 1½ to 2 minutes. Had there been any intention to do away with the life of the deceased, nothing prevented the appellant from making a second assault to ensure his death, rather than to have run away.

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RATANLAL & DHIRAJLAL'S LAW OF CRIMES

AUTHOR : Uday Umesh Lalit

PUBLISHER : Taxmann

DATE OF PUBLICATION : March 2025

EDITION : 30th Edition

ISBN NO : 9789364558068

NO. OF PAGES : 6388

BINDING TYPE : Hardbound

DESCRIPTION

For over 125 years, Ratanlal & Dhirajlal's Law of Crimes has been recognised as the authoritative commentary on India's penal legislation. Originating in 1901, this landmark publication has guided readers through the evolution of Indian criminal law. Now in its 30th Edition, the work marks a historical transition from the Indian Penal Code, 1860 ('IPC') to the newly enacted Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 ('BNS'). This Edition o ers a comprehensive and up-to-date analysis of the BNS, e ective from July 1, 2024, reﬂecting the converging inﬂuences of tradition, judicial precedent, legislative reforms, and contemporary socio-legal developments. This book is intended for the following audience:

• Judges & Judicial O cers

• Academicians & Researchers

• Policy Makers & Government Bodies

• Law Students & Competitive Exam Aspirants

• Other Stakeholders in Criminal Justice

The Present Publication is edited by Hon'ble Justice Uday Umesh Lalit, former Chief Justice of India; this work is imbued with judicial insights, complementing the scholarship for which Ratanlal & Dhirajlal's Law of Crimes has long been revered. Building on its rich heritage, the commentary harmonises historical perspectives with the modern principles embodied in the BNS. It includes the following noteworthy features:

• [A Century-old Legacy] Preserves the authority of prior editions while integrating the transformative BNS, 2023

• [Authorship by the Former Chief Justice] Delivers unparalleled judicial clarity, ensuring reliability in interpretation and application

• [Comparative Study] Places BNS and IPC provisions side-by-side, spotlighting legislative changes and repealed sections

• [Systematic Structure & Flow] Follows a consistent pattern: section text, overview, com parative analysis, highlights, detailed commentary, and o ence summary

• [Integrated Perspective] Cross-references Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, and other overlapping laws

• [Extensive Case Law & Judicial Pronouncements] Provides Supreme Court, High Court, and select foreign judgments, clarifying evolving legal principles

• [Summarised Classiﬁcation of O ences] Features detailed tables indicating punishment, cognisability, bailability, trial courts, and compoundability

• [Contemporary Relevance] Addresses newly codiﬁed o ences (cyber-crimes, organised crime, child-speciﬁc o ences), gender-neutral provisions, and reforms of colonial-era clauses

• [Trusted Scholarship & Legacy] Continues the excellence of prior editions, expanding its reliability to a restructured penal code

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Ratanlal & Dhirajlal’s Law of Crimes by Justice U.U. Lalit

Published on Mar 7, 2025

Taxmann

Ratanlal & Dhirajlal's Law of Crimes by Taxmann, authored by former Chief Justice of India, Hon'ble Justice Uday Umesh Lalit, heralds the historic shift from the Indian Penal Code, 1860, to the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, effective July 1, 2024. Building on over 125 years of authority, this edition offers comprehensive commentary, extensive case law, and side-by-side comparisons of repealed and newly introduced provisions. Each BNS section is reproduced, examined, and summarised, highlighting legislative intent and contemporary socio-legal developments. Catering to judges, lawyers, academics, policymakers, and students, this authoritative commentary ensures a holistic understanding of India's evolving penal framework.

Ratanlal & Dhirajlal’s Law of Crimes by Justice U.U. Lalit

125 YEARS’ OF READERSHIP

CONTENTS

CHAPTER III

GENERAL EXCEPTIONS

Of Right of Private Defence

CHAPTER VII

CHAPTER VIII

OF OFFENCES RELATING TO THE ARMY, NAVY AND AIR FORCE

CHAPTER IX

OF OFFENCES RELATING TO ELECTIONS

CHAPTER X

OF OFFENCES RELATING TO COIN, CURRENCY-NOTES, BANK-NOTES, AND GOVERNMENT STAMPS

CHAPTER XI

OF OFFENCES AGAINST THE PUBLIC TRANQUILITY

CHAPTER XII

OF OFFENCES BY OR RELATING TO PUBLIC SERVANTS

CHAPTER XIII

OF CONTEMPTS OF THE LAWFUL AUTHORITY OF PUBLIC SERVANTS

CHAPTER XVI OF OFFENCES RELATING TO RELIGION

Of

Of

CHAPTER XIX

OVERVIEW OF SECTION 101

BHARATIYA NYAYA SANHITA, 2023

COMPARATIVE STUDY OF PROVISIONS OF BNS & IPC

BHARATIYA NYAYA SANHITA, 2023

BHARATIYA NYAYA SANHITA, 2023

SECTION ANALYSIS AT A GLANCE

BHARATIYA NYAYA SANHITA, 2023 1558

BHARATIYA NYAYA SANHITA, 2023

COMMENTS

101.2 Scope

101.3 Culpable homicide vis-à-vis murder

2023

INTENTION

BHARATIYA NYAYA SANHITA, 2023 1564

KNOWLEDGE

BHARATIYA NYAYA SANHITA, 2023

BHARATIYA NYAYA SANHITA, 2023

1569 CH. VI : OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY S. 101

BHARATIYA NYAYA SANHITA, 2023

BHARATIYA NYAYA SANHITA, 2023 1572

BHARATIYA NYAYA SANHITA, 2023

Rs. 14,995/-

RATANLAL & DHIRAJLAL'S LAW OF CRIMES

DESCRIPTION