Poland, Ukraine and Russia

POLAND, UKRAINE

& RUSSIA MAREK MAGIEROWSKI: Thank you very much for this kind invitation to The Commonwealth Club and also to this marvelous city of San Francisco. As you already know, my previous posting was in Israel. I spent three wonderful years there with my beloved wife—and without our children. [Laughter.] And whenever we travel around to Florida, for

From the October 6, 2022, program “Poland at the Border instance, or to California, upon landing at the of Putin’s War Against Ukraine and the West.” Program airport we see the palm trees. My wife says, sponsored by Taube Philanthropies. “Finally, I feel like I’m home.” And I say, “What

MAREK MAGIEROWSKI, Ambassador of Poland to the do you mean? You are from Poland, not from

United States Israel.” Still, we miss Israel, and I believe that after my four-year term here in America, we’ll

ABRAHAM D. SOFAER, George P. Shultz Distinguished miss America greatly.

Scholar and Senior Fellow, The Hoover Institution— Ladies and gentlemen, more than 60 years

Moderator ago, Nikita Khrushchev—a name some of you may be familiar with, the former secretary general of the Soviet Communist Party,

he was a frequent visitor to America, quite paradoxically—and in October 1960, he delivered his remarks at the headquarters of the United Nations in New York City. He said, “History is on our side. We will bury you.” Of course, you realize whom he was addressing in that speech. He was addressing the main enemy—the United States. “History is on our side. We will bury you.”

Now, when you hear President Putin and you wade through his speeches, how reminiscent his words are of those remarks made by Nikita Khrushchev 62 years ago in New York. History is on our side. We will bury you.

Make no mistake. History is not on Russia’s side today. And they will not bury us. They will not bury us. They will not bury Poland. And they will not bury Ukraine. In spite of the fact that this is the malign intent of Mr. Putin and all his acolytes in Russia to bury Ukraine, to erase Ukraine, to annihilate not only the Ukrainian culture, the language, the roots, [but] the whole nation.

In July last year, he wrote and published a lengthy essay about his vision of the Russo-Ukrainian bond. Again, his main message was that such a bond did not exist. Why? Because there is no Ukrainian nation.

Now, one of the most important achievements of Mr. Putin in recent months was strengthening the Ukrainian national identity. We are entering the eighth month of the war, and I believe that nobody in America, in Europe, in Poland and even in Russia, nobody has any doubts whatsoever that the Ukrainian culture does exist. The language, the heritage. This is what Putin has achieved. We have to give credit to him for that particular accomplishment.

Putin decided to carry out that invasion. He wants to erase Ukraine from the map of Europe, because he’s got an obsession, deeply feared in his mindset. He knows very well that Ukraine does pose a threat to his rule in Russia, because what he fears most is a prosperous Ukraine, liberal and

democratic Ukraine. A Ukraine which adheres to European values. I just want to remind you that in 2014, at the time of the so-called Maidan revolution, it was Ukraine’s hypothetical and potential accession to the European Union which jangled Putin’s nerves. He was so irritated that the Ukrainians wanted to get closer to the European Union in all respects. That’s why, for example, when I talk to my American interlocutors, I always try to persuade them that for “Putin fears Ukraine, it’s much more important today to join the European Union than to a European join NATO, because Putin fears a European Ukraine Ukraine more more than Ukraine being a NATO member state. than Ukraine For today’s Russia, one of the most important pillars of Putin’s rule is the being a NATO whole alliance with all those post-Soviet repubmember lics in Central Asia, in the Russian underbelly. Many of them are corrupt. And state.” corruption is an inherent element in Putin’s rule, not only in Russia, but also in the Russian sphere of influence. The less corrupt these countries are, the more European, the more democratic, the more liberal in terms of the economic development, the weaker Putin’s rule is. Poland, as you know, has reacted quickly and in a very steadfast manner to what happened in Ukraine. It was an incredible effort, a remarkable outpouring of solidarity and sympathy towards our Ukrainian neighbors. Our president, Mr. [Andrzej] Duda, has been saying repeatedly that we don’t treat them as refugees, we call them guests. They are guests in all our country. So far, there’s been roughly 6 million people who have crossed the border with Poland. According to recent estimates, about 1.5 million decided to stay in our country. Some of them emigrated to other countries in Europe. Many of them have already returned to Ukraine. But if you add those 1.5 million Ukrainian refugees or guests in Poland to those approximately 1.5 million Ukrainian migrants who had already lived and worked in Poland before the war, it turns out that the Polish population has increased by about 3 million Moderator Abraham Sofaer (left) talks with Ambassador Marek Magierowski at the Club.

Ukrainian refugees who are integrating into the Polish society smoothly, impeccably in an exemplary manner, which is also a lesson for other European nations to follow the Polish model of integration, of migration policy.

A few months ago, just after the beginning of the war, the Polish Parliament passed a law which essentially facilitated the integration of Ukrainian refugees into the Polish labor market. They can now apply for a Polish I.D., which does not make them automatically Polish citizens. But with that ID, for instance, they

can set up their own businesses. They can send their children to Polish schools. They are eligible for free health care. And they get a lot of other benefits, like Polish citizens. We have incorporated more than 200,000 Ukrainian children into [the] Polish schooling system; 400,000 Ukrainian refugees have received working permits, so they work legally in Poland. There hasn’t been a single racial incident in Poland. Nobody has ever assaulted anybody because someone spoke Ukrainian in Krakow or in Warsaw or in Poznań. No ethnic tensions. That’s why I think that this is a momentous development in our bilateral history, as I said, an extraordinary outburst of solidarity.

Solidarity is of paramount importance for us, not only as an empty term. For us, solidarity means much more than that. Also, because of our historical experiences. Now, it’s not only about humanitarian assistance, it’s also about military assistance. Just recently we delivered, for example, more than 240 main battle tanks to Ukraine. Self-propelled howitzers, which are doing an amazing job in the east right now, clobbering the Russian aggressors. [Applause.]

We are ready to deliver even more. And I believe this is our common obligation to help Ukraine arm itself and to help the Ukrainian armed forces in this struggle and this fight against the Russian invaders, which will be probably protracted. This war, unfortunately, will not end shortly.

This is our common obligation. In our case, it’s also a Christian obligation, because we believe that this is a morality tale for all of us. I had various discussions about this particular war, and we were asking ourselves—for example, among EU

ambassadors in the United States, I have a vivid memory of one such discussion— whether this is a clash of civilizations. Samuel Huntington, as you know, published a book about a clash of civilizations. He referred to the clash between Christianity and Islam. I believe that what is going on now in Ukraine is also a clash of cultures. Especially when you think about that blatant disregard for human life and for human dignity on the part of the Russian aggressor.

You probably remember all those reports about crematoriums being brought to the front lines by the Russian army just in order to burn the bodies of the fallen Russian soldiers. How different it is from our approach. We save every single human life. We rescue every single soldier left behind enemy lines. We evacuated them, and we evacuated their bodies.

Can we talk about a clash of civilizations? I don’t know. But perhaps we should also think about the perception of Russia which has been embedded in the European mentality for so many years. Many European politicians still think that Russia is an inherently European country because of the Russian culture, because of the Russian literature, music, ballet and so on and so forth. I fully agree with that. I do love the Russian language, the Russian culture and the Russian music. But do we have the same roots? Do we have the same history?

Just to remind you that Russians have lived under the communist yoke for more than a hundred years, unlike us. The Bolshevik Revolution took place in 1917 and then the Soviet Union disintegrated in 1991. But it did not cease to exist. It did cease to exist geographically and politically. But I can still see vestiges of Soviet mentality in contemporary Russia. Unfortunately, unfortunately, if it is a clash of civilizations, I think this is our crucial question we have to not only ask ourselves but also bear in mind, because if this is a clash of civilizations, if this is a clash of cultures, it means that the Ukrainians are fighting not only for their own freedom, not only for their own sovereignty, they are also fighting for ours. They are also defending the free world, the West, from that murderous wave, from that unspeakable aggression and all those crimes committed by Russian troops now on Ukrainian soil. But in a few years time, maybe also on Polish soil and in the Baltics, maybe in Finland. If we don’t stop Putin now, he will come back with a vengeance. Our Ukrainian friends note, rightly, that the war began not on February the 24th. It began in 2014 with the annexation of Crimea and an incursion of Russian forces into Donetsk and Luhansk. So the Ukrainians have been waging this war for more than eight years. Another important issue—and I have to go back to my point about Europe’s approach and Europe’s attitude towards Russia— Europe has always been pretty much naive about Russia’s intentions, not only in terms of foreign policy, but also, for example, in the field of energy security. This is a topic I have been dealing with also here in America for many months. I’ve been saying to my American friends, Look, Poland has always been prescient. We’ve known all along that Putin would one day weaponize energy. And that’s why we were trying to brace ourselves for that eventuality, for that potential hypothetical scenario. So, for example, we inaugurated our first LNG terminal on the Baltic Coast five years ago. A month ago we opened the so-called Baltic Pipe, which now transfers gas from the Norwegian continental shelf via Denmark to the Polish stretch of

the Baltic Coast. We are buying now gas from American companies, from Qatar and from some other sources as well. We have decided not to renew the long-term contract with Gazprom. From now on, we are entirely independent of imports of Russian gas [applause], unlike some other countries in Europe, which I’m not going to name as a diplomat. [Laughter.] I hope “We are abwinter will not be as harsh as some predict, but there is a German word which has also somehow been used over here in Amerisolutely con- ca, in English and in some other European languages—schadenfreude. Yeah, we don’t vinced that feel schadenfreude when we look at what is going on now in Germany and all those German politicians—it’s really hilarious. Article 5 of the All those German politicians who are so worried that German citizens will have to Washington lower the temperatures in their swimming pools during the upcoming winter by one Treaty is sacdegree Celsius. It’s also the question of resilience. We are not as resilient as Russians, and that’s why rosanct the final outcome of that confrontation, not only the war in Ukraine, but of that . . . that Amerconfrontation between the free world and Russia, is not so clear. To what extent can we be resilient in the face of this energy criica is ready to sis, for example? I do believe that there is an ongoing defend every debate in America and also in other parts of the world to what extent America inch of NATO should be focused on the eastern flank, on Ukraine, on this particular region. I have been asking this question to my American territory.” partners and colleagues, if there will be political will to keep not only the pressure on Russia, but also to keep financing and assisting Ukraine’s war effort. Many people will tell me, rest assured, that we are not going to relent; we’re going to keep arming Ukraine, we are going to keep transferring weapons to Ukraine. We are ready to do that as well. But we have to convince our American friends that this is an immediate threat. And of course, I’m talking about this in the context of America’s approach to the Indo-Pacific, because many analysts are now claiming that America is not capable of waging two wars at the same time. But it is my priority, and my government’s and my country’s, to persuade our American allies that what is going on now in Eastern Europe—this is an immediate threat. This is a race against

time. That’s why we have to strengthen the eastern flank. And Poland is also arming itself. We know very well, we are absolutely convinced that the Article 5 of the Washington Treaty [the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949, the founding agreement of NATO] is sacrosanct, that as President Biden has also said on several occasions, America is ready to defend every inch of NATO territory.

So are we. Poland has been perceived until recently as a net recipient of security. Now we are transitioning to the role of net provider, and that’s why we are arming ourselves at an accelerated pace. That’s why we are delivering our tanks to Ukraine, but we are also buying 250 Abrams tanks from the United States. We are buying weaponry from South Korea. Probably in a few years time, we will become the most militarized country in that part of Europe.

I wish that other countries, other NATO members, chose the same way, because we have to be prepared for any eventuality. It’s very risky to navigate Putin’s mind today. I’ve also used this argument many a time: Poland could be the next item on his menu. I hope it won’t happen. I still believe that he won’t dare carry out a “special military operation” against one of the NATO member states.

But we have to be vigilant, and we have to stave off this threat preemptively. That’s why we count on our American friends, because we do believe that America has always been, is and will remain our most steadfast ally.

Thank you very much. ABRAHAM D. SOFAER: Mr. Ambassador, thank you for those wonderful remarks. As grisly as some of the thoughts you had struck us. MAGIEROWSKI: It was not my intention. SOFAER: No, I understand. But we understand how you feel, and the consequences of failure in Ukraine are very real for you. MAGIEROWSKI: And this war is very real for us. I’ll tell you an anecdote, a little bit grisly as well. When there was a missile strike against one of the Ukrainian bases on the Ukrainian side of the border, but very near the Polish border, just about, I believe, 10 miles, Polish citizens who live on the Polish side of the border not only heard the blast, but the windows and the houses were rattling. So it was the physical experience, of course, not as ominous and as bloody as what we witnessed in Bucha or Irpin and in other cities and villages in Ukraine. But we feel that war also physically, to a certain extent. SOFAER: I’m not surprised. And you use the word solidarity, that was particularly important to me in my experience with George Shultz and Ronald Reagan in the late ’80s, when we watched a great pope and Lech Walesa lead your country to freedom. So I think it’s a particularly— MAGIEROWSKI: We always add Margaret Thatcher to that. SOFAER: I don’t mind that at all. But I think the notion that we are in a period of solidarity with Ukraine is exactly the right idea.

Thank you for that. Tell me, Mr. Ambassador, what could the United States do other than what you’ve said about staying true to the cause? What could we do to help Poland and to help Ukraine? MAGIEROWSKI: First of all, let me express my gratitude for American leadership in this conflict. Without American leadership. I can’t imagine that we would be cooperating so strictly and so tightly. When I mentioned Putin’s achievements, it’s not only about strengthening the Ukrainian national identity, but he has also reinvigorated NATO. He has reinforced the European Union. He has enlarged NATO by himself, with Sweden and Finland about to join this organization. Again, we have to give him the credit.

The American leadership is of para-

mount importance, particularly in these difficult times. If you ask me what America should be doing right now and in the future, I think America is doing the right thing right now, approving subsequent packages of military assistance to Ukraine. And the question is, of course, whether we fulfill all the needs in terms of our military help, military aid of our Ukrainian brothers. The question is, to what extent should we allow, for example, the Ukrainian armed forces to use long-range missile launchers attacking Russian territory? The position of the Polish government has always been very clear. We don’t think that it would be too escalatory to win this war.

I had a friendly and a very insightful chat with one of [the] American admirals just yesterday. He was asking me an open question: How successful can President Zelenskyy be in this war to become a little bit too successful?

And there is that persistent question about what Putin would do if he’s finally encircled, if he feels like a caged animal, a cornered rat. Of course, we have heard so many nuclear threats coming out of the Kremlin. SOFAER: You’re preempting my second question, and we’re all thinking this. MAGIEROWSKI: This is, of course, a serious dilemma. But again, I believe—and this is not only my personal opinion, but I think that the Polish government has also expressed its view on multiple occasions— we have to help Ukraine win this war at any cost. SOFAER: That’s breathtaking in the context of nuclear weapons. All of us feel exactly as you do on the merits, I’m sure. But nonetheless, how real is the fear, do you think, that nuclear weapons, tactical nuclear weapons, some of which are far less damaging, they involve far less power than even Hiroshima and Nagasaki? So the fear is that Putin will feel that he can use 1/20th, let’s say, of the force with a nuclear device

and get away with it. MAGIEROWSKI: He has already got away with many nasty things he has done in the past. I am maybe not terribly optimistic or slightly optimistic about what he will or what he would choose to do if he feels that he is losing this war. I don’t think that it would be of great political and military benefit for him to use even low-yield tactical nuclear weapons on the battleground in Ukraine. Humankind has never used a low-yield nucle“I’m keeping ar warhead. So, we know what the impact of these my fingers two bombings in Japan was in 1945. But we don’t crossed for know what would be the impact of a nuclear strike with low-yield warhead, the Ukrainian especially on the battlefield, not dropping a bomb army to on an urban center, for example, on a city in Ukraine, but on the front line. And ultimately deI do believe that Putin is making this calculus right feat and crush now, and this calculus is not very positive for him. So as I said, I’m optimistic the Russian that he will not dare use the nuclear bomb. aggressor.” Also, because he’s losing allies right now. I’m talking about some of those post-Soviet republics like Kazakhstan, Romania and many others. If he does choose to use a nuclear bomb, he will probably lose also China. He will also lose India. Now, it’s a very tricky game for these countries, because their position is very blurry in terms of criticizing or endorsing Putin’s war in Ukraine. In case of a nuclear conflagration, I think it would be politically suicidal for Putin. SOFAER: I hope your reliance on his capacity to reason is well stated. MAGIEROWSKI: As I said, I am not a Putin-ologist. It’s really an extremely hard task to decipher his mind and his intentions. SOFAER: He reminds me of the untutored hero in Notes from the Underground who found a way to act against his interests in every possible situation. MAGIEROWSKI: Absolutely. Clockwise from top photo: Ukrainian Consul General Dmytro Kushneruk addresses the Club audience; Tad and Dianne Taube with Ambassador Marek Magierowski on the Club’s rooftop terrace; Abraham Sofaer, Club Board of Governors member Colleen Wilcox, and Magierowski.

SOFAER: Very Russian. [Laughter.] Well, sir, tell us how you think this war might end. MAGIEROWSKI: And next question, please. [Laughter.] SOFAER: We are blessed here with the presence of the consul general of Ukraine. And I would like to have your views on that, and I’d like to have his as well. MAGIEROWSKI: I’m keeping my fingers crossed, of course, for the Ukrainian army to ultimately defeat and crush the Russian aggressor. It’s very interesting to see how Putin was manipulating his own public opinion over the last couple of months. Until recently, he could have sold defeat in Ukraine as victory to his own domestic audience, because an overwhelming majority of Russians have so far lived in an

information bubble. So he could have said, for example, “Okay, we have defended the Russian speaking population of Donetsk and Luhansk from the Nazis in Kyiv.” This is the narrative he was trying to peddle to his own domestic audience.

Now, everybody in Russia knows that this is not a special military operation, that this is a war. And now every 19-yearold lad in Russia knows that he can be sent to the front line overnight. So this has changed his political standing quite dramatically, because now he cannot sell this possible defeat in Ukraine as victory. It’s no longer the case.

So it has its downsides and upsides. But I believe that this is something he has to be coping with right now. SOFAER: And you think that would force the war to an end that’s really an end, to a conclusion? MAGIEROWSKI: He will have to find a way to. There have been some proposals on the part of some European politicians to offer Putin an off-ramp. And I’ve seen some memes on Twitter and other social platforms arguing that the only off-ramp for Putin would be the Kerch Bridge, which connects Russia proper with Crimea— leaving Crimea and leaving Ukraine forever. This is the off-ramp we should offer President Putin.

I don’t know how this war will end. The

only thing I’m sure of is that Russia will not be identical after the war, because all these wars of aggression that Russia has waged over centuries in the past have always led to turbulences and to social upheaval in Russia, in tsarist Russia, in Bolshevik Russia, and now I believe it will happen also in Putin’s Russia. SOFAER: Mr. Consul General, we would greatly appreciate your reactions. DMYTRO KUSHNERUK: Thank you. So, first of all, if you allow me, I would like to [give a] huge thanks to Ambassador Magierowski for his excellent remarks and such a clear, clear understanding about the whole situation between Ukraine and Russia. And I would like to use this opportunity to thank Poland for the enormous help, enormous support; and all Ukrainians appreciate that very, very much.

Just on a human level, it’s a huge help to refugees who are called guests. And also, our languages are very similar. We used to say that our language is closer to Polish than it is to Russian, in fact. And of course, the alliance between Ukraine and Poland probably is now the strongest in Europe. And if we combine [our militaries], our army definitely would be the most powerful army in Europe. That’s true.

Actually, as the ambassador mentioned, Poland is the biggest supplier of battle tanks to Ukraine among all the countries in the world—or probably after Russia, because we managed to get even more tanks from Russia. [Laughter.] That’s true.

But so how would the war end? Probably so. Ukraine has been recently quite successful in counter-offences in the Kharkiv region, in the south and even now in Donetsk region and Luhansk, which Russia or Putin already announced [as] their own territory.

The Russians now announced this general mobilization, trying to mobilize 300,000 people, probably close to 1 million. But this will not make a huge change, because those people don’t know what they’re fighting for and what they are being sent to fight for. And Ukrainians, of course, are fighting for freedom in our country and in the whole Europe. That is a huge, huge difference.

And now Putin tries to intimidate Ukraine, tries to intimidate Europe and the whole world with some other threats. Ukraine, they are not afraid. What our president is always saying [is that] we want the world also not to be afraid of that. We all take it very seriously, of course, but we should not be afraid.

And as President Zelenskyy says, that NATO should not wait for Putin to make a move; NATO should make a preemptive pressure. So for him to show what the consequences would be if he ever tries to do it. And the more we do together now to cooperate and to put more pressure on Putin, the more safer the winter would be in Europe.

And again, as President Zelenskyy said, there is no negotiation now possible for us with Putin. We’re waiting for a new president of Russia to arrive.

And after the war will be over—what’s the end of the war for us? Of course, the liberation of all our territory—again, as Ambassador Magierowski said, including Crimea. The Russian forces should be withdrawn from Ukraine. Just the liberation of our territory, that’s the end of the war. And now it seems really realistic in the future. Thank you very much. SOFAER: What is it that accounts for what the consul general touched upon, which you explicitly talked about—what is it that led us to fail to react in 2014 to the invasion and conquering of Crimea? MAGIEROWSKI: There are so many European politicians who still believed that Russia may one day become as European as France, as liberal as Poland, as democratic as the United States, as civilized as the free world. There was that hope, which was not entirely wrong, because I do believe that Russia will one day become more democratic and more prosperous and friendlier towards its neighbors.

Russia, for example, has always been one of the most important trading partners for Poland. So losing Russia is not good for Poland; losing Russia as an important player on the international stage. Russia will not vanish. Russia will always be there, even if it by a freak of history disintegrates like the Soviet Union did at the beginning of the ’90s over the past century.

But Russia and Russians will always be our neighbors. And of course, it’s the priority of every nation and every country in the world, also Ukraine, to have a friendly neighbor. We don’t want a confrontation with Russia. We don’t want to wage a war against Russia, let alone the Russians. We want Russia to change, and Ukraine wants to settle this dispute, but not with that president. So that means that even the Ukrainians believe that Russia can change. We share the common enemy right now, because we also had a very painful history of our bilateral relationship with Russia. The memory is still vivid of all the horrendous atrocities committed by communists, by Russian troops on Polish soil, for hundreds of years. But I believe that what we are facing right now is a real and existential threat, not only to Ukraine, not only to Poland, to [the] whole Europe, but also to the United States. Because if we don’t curb Putin’s neo-imperial ambitions, this will lead us to a very perilous shift in the entire security architecture in the world. If you look, for example, at the relationship at this particular bond between Russia and China, if we lose Ukraine, we will also lose Taiwan, because what China is doing now is monitoring very closely and very meticulously what is going on in Ukraine right now, drawing lessons.

China thinks about its political standing in the international arena in the prospect of 100 years. Unlike many European and American politicians, [who] think about the next press conference and not about the next century.

So it’s not only about Kyiv and Lviv. It’s also about Paris and Washington and Beijing. So this is absolutely vital for us to defend Ukraine today and to protect the free world.

“We share the common enemy because we also have a very painful history of our bilateral relationship with Russia.”

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