Arches Vol 5 Edition 9 by The Cordoba Foundation

VOLUME 5 EDITION 9 SPRING 2012 ISSN 1756-7335

TERRORISM AND COUNTER-TERRORISM: SPOTLIGHT ON STRATEGIES AND APPROACHES

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Arches Quarterly is published by

Westgate House, Level 7, Westgate Road, Ealing, London W5 1YY Tel 020 8991 3372 / Fax 020 8991 3373 info@thecordobafoundation.com / www.thecordobafoundation.com Submissions of articles and reports for Arches Quarterly should be made by e-mail, in Word format, to the editors: publications@thecordobafoundation.com DISCLAIMER: The views expressed in Arches Quarterly are those of the individual authors and should not be taken to represent a corporate view of The Cordoba Foundation. ÂŠ The Cordoba Foundation UK 2012

THIS ISSUE Volume 5 Edition 9 Spring 2012 ISSN 1756-7335 Available online: thecordobafoundation.com Anas Altikriti Chief Executive Abdullah Faliq Editor Editorial Team: Amjad Mohamed-Saleem Ibrahim Hewitt S. Alam Arzoo Ahmed H.D. Foreman Dr Basia Spalek Kathleen Grant Amina Easat Mehrunisha Suleman A.S. Khan Art Editor

19 40 67 72 105 105 130 130 138

LITERATURE PROMOTIONS: European Multiculturalisms: Cultural, Religious & Ethnic Challenges (Anna Triandafyllidou, Tariq Modood & Nasar Meer) Islam and Muslims (Muhammad Ali Chaudry & Robert Dickson Crane) The Missing Martyrs: Why There Are So Few Muslim Terrorists (Charles Kurzman) Contemporary Debates on Terrorism (Richard Jackson & Samuel Justin Sinclair) The British War on Terror: Terrorism and Counterterrorism on the Home Front Since 9-11 (Steve Hewitt) Snitch!: A History of the Modern Intelligence Informer (Steve Hewitt) Counter-Terrorism: Community-Based Approaches to Preventing Terror Crime (Basia Spalek) From Beirut to JerusalemÂ (Swee Chai Ang) Terrorism: A Critical Introduction (Richard Jackson, Lee Jarvis, Jereon Gunning & Marie B. Smyth)

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INTHISISSUE 04

Editorial

Foreword

Complicating ‘Radicalism’ – Counter-Terrorism and Muslim Identity in Britain

Counter-Terrorism: Police and Community Engagement in Britain and the US

A Grand American Strategy of Counter-Terrorism

The Strength of Local Partnerships: Overcoming Obstacles During the War on Terror

The Use of Secret Evidence is a Threat to Human Rights

The New Prevent: Will it Work? Can it Work?

Prevent Agenda and the Doctrine of Fear in the Muslim Community

The Causes of Terrorism: Deconstructing the Myths

The Complexity of Police-Muslim Community Relations in the Shadow of 9/11

Beyond the Rhetoric – Setting a New Perspective for Partnerships

From Moulin Rouge to 9/11

Abdullah Faliq

Anas Altikriti Nasar Meer

Basia Spalek & Laura Zahra McDonald Robert D. Crane

Robert Lambert Jean Lambert MEP

Therese O’Toole, Stephen H. Jones & Daniel Nilsson DeHanas Imran Awan

Richard Jackson, Lee Jarvis, Jereon Gunning & Marie B. Smyth P. Daniel Silk

Amjad Mohamed-Saleem

Zubeda Limbada

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Informing Continuity: Domestic Surveillance from the Cold War to the War on Terror

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Time for Change After 10 Years of Detention Without Trial

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Shifting Paradigms: De-Radicalisation

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Fundamentalists vs. Moderates: The War Within Judaism

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Counter-Terrorism Post 9/11 and the Erosion of Human Rights and Civil Liberties

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‘From Beirut to Jerusalem’ 2009 - The Wounds of Gaza

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Youth De-Radicalisation: the Wolverhampton Experience

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Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: Young People’s Perspectives

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Developing Community Partnerships - A Practical Solution for Peace, Prosperity and Justice Nick Maurice

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The Muslim “Demand Curve” for U.S. Foreign Policy

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Behind Closed Doors - Ten Years of Secret Evidence and Human Suffering

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Conviction of Thought: How Islamic Concepts are Ruled on in UK Courts

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Muslims in Poland and Eastern Europe: Widening the European Discourse on Islam

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Picture Gallery

Steve Hewitt Paul Donovan

Ahmad Hassan Rabbi Mark L. Winer

Saalik Haleem Swee Chai Ang Revd. Mason West Hussain Al-Jabir

Charles Kurzman

Aisha Maniar & Adrienne Burrows Asim Qureshi

Book review by Małgorzata Wróblewska

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FROM THE

EDITOR

Welcome to this special edition of Arches, which examines the various strategies and approaches adopted to deal with terrorism and counter-terrorism. The editorial team of Arches would like to acknowledge and thank the University of Birmingham (UK), in particular Dr Basia Spalek, for sourcing a number of excellent contributions for this edition from a conference she convened on “Political Transitions, Policing and CounterTerrorism: Power, Partnership and Community”. The Cordoba Foundation is grateful for this collaboration. In this issue, experts from various disciplines examine the threat posed by terrorists; tracing the origins and source of terrorism they assess the effectiveness of strategies and approaches employed to respond to and challenge this threat. Importantly, we focus on de-radicalisation and explore alternative strategies and approaches that deal with terrorism, which is often exaggerated and conflated with other issues. Without wishing to make light of such a serious issue, it is worth considering that Micah Zenko, writing in the Atlantic, argues that Americans are as likely to be killed by their own furniture as by terrorism: The number of US citizens who died in terrorist attacks increased by two between 2010 and 2011; overall, a comparable number of Americans are crushed to death by their televisions or furniture each year.1

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The total number of worldwide attacks in 2011 dropped by almost 12 per cent from 2010 and nearly 29 per cent from 2007.

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Attacks by Al-Qa’ida and its affiliates increased by 8 percent from 2010 to 2011. A significant increase in attacks by Al-Shabaab, from 401 in 2010 to 544 in 2011, offset a sharp decline in attacks by al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI) and a smaller decline in attacks by alQa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).

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In cases where the religious affiliation of terrorism casualties could be determined, Muslims suffered between 82 and 97 per cent of terrorism-related fatalities over the past five years.

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Of the 978 terrorism-related kidnappings [in 2010], only three hostages were private US citizens, or .003 per cent. A private citizen is defined as ‘any US citizen not acting in an official capacity on behalf of the U.S. government.’

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Of the 13,288 people killed by terrorist attacks last year, seventeen were private US citizens, or .001 percent.

Citing the 2011 Report on Zenko rightly points out that the Terrorism2 published by the National CounterTerrorism Centre (which offers the above is indicative of an irrational fear of best available data and analysis of terrorism terrorism which is both unwarranted and a to the US government), Zenko highlights poor basis on which to base public policies. The effects of this exaggeration of the following interesting observations:

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EDITORIAL

the terrorist threat and subsequent disproportionate spotlight have tended to fall on the Muslim community, with innumerable negative implications; it is, for a start, projected as a “suspect community”. Although Washington framed the War on Terror in response to 9/11, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton recognised back in October 2007 that “you can’t lump all terrorists together” and that America has been “mistake[n] to paint with such a broad brush, which has not been particularly helpful in understanding what it is we were up against”. Whilst accepting the threat and urgency posed by terrorists, the reality is that the strategy of the War on Terror by the US and endorsed by other countries is one that is exaggerated, un-nuanced and laden with grave consequences for civil and human rights, as well as freedom of expression. These consequences range from “racial profiling” by the police; “hate speech” laws often extended to stifle legitimate views; the undermining and limiting of Habeas corpus by extending detention without charge, often indefinitely; a rise in Islamophobia leading to hate crimes as well as a negative effect on community cohesion; “no-flylists” which curtail freedom of movement, including that of peace activists; the practice of “extraordinary rendition”, resulting in suspects being tortured; preemptive wars to repel perceived “terrorist” threats; and strained East-West relations, namely a hatred of America and other Western powers in the Muslim world. The list goes on but all of these factors affect individuals and communities in different ways. Our broad panel of contributors not only offer their different perspectives and experiences on these and other issues, they also offer solutions. Whilst we draw largely on case studies and experiences of terrorism and counterterrorism within a British and US context, Arches also offers related discussion on building partnerships and dialogue between cultures, societies and agencies

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at local, national and international levels. The Cordoba Foundation maintains that genuine partnerships and a sound understanding of issues and factors that give rise to distrust, tensions and conflict are essential to help dissuade people from turning to extremism and violence; and also better-inform those in authority to respond to this dilemma effectively. Terrorists will continue to advance their eschewed and parochial views, often taking advantage of the freedom of democracy and misusing religious texts to do so. The response to this, however, needs to be measured and not disproportionate; for when we limit or abandon hard-won freedoms and the due process of law, we are doing the terrorists’ work. Attaining a proper balance is a delicate but essential process. Thank you. Abdullah Faliq EDITOR ARCHES QUARTERLY

Abdullah Faliq helped set-up The Cordoba Foundation and edits Arches, amongst other publications, as the foundation’s Head of Research. In 2001, he helped launch the “Declarations of European Muslims” by the Grand Mufti of Bosnia Dr Mustafa Ceric. Faliq studied Arabic and conducted research in Egypt, Jordan, Sudan, Palestine & Bosnia as part of his MA and doctoral studies specialising in Arab political Islam and British Muslims. Active in the British Muslim scene since the 1980s, he is currently a trustee of the London Muslim Centre and former Deputy General Secretary of the Islamic Forum of Europe.

ENDNOTES 1. Zenko, Micah (2012). “Americans Are as Likely to Be Killed by Their Own Furniture as by Terrorism”, The Atlantic, June 6. - http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/06/ americans-are-as-likely-to-be-killed-by-their-own-furnitureas-by-terrorism/258156/#.T8_ecHyMuW4.twitter 2. Report on Terrorism: 2011, The National CounterTerrorism Centre, Washington, DC. - http://www.nctc.gov/docs/2011_ NCTC_Annual_Report_Final.pdf

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THE CORDOBA FOUNDATION FOUNDED IN 2005, The Cordoba Foundation (TCF) is an independent Public Relations, Research and Training unit, which promotes dialogue and the culture of peaceful and positive coexistence among civilisations, ideas and people. We do this by working with decisionmaking circles, researchers, religious leaders, the media, and a host of other stakeholders of society for better understanding and clearer comprehension of inter-communal and inter-religious issues in Britain and beyond. OUR ACTIVITIES INCLUDE: • Structured consultation and advisory services • Face-to-face interaction with decision-makers and figures of authority • In-house research • Workshops, seminars and debates on pertinent issues • Training and capacity-building • Periodicals and journals • Resourceful website 6

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FOREWORD BY THE

CHIEF EXECUTIVE

The media helped to fix a particular perception of terrorism… in people’s minds [which] are mass-produced terms with extremely vague meanings.

that negative and counter-productive outcomes would result. Essentially, what began as a collective approach based on socio-economic considerations was then transformed into a security operation with ideological undertones which singled out the Muslim community as the target. The obvious outcome was that the Muslim community withdrew from engagement with government efforts to address the problem of extremism. Meanwhile, the media helped to fi x a particular perception of terrorism, extremism and radicalisation in people’s minds. These are mass-produced terms with extremely vague meanings; nevertheless, they became reference points to describe the threat facing Western societies. Along with a selective government engagement – disengagement policy based on ideological and political preferences, 11 years on we remain unclear as to how to confront what

However, what is almost certain as a common outcome of each of these approaches is that virtually none can claim to have been remotely successful. If anything, many countries witnessed negative results from their respective policies and, in some cases, counterproductive outcomes. In Britain, for example, an approach that departed from the reasonable notion of engaging with communities in which vulnerable individuals were preyed upon by “hate preachers” was suspended in favour of an even more hostile policy with counter-subversion as its central premise. This was also adopted despite overwhelming expert evidence suggesting

The Cordoba Foundation was founded to address the relations between parties holding differing views and try to prevent discussions from becoming conflicts. Disagreement is normal and often healthy, but to disengage or eliminate the other on the basis of disagreement is a problem of our times.

hilst confronting terrorism has been a pronounced objective of the United States and other Western governments since the mid-1990s, it was the 9/11 attacks in 2001 which drove the call for comprehensive and sophisticated counter-terrorism strategies to be introduced throughout the West. Approaches which differed in emphasis and nature from one context to another were invariably controversial and met with varied levels of resistance and opposition.

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FOREWORD

we perceive as a serious and real threat. The Cordoba Foundation was founded to address the relations between parties holding differing views and try to prevent discussions from becoming conflicts. Disagreement is normal and often healthy, but to disengage or eliminate the other on the basis of disagreement is a problem of our times that has led to countless outcomes of a tragic and violent nature. This edition of Arches attempts to address the questions, philosophical as well as political, social and ideological, which arise from this debate. It also attempts, through its expert contributors, to consider the myriad of possible scenarios and outcomes with which we can break the deadlock we find ourselves in. Anas Altikriti CHIEF EXECUTIVE THE CORDOBA FOUNDATION

Anas Altikriti, CEO of The Cordoba Foundation, is an internationally accredited translator and interpreter by profession and a postgraduate lecturer in the same field. He was a leading figure of the British Anti-War Movement and Chair of the 2-million Iraq demonstration in February 2003. Altikriti helped successfully negotiate the release of Western Christian peacemakers taken hostage in Iraq in 2005. He is a media commentator and writer in Arabic and English, as well as an advisor and consultant to numerous UK and international organisations on Muslim politics, East-West relations, combating extremism, negotiations, and dialogue. He is former President of the Muslim Association of Britain, a founding member of the British Muslim Initiative and an advisor to the European Muslim Research Centre. Altikriti is also completing a PhD in Political Studies at the University of Westminster, London.

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Complicating ‘Radicalism’ – Counter-Terrorism and Muslim identity in Britain NASAR MEER

he formulation and implementation of approaches concerned with addressing ‘radicalism’ and preventing violent extremism have come to inform prevailing approaches to citizenship in Britain (and vice-versa) in novel and challenging ways. Of course there is a wider political context in which these issues are raised, and a number of contributions have traced how the fate of multiculturalism in Britain has become intertwined with the political identities of Muslims (see Meer and Modood, 2009), especially the ways in which Muslim claims-making is seen as peculiarly ambitious and difficult to accommodate (Joppke, 2009, 2004; Policy Exchange, 2007; Pew, 2006; Moore, 2004, 2006 cf Meer, 2012). This is especially the case when Muslims are perceived to be in contravention of liberal discourses of individual rights and secularism that are made porous by concessions implied in multiculturalist approaches (Hutton, 2007; Hansen, 2006; Toynbee, 2005). This is exemplified by the way in which visible Muslim practices such as veiling have in public discourses been reduced to and conflated with alleged Muslim practices such as forced marriages, female genital mutilation, a rejection of positive law in favour of criminal shar’ia law and so on (Meer, Dwyer and Modood, 2010). Each suggests a radical ‘otherness’ about Muslims and an illiberality about multiculturalism, and, since the latter is alleged to license these practices, opposition to the practice, it is argued, necessarily invalidates the policy. Where a discussion of the implications of a security agenda has been touched upon, however, it tends to focus more on the discursive issues surrounding the ways in which the explanatory purchase of Muslim cultural dysfunctionality has generated an 10

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economy in accounting for what has been described as ‘Islamic terrorism’ (cf Phillips, 2006; Gove, 2006; Cohen, 2007). In contrast, in this article I explore broadly defined ‘radicalization prevention policies’, and how these have been implemented and justified, and how they become problematic in terms of very conventional Muslim identity articulations.

THE PREVENT AGENDA Following the London bombings, and several aborted bombings in a similar ‘leaderless Jihad’ (Sageman, 2008), the Labour government (1997-2010) created seven working groups comprising representatives of Muslim communities under the terms of ‘Preventing Extremism Together’ (PET). These were clustered as follows: (1) Engaging with young people; (2) Providing a full range of education services, in the UK, that meet the needs of the Muslim community; (3) Engaging with Muslim women; (4) Supporting regional and local initiatives and community actions; (5) Imam Training and accreditation and the role of Mosques as a resource for the whole community; (6) Security – Islamophobia, protecting Muslims from extremism, and community

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confidence in policing; and (7) Tackling extremism and radicalisation. Initiated by the Home Office this would later fall under the remit of the subsequently created Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG). These working groups devised a series of proposals to develop ‘practical means’ of tackling violent extremism. Sixty-four recommendations were put forward in a report published in November 2005, which contained a particular emphasis upon three recommendations that would serve as central planks in the unfolding of government strategies concerned with preventing violent extremism. •

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These included, firstly, the development of a ‘Scholars Roadshow’ coordinated by British Muslim organisations to facilitate ‘influential mainstream’ Muslim thinkers to address audiences of young British Muslims. The rationale being that these speakers would distil effective arguments against extremist justification for terrorism in denouncing it as un-Islamic, so as to ‘counter the ideological and theological underpinnings of the terrorist narrative’.1 The roadshow included a variety of international figures, and two of the most high-profile Muslim intellectuals to take part were the Swiss-born Francophone scholar Tariq Ramadan and the American convert Hamza Yusuf Hanson.

substantive recommendation, in terms of proposed structural capacity building within British Muslim communities, promoted the formation of a Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board (MINAB). To this end, a steering group of Muslim leaders undertook an extensive national consultation on matters such as the accreditation of imams, better governance of mosques and interfaith activity (the steering group published a good practice guide for mosques when the Advisory Board was formally launched on 27 June 2006.) Alongside this professional development programme or ‘upskilling’ of imams and mosque officials, recommendations were also made for a national campaign and coalition to increase the visibility of Muslim women, and to specifically empower and equip them in the course of becoming ‘active citizens’. While Prevent inevitably included some security-related work; it has been criticized for a variety of reasons, ‘ranging from targeting the wrong people to stigmatizing Muslim communities by treating them all as potential terrorists’ (Bartlett and Birdwell, 2010: 8). Two recurring issues were that, firstly, intelligence agencies were using the softer cohesion aspects of Prevent ‘to spy and illicitly collect intelligence, which has dramatically harmed the programme as a whole’ (ibid). Secondly, that Prevent was oriented to address wider social policy within Muslim communities which implied that this policy was only valuable because it contributes to counterterrorism (something illustrated by the fact that Prevent funding was directly linked to the size of the Muslim population in a local authority, not on the basis of known risk).

A second proposed plank focused on the creation of Muslim forums against extremism and Islamophobia. These could be led by key individuals and brought together members of local Muslim communities, law enforcement and public service agencies to discuss how to tackle extremism and Islamophobia in their area. THE CONTEST CONTEXT The provenance of Prevent, as The third and perhaps most well as the working groups and their

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recommendations, rests in a broader strategy which the British government had been cumulatively developing since the events of 9/11. Known as CONTEST, this broad-ranging counter-terrorism strategy was launched in 2003 and comprised four components concerned with meeting the objectives of Pursuit (to stop terrorist attacks); Preparedness (to mitigate their impact where they cannot be stopped); Protection (to strengthen overall protection against terrorist attacks); and Prevention (to stop people from becoming terrorists or supporting violent extremists). It is this last objective that was given added impetus upon the news that British Muslims had planned and carried out the London bombings, and it is the objective that has most overtly sought the participation of British Muslim communities at large. It is therefore unsurprising to learn that a strategy premised upon entering, and to some extent reformulating, the life worlds of British Muslim communities has been the subject of critical debate in the study of ethnic relations more broadly (Spalek and Imoual, 2007; Lambert, 2008; McGhee, 2008). That this objective was intended could be gleaned from the fact that immediately after the London bombing, the Home Office signalled that it would establish a Commission on Integration and Cohesion (COIC) ‘to advise on how, consistent with their own religion and culture, there is better integration of those parts of the community inadequately integrated’.2 The Prevent strategy itself, as pursued by the DCLG, was concerned with five further strands – each conceived as a prophylactic in addressing the causal factors for people becoming or supporting terrorists or violent extremists: 1. Undermine extremist ideology and support mainstream voices; 2. Disrupt those who promote violent extremism and strengthen vulnerable institutions; 3. Support individuals who are being targeted and recruited to the cause of violent extremism; 4. Increase the capacity of 12

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communities to challenge and resist violent extremism; Address the grievances that ideologues are exploiting.

The previous government sought to advance these objectives through a variety of local community partnerships and across statutory bodies, as well as voluntary agencies and community groups ‘with police forces, local authorities and their partners working closely together to oversee and deliver the project’ (DCLG, 2008b: 9). To foster these outcomes the prevent-related funding for the period from 2008/09 to 2010/11 was around 45 million and was distributed via local authorities. In this way the Prevent strategy signalled some diff usion of formal responsibilities for policy implementation and service delivery in a way that some see as indicative of broader developments in ‘governance’ practices whereby ‘responsibility and accountability for a wide range of social issues is increasingly focused towards local levels, while at the same time centralised control in terms of resources and targetsetting is maintained’ (Spalek and Imoual, 2007: 188). While it is not immediately apparent in the earlier quotation, the incorporation too of faith-based groups from within the third sector is potentially party to novel approaches to engaging with religious minorities through the practices and models of representation, stakeholders and advocacy in the consultative arena (DeHanas, O’Toole, Modood and Meer, 2010); perhaps as a development of what has been termed a multicultural ‘municipal drift’ (Meer and Modood, 2009). The extent of this shift is not the central focus here, other than in elaborating the manner in which the Prevent agenda, in constituting part of the broad counter-terrorism strategy, appears to be simultaneously subject to at least two broader prevailing dynamics comprising: [firstly] the implementation of anti-terrorist laws that can be used disproportionately against Muslims leading to the potential for their increased surveillance and control and volu m e 5

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thereby serving to reduce Muslims’ trust of state institutions, while [secondly] at the same time pursuing approaches that acknowledge, and stress the importance of, the involvement of British … Muslim communities in helping to combat extremism. (Spalek and Imoual, 2007: 191) Indeed, Spalek and Imoual (2007) frame these dynamics relationally in terms of ‘harder’ and ‘softer’ strategies of engagement, whereby the former may be understood as consisting of various means of surveillance, policing and intelligence gathering and so on. The latter, meanwhile, would include the development of dialogue, participation and community feedback between Muslim communities, state agencies and voluntary organisations in a way that may serve to increase trust in ‘the battle for hearts and minds’. For example, the Prevent strategy also emphasised and sought to extend to Muslims, long-established equality traditions historically orientated towards ethnic and racial minorities: The Prevent strategy requires a specific response, but we must also make the most of the links with wider community work to reduce inequalities, tackle racism and other forms of extremism (e.g. extreme far right), build cohesion and empower communities […] Likewise, it is recognised that the arguments of violent extremists, which rely on creating a ‘them’ and an ‘us’, are less likely to find traction in cohesive communities. (DCLG, 2008: 6–7) This built upon other recognition within government policies and legislation of Muslim religious difference that has been manifested in other ways, including measures against religious discrimination as set out in the Equality Act 2006. The tensions, then, surround the extent to which the prevailing British citizenship being extended to Muslims – through social and community cohesion agendas – are twinned with or placed within the same register as anti/ counter-terrorism strategies that import or rely upon certain securitized ‘hard’ aspects of this dimension volu m e 5

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of State-Muslim engagement. The risk has always been that ‘active citizenship’ for Muslims is to some extent framed in terms of demonstrable counterterrorism activities in a way which assumes that Muslim communities at large remain the ‘locus of the issue of extremism’ (Spalek and Imoual, 2007: 194). As such, while it is not quite the case, as Fekete (2004: 25) has suggested, public policy engaging with Muslims amounts to being ‘tough on mosques, tough on the causes of mosques’, it certainly became common to find statements such as that made by the former Communities Secretary Ruth Kelly, that it is a requirement for Muslim organisations to take ‘a proactive leadership role in tackling extremism and defending our shared values’ (11 October 2006).

Britain is no exception to a global trend displaying evidence of pan-Muslim solidarities. The net outcome of coupling of diversity and anti-terrorism agendas is the implication of contemporary British multiculturalism as the culprit of Britain’s security woes. Gilles Kepel (2005 quoted in Modood, 2005b), for example, has insisted that the bombers ‘were the children of Britain’s own multicultural society’ and that the bombings have ‘smashed’ the implicit social consensus that produced multiculturalism to ‘smithereens’. More recently, Prins and Salisbury (2008: 22–3) have claimed that a misplaced deference to multiculturalism, which failed to lay down the line to immigrants, has contributed to a lack of national selfconfidence and a fragmenting society that has been exploited by Islamist terrorists. This has prompted Modood (2008: 17) to insist that ‘the simplistic linkage between home-grown terrorism and the multicultural project is unfair because it ends up blaming not just national policies but specific communities for particular outcomes’. In this case, Muslims as a whole arches quarterly

are blamed for terrorism, for not standing twentieth century, globalising Britain. up to extremism and for not integrating, This then invokes the idea of the Muslim which not only appears unfair ‘but also divisive and so not likely to achieve the ‘ummah’ or ‘community of believers’ (Sayyid, 2000) and echoes Ali’s (1992: 113 much-sought for integration’. cited in Modood et al., 1994) assertion that ‘the global appeal of intellectual Islam ISLAMISM AND BRITISH offers the possibility of a wider world to MUSLIM ‘RADICALISM’ AND live in’, particularly when enacted in the ‘EXTREMISM’ The discussion has as yet not tackled local community, since youth can use the the issue of identification and the ways political and intellectual teachings of Islam in which Islamism features in debates to argue and resist parental pressure (based over radicalism and violent extremism. upon an explicitly cultural understanding With respect to the question of religious of Islam) as much as the pressures of identity, Britain is no exception to a global racism and exclusion they experience trend displaying evidence of pan-Muslim from the majority group. One element solidarities. Long established research in this process, noted by Neilsen (1984) illustrating this in the UK includes how nearly three decades ago, is the tendency Jacobson (1997), amongst others, observed for young people to reject certain customs that religion is proving much more central from overseas that their parents have than other social identities amongst a resurrected in their British localities. A variety of Muslim minorities. Earlier still significant factor is the frequent encounter Knott and Khokher (1993) and Dwyer between Muslims with different ethnic (1999) showed that young Muslim women backgrounds and cultural expressions, all drew a distinction between ‘religion’ of whom hold a valid claim on Islam. What these transactions also facilitate and ‘ethnicity’ in rejecting their parents’ subscription to traditions that were less is the adoption and promotion of transconsistent which the aspirations of young national Muslim and Islamic identities women themselves. This frequently built that are traditionally critical of nationupon a self-conscious exploration of religion state citizenship, and are typically termed as a means of promoting advancement ‘Islamist’. This requires some conceptual in education, career opportunities and disentangling that can be assisted by so forth. Jacobson (1997) referred to this turning to Mondal (2008: 35) who development as the ‘religion-ethnic culture conceives ‘Islamism’ as ‘a form of Muslim distinction’ and contrasted it with her politics concerned with political behaviour second ‘religion-ethnic origin distinction’ embedded in Islamic principles, usually which involves a perception of identity directed at creating an [supra-national] in terms of one’s attachment to a place, Islamic state’. This may be contrasted with while one’s religious identity as a Muslim Lambert’s (2008: 33) narrower distinction denotes belonging to a global community in insisting that an Islamist is ‘a term used which transcends national boundaries (see to describe an Islamic political or social also Baggueley and Hussain, 2008). As activist’. This in turn seems closer to what Mondal, again drawing upon Mandeville, Mandaville (2009: 498) reiterates, Among British Muslims born and raised casts as Muslim politics directed towards in the UK, from about the late 1980s/early ‘a more inclusive formulation that does 1990s, there emerged what might be thought not pursue the establishment of formal of as a search for a ‘universalist’ Islam. To Islamic political systems’ (ibid). Perhaps a some extent this took the form of a rejection of better definition of an ‘Islamist’ or ‘Islamic what they saw as the parochialised religiosity activist’ is someone who believes or states of their parents. This ‘village Islam’, as many that their politics is derived from Islam or saw it, was mired in a past that had little gives primacy to Islamic causes. In this relevance to the challenges of daily life in way we can distinguish it from a ‘Muslim 14

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activist’ who would be concerned with the extremism. Such tensions are elaborated in well-being of Muslims in tandem with the Lambert’s (2008: 34) insistence: The fact that al-Qaeda terrorists adapt well-being of society as a whole. and distort Salafi and Islamist approaches Islam does not mean that Salafis and The fact that al-Qaeda toIslamists are implicitly linked to terrorism or terrorists adapt and extremism-nor does it mean that individual distort Salafi and Islamist Salafis and Islamists are likely to be terrorists […] However, it is axiomatic approaches to Islam does orthatextremists. by the time they become al-Qaeda not mean that Salafis and suicide bombers (or other active terrorists) Muslim recruits have bought into an Islamists are implicitly UK ideology that distorts strands of Salafi and linked to terrorism or Islamist thinking.

extremism.

It is argued, however, that while Islamist identities are by definition challenging, they neither need be ‘extremist’ not ‘violent’. Indeed quite the opposite can be true. One good illustration of this may be garnered from the former head of the Metropolitan Police Service Muslim Contact Unit (MCU), Robert Lambert’s (2008) insider account of a London-based police and community initiative. This initiative worked in partnership with British Islamist groups that are widely portrayed as ‘radical’ and ‘extremist’. Yet in a series of projects since as early as 1994, London-based Islamist Muslim youth workers have been galvanising non-violent responses against Al Qaeda propaganda through forms of community engagement that champion education. While these groups have been challenging Al Qaeda propagandists long before the issue was recognised by the government, these groups’ limited inclusion in counterterrorism efforts has invited significant controversy. As Lambert (2008: 33) details, this controversy emerges from the charge that, in seeking Islamist involvement, the MCU has become an ‘appeaser of extremists’ and has succumbed to an ‘ideological Stockholm Syndrome’. These charges are premised upon a conflation of Islamism and Al Qaeda philosophies or traditions of thought, and the powerful assumption that ‘political radicalism’ leads to violent volu m e 5

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The idea of Islamism will be further discussed below and while the idea of Salafism will reoccur, it won’t be centrally discussed so that it is worth noting here how Lambert (2008: 33), drawing upon Esposito (2003), uses the term to refer to a ‘name derived from salaf, “pious ancestors”, given to a reform movement that emphasises the restoration of Islamic doctrines to pure form, adherence to the Qur’an and Sunnah, rejection of the authority of later interpretations, and maintenance of the unity of ummah – that is, a global Muslim fellowship’. One of the most salient Muslim illustrations of the conflations Lambert is critiquing may be found in The Islamist – a highly influential account by the self-professed ‘former radical’ Ed Hussein. In his memoir of a time spent in various burgeoning and politically active Muslim groupings in London during the 1990s, Hussein traces and critically recounts a journey through a number of Islamist organisations that overlapped with or operated among East London’s Bangladeshi communities, but which also held transnational ambitions. These allegedly included the East London Mosque, Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), Young Muslims Organisation (YMO) and the Islamic Society of Britain (ISB), among others. Hussein’s account insists upon intellectual and political code tendencies in the contemporary articulations of otherwise very disparate strands of modern Islamic political thought. This need not arches quarterly

be invalid, however, when he describes where Islamist activists and organisation take their own sources of influence and inspiration and so forth. Much of this is genealogically premised upon an earlier ‘Islamism’ ushered in under the austere Islam of Wahhabism, promoted by the eighteenth century Arab cleric Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab. Hussein’s account of Islamism moves outwards from this earlier incarnation to couple Hassan al-Banna, who founded the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in Egypt in 1928, with Abu A’la Mawdudi, who founded the Jamat-e-Islami in northern India in the 1930s, with another Egyptian Sayyid Qutb, writing in the 1950s and 1960s. What is omitted in these moves is the contextual bearing that each of these figures wrote in broadly anti-colonial and pre- Independence eras (perhaps with the exception of Qutb). This is repeated in Hussein’s linking of Taqi al-Nabhani, who founded Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT) in Jerusalem in 1953, to contemporary Al Qaeda-inspired philosophies, a reading which leads Hussein (2008) to conclude that Islamists are ‘all at one with Wahhabis in creed’3 Indeed, of all these groupings it is the supra-national HT, outlawed in many Muslim countries, and particularly in the ex-Soviet republics of Central Asia, that draws his most virulent criticism. In Hussein’s account the crucial issue is that such Islamist groups harbour antidemocratic ambitions in their desire for Islamic supremacy, and must not therefore be included as constituents in a political process. It is certainly the case that HT openly, but non-violently, aspires towards what it understands as the Islamisation of societies, the world over, and boasts a detailed conception of its supra-national Islamic state, the Caliphate. This includes a draft constitution that, among other things, outlaws any political parties they deem un-Islamic, excludes women and non-Muslims from ruling positions, and sanctions capital punishment for apostates.4 Though it is also worth 16

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recognising that in this regard HT is not typical of Islamist parties, as Ramadan (1999: 139) reminds us: There was never any question in alBanna’s texts of reducing the shar’ ia to the status of a criminal code. The application of this code has several pre-requisites, primarily that a society has reached a sufficient level of social justice and individual responsibility. […] The first phase of applying the shari’a should involve a process of social reform with the aim of restoring very basic rights to the people. Education, together with the need for involvement in the struggle for social justice, is the watch word of the Muslim Brotherhood. Nevertheless, what does it tell us if by the beginning of the 1990s, HT could count several thousand young British Muslim supporters among its ranks, in Hussein’s account? These levels of recruitment reflected a process of ‘political brainwashing’ that has taken place on Britain’s student campuses and elsewhere, has exploited young Muslims ‘caught between two cultures’ and has been fostered by a segregationist multiculturalism that has facilitated this first step of ‘radicalisation’ on the path to ‘violent extremism’. It is worth noting, however, that while it is true that the search for identity at moments of crisis, what Choudhry (2007: para 8) describes as a ‘cognitive opening’, has often gone hand in hand with lack of religious literacy as two characteristics of those drawn to fringe groups, this does not mean that young people drawn to these groups remain embedded within them over a life course. Not only does Hussein’s own rejection of HT illustrate this, but also Hamid’s (2007: 157) ethnographic work with ex-members reports that: Many young people … credit HT for awakening their religio-political consciousness. HT appeals to a section among young people frustrated with what they see as the inaction of traditional authority in their communities and ineff ectiveness of other Islamic groups. […] Joining HT seems, for most, to be a phase young people go through while at college or university. As they grow volu m e 5

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older, ex-members either join more moderate groups, withdraw from the activist scene, or in some cases join groups that are influenced by HT (emphasis added).

have forsaken everything for what we believe. […] Until we feel security, you will be our targets. Until you stop the bombing, gassing, imprisonment and torture of my people we will not stop this fight. We are at war and The concern, then, should not be to I am a soldier. Now you too will taste the fi x as ‘authentic’ our reading of a variety reality of this situation. of Islamist movements but rather to view them as projects whose ‘meaning, reception Muslim trans-nationalism and political instantiation evolve’ as they enter new contexts (Mandaville, 2009: should not be treated 501). This could be an example of what as a post- or near- 9/11 Said (1984) once termed a ‘travelling phenomenon, but theory’ or even what McLennan (2004) has termed ‘verhicularity’. A related and rather as a space and set equally pressing critique of Hussein is that of practices that have in many ways his account is of decreasing relevance, unless one assumes that there evolved over decades. have been few advances over the last one and a half decades within or around the It is thus problematic that Hussein organizations he discusses. For example, has implicated a wide array of British Butt (2007) insists that Hussein’s account Muslim organisations, such as the Muslim ‘is dated and misleading’ for ‘the groups Council of Britain (MCB) and the Muslim he mentions, and their modus operandi, Association of Britain (MAB), among are more fluid and sophisticated now’.5 It many others, as potentially extremist is also interesting to note how Hussein’s because they may contain Islamists description of HT as involved in violent within their ranks and/or maintain very extremism implies that violent extremists legitimate transnational links to ancestral form part of traditional party structures homelands. As Mandaville (2009: 497) and work with strategic political objectives insists, Muslim trans-nationalism should in mind. This appears inconsistent with not be treated as a post- or near- 9/11 what is known of such groups, as Brighton phenomenon, but rather as a space and set of practices that have evolved over decades. (2007: 14) reminds us: Al-Qaeda’s jihad … derives ‘ from the The events of 9/11 and 7/7, however, luxury of moral choice’. The ideology and certainly had enormous impact on these practice of jihad become gestural rather than institutional fields-not least through the deliberate, ethical rather than political. Its various responses of state authorities and attacks are moments of sanctimonious – self- the fact that they came to view Muslim sanctifying – violence, not coordinated events trans-nationalism primarily through a within a comprehensive strategy. Thus, and national security lens. This is related to Kundani’s (2008: 53) while violent extremism is indeed meant to accomplish certain ends, it is, as Devji critique of Hussein’s distinction between (2005: 3–5) argues, better conceived as true Islam as ‘spiritual’, ‘moderate’ and ‘gestures of duty or risk rather than acts of ‘traditional’, and a distorted form of Islam as ‘ideology’, ‘extremist’, ‘activist’, instrumentality properly speaking’. ‘literalist’, ‘anti-western’ and ‘political’ A graphic illustration of this may as over general and indeed damaging in be found in the posthumous words of its simplicity. As Lambert (2008: 34) has Mohammed Sidique Khan, the lead complained, ‘licensing and encouraging one religious community (e.g., Sufis) bomber of London on 7 July 2005: Our words are dead until we give them against another (e.g., Salafis and Islamists) life with our blood. I and thousands like me may prove divisive and provide further volu m e 5

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ammunition for al-Qaeda propagandists’. It is therefore striking that instead of offering a ‘non-political’ notion of Islam, Hussein is positing a very political right to name what is and what is not legitimate for governments to engage with. Another way of putting this is to draw upon Lambert’s (2008: 34) analogy of Irish republicanism through which he maintains that ‘one of the major lessons of that long campaign was UK counter-terrorism’s failure to adequately distinguish terrorists from the Republican Catholic communities from where they sought support. […] Nor was Irish Catholicism a key pointer to Provisional IRA terrorism’. The wider implication being that if political lessons are to be learned, then a more fruitful means of engaging a variety of Muslim groups, across a political spectrum, would proceed on the understanding that complex forms of democratic politics, where citizens have widely different sets of beliefs, is a challenge for – and not an obstacle to – State-Muslim engagement. Dr Nasar Meer is Senior Lecturer in Sociology at the University of Northumbria. He is currently serving as the Minda de Gunzberg Fellow at Harvard University and a Visiting Fellow with the Institute for Advanced Studies in the Humanities (IASH) at the University of Edinburgh. [www.nasarmeer.com]

BIBLIOGRAPHY Bagguley, P. and Hussain, Y (2008). ‘Riotous Citizens: Ethnic Conflict in Multicultural Britain’. London: Ashgate. Bartlett, J. and Birdwell, J (2010). ‘From Suspects to Citizens: Preventing Violent Extremism in the Big Society’.

Department for Communities and Local Government (2008). ‘Preventing Violent Extremism: A Strategy for Delivery’. London: HMSO. Fekete, L (2004). ‘Anti-Muslim Racism and the European Security State’, Race and Class, 46 (1), 4–29. Gove, M (2006). ‘Celsius 7/7’. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. Jacobson, J (1997). ‘Perceptions of Britishness’, Nations & Nationalism, 3 (2), pp. 165–79. Joppke, C (2009). ‘Limits of integration policy: Britain and her Muslims’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 35 (3), 453-472. Joppke, C (2004). ‘The Retreat of Multiculturalism in the Liberal State: Theory and Policy’, British Journal of Sociology, 55 (2), 237–57. Lambert, R (2008). ‘Empowering Salafis and Islamists against Al-Qaeda: A London counter-terrorism case study’, Political Science (PS) Online January. Manderville, P (2009). ‘Muslim transnational identity and state responses in Europe and the UK after 9/11’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 35 (3), 491-506. McGhee, D (2008). ‘The End of Multiculturalism? Terrorism, Integration & Human Rights’, Open University Press & McGrawHill Education. Meer, N (2012). ‘Misrecognising Muslim Consciousness in Europe’, Ethnicities, 12 (2), doi:10.1177/1468796811431295. Meer, N (2009). ‘Identity articulations, mobilisation and autonomy in the movement for Muslim schools in Britain’, Race, Ethnicity and Education. Meer, N and Modood, M (2008). The Multicultural State We’re In: Muslims, ‘Multiculture’ and the ‘Civic Re-balancing’ of British Multiculturalism’. Political Studies. Modood, T (2008a). ‘‘Multiculturalism after 7/7: A Scapegoat or a Hope for the Future?’, RUSI, 153 ( 2), pp. 14–17.

Brighton, S (2007). ‘British Muslims, Multiculturalism and UK Foreign Policy: ‘intgration’ and ‘cohesion’ in and beyond the state’, International Affairs, 83 (1), pp: 1-17.

Modood, T (2008b). ‘Multicultural Citizenship and the Shar’ia Storm’, Open Democracy, 14 February, 2008. http:// www.opendemocracy.net/faith_ideas/Europe_islam/ multiculturalism_future [Accessed 13 July 2008].

Butt, R (2007). ‘How Mohammed became Ed’, The Guardian, 9 May.

Modood, T (2005b). ‘Multicultural politics: Racism, ethnicity and Muslims in Britain’. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Cameron, D (2007). ‘Address to Handsworth Mosque’, Birmingham, 30 January.

Moore, C (2006). ‘How Cromwell Gave Us Joan Collins and Other Luminaries’, Daily Telegraph, 17 June. Available from: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/opinion/main. jhtml?xml=/opinion/2006/06/17/do1702.xml&sSheet=/ opinion/2006/06/17/ixop.html - Accessed 13 July 2008.

Choudhry, T (2007). ‘The Role of Muslim Identity Politics in Radicalisation’, Department for Communities and Local Government.

DeHanas, D., O’Toole, T., Modood, T., and Meer, N. (2010). ‘Muslim Participation in Contemporary Governance: A Literature Review Summary’, University of Bristol.

Pew (2006). ‘The Great Divide: How Westerners and Muslims View Each Other’. Washington DC: The Pew Global Attitudes Project.

Commission on Integration and Cohesion (COIC) (2007) Our Shared Future: Themes, Messages and Challenges: A Final Analysis of the Key Themes from the Commission on Integration and Cohesion Consultation. London: HMSO.

Prins, G and Salisbury, R (2008). ‘Risk, Threat and Security’, RUSI, 153 (1).

Cohen, N (2007). ‘What’s Left? How Liberals Lost Their Way’. London: Harper Perennial.

Phillips, M (2006). ‘Londonistan: How Britain Created a Terror State Within’. London: Gibson Square Books.

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Policy Exchange (2007). ‘Living Apart Together: British Muslims and the Paradox of Multiculturalism’. London: Policy Exchange. Policy Innovation Unit (PIU) (2001). ‘Improving Labour Market Achievements for Ethnic Minorities in British Society’. www. cabinet-office.gov.uk/innovation/2001 /ethnicity/scope.shtml Radcliffe, L (2004). ‘A Muslim Lobby at Whitehall?’ Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, 15 (3), 365-386. Said, E (1984). ‘Travelling Theory’, The World, The Text, The Critic. London: Vintage. Sageman, M (2008). ‘Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the 21st Century’, University of Pennsylvania Press.

ENDNOTES 1. Foreign and Commonwealth Office, ‘EIWG fact sheet’, http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/ Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/

ShowPage&c=Page&cid= 1153388310360 - accessed 19 Oct. 2006. The ‘Radical Middle Way’ project – http://www. radicalmiddleway.co.uk – was also supported by the Home Office, and according to the DCLG over 30,000 people have presently attended the first seven of twelve road shows and the organisers expect more than 100,000 to attend in total (see http://www.communities.gov.uk/documents/ communities/ pdf/151792.pdf for more details). 2. Outlined by Tony Blair himself. See the prime minister’s press conference, 5 Aug. 2005, http://www.pm.gov.uk/ output/Page8041.asp - accessed 9 Nov. 2005. 3. Andrew Anthony’s (2004) too insists that ‘Wahabbism … informs the spread of Islamic fundamental’. ‘Multiculturalism is dead. Hurrah?’ The Guardian, 8 April, 2004. 4. See http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.info/english/constitution. htm 5. See also Yayha Birt’s review: http://www.yahyabirt. com/?p=71

BOOK PROMOTION

European Multiculturalisms: Cultural, Religious & Ethnic Challenges EDITED BY ANNA TRIANDAFYLLIDOU, TARIQ MODOOD & NASAR MEER This book proposes a common European intellectual framework to evaluate recent developments de in European multiculturalism. The heightened security awareness in th the wake of the 9/11 attacks and the London and Madrid bombings has resulted in a 'crisis of multiculturalism'. E Each chapter in this interdisciplinary book reviews the actual state of affairs in se several countries (Belgium, UK, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece and Spain) in relation to the theories behind immigrant minority claims. With a special focus oon Muslim immigrants, the contributors look at the value issues entrenched in m multiculturalism and the policy challenges and measures adopted to address them. E European Multiculturalisms: Cultural, Religious and Ethnic Challenges provides a good overview of different approaches to multiculturalism, as well as examining issues relating to citizenship, diversity, civic recognition, gender, religious diversity & education, integration, anti-discrimination policies and social policy.

European Multiculturalisms: Cultural, Religious & Ethnic Challenges, Edited by Anna Triandafyllidou, Tariq Modood and Nasar Meer. Published in November 2011 by Edinburgh University Press volu m e 5

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Counter-Terrorism: Police and Community Engagement in Britain and the US BASIA SPALEK & LAURA ZAHRA MCDONALD

he notion that ‘communities can defeat terrorism’ has generated much interest in Britain and in the US, especially in the aftermath of 9/11 and 7/7 where policy makers and others have begun focussing upon the potential advantages of community involvement in counter-terrorism (Briggs et al. 2006; Silk, 2010). The notion that communities can defeat terrorism heralds a potentially progressive departure from traditional counter-terrorism policies and practices, which have relied historically upon ‘hard’ policing tactics such as the use of informants, covert policing operations and police officers, the use of stop and search, surveillance and other means. Nonetheless, the notion that communities can defeat terrorism has generated, and continues to generate, much controversy in the UK as well as in the US. This is partly because communitybased approaches to counter-terrorism may be targeted at communities rather than focussed upon, and supportive of, communities. So, for example, community-based approaches have been experienced at times as a kind of Trojan horse for ‘top-down’ state security-led approaches that involve the penetration of communities to be used as spying networks (Goldsmith, 2005; Hewitt, 2010). Indeed, an accusation made against the government’s Prevent strategy in Britain is that it may have alienated sections of Muslim communities because the policy may have encouraged community members to watch and share information on suspicious neighbours or friends with police (Kundnani, 2009). In the US, community outreach programmes have also been criticised for ‘spying on communities’ (e.g. Sullivan & Hawley, 2011). It seems, therefore, that an important distinction to 20

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be made here is between those communitybased approaches to counter-terrorism that are community-focussed and those which are community-targeted, for there can be a tendency to idealise and romanticise overly the notion of communities countering terrorism. This article examines the notion that communities can defeat terrorism by presenting a model of police and community engagement which distinguishes between community-targeted and communityfocussed approaches, based upon more than five years of in-depth research into police and community engagement and partnership work in relation to counterterrorism (Spalek & Lambert, 2008; Spalek, El-Awa & McDonald, 2009; Spalek & McDonald, 2009; Spalek & Lambert, 2010; Spalek, 2010; McDonald, 2011; Spalek, 2011).

‘COMMUNITY’, ‘ENGAGEMENT’ AND ‘PARTNERSHIP’: SOME DEFINITIONS ‘Community’, ‘engagement’ and ‘partnership’ are terms that require some examination. The notion of ‘community’ is problematic and highly contested; it can be a catch-all phrase used as a way of simplifying, merging and combining complex social identities and groupings for the purposes of policy development and implementation. Furthermore, although the term ‘community’ gives the outward impression of neutrality, the ways in which the term tends to be used suggests that it is loaded with assumptions about the kinds of social identities that are included, as well as fostered, for the purposes of community participation, engagement and scrutiny of performance. Many communities might be thought volu m e 5

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of as being both locally and geographically specific, as well as consisting of connections between individuals across wider spaces in relation to factors like ethnicity, culture, politics and so on. Some communities have been conceptualised as consisting of ‘diasporas’, which are both local and global in character, with the development of new technologies enabling dispersed populations to interact and link together important parts of their social and cultural lives (Gilroy, 2002). In diasporas, individuals gain a sense of belonging, devising narratives about themselves and their origins, about how they are linked to broader global religions, nationalities and/ or ethnicities as well as to localities that are ‘simultaneously home and a place of exile’ (Rew and Campbell, 1999: 167).

Communities constitute sites at which the social world is experienced, acted upon and understood, even though these sites may be temporary, in constant flux and underpinned by power relations. Although the notion of community is problematic, and can only partially ever be understood in relation to micro and macro level fluctuations in relation to wide-ranging factors like history, politics, geography, religion, culture and so forth, it is important to stress that communities constitute sites at which the social world is experienced, acted upon and understood, even though these sites may be temporary, in constant flux and underpinned by power relations. Community might be thought of as a space of belonging, as consisting of shared meanings, comprised of one or more of a combination of geographical, imaginative, emotional, political and other ties (Lash, 1994; Kennedy & Roudemetof, 2004). According to Anderson (2011), volu m e 5

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violence committed for or in the name of communities – at local, national and transnational levels – is an important dynamic to consider, as popular support is necessary for social change (Anderson 2011). Community perceptions of the legitimacy or not of violence should also be considered (Anderson, 2011), as should the theological influence in relation to such perceptions, for example, in the case of martyrdom (Tyler, 2010). Social and political factors should also feature when trying to understand community support for terrorism; social factors like poverty or disenfranchisement can play a role (Schmid 2007; Tyler 2010), and according to Alden (2009): the social nature of suicide terrorism makes societal support a necessary ingredient for its continued occurrence (Alden 2009:ab). It is important to stress that support within communities may fluctuate. According to Crenshaw (1981: 388):

Lack of popular support at the outset of a conflict does not mean that the terrorists' aims lack general appeal. Even though they cannot immediately mobilise widespread and active support, over the course of the conflict they may acquire the allegiance of the population. (Crenshaw 1981:388) Furthermore, passive support by communities may comprise the ‘backbone’ of terrorist action; thus, according to Galam (2002: 269), only one passive supporter is needed to aid/allow a terrorist at any one time. Hence, counter-terrorism policy and practice should aim towards reducing community support:

The strategic centre of gravity for militant Islamic terrorist groups is the popular support of the Muslim world. Popular support provides the terrorists [with] invaluable sources of funding, manpower, legitimacy, and the real potential to threaten entrenched governments in Muslim countries. Without this popular support, Osama bin Laden and other violent global Muslims will not be able to achieve their desired end-state. (Kohn 2002:4) arches quarterly

There also appear to be a number of factors that affect popular and/or community support for terrorism. It is important to consider the social programmes that some terrorist groups may provide; for example, the charitable work supported by Hamas. The IRA responded to law and order issues in Northern Ireland when police were distrusted by the majority of Catholics. The suffering of the collective may also influence public support in that if the atrocities committed by terrorists are deemed disproportionate and have created significant suffering within a community then support for the terrorist group (s) may decline (Bloom, 2004). State repression may also influence popular support. What then is state engagement like in relation to counter-terrorism? Policing is one aspect of this, for police officers, whilst working on behalf of community members, are empowered to enforce statedriven laws. Engagement in relation to policing might be considered to comprise of ‘the process of enabling the participation of citizens and communities in policing at their chosen level, ranging from providing information… to empowering them to identify and implement solutions to local problems and influence strategic priorities and decisions’ (Myhill: 2004: 4). This suggests that engagement can be an effective tool in developing a communityfocussed approach to counter-terrorism, for engagement includes empowering citizens to identify and implement solutions to local problems. Partnership can also be an effective tool. Partnership might be defined as involving equality, transparency and legitimate cooperation between partners, which may involve different interests forming a partnership to carry out work that they decide collectively to do (Cook, 2006). Partnership work has a number of inherent difficulties. For example, there may be differences in the resources that are available to different groups, and different organisations are also likely to have different sets of priorities, so that there can be considerable difficulties arising from, and tensions within, partnership 22

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approaches. At the same time, partnership work can be difficult as it involves power differentials and so community groups may not feel that they are actual partners in the policy process (Thacher, 2001). Police-community partnerships within a counter-terrorism arena have been documented by researchers (Lambert, 2008; 2010; Spalek et al. 2009, Spalek, (2010), McDonald (2011), Spalek (2011), Baker (2012). Community policing seems to have played a central role in the development of key partnerships between police officers and community members. According to Virta (2008), although it has previously been argued that community-based policing is no longer ‘in vogue’, having been replaced by reassurance policing or intelligence-led policing, community-based policing is still very much prominent in policing agendas. Rather than there having been a paradigm shift from community-based policing to intelligence-led policing, therefore, both styles of policing co-exist, albeit there being different emphases on the different styles in different contexts. Within the post 7/7 counter-terrorism context in England and Wales, linkages between community-based policing and intelligence-based models of policing can most clearly be seen in the way in which the recently established ‘neighbourhood policing’ model is being connected explicitly to intelligence-gathering. It has been argued that under the neighbourhood policing model, which contains elements of community-based policing, in responding to individuals’ routine security concerns around issues such as anti-social behaviour or crime police officers will be more likely to persuade community members of the benefits of assisting them. Neighbourhood policing is being linked explicitly to counter-terrorism activities in that it is argued that ‘neighbourhood policing is a process that can be harnessed to establish the presence of any suspicions about potential terrorist activities’ (Innes: 2006: 14). The developments set out above in relation to the British context can also be seen in volu m e 5

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the US, where there has been an increasing focus upon the utilisation of communitybased policing within a counter-terrorism context, with partnerships being developed between Muslim, Arab, Sikh and South Asian American communities and police. It is argued that these partnerships have a number of important strands to them: they are said to provide police with important cultural and linguistic insights, vital information and cooperation, and informed observations that can become part of a productive strategy for terror crime prevention. At the same time, these

Partnerships between police officers and communities in the US has been questioned as a result of the extensive use of informants within Arab Muslim communities alongside other ‘hard’ policing strategies. partnerships are said to help to ensure the mitigation of damage to communities that results from ‘hard’ policing strategies, and they also purportedly enable hate crimes to be investigated effectively and prosecuted (Ramirez, 2008). However, the extent to which there are real partnerships between police officers and communities in the US has been questioned as a result of the extensive use of informants within Arab Muslim communities alongside other ‘hard’ policing strategies, which have created distrust and anger from within communities (Sullivan & Hawley, 2011). Partnerships highlight the importance of targeted work with individuals deemed at risk of committing acts of terrorism, involving community members and the police. This has been a neglected issue, given that the debate around preventing volu m e 5

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terrorism and community policing has tended to be one dominated by a generalist approach, one which although highlighting the importance of local contexts, nonetheless posits that neighbourhood policing, through responding to Muslim communities’ concerns regarding particular signal crimes like burglary, hate crime and drugs, can help build enough rapport with community members for them to provide police with community intelligence (Innes, Abbott, Lowe & Roberts, 2007). Further attention needs to be paid to specific partnerships between police officers and members of Muslim communities that have been developed, where young Muslims deemed at risk of committing acts of terrorism are targeted for interventions. It is not necessarily the case that intelligence regarding young people at risk is widely available amongst members of Muslim communities, but rather this intelligence is perhaps concentrated amongst particular groupings and networks, and so preventing terrorism is not a question of necessarily engendering trust between all Muslim communities and police but rather developing trust between specific Muslim groups and police. We would also like to introduce the notion of connectors, individuals who may experience community memberships in highly complex ways, and are able to negotiate forms of frame alignment so that groups with very different ‘positionalities’ are able to work with each other, for common goals. A key example of this are politically radical activists who maintain their views while working with police officers who represent a state with which they feel disconnect, but with whom they are willing to work in order to save lives and prevent violence emanating from the state or grassroots.

COMMUNITY-FOCUSSED AND COMMUNITY-TARGETED APPROACHES TO COUNTERTERRORISM For Brennan et al (2007), the notion of governance is to be understood as that which includes both government and arches quarterly

civil society, with the state and the civic engaging in decision-making and other processes, through the interaction of topdown, state-led, imperatives and bottomup approaches which include networks, groups, communities and others that are part of what might be deemed civil society. Similar to traditional forms of crime, the governance of ‘new terrorism’ reflects broader developments in governance, whereby responsibility and accountability for preventing terror crime is focused increasingly towards local levels, whilst at the same time centralised control in terms of resources and target setting is maintained. Also, formal responsibilities for policy implementation and service delivery are being shared progressively across statutory, voluntary agencies and community groups in the form of partnership work. Previously, we have highlighted that in relation to counter-terrorism, community can be viewed as both ‘problem’ and ‘solution’. Where ‘community’ is viewed as ‘problem’, counter-terrorism strategies can be used which target those communities deemed problematic. Where ‘community’ is viewed as ‘solution’, then counterterrorism strategies can be used which involve community members and may also involve partnerships between communities and statutory agencies. Interestingly, different state and other agencies and groupings may view community organisations differentially, and so whilst one state agency or individual working within the agency, or one governmental body, may view a particular community group as a ‘problem’, other agencies and individuals may view the same community group through the lens of ‘solution’. Tensions are, therefore, perhaps inevitable. Moreover, wider public opinion may also view particular community groups through the ‘problem’ lens, perhaps for being religious fundamentalists for example; state actors involved in engaging and developing long-term partnerships with members of ‘problem’ communities are thus likely to attract criticism. It is important to distinguish between community-focussed and community24

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targeted approaches to counter-terrorism. A community-targeted approach might be characterised as one that ignores the issue of gaining the consent of those communities that are being targeted, with the well-being of targeted communities often being compromised in the name of the broader goal of state security. At the same time, a community-targeted approach is characterised by distrust between communities and security officials and practitioners. Communityfocussed approaches, on the other hand, can perhaps be characterised by partnership between communities and state officials; by community consent and participation in the actual governance of the various strategies and approaches that are applied; and by trust existing between state officials and security practitioners and community members (Spalek et al. 2009). At the same time, a communityfocussed approach embraces communities for their complexities in relation to ethnicity, religion, politics, emotions, grievances, locales, histories and so on. This approach seeks to work with rather than to manipulate communities. The distinction between communityfocussed and community-targeted approaches is helpful in that this allows us to go beyond the rather simplistic binary that is often portrayed in research literature in relation to ‘top-down’ and ‘bottomup’ approaches to counter-terrorism. This is because top-down approaches, whilst predominantly and traditionally being community-targeted, might, with appropriate community consent, be community-focussed. Thus, tactics such as stop and search and the use of surveillance technology can be community-focussed where community consultation has taken place, where there are partnerships between security practitioners and community members, and where trust has been developed. At the same time, ‘bottom-up’ approaches can be community-targeted rather than community-focussed where community participation is not based on real partnerships but rather is used to instigate state-led agendas. For example, volu m e 5

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It is important for policy makers to develop policies that are clearly community-focussed and not community-targeted. the use of informants draws upon the skills and networks of community members; however, these often operate in secrecy with no wider community consent or involvement in their governance. At the same time, ‘top-down’ approaches to counter-terrorism can draw upon communities as part of a strategy of counter-subversion, where countersubversion involves strategies which aim to target and stigmatise those groupings deemed subversives in the same way that terrorists would be targeted. This has the potential to add to intra and inter community tensions. It is important for policy makers to develop policies that are clearly community-focussed and not communitytargeted. Accountability seems to be a key issue for policing in relation to community-focussed approaches to counter-terrorism. Accountability might be understood as being accessible and visible to communities; it may also be about police officers being open about the fact that they are counter-terrorism officers. Accountability is not without difficulties. It can involve some challenging interaction between police officers and community members. Within the counter-terrorism arena, which has been dominated by secrecy, police officers will have to meet with community members and provide forums through which vital exchanges can take place, even if those exchanges are, at times, quite tense. A key aspect to accountability is information-sharing, and police officers have to decide what information to release to communities regarding terrorism and counter-terrorism related issues, how to go about sharing this and to whom this should be made available. Information-sharing is seen as a key way of building trust, for through openness it can volu m e 5

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be possible to dispel rumours regarding police operations, as well as challenge media stereotyping. Community intelligence in relation to counter-terrorism is particularly sensitive, especially given the pervasive use of informants by intelligence and policing agencies within wide-ranging historical and international contexts (Hewitt, 2010). For police officers, intelligence is part of their everyday role; it is a fundamental aspect of policing. Intelligence that comes to the attention of the police, through the national intelligence services or other means, is checked with other sources of information; the role of communities can be crucial in helping to assess its validity. Community members can play a crucial role in helping to risk assess those individuals who have come to the attention of the police or other agencies due to a perceived vulnerability to violent extremism, for there may be aspects to individuals’ lives that only community members can witness and understand. However, it is important that partnership is pursued as a goal in relation to intelligence/information sharing between communities and police and other agencies. There may be a danger that statutory agencies enter into relationships and agreements with community members that may prioritise the risk and other needs of those agencies rather than the risks and the needs of community members themselves. Community members who work with the police and other agencies as part of multi-agency forums assessing risk may be placing themselves at high risk of reprisals from members of their own communities or any networks to which they belong. Hence, agreements which represent fully both communities’ and police and other statutory agencies’ requirements and parameters of operation are crucial. It is important to take into consideration, and to acknowledge, that within multi-agency approaches to assessing and working with risks of violent extremism, community members may face risks that statutory agencies do not face, and vice versa, hence the need for clear arches quarterly

discussion about how any protocols of engagement can capture both the needs of communities and those of statutory agencies (see also Baker, 2012). Risk is an important and often neglected feature of police-community engagement and partnership in relation to counterterrorism. First is the risk that individuals working for statutory agencies may take during the course of their work. Individuals may engage in actions which, they argue, helps prevent terrorism but which the agencies that they work for will perhaps discourage them from undertaking. This may be partly because the organisational cultures of the agencies themselves are more risk averse than the individuals working for them. Another issue is that of who identifies risk, how this is managed and, ultimately, who decides whether a set of vulnerabilities constitutes risk of violent extremism. For instance, there is a danger that there can be a tendency for over-assessing vulnerability and for too many cases to be brought to the attention of neighbourhood police officers, who then have to decide whether a particular case is so insubstantial that it does not reach the attention of counter-terrorism units nor of intervention providers in relation to preventing terrorism. At the same time, it may be that all cases deemed ‘borderline’ are passed on to counter-terrorism units or to intervention providers and so there is a potential here for net-widening, for bringing in greater numbers of individuals for intervention. There is of course an inherent issue here: that in encouraging agencies and staff across wide-ranging sectors to look for signs of vulnerability in the first place this is encouraging a society to look for risks in relation to violent extremism. With the focus of the Prevent strategy having been on Muslim communities there is the inherent danger that Islamic beliefs and practices are stigmatised (Spalek & McDonald, 2010). A further dimension to risk is in a situation where risk is being assessed by different agencies; whose voice carries most weight, and is there a potential that communities’ voices in particular are marginalised? Is 26

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there a very fine line in risk-assessing cases that involve individuals who might be dealt with constructively under Prevent but who also might be dealt with under the Pursue strand of the government’s counterterrorism strategy? Who ultimately decides whether an individual has passed from Prevent intervention to Pursue? Moreover, in relation to the notion of partnership, is there equality, transparency and legitimate cooperation between partners when cases which fall between Prevent and Pursue are apparent? It is also important to stress that trust should not be exploited by police officers for intelligence-gathering mechanisms. Trust can help to enable communities to begin to discuss openly any perceived vulnerabilities they may have in relation to violent extremism, an issue that carries with it much sensitivity.

CONCLUSION The single, most important, dimension to police and community engagement in relation to counter-terrorism is the extent to which this is community-focussed or community-targeted. It is important to stress that this is not a binary, but rather a continuum, so that whilst some policies and activities may lie more towards the community-focussed side, other policies and activities may lie more towards the community-targeted side. It is, therefore, important to assess where a programme of activities, or a particular initiative or a set of initiatives, lies on this continuum in order for policing, community and other bodies to be able to implement future policies and practices. In this article we have moved purposefully away from using the often utilised notion of community-based counter-terrorism because the research that we have been undertaking suggests that this is an overused notion which fails to distinguish between community-based strategies that are targeted at communities and those community-based strategies that are focussed upon communities, and this distinction is fundamental to understanding counter-terrorism policy and practice. volu m e 5

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Dr Basia Spalek is a Reader in Communities & Justice within the Institute of Applied Social Studies at the University of Birmingham. She has led a number of high profile research projects looking specifically at community-based approaches to counter-terrorism, including a Connected Communities Programme, exploring conflict within and between communities; a collaborative project involving researchers in Britain, the USA and in Northern Ireland; and a Religion & Society Programme examining approaches involving Muslims and the police.

Center Of Gravity: Naval War Coll Newport Ri Joint Military Operations Dept. Lash, S. (1994). ‘Reflexivity and its Doubles: Structure, Aesthetics, Community’, in U. Beck, A. Giddens and S. Lash eds. Reflexive Modernization: Politics, Tradition and Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order, Cambridge: Polity Press, pp.110–73. Lambert, R. (2008). ‘Salafi and Islamist Londoners: Stigmatised Minority Faith Communities Countering Al-Qaida’, Crime, Law and Social Change, 50: pp.73 – 89.

Spalek is also an Ambassador to the Make Justice Work campaign and has acted as an adviser/consultant to: inter alia, the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) and the Equality and Human Rights Commission. She is a Nominated Social Expert by the Human Rights Law Centre, University of Nottingham and the Director of a new international forum on police community engagement for conflict transformation: pcct-hub.org.

Lambert, R. (2011). Countering al-Qaida: Police and Muslim Communities in Partnership, London: Hurst.

Dr Laura Zahra McDonald is a Research Fellow at the Institute of Applied Social Studies, University of Birmingham, and co-founder of PCCT Hub. Her research interests include Islam, intersectionality, community, and security. She is keen to continue developing the links between academic research, grassroots activism and practitioner perspectives, particularly with regards to the impact of state policies on minority groups.

Silk, D. (2010). Planning Outreach between Muslim Communities and Police in the USA and the UK, PhD dissertation, Department of Lifelong Education, Administration, and Policy, University of Georgia, Athens, GA.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Rew, A. & Campbell, J. (1999). ‘The Political Economy of Identity and Affect’, in: J. Campbell, J., and Rew, A. eds. Identity and Affect: Experiences of Identity in a Global World, London: Pluto Press, pp.1–36.

Spalek, B., EL Awa., S., & McDonald, L.Z. (2008). Police-Muslim Engagement and Partnerships for the Purposes of CounterTerrorism: an examination //www.ahrc.ac.uk/News/Latest/Documents/Rad%20Islam%20 Summary%20Report.pdf

Anderson, E. G. (2011). ‘A dynamic model of counterinsurgency policy including the effects of intelligence, public security, popular support, and insurgent experience’ System Dynamics Review, 27: n/a. doi: 10.1002/sdr.443.

Spalek, B., El-Awa, S. & McDonald, L.Z. (2009). Police-Muslim Engagement for the Purpose of Counter-Terrorism: An Examination, Birmingham, UK: The University of Birmingham.

Briggs, Rachel, Catherine Fieschi, and Hannah Lownsbrough. (2006). Bringing it Home: CommunityBased Approaches to Counter-Terrorism. London: Demos.

Spalek, B. & Lambert, R. (2008). ‘Muslim Communities, CounterTerrorism and CounterRadicalisation: A Critically Reflective Approach to Engagement’, International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice, vol. 36, 257-70, doi:10.1016/j.ijlcj.2008.08.004.

Crenshaw M. (1981). ‘The Causes of Terrorism’ Comparative Politics, Vol. 13, No. 4 (Jul), pp. 379-399 Galam S. (2002). The September 11 attack: A percolation of individual passive support. The European Physical Journal, Vol. 26, No. 3, 269-272, DOI: 10.1140/epjb/e20020089 Gilroy, P. (2002). ‘Diaspora and the detours of identity’, in K. Woodward ed. Identity and Difference, London: Sage, pp 299–346. Goldsmith, A. (2005). ‘Police Reform and the Problem of Trust’ Theoretical Criminology 9 (4): 443-470. Baker, Abdul-Haqq (2011). ‘Engagement and Partnership in Community-based Approaches to Counter-Terrorism’ in: Spalek, B. ed. Community-Based Approaches to CounterTerrorism Palgrave.

Spalek, B. & Lambert, R. (2010). ‘Partnering Muslim Communities for the Purposes of Counter-Terrorism’ in: Goodwin, M. & Eatwell, R. eds. The ‘New’ Extremism in 21st Century Britain London: Taylor & Francis pp.103-122. Spalek, B. (2010). ‘Community Policing, Trust and Muslim Communities in Relation to ‘New Terrorism’ Politics & Policy Vol. 38 (4) pp.789-815. Spalek, B. (2011, in press). ‘Researching Muslim Communities and Islam Within the Context of Counter-Terrorism: A Critical Reflection’ Religion, State and Society. Sullivan, E. & Hawley, C. (2011). ‘Angry Over Spying, Muslims Say: ‘Don’t Call NYPD’, November 14th. http://ap.stripes. com/dynamic/stories/U/US_NYPD_INTELLIGENCE?SIT E=DCSAS&SECTION=HOME&TEMPLATE=DEFAULT&CTI ME=2011-10-26-19-00-17

Baker, Abdul-Haqq (2012). ‘Engagement and Partnership in Community-based approaches to Counter-Terrorism’ in: Spalek, B., ed Community Based Approaches to Counter Terrorism, Hertfordshire: Palgrave. Hewitt, S. (2010). Snitch!: A History of the Modern Intelligence Informer, London: Continuum. Kennedy, P. & Roudometof, V. (2004). ‘Transnationalism in a Global Age’, in: Kennedy, P. and Roudometof , V. eds. Communities Across Borders: New Immigrants and Transnational Cultures, London: Routledge, pp.1–26. Kohn, Bryan S. (2002). Attacking Islamic Terrorism’s Strategic

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A Grand American Strategy of Counter-Terrorism ROBERT D. CRANE

GRAND STRATEGY

ountering 21st century terrorism requires the same philosophy of “grand strategy” that was developed to counter the 20th century terrorism of Stalinistic Communism. Although the 19th century British first used this term to support their imperial expansion in Asia, the paradigmatic substance of the concept was developed two millennia earlier by Sun Tzu in China and by Clausewitz in 18th century Europe. In the early 1960s, the same substance was introduced under the term “total war” by the French General of the Army, Andre Beaufre, who was the personal strategist for Charles de Gaulle.1 Shortly after the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, this was developed further at the new Centre for Strategic Studies (later misnamed The Centre for Strategic and International Studies) under the name “Philosophy of Strategy”.2 Later in the 1960s, the ideative core of what could be called holistic or tawhidian strategy was applied to specific foreign policy issues. For example, the constructive role of Islam in the Middle East as a force in the rise and fall of civilisations and in distinguishing friend from foe;3 the power of the search for justice, community coherence and supra-national regionalism as a support rather than a threat to enlightened American foreign policy in Southeast Asia, and as a reason to reject bombing civilians as a means to combat the spread of Communism from Vietnam throughout Southeast Asia;4 and the rehabilitation of the classical principles of human rights as a framework for American foreign policy.5 After the fall of Communism in 1990, this “grand strategy” was applied to counter 28

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the more amorphous threat of insurgents under the banner of a politicised Islam.6 After 9/11, this approach to the grand philosophy of strategy was developed further to counter the asymmetric challenge of terrorists who use modern technology against its originators, with dozens of articles published in the newly online edition of The American Muslim.7

THE GRAND STRATEGY OF GLOBAL VISION: OPENING AMERICAN HEARTS AND MINDS The challenge to Muslims in America today is how to make common cause with those who are determined to fight the “evil empire” once based in the proverbial “caves of Afghanistan”, but who think that to do so they must attack Islam as a global religion. The challenge is how to educate the detractors of Islam about the sophisticated tradition of Islamic thought so that they can distinguish the religion from those Muslims who are equally ignorant and violate all its principles. Effective education about Islam should focus on the paradigm of natural law, especially in its major components of justice as expressed in human responsibilities and rights and equally in the empowerment of justice through faith-based reconciliation, because these are basic to the traditions of America and to the classical teachings of all the world religions.8 Jeremy Henzell Thomas emphasizes the role of education and the universality of spiritual awareness: “One of the pressing challenges for America is to open its mind and heart to the validity of non-American perspectives, or to the existence of other ways. This needs to start in schools with far greater emphasis on knowledge of world history, geography and other cultures. There is no point in talking about volu m e 5

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The most insidious threat to every individual person, indeed to all humankind, is the temptation to abandon one’s transcendent purpose in life and one’s global vision in order to focus only on mere survival, especially through religious tribalism. the underlying convergence of Islamic and American principles unless their followers have respect for and willingness to learn from diversity… The scourge is tribal partisanship, whether American or Muslim. The … best hope for mankind is not the compulsion inherent in exported fundamentalist and politicised ideologies and religious systems, whether American or Muslim, totalitarian or liberal… but it is the adherence of mankind to the ideal of the fully human being represented in all authentic spiritual traditions.9 The most insidious threat to every individual person, indeed to all humankind, is the temptation to abandon one’s transcendent purpose in life and one’s global vision in order to focus only on mere survival, especially through religious tribalism. When a civilisation becomes obsessed with maintaining order just to survive, at the expense of justice and freedom, the civilisation dies. This is the iron law of history. Muslims have a responsibility to build bridges of understanding with all communities through civic engagement in public arenas. Opening the hearts and minds of Americans to Islam and Muslims will require a two-way commitment by America’s general public on the one hand and its Muslims on the other. The spiritual and faith-based approach calls for volu m e 5

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Americans to be open to understanding the true message of Islam, which is the pursuit of peace, prosperity and freedom through faith-based, compassionate justice. The recurring acts of terrorism by some Muslims aimed at America or other western countries, however, create a huge disconnect between them and what Islam teaches. These wanton acts undermine the potential of interfaith understanding and cooperation and hamper communication. To be sure, American Muslim leaders and those abroad have issued numerous statements of condemnation after every terrorist incident.10 But it is obviously insufficient to erase doubts about that disconnect and keep the hope alive that their non-Muslim partners in the dialogue will open their hearts and minds to Islam. Even those non-Muslims who are open to the dialogue and recognise that the ongoing war in Afghanistan and the continuing conflicts in Palestine and Kashmir, for example, tend to radicalise Muslims, get frustrated by acts of violence and wonder why such a disconnect exists. Moreover, they tend to become sceptical of the pristine message of classical Islam. It appears that unless American Muslims take some concrete steps to confront the problem of recurring terrorism by Muslims, the prospects of the general public opening their hearts and minds to Islam and Muslims will remain limited. This would require a strategy on the part of American Muslim leaders to create a new paradigm that obviates the use of violence as a response to violence. Peace through mutual respect, personal equity, institutional transformation and Muslim leadership using the best of classical Islamic and American thought in the present will build a better future for everyone.

THE PARADIGM OF GLOBAL PLURALISM The future of America and global civilisation will depend on whether the world’s nations can join to bring out the best of each civilisation in order to build global pluralism. The purpose must be to use the best of the past in order to build arches quarterly

a global federation of independent nations pursuing peace through compassionate justice. The opposite would be mutual demonisation whereby members of one civilisation join the extremists of another in supporting the extremists’ perversion of their own religion. In practice, this would bring out the worst of the past to paralyse the present and destroy the future. The most egregious denial of human rights is to deny the right of others to define and interpret their own religion. In order to develop objectivity, one must go to the source of all the understanding and misunderstanding, namely, the scriptures and tradition as understood by most Muslims throughout history. The base should be Islam as a religion, not Muslims, as they sometimes practice it in pursuit of political agendas. This is the basis of respect both by and for Muslims within the community of the three Abrahamic traditions. This should be the basis for long-term planning, especially for Muslims and Jews, who throughout most of the past thousand years have been each other’s most reliable friends. Governments, of course, must base policy prudentially on practical threat analysis, not on theory, but equal emphasis should be placed on “opportunity analysis” in the pursuit of compassionate justice through peaceful engagement as an end goal in both domestic and foreign policy. The base case for all followers of the Abrahamic faiths who share an opportunity mentality, as distinct from an exclusively threat mentality, should be the balanced middle as understood by the great jurisprudents, philosophers and spiritual leaders in interpreting Islamic scriptures. These include the Qur’an, the sayings and practice of Prophet Muhammad and his early followers, and the scholarly writings of the great intellectual leaders. Two paradigms of scriptural interpretation have been debated among Muslims; should the messages of God in the various religions be interpreted as exclusive or inclusive? Historically, the exclusive approach, often condemning to 30

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hell all who disagree with the interpreter, has dominated in the presence of existential fear of the “other”. Such fears fuel the challengers within each religion who hijack it and are infused with hatred for everyone who refuses to accede to their claims to exclusive possession of ultimate truth. The inclusive approach welcomes the followers of other paths to God as part of the divine design for humanity. This paradigm, has been the most pervasive in the spread of Islam throughout the world,11 especially by the Sufis. They believe that the purpose of divine revelation is to unify in common purpose all persons and communities at the level of worship and morality. The common purpose is love of God, which is our reason for existence, but the paths to this end are found in religious diversity. As people converge from the edge toward the Oneness of God at the centre, they can become unified in action. The spiritual leaders believe that this unity in purpose through diversity in means is the only way to achieve justice in practice; the only way to counter terrorism as a threat to civilisation effectively. The governing paradigm of thought among those who follow the inner meaning of their religion is loving submission to God in response to God as the Initiator of Love. This gives meaning to everything else. It’s the root of the opportunity mentality and the best basis for mutual cooperation in addressing the practical issues of conscience in domestic and foreign policy, because it is based on mutual respect among the followers of all the world religions. The challenge thereby becomes not a clash of civilisations based on a chasm of purpose between irreconcilable cultures, nor even a chasm of meaning within each civilisation, but the growing chasm between humanity and God.

THE POLITICS OF FEAR In politics the two most powerful motivators are fear and religion. This is especially true in places like America and volu m e 5

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the Muslim world where religion is a force to be harnessed in the pursuit of power. Muslims are not the only ones who exploit religion for political ends. American extremists, political and religious, exploit religion by demonising Islam as the necessary first step in a perceived war of self-defence against universal evil. A principal weapon in this “war against evil” is the orchestration of words or symbols, known as memes, in memetic warfare. This attacks the mind subliminally; shaping thought without the victim knowing that his (or her) thinking has been affected. On 1 September, 2007, presidential candidate and Republican Senator John McCain sent out a letter to his supporters pegging his new campaign on a single, simple theme that he hoped would lead to electoral victory in a time of great national peril. He declared, “The transcendent issue of the 21st century is the struggle against radical Islamic extremism.” Current presidential hopeful Newt Gingrich called for a “coherent strategy” against Islamic totalitarianism at a conference in February 1995. In the American lexicon developed in the war against Communist global conquest, the world is full of harmless tyrants who seek only their own power at home and therefore can be co-opted to serve American purposes. Such tyranny is different from totalitarianism, which by definition seeks control of the human mind not only as a means to consolidate its own power but primarily as the ultimate end of its own destiny. Whether by design or not, the use of the emotive “totalitarianism” became an instrument of thought control and escalated the battle against terrorism to the ideological level of grand strategy, having been the major global threat to Western civilisation for most of the 20th century. By the mere turn of a phrase, this seminal thinker of the Neocon movement transformed Islam from a religion that occasionally has been distorted to justify terrorism into a generic monster that must be fought wherever it raises its ugly head; volu m e 5

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”Islamic totalitarianism” by definition threatens the survival of the Free World. This simple change in terminology served to short-circuit thought so that operational doctrine and specific military plans no longer had to be based on knowledge. The thinking is encapsulated in the new language, where a false symbolism becomes an unchallengeable reality. By a process of self-fulfilling prophecy, the danger becomes real and triggers a spiralling confrontation of action and reaction.

PLAYING THE GAME OF MEMETIC WARFARE Gingrich was playing at memetic warfare; two can play this game. Muslims can play by exposing the heresies against Islam that extremists, Christians and Muslims, advance to justify a war against civilisation. A first step is to recapture Islamic terminology, especially the shari’ah as a code of human responsibilities and rights.12 This can be done by avoiding the use of denigrations like “jihad violence and sharia supremacism” and avoiding demands that Muslims reject “Muhammad’s warlike example”, which is a fiction promoted by those wishing to demonise Islam.13 The second step is to denounce the justifications used by violent criminals for their actions. They should be denounced in terms they understand, namely, by words used in the Qur’an that apply expressly to them and their crimes. Their use of the term jihad for what they say is holy war but in fact is terrorism should be called by its proper name in classical Islamic terminology, which is hiraba (unholy and demonic war to destroy society). They call themselves mujahidun or holy warriors destined for jannah or heaven. In fact, they are muharibun (guilty of hiraba) and mufsidun (guilty of fasad) headed for jahannam, hell. They claim that they are fighting for ihtiram or human respect, whereas they are committing istihlal, which is the cardinal sin of “playing God”. Their murderous assault on human rights should be exposed for what it is; a monumental act of rida al arches quarterly

shaytaniya (diabolical apostasy). The last testament of the terrorist who crashed the first plane into the World Trade Centre, according to plans found in his personal effects, were from the Qur’an: “Say, my prayers, my actions, my life, and my death I dedicate to Allah, Lord of the Worlds.” He chose to dedicate his death to ending the lives of thousands of innocent people. The context of this verse called him instead to dedicate his life after the model of Prophet Abraham, who loved and lived for God in order to bring compassionate justice to all of His creation. Suicide bombing requires blind fanaticism not courage. True submission to God requires the dedication of one’s life to a much more difficult and daunting task. This is to transform one’s own life, which was given as a gift created in the image of God, in order better to transform the world in which one lives out of love, rather than to destroy it out of hatred. This message applies to everyone in every religion who demonises whole communities and entire religions out of hatred. Professional Christian demonisers of Islam who recruit naïve young people to their cause are no different from the masters of terror in Al-Qaeda who recruit equally naïve young people to their cause, because the end result is the same.

THE CHALLENGE OF ECUMENICAL PLURALISM Exposing the weaknesses of the opponent is only half the battle; one must also recognise one’s own. Despite the growing wealth gap in America and around the world, the major cause of global terrorism,14 America is indeed a model of material success. The major challenge is to reverse the decline in moral virtue by overcoming the solipsistic and even autistic refusal to recognise its shortcomings by accepting virtue beyond itself. This requires an advance from mere toleration to diversity and beyond this to pluralism. Toleration can mean simply “I won’t kill you yet.” Diversity often means, “You are here and I can’t do much about it.” Pluralism means, “We welcome you 32

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because we each have much to learn from each other.” One of the best explorations of this challenge in the realm of interfaith relations is William R. Hutchison’s, Religious Pluralism in America: The Contentious History of a Founding Ideal. Well-known scholar David Hollinger writes that, “This is the most ambitious book yet from the dean of historians of religion in the United States: a wonderfully discerning exploration of how Americans have variously confronted and tried to evade the challenge of religious diversity.” Hutchison’s conclusions focus on America’s failings toward its own citizens, but the analysis fits its failings toward the rest of the world. The thesis of Hutchison’s book is that pluralism has never been institutionalised in America, much as Americans like to pride themselves on being a model of religious freedom. The book can be summarised in the assertion that America leads the world in naiveté about its own superiority as a pluralistic society. Like all seminal writers, Hutchison presents his thesis in the form of a new paradigm for analysis. Calling for “new models for understanding”, Hutchison distinguishes “between a fact or condition called diversity and an ideal or impulse for which the best term is pluralism”. Diversity is what happened to American religion in the first half of the nineteenth century. “Radical diversification” started to occur only in the last half of the twentieth century. The term pluralism was coined in the 1920s to denote “a state of society in which the members of diverse ethnic, racial, religious, or social groups maintain an autonomous participation in and development of their traditional culture or special interest within the confines of a common civilisation”. This reflected awareness of a new state of society and of the world or new awareness of an old state, just as other terms have, witness liberalism in the 1820s, imperialism in the 1850s, and racism in the 1930s. The modern definition of pluralism as an actual welcoming of diversity is a volu m e 5

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modern concept, which historians like to project back, without evidence, into American history. Hutchison writes in his introduction, “Quite obviously, many diversified societies, throughout history, have either lacked pluralist ideals entirely, or have trumpeted such ideals and failed to make good on them. But surely the United States, the champion of religious freedom and scorner of establishments, was famously not that kind of society.” Hutchison’s latest book addresses this question. He observes that the very ideas of religious freedom and pluralism have evolved in America in a “quietly persistent process of redefinition”, including “pluralism as toleration, pluralism as inclusion, and pluralism as participation”. Hutchison does not dwell on the colonial history of America, which was marked by people who fled the intolerance of Europe only to impose their even worse intolerance in the New World. Summing up the first century of the American Republic, he writes, “Through much of the nineteenth century, a positive response to diversity entailed legal tolerance and social tolerance – each of which could sometimes be little more than an absence of persecution. According to this definition of acceptance, a deviant person or group should be accorded the right to exist and even to thrive, but in general to do so only as an outsider to the dominant religion and culture.” He concluded that the “inclusionist” ideology developing during the 19th century “clearly was a move forward in any pluralist perspective”, but “rarely granted to the newly included an equal or proportional right to share in the exercise of cultural authority”. In the field of religion this meant by analogy that, “the newly included sat at the back of the bus”. Perhaps Hutchison’s most controversial conclusion, because it results in recommendations, is that the “melting pot” ideal “operated to suppress differences far more than to respect and utilise them”. He details the lack of freedom inherent in pressures for “assimilation”, which amounts to both individual and volu m e 5

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community suicide. Although he has no specific recommendations, the thrust of the entire book advocates what should be called “integration”. This term, which he does not use, means that individuals of each group in society bring the wisdom of their tradition to enrich the overall society in which they live. Hutchison instead uses the term “participation”. “Pluralism by participation,” he writes, “implies a mandate for individuals and groups … to share responsibility for the forming and implementing of the society’s agenda.” His other important definitional innovation involves the dynamic nature of the concept of religious freedom. Why have Americans always prided themselves on offering a model of religious freedom, when in fact they never have done so? When the standard was mere tolerance in the negative sense of not persecuting people who were not mainstream Protestant, Americans could argue, because of their ignorance of the world beyond Europe, that they were the most tolerant in the world. Later when diversity gave rise to the concept of inclusion, Hutchison writes, “Americans could generally congratulate themselves on the society’s inclusiveness even though ‘inclusion’ involved forms of subordination that many were already viewing as patronising and generally unacceptable.” Those most concerned about Americanborn Muslims becoming aliens in their own country, as European Muslims have in theirs, are searching for answers. The response required of Muslims to the challenge of sophisticated disinformation about both the religion Islam and its Muslim practitioners is to internalise Hutchison's concept of progress from mere negative tolerance to positive pluralism so that they can move from the growing culture of isolationism and rejectionism toward a culture of ecumenical outreach, understanding and cooperation.

CLASSICAL ISLAM: POWERFUL FORCE AGAINST EXTREMISM A paradigmatic transformation among Muslims toward pluralism requires arches quarterly

support from non-Muslims willing to join in a strategy to combat incipient terrorism by invoking classical or “traditionalist” Islam. This can be done only when those who would demonise Islam as the cause of terrorism would instead invoke the classical teachings of both America and Islam on human responsibilities and rights based on freedom of religion, love, and compassionate justice. The overwhelming majority of Muslims, Christians and Jews recognise that the demonisation of an entire religion is a threat to everyone. They also all recognise that there is a growing extremist movement among Muslims which can lead to terrorism. However, they fear that demonising Islam as the source of such extremism is helping to provoke it. Furthermore, citing the same bogus sources that extremists use to justify their crimes reinforces their “legitimacy”. How do we persuade policy makers to use the term “radical extremists” without reference to religion in order to distinguish between a religion and those who carry out crimes against humanity in its name? There is no such thing as Islamic extremism, any more than there is Christian or Jewish extremism, unless one wants to reduce all religion to the level of tribalism. These are oxymorons. Unfortunately, extremists in every religion have always been with us and always will be, so what do we do about it? The first requirement is to recognise that the traditionalist peoples in all religions face a common enemy. One part of the threat to global civilisation is the postmodern phenomenon of the totalitarian mind in the West fi xated on fighting fire with fire while ignoring the injustices that produce hatred. Another is the equally post-modernist phenomenon of Al-Qaeda which has borrowed the phenomenon of ideological totalitarianism, as distinct from mere despotism, from the spawn of the French Revolution. In the art of global strategy and longrange forecasting, the most instructive tool is paradigm management to resolve apparently irresolvable conflicts by 34

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addressing differing assumptions and views of reality. The major threat to the world today comes from the extremists, both Muslim and non-Muslim, who are engaged in what amounts to a de facto alliance designed to pervert the classical wisdom of Islam in their frenzy of hatred for everyone who disagrees with them. The demonisers of Islam have a valid point in their insistence that Muslims take the lead in countering their own demons. Only Muslims can wage a war effectively against the extremists in their midst; if they can’t, then the professional Muslim bashers will claim legitimacy in blaming Islam for all the evil in the world. The Saudi King Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz is struggling to overcome the culture of exclusionary extremism in the symbolic heartland of Islam. He can succeed, however, only if he is supported by the world body of Muslims, including American Muslims. They will be the principal victims of failure to unite in exposing the heretical nature of the Wahhabi declaration of war against human rights and the very concept of human dignity. American Muslims must not be defensive and condemning and countering religious extremism wherever they encounter it.15

PRINCIPLES OF RESPECT

Recognition of the commonalities among the world religions requires above all respect for each other in order to combat extremism and address some of the underlying issues of conscience. The years 2005 to 2010 witnessed unprecedented movement toward mutual understanding and cooperation. This culminated in what is known as the “Common Word”, the equivalent of universal Muslim guidance for both intra-faith and inter-faith cooperation.16 This bold venture in interfaith cooperation started in response to Pope Benedict XVI’s Regensberg speech of 12September, 2006, which was widely perceived as an attack on Islam and a radical change from the interfaith outreach of his predecessor, John Paul II. This helped to spark intra-faith conferences volu m e 5

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that year, following the Amman Message of July, 2005, at which the leading Islamic scholars of the world convened in Jordan to condemn the growing practice, known as takfir, among Muslim extremists to condemn as apostates those who disagree with them. This was the first such universal fatwa by all six of the Islamic schools of law in many decades, designed to launch a global process of intra-faith dialogue and cooperation among Muslims. It was obvious that the first step in inter-faith understanding and cooperation must be intra-faith cooperation within each of the major world religions, based on understanding that the real clash is not between civilisations but within each of them. The first initiative at the inter-faith level following this opening was the Open Letter to the Pope on 12October, 2006, in which thirty-eight authoritative scholars from every branch of Islam spoke with one voice about the true teachings of Islam. This was followed by a letter of 13September, 2007, from 138 such scholars entitled “A Common Word Between Us and You.” This was even more inclusive and for the first time since the days of Prophet Muhammad declared the “common ground” between Christianity and Islam. In November, 2007, a group of scholars at Yale Divinity School drafted a reply to A Common Word, entitled “Loving God and Neighbour Together: A Christian Response to ‘A Common Word Between Us and You’”, which was endorsed by more than 300 leading Christian scholars in an effort to reorient MuslimChristian relations away from “a clash of civilisations”. This, in turn, led to the first of a series of conferences beginning at Yale University in July, 2008, which was followed by four more at Cambridge University, The Vatican, Georgetown and the Royal Ahl al-Bayt Institute in Jordan. This pioneering process was enriched by parallel efforts, beginning with the conference held by King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia in Madrid at the end of July, 2008, to bring Jewish scholars into the process volu m e 5

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for the first time.

The 21st century will be better than the 20th only if the secular ideologies that brought unprecedented global catastrophes are rendered irrelevant by policies which reflect the transcendent justice inherent in world religions. The success of this global movement depends first of all on the role of respect among the followers of these religions for each other. The Qur’anic guidelines focus on three basic principles emphasised throughout the Qur’an:17 1. Freedom of religion, which includes equality in human dignity, unity in diversity, universal conditions for salvation, and equality of the prophets; 2. Love, which includes one’s personal relationship with God, forgiveness, and peaceful reconciliation; and 3. Compassionate justice, which includes personal righteousness and normative law. Together these lead to respect for each other among Jews, Christians and Muslims and to acceptance of each other as fellow “Peoples of the Book”, providing a framework for the global vision and grand strategy needed to counter terrorism.

BUILDING A STRATEGY OF TRADITION AND PROGRESS The 21st century will be better than the 20th only if the secular ideologies that brought unprecedented global catastrophes are rendered irrelevant by policies which reflect the transcendent justice inherent in world religions. arches quarterly

A major challenge of the 21st century is to combine the wisdom of the past with the demands for material progress. Failure will result in the elevation of both tradition and progress to the level of false gods, each competing to destroy the other.

A. Paradigmatic Networking Constructive policies that promote the higher purpose of justice for persons, communities and nations emerge from competition among special interest groups and the think-tanks which purport to provide a higher perspective by shaping policy agendas. The key to success in policy-making, agenda formation and paradigmatic guidance, is grand strategy, and the operational key to grand strategy is networking among like-minded groups.

B. The Circle of Tradition and Progress A major paradigm derived from the principal mentor of America’s Founders, Edmund Burke of the Scottish Enlightenment, is known as traditionalism. Both Muslim and non-Muslim scholars have begun to use this term in reference to the common wisdom of classical Islamic and classical American thought. In 1997, an interfaith coalition of scholars met in London to form The Circle for Tradition and Progress as a means to develop this traditionalist paradigm. The three major founders were Shaykh Rashid al Ghannouchi, a philosophy professor in Tunis who also founded the uniquely pacifist Islamist party known as Al-Nahda (Renaissance). In November, 2011, AlNahda won 40% of the vote in the new Tunisia of the Arab Awakening, giving it a platform to marginalise extremism and terrorism. Shaykh Rashid’s name for the circle for Tradition and Progress in Arabic was the halaqa al asala wa taqadun. This traditionalist project was ahead of its time a decade ago, but the need for it has been increasing in recent years in order to provide spiritual and moral direction to revolutionary movements that may oppose modernism but are very much part of it, 36

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just as the Qutbian trend in the Islamist movement was almost entirely a product of Western secular education without any real foundation in the classical wisdom of any world religion. The founding vision and mission of the Circle of Tradition and Progress is described in pages 13-15 and 78-81 of the book, The Grand Strategy of Justice.18 At stake is not any single civilisation but all civilisations and the future of a global civilisation of traditionalist cooperation for all mankind ... There are encouraging signs of change within the Muslim community worldwide that would make such ecumenical leadership possible and realistic. One of these signs is the rapid growth of an ecumenical movement of convergence between traditionalist Muslims and traditionalist Christians, perhaps best illustrated by The Circle of Tradition and Progress ... which was founded initially by Shaykh Rashid al Ghannouchi..., leader of al Nahda, the enlightened Islamist movement in Tunisia, and by the Programme Director of both the Relm and Earhart Foundations, Anthony Sullivan, and Professor Louis Cantori of the University of Maryland. The specific orientation of this movement within the broad scope of change now sweeping the Muslim world is indicated in the founding statement's emphasis that: We believe in the transcendence of God, the need of man for divine guidance, and the continuing relevance of the prophetic faiths of Muslims, Jews, and Christians ... Just as there has always been a Muslim imperative to reform, there has also been a Western search for God and for the modalities of cultural conservation. Belief in a religiously rooted natural law and an acknowledgement of the importance of the claims of the past have been a hallmark of Western thought at least since Thomas Aquinas. In more recent times, this Western religious imperative and traditionalism has manifested itself in the work of such thinkers as Edmund Burke, Eric Vogelin, Russell Kirk, and Gerhart Niemayer. Together, we believe that the Islamic impulse to reform and the Western quest for religious understanding provide a volu m e 5

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solid foundation for our joint endeavours. The three principles governing this movement are described on page 79 of The Grand Strategy of Justice: Professor Ghannouchi states that the first principle of this movement is tahqiq, the ascertainment of reality. The second principle is masawad, equality in dignity and opportunity. And the third principle is khadam, or servant, which is the designation that he gives to governmental power. The following founding statement of this movement summarises succinctly the key to global leadership in the 21st Century: The modern project, derived from the European Enlightenment, can rightly claim great achievement in the technical and sociopolitical realms. Many people ... however, have come to realise the destructive consequences occasioned by modernity: the triumph of materialism, the decline of morality, unequal global economic development, the collapse of family and community, and the erosion of religious belief. Implicit in the modernist project is an arrogant and naïve insistence that human fulfilment can be achieved solely on materialistic bases, and a belief in the absolute autonomy of human reason and in man’s presumed ability to create his moral and cultural systems in isolation from any belief in transcendence. The modernist project issuing from a shallow, utilitarian claim of value-free rationality has come to pose a threat to life itself. The Circle of Tradition and Progress has been established to promote and enhance dialogue, discussion, and scholarly research among academics and public figures committed to the preservation of religious and traditional values and the achievement of progress in the Muslim world, the West, and elsewhere. Special emphasis will be placed on counteracting the excesses of modernity, with particular attention to a critique of the contemporary materialistic, behavioralist, and radically secular experiment. All the activities of the Circle will be scholarly and intellectual in nature. The Circle will not engage in the advocacy of any specific public volu m e 5

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policies. ...this eff ort will include an encouragement of holism in both the individual and society. The societal holism we seek will incorporate accountable and democratic government, individual liberty and human rights, and an economic system that is both free and humane. What we propose is to re-establish an equilibrium between the spiritual and the material, and reclaim for our time what have been called the “permanent things”. Most broadly, the intention of the Circle is to foster intellectual activities designed to rectify the modern rupture between economics and ethics, reason and religion, and man and God. Above all, we hope to encourage greater understanding between religions and to contribute to reconciliation of peoples and to international cooperation. We believe in values that are not alterable and have been manifested in the teaching of all the prophets (peace be upon them) and great civilisations throughout the ages. We believe further in the transcendence of God, the need of man for divine guidance, and the continuing relevance of the prophetic faiths of Muslims, Jews, and Christians. A commitment to reform has always been at the heart of the Islamic project as articulated in the work of such ulama and scholars as al-Ghazali, Ibn Taymiyya, alAfghani, Abduh, Rida, Iqbal, Baqr al Sadr, and Malik ben Nabi. Each of these great reformers attempted to address the problems occasioned by the recurring imbalance caused by man’s quest for earthly fulfilment and material prosperity on the one hand, and the reality of God and the ultimate primacy of matters spiritual on the other. We regard the Circle of Tradition and Progress as a new initiative in this long and unending enterprise of reform. Just as there has always been a Muslim imperative to reform, there has also always been a Western search for God and for the modalities of cultural conservation. Belief in a religiously rooted natural law and an acknowledgement of the importance of the claims of the past have been a hallmark of Western thought at least since Thomas Aquinas. In more recent times, this Western religious imperative and traditionalism... arches quarterly

That attempts to reinvent the Cold War with Muslims as enemies of the West, or the West designated as an incorrigible enemy of Islam, are deplorable and should be avoided.

Dr Robert Dickson Crane is the former adviser to the late President of the United States Richard Nixon, and is former Deputy Director (for Planning) of the United States National Security Council. He is also the former U.S. Ambassador to the United Arab Emirates (1981). In 1962 he became one of the four co-founders of the first Washington-based foreign-policy thinktank, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). In 1966, he left to become Director of Third World Studies at the first professional futures forecasting center, The Hudson Institute, led by Herman Kahn. He is the Chairman of the Center for Understanding Islam, and President of the Center for Policy Research. Crane obtained a doctorate (J.D.) at Harvard Law School (1959) in International Investment and Comparative Legal Systems, and was a religious instructor on Islam at the Islamic Center, Massachusetts Avenue, Washington, D.C. between 1983-86. He was the director of publications for the International Institute of Islamic Thought between (1986-1988); later becoming the founding member of The American Muslim Council and Director of its Legal Division, 1992-1994.

has manifested itself in the work of such thinkers as Edmund Burke, Eric Vogelin, Russell Kirk, and Gerhart Niemayer. Together, we believe that the Islamic impulse Crane has authored a number of books and many professional articles on a range of issues. Since January to reform and the Western quest for religious 2012, Crane took up the position of director of the understanding provide a solid foundation for Center for Research on Muslim Societies in Doha, Qatar which is the new extension of the Qatar Foundation. our joint endeavours. We favour the conduct of international relations on a basis of respect for all the FURTHER READINGS world’s civilisations. We oppose all attempts Abdul Rauf, Imam Feisal. (2004). What’s Right with Islam: A to export or impose cultural systems, to support New Vision for Muslims and the West. HarperSan Francisco, 314 dictatorial regimes, or to obstruct democratic pages. transformation. It is our conviction that Adler, Mortimer J. (1997). Ten Philosophical Mistakes: Basic Errors attempts to re-invent the Cold War with in Modern Thought – How They Came About, Their Consequences, Muslims as enemies of the West, or the West and How to Avoid Them. New York, Macmillan, 200 pages. designated as an incorrigible enemy of Islam, Ansary, Tamim. (2009). Destiny Disrupted, A History of the World are deplorable and should be avoided. We are Through Islamic Eyes. New York: Public Affairs, 416 pages. united in our belief that all such Manichaean formulations will impede cooperation ENDNOTES between Muslims and the West and are likely 1. Beaufre, Andre (1964). Introduction a la Strategie. Paris: over time to have a dramatically negative Librairie Armand Colin. Translated as Totale Kriegskunst im impact on both international stability and Frieden. Berlin: Propylaen Verlag. 189 pages. 2. Crane, Robert D. (1963). “The Cuban Missile Crisis: A Strategic world peace. Analysis of American and Soviet Policy”, Orbis: A Quarterly

Conclusion There is nothing new in the world, just new iterations of the old as every civilisation rises and falls ad infinitum based on whether material power or transcendent justice provides the civilisational paradigm of ultimate purpose. The United States of America arose as an exceptional experiment in faith-based justice, but it can survive and prosper as a model to counter terrorism only if activists in all religions cooperate in solidarity to rehabilitate its traditional heritage, which once was the heritage also of classical Islam.

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Journal of World Affairs, January, pp. 528-563. Also Crane, ed. (1963). Soviet Nuclear Strategy: A Critical Appraisal, Washington: The Center for Strategic Studies, August, 196 pages; and “Moral Guidelines for the American Strategy Debate”, prepared for the Catholic Association for International Peace with Justice and Charity, published in The Congressional Record, August 15, 1963; and Dulles and Crane (1965). Cold War Strategies in Transition, Praeger, 307 pages; and “Psychostrategy: A New Concept”, in The Military-Technical Revolution: Its Impact on Strategy and Foreign Policy. ed. John Erickson, Praeger, 1966 (condensed in Survival: Journal of the Institute for Strategic Studies, London, March-April 1965 and in The Journal of National Defense (in Japanese) , Tokyo, October 1967; and “Some Basic Strategies of Arms Control”, in Prospects for Arms Control, eds. James E. Dougherty and John F. Lehman (1965). Jr., New York, MacFadden-Bartell, pp.108-130, a seminal essay on combining positive incentives of peaceful engagement with negative incentives of deterrence. 3. Crane, Robert D. (1967). “Islam, Communism, and the West: Problems in Power and Policy in the Middle East”, Preservation of the Principles of Freedom, Freedom Foundation, August.

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A GRAND AMERICAN STRATEGY OF COUNTER-TERRORISM 4. Crane, Robert D. (1968). “Revolutionary Regionalism in Southeast Asia: The Newest Challenge to American Policy”, The Reporter, May 2, pp.11-16, reprinted in The London Observer in condensed form and in The Washington Post, June 30, 1968, and in Survival, The Institute for Strategic Studies, London, September 1968. 5. Crane, Robert D. (1968). New Nationalisms in the Third World, The Ripon Forum, May, reprinted in The Best of Ripon, 19631968, on the political dynamics of community and cultural resurgence in the economic development of traditional societies in Africa, Asia, and Latin America; and Crane, “The Politics and Dynamics of Human Rights”, American Journal of International Law, July 1969; and Crane, “New Directions for American Foreign Policy: Some Thoughts for Macro-Modeling”, Orbis: A Quarterly Journal of World Affairs, Summer 1969, pp.455-475, condensed from a book of position papers with a foreword by Gerald Ford, advocating the formulation of national self-interest from the enlightened, global perspective of justice and pluralism. 6. Crane, Robert D. (1998). Counter-Terrorism 101: Grand Strategy, The Missing Dimension of Foreign Policy, United Association for Studies and Research, Policy Paper 8, Springfield, Virginia, September; and The Muslim Challenge in America and the World, Islamic Institute for Strategic Studies, Washington, Virginia, Policy Paper 2, March 2000, 35 pages. 7. Crane, Robert D. (1994). “Civilizations in Crisis: Confrontation or Peaceful Engagement”, in the ezine www. theamericanmuslim.org, Bel Ridge, Missouri, vol. 2, no. 9, Jan-Mar; “Religious Extremism: Muslim Challenge and Islamic Response”, September 1, 2002; “New Frontiers in Conflict Management: A Grand Strategy to Wage Jihad Against Terrorist Muslims”, September 24, 2004; “Counter-Terrorism 201: The Role of Islam”, March 4, 2005; “Taproot to Terrorism”, June 19, 2005; “Reclaiming Islam: The Missing Dimension of Counter-Terrorism”, October 7, 2005; “Islam and Islamism: Prelude to Democracy or to a Global Caliphate”, December 10, 2005; “Islamic Economics: Cause or Cure for Global Terrorism”, October 11, 2006; “Muslim Bad Guys: Distinguishing Between Monist and Monolithic”, November 10, 2006; “Mission of Muslims in America: A Grand Strategy to Marginalize Extremists”, July 18, 2007; “A Faltering Freedom Agenda: The Disillusion of Muslim Reformers: A Traditionalist Reply”, April 9, 2008; “Waging Mimetic Warfare on Tricky Terrain”, August 19, 2008; “Seize the Moment: Interfaith Cooperation against Terrorism”, September 14, 2008; “Thank God for Justice: Renewing the Spirit in Uncertain Times”, November 26, 2008; “Perception Management: Source of the Eternal Conflict Between Good and Evil”, February 27, 2009; “Religious Tribalism: A Major Obstacle to Peace through Justice”, April 8, 2009; “The Paradigmatic Revolution of Common Ground”, June 9, 2009. 8. This theme has been expanded by Dr. Crane into a 200page book, entitled Rehabilitating the Role of Religion in the World: Laying a New Foundation on the Natural Law of Faith-Based, Compassionate Justice, available online at www. theamericanmuslim.org in four parts on May 30th and June 6, 2009, with separate chapters on each of eight universal principles of human responsibilities and rights in Islamic normative jurisprudence. 9. Thomas, Jeremy Henzell, personal email to co-author, Dr. Robert Crane. 10. For a comprehensive list of these condemnations see Sheila Musaji’s home page in her electronic magazine, www. theamericanmuslim.org. 11. See Chapter 10. “The Spread of Islam”, 77-pages, in

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Chaudry, Muhammad Ali and Crane, Robert D. (2011). Islam and Muslims, Basking Ridge, New Jersey, The Center for Understanding Islam, two volumes, 800 pages. 12. Crane, Robert D. (2005). “From Clashing Civilizations to a Common Vision,” in Islam and Global Dialogue: Religious Pluralism and the Pursuit of Peace, Roger Boase, editor, with a Foreword by HRH Prince Hassan bin Talal, Ashcroft, 310 pages., pp.159-177. 13. See Crane, Robert D. (2010). The Transcendent Law of Compassionate Justice: An Islamic Perspective, Fort Washington, Maryland, Scholars Chair, 224 pages, reissued under the title Islam: What It Is and What It Is Not, Washington, Virginia, Global Vision, 2012. 14. Crane, Robert D. (2002). “Economic Justice: A Cure for Terrorism”, www.theamericanmuslim.org, September 29. 15. See, Crane, Robert D., www.theamericanmslim.org, “The Mission of Imams in America: Marginalizing Extremists by Revealing the Real Truth about Muhammad, June 25, 2007, and “Mission of Muslims in America: A Grand Strategy to Marginalize Extremists,” July 18, 2007. See also, Crane, “New Frontiers in Conflict Management: A Grand Strategy to Wage Jihad Against Terrorist Muslims,” www.theamericanmuslim.org, September 24, 2004, and “Counter-Terrorism 201: The Role of Islam,” www. theamericanmuslim.org, March 4, 2005. 16. Crane, Robert D. (2008). “Common Word and Principles of Respect: Transforming Interfaith Dialogue into Interreligious Solidarity for Justice,” condensed for delivery at the 37th Annual Conference of the Association of Muslim Social Scientists (AMSS), entitled “Crossing Boundaries: Mobilizing Faith, Diversity, and Dialogue,” at Harvard Divinity School on October 24th-25th, www.amss.org. 17. Crane, opt cit, The Transcendent Law of Compassionate Justice, Chapter 2, pp.43-68. 18. Crane, Robert D. (2000). The Grand Strategy of Justice. Washington, D.C.: Islamic Institute for Strategic Studies, 83 pages.

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BOOK PROMOTION

ISLAM AND MUSLIMS BY MUHAMMAD ALI CHAUDRY & ROBERT DICKSON CRANE This rich two-volume, 800-page textbook, was prepared over a three-year period by Dr Muhammad Ali Chaudry and Dr Robert Dickson Crane, as part of the Center for Understanding Islam’s extensive range of publications and research. Islam and Muslims engages the reader on a number of important subject matters, including: The Spirit of Islam: The Faith, The Qur’an, The Sunnah, The Shari’ah -Universal Principles of Human Responsibilities and Rights, Islamic Principles of Economic and Social Justice, Commonalities and Differences among Faiths. Life and Legacy of the Prophet Muhammad: The Early Years of the Muslim Community: Challenge and Response. The Spread of Islam: Islamic Civilization: Science, Art, Architecture; Islamic Education, Philosophy and Science; and Contemporary Muslim World Demographics. Jihad and the Doctrine of Just War: Gender Equity, Democracy and Islam, Ecology and Islam, and The Role of Knowledge, Philosophy, and Theology. Challenge and Response: Common Misperceptions - Addressing the Main Distortions. Interfaith Dialogue and Cooperation: Bringing Out the Best of All Faiths, Building the Future through Education and Engagement, Building a Traditionalist Paradigm, and Selected Resources on Islam.

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ENDORSEMENTS Islam and Muslims is a rich resource for students of Islam and the world religions. It provides an accessible and engaging synthesis and perspective on Islam's rich tradition of faith, history, and culture." JOHN L ESPOSITO, PRINCE ALWALEED BIN TALAL CENTER FOR MUSLIM-CHRISTIAN UNDERSTANDING, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY.

“Islam and Muslims, based on long experience, both personal and scholarly, of the Islamic religion, as well as on so many facts of Islamic civilization and the encounter between Islam and the West, is an important response to this need. It is a very accessible and authentic account which can serve as a reliable introduction to the world of Islam.” SEYYED HOSSEIN NASR, THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY

“This book marshals the rich tradition in Islam and other Abrahamic faiths to help interfaith leaders translate their sacred texts' Common Word of love and compassion into solidarity of action in support of human responsibilities and universal human rights.” IMAM FEISAL ABDUL RAUF, ASMA SOCIETY

- CORDOBA HOUSE, NEW YORK CITY; AUTHOR OF

WHAT IS RIGHT WITH ISLAM.

“This important book is long overdue. Encyclopedic in its coverage, Islam and Muslims, offers students and general readers critical insight into how thoughtful Muslims themselves understand their faith…This book goes a long way to filling a huge gap by providing readers with insight into how Muslims themselves understand their religious tradition and its history.” PROFESSOR CHRISTOPHER S. TAYLOR, CENTER ON RELIGION, CULTURE AND CONFLICT (CRCC), DREW UNIVERSITY.

“Islam and Muslims is a comprehensive, authoritative, extremely well-written and organised introduction to the religion of Islam. The authors cover material that is not usually found in other presentations and gives one a real sense of how Muslims perceive their religion and live it." RABBI JACK BEMPORAD, DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR INTERRELIGIOUS UNDERSTANDING (CIU)

Islam and Muslims by Muhammad Ali Chaudry and Robert Dickson Crane. Published in 2011 by Centre for Understanding Islam - www.cuii.org

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The Strength of Local Partnerships: Overcoming Obstacles During the War on Terror ROBERT LAMBERT

ne of the great strengths of a wellgrounded local partnership is that it can withstand tensions and clashes with national and international policies. This is not to suggest that tensions between local and national, or between local and international policy imperatives, are inevitable or welcome. To be sure, any local partnership is more likely to thrive and prosper if it is in harmony with policies prescribed by central government. By the same token, local partnerships may ultimately become untenable if they threaten to subvert central government policies that require a significant degree of local conformity. However, local partnerships ultimately rely on local legitimacy and credibility for success and when they encounter tensions with national and international policies they are duty bound to alert central government and to navigate a middle path between the two competing requirements. In many respects this sense of locating a middle path, between bottom-up local strategies and top-down national policy imperatives during a period of tension, describes the work of two local partnerships I document and analyse in my recent book Countering al-Qaeda in London: Police and Muslims in Partnership (Lambert 2011a). In both Finsbury Park in North London and in Brixton in South London, police and Muslim community partnerships worked effectively and harmoniously in support of national and public safety in tackling a threat of terrorism and violent extremism. In such circumstances it is hard to envisage how such valuable work so clearly in tune with British interests could be at odds with national and international policy. Suffice to say only the particular demands of 42

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the war on terror can account for such a seemingly perverse situation. Be that as it may, it is to the enormous credit of local partners in Finsbury Park and Brixton that they succeeded for as long as they did in treading a fine line between local needs and national demands. By developing themes in my book and other publications (Lambert 2008a, 2008b, 2011b), I will seek to illustrate how the strength of well-grounded local partnerships can serve as a useful corrective to national and international policies that are conceived and implemented without sufficient consideration given to the adverse community impact they may engender. During the major period of my research between September 2001 and October 2007 I found that the war on terror had both individual and cumulative adverse impacts on local partnership efforts in Finsbury Park, Brixton, and elsewhere in London, notwithstanding the fact that the war on terror and the local London partnerships shared the same ostensible aim of combating al-Qaeda influence. The police partners in Finsbury Park and Brixton were police officers belonging to the Muslim Contact Unit (MCU) a small specialist unit based within Metropolitan Police Special Branch. A crucial aspect of their success in winning trust in Muslim communities was an awareness of the importance of tackling unwarranted and often violent attacks on Muslims. In the immediate aftermath of 9/11 there was a real risk that anyone resembling a Muslim might face an Islamophobic incident of some kind (Abbas 2004; Allen 2004). However, as time passed, just as once Irish Protestant loyalists became less likely, and only mistakenly, conflated with Provisional volu m e 5

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IRA terrorists (and a consequent threat to Londoners), so too would many “cultural” or “secular” London Muslims become less likely to be stigmatised as terrorists and subversives (even then only mistakenly) than Salafis and Islamists, who were routinely conflated with terrorism, extremism and violent radicalism by influential commentators during the period under review (see for example Gove 2006; Phillips 2006; Desai 2007; Cox and Marks 2006). While the events of 7/7 inevitably placed London’s Muslims under the spotlight, it became increasingly apparent that London’s Salafi and Islamist communities (like London’s Irish Catholic nationalist and republican communities in the recent past) faced the greatest risk of being cast in the role of ‘suspect communities’, an apt term coined by Paddy Hillyard in relation to Irsih communities (Hillyard 1993). Moreover, just as London’s Irish Catholic communities faced this very stigmatisation, it must also be noted that their young community members were also often at high risk from Provisional IRA propaganda and recruitment strategies. Similarly, young members of Salafi and Islamist communities in the UK have also been at risk from highly developed al-Qaeda propaganda and recruitment strategies since 9/11 (Lambert 2008a). The adverse impact of these instances of parallel stigmatisation of minority communities as terrorists and susceptibility to terrorist recruitment is noteworthy especially when considering the extent to which New Labour and more recently a Conservative led coalition government has sometimes wittingly and sometimes unwittingly, nurtured it. Salafism and Islamism, as causal or predictive factors, are no more significant to the profile of an al-Qaeda terrorist than Catholicism was to the profile of a Provsional IRA terrorist. On the contrary, the fact that al-Qaeda spokesmen often invoked and subverted Salafi and Islamist approaches to Islam in an attempt to legitimise their violence during the period under review, helps illustrate why it is that Salafi and volu m e 5

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Islamist community groups (in London as elsewhere) often had the best tools with which to undermine al-Qaeda propaganda within their own youth communities. In doing so, they often faced the double jeopardy of attack from within their own increasingly alienated communities— where they were sometimes described as working with the enemy, namely, Bush and Blair—and suspicion from without— where Islamists and Salafis are pejoratively conflated with the al-Qaeda threat.

While media attention rightly focussed on the kind of threat al-Qaeda infiltrators might have posed to the police or the security services, MCU experience taught of the preventative value; through trusted Muslim community leaders who might offset the risk. Additionally, MCU police officers sought to foster a climate where the suspicion and anxiety that haunted the daily life of an informant was replaced by a healthy atmosphere where the temptation informants sometimes felt to ‘guild the lily’ – to embellish information - or to act as the agent provocateur were removed (O’Callaghan 1999). To create a space for this kind of success; identifying and separating al-Qaeda propagandists from the communities they sought to recruit from, was a clear MCU objective from inception. This was especially important for officers who recalled how Provisional IRA propagandists would covertly embed themselves in organisations in London that supported their prisoners and their political cause. While media attention rightly focussed on the kind of threat al-Qaeda infiltrators might have posed to the police or the security services, MCU experience arches quarterly

of the Metropolitan Police. This became significant when the MCU came to deal with attempts by al-Qaeda propagandists to portray the Metropolitan Police in the worst possible light, so as to encourage alienated London Muslim youth to join or support them. In the same Arches article, the MCU sought to explain the continuity of the terrorist purpose that it identified in alQaeda. This was especially helpful in building bridges with sections of the community who felt that the current threat was being portrayed in purely Muslim terms: By successfully targeting iconic symbols of political and economic power the `strategists behind 9/11 demonstrated the key purpose of terrorism: political communication, what the Russian anarchist Peter Kropotkin called propaganda of the deed at a meeting in London in 1881. By simultaneously achieving an incredibly potent impact on live television the same strategists took the business of terrorism into a new global media arena for the first time. Never before had terrorists achieved such concentrated international attention. All around the world people stopped what they doing to ponder unbelievable images on their television screens. While the majority could not comprehend any rational purpose to what they saw, the audacious terrorist act immediately communicated itself as a reciprocal act of violence amongst a minority already in tune with al-Qaeda’s revolutionary ideology. The empowerment of minorities is always more important to By word of mouth, in ways that are terrorist strategists than the condemnation of characteristic of trust networks, the their actions by the majority. reputation of the MCU would be bolstered Combining professional experience within communities (Tilley 2004). Just as London Islamists contained far more with reference to academics, it became a potential allies against al-Qaeda than largely productive educational exercise potential supporters, so too did the same to offer Muslim audiences a perspective apply to London’s Salafis – at least according on terrorism (and counter-terrorism) that to the MCU perspective. Significantly, just departed at critical points from both the as many immigrant Islamists from North ‘official’ Bush - Blair line and the al-Qaeda Africa had faced discriminatory and narrative. By way of illustration, the hostile policing in their home countries, positive audience reaction to Bill Tupman’s so too had many black London Salafis deconstruction of the war on terror was experienced lesser but nonetheless rough evident at the first Islam Expo gathering at treatment at the hands of some members Alexandra Palace in 2006. More generally, taught of the preventative value; through trusted Muslim community leaders who might offset the risk. Moreover, to help reassure Muslim communities that the MCU was in the partnership, and not in the recruitment business a community partner, the editor of the London-based journal Arches, published an account of the MCU’s formation: In the morning after night-time air strikes on Afghanistan launched the ‘war on terror’ I discussed the implications for London with a long time colleague. Over a cup of coff ee in a café in St. James’s Park underground station two experienced counter terrorism police officers came to the swift conclusion that the ‘war on terror’ was in grave danger of playing into the hands of al-Qaeda strategists if it did not sufficiently distinguish between terrorists and the communities where they choose to operate. We reckoned: one, that the terrorist enemy would already be excited by the nature and tone of the ‘war on terror’; two, that sophisticated terrorist strategists would regard it as being disproportionate and thereby boost recruitment to their cause, and most importantly; three, that London Muslims – fellow citizens paying a good chunk of our wages – might begin to feel so alienated by the rhetoric of the ‘war on terror’ that we would lose their critical support in combating al-Qaeda’s established influence in the capital. We determined to do all that we could to retain it. The discussion marked the inception of the Muslim Contact Unit (Lambert 2007).

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the day to day attempts to counter and reduce al-Qaeda influence, provided a common partnership purpose. In addition, the MCU’s express professional purpose of countering terrorist propaganda and recruitment activity often blended seamlessly with their Muslim community partners’ wider social purpose of correcting religious and political misunderstandings within Muslim youth communities targeted by al-Qaeda for recruitment and support. Experienced counter-terrorism police officers and Muslim police officers, with expert community knowledge the MCU combined purposefully, worked with community partners who had credibility to challenge al-Qaeda narratives. Moreover, the MCU’s purpose of reducing the terrorist threat to London sat within recognised objectives in other areas of police work, even though it was not an established approach to counter-terrorism. Indeed, it was an especially novel approach to counter-terrorism in January 2002 when the wider ‘with us or with the terrorists’ war on terror was dropping massive bombs on hundreds of civilians in its first display of military might in Afghanistan in the aftermath of 9/11. While it was unsurprising that a severe terrorist threat to London, with roots in one of the capital’s Muslim subcultures should have prompted counter terrorism interest, it was unprecedented for a counter-terrorism police unit to forge trusting, reciprocal partnerships within the very communities generally deemed most suspect. Indeed, it is the issue of MCU partnerships with Salafi and Islamist Muslim community groups – as opposed to the more conventional detective and police informant relationship – that proved the most controversial. That is to say, the notion that police should obtain intelligence from communities is uncontested: rather, it is the practice of treating Salafis and Islamists as partners instead of informants that was/is the issue. Dean Godson makes the point trenchantly when he acknowledges the need for police to meet such individuals in volu m e 5

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the course of their work, but insists that it be done ‘in a dark alley’ (Godson 2007). Significantly, as security research director of London’s most influential think-tank, Policy Exchange; Godson does so in the knowledge that he has the support of key ACPO police officers and more crucially the ear of leading politicians (Beckett 2008). In the circumstances it is significant that Godson would begin to discredit the MCU in 2006 – once it became clear to him that the unit was working closely with Muslim groups he regarded as a subversive threat. Instead of the MCU approach he wanted to see a counter-insurgency approach adopted against the same groups: During the Cold War, organisations such as the Information Research Department of the Foreign Office would assert the superiority of the West over its totalitarian rivals. And magazines such as Encounter did hand-to-hand combat with Soviet fellow travellers. For any kind of truly moderate Islam to flourish, we need first to recapture our own self-confidence. At the moment, the extremists largely have the field to themselves (Godson 2006). As Tom Griffin notes, Godson's approach to fighting radical Islam ‘has significant parallels with a US Department of Defence proposal from 2002,’ which called for ‘efforts to discredit and undermine the influence of mosques and religious schools that have become breeding grounds for Islamic militancy and anti-Americanism across the Middle East, Asia and Europe’ (Griffin 2008). This is therefore not simply a procedural or management issue; recurring challenges to the suitability of Salafis and Islamists as police partners needs to be addressed against the notion of legitimacy and effectiveness as defined by one of the UK’s most influential thinktanks. Instead, major recent developments in policing theory concern the risk management of intelligence gathering, as opposed to political and ethical issues of this kind, concentrating instead on information technology, data mining and the concept of the police as ‘’knowledge arches quarterly

workers’’ in a society measured by risk (Ericson and Haggarty 1997; Brodeur and Dupoint 2006; de Lint 2000). The same is true in police practitioner circles where the last ten years have been dominated by the development of risk management procedures for intelligence models such as the National Intelligence Model (ACPO 2005). Both approaches think of intelligence in terms of risk management rather than legitimacy and effectiveness. In contrast, the issue of MCU partnership legitimacy and effectiveness raises ethical questions of the kind that have been raised in recent years by the judiciary, most notably Lord Scarman (Scarman 1981) and Lord Macpherson (Macpherson 1999). Indeed the moral censure delivered to police by Lord Macpherson has contributed to a loss of their ‘symbolic aura’, a ‘capacity to command widespread implicit trust’, and an ‘ability to signify a common moral and political community’ (Loader and Mulcahy 2003). Moreover, as Nigel Fielding notes, policing has to ‘balance its function as servant of the public with its function as coercer of the public’ and ‘the problem of balancing the opposed functions is acute’: [Policing is] constantly obliged to negotiate the space between the need to serve the whole society by enforcing general norms and the need to serve individuals demanding mobilisation of the law. Community policing aims to overcome policing’s coercive dimension, but this dimension is acutely innate in political institutions (Fielding 2005).

The distinction between the military and police functions, at least since the formation of the modern police in 1829, has been marked in Great Britain.

the ‘coercive dimension’ of policing is otherwise innate to counter-terrorism, especially in Europe. When French counter-terrorism officials listened to accounts of MCU empowerment of Salafi and Islamist communities, they were at a loss to understand its rationale. Given the extent to which the MCU rationale differs from counter-terrorism approaches elsewhere in Europe, it is worth recalling John Alderson’s observation about the crucial separation of the police and the military in Britain: The distinction between the military and police functions, at least since the formation of the modern police in 1829, has been marked in Great Britain. The distinction is not so clear in France and other countries much influenced by the Napoleonic police systems where the gendarmerie are in fact under military command but have a normal policing function as well. It is only the absence of military thinking that allows British policing to build partnerships with minority and marginalized communities. William Lyons argues that counter-terrorism must learn to police in ways ‘that build trusting relationships with those communities least likely to willingly assist the police: those often marginalized communities where criminals and terrorists can more easily live lives insulated from observation’.1 This point is re-enforced by M. C. de Guzman who argues that a ‘communitypolice relationship that is based on mutual trust is more likely to uncover matters that are helpful in identifying prospective terrorists’: A more formal or authoritarian policecommunity relationship would distance police from the rest of the community and only reports of actual law breaking are likely to be reported…Enlisting the community in its own defence encourages it to take control of its own destiny.

All local partners – the MCU, Salafi and Islamist community groups – utilised This dilemma sits at the heart of high levels of what David Thomas and the MCU project, not least because Kerr Inkson call cultural intelligence to 46

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empathise and communicate effectively with each other in what is, essentially, a cross-cultural dialogue (Thomas and Inkson 2003). For Thomas and Inkson, cultural intelligence consists of ‘being skilled and flexible about understanding a culture, learning more about it from your ongoing interactions with it, and gradually reshaping your thinking to be more sympathetic’ to it. Muslim police officers deployed on the MCU are shown to have played a key role in developing and nurturing this skill to the benefit of police colleagues and community partners alike. The same officers are also described as having made a significant contribution to trust building between MCU and Muslim community partners. In addition, the Muslim police officers are shown to have played a vital role in introducing nonMuslim police colleagues to the religious and cultural differences of diversely rich and often competing Muslim community groups in the capital. This approach is also significant given the lack of cultural empathy and trust that has characterised the wider engagement between Western officialdom and Muslim communities in the first six years of the war on terror. Throughout the period under review the partnership’s two-way cultural empathy and trust building stands in marked contrast to prevailing attitudes of confrontation and suspicion explicit and implicit in the wider war on terror (Jackson 2005). One Muslim community leader in East London compares the courteous partnership approach of the MCU with his degrading treatment at the hands of immigration and security officials at a US airport where he was detained overnight in a cold cell pending further enquiries into his visit (both to lecture and to see his son at university). When he was asked at 2am whether he had any tattoos by a security official with a form to fill in it struck him that he was unwittingly on the wrong side of a war between ‘us and them’ - a thought that has occurred to London Muslim community leaders on numerous occasions during the period under review. Subsequently, on his return to the UK, the volu m e 5

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MCU sought to explain the community leader’s value as a community partner against al-Qaeda to US officials but with limited success. Attempts to broker a meeting between US officials and the community leader were unsuccessful. In this case, as in so many others, the MCU partnership approach towards Muslim figures with uncompromising religious and political beliefs, failed to instil confidence in the wider war on terror. Consequently, MCU officers became concerned that their ability to win over suspicious community leaders would be undermined. As one MCU officer notes, ‘it is hard to think of someone less likely to have a tattoo and less important in persuading local Muslim youth that al-Qaeda is the wrong way to go.’

Government language is always careful to describe the al-Qaeda threat as existing independently of British foreign policy. At times MCU officers placed themselves at odds with government policy on counterterrorism by endorsing the concerns of the Muslim community that British foreign policy – most especially, but not exclusively with respect to the war in Iraq – has had an adverse impact on the terrorist threat level to the UK. Government language is always careful to describe the al-Qaeda threat as existing independently of British foreign policy and as having ideological motivations that pre-date 9/11. Moreover, Tony Blair, as British prime Minister, was at pains to describe 7/7 as an ‘attack on our way of life’ when delivering high profile media messages that explicitly excluded political grievance from an analysis of the root causes of terrorism: But, coming to Britain is not a right. And even when people have come here, staying here carries with it a duty. That duty is to share and support the values that sustain the British arches quarterly

way of life. Those that break that duty and try to incite hatred or engage in violence against our country and its people, have no place here. Over the coming months, in the courts, in parliament, in debate and engagement with all parts of our communities, we will work to turn those sentiments into reality. That is my duty as prime minister.

extraordinary rendition. In both instances MCU officers challenged the notion that UK counter-terrorism can be arbitrarily separated from the acts of its US partners in the war on terror, still less from the actions of its own military partners in Iraq and Afghanistan. Throughout the first six years of its existence, London partnership initiatives appreciated the importance of acknowledging these concerns in an effort to reduce the risk of al-Qaeda propagandists mobilising community disquiet as a vehicle for recruitment and support. In doing so, it aligned itself to stern critics of the war on terror. At this point the distance from conventional counter-terrorism looms large. So, too, the tension between a local strategy, and national and international policy. Rather than assuming that the local must always give way to the national imperative, it may be helpful in future to accommodate both approaches, especially when tackling a threat like the one inspired by al-Qaeda, that adapts well to local conditions and skilfully exploits inconsistencies in government domestic and foreign policies that stigmatise or harm Muslim communities.

In a speech to the World Affairs Council in Los Angeles on Monday, 1st August 2005 he described it as a ‘struggle between what I will call Reactionary Islam and Moderate, Mainstream Islam’. Rather, the MCU inclined to Peter Bergen’s analysis of root causes having far more to do with a violent political response to US [and after 9/11, UK backed] policies in the Middle East (Bergen 2002). As a result, whenever the MCU reported and endorsed the views of its community partners that directly contradicted the prime minister’s analysis, it faced the prospect of marginalization itself. The development of the London partnership initiative relied on the skills and experience of the MCU and Muslim community partners who challenged prevailing wisdom about the way to tackle al-Qaeda at virtually every turn. If mainstream counter-terrorism Dr Robert Lambert MBE is a lecturer at the Centre for acknowledges the need for community the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence (CSTPV) at support, it is principally as a prerequisite the University of St. Andrews. He co-authored, with Dr Jonathan Githens Mazer, Islamophobia and Anti-Muslim for community intelligence that will allow Hate Crime: A London Case Study (January 2010) and terrorist activity to be identified in time Islamophobia an Anti-Muslim Hate Crime: UK Case Studies for it to be disrupted. The MCU took this (November 2010). Lambert’s twin research interests objective a stage further and posited the are Islamophobia and community based approaches to counter-terrorism, both topics are reflected in his notion that counter-terrorism will fail to book, Countering Al-Qa’ida in Britain: Police and Muslim win the support it needs if it is perceived to Communities in Partnership in London (Hurst). care more about intelligence than the fair and proportionate treatment of Muslim For the bulk of his police service (1977-2007) Lambert worked in counter-terrorism, gaining operational communities. Community concern here is experience of tackling all forms of violent political shown to extend across all areas of counterthreats to the UK, from Irish republican to the many terrorism, from approaches to recruit strands of international terrorism. Prior to retiring informants to the alleged mistreatment of from the Metropolitan Police in 2007 he was the head of the Muslim Contact Unit, which he helped set-up in British Muslim terrorist suspects at home 2002 to help establish partnerships with the Muslim and abroad. community. MCU officers examined the Muslim community’s concerns about the treatment of British Muslims at Guantanamo Bay BIBLIOGRAPHY and at multiple venues during the course Abbas, Tahir (2004). After 9/11: British South Asian Muslims, of what the US authorities have termed Islamophobia, Multiculturalism, and the State: American Journal 48

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THE STRENGTH OF LOCAL PARTNERSHIPS: OVERCOMING OBSTACLES DURING THE WAR ON TERROR of Social Sciences. 21(3), pp.26-38. Alderson, John (1979). Policing Freedom. Plymouth: Macdonald & Evans. Alderson, John (1998). Principled Policing: Protecting the Public with Integrity. Winchester: Waterside Press. Allen, Chris (2004). ‘Justifying Islamophobia: A Post-9/11 Consideration of the European Union and British Contexts’, American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences, 21(3), pp.1-25. Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) (2005), ‘National Intelligence Model’, National Centre for Policing Excellence: Centrex. http://www.acpo.police.uk/asp/policies/Data/nim2005.pdf accessed 18 May, 2011. Beckett, Andy (2008). ‘What can they be thinking?’ Guardian Online 26 September. http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2008/sep/26/thinktanks. conservatives - accessed 3 August 2011.

-- (2008a). ‘Empowering Salafis and Islamists Against Al-Qaeda: A London Counter-terrorism Case Study’, Political Science and Politics, January 2008. 41(1), pp.31-35. -- (2008b). ‘Salafi and Islamist Londoners: Stigmatised Minority Faith Communities Countering al-Qaida,’ Crime Law and Social Change. Special Issue, 50. pp.73-89. -- (2007). ‘Reflections on Counter-terrorism Partnerships in Britain.’ Arches, Jan-Feb., London: The Cordoba Foundation, pp.3-6. Loader, Ian & Mulcahy, Aogan (2003). Policing and the Condition of England: Memory, Politics and Culture. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lyons, William (2002). ‘Partnerships, information and public safety: community policing in a time of terror’, Policing: an International Journal of Police Strategies & Management. 25(3), pp.530-542. Macpherson, Lord (1999). The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry: Report, Cm. 4262-1. London: Home Office. O’Callaghan, Sean (1999). The Informer. London: Corgi Books.

Brodeur, Jean-Paul & Dupoint, Benoit (2006). ‘Knowledge Workers or ‘’Knowledge’’ Workers?’ Policing & Society. 16(1), pp.7-26. Cox, Caroline & Marks, John (2006). ‘The West, Islam and Islamism: Is Ideological Islam Compatible with Liberal Democracy?’ London: Civitas. De Lint, Willem (2000). ‘Autonomy, Regulation and the Police Beat’, Social & Legal Studies. 9(1), pp.55-83. Desai, Meghnad (2007). Rethinking Islamism: The Ideology of the New Terror. London: I. B. Taurus. Ericson, Richard V. & Kevin D. Haggerty (1997). Policing the Risk Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Fielding, Nigel G. (2005). The Police and Social Conflict. 2nd ed. London: Glass House Press.

Phiilips, Melanie (2006). Londonistan: How Britain Is Creating a Terror State Within. London: Gibson Square. Scarman, Lord Justice (1981). The Brixton Disorders, 10-12 April 1981. Cmnd 8247 London: Home Office. Tilly, Charles (2004). ‘Trust and Rule’, Theory and Society. 33(1), pp.1-30. Thomas, David & Inkson, Kerr (2003). Cultural Intelligence, San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler.

ENDNOTES 1. Lyons, William (2002). Partnerships, information and public safety: community policing in a time of terror. Policing: an International Journal of Police Strategies & Management. 25(3), pp.530-542.

Fielding, Nigel G. (2005). ‘Concepts and Theory in Community Policing,’ The Howard Journal. 44(5), pp.460-472. Godson, Dean (2007). ‘The Old Bill Should Choose its Friends Carefully: What on Earth are West Midlands Police up to?’ The Times, August 23. Godson, Dean (2006). ‘The feeble helping the unspeakable.’ Times Online, 5 April. www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/guest_ contributors/article702053.ee - accessed 1 September 2011. Gove, Michael (2006), Celsius 7/7. London: Weidenfield & Nicholson. Griffin, Tom (2008). Conrad Black’s favourite Commissar. Spinwatch, 15 May. http://www.spinwatch.org.uk/-articles-by-categorymainmenu-8/49-propaganda/4908-dean-godson--conradblacks-favourite-commissar - accessed 8 October,2011. Hilliard, Paddy (1993), Suspect Community: People’s Experience of the Prevention of Terrorism Acts in Britain. London: Pluto Press. Lambert, Robert (2011a). Countering al-Qaeda in London: Police and Muslims in Partnership, Hurst, London. -- (2011b). ‘Competing Counter-Radicalisation Models in the UK.’ In Rik Coolsaet, ed. Jihadi Terrorism and the Radicalisation Challenge. European and American Experiences Ashgate, Aldershot. October. pp.215-225.

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The Use of Secret Evidence is a Threat to Human Rights JEAN LAMBERT MEP

ecret evidence refers to evidence which is not fully disclosed in any trial or hearing: or that it may be disclosed partially or in full under very limited circumstances. A summary version (sometimes described as “gist”) may be allowed or it may not be disclosed at all. In all these circumstances, the accused is not allowed to have full knowledge of the case against him or her. The Government’s preferred term is “closed material procedures” (CMP). In this paper, I seek to make the case that such secret evidence compromises the right to a fair trial or hearing under Article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) which declares that: In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law... Article 6 goes on to state in paragraph 3 that: Everyone charged with a criminal off ence has the following minimum rights: ...(b) to have adequate time and the facilities for the preparation of his defence; ... (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him.

How is it possible to construct a defence or adequately instruct your legal representative when you cannot a) see the evidence, b) examine it in detail, c) crossexamine witnesses and d) test the evidence against you effectively? There are judgements from the European Court of Human Rights, the House of Lords and the High Court which 50

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criticise the use of “secret evidence” and effectively state that the controlee must be given sufficient information about the allegations against him in order to be able to instruct those defending him.1 We heard much personal testimony during the meeting of the 19th December about the effect of Control Orders on the lives of the individuals concerned and their families. These Orders provide for considerable restrictions in order to prevent people, believed on the basis of CMPs to constitute a risk to public safety, engaging in activities likely to put the public at risk. As Lord Bingham said: The appellants suggested that conditions of this kind, strictly enforced, would eff ectively inhibit terrorist activity. It is hard to see why this would not be so. However, what also becomes clear from the controlees’ accounts is that the authorities do not really believe that Control Orders work. If deprivation of contact with others and access to phone and internet, frequent searches of an individual’s property and family members can still result in controlees being re-arrested and detained on suspicion of terrorist activities then, to me, this demonstrates a lack of confidence in Control Orders being able to prevent such activities. We should also remember that Control Orders are based on untested evidence.

WHAT IS THE BACKGROUND TO CONTROL ORDERS AND THE INCREASING USE OF “SECRET EVIDENCE”? Cases concerning national security have often had areas of difficulty in the disclosure of certain evidence when it has been gathered by intelligence services, but that has generally been in full volu m e 5

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criminal trials rather than administrative procedures or issues concerning pre-charge detention or detention in place of charges. The latest developments have their origins in anti-terrorism legislation: legislation that is often passed in apparent haste but where the measures have been waiting in the wings for some time. CMPs come cloaked in the language of “security concerns” and public safety which prevents certain information being made public. This allows procedures to move outside the normal legislative process. This was outlined in a speech by Dr Alex Conte of the International Commission of Jurists in a statement to an OSCE conference in September 2011: ...Given the severe and fear-inducing nature of the threat of terrorism, many States have designed their counter-terrorism laws and policies under a framework of exceptionalism rather than a framework of normalcy.2

In its report, the Joint Committee went on to call for the Government to review the use of secret evidence, not least in immigration cases concerning Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC): We recommend that the Government urgently conduct a comprehensive review of the use of secret evidence and special advocates, in all contexts in which they are used, in light of the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights and the House of Lords, to ascertain how often they are used and whether their use is compatible with the minimum requirements of the right to a fair hearing as interpreted in those judgments, and to report to Parliament on the outcome of that review”6

The Government’s review of Antiterrorist legislation earlier this year, which has led to the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures (TPIM) Act7, looked at Control Orders but not at “secret evidence” per se. That is examined in the For the UK, this has meant: the derogation from rights and freedoms Government’s Green Paper on Justice and and the undermining of the primacy of the Security8 out for consultation until 6th criminal justice system... The undermining January 2012. of rights and freedoms with a key role for the intelligence community.3 Control orders go Once such “exceptional” practices start, they begin to spread. In January 2010 the Rt. Hon David Hanson MP, Minister of State at the Home Office, indicated that there were at least 21 different contexts in which the Government was ‘aware’ that special advocates and secret evidence have been or may be used. 4 The Joint Human Rights Committee of Parliament has stated that: ...It (secret evidence) can now be used in a wide range of cases including deportation hearings, control order proceedings, parole board cases, asset-freezing applications, employment tribunals, and even claims for damages. We note that in Binyam Mohamed’s and others’ claim for compensation the High Court has held that special advocates and secret evidence may be used for the first time in a civil action for damages” 5 volu m e 5

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against the British traditions of justice and liberty. They undermine the presumption of innocence and the right to a fair trial.

The so-called TPIM proposals from the Government were heavily criticised by a number of human rights organisations. Liberty stated: Control orders are unfair. Innocent people should not be subjected to years and years of punishment without trial. Control orders place dehumanizing sanctions on people based on suspicion rather than evidence. Control orders go against the British traditions of justice and liberty. They undermine the presumption of innocence and arches quarterly

the right to a fair trial. 9 Among many criticisms from Amnesty International, they raised an additional objection to a late amendment from the Home Secretary: ...The appeals process for individuals placed under a TPIMs order is deeply flawed, as it allows the government to base its allegations on secret material which the individual or their chosen lawyer are prevented from seeing. Instead, material is considered in closed session and a court-appointed “Special Advocate” is supposed to represent the interests of the accused - though they cannot communicate with them or their legal team over the accusations.10 As previously mentioned, the Government is consulting on the use of secret evidence in its Green Paper. In his statement to MPs, introducing the Green Paper, Justice Secretary Kenneth Clarke set out the difficulties when evidence concerned security issues that it was felt should not be openly disclosed: The Government is unable to defend its actions. Claimants are left without clear judgments based on all the relevant information. And the public are left with no independent judgment by the Court because it has not been able to consider all the evidence.

practise. There is also concern about what is happening via anti-terrorism legislation and the call for “public security” elsewhere. In December 2011, the European Parliament (EP) called on Member States to submit reports on the cost-efficiency of their counter-terrorism measures and their impact on civil liberties12, with the European Commission set to produce an EU-wide evaluation on the EU antiterrorism strategy. The majority of the Parliament is concerned that Member States should comply with Article 1.2 of the Framework Decision 2002 which states: This Framework Decision shall not have the eff ect of altering the obligation to respect fundamental rights and fundamental legal principles as enshrined in Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union. The EP Resolution explicitly stated in Conclusion 6: Recalls that counter-terrorism policies should meet the standards set with regard to necessity, eff ectiveness, proportionality, civil liberties, the rule of law and democratic scrutiny and accountability that the Union has committed itself to uphold and develop, and that assessing whether these standards are met must be an integral part of an evaluation of all EU counter-terrorism eff orts; considers that these policies must be developed in accordance with the provisions of EU primary law and, in particular, give priority to respecting the rights enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.13

Organisations, such as Reprieve which was active in the Binyam Mohammed case, have already raised concerns about certain proposals contained in the Green Paper: Clare Algar, director of Reprieve, said: The Government is seeking to close off In the framework of the European the very methods by which we first found Council’s “Roadmap” of procedural out about UK complicity in torture and safeguards for defendants and suspects rendition.11 (a programme of reform to raise fair trial standards to an acceptable minimum across Material disclosure at inquests is also the EU) the European Commission has under consideration, which might have been consulting on pre-trial detention.14 implications for the procedure following The issues have been set firmly within the certain incidents involving police. Any context of Human Rights and international legislative proposals arising from this instruments such as the International consultation will need careful scrutiny if Covenant on Civil and Political Rights they are not to entrench or extend current (ICCPR). It has raised questions such as: 52

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Question 4: There is an obligation to release an accused person unless there are overriding reasons for keeping them in custody. How is this principle applied in your legal system? The Consultation closed at the end of November 2011 and we are now awaiting the publication of the responses and a possible White Paper (“Book” in EU parlance) or legislative proposals. This will give those concerned the possibility to raise and question the use of secret evidence within the EU. There are some, of course, who blame the judiciary and human rights legislation for the very existence of measures, such as Control Orders and their dependence on CMP, while recognising they are in contravention of the ECHR. Second, would we really need control orders at all, if the judiciary did not actively prevent the British state from deporting foreign trouble-makers? Most of those against whom control orders were first made were not even British citizens. Prevented from deporting them, and unable to detain them in prison, the government seemed pushed into inventing control orders as an alternative. Douglas Carswell M.P.15 But this is to miss the point. We should welcome the fact that British judges are complying with their international and legal obligations concerning nonrefoulement (not returning someone to a country where this entails a risk of the individual being subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment). It is salutary to look at some of the countries where such return has been sought by British governments, on the basis of written assurances which have no legal force: they include Libya and Algeria – before the so-called “Arab Spring”. The idea of extending the range of such agreements is still on the table but those who advocate such measures should consider the words of Sir Konrad Schiemann, a judge at the European Court of Justice (ECJ).16 ...We condoned the torture of terror suspects, for instance, not to mention volu m e 5

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If we want to tackle terrorism and its causes, we cannot do that by stepping back from a commitment to the universal application of human rights. detention without trial, extraordinary rendition, telephone tapping, control orders and all sort of barbarous things that we associate with countries where the rule of law does not prevail. Our politicians justified this by saying the security forces needed extraordinary powers to meet an extraordinary emergency. The ECtHR, on the other hand, has the impartiality and distance to remind us that ‘ laws should speak the same language in war or peace’. If we want to tackle terrorism and its causes, we cannot do that by stepping back from a commitment to the universal application of human rights. In the European Parliament, I have the privilege of chairing the Delegation to South Asia and I also meet human rights activists and diplomats from around the world. One of the duties I have as a Delegation Chair, is to raise the issue of the implementation of human rights norms. It is deeply upsetting to me when I raise issues of longterm detention without charge, trial or presentation of any form of evidence that can be effectively questioned, to know that I have to make the same criticisms of my own country’s government. I know there is an enormous difference of scale and effect –we do not have the death penalty and our legal professionals are not routinely under threat of death or injury and our civil society and Parliamentarians are free to voice their opposition. However, it opens the way for accusations of double standards to be made. We should also remember that the UN’s Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy of 2006, reaffirmed in 2008 arches quarterly

THE USE OF SECRET EVIDENCE IS A THREAT TO HUMAN RIGHTS

and 2010, recognises that human rights ENDNOTES compliance while countering terrorism 1. Cases cited by Justice Briefing for House of Lords Report Stage 2011, Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures is an indispensible part of a successful Bill, November 2011, p.4. medium- and long-term strategy to 2. Statement by Dr Alex Conte for Working session 5:Rule combat terrorism. The Strategy identifies of Law, OSCE Human Dimension Implementation Meeting, respect for human rights for all, and the Warsaw 28 September 2011 3. Ibid rule of law, as one of its four pillars and as 4. See: Letter to the Chair of the Joint Committee on Human the fundamental basis of the fight against Rights from Rt Hon David Hanson MP. Minister of State, Home terrorism. To return to the words of Dr. Office, dated 7 January 2010. 5. The Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights Alex Conte of the ICJ: (JCHR) report: Counter-Terrorism Policy and Human Rights: The Strategy represents a clear affirmation Bringing It Back In 25 March 2010. by all UN Member States that eff ective 6. Ibid. 4 April 2010. counter-terrorism measures and the 7. This received Royal Assent on 14.12.2011. protection of human rights are not conflicting, 8. Justice and Security Government Green Paper, 19th October 2011 http://consultation.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/ but rather complementary and mutually justiceandsecurity/ reinforcing goals.17 9. Liberty, September 2011. Our Government needs to remember that. (This article is based on a speech by Jean Lambert MEP for Campaign Against Secret Evidence public meeting at the London Muslim Centre, 19.12.2011)

Jean Lambert is the Green Party MEP for London. She is a deputy member of the Parliament’s Civil Liberties Committee and particularly active on issues of asylum, immigration and social justice. She was a substitute member of the EP’s Temporary Committee on the alleged use of European Countries by the CIA for the Transportation, and Illegal Detention of Prisoners. She is also a Council member of Liberty and Vice-President of Waltham Forest’s Race Equality Council. This article represents her personal views.

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10. Amnesty International UK press release on the latest version of the bill – 4 September 2011. 11. As quoted by BBC 10.10.2011. 12. European Parliament resolution of 14 December 2011 on the EU Counter-Terrorism Policy: main achievements and future challenges (2010/23/INI). 13. Ibid. 14. Strengthening mutual trust in the European judicial area – A Green Paper on the application of EU criminal justice legislation in the field of detention (COM (2011) 327 final pub.14 6.2011. 15. blog: Talk Carswell 3.1.2011. 16. Sir Konrad Schiemann , as quoted http://www. lawgazette.co.uk/blogs/news-blog/what-happens-whenpoliticians-clash-human-rights 4.3.2011. 17. Statement by Dr. Alex Conte for Working session 5:Rule of Law, OSCE Human Dimension Implementation Meeting, Warsaw 28 September 2011.

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The New Prevent: Will it Work? Can it Work? THERESE O’TOOLE, STEPHEN H. JONES & DANIEL NILSSON DEHANAS

INTRODUCTION

he Conservative–Liberal Democrat coalition formed following Britain’s May 2010 election was quick to set aside the previous government’s strategy for preventing violent extremism (known as PVE or, more commonly, Prevent). Formulating a new strategy proved, though, to be a lengthy and fractious process. Initially due to be released in January 2011, the successor policy to Prevent was delayed to June 2011, during which time the Security Minister, Pauline Neville-Jones, resigned. Journalists reported that the coalition was divided between hard-line ‘neo-conservatives’ like Michael Gove and more moderate voices such as Nick Clegg and Sayeeda Warsi.1 As late as April 2011, just two months before the release of the new strategy, NevilleJones stated in a speech that the core of the new policy will be the three ’I’s: ideology, institutions and individuals. However, the new strategy does not mention this triad even once, indicating that the final report was subject to all kinds of last-minute alterations and insertions.2 Indeed, this is how the new strategy comes across when read closely: some statements seem to clash with, even directly contradict, others, as though they have been shoehorned in during the final draft.3 Whatever the accuracy of journalists’ accounts of divisions in Whitehall, it is certainly true that one can point to those passages in the published report that seem to have been inserted by hard-liners and those that seem to have been written by more moderate individuals. For example, midway through the report a passage emphasises the significance of maintaining free expression and ‘the rights of all men and women to live free from persecution 56

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of any kind’ as a way of challenging extremism. Yet just a few pages earlier it talks insouciantly about how it is now a criminal offence to ‘wear clothing or carry articles in public which arouse reasonable suspicion that an individual is a member or supporter of a proscribed organisation’.4 Nevertheless, though it is far from entirely coherent, the new strategy does mark out some important departures from its predecessor. In this article our aim is to explore the possible implications of these departures. Drawing upon work from a national research project5 examining Muslim participation in processes of governance, we examine some of the events that formed the background to the new strategy and how they shaped it. We argue that, despite its rhetorical claim to mark a new approach, there are a number of significant continuities between the old and new strategies, and that some of the tensions which were evident in the old strategy are likely to beset the new version. Indeed, the key question we seek to ask is whether Prevent, defined as a policy designed to make extremism less appealing to British citizens, can actually succeed in any form.

CRITICISM OF PREVENT UNDER NEW LABOUR There was certainly no shortage of criticism of the Prevent strategy under New Labour, most of which can be traced to the way it focused on the British Muslim population. Despite the fact that it is widely accepted that extremists are a tiny minority in Britain, the strategy frequently appeared to be trying to effect a substantial change in all Muslims’ attitudes. When the first ‘Pathfinder’ funding for Prevent was announced to local authorities by the Department for Communities and Local volu m e 5

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Government (DCLG) it was requested that only authorities with a Muslim population of more than five per cent (the national average is three) bid for the money. When the full strategy was rolled out, local authorities were funded directly in proportion to the number of Muslim residents.6 Money was injected into a bewildering variety of community initiatives aimed at Muslims, especially the young, including everything from theatre projects and national ‘road shows’ of religious scholars, to women’s organisations and helplines for Muslim youth.

There was widespread suspicion that Prevent funding was being used to gather information on Muslim communities. Unsurprisingly, this had the effect of frustrating non-Muslims who felt that they were being denied public money when they had equal levels of need.7 The strategy, which ignored far-right and other forms of extremism entirely, also seemed to imply that British Muslims in general were ‘flawed citizens’ in need of alteration.8 The varied uses to which Prevent funding was put, meant that the policy goals of countering terrorism and promoting social cohesion became blurred, with a number of critics suggesting that the former had undermined the latter.9 Government efforts to promote a ‘mainstream’ form of Islam caused controversy, particularly among more liberal Muslims who found themselves accused of ‘parroting the government’s line’.10 Others found fault with the way the strategy was implemented and its success evaluated.11 Numerous councils and other public bodies, many of which had been trying to avoid giving funds to specific ethnic or religious minorities, either rejected Prevent funding or rebranded it.12 In addition to these general problems, there was widespread suspicion that volu m e 5

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Prevent funding was being used to gather information on Muslim communities.13 The suggestion that this was official policy was always denied by the DCLG,14 but some youth workers and councillors who were involved with Prevent reported that they felt coerced into providing information about individuals,15 with some claiming that local government was under pressure to become ‘an agency of the intelligence service’.16 These perceptions were not helped by cases of covert surveillance, such as Project Champion in Birmingham, which had the effect of alienating whole Muslim communities. Project Champion was a scheme led by West Midlands Police Authority which entailed the installation of 216 closed circuit television (CCTV) and Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) cameras in two areas of Birmingham in which Muslims are concentrated: Sparkbrook and Washwood Heath.17 Initially, the cameras were announced as a general crime prevention initiative under the Safer Birmingham Partnership. It gradually emerged, however, that the scheme was funded by the Home Office via the Association of Chief Police Officers (Terrorism and Allied Matters) (ACPO [TAM]), and its counter-terrorism surveillance purpose had been concealed. Following a campaign by citizens and residents groups, the cameras were covered over and then finally dismantled in 2011. Two public reports – one from Birmingham City Council, the other from Thames Valley Police – condemned the way in which Project Champion had been implemented and the ways in which local communities had been misled over the purpose of the cameras, with the latter arguing that the initiative had ‘set back community relations by a decade’.18

OUTLINE OF THE NEW PREVENT Given this widespread opposition, it is perhaps unsurprising that the new report – authored by a government keen to distance itself from its predecessor – accepts many of the criticisms of the strategy it replaces. One of the things it emphasises arches quarterly

particularly strongly is the need to separate Prevent-funded activities from community cohesion. It argues that targeting the whole British Muslim population is likely to lead to resentment and wasted money.19 It accepts, in a way New Labour’s strategy did not, that ‘well-integrated’ people have committed terrorist attacks – which also implies, of course, that belonging to a tight-knit religious community does not necessarily make one a risk to national security.20 Although still mainly concerned with violence in the name of Islam, the new report is also far clearer that it is interested in extremism per se, and discusses the threat posed by far-right and inter-ethnic terrorism at various points.21 The rhetorical style is different as well. Gone is the New Labour rhetoric, with its frequent references to ‘faith’ and ‘community’. In fact, ‘religion’ and ‘faith’ are mentioned relatively infrequently in the new strategy. The coalition does not aim to shape gender relations among Muslims as part of Prevent. New Labour’s policy documents on Prevent contended that the government should ‘enable [Muslim women’s] voices to be heard and empower them to engage with disillusioned youths’ by breaking down barriers to mosques.22 There is an argument for strengthening the role of British Muslim women (who remain excluded from many places of worship and chronically underrepresented in higher education and employment in the UK).23 Yet making this a part of counter-terror policy confused matters – not least because, as Katherine Brown has observed, it cast British Muslim women only as ‘mothers’ whose role is primarily to act as a ‘correcting influence’ to ‘combative masculinist’ varieties of Islam.24 Finally, the rationale announced for choosing areas on which to focus Prevent activity is a big improvement. Rather than using the number of Muslims living in a specific area as the basis for prioritising Prevent work, the new strategy is led by intelligence on levels of extremist activity. The result of this shift is fairly small: 17 of the 25 new ‘priority areas’ for Prevent would feature in a list of the top 25 Muslim 58

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population percentage areas. Nevertheless, the effect of this and other changes is to give the impression – far more clearly than Labour’s strategy did – that the UK government is dealing with political violence, not trying to reshape Muslim Britain.

THE CONSERVATIVE CRITIQUE Though these changes undoubtedly represent an improvement on the New Labour strategy, in order to evaluate the coalition’s approach it is important to understand how it has been influenced by critiques of Prevent made by politicians and organisations on the centre-right. Three themes can be identified in these critiques. The first focuses on the perceived wastefulness of Prevent, contending that the monitoring and evaluation of projects was not robust enough to justify the sums of public money spent on them. The former Conservative MP Paul Goodman was prominent in calling New Labour to account on this, raising questions on the subject in parliament.25 The Taxpayers’ Alliance made an argument along similar lines, claiming that, ‘Skilled policing and robust intelligence are the most effective ways of tackling violent extremism. Funding projects carried out by community groups is a method that is doomed to failure.’26 Given the wide reach of Prevent under New Labour, it is easy to sympathise with this theme (even if one suspects that groups such as the Taxpayers’ Alliance are opposed not just to the use of social and community projects to prevent terrorism, but to the public funding of community projects per se). The other two themes, however, are much harder to sympathise with. One centres on the allegation – made by the Centre for Social Cohesion and the Social Affairs Unit, among others – that not enough has been done to counter ‘radicalisation’ within public institutions.27 The new strategy aims to address this by moving away from a ‘community oriented’ towards a ‘sector oriented’ approach. Rather than being delivered through local community organisations, the new strategy volu m e 5

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will be focused on those areas of society where propagandists are thought to be operating: prisons, hospitals, universities and so on. This may have some worrying ramifications for British Muslims, as well as for an increasingly wide range of citizens in the identified sectors (for instance, health service workers, academics) who could be incorporated into the delivery of the government’s counter-terrorism agenda. New Labour actually took a fairly hard line on this, encouraging UK universities to be vigilant in reporting terrorism.28 This approach had some disastrous consequences, such as the arrests of Hicham Yezza and Rizwaan Sabir, a former administrator and former postgraduate student at the University of Nottingham. Yezza and Sabir were detained in solitary confinement for, respectively, five and six days after being reported for acquiring an Al-Qaeda training manual for academic research. The manual in question was downloaded from the US Department of Justice website and is freely available from booksellers such as Amazon. Despite this, there seem to be some within the coalition who are willing to go further. Indeed, at one point the strategy argues that ‘[t]here should be no “ungoverned spaces” in which extremism is allowed to flourish without firm challenge and, where appropriate, by legal intervention’.29 The suggestion seems to be that every institution, public space and place of worship needs to be regulated and monitored. This is a particularly striking argument given that it comes from the two parties which promote ‘small government’. It also indicates that it is not going to be simple to alleviate the widespread suspicion of Prevent among Muslims. Finally, it is clear that many Conservatives sympathise with the argument articulated by think tanks such as Quilliam and Policy Exchange that Prevent actually facilitated extremist views and radicalisation by sanctioning partnerships between government and Islamist organisations.30 This includes David Cameron, who has accused the volu m e 5

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[According to] Policy Exchange’s Choosing Our Friends Wisely, any person who has had any association with the Muslim Council of Britain, the Islamic Foundation or STREET, among others, is portrayed as an ‘Islamist’ dedicated to undermining British democracy from within. former New Labour government of associating with ‘non-violent extremists’ in order to combat ‘violent extremists’ – a practice that, in a speech delivered in Munich in February 2011, he likened to ‘turning to a right-wing fascist party to fight a violent white supremacist movement’.31 Accordingly, in the new strategy one finds the concern expressed ‘that insufficient attention has been paid to whether [funded] organisations comprehensively subscribe to what we would consider to be mainstream British values’ and the assurance that Prevent funding or support will not ‘be given to organisations that hold extremist views or support terroristrelated activity of any kind’.32

WILL THE NEW STRATEGY WORK? Unfortunately there is a serious flaw in this third theme in the centre-right critique of Prevent, namely, that it has been based largely upon a caricature of Muslim organisations within the UK. In texts such as Policy Exchange’s Choosing Our Friends Wisely, any person who has had any association with the Muslim Council of Britain, the Islamic Foundation or STREET, among others, is portrayed as an ‘Islamist’ dedicated to undermining British democracy from within. Even the Radical Middle Way – a Prevent-funded initiative which organised ‘scholars’ arches quarterly

tours’ of the UK consistently and clearly preaching a message of tolerance and engagement – is deemed to be a barrier to national integration and the government’s goal of countering terrorism.33 It is not, of course, the case that Muslim organisations cannot be criticised justly or that they always play a positive role. There are legitimate debates to be had about whether some Muslim civil society organisations are representative or effective deliverers of services, and some have had links with radical Islamic parties. Yet the reality is far more complex than Policy Exchange’s report admits. The Islamic Foundation is a useful illustration. It was founded by Khurshid Ahmad, the onetime vice-president of Jamaat-e-Islami in Pakistan.34 One of its main roles early in its history was to translate the writings of Maulana Mawdudi, the party’s founder, into English, and it played a decisive role in mobilising Muslims after the publication of The Satanic Verses in the late eighties. However, as research by Seán McLoughlin has shown, since the 1990s the organisation has altered its published output and taken on more British-born members of staff, a number of whom have become prominent advocates for less oppositional forms of Islam.35 It is these individuals who tend to be invited onto government partnerships, though these partnerships too tend to be characterised by Policy Exchange and others as worrying concessions to ‘Islamists’. Indeed, it is not unknown for think tanks to characterise conciliatory gestures by Muslim organisations as merely ‘Islamism by stealth’: only on gaining power, it is said, will their true colours show. In the Islamic Foundation’s case, however, sustained engagement by government actually appears to have encouraged new stances to be adopted. Another more directly relevant case is STREET, a Brixton-based scheme whose aim is to help young Muslims who may be susceptible to violent extremism. Although at one point the recipient of Prevent funding, STREET has been denounced repeatedly as an organisation run by ‘nonviolent extremists’. This is largely because 60

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many of its staff, including its founder, Abdul Haqq Baker, identify themselves as Salafis. The term ‘Salafi’ is often equated, even in scholarly publications, with scriptural literalism and extremism, but this is a simplification.36 It certainly does not describe Baker accurately; his political opinions, interestingly, actually overlap with the Conservatives on some issues. He claims, for example, to be opposed to any kind of support for non-violent extremism, and says the following about debates on the subject of multiculturalism and British values: There is a problem, I think, that as British, we’ve lost our way somewhat. I think ... multiculturalism has pandered too much to all of the ethnicities that have come in, when it should be that multiculturalism invited diff erent faiths, diff erent cultures to come and subscribe to a set of values, bring conducive cultural values to the table, and [leave] those that [are] not conducive in the private spaces of their home. That’s what I believe in, and if the Conservatives or any other party talks about that, I will be one to stand up and say ‘I agree with that’.... [The UK government should only] work with individuals that ... on the whole subscribe to [those] core values of Britishness and Western society.37 The willingness of many Conservative MPs to accept the argument that New Labour knowingly or out of a misplaced sense of cultural sensitivity engaged with ‘non-violent extremists’ – who differ from terrorists not in their ultimate political aims but only in the means that are seen as acceptable – is likely to cause problems for Prevent. It leaves the government unable to engage with a wide variety of partners, many of whom actually agree with much of what the coalition is trying to do. With so many labelled as ‘extremists’ or fronts for a variety of radical Islamic parties, the government is likely to struggle to find partners who can target initiatives in the way the new strategy suggests.

CAN PREVENT EVER BE MADE TO WORK? Beyond these flaws, there are other volu m e 5

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reasons to doubt the ability of the coalition’s Prevent strategy to avoid the pitfalls into which its predecessor fell. It is important to stress that Prevent is not the same as ‘Pursue’, the aspect of the UK’s counter-terror strategy dedicated to finding and jailing criminals. The gathering of information on terrorist suspects has been and will remain beyond Prevent’s remit. It still is a social project with the aim of shaping the opinions of ordinary people within the UK. Specifically, its stated goal is still to reduce the appeal of extreme ideas and opinions within Britain by ‘countering extremist ideology’ and promoting integration. For that reason, it is hard to see how it can be separated from community cohesion policy, especially at the local level, given that local authorities are unlikely to be able to separate their activities into two.

Few would argue against the idea of the government having some role in supporting vulnerable or disaffected young people.

problem at the heart of Prevent. This leaves an interesting question. Does Prevent actually need to exist? No one doubts that steps need to be taken to ensure that anyone planning political violence is stopped and possibly jailed, but this is not what Prevent is designed to do. That is the role of Pursue, which could and perhaps should have responsibility for, say, any measures taken to ensure that extremists are kept away from university campuses. Similarly, few would argue against the idea of the government having some role in supporting vulnerable or disaffected young people or providing assistance to those who support integration and who argue against extremists seeking to turn social groups against one another. However, that kind of support could easily be incorporated into community cohesion policy. If those steps were taken, would there still be a role for Prevent? Dr Therese O’Toole is a Senior Lecturer at the Centre for Ethnicity and Citizenship and School of Sociology, Politics and International Studies at the University of Bristol. She is currently Principal Investigator on the AHRC/ESRC funded project Muslim Participation in Contemporary Governance. Her previous work has focused on political activism among ethnic minority and Muslim young people, models of local participatory governance and inter-faith social justice movements. Dr Stephen Jones is a Research Assistant at the Centre for the Study of Ethnicity and Citizenship at the University of Bristol, where he works on the project Muslim Participation in Contemporary Governance. Previously he worked on the Hefce-funded project Religious Literacy Leadership in Higher Education. He completed his doctoral thesis, which examined debates among Muslim activists and scholars about the relationship between Islam and liberalism in Britain, at Goldsmiths, University of London, in 2010.

This hints at what is really the most striking thing about the new strategy: despite the new report’s acceptance of most of the criticisms of New Labour’s Prevent strategy, it suffers from many of the same tensions. For example, it tries to Dr Daniel Nilsson DeHanas is a Research Associate with the Muslim Participation in Contemporary Governance distance itself from New Labour’s efforts project at the Centre for Ethnicity and Citizenship, to ‘promote a mainstream form of Islam’, University of Bristol. He has completed research on Muslim Community Radio (in The Sociological but still promises to ‘support the efforts’ of Review) and on the London ‘Olympics Mega-Mosque’ 38 theologians in challenging extreme ideas. controversy (co-authored, in Sociology) and has publications forthcoming from his doctoral thesis on It confirms that Prevent should not be used the role of religion in youth political participation in as a way of ‘spying’ on Muslims, and can be Brixton and Tower Hamlets, London. credited for calling for greater transparency in the way that local police forces act, but it still leaves open the possibility of gathering ENDNOTES information through Prevent.39 The new 1. Stratton, Allegra (2011). ‘Are we there yet? Nick Clegg and Cameron agree to disagree’ in The Guardian, June 1. strategy accepts the criticisms of the old, David http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2011/jun/01/nick-cleggbut treats them as minor flaws which can david-cameron-disagree. Oborne, Peter (2011). ‘Where’s the be ironed out with small adjustments. divide?’ in The Spectator, January 29, http://www.spectator. Yet these continuing tensions suggest a co.uk/essays/6650288/whereandx2019s-the-divide.thtml. 2. HM Government (2011). Prevent Strategy. London: The

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THE NEW PREVENT: WILL IT WORK? CAN IT WORK? Stationery Office. 3. This point is also made in Nawaz, Maajid (2011). ‘Confused, flawed, but a step in the right direction’ in The Times, June 6. 4. HM Government, Prevent Strategy, pp.44 and 26. 5. For details of this project see: http://www.bristol.ac.uk/ ethnicity/projects/muslimparticipation/. 6. Kundnani, Arun (2009). Spooked: How Not To Prevent Violent Extremism. London: Institute of Race Relations, pp.13–14. 7. Birt, Yahya (2009). ‘Promoting Virulent Envy? Reconsidering the UK’s Terrorist Prevention Strategy’ in Royal United Services Institute Journal 154, no. 4, pp. 52-58. 8. Birt, Yahya (2011). ‘Governing Muslims After 9/11’ in Thinking Through Islamophobia: Global Perspectives, S. Sayyid and Abdoolkarim Vakil (eds.). New York: C Hurst & Co, pp. 117-128. Mcghee, Derek (2008). The End of Multiculturalism? Terrorism, Integration and Human Rights. Maidenhead: Open University Press. 9. Husband, Charles, and Alam, Yunis (2011). Social Cohesion and Counter-Terrorism: A Policy Contradiction? Bristol: Policy Press. 10. Kazi, Tehmina (2010). ‘How Prevent undermined cohesion’ in The Guardian: Comment is Free, July 16, http://www.guardian. co.uk/commentisfree/belief/2010/jul/16/prevent-cohesioncommunities-islam. Thomas, Paul (2010). ‘Failed and Friendless: The UK’s “Preventing Violent Extremism” Programme’ in The British Journal of Politics & International Relations 12, no. 3, pp.442-458. 11. Thomas, Paul. ‘Failed and Friendless’. 12. In Leicester, for example, Prevent was rebranded ‘Mainstreaming Muslims’, while in Bristol Prevent work was carried out under the heading ‘Building the Bridge’. 13. Kundnani. Spooked, p.15. 14. Communities and Local Government Committee (2010). Preventing Violent Extremism: Sixth Report of Session 2009–10. London: House of Commons, p.3. 15. Kundnani. Spooked, pp.28–29. 16. A councillor quoted in Husband and Alam. Social Cohesion and Counter-Terrorism, p.146. 17. Birmingham City Council (2010). Project Champion: Scrutiny Review into ANPR and CCTV Cameras. Birmingham: Birmingham City Council, p.7. 18. Thornton, Sara (2010). Project Champion Review. Kidlington: Thames Valley Police, p.47. 19. HM Government. Prevent Strategy, p.30. 20. Ibid. p.27. 21. Ibid. p.25. 22. Department for Communities and Local Government (2007). Preventing Violent Extremism: Winning Hearts and Minds. Wetherby: Communities and Local Government Publications, pp.9–10. 23. Lewis, Philip (2007). Young, British and Muslim. London: Continuum, p.27. 24. See Brown, Katherine E. (2008). ‘The Promise and Perils of Women’s Participation in UK Mosques: The Impact of Securitisation Agendas on Identity, Gender and Community’ in British Journal of Politics and International Relations 10, p.482. 25. See Parliament, (2009). House of Commons daily debates, February 26, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ cm200809/cmhansrd/cm090226/text/90226w0033.htm. 26. The Taxpayers’ Alliance, (2009). Council Spending Uncovered II: No. 5: The Prevent Strategy. London: The Taxpayers’ Alliance, p.2, http://www.taxpayersalliance.com/prevent.pdf. 27. The Centre for Social Cohesion (2010). Radical Islam on UK Campuses: A Comprehensive List of Extremist Speakers at UK Universities. London: The Centre for Social Cohesion. Glees,

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Anthony, and Pope, Chris (2005). When Students Turn to Terror: Terrorist and Extremist Activity on British Campuses. London: Social Affairs Unit. 28. See Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills (2007). Promoting Good Campus Relations, Fostering Shared Values and Preventing Violent Extremism in Universities and Higher Education Colleges. London: Department for Business Innovation and Skills. 29. HM Government. Prevent Strategy, p.9. 30. Maher, Shiraz, and Frampton, Martyn (2009). Choosing our Friends Wisely: Criteria for Engagement with Muslim Groups. London: Policy Exchange. Quilliam Foundation (2010). Preventing Terrorism: Where Next for Britain? London: Quilliam Foundation, http://www.scribd.com/doc/34834977/SecretQuilliam-Memo-to-government. See also Bright, Martin (2006). When Progressives Treat with Reactionaries: The British State’s Flirtation with Radical Islamism. London: Policy Exchange. 31. Cameron, David (2011). ‘PM’s speech at Munich Security Conference’ in The Official Site of the British Prime Minister’s Office, http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/pms-speech-atmunich-security-conference/. 32. HM Government. Prevent Strategy, p.35. 33. Maher and Frampton. Choosing our Friends Wisely, pp.32– 33. Anyone with doubts about the Radical Middle Way can listen to the events and speeches hosted by the organisation, almost all of which are recorded and put on their website: http://www.radicalmiddleway.org/events. 34. McLoughlin, Seán (2005). ‘The State, New Muslim Leaderships and Islam as a Resource for Public Engagement in Britain’ in European Muslims and the Secular State, Jocelyne Cesari and Seán McLoughlin (eds.). Aldershot: Ashgate, p.63. 35. Ibid. pp.62–65. 36. The Salafi movement actually emerged out of Egyptian modernist Islam, and though there are certainly literalist and militant Salafis, there are liberals too. See Abou El Fadl, Khaled (2007). The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists. San Francisco: Harper. 37. Interview conducted for the ‘Muslim Participation in Contemporary Governance’ project, March 31, 2011. 38. HM Government. Prevent Strategy, p.52. 39. Ibid. p.32.

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Prevent Agenda and the doctrine of fear in the Muslim community IMRAN AWAN

he UK government’s review of counter-terrorist legislation in 2010 included an examination of the broader counter-terrorists policies, namely, the Prevent Agenda. Enshrined in the counter-terrorist strategy, the Prevent has been the subject of a fierce legal and political debate. Prevent is seen as the government’s “softer” approach of community engagement which has led to a number of local level initiatives aimed at supporting mainstream voluntary and statutory sectors. The design of Prevent rests centrally on the notion that the only way to counter violent extremism is for the Muslim community to act as partners with the state. There appears to be an ideological campaign that is embedded within UK government policy to increasingly viewing many in the Muslim community as vulnerable to extremism and terror. Indeed, Wikileaks’ cables in 2010 revealed a tense relationship between US and British policy on how best to prevent extremism within Muslim communities1. In a leaked cable, US Diplomats suggested that; ‘since 7/7, HMG has invested considerable time and resources in engaging the British Muslim community. The current tensions demonstrate just how little progress has been made.’2 This sense of perpetual fear from the media, academics and politicians surrounding extremism has become heightened, with incidents such as the Stockholm bomber, Taimour Abdulwahab al-Abdaly, an Iraqi-born Swede who lived in the UK and Umar Farouk Abdul Mutallab3; who had planned to detonate a bomb on a US aircraft on Christmas day. Furthermore, the British Prime Minister, David Cameron’s speech at a Munich conference about multiculturalism, security and radicalisation sparked volu m e 5

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controversy about how the UK monitors and tackles extremism. His fears stem from the belief that British Muslims are being targeted by extremist groups and may be more vulnerable to being radicalised, posing a ‘unique’ threat to home grown security. Blaming the doctrine of ‘statemulticulturalism’ Cameron called for a more ‘active muscular liberalism’ which would help tackle extremist ideology4. His remarks were reinforced by the government’s reviewer for counter-terror policies, Lord Carlile who argued that Britain had become a safe haven for terrorist groups. This paranoia and hysteria about Islam, Muslims, extremism and radicalisation is further heightened by the way Britain is increasingly being used by extremist organisations to radicalise and promote religious intolerance and indoctrination. Inevitably, within this climate of fear British Muslims are becoming increasingly suspicious of counter-terrorism policies, Prevent for example. The government’s vision for Prevent was aimed at creating an institution of law abiding Muslims who would value British life and citizenship, and thereby at the same time reduce the risk of home-grown terrorism. But has it succeeded?

THE PREVENT AGENDA 2011 The Prevent Agenda (of 2011) contains three main objectives; firstly, to tackle perceived ideological challenges of terrorism and the threat from extremist groups. Secondly, to prevent people from being drawn into terrorist acts and finally to promote the working of various sectors and institutions where there are risks of radicalisation5. However, both previous and present Prevent strategies have been criticised for the manner in which funding has been allocated to the public arches quarterly

and private sectors in particular local authorities, security agencies and the police who have all benefited from the perceived danger that Muslims are dangerous extremists. Furthermore, the Prevent Strategy 2011 has been driven by stateled policies embedded within vague and unhelpful local initiatives that lack detail and in effect get communities to provide intelligence on each other and identify would-be extremists and terrorists.6 Although Prevent in principle covers all forms of far right extremism from animal rights groups to anti-capitalists, it has by implication only targeted Muslim communities7. Counter-terror legislation such as pre-charge detention, control orders, and stop and search powers under the Terrorism Act 2000 were too broad and had been used disproportionately against Muslim communities and revealed that British Muslims, and young British men in particular, feel a sense of victimization and stigma.8 Indeed, one of the most damaging views about Prevent is the means in which it has become an agenda for counter-terrorism surveillance on Muslim communities. For example, Operation Gamble which involved covert and overt surveillance cameras in predominately Muslim areas of Birmingham,9 was heavily criticised for breaching human rights legislation.10 The independent Report into Project Champion concluded that there was a lack of transparency and a real risk that the project would lead to a stigma against the Muslim community. It seems that while Prevent, had an overall goal of engaging with Muslim communities to help defeat terrorism, it has instead alienated sections of Muslim communities because the policy has been misdirected. This in effect has constructed a ‘suspect’ community within a narrative of discouraging people from becoming terrorists. The Prevent Strategy 2011 has the potential of making Muslim communities more suspicious of law enforcement agencies leading into a growing sense of fear and a lack of trust in the British political system. Jarvis and Lister (2011) conducted a series of 64

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focus groups with Muslim communities examining views of British Muslims about UK counter-terrorism policy. They found Muslim communities and police relations had been damaged by counter-terrorism strategies such as Prevent. They state that; “first, the discussion of ‘mainstream British values’ that runs throughout the new Prevent is both conceptually flawed and potentially dangerous”.11 Below is an extract taken from Jarvis and Lister (2011) research study from an Asian female participating in one of the focus groups: …look at September 11th, when that happened there was a high number of women who were wearing the headscarf who were being treated with discrimination, headscarves were being pulled off, calling names, being called terrorist, Ninja, whatever, very negative name calling. Why?12 This type of analysis has led to a perception by Muslim communities that they have been unfairly targeted and treated as a ‘suspect’ community due to the nature in which counterterrorism policy has disproportionately focussed on identifying Muslim citizens as vulnerable to extremism13. According to research, many Muslims feel they are being discriminated against as a result of counter-terrorist strategies like Prevent, which often leads to an increase in hate crimes committed against them. Fenwick and Choudhury’s (2010) study found that British Muslims, and in particular young British men, feel a sense of victimization and stigma. They found that counterterror legislation such as pre-charge detention, control orders, the glorification offence and stop and search powers under the Terrorism Act 2000 and Terrorism Act 2006 were too broad, ill-defined and had been used disproportionately against Muslim communities.

SHORT CASE STUDY The author conducted a short case study which involved semi-structured interviews with members of the British Muslim community who had been directly involved with Prevent programmes across different volu m e 5

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areas of Birmingham. The interviews allowed the author to obtain an overview of some of the views and experiences of those involved in this project. As the author had already established links with the Muslim community in Birmingham he was able to use a snowball methodological approach from within the community to get unbiased access which meant visiting families, community leaders and local mosques. The ethical considerations included all participants being able to withdraw their consent at any time and all participants were given assurance about confidentiality and anonymity throughout the study. As it was a small scale case study the author carried out a total of 5 semistructured interviews which were each 30 minutes long. The interviewees consisted of: one community leader, one local councillor, two members of the community, and 1 local Imam.

The Prevent strategy failed to establish community cohesion and this was based on the policing of Prevent which included the way funding had been allocated to various groups and bodies without proper consultation and due diligence. All of the interviews were conducted face-to-face and questions were based on the topic of the effectiveness of the Prevent Agenda in Birmingham. Questions put to the respondents included, what their perception of Prevent was in the city of Birmingham? To what an extent trust was an important factor between the police and Muslim community members? How volu m e 5

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had covert police tactics influenced wider counter-terrorism strategies within local Muslim communities in Birmingham?

FINDINGS The study found many interviewees felt that the Prevent strategy failed to establish community cohesion and this was based on the policing of Prevent which included the way funding had been allocated to various groups and bodies without proper consultation and due diligence. One community member noted; ‘Prevent did not clearly state where money was going to be given and to whom and so we were quite surprised when we were being told that our area had been given lots of money because we never actually saw how the money had been used?’(Anon 1: Interview 1, 2011).14 Indeed, research carried out by Basia Spalek et al. (2011) about preventing extremism in the West Midlands found Muslim communities felt there was a lack of understanding in relation to cultural awareness and community partnerships. This study also found that there are strong reasons for arguing that Prevent, in effect, had viewed the Muslim community as ‘suspect’, thus fostering social divisions within the community. There were fears of violation of data protection and human rights which in turn damages police and local community relations. One Birmingham community leader observed that ‘what [the] Prevent has done is to destroy all relations between the Muslim community and the police because they have unfairly arrested many people in this community with little evidence and no-body ending up being charged’ (Anon 2: Interview 2, 2011).15 Similar studies have shown Muslim communities’ fear of counter-terrorism policing being misused, such as allowing the police greater powers that may lead to the unfair targeting of minority communities in general (Innes et al. 2011). There is also a perception that the Muslim community feels that it is also being targeted by counter-terror policies because of the ethnic background of Muslims (Forum Against Islamophobia arches quarterly

and Racism 2004). This was also the view of the majority of the respondents who perceived the police as targeting the Muslim community as a result of their ethnicity. A local councillor remarked, ‘all terrorist suspects need to be brought to justice, however that should be proportionate and equality in treatment and not just stopping and searching people from a single community because they fear they may be extremists or radicals’ (Anon 4: Interview 5, 2011).16

If Prevent is too succeed than it must begin to engage with Muslim communities and recognise the contribution they have made to society. Echoing the above, an Imam in Birmingham felt that the Prevent had actually stigmatised local mosques and Imams because they were viewed as not addressing and dealing with the challenge of extremism adequately. The Imam stated, ‘Muslims are being portrayed in the media as would-be terrorists... and the government really needs to look at the role of all organisations because the problem is when you portray Muslims as fanatics and jihadists what you actually do is drive dissent underground’17 (Anon 5: Interview 6, 2011). As noted above, all the interviewees had a lack of trust with the state and its counter-terrorism narrative. It appears that the overall feeling was a sense of anger and disappointment amongst the participants because of fears of Prevent being used as an spying operation on British Muslims.

CONCLUSION The Prevent Agenda risks stigmatising the Muslim community as the state has begun a policy of treating this community as ‘suspect’.18 Political pressures on local 66

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police forces across the UK means a higher level of policing in mainly Muslim areas which further fuels dissent and alienation amongst the community. If Prevent is too succeed than it must begin to engage with Muslim communities and recognise the contribution they have made to society. However the current debate surrounding extremism and radicalisation appears to be one which attempts to use Muslims as informants for the state as opposed to partners. Imran Awan is a Senior Lecturer at the Centre for Police Sciences at the University of Glamorgan. He is co-editor of Policing Cyber Hate, Cyber Threats and Cyber-Terrorism (Ashgate). He has also authored Terror in the Eye of the Beholder: The ‘Spy cam’ Saga in Birmingham: CounterTerrorism or Counter-Productive? (The Howard Journal of Criminal Justice). Awan is currently researching the impact of counter terrorism legislation on Muslim families in Cardiff, UK.

ENDNOTES 1. HM Government (2011). Prevent Strategy, presented to Parliament by the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for the Home Department by Command of Her Majesty: http://www. homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/counter-terrorism/prevent/ prevent-strategy/prevent-strategy-review?view=Binary 2. The US Embassy Cables. (2010). US Embassy Cables: Britain Making Little Progress in Engaging Muslim Community, Confidential Section 01 OF 03 London 005958 EO 12958 Subject; Classified By: PolMinCouns Maura Connelly, Reasons 1.4 (B, D). [Online]. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassycables-documents/74818 - accessed 1 July 2011. 3. BBC News (2010). Profile: Umar Farouk Abdulmutallib., http:// www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-11545509 - accessed 1 July 2011. 4. Cameron, D. (2010). PM’s speech at Munich Conference, No10.gov.uk http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/speechesand-transcripts/2011/02/pms-speech-at-munich-securityconference-60293 - accessed 2 July 2011. 5. Op. cit. HM Government (2011). Prevent Strategy 6. Spalek, B. & Lambert, R. (2008). Muslim Communities, Counter- Terrorism and De-Radicalisation: A Reflective Approach to Engagement, International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice. 36 (4): 257-270. 7. Spalek, B. & McDonald, L. (2010). Anti-Social Behaviour Powers and the Policing of Security, Social Policy and Society, 9 (1): 123-133. 8. Githens-Mazer & Lambert, R. (2010). Islamophobia and Anti Muslim Hate Crimes: a London Case Study, European Muslim Research Centre. http://centres.exeter.ac.uk/emrc/publications/ IAMHC_revised_11Feb11.pdf - accessed 19 June 2011. 9. Thornton, S. (2010). Project Champion Review. www.westmidlands.police.uk/ latest-news/docs/Champion_Review_FINAL_30_09_10.pdf - accessed 10 March 2010. 10. Awan, I. (2011). Terror in the Eye of the Beholder: The Spy cam Saga: Counter-terrorism or Counter-productive, The Howard Journal of Criminal Justice, Vol. 50. Issue 2:199-202.

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PREVENT AGENDA AND THE DOCTRINE OF FEAR IN THE MUSLIM COMMUNITY 11. Jarvis, L & Lister, M. (2011). Values and Stakeholders in the 2011 Prevent Strategy Responding to Prevent 2011, Muslim Council of Britain. http://www.mcb.org.uk/comm_details. php?heading_id=121&com_id=2 - accessed 1 July 2011. 12. Ibid. 13. Spalek, B. (2011). A Top Down Approach Responding to Prevent 2011, Muslim Council of Britain. http://www.mcb.org. uk/comm_details.php?heading_id=121&com_id=2 - accessed 1 July 2011. 14. Author interview (Anonymous 1: Muslim Community Member), Birmingham, 10 Nov 2011. 15. Author interview (Anonymous 2: Muslim Community Leader), Birmingham,

14 Nov 2011. 16. Author interview (Anonymous 4: Local Councillor), Birmingham, 19 Nov 2011. 17. Author interview (Anonymous 5: Local Imam), Birmingham, 22 November 2011. 18. House of Commons Communities & Local Government Committee (2010). Preventing Violent Extremism, Sixth Report of Session 2009â&#x20AC;&#x201C;10, London: The Stationery Office. www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmcomloc/65/65. pdf - accessed 10 March 2010.

BOOK PROMOTION

THE MISSING MARTYRS: WHY THERE ARE SO FEW MUSLIM TERRORISTS BY CHARLES KURZMAN IIn The Missing Martyrs, the author explores some very pertinent questions, including: Why are there so few Muslim terrorists? q With W more than a billion Muslims in the world--many of whom supposedly hate the West and ardently desire martyrdom--why s don't we see terrorist attacks every day? Where are the missing d martyrs? m Kurzman demonstrates that terrorist groups are thoroughly K marginal in the Muslim world. He argues that it takes only a m ssmall cadre of committed killers to wreak unspeakable havoc. But that very fact underscores his point. As easy as terrorism B iis to commit, few Muslims turn to violence. Out of 140,000 murders in the United States since 9/11, terrorists from the Muslim community have killed at most three dozen people. Of the 150,000 people who die each day, worldwide, Islamist militants account for fewer than fifty fatalities--and only ten per day outside of the hotspots of Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan. The real bulwark against Islamist violence, Kurzman finds, is Muslims themselves, who reject both the goals of the terrorists and their bloody means. With each bombing, the terrorists lose support among Muslims. The Missing Martyrs provides much-needed corrective to deep-seated and destructive misconceptions about Muslims and the Islamic world.

The Missing Martyrs: Why There Are So Few Muslim Terrorists by Charles Kurzman. Published in 2011 by Oxford University Press (USA)

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The Causes of Terrorism: Deconstructing the Myths RICHARD JACKSON, LEE JARVIS, JEREON GUNNING & MARIE B. SMYTH

n the past, it was somewhat controversial to try and understand the political causes of terrorism, because ‘to many people, any focus on underlying causes, motivating factors, and grievances, implies a kind of justification’ (Lia and Skjolberg 2005: 7). Instead, it was commonly argued that terrorism was a product of psychological illness or brainwashing, rather than political dynamics. This served a very political purpose: ignoring the possibility that it might have been caused by systemic problems, such as political exclusion or discrimination, meant depoliticising those engaged in it, thus preventing any reflection on how the status quo might have contributed to the problem. Terrorism research has changed drastically since those early days, and efforts to understand the causes of terrorism are now one of the mainstays of the field. But the temptation to downplay the political causes of this type of violence and to absolve the status quo from any responsibility is still with us. Of course, understanding a phenomenon necessitates neither exoneration nor justification, and a rich body of research has emerged on the causes of terrorist violence. […] [A] good place to start is to identify some prevalent myths about what is popularly proclaimed to cause terrorism. Three myths are particularly dominant, in part, because they are persistently repeated by the media, political leaders and some academics. Critical scholars are not alone in questioning these myths; indeed, much of the research they draw on has been carried out by critically-minded traditional scholars. The first myth – that poverty causes terrorism – has become particularly popular since the attacks of 9/11. In 2002, 68

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US President George W. Bush told a UN development summit that ‘poverty and hopelessness, lack of education and failed government... often allow conditions that terrorists can seize’ (The Independent, 23 March 2002).

Quantitative research suggests that people living in poverty are less likely to turn to terrorism and poorer countries are less likely to experience terrorism. The causal link between poverty and terrorism is far from clear. If anything, quantitative research suggests that people living in poverty are less likely to turn to terrorism and poorer countries are less likely to experience terrorism. Numerous studies have found that those involved in terrorism are more often well-educated and middle class than poorly educated and poor. Studies of the Italian Red Brigades, the Baader-Meinhof group, Hamas, Hizballah and militant Israeli settlers, all suggest that those responsible for violence are usually better off than their compatriots (Krueger and Malečková 2003). Popular support for terrorist tactics in the latter three cases was also found to be particularly high among the better off and more highly educated (Krueger 2007; Gunning 2007). This, in itself, is not surprising since political activism in general tends to attract members of the educated middle classes. However, dynamics are different where larger movements are concerned, particularly if they are engaged in a civil volu m e 5

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or guerrilla war. In this context, a group’s ‘foot soldiers’ are often recruited from the poorer sections of society. Lack of job opportunities in particular can be a motivation for young men to join up, as can the status derived from group membership. The Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) in Northern Ireland and the LTTE in Sri Lanka, for example, both had relatively high percentages of ‘foot soldiers’ from poorer backgrounds (Heiberg et al. 2007). But in these conflicts, we are moving away from ‘terrorist’ tactics to situations where a plethora of tactics is used, many falling within the guerrilla warfare category. Leaving aside the fact that activists are more likely to come from middle class, well-educated backgrounds, one could argue that poverty provides a background condition which either motivates terrorists or which they can exploit. The argument here is not that those carrying out the violence are poor, but that they are motivated to turn to violence on behalf of their poorer brethren. However, this argument is also unsupported in the research. Quantitative studies have found no statistically relevant link between a country’s poverty level and levels of terrorism (see Krueger 2007; Piazza 2006), although there is some evidence to suggest that when economic inequality overlaps with ethnic divisions, there is an increased possibility of activists turning to violence (Stewart 2008). In short, levels of poverty alone cannot explain why terrorism occurs, which is not to say that poverty should not be tackled in its own right. Poverty, as Yunus (2006) points out, ‘is the absence of all human rights’, and according to World Bank figures, 1.4 billion people, almost a quarter of the world’s population, lives below the so-called poverty line – less than US$1.25 a day (Shah 2010). Yet, these statistics in themselves further support the argument that poverty in itself is not a primary cause of terrorism: if the majority of the world’s population lives in poverty, why is there so little terrorism? There are of course political reasons volu m e 5

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for politicians’ efforts to reiterate a link between poverty and terrorism. Yemen, for instance, has benefited greatly from an increase in development aid as a direct result of the war on terror. Since Yemen has become a region of concern over the presence of al-Qaeda supporters, development aid has grown exponentially, driven in part by the notion that development can help stem terrorism (DFID 2010). This notion is not just about the presumed link between poverty and terrorism. The UK’s Department for International Development, for example, is very clear that poverty per se does not cause terrorism (DFID 2005: 11). Rather, its decision to prioritise development aid to Yemen was motivated by a complex set of other reasons. If state failure, or the absence of strong state structures, is a factor in facilitating terrorism, as many argue, strengthening the state through development may help limit terrorism. Development can also strengthen communities, which, in turn, is believed to help prevent terrorism. Thus, poverty can have an indirect effect on factors such as state strength or level of civil society activism, which affect the occurrence of terrorism more directly. …[A] second prevalent myth is that psychological deviance causes terrorism. This myth has taken on various guises. Some have argued that terrorists are irrational; others that terrorists are psychopaths or suffer from psychological disorders. A variation is that terrorism is caused by brainwashing – echoes of which are still present in some of the current radicalisation literature. In all cases, the intent, or at least the effect, is to locate the cause of the violence in the perpetrator’s mental state or personality, while ignoring the political and social context within which the act is perpetrated. This myth is chillingly encapsulated in the following quote from Jerrold Post (1990: 25), one of the exponents of the notion of ‘psycho-logic’: ‘political terrorists are driven to commit acts of violence as a consequence of psychological forces … their special psycho-logic is constructed to arches quarterly

rationalize acts they are psychologically compelled to commit. Thus … individuals are drawn to the path of terrorism in order to commit acts of violence…’ (emphasis added). By the 1990s, this rather crude explanation of terrorist psychopathy had been replaced by explanations involving more ‘subtle’ forms of ‘deviance’, such as narcissism, splitting and paranoia (Horgan 2005: 48). However, as Horgan and others have noted, ‘the evidence for these arguments is flimsy at best and methodologically dubious. The data sets on which the research is based tend to be small and idiosyncratic, and the inferences drawn are often speculative and not consistently supported of this [narcissistic] interrelationship’ (Horgan 2005: 59). In addition, studies are often based on interviews with those who have been imprisoned, thus making it difficult to establish whether any apparent psychological traits were a cause or a consequence of engaging in violence. The consensus of more recent research – or rather, what Silke terms ‘most serious researchers in the field’ – is that those engaged in terror tactics ‘are essentially normal individuals’ (Silke 1998: 53). Like any population group they will be diverse – which is why it is problematic to try to arrive at a single psychological profile. In fact, there are strong strategic reasons for not employing activists with psychological problems. For example, while psychopaths may be drawn to violence as ‘an outlet for aggressive tendencies’ unburdened by remorse, Horgan (2005: 51) rightly points out that they lack ‘some of the required characteristics sought after by terrorist leaders... high motivation, discipline and an ability to remain reliable and task-focused in the face of stress, possible capture and imprisonment’. Acknowledging that those who engage in terrorism do so for tactical and strategic reasons, it soon becomes clear that psychological deviance is usually a hindrance, rather than an asset, to any group seeking to employ terrorism strategically. One of the reasons for the prevalence of the psychological deviance myth is 70

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what psychologists term ‘the fundamental attribution error’. According to this, we ‘tend to explain other people’s behaviour with reference to dispositional features (e.g. personality, what they are ‘like’), while we might attribute situational features to our own (e.g. it was the type of company I was in that night that made me behave in that way)’ (Horgan 2005: 47-48). This tendency is particularly strong when we are caught up in the emotions of an event. Another reason for its prevalence is that it is easier to explain terrorism by reference to abnormality, thereby absolving us of any moral or political responsibility for the occurrence of an attack (Zulaika and Douglass 1996).

The literature on ‘religious terrorism’ is part of a long – and problematic – tradition within Western social science linking religion causally to violence. A final prevalent myth is that religion is a primary cause of terrorism, and that when people are inspired by religion, they are more violent, more radical and less willing to compromise. From Laqueur (1999) to Juergensmeyer (2000) and Hoff man (2006), it is argued that we are currently experiencing a new form of religiouslyinspired terrorism, which is more lethal and more threatening to Western interests than anything that came before. Religion, in this view, is seen as a cause of violence, rather than an intervening factor. Hoffman (2006: 88-89), for instance, explicitly links the assumed tendency of ‘religious terrorists’ towards greater violence to their religious perspective, and in particular, the notion that God has both sanctioned and commanded the violence. In this, the literature on ‘religious terrorism’ is part of a long – and problematic – tradition within Western social science linking religion causally to violence (see Cavanaugh 2004). volu m e 5

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In addition, scholars have assigned a causal role to religion on the basis that, taken together, ‘religious terrorists’ appear to have been more violent than their secular counterparts (Gurr and Cole 2000: 28-29; Hoffman 2006: 85-88). … [A]lthough on aggregate those labelled ‘religious terrorists’ have caused more deaths than their secular counterparts, a closer look at individual cases identifies numerous secular groups (mostly ethnonationalist) which have been far more violent and uncompromising than many ‘religious’ groups. In addition, even in cases where religiously-inspired militants have been more brutal than secular militants, it is far from clear that it is religion that was the causal factor, rather than the fact that the violence was carried out in the context of a civil war, for example (Cavanaugh 2004: 13, 28-29). More broadly, the relationship between beliefs and behaviour is far from clear (Gunning forthcoming). Beliefs, for instance, do not necessarily cause people to act, but can instead be the eff ect of activism which people may embark upon for non-ideological reasons (Ferree and Miller 1985). Activists have been found to join movements for a variety of reasons, including peer pressure, a longing for social standing or a desperate search for protection from the violence of states or rival groups (della Porta 1995; Bjørgo 2009). Groups, meanwhile, do not necessarily act out their ideological views, preferring at times compromise to marginalisation (Gunning forthcoming). Religion, or ideology more broadly, can act as a primary motivation – but it does not do so automatically. In short, although religious identity, beliefs, networks and institutions can play an important role in how conflicts are perceived and the resources available to protagonists, the notion that religion is a primary causal factor is empirically dubious and should be approached with caution (Gunning and Jackson 2011). Nonetheless, governments and counterterrorism practitioners often argue that religious beliefs, particularly extreme

or radical views, are a primary cause of terrorism. The UK’s Prevent Strategy, for instance, accords radical religious ideology a central place in the process of radicalisation and sees nurturing alternative religious voices as a key tactic in the fight against terrorism (HM Government 2008). Radical religious beliefs, rather than religion per se, are thus singled out as a core driver of terrorism, replicating the logic of the ‘religion-inspires-violence’ thesis. Politically, such views are popular because they allow states to ignore the political grievances and demands of the terrorists or the accusation that foreign policy is a key driver of violence. Extract from Richard Jackson, Lee Jarvis, Jereon Gunning and Marie Breen Smyth, Terrorism: A Critical Introduction, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011.

Richard Jackson is Professor of International Politics, Aberystwyth University, UK. He is the founding editor of the journal Critical Studies on Terrorism. Lee Jarvis is a Lecturer in Politics and International Relations, Swansea University, UK. Jeroen Gunning is a Reader in Middle East Politics and Conflict Studies, Durham University, UK. He was founder and deputy director of the Centre for the Study of 'Radicalisation' and Contemporary Political Violence (CSRV) at Aberystwyth University from 2005-2010. Marie Breen Smyth is Professor in International Politics, University of Surrey, UK. She was founder and deputy director of the Centre for the Study of 'Radicalisation' and Contemporary Political Violence (CSRV) at Aberystwyth University from 2005-2010.

REFERENCES Bjorgo, T (2009). ‘Processes of Disengagement from Violent Groups of the Extreme Right’, in J. Horgan and T. Bjørgo, eds., Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and collective disengagement, London: Routledge. Cavanaugh, W (2004). The Violence of ‘Religion’: Examining a Prevalent Myth, Kellogg Institute for International Studies, Working Papers, no. 310, Notre Dame, IN: KI, available online at: http://www.nd.edu/~kellogg/publications/workingpapers/ WPS/310.pdf, accessed 18 January 2008. Della Porta, D (1995b). Social Movements, Political Violence, and the State: A Comparative Analysis of Italy and Germany, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. DFID (2005). Fighting poverty to build a safer world: A strategy for security and development. London: DFID. DFID (2010). ‘Alexander and Miliband on Yemen conference’, DFID Media room, News stories, 27 January 2010, available online at: http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/, accessed 29 August 2010. Ferree, M., and Miller, F. (1985). ‘Mobilization and Meaning:

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THE CAUSES OF TERRORISM: DECONSTRUCTING THE MY THS Toward an Integration of Social Psychological and Resource Mobilization Perspectives on Social Movements’, Sociological Inquiry, 55(1): 38–51. Gunning, J., forthcoming. ‘It’s the Context, Stupid’, in J. Deol and Z. Kazmi, eds., Contextualizing Jihadi Ideologies, London: Hurst. Gunning, J. (2007). Hamas in Politics: Democracy, Religion, Violence, London: Hurst. Gunning, J., and Jackson, R. (2011). ‘What’s so Religious about Religious Terrorism?’, Critical Studies on Terrorism, 4(3). Gurr, N., and Cole. B. (2000). The New Faces of Terrorism: Threats from Weapons of Mass Destruction, London: I.B. Tauris. Heiberg, M., B. O’Leary and Tirman, J., eds. (2007). Terror, Insurgency and the State: Ending Protracted Conflicts, Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press. HM Government (2008). The Prevent Strategy: A Guide for Local Partners in England, London: HM Government. Hoffman, B. (2006). Inside Terrorism, revised edition, New York: Columbia University Press. Horgan, J. (2005). The Psychology of Terrorism, London: Frank Cass. Juergensmeyer, M. (2000). Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence, Berkeley: University of California Press. Krueger, A. (2007). What Makes a Terrorist: Economics and the Roots of Terrorism, Princeton: Princeton University Press. Krueger, A., and Malečková, J. (2003). ‘Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is

There a Causal Connection?’, Journal of Economic Perspectives 17 (4): 119–144. Laqueur, W. (1999). The New Terrorism, Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction, New York: Oxford University Press. Lia, B., & K, Skjolberg (2005). ‘Causes of Terrorism: An Expanded and Updated Review of the Literature’, FFI-report 2004/04307. Kjeller, Norway: Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI). Piazza, J. (2006). ‘Rooted in Poverty?: Terrorism, Poor Economic Development, and Social Cleavages’, Terrorism and Political Violence 18(1), 159-177. Post, J. (1990). ‘Terrorist Psycho-logic: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Psychological Forces’, in W. Reich, ed., Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, pp. 25-40. Shah, A. (2010). ‘Poverty around the World’, Global Issues. Available online at: http://www.globalissues.org/article/4/povertyaround-the-world, accessed 10 March 2010. Silke, A. (1998). ‘Cheshire-cat Logic: The Recurring Theme of Terrorist Abnormality in Psychological Research’, Psychology, Crime and Law, 4: 51-69. Stewart, F. (2008). Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict: Understanding Group Violence in Multiethnic Societies, London: Palgrave Macmillan. Yunus, M. (2006). Nobel Lecture, Oslo, December 10, 2006. Available online at: http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2006/yunus-lecture-en.html, accessed 10 March 2010. Zulaika, J. & W, Douglass (1996). Terror and Taboo: The Follies, Fables, and Faces of Terrorism. London: Routledge.

BOOK PROMOTION

C CONTEMPORARY DEBATES O ON TERRORISM EDITED BY RICHARD JACKSON AND SAMUEL JUSTIN SINCLAIR This new innovative textbook addresses a number of key issues in contemporary terrorism studies from both 'traditional' and 'critical' perspectives. The format of the volume involves a leading scholar taking a particular position on the controversy, followed by an opposing or alternative viewpoint written by another contributor.

Contemporary Debates on Terrorism, edited by Richard Jackson and Samuel Justin Sinclair. Published in 2012 by Routledge.

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The Complexity of Police-Muslim Community Relations in the Shadow of 9/11 P. DANIEL SILK

n January of 2009, US President Barack Obama proposed a refreshing era of openness when he said, ‘to the Muslim world, we seek a new way forward, based on mutual interest and mutual respect’ (Obama 2009,). The President’s emphasis on improved relationships between his administration and Muslims was significant, and not surprisingly, media outlets and leaders around the world took notice.1 When a naturalized American citizen was identified as the perpetrator in a suicide bombing in Somalia not long after the inauguration, the US Federal Bureau of Investigations Director’s response (Mueller 2009) echoed the President’s sentiments by suggesting that increased efforts at outreach between law enforcement and Muslim communities within the United States were needed -- albeit for a more acute purpose -- echoing a philosophy shared in the official counter-terrorism strategy in the UK (HM Government 2009).

In a post-9/11 world, law enforcement personnel and communities are challenged by the call to support counterterrorism endeavors while simultaneously striving to build dialogue. Indeed, since the events of September 11, 2001, a wide variety of influential voices have specifically advocated a communitycentered strategy to fight violent extremism (e.g. Downing 2007; Al-Marayati 2007; HM Government 2009; Benjamin 2010), and in the current environment, healthy volu m e 5

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relationships between police and Muslim communities in the United States and the United Kingdom have taken on a new and tangible importance (Ramirez, O’Connell, & Zafar 2004; Innes 2006; Spalek & Lambert 2008). While astute government and community leaders quickly dissociate the acts of extremist criminals from the faith of the world’s Muslims, the last decade has obviously ushered in a new era of interest in the effectiveness of partnerships between Muslim communities and law enforcement in both the US and the UK. At the same time, however, discussions regarding outreach between Muslim communities and police have become extremely public and politicised, and individual efforts to build relationships are constantly overshadowed by the relentless pursuit for security. In a post-9/11 world, law enforcement personnel and communities are challenged by the call to support counter-terrorism endeavors while simultaneously striving to build dialogue, trust, and opportunities for quality police services. This challenge, it seems, has become a lasting legacy ten years after 9/11. One could argue that the need for collaboration between Muslim communities and law enforcement is obvious, so therefore the recipe for success is itself straightforward: Muslims and police in the US and the UK have a common foe in those who sow destruction in the name of Islam, so they simply must work together to defeat this criminal threat. However attractive though this may seem, this one-dimensional view leaves out a complex collection of factors (historical, political, personal and social) that may seem outside of police-community concerns, but may still make developing partnerships more difficult. For example, arches quarterly

(Spalek, El Awa, & McDonald 2009), and numerous other authors have commented on the scrutiny that Muslim communities feel (Cainkar 2002; 2004; Abbas 2007; Pew Research 2007; Khan 2009). Despite the consistent call for community-centered policing practices as a tool for preventing extremist violence, certain Muslim groups are seen as appropriate partners for police outreach, while others are vilified (Lambert 2008a; 2008b) and Muslims in general are often viewed only through a lens that prioritises security (Githens-Mazer & Lambert 2010). But how do these concerns play out at the local level, and do they affect police-community relations? The complex historical background that sets the stage for police-Muslim relations in both the US and the UK must figure prominently in plans to build partnerships, and a variety of issues deserve close attention. For police or communities to fail to recognise and act to balance these challenges can be, to THE BACKGROUND MATTERS In the current securitised climate found borrow a phrase, ‘like walking across a in the US and the UK since 9/11, it is well busy intersection with one’s eyes closed’ documented that Muslims feel pressure (Forester 1989, p.7).3 from the constant attention. For example, more than half of the American Muslims MAINSTREAM POLICING, surveyed reported that being a Muslim in COUNTER-TERRORISM, OR the United States has been harder since the BOTH? terrorist attacks of 9/11 on Washington DC If we assume that safe communities are a and New York City, and similarly a number cornerstone of both good government and of respondents observed that Muslims community-police relations; recognising have also been singled out for Government that outreach is challenging and politicised surveillance (Pew Research 2007). for all involved is a key step for both law Muslims in the United Kingdom in recent enforcement and Muslims in making the years have also stressed the difficulties important decisions needed to initiate they have experienced in this climate that the work called for by leaders in the US has developed there as a response to both and the UK. What does this mean? 9/11 and the attacks in London on July 7, Practically, it means that in the post2005 (Abbas 2007; Khan 2009; Spalek, 9/11 era, police personnel and Muslims El Awa, & McDonald 2009). In an age can expect that circumstances beyond in which thoughtful, robust and unified their control often affect police-public counter-terrorism strategies incorporating relations even before an outreach program police and communities are integral to the begins. Counter-terrorism policies, media struggle against violent extremism, this coverage, international affairs, a lack of pressure clearly presents problems. knowledge about Islam as well as proper Researchers on Muslim-police police procedure, and the past negative partnerships acknowledge the effect of experiences Muslims may have had with issues such as media attention, noting how police around the world all have ‘a say’ in the post 9/11 environment, communities in developing partnerships, and must be have felt the pressure of being suspected recognised and considered as important where do we add the effect of variables like foreign policies concerning the West Bank and Gaza, Afghanistan, and Iraq? Or the recent debates on immigration laws? Or calls for a Congressional inquiry into the supposed lack of cooperation police get from Muslim communities in the US?2 It may be tempting to dismiss these issues as unrelated, but they do indeed matter, and the views of police personnel and Muslims in the US and the UK involved in outreach stress that while partnerships between police and Muslims are needed and worthwhile, planning these efforts is not necessarily easy given the external contexts (Silk 2010). 9/11 may have spurred communities and governments to act, but a multitude of factors that have emerged from those attacks and events since make it more difficult to continue to do so.

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and influential variables.4 While combining uniformed, streetlevel policing with larger efforts to improve national security may serve a practical purpose, the two, in application, can also provide a contentious dichotomy for police and communities. As necessary as counterterrorism efforts are in our world, this work also comes with some heavy baggage. Numerous other outreach efforts between Muslims and police exist outside of the counter-terrorism arena, but this important fact -- that the outreach with Muslim communities is often a facet of a larger counter-terrorism strategy -- underlines the context in which these relationships are developed and collaborative work is planned. It is not difficult to imagine a Muslim community leader expressing understandable concern that the police interest in his community seemingly comes only from counter-terrorism personnel, regardless of whether or not this is true. Indeed it is a concern I myself have often felt, as a researcher, law enforcement veteran, and citizen, and it is one I have also heard from other police personnel -even those involved in counter-terrorism policing. So when a prominent Muslim professional asked me several years ago if I started studying Islam in graduate school before or after 9/11 I was not particularly surprised, and the real meaning of his question was not lost on me.5 It is a sentiment certainly echoed by vast number of Muslims in the US and the UK. Indeed, as one British police officer I interviewed recognised, this type of work is difficult precisely because of the need to discuss terrorism: So much of our engagement is skewed by the necessity to discuss and manage counterterrorism issues when we should be talking about mainstream policing issues. We should be talking about the burglary that happened up the road, the fact that there’s vandalism, there’s litter on the streets that people don’t feel safe walking to the corner shop at night. But we’re necessarily getting drawn into these very difficult and sensitive discussions around a very peculiar security problem volu m e 5

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which hinders the quality of the service we can deliver. In this vein, one can imagine the surprise a Muslim community member could only reasonably be expected to express when approached by police counter-terrorism personnel: ‘I’m a physician, I have a family, and I am a loyal American (or British) citizen. Why are counter-terrorism personnel coming to talk to me? Is it just because I am a Muslim? Is this the only way Muslims are viewed in our world?’ His concerns may miss the true intent of the officer involved, but we can see how an apparently straightforward opportunity for law enforcement and a community member to meet is framed and politicized by its very nature in our post-9/11 world. Perhaps the question is not why would a member of the community be taken aback by a friendly contact from counterterrorism police? A more appropriate inquiry is: How could he or she not be? Our theoretical physician might be asking himself an array of questions: ‘Why aren’t we talking about theft in my neighborhood instead of terrorism? And are the police asking Italian Catholics about terrorism? Is the Hindu community receiving the same attention?’ How could he not have these understandable concerns? Of course, this begs a question from another angle: Can Muslims and police in the US and the UK afford not to use community outreach as a tool to derail a common criminal threat? In my experience, law enforcement personnel often demonstrate substantial evidence of empathy and concern for the perceptions attention from counter-terrorism police causes (and at times may even be reluctant themselves because of it) -- but this must serve as a strong reminder of the way in which law enforcement relationships with Muslim communities are so often currently framed. No doubt, the police officer involved on the other side of the same hypothetical conversation has concerns as well, which, in all fairness, must not be dismissed: ‘I hope he doesn’t think I am here because I am closed-minded about arches quarterly

Islam and Muslims; I just really need his help’. This sentiment, however, may or may not allay the suspicions of community members. At the same time, however, these feelings are real, even if left unsaid, and they must be considered.

It often seems that discussions of Islam have sadly devolved almost exclusively into discussions of terrorism. Police personnel and community leaders alike must recognise that these worries exist, and seek to ameliorate them. It often seems that discussions of Islam have sadly devolved almost exclusively into discussions of terrorism (Esposito & Mogahed 2007) and Muslims are seen almost exclusively through the prism of security concerns (Githens-Mazer & Lambert 2010). At the same time, the distinction between the counter-terrorism mission and Muslim community-police relations becomes blurred, even if everyone involved attends to their responsibilities in the spirit of service to a greater good. Though adroit individuals involved in this type of work are accustomed to the difficulties the counter-terrorism agenda can cause -- however well intentioned or necessary it may be -- the effects of 9/11, our insatiable concern for safety, and the polarizing effect it has on communities cannot go unrecognised. I once spoke with one Muslim in the US who put it like this: ‘I think the main thing is that the Muslim American community is trying to overcome this notion of being [a] suspect community after 9/11’ — a sentiment surely felt by the hypothetical Muslim physician we have considered above, and perhaps also by the police officer. This reality emphasises the importance of understanding that as police and Muslims are working on outreach initiatives for the purpose of counter-terrorism, potential relationships are already influenced by the 76

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pervasive emphasis on security since 9/11. It represents a bit of a ‘Catch-22’ for our physician and police officer: ‘We know we need to work together on terrorism, but terrorism seems to make it harder for us to work together’.

THE TERRAIN IS COMPLEX To add to the challenge of this all, it is not just the one police officer and one community member who are involved in their emergent relationship. It is those two people, enveloped in a historically situated, complex, and imperfect world, carrying with them their own pasts, concerns, and biases. And they are certainly not the only two people who have input in how police and Muslims regard one another and interact. A Muslim in the US pointed out to me something of which I am well aware, and fear is on the increase: ‘Islamophobes’ who seek to undermine engagement. If we recognise on one hand that better relationships are needed between law enforcement and Muslims, how do we simultaneously respond to the influence of fear-laced arguments which suggest that US citizens and their government are apparently unaware of some vast underground Islamist conspiracy to subvert democratic systems and implement Islamic law (e.g., Spencer 2008)? This is especially noteworthy as a similarly alarmist story line is suggested to the public in the UK (see the overview in Spalek & Lambert 2008). The same Muslim in the US mentioned above offered a useful warning to me when he described his concern regarding ‘this threat of people on the outside that want disengagement, either non-Muslims or Islamophobes if you will, who are exploiting 9/11 and the concern over 9/11 to continuously disengage between Muslims and government agents’ (emphasis added). But we can’t just limit our recognition of the influence of outside factors to those who are so explicit in their goals. Instead, attention must also be paid to seemingly innocuous factors that can additionally affect engagement efforts. Muslims and police personnel I have volu m e 5

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interviewed have often commented on the influence of the media on police-Muslim community relations. Indeed, even wellintentioned media attention can have a very real and immediate effect on the ability of Muslims and police to work together. In both the US and the UK I have had many opportunities to hear Muslims and police personnel give recent examples of this phenomenon. Far from hearing just theoretical suggestions that media reports influence police-community relations, I was told during my research of particular examples in which media stories and had negative consequences. In the UK a Muslim offered a practical take on the issue overall, even while noting that good news (such as a recent policeMuslim community event at his mosque) fails to get nearly as much attention as bad: And as we know… controversy sells more than anything else. So generally when there’s a controversial issue, it will sell in the papers. And when you have a good event like this [event at a mosque], hardly any people will pick it up or, and even if they do pick it up, they might just put a few lines in here in the end, that’s about it and move on. Because I think it, it’s not going to sell the paper, it’s not going to sell the article or whatever else. Coverage of events such as the planned (and then cancelled) Qur’an burning by a pastor in Florida can only be expected to have a similar effect, as does other coverage. As I was told in the UK: ‘Something happens and they bring somebody on the television and they’ll [the media] just choose the most extreme person from within the Muslim community to come and talk’ and therefore ‘A lot of the time it’s the media that’s responsible for negative portrayal and giving rise to tensions and Islamophobia really’.

SEEKING BALANCE IN A POLITICISED ARENA Outreach is politicised and difficult, but still needed in a post-9/11 world. What do police personnel and Muslims do, as they are on the ‘front lines’ of broad government policies (correctly, in volu m e 5

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my opinion) suggesting outreach to build safe neighborhoods, communities, and countries? Key to our discussion here is a theme which is reinforced by Cervero and Wilson (2006) who emphasise that as we work to figure out what is needed when developing a program (in our example, outreach programs between police and Muslim communities), we also engage in work that is affected by both historical and current social issues.6 The context in which police-community outreach planning takes place (in this instance a security-conscious, political, and media-influenced world) must be a prime concern to those involved. It may be tempting to portray the need for engagement as self-evident and therefore simple, but to do that is to consider the issue with blinders on. Muslims and police cannot be reasonably expected to ignore or disassociate themselves from external forces. To do so would dangerously undermine the potential success of the very outreach programs they hope to pursue. Policy makers and political commentators would be well served to keep this in mind. Several examples stand out in my experience of officers who have recognised the contextual, historical, and social forces that may affect their potential relationships with Muslim communities with whom they hoped to work in the post-9/11 world. These police personnel strike me as empathetic, aware, curious, and concerned about the communities in which they work. Not surprisingly, successful community members I have met who work with police in the US and the UK also exhibit these same qualities. Both Muslims and police personnel have stressed to me the importance of influential factors such as international affairs, foreign policy, national government counter-terrorism agendas, and the experiences of immigrant Muslims with police in their native countries. This attention is illustrative of the understanding they have of the world around them and its tangible effect on relationships between communities and police at the local level. Th is awareness is absolutely key to the potential success of any outreach efforts, especially as Muslims and arches quarterly

police seek to navigate the effects 9/11 and terrorism have had on police-community relations. This is not the simplified world of sound bites and easy answers, but the complex reality that police and Muslim communities face daily. In the current environment, keenly recognising the issues that are likely to have an effect on outreach between police and Muslim communities is imperative, as is the ability to negotiate the hurdles presented by these same issues. In other words, everyone involved must approach outreach with an open mind and recognise potential causes of reluctance and suspicion on both ‘sides’, and at the same time be flexible and interpersonally skilled in a way that allows them to work together -- despite real or perceived challenges. Police personnel and members of Muslim communities must actively seek to identify and learn about these potentially problematic issues, but then they must also display the forethought and flexibility required to work around the hurdles they present. In the broadest terms, this may be linked to the ability of all involved to simultaneously recognise the real threat posed by terrorism while emphatically countering the pervasive stereotypes that threaten the very relationships needed to open up a path for national security discussions when they are truly needed. However, before we leap into this dialogue, we must recognise the real perils for all involved. As a police officer in the UK once told me: I believe there’s been significant failures in communication which have tended to associate, unfairly, international Al-Qaeda incidents of terrorism with mainstream Muslim community issues. And this has alienated Muslim communities and they feel it has contributed to the challenges they face day-to-day in achieving essentially health, wealth and happiness as British citizens… It’s particularly off ensive to them because they actually see acts of terrorism as the fundamental opposite of all of the principles of Islam that they hold so dear. And whereas the state and other commentators and 78

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media constantly highlight how AlQaeda is twisting Muslim community issues, I think Muslim community issues also see the establishment as practically doing as much damage as Al-Qaeda (emphasis added). Everyone involved in police-Muslim community outreach must acknowledge that similar feelings may exist. This is not to suggest, however, that this type of sentiment cannot be changed. Indeed, I interviewed a Muslim in the UK who pointed out how his relationship with one specific police counter-terrorism officer strongly affected his opinion of the unit’s outreach work, and therefore also caused him to discuss it within his community in different terms. The interviewee stressed that he and the officer ‘talk about our families, [the officer]… tell[s] me about her children, and this is what our culture is, it’s that way we build relationships around human issues, and that’s how we gain confidence [in] each other.’ Importantly, he compared this officer to previous police personnel whom he referred to as ‘ignorant’ because of their let’s get-down-to business and talk about terrorism approach to him in the past. This same interviewee candidly admitted that his ideas about the counterterrorism agenda in the UK were changed by what he learned from the police officer with whom he had built a relationship, and based on what he had learned, he would ‘explain to people no [the counterterrorism agenda of these officers is] not against Muslims’. While his previous opinion had been negative, the influence of one officer made the difference in his views, and therefore had the potential to possible influence the wider community. This effect is real and extremely valuable, and must be magnified.

WHERE DO WE GO NOW? It is a shame that ‘with few exceptions, when the Western media talks about Islam and Muslim culture, discussion tends to center on religious extremism and global terrorism’ (Esposito & Mogahed 2007, p.1), but it is also a reflection of the real volu m e 5

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environment in which communities and police in the US and the UK must operate. As we have seen, one of the lasting legacies of 9/11 has been the constant scrutiny of Muslims in the â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;Westâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;, perhaps most especially reflected in the media, and this phenomenon also strongly affects the ability of police to work in conjunction with Muslim communities. There is evidence of extremely valuable practices I have observed in communities in the US and the UK, echoing portions of what has been illustrated in other police forces found in previous research.7 Based on this, we can outline important overarching themes for police personnel and Muslim community members to consider when they intend to work together to develop outreach.

For government and community decisionmakers, the potential for success in outreach may be directly connected to selecting the right people, and supporting those individuals with guidelines that emphasise learning, flexibility, and personal relationships between communities and police. In our world ten years after the 9/11 tragedy, everyone involved in outreach between Muslim communities and police should consider, at a minimum, three persistent characteristics of outreach: (a) the need for efforts designed to build strong, personal, mutually beneficial relationships between Muslims and police personnel to support overall community welfare (and not just counter- terrorism initiatives); (b) the need to be flexible in negotiating what is expected and delivered volu m e 5

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through the planning and delivery of these efforts; and (c) the need to identify what can and should be learned about communities, police, and their histories, goals, needs and expectations. These three factors offer a place from which to start the outreach process, but they may also offer answers when existent programs struggle. Perhaps the question of greatest importance is this: How can police agencies and communities identify and develop people with the needed interpersonal skills, emotional intelligence, and empathy necessary to plan and institute outreach work between Muslims and police?8 Clearly, it is not just about sound policies. For government and community decision-makers, the potential for success in outreach may be directly connected to selecting the right people, and supporting those individuals with guidelines that emphasise learning, flexibility, and personal relationships between communities and police. It is possible these skills were always needed in outreach work. But in the post9/11 environment, they are especially important -- indeed, key -- if communities and police want to move forward with projects for the public good. This type of work requires flexible, caring, individuals with exceptional interpersonal skills and a willingness to collaborate, a proven dedication to open-minded problem solving, and a real thirst for learning and working in non-traditional police and community roles. Government personnel and community members must be willing to have ongoing and at times extremely challenging dialogue, planning what may often be unconventional opportunities for outreach while also spending the required time to build strong personal relationships. Let us not forget that outreach between Muslim communities and police is at its most basic level just a relationship between two people. But this relationship is built and sustained on a complex organisational, international and public stage, and we therefore need to focus more attention on the human side of outreach as well as on national policies. This reflects the real-world process of working on joint arches quarterly

community-police efforts which facilitate Dr Phillip Daniel Silk is a Fulbright Police Research ‘informal moments where we build tighter Fellow, who studied outreach between Muslim communities and British police, and a similar topic more intimate bonds with one another,’ as was the focus of his doctorate dissertation, completed a US police interviewee suggested to me. at the University of Georgia’s Department of Lifelong Education, Administrations, and Policy. His bachelor’s Or, as another interviewee put it: ‘It’s less degree is in Religion, as is his master’s degree, with an Islamic Studies emphasis. Silk has had the opportunity systems and institutions and things than to study and work in a variety of Muslim communities it is personal relationships and interaction’. around the world, and has long been interested in studying how law enforcement and Muslim This is a view of relationships built between communities interact and work together. police and Muslims that are much more Silk is also an 18-year veteran of campus, local and than rational, organisation- and resultsfederal law enforcement in the United States. In 2002 driven mandates. The Director of the FBI he was part of the first permanent staff at the newly re-opened US Embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan; he has or the Home Office may (and should) call also been a captain with the Athens-Clarke County for more organizational outreach between (Georgia) Police Department, where at various times he commanded a community policing unit, internal law enforcement and Muslims, but it is affairs, training, and vice. Currently, Silk works individual relationships that will actually for the University of Georgia, where he manages communications for the Police Department and make it happen. teaches in the Criminal Justice Studies Program. Success, then, cannot be fully or easily captured through common measures, nor can it be easily described.9 It may not align ENDNOTES with any simple metrics but instead sound 1. For a concise example, see Pennington’s ‘The Inauguration more like the opinion of a Muslim youth of Barack Hussein Obama’ on http://muslimvoices.org. See Gruber, 2010. worker in the UK who colorfully described 2.3. See Bravin, 2010. a police officer he had once worked with: 4. See Dodd, 2009. He was a gem of a police officer… I’ve seen 5. See Condon, 2010. many… diff erent police officers, but he was 6. Cervero and Wilson (2006) use the Forester quote to planning adult educational opportunities. an absolute diamond of a police officer... describe 7. This conclusion represents one of those found in my He could sit down in here, have a cup of tea, research associated with a 2009 Fulbright Police Research have a laugh, have a joke with some of the Fellowship as well as my 2010 PhD dissertation work. I young people. He had a very, very good way conducted two case studies, relying on interviews with personnel and Muslims in the US and the UK about him… I’m sure he was a youth worker police to understand the goals of outreach between Muslim in his previous life. I’m sure that he had communities and police, and how those outreach efforts something about him… you know, in terms are planned. Overall, 31 semi-structured interviews were of his skills, his interpersonal skills (emphasis conducted, and approximately half of the interviewees were police personnel, and half were members of Muslim added). communities. I also benefited from a great deal of informal Do we really need a statistic plotted on a graph to know that this is good? No more so than we need charts to tell us good community-police relations are important. Perhaps for community and police organisations, therefore, one of the keys to effectively building relationships is taking the time to recognise potential challenges, learn about them, and then working to navigate around them. This may be no different than the equation for successful partnerships between police and Muslim communities before 9/11, but in the long shadow cast by those events, it is now imperative.

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time spent with Muslims and police personnel in the US and the UK, discussing related issues, and generally trying to grasp the context behind the work of Muslims and police involved in outreach. The data and these experiences were further contextualised by my graduate studies in Islam, as well as my experiences since 1999 studying, traveling, or working in communities largely built of Muslims around the world, including approximately 15 months spent in Afghanistan starting in early 2002. 8. Spalek and Lambert (2008) similarly emphasized reflecting on the importance of “wider social, cultural and political contexts” (p.258). 9. This is indeed pertinent; I began my graduate degree four years before 9/11, and finished in 2000. 10. While Cervero and Wilson were speaking specifically to planning adult education activities, we can and should conceptualise outreach as a practice with a distinct educational component, and therefore also recognise how true their observation is in the community policing arena. 11. See examples such as: Spalek, El Awa, and McDonald (2009); Lambert (2008a; 2008b); Ramirez, O‘Connell, and Zafar (2004); Henderson, Ortiz, Sugie, and Miller, (2006).

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THE COMPLEXITY OF POLICE-MUSLIM COMMUNITY RELATIONS IN THE SHADOW OF 9/11 12. Here, I use the concept of interpersonal skills from BarOn, et al. (2000), and the understanding of emotional and social intelligence proposed by Goleman (1995; 2006). 13. A question echoed by Spalek, Al-Awa, and McDonald (2009).

REFERENCES Abbas, Tahir (2007). ‘Muslim minorities in Britain: Integration, multiculturalism, and racism in the post-7/7 period’, Journal of Intercultural Studies, vol. 28, no. 3, pp.287-300, doi:10.1080/07256860701429717 Bar-On, R., Brown, J. M., Kirkcaldy, B. D. & Thome, E. P. (2000). ‘Emotional expression and implications for occupational stress; application of the Emotional Quotient Inventory (EQ-i)’, Personality and Individual Differences, vol. 28, pp.1107-18, doi:10.1016/ S0191-8869(99)00160-9. Benjamin, Daniel (March 10, 2010). ‘U.S. Government efforts to counter violent extremism: Testimony before the Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee’, http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/ rm/2010/138175.htm Bravin, , Jess (Nov 5, 2010). ‘Oklamhoma is sued over shariah ban’, Wall Street Journal Online’, http://online.wsj.com/article/ SB10001424052748704805204575594793733847372.html, accessed on February 19, 2011. Cainkar, Louise (2002). ‘No longer visible: Arab and Muslim exclusion after September 11’, Middle East Report, vol. 224, pp. 22-9. Cainkar, Louise (2004). ‘The impact of the September 11 attacks and their aftermath on Arab and Muslim communities in the United States’ GSC Quarterly, vol.13, http://programs.ssrc.org/ gsc/publications/quarterly13/cainkar.pdf, n.ac. Cervero, Ronald M. & Wilson, Arthur L. (2006). Working the Planning Table: Negotiating Democratically for Adult, Continuing, and Workplace Education. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass Condon, Stephanie (Dec 17, 2010). ‘Rep. Peter King Planning Hearings on Muslim "Radicalization"’, CBSNews online, http:// www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-20026083-503544.html, accessed on February 19, 2011. Dodd, Vikram (Oct 16, 2009). ‘Government anti-terrorism strategy ‘spies’ on innocent: Data on politics, sexual activity and religion gathered by government’; The Guardian, http://www. guardian.co.uk/uk/2009/oct/16/antiterrorism-strategy-spiesinnocents, accessed on February 19, 2011. Downing, Michael P. (Oct. 30, 2007). ‘Statement of Michael P. Downing before the Committee on Homeland Security’s and Government and Government Affairs United States Senate’, http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Files. View&FileStore_id=ac58750d-0a53-4deb-a19a-31344ba2f733-, accessed on February 26, 2011. Esposito, John L. & Mogahed, Dalia (2007). Who Speaks for Islam: What a Billion Muslims Really Think, New York, NY: Gallup Press. Field, Clive D. (2007). ‘Islamophobia in contemporary Britain: The evidence of the opinion polls, 1988-2006’, Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, vol. 18, no. 4, pp. 447-77

bia and Anti-Muslim Hate Crime, Exeter, UK: The University of Exeter. http://centres.exeter.ac.uk/emrc/publications/IAMHC_ revised_11Feb11.pdf, accessed on February 26, 2011. Gruber, Ben (Sep. 9, 2010).‘Florida pastor cancels Koranburning plan’, Reuters.com, http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/09/09/us-usa-muslims-idUSTRE68709M20100909, accessed on February 19, 2011. Henderson, Nichole J., Ortiz, Christopher W., Sugie, Naomi F. & Miller, Joel (2006). Law Enforcement & Arab American Community Relations after September 11, 2001: Engagement in a Time of Uncertainty. New York, NY: Vera Institute of Justice, http://www. vera.org/publication_pdf/353_636.pdf, n.ac. HM GOVERNMENT 2009 Pursue Prevent Protect Prepare: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering International Terrorism, Norwich, UK: TSO, http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/cm75/7547/7547.pdf, n.ac. Innes, Martin (2006). ‘Policing uncertainty: Countering terror through community intelligence and democratic policing’ The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 605, pp. 222-41. doi:10.1177/0002716206287118. Khan, Khalida (2009). Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) and PREVENT: A Response from the Muslim Community, London, UK: An-Nisa Society, http://www.annisa.org/downloads/ PVE_&_Prevent_-_A_Muslim_response. pdf, accessed on February 19, 2011. Lambert, Robert (2008). ‘Empowering Salafis and Islamists against al-Qaeda: A London counterterrorism case study’, PS: Political Science & Politics, vol. 41, no.1, pp. 31-5, doi: 10.1017/ S1049096508080049. 2008b ‘Salafi and Islamist Londoners: Stigmatised minority faith communities countering al-Qaida’, Crime, Law and Social Change, vol. 50 no. 1-2, pp. 73-89, doi: 10.1007/s10611-0089122-8. Al-Marayati, Salam (Jun 14, 2007). ‘Assessing and addressing the threat: Identifying the role of the National Commission on the Prevention of Violent Radicalization and Homegrown Terrorism. Testimony to the United States House of Representatives House Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment’, http://homeland.house.gov/SiteDocuments/20070614135307-44582.pdf, n.ac. Mueller, Robert S. (Feb. 23, 2009). ‘Speech delivered to the Council on Foreign Relations’, http://www.fbi.gov/news/ speeches /addressing-the-globalization-and-evolution, accessed on February 19, 2011. Obama, Barack Hussein (Jan. 20, 2009). ‘President Barack Obama's Inaugural Address’, http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/ inaugural-address, accessed on February 19, 2011. Pennington, Rosemary (Jan. 20, 2009). ‘The inauguration of Barack Hussein Obama’, http://muslimvoices.org/inaugurationbarack-hussein-obama/, accessed on February 19, 2011. Pew Research Centre (2007). Muslim Americans: Middle Class and Mostly Mainstream, Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, http://pewresearch.org/assets/pdf/muslim-americans.pdf, n.ac.

Forester, John (1989). Planning in the Face of Power, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Pontuing, Scott & Mason, Victoria (2007). ‘The resistible rise of Islamophobia: Anti-Muslim racism in the UK and Australia before 11 September 2001’, Journal of Sociology, vol. 43, no. 1, pp. 61-86, doi: 10.1177/1440783307073935.

Githens-Mazer, Jonathan & Lambert, Robert (2010). Islamopho-

Ramirez, Deborah A., O’Connell, Sascha Cohen & Zafar, Rabina

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THE COMPLEXITY OF POLICE-MUSLIM COMMUNITY RELATIONS IN THE SHADOW OF 9/11 (2004). Developing Partnerships between Law Enforcement and American Muslim, Arab, and Sikh communities: A Promising Practices Guide, Boston, MA: The Partnership for Prevention and Community Safety Initiative, http://www.spcs.neu.edu/pfp/ downloads/ Guide_Final5.4.04.pdf, n.ac. Silk, Phillip D. (2010). Planning Outreach between Muslim Communities and Police in the USA and the UK, PhD dissertation, Department of Lifelong Education, Administration, and Policy, University of Georgia, Athens, GA Spalek, Basia, El Awa, Salwa & McDonald, Laura Zahra (2009). Police-Muslim Engagement for the Purpose of Counter-Terrorism: An Examination, Birmingham, UK: The University of Birmingham.

Spalek, Basia & Lambert, Robert (2008). ‘Muslim communities, counter-terrorism and counter-radicalisation: A critically reflective approach to engagement’, International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice, vol. 36, 257-70, doi:10.1016/j.ijlcj.2008.08.004. Spencer, Robert (2008). Stealth Jihad, Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing. Weller, Paul (2006). ‘Addressing religious discrimination and Islamophobia: Muslims and liberal democracies. The case of the United Kingdom’, Journal of Islamic Studies, vol. 17, no. 3, pp. 295-325, doi:10.1093/jis/etl001.

FOUNDATION TO ADVANCE INTERFAITH TRUST AND HARMONY (FAITH) FAITH projects a global vision, but creates peace-building programs with local partners, in a network of institutions and interfaith centers throughout the world. The interfaith connections are particularly strong in the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, Israel and Russia. In the near future FAITH looks to expand its network of programs through institutions in Poland, Italy, Brazil, South Africa, Australia, and Dubai. FAITH uses its network of individuals, institutions, and interfaith centers to establish best practices in interfaith dialogue and action. FAITH facilitates collaboration among existing institutions. FAITH raises financial resources to enhance the quality of all within its network. Find out more, get involved!

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Beyond the Rhetoric – Setting a New Perspective for Partnerships AMJAD MOHAMED-SALEEM

Everyone of us living on this planet is an world. The basic premise of this paper is that engaging with local grass roots Other in the view of Others communities has to consider the role of - Ryszard Kapuściński faith as it offers a simple and easy access yszard Kapuściński’s quote to communities (strong in their spiritual symbolises the challenge that is and faith teachings) and a simple language increasingly being faced in the to express the commonalities of existence world today, of conflict though different and create the prerequisites for forgiveness, in causes, that seems to unearth the most respect, understanding and acceptance. dramatic view of the ‘Other’. They tend to Whilst dialogues are a beginning it is evoke forms of supremacist notions of the important that engagement goes beyond religious ‘self’ and negative images of the this; engaging practically with faith leaders religious ‘other’ which are deeply-rooted and communities to help resolve and avoid in dominant understandings of religion. conflict, and achieve gains that make a These are deeply divisive assumptions of difference to people’s lives. In particular, single exclusive identities by sectarian the paper highlights how different faith activists, who want people to ignore all communities make natural allies for affiliation and loyalties in support of one the promotion of cross-border linking specific identity. Such exclusive identities initiatives to work across national and are negative, stressing difference rather religious boundaries, thereby providing a than belonging and ‘opposition to’ rather potential significant anti-dote to conflict and the perceptions that fuel it. than ‘support for’ something. It is against this framework of disagreement that there is a need to explore DEVELOPING A NEW PARADIGM new initiatives. This paper explores how The interaction of religion with the the concept of partnerships is essential to public sphere is also diluted by increasingly addressing some of the many challenges new challenges. In the face of globalisation, of the twenty first century. This concept we see the transmogrification of traditional is based on the fact that in reality no religions and belief systems as a result of individual / community / organisation the disintegration of traditional social can operate in isolation in today’s complex fabrics and shared norms by the invasion of consumerism, cyber culture, newfangled In the face of religions, social fads, and changing work and work rhythms. Coupled with globalisation, we see the ethics this, there is a generational conflict which transmogrification of starts to develop and exacerbates structural traditional religions and and/or socio-psychological discrimination to leadership vacuums and a gap in belief systems as a result leading terms of framing a proper understanding of the disintegration of of a world constructed by ‘others’. Efforts are required at all levels within traditional social fabrics society develop a new workable and and shared norms. principledto political paradigm which can bridge the gaps of mistrust and suspicion

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between faiths, beliefs, cultures and communities. Firstly, we will need to confront our own relativisms by rethinking concepts of human nature (especially as regards the ageold search for spiritual values and religious truths) and competing, confusing, or illdefined concepts of tolerance, diversity, and freedom. Secondly we need to relook at the concept of harmonious pluralism which will include the interaction of religious actors with one another, with society and the state around concrete cultural, social, economic and political agendas. It denotes a politics that encourages diverse communities with overlapping but distinctive ethics and interests. Whilst such interaction can involve sharp conflict, the politics should provide a space for people to struggle openly with religious and cultural differences. Provision of this space should consider: a) Common Values where major faith traditions are united in the values which espouse the notion of a shared humanity, b) Social Responsibility where there is diversity and the reality of its prevalence is reason enough for people to come together and dialogue, and c) articulating Social Justice, Ethics and Values which demonstrate endurance of a lived spirituality, mirroring a soul at peace. The concept of harmonious pluralism is also about taking into account Nobel Laureate Professor Amartya Sen’s (2006) premise in his book Identity and Violence, that the key to good citizenship and social cohesion which are components in a cosmopolitan society is the encouragement and retention of multiple identities. People have several enriching identities: nationality, gender, age and parental background, religious or professional affiliation. They identify with different ethnic groups and races, towns or villages they call home, sometimes football teams; they speak different languages, which they hope their children will retain, and love different parts of their countries. It is the recognition of this plurality and the searching for commonalities within this pluralism that will lead to greater 84

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respect and ultimately understanding and acceptance. The third aspect is about rebuilding trust which in an age of mistrust and suspicion can be a challenge. As Corcoran (2010) states, trust building involves, a) value integration which emphases personal responsibility to be part of the change; b) inclusion of all to establishing open dialogue and engagement; c) acknowledging history in order to establish an agenda for healing; and d) forgimg alliances and a networks of responsibility that embraces diversity. To support the four steps outlined above for trust-building, there is a need to inculcate intellectual empathy to ensure that people who are in conflict with each other will have to acknowledge and understand that everyone has justified grievances. Rationality and faith in one self and others will help us to intellectually disagree with someone’s view, analysis or policy without doubting their sincerity and loyalty. Spirituality will be the glue that binds the factors together in a spirit of ethics, morals and basic humanity so that at the very base of the argument, one agrees to disagree. These factors and the steps outlined above will ensure that any dialogue and trust building measure is undertaken in a spirit of mutual tolerance, acknowledgement, forgiveness and nonretaliation so that people move towards respecting, understanding and accepting one another's differences in an atmosphere of justice and equality.

CREATING A NEW ENVIRONMENT Developing these ideas has been helped by several global initiatives. One such initiative was the Commonwealth Peoples’ Forum, held in Uganda, November 2007, where the communiqué1 that was issued to heads of governments called for programs to support intercultural and inter-, intra-, and cross faith exchange to build understanding and cooperation for joint working on development and governance. The communiqué re-emphasised the focus of the Commonwealth that was agreed in 2005 to focus on the promotion of mutual volu m e 5

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understanding and respect among all faiths and communities within it2. By issuing the communiqué, the forum recognised the need to move away from just pure interfaith dialogue and networking, to a more grass roots centred partnership of practical action between and within communities of faith, ethnicity and culture. In a conference held at the UN in 2008 organised by King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, appropriately called ‘Culture of Peace’ the very concept of creating a new environment by the promotion of InterReligious and Inter-Cultural Dialogue, Understanding and Cooperation for Peace was examined. The conference examined the need to build tolerant societies and durable peace by restoring values of compassion and solidarity and encouraging the promotion of dialogue amongst the different forums available in all cultures. The conference noted that achieving a culture of peace required effort from “the forces that hold our societies together”, which also included religious beliefs, among other worldviews and focussing on the shared values of these religions and not on the differences. In 2010, senior officials from the 118 member countries of the NonAligned Movement (NAM) met in Manila, Philippines where the heads of delegations declared their support for the extraordinary theme chosen for their conference: “Interfaith Dialogue and Cooperation for Peace and Development” – an implicit admission that the fault lines threatening the world’s unity today may no longer run across ideological lines, but more profoundly across religious lines. So faith it seems matters. It is obvious that while these conferences are evidence of a political resolve to establishing a ‘culture of peace’ and to concentrate efforts to develop a new workable and principled paradigm which can bridge the gaps of mistrust and suspicion communities, there is still disconnect between theory and the practice. Thus efforts are still required at all levels within society to ensure that the resolve goes beyond the rhetoric. So the volu m e 5

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question is how to go about this? One suggestion can be offered by a report of the Brookings Doha Centre which in 20093 suggested that ‘joint partnerships are the key to successful initiatives of building support within civil society and non state actors across the international divide as a way of strengthening international security through mutual understanding and open communication channels that can be used to solve shared challenges’.

CASE STUDY - THE IMAM AND THE PASTOR Emerging from the 1990s in Northern Nigeria after being in the frontlines of confrontations between Christians and Muslims which saw the killings of thousands in inter-religious warfare, Imam Muhammad Ashafa and Pastor James Wuye are two of the most unlikely of allies, forging new grounds in mediating peace between Christians and Muslims in Nigeria's Kaduna state. They both come out of the heart of the religious teachings of their communities (Imam Ashafa was once committed to the total Islamisation of Nigeria and Pastor James to its total evangelization) and were sucked into the religious conflict, becoming bitter enemies, determined to kill each other. Joining rival militias and fighting against each other, the Pastor had his hand hacked off while defending his church against Muslims and the Imam had his spiritual adviser and two of his brothers killed by Christian extremists. In 1995, a chance meeting between the two at a mediation conference held under the auspices of the Kaduna State Women’s Commission to tackle the problem of drug abuse saw them discovering a lot of commonalities. This started their journey towards healing and forgiveness. They each began to question the cost of violence, reverting back to their scriptures for guidance on common approaches. The culmination of this was the Interfaith Mediation Centre which has been described as a prototype of global conflict-resolution. The journey has been a arches quarterly

tough one. They were labelled as betrayers by their own people and when they visited each other’s religious institutions, they were met with suspicion. Their personal journey was equally tough. Moving away from hating each other was a hard one. The turning point for Imam Ashafa came when he heard a jumu’a khutba (Friday sermon) about forgiveness and the example of the Prophet Muhammad who forgave the Quraish tribe upon the conquest of Makkah. For Pastor James, it took him three years to really overcome his hatred. He says that sometimes when they would be travelling together, even sharing a room, he was sometimes tempted to try and suffocate Ashafa in retaliation for the loss of his hand. However it was with the sickness of his mother and the support shown by Imam Ashafa that Pastor James began to really embrace the concept of reconciliation. He was further helped by the words of a fellow evangelist: ‘You can not preach to someone you hate. You must begin to forgive them for every hurt against you.’ The main objectives of their work are to re-establish relationships that have been damaged due to violence; attempt to minimise the likelihood of the reoccurrence of violence; offer projects which require the involvement of both Christians and Muslims, such as cultural events and workshops; and help support the capacity development of partners involved in peace-building. Activities have a particular focus on including women, as the chief transmitters of and educators about values in the home, and young people, who are vulnerable to religious calls to violence. Work has also begun in schools to provide conflict resolution training to religious instructors and other educators, recognising that minor conflicts can escalate if not tackled early. A major landmark was the signing of the Kaduna Peace Declaration in August 2002. This was drafted to be inclusive of and acceptable to a broad range of religious leaders, who were encouraged to review drafts with their constituents. Twenty religious leaders signed the Declaration, and instituted an annual Peace Day in Kaduna 86

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State. Part of the follow-up to this has been the development of a cadre of religious leaders who can be rapidly deployed to defuse tension in times of crisis. In November 2002, for example, a newspaper article about the Miss World beauty competition, due to be held in Nigeria, caused offence to many Muslims. Ashafa and Wuye, with other religious leaders, quickly visited affected neighbourhoods and made united television appeals for calm. This was seen as something that would not have been possible without the formal commitment earlier made in the Kaduna Peace Declaration. When Pope Benedict XVI made comments about Islam which many found offensive in a speech made in September 2006, the lack of violent response by Muslims in the state was attributed to the groundwork done by the Interfaith Mediation Centre. Their work has since been applied to contexts other than the strictly religious, such as ethnic contexts, with the skills developed in Christian-Muslim peace building used to bring together opposing Fulani and Berom tribes. In 2008, they were invited by the Kenyan Government to look at healing tribal rifts in the aftermath of election violence. The two men working together are helping to empower others to understand and rejoice in the commonality in the faith of others and to speak of those faiths with the respect they deserve whilst remaining faithful to their own religions. In fact it is this demonstration of the importance of staying faithful to one’s own religious principles whilst reaching out to others of a different faith, is what has been the appeal of their story over the last decade

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or so. This and the fact that their solution is a home-grown solution (from when they were at the heart of the problem to becoming part of the solution) that has not had any external influences, means they talk not only with credibility but with a refreshing sense of uniqueness. This credibility is important especially for a continent that has suffered from being told how to solve its problems rather than being provided with a space and facilitation in order to solve the problem for itself.

LESSONS FROM THE IMAM AND THE PASTOR The story of the Imam and the Pastor clearly shows that the strength of the message of perceived ‘enemies’ working together cannot be underestimated. This of course needs to be followed by action. Announcements of peace and reconciliation must carry a visible, immediate and tangible benefit to disadvantaged conflict communities to have an impact. Their experience demonstrates the need for processes of reconciliation to start from personal and apparently modest roots. A process of personal acceptance and understanding gradually broadened out into something that could reach and engage with others. It also draws attention to the need for inspirational leadership and role models, and for the sharing of this experience through popular forms that can reach others. Further, while the Kaduna Peace Declaration can be seen as a symbol – and symbols are of course important – an opportunity to demonstrate its value in practical application has to be quickly taken. The story also highlights some significant steps towards establishing partnerships. The first is about moving from a point of ‘clash’ to a point of ‘alliance’. This is crucial in helping to set a cornerstone for understanding each other. In deciding to move towards alliance, there is an element of acknowledging the other. Once there is acknowledgement, then there is an opportunity to develop respect, understanding and eventually acceptance. Ultimately, for both Ashafa and Wuye, the volu m e 5

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starting point was a willingness to work round initial hostility and suspicion and a readiness to admit that an understanding of another’s method might be faulty. The first step was that they were prepared to have their own assumptions challenged, but in a safe, private and unpressured space. The journey towards developing partnerships is then about taking an individual responsibility to create a safe space for people to talk and share ideas. This safe space entails not only moving beyond victimhood but also being cognizant of the past (accepting and facing up to the past honestly). Imam Ashafa and Pastor James are hardly candidates for setting an example for their country or for peace-building or unlikely to be described, as they are now, by the Archbishop of Canterbury as ‘a model for Christian Muslim relations’ yet today their story is one about the power of the responsibility placed upon the shoulder of the individual to take the lead in becoming a true citizen of the country and of the world, where one can rise above their narrow confines of individualistic concerns to face the broader concerns of all humanity and to redress the contradiction of society. This is not just something that should be left to the politicians or the institutions but really no one can be ruled out of having a part in contributing.

CONCLUSION The story of the Imam and the Pastor shows that while strong ethical commitment in religious traditions can sharpen identity politics more importantly it can form the basis of inter and intra faith collaboration. Thus religious pluralism can not only lead to an absence of violence mainly due to better understandings and interaction but can open a space for discussion, dialogue and engagement. In short, we must learn to listen closely to one another, not simply because it is polite, but because it is just possible that we might learn something important about ourselves, and build a better global village in the process. The next step is about translating this into practice. This can only be done arches quarterly

in partnership which is important as REFERENCES Hady (2009). The opportunity of the Obama Era: Can Civil an element of inter faith co-operation. Amr, Society help bridge divides between the United States and a It works! It should be encouraged and Diverse Muslim World?, Analysis Paper No. 1, Brookings Doha supported. It should be enhanced through Centre. a comprehensive education strategy, both Appiah, Kwame Anthony (2006). Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a formal and informal, that breaks down the World of Strangers, W.W. Norton. seemingly insurmountable divide of us and Banchoff, Thomas (2008). Religious Pluralism, Globalisation and them. World Politics, Oxford University Press. Addressing these challenges offers Jose (1994). Public Religions in the Modern World, an antidote to sectarianism and the Casanova, University of Chicago Press. polarisation of different faiths in multiGerard (2006). Faith Matters: Faith-Based Organisations, cultural societies. This will never be easy, Clarke, Civil Society and International Development, Journal of Internabut remains vitally important as Faith tional Development, Vol. 18, No. 6, 835-848. identities will continue to be part of the (2008). Faith-Based Organisations and International Developpicture, and faith-based organizations will --ment: An Overview, in Gerard Clarke & Michael Jennings (eds.), continue to thrive as part of civil society. Development, Civil Society and Faith-Based Organisations: Bridging the Sacred and the Secular, Palgrave Macmillan. The story of Tau Sen, the master musician at the court of the Mogul -- (2010). Trans-Faith Humanitarianism: Muslim Aid and the Emperor, Akbar, sets an example of how United Methodist Committee on Relief, European Journal of listening can build understanding. He Development Research 22, 510-528. had some fifteen musical instruments in Corcoran, Rob (2010). Trustbuilding: An Honest Conversation on the Emperor’s chamber, which he had Race, Reconciliation and Responsibility, University of Virginia Press. tuned to one frequency. Upon playing just one instrument’s musical note, the Eickelman, Dale & Salvatore, Armando (2002). The Public Sphere other fourteen started to resonate, to the and Muslim Identities, Arch.europ.sociol., XLIII, 92-115. astonishment and delight of the audience. Firmin, Andrew & Linden, Ian (2007). Engaging with FaithIdeally this story serves a metaphor for Report of the Commonwealth Foundation Project on Improving and Cooperation between Different Faith Comhow communities can work in harmony Understanding munities 2005-2007, Commonwealth Foundation. to achieve an enlightened result. Not Michael (2009). No Enemy to Conquer: Forgiveness in everyone sees it that way. Certainly Henderson, an Unforgiving World, Baylor University Press. not every faith community is tuned to the same frequency, indeed, not every Hovey, Guy & Saleem, Amjad (2008). Faith, Relief and DevelopThe Sri Lankan Experience, Forced Migration Review, Issue faith community has achieved harmony ment: 30. within itself but an opportunity exists Katerine. & Van Saanen, Marissa (2007). Development through the promotion of linking to Marshall, and Faith: Where Heart, Mind and Soul Work Together, The World faith communities, to harness more cross- Bank. community collaboration, in the interest Non Aligned Movement, Aligning for Interfaith Dialogue. http:// of peace, tolerance, and wellbeing. lamdagcdo.blogspot.com/2010/07/aligning-for-interfaithdialogue.html Amjad Mohamed-Saleem was born in Nigeria and received his early education in Ethiopia and Britain, later graduating from Imperial College, London, with a Masters in Civil and Environmental Engineering. In 2009, he completed an MBA from Universitas21 Global in Singapore. After the 2004 Tsunami and having lost several family members to it in Sri Lanka, Saleem left the engineering profession and joined the humanitarian and development field working for British NGO Muslim Aid. In 2006, Saleem became Country Director of Muslim Aid’s Sri Lankan office whilst also coordinating projects in Bangladesh. Saleem joined The Cordoba Foundation as Head of Communications in 2009. In 2010, he has commenced his doctorate at Exeter University, UK.

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Sen, Amartya (2006). Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny, W.W. Norton & Company Inc. Shrader, Douglas (2006). Beyond Tolerance: Globalisation, Freedom and Religious Pluralism, 6th World Congress of the International Society for Universal Dialogue- Humanity at the Turning Point: Rethinking nature, Culture and Freedom, Finland. www. oneonta.edu/academics/philos/Shrader/Beyond-Tolerance.pdf UN, Adopting Consensus Resolution, General Assembly Affirms Mutual Understanding, Interreligious Dialogue as Important Dimensions of Culture of Peace. http://www.un.org/News/ Press/docs//2008/ga10784.doc.htm

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ENDNOTES 1. ‘Realising People’s Potential: The Kampala Civil Society Statement to the 2007 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting November 2007’ Commonwealth Foundation. 2. See ‘Civil Paths to Peace’ (Commonwealth Secretariat 2007) and ‘Engaging with Faith’ (Commonwealth Foundation 2007) for further details. 3. Report, ‘The Opportunity of the Obama Era’, November 2009.

MUSLIM PARTICIPATION IN CONTEMPORARY GOVERNANCE: NEW RESEARCH FROM UNIVERSITY OF BRISTOL

This major new research initiative is on British Muslim engagement with the UK state, from 1997 to present. The study focuses on how Muslims have been brought into partnerships, forums and governance networks through policy agendas such as Prevent, community cohesion, multiculturalism, interfaith work and urban regeneration. The research is led by Dr Therese O’Toole and Professor Tariq Modood, with Dr Daniel Nilsson DeHanas, Dr Stephen Jones and Dr Nasar Meer, and is funded by the AHRC and ESRC. The study involves interviews with significant actors in UK politics and governance at national and local levels, with local-level research focusing on three areas: Birmingham, Leicester and Tower Hamlets, London. It will provide detailed, evidence-based analysis of state-Muslim engagement for policymakers, academics and the general public. http://bris.ac.uk/ethnicity/projects/muslimparticipation Join the email list, or return regularly to see the project’s findings as they are released

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From Moulin Rouge to 9/11 ZUBEDA LIMBADA

was working at a call centre in Salford on 9/11. It was an ordinary day when a colleague shouted, “You won’t believe this, but a plane has hit a building in America.” A few minutes later “...and they’re saying it’s a terrorist attack.” For the rest of the day, office talk and radio news centred around who might have carried out the attack.

The effect of 9/11 on me personally was immediate. In busy public places, I was called “Bin Laden’s wife” or a “terrorist lover”. When the news changed from “terrorists” to “Arabs” my private dread of Muslims being involved became a reality. Uneasy eyes wanted to probe my silence. I was glad to escape the office and meet friends to watch “Moulin Rouge”, a romantic musical film adaptation based in late 19th century Paris. Buying tickets, my Muslim friends and I talked about events unfolding in America and wondered what was happening. TV screens in the cinema lobby confirmed that the culprits were Muslims. The effect of 9/11 on me personally was immediate. In busy public places, I was called “Bin Laden’s wife” or a “terrorist lover”; I was abused verbally when socialising with Muslim and non-Muslim friends. Colleagues sought my opinion and explanation for a terrible terrorist attack as though my faith and headscarf provided a hotline to Bin Laden himself. At home in Bolton, my family and I watched the news and shared our real concerns. 90

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Friends and family no longer walked alone as harassment became a way of life. Our fears were multiplied when we heard of British Muslims being attacked, spat at and abused. To that end, writing about 9/11 a decade on, living in Birmingham, provided a perfect opportunity for me to examine closely the attitudes of a newer generation of Muslims and the emotional legacy and impact of 9/11.

METHODOLOGY For the purpose of this localised study a total of ten structured interviews in two inner city call centres were held to seek the views of predominantly British Pakistani Mirpuri workers in Birmingham and, in Bolton, British Indian Gujerati workers who form the significant minorities in their areas. A semi-structured interview approach was taken in the form of snapshots conducted between 25 December 2010 and 29 January 2011. Interviews were not recorded, but detailed notes of the sessions were made during the interview to capture lived experiences. Ages ranged from 21-24 years with a 6:4 male: female ratio. Ethnic backgrounds were 6 Indians, 3 Pakistanis and 1 Yemeni; all were Muslims.

RESEARCH FOCUS The interviews sought the participants’ insights on themes including identities, realities, values and attitudes in relation to their community, cultures and family. More specifically, two particular strands of thought were examined: 1. What does being Muslim mean, and how does this differ from how society generally labels oneself and others? Are definitions such as Islamophobia, racism, cultural Muslim, and so forth, too complex and reductive as terms for local volu m e 5

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Muslims to navigate as an identity, in a controlled, compact environment. and are local realities detached Those interviewed lived within a short radius in tight-knit, predominantly from a national problem? inner-city, communities. Some of these 2. The interviews tried to explore if community networks replicate themselves there is a “public and private space” in the workplace. Experience suggests that which enables communities to deny the younger employees may be familiar immediate realities to stave off with colleagues who attended the same change and/or to deny the existence schools, mosques, colleges or universities. of a reality, which they seek to hide As such, shared social and religious from. What these reasons may be networks may already exist. The call centre microcosm provides were examined. access to a generation who grew up in the An understanding of the decade after shadow of 9/11 whose views will have been 9/11 and how individuals within a locality shaped by it. Generally, individuals are at a define themselves is crucial in seeing how pivotal stage of early adulthood, with most far a community has understood its own still living with their parents. As Muslims are sometimes viewed as a challenges, and whether a community’s ideals are disconnected from its reality. homogeneous religious group, the snapshot Is the cultural norm of a public face interviews were designed to gauge local and a private persona a natural coping realities and diverse cultural difference. mechanism in a changing post-9/11 environment? A. WHO AM I? WHO IS A

MUSLIM?

WHY 9/11? The events of 9/11 are referred to as a defining moment; the beginning of a war against an undefined, porous enemy, and a “war on terror” which has subsumed vast sums of money. Looking beyond the global picture of Muslims, I have attempted to gain a local, more intimate view of a generation of British Muslims working in call centres in 2011 and accustomed to a post-9/11 reality. Whilst 9/11 is a key reference point, the paper refers also to the terrorist attacks in London on 7 July 2005 (“7/7”).

WHY CALL CENTRES? A call centre is usually a small, localised business within the service industry employing a high number of usually young individuals. Staff are expected to work around a more flexible employment arrangement but matched with competitive wages. They include a large number of students whose flexibility allows them to work longer and often unsocial hours. The rationale for interviewing Muslim call centre workers was because they work volu m e 5

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Quiet, outgoing, funny, religious, British, Indian and Muslim. (Mansour) Post-9/11 Muslims remain imagined as a non-integrated community living uneasily with the wider British society. Questions about British Muslims’ loyalty to the state, and whether Islamic values are at odds with those in Britain are recurring topics of conversation. Identity is a crucial variable; an evolving descriptor through which a person is best able to describe who they are, based on factors like appearance, race and language. When asked how they would describe their identity most participants were emphatic in comfortably expressing their Britishness equally alongside their other identities. Many said that being Muslim means being many complementary things. The majority of interviewees used their British nationality and religious faith to declare who they are, with their ethnicity used to define their racial identity. Tara describes herself as, “British Muslim or British-born Indian Muslim. It depends on who I talk to.” Though Nafisa does not wear a arches quarterly

headscarf, she sees herself as “a young, approved of 9/11. It’s quite hurtful. (Gadil) British, Muslim girl. Not attached to 9/11 changed things... grew out of culture. I follow religion.” proportion. Now I’m used to it.. it probably utopia pre-9/11 but for Muslims it Whilst communities can wasn’t was OK. (Sara)

and do evolve, they are affected by external, socio-political events.

Whilst the participants’ communities seem to have maintained their day to day rhythms, the interviews confirm a local impact on Muslim communities as The interviews give a general impression a direct result of 9/11; Muslims became that belonging to an assimilated fourth or a visible minority, not due to their racial fifth migrant generation may mean that background but because of their faith. placing British identity with a religious identity is not regarded as contradictory for most participants who feel comfortable C. POST-9/11. WHO IS THE being part of a multicultural society. MUSLIM COMMUNITY? Living as a visible minority means that Having defined what being Muslim interviewees are confident about describing means and if it remains a distinct identity, their identity and accepting how others participants were asked to explore what may describe them. community means to them. If I’m wearing Asian garb then [I’m seen People from diff erent backgrounds who are as a] Muslim or Asian Bangladeshi. Clothing close to you: street, road, [within] walking has impact. Even wearing a topi [skull cap], distance; white, black. You see them every having a beard, has an impact. (Mansour) day and ask how they are… Your neighbours [are mycommunity]. (Mansour)

B. HOW WOULD YOU DEFINE YOUR COMMUNITY?

Communities provide a broader sense of collective identity; they are a lens through which a person can sense the dynamics of influences. The influence of family, neighbours and neighbourhood bind kinship to a specific place. Other variables, like feelings and attachment to a local area, help to form individual identity. Whilst communities can and do evolve, they are affected by external, socio-political events. The civil disturbances (“riots”) in working class black communities in Brixton and Toxteth in 1981 and similar disturbances in Oldham in May 2001 involving mainly Asian working class youths had an effect on local communities. However, the interviews suggest that few global events have had a direct impact on a cultural/religious group as 9/11: I didn’t personally get aff ected... but 9/11 made Muslims conscious and victimised. When walking down the street people were scared. Others may have thought you 92

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Most sought to define “community” as an extension of the family, with the familiarity of growing up with individuals, identifying with certain places and the written and unwritten rules that govern this space. Most people did not make reference to religion solely and it seems that the community is a place with a sense of familiar concepts that most people would identify with readily. Togetherness, or attachment to my area… unity… A picture of faith, colour, people coming together. I don’t know what my community is; it crosses over Sparkhill and Moseley [Birmingham areas], because it’s mixed, but everyone is friendly [and I] love it. [I feel it’s] secure and safe and other communities don’t have it. (Sara) Whilst a majority of the participants live in areas with a high number of Muslims, only one individual sought to define his community narrowly. He only saw Muslims as his community despite the fact volu m e 5

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that his immediate neighbours are Hindus. My Hindu neighbours are not my community... [White people just want to get pissed, [they have a] diff erent background, no shared interests… I’ve not been exposed to other communities. I’ve never interacted with white, middle class professions and I feel that might aff ect me adversely [in the future]. Work is [filled with] white working class [people] and interaction is fairly limited. I’ve not made.. eff ort to interact outside my community as [I have] not felt the need. Not had the opportunity. (Malik) Communities can govern behaviour and most people can say who belongs rather than who doesn’t. This is often based on notions of personal safety and an element of ‘looking out’ for someone for unselfish reasons. Salma explained community through a subjective experience which, she said, was not about racial discrimination but racial familiarity: “It’s about people who help if they find out you’re in trouble. We’re quite selective about our community [i.e. Asian community] but a white person is not close [enough] to leave your house keys with them.”

loyalty to, and compatibility with British values was questioned. Some interviewees suggested that the need to hide, to behave ‘appropriately’, to withdraw from debate, were just some of the emotional responses they sensed and have displayed since 9/11. Some said that this placed them in an uncomfortable space with the need to act in a particular way at odds with sound community values, or even in a manner seen as being hypocritical.

Social problems in the Muslim community are being talked about in private but denied in public, despite the evidence of prison statistics.

Take for instance - the rise in criminal and social problems (not unique to any inner-city community) was pointed out as evidence of a kind of denial occurring in communities. Gang issue is a big problem ‘cos of violence – people going to prisons. Everyone knows it’s D. THE PUBLIC AND THE a problem ‘cos of violence … I’m familiar PRIVATE MUSLIM This notional romanticism of what drugs exists as a problem – but none of my a community is does not tally with the friends do it. (Suleman) undercurrents of social change. Where Whilst the above quote bears no direct personal belief and community identity reflect a growing divide, the decade since link to 9/11, there is a feeling that social 9/11 has provided time for retrospective problems in the Muslim community are analysis. It could be said that prior to being talked about in private but denied 9/11 Muslim communities were, generally, in public, despite the evidence of prison integrating into British society. That statistics.2 To acknowledge a problem changed with 9/11; sections of wider publicly would seem to invite media-led society started to question minorities, links of Muslims with criminality as well specifically Muslims, about integration as terrorism. and their compatibility with society. For some participants the problem Britain’s minority ethnic seems to lie not so much in an acceptance communities, including Muslims, suffer of what is happening but the frustration disproportionately from poor socio- of not knowing what to do about it. economic conditions1 and inequality. Post- One participant said they did not want 9/11, where once minorities were described to lend credence to the negativity about in racial terms, suddenly there emerged a Muslims which is often Islamophobic, nor religious identity and label. Soon, Muslims the minority voice which questions the were the “problem” community whose compatibility of Muslims with a Western, volu m e 5

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secular society. The following quotation from Mahmoud, who has been in prison, provides an insight into his Bolton community which he feels is reflective of the national picture: [Our problem is] Drugs, coke, weed [which then] brings fights to the area… usually gangrelated; 10-15 lads go for other lads, and then come back with weapons. Not always about drugs but could be about girls. The drug problem is not hidden any more. Everyone knows the dealers. It’s hidden 'cos the Asian community knows you’re not allowed to do it. Nowt is being done ‘cos dealers will continue ‘cos we don’t know what to do, parents don’t want to do anything. According to Salma, “Lots of [Muslim] girls have abortions by 17. Marriage is seen as the only cure. The view is still that our lot wouldn’t do terrorism but people like us do do it.” Naima claims that there is constant drug dealing, gang warfare and gun crime issues in her Birmingham community but she “would only talk about certain issues with Muslims because non-Muslims may feel they understand but don’t… [for example] religion says no to sex before marriage so it’s not religion’s fault - but it happens.” What was telling about this discussion was the realisation that Muslims are not immune to social problems, and having an Asian or Arab heritage which subscribes to cultural notions of respect can be somewhat romanticised. The question remains about how the frustrations of Muslim communities since 9/11 have led to a continued reluctance to deal with social problems within communities.

E. POST-9/11: SUSPICIOUS CONSPIRACY OR MEDIAENFORCED CONSPIRACY? A BUNDLE OF WORRIES A consistent finding of this research is how 9/11 has made some Muslim participants feel more visible and observed in society leading to paranoia, further insecurity and suspicion. Gadil’s response was to say, “9/11 conspiracy? I’m not in a position to say anything. There are no 94

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full answers. Can’t know for sure – it’s just another event of history. Just get on with it.” Whether that is because 9/11 is now seen as “an event that should not have occurred but did” (Mohsin) or by one 23 year old saying that she was 12 in 2001; not even a teenager. Her way of making sense of the events illustrates the confusion: “I’m still learning about my religion. One person doesn’t make a whole community bad. The littlest things in our religion are highlighted when seen [by the media and society] as bad.” One participant was uneasy about even mentioning 9/11 in a public space: “I’d never use the word 9/11 publicly; it might hurt someone, so I would be careful where I would use it. I don’t want to cause trouble.” (Mansour) Tara’s reasoning was logically explained: when discussing 9/11 with friends she “wouldn’t talk on the ‘phone ‘cos it could be tapped, MSN too...wouldn’t risk it… look at Guantanamo...some innocent people. I’d whisper, and see who could hear. If I was a white person it may freak me out. I don’t like them getting worried. What if they rang the police? My parents would be worried. People could get arrested.” Most participants did not subscribe to a conspiracy theory per se, but were careful about the surroundings when discussing 9/11. Tara’s response is worrying, displaying the burden carried by ordinary individuals. There is a fear about how they will be perceived in public; their identity may then dictate how they behave in public and in private. It is apparent that many of these young people feel pressure to negate the burden of being a watched community and this is then exhibited in their behaviour. With regards to behaviour, another question explored the emergence of conspiracy theories of which the media is seen as being at the heart. The question of whether Muslims are being unfairly targeted or the focus of a wider agenda by the Government is a discussion point. People felt anger and resentment at the media’s lazy links between Muslims, volu m e 5

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extremism and terrorism, leading to insults to their faith and identity. Sara is a media studies graduate; she said that she no longer listened to the news or read newspapers as “we get brainwashed subliminally”; she felt empowered by her decision. The sense of taking personal responsibility to do something about media bias since 9/11 was reflected by one participant’s altered TV viewing patterns and use of social network sites to filter news and limit her interaction: On Facebook, even if one of my friends adds something [to the wall] about 5 people will view it. (Salma) Such news “management” allows the individual to regain an element of control over media influences. Sara believes that the mainstream Western media has let her down: “News is tailor made. Al-Jazeera English, I believe [in more]. I didn’t believe everything [else] I hear in the media. Nor is government accurate. Al-Jazeera is accurate, it doesn’t conceal the truth. Some of my friends think I’m a bit extreme but I don’t care.” Although Muslims are just one of many minorities, the “Muslimisation” of the background of criminals frustrates participants; they link this media shift directly to 9/11. For instance: “Use of the word Muslim grates ... usually bad things associated with Muslims: Muslim rapists, Muslim burglars, but nothing positive said about a Muslim man getting the MBE .” (Tara) And, “Muslims are seen negatively. Muslim equates to terrorism. IRA are terrorists not [but are not referred to as] Catholic terrorists.” (Malik) Some participants think that post-9/11 media language and hysteria over Muslim visibility is contributing to additional pressure to behave in a certain way. Suleman adds, “the British population don’t have the nous to link a criminal’s actions as bad, but the Muslim name means they’re equated with Islam; why?” Another response was that communities are not in a permanent state of denial and volu m e 5

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are trying to address issues through trusted community or religious institutions beyond the gaze of the media. Whether this was because mosques, for example, are seen as an authoritative voice, or because they offer guidance on Islamically “forbidden topics” is inconclusive. Since 9/11 my community has tried to address issues like pregnancy, drugs, etc., using broadcasts into people’s homes. I know some people are not very exposed to what’s happening in the world so at least some people are aware. (Tara) Although there was an acceptance that mosques are aware of social problems, there remains an underlying sense that communities themselves do not know what to do, itself lending to a culture of denial. Malik says, “Asians have done well. Lots of money. But problems. Drugs. Minor issue. Terrorism is not an issue. My community [in inner-city Bolton] is not underprivileged. Statistics lie. It is acceptable to lie ‘cos everyone lies, including politicians and bankers.” Some believe that social problems are used by the media for “Muslim bashing”. Denial is followed by conspiracy theories and weak arguments to try explain away known problems. Naima sees the media focus on Muslims in a positive light. Instead of feeling victimised she sees a legitimate opportunity and social “permission” to talk positively about religion (not culture) to non-Muslim colleagues and friends. “There’s a lot of confusion about my religion. I’m not ashamed but proud. At the moment less bad since 9/11 ‘cos of the person I am. I speak out. I can direct them to read but then it’s up to them. I don’t feel I’ve done anything wrong so why can’t I talk about it? Why should I be ashamed? Why isn’t every criminal labelled, like ‘Christian paedophile’?” (Naima) Overall, the media focus on Muslims has led to an increased consciousness in terms of how they behave publicly and a politically-heightened understanding about how others may judge them. arches quarterly

F. POST-9/11: RACISM? ISLAMOPHOBIA? OR SOMETHING ELSE? The above point about perceptions of Muslims reinforced one of the few surprising things to emerge from the interviews relating to the sudden transition since 9/11 of acts of racism and racist behaviour to Islamophobia. Whilst the word itself has been in use only since 1997,3most participants’ definition of the word matched the language used to describe it. Islamophobia is very specific racism. It aff ects specific group. (Gadil) Hatred of Islam. The word indicates a worry or that they’re scared. (Tara) [Racism can be] Islamophobia and linked. Ultimately it’s discrimination. It’s about colour and race. Racism is big picture to Islamophobia. (Suleman) Within a call centre environment, local accents can be discerned on the phone, with some Asian boys being recognised as such “when they say ting, yeah, innit, dey.” (Salma) A person’s identity cannot otherwise be discerned over the telephone. “Remember people can’t see you, so less racism.” (Salma) Simple racism cannot explain a rise in Islamophobia: “Before, the word Paki was used; (now) all Asians are called Muslim or extremists.” (Tara) Naima said it was “fear of Islam and what it teaches - (you) see it in America. [She referred to the American pastor Terry Jones4 Qur’an burning provocation in Sept 2010.] The Qur’an doesn’t disappear as it’s in people’s hearts. I can’t define it [Islamophobia]. Islamophobia is very specific racism – directly affecting one race. I dunno. Not just based on skin colour, but it affects a specific group.” Salma, made links in the shift in language from racism to anti-Islamic references since 9/11. Her reasoning was that the racist terminology became very 96

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Muslim specific: “Ninja, bin liner. I know lots of women who have experienced this [Salma’s mother in Bolton wears a burkha.] and had burkhas pulled off… or called terrorist, Bin Laden’s wife; but I feel it’s decreasing at the moment.” Tara added that whilst such negative incidents continue to occur the case of a Muslim female teaching assistant in 20065 who did not wear her burqa in a job interview and later decided to wear it in school made her reflect differently on the issue. As someone who wore the headscarf, Tara expressed her disapproval with the teaching assistant whom she felt had “put back the cause” through her subsequent legal action as it seemed the assistant’s actions were almost deceptive. Mahmoud felt that the majority of white people he had encountered in prison were racists. Whilst he was nonchalant about racism he felt that prison banter such as “when are your [Muslim] lot going to bomb this place [so we can escape]?” was typical. Interestingly, the difference between Birmingham and Bolton came up when discussing personal safety. Bolton participants were familiar with everyday, casual racism and feeling unsafe. Most Birmingham participants, whilst visible Muslims in terms of their dress have received very little vocal abuse in what is a very diverse wider society. Sam’s personal experience of being on the London Underground with a rucksack led to “funny looks... it’s annoying... you’re tarnished; I feel angry.” On the whole, Birmingham residents feel safe as Muslims in their city. In Bolton, the blur between racism and anti-Muslim sentiments is an ongoing factor. One participant pointed out angrily that he saw a demonstration by the English Defence League (EDL) in March 2010 in the town centre as a demonstration of hostility against his Muslim and racial identity. This experience was reflective of his childhood which was littered with racist experiences, I see white people as racists, behind our backs it’s all the same, based on school volu m e 5

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experience. One way or the other they’re going to take us out of this country… we would have stopped EDL from coming to our [Asian dominated] area... they had coaches [coming from other areas]. (Mahmoud) Tara added that her friends wanted to go to the EDL demonstration and “show what we’re made of… to defend our community, but overwhelmingly to say that we’re not staying at home and taking it.” The boundaries of racism and discrimination have blurred and derogatory comments against Muslims now seem to have some social acceptance; it is almost certain that reactions to 9/11 have led to this. Such acceptance is at the heart of the problem of linking personal faith with terrorism. “They may see an imam in the mosque and see him as a terrorist and (think) he may kill...” (Salma) Many of the participants feel some helplessness, because Islamophobia itself is not a crime and is hard to prove. Being called a Paki has a clearer racist sentiment than being called a “Muslim terrorist”. Salma reasoned that, “if you ask a nonMuslim about defining Islamophobia then they could say the basics without the subtleties one is exposed to on a personal level.” This is reflected in how the far-right groups such as the BNP and EDL use slogans such as “Stop the Islamification of Britain” with impunity.6 The pressure to blend in, to be accepted, remains a challenge; integration implies society’s acceptance of difference or society’s acceptance of Muslim integration as a natural part of the fabric of society. Whilst many of the participants wore religious clothing and were comfortable about asking for spaces to pray at work they appear to accept that their insecurity arising from attacks on Islam compounded by the 9/11 attacks looks set to continue for some time.

CONCLUDING REMARKS A decade on from 9/11 the Muslim participants in this small survey remain confident British citizens who are comfortable with the multiplicity of volu m e 5

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their identities. From a sociological viewpoint, 9/11 may have disturbed the natural rhythm of integration for former Commonwealth migrants, and where once migrants were identified by their race; in 2011 the media and political discourse have made a Muslim’s faith the primary identifier. The interviews confirm that the post9/11environment has strengthened Muslim identity. Though British Muslims constitute around 2-3%, of the population, media interest about Muslims since 9/11 is disproportionately high.7 For some participants this is worrying as it reinforces the opinion that Muslims are “problem citizens”; they feel “unjustified” pressure to answer for the whole community when asked if Muslims want to integrate. Participants feel that this constant media questioning diverts communities from addressing social problems, with integration related issues being defined as the big problem for the host community. The interviews emphasise frustration at such an approach, resulting in greater political awareness nationally and internationally.

A decade on from 9/11 for many people a guarded, pragmatic defensive position may turn out to be the best negotiated space to have emerged. Whilst most people, Muslim and non-Muslims, have moved on from the political climate of 9/11, most participants feel that the Muslim community is still being watched.8 The shift in the language of everyday racism language, to a casual association of Islam with terrorism and extremism in the media, reflects the powerful impact of 9/11. A concern expressed by some people relating to the post 9/11 and 7/7 climate is that that the smaller a community becomes arches quarterly

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for the individual (i.e. who they think belongs and who doesn’t) the greater the risk of insularity. Others believe that by not acknowledging community problems it may appear that the Muslims are under attack and a way will be found to link this to wider conspiracy theories. It seems then, that a decade on from 9/11 for many people a guarded, pragmatic defensive position may turn out to be the best negotiated space to have emerged. This allows the community to acknowledge problems which can no longer be denied (e.g. drugs, alcohol, a rising Muslim prison population) and that a community-based approach to is needed, along with an acceptance that what is happening is not due to a 9/11 conspiracy. Finally, the interviews suggest that there is a natural, defensive reaction when an interviewer asks whether Muslims have suffered from negative media reaction. A decade on from 9/11, whilst there remain suspicions of media coverage, individuals are more reflective in their responses. Certain cases highlighted in the media such as burkha/hijab issues, reflect the various nuances of debate, especially where those cases tap into the wider public fear within the public space.

2. The Muslim population estimates vary from 2-5%, and disproportionately the Muslim prison population is currently estimated to be 12%. 3. Available at: http://www.runnymedetrust.org/ publications/17/32.html 4. Available at: http://articles.cnn.com/2010-07-29/us/florida. burn.quran.day_1_quran-burning-florida-church-terryjones-american-muslims-religion?_s=PM:US 5. Available at: http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/ article606478.ece 6. (English Defence League manifesto) Available at: http:// englishdefenceleague.org/content.php?136 7. Oborne, P. (2008). Muslims Under Siege. University of Essex: London UK. Available at: http://www.channel4.com/ news/media/pdfs/Muslims_under_siege_LR.pdf 8. Anderson, Bennedict (1991). Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism Verso Press.

Zubeda Limbada works in local government and has extensive experience around policy and community activism. She has been a member of the BBC West Midlands Regional Audience Council; is an alumni of the Wilton Park British-German Forum, and part of Oxford University Young Muslim Leadership Programme as well as the British Council (Africa) Interaction programme. She graduated from the University of Manchester with a BA in Politics and Modern History and an MA in Middle Eastern Studies.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Allen, C. (2010). ‘Islamophobia’ London: Ashgate. Lambert, R & Githens-Mazer (2010). ‘Islamophobia and AntiMuslim Hate Crime’ London: EMRC: University of Exeter. Casari, J. (2004). ‘When Islam and Democracy meet: Muslims in Europe’ Palgrave Macmillan. Oborne, P & Jones, J. (2004). ‘Muslims Under Siege: Alienating Vulnerable Communities’, Democratic Audit, Human Rights Centre, University of Essex with Channel 4.

Interested in writing for Arches? E-mail your interests and ideas to publications@thecordobafoundation.com

ENDNOTES 1. Suleiman, Y. (2009). Contextualising Islam in Britain, Centre of Islamic Studies, Cambridge: UK - http://www.cis.cam. ac.uk/CIBPReportWeb.pdf

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Informing Continuity: Domestic Surveillance from the Cold War to the War on Terror STEVE HEWITT

hese are familiar stories. Young British men, against the wishes of their government and despite the surveillance of the Security Service (MI5), travel overseas to fight, and in some cases die, in a foreign conflict. Other young British men become radicalised while at university and engage in activities that lead to the deaths of others. Yes, these details are well known, but they apply to the 1930s. Then over 2000 young British men travelled to Spain to fight with other working-class men from around the world against fascism.1 And the men radicalised while at university were the “Cambridge Five” who betrayed their country by spying for the Soviet Union and in the process revealing secrets that led to deaths. If the issue of radicalisation isn’t a new one, neither is the response of the state to radicalism. In the 1930s, many in the general public clearly saw the support for radical causes and general radicalism to be a consequence of the wider societal environment such as the economic malaise brought on because of the Great Depression and the “crisis of capitalism” or the destructive Great War that had led to the deaths of millions while spawning societal upheaval such as the Russian Revolution (when the real Cold War began for domestic security agencies in western nations). Western states and their security agencies, however, interpreted radicalisation differently in echoes of the present approach in the United Kingdom and elsewhere. Their interpretation was what the late Frank Donner, who wrote extensively about the American domestic security state, labelled as ‘the agitatorsubversion thesis, which’, he noted, ‘denies the relevance of social and economic factors as the cause of unrest.’2 Instead, 100

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the individual was dominant in this state discourse by initiating or encouraging the radicalisation of others where it otherwise would not have existed to the same extent if at all. Essentially, impersonal social forces were being downplayed in favour of what might be crudely labelled a ‘great man theory of history’ in which prominent individiuals alone determine the course of major events or societal developments.

Subversion is largely a forgotten concept since the end of the Cold War although some have argued for its resurrection in the context of a fight against terrorism. Although the post-Cold War discourse has emphasized the significance of counter-espionage as the focus of domestic intelligence practices during the Cold War, in reality greater emphasis was on countering perceived subversion on the part of radicalised individuals.3 Subversion is largely a forgotten concept since the end of the Cold War although some have argued for its resurrection in the context of a fight against terrorism.4 It is at best a nebulous concept. Elizabeth Grace and Colin Leys define subversion as ‘legal activities and ideas directed against the existing social, economic and political order (and very seldom against “democracy”, as liberaldemocratic states are wont to claim).’5 In some ways it parallels terrorism in the present whereby efforts to produce a single definition continually fail. Even within the volu m e 5

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government of the United States there exist several different definitions.6 If some similarities exist between the Cold War and the War on Terror in terms of domestic perceptions of the threat to the state with the emphasis on individuals, radicalism, and, at times, concepts lacking in clarity, the parallels are stronger in terms of how the security state has responded to the real and imagined threats. This response to radicalisation has reflected some or all of the elements of the pattern described by Donner in his important study of Cold War domestic intelligence practices in the United States: 1) physical surveillance of a `subject,’ usually conducted in secret and frequently termed `information gathering’ or `data collection,’ benign usages characteristic of a system of repression; 2) a body of techniques that, in addition to informer infiltration, ranged from observation and mail opening to wiretapping and photography; 3) the compilation and dissemination of files and dossiers about individuals and organizational `subjects’; 4) the assessment of file data; and 5) the aggressive use of such data to do injury to the subject.7

CCTV cameras are the perfect example of this type of information gathering. In the United Kingdom, CCTV cameras are a permanent and generally overt fi xture of the urban landscape that impact on the privacy of all although not always equally as Project Champion in Birmingham proved.8 In contrast, informing and informers is a secretive activity that is not flagged up for all to see. Nor is informing ever, except in undemocratic ‘informer states’ of the type that the former German Democratic Republic represented, experienced equally or even at all by all parts of the population. Instead, certain groups, individuals, and communities, usually deemed a threat by the state and in some way marginalized (although possibly for legitimate reasons as in the case of the Ku Klux Klan in the 1960s), disproportionately or exclusively experience the practice of informing.9

It is Donner’s second point that I wish to focus on in the remainder of this piece because it demonstrates clear continuity between the past and present. Specifically, I am referring to the collection of information through the use of informers. Informers generally receive less attention when it comes to spying than does the use of technology to achieve the same end. There are a number of reasons for this inequality. Technology, particularly as portrayed in popular culture (see, for example, Hollywood movies Enemy of the State or Minority Report), can be exciting and sexy. Spying through technology is also frequently more overt and omnipresent and thus seemingly imperils the privacy of wide swaths of the general public in addition to specialized targets.

The reasons why informers were crucial for counter-subversion investigations in the Cold War and remain critical for counterterrorism investigations in the War on Terror can be summarized through the acronym N.E.R.D. `N’ represents the nature of the target. Essentially, the more different the targets are from those tasked with spying on them, the greater the need for informers. This was true during the Cold War when members of certain Eastern European ethnic groups were targeted because of their involvement in far-left radicalism. Intelligence agencies, lacking linguistic skills, had to recruit informers from within the targeted communities. The lack of diversity within security agencies has also applied to gender in the past. Into the early 1970s, the two

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Essentially, the more different the targets are from those tasked with spying on them, the greater the need for informers.

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main domestic intelligence agencies in Canada and the United States, in part reflecting that policing and intelligence work has been historically gendered male, still did not have female agents or officers. Despite this limitation, they still managed to conduct detailed espionage against women’s liberation groups, including all-female gatherings. This could not have occurred without the utilization of informers.10 This point is even more relevant in the increasingly multicultural world of today. Government agencies simply cannot always be diverse enough to have expertise in every language and/or culture present in many countries today- think of cities like London, New York and Toronto that literally have representatives of every corner of the globe. It is for this reason that the Federal Bureau of Investigation is becoming increasingly reliant on informers for intelligence-related investigations, more so than for normal criminal work, particularly as a starting point into terrorism investigations.11 In the United Kingdom, there has been a drive to recruit more informers from among Muslim communities because of the difficulties the police and MI5 have had in penetrating them from within their own ranks which is in part down to their own failures to reflect the makeup of the communities they are targeting for surveillance.12 `E’ stands for ease and effectiveness which is why informers are deployed. In democratic societies, it is often easier to employ informers than forms of shadowing involving technology. A scandal erupted in December 2005, when the New York Times revealed that the administration of President George W. Bush had been conducting warrantless communications interceptions.13 No similar requirements exist for the deployment of informers.14 The committee of Senator Frank Church which in the 1970s investigated wrongdoings by American intelligence agencies noted this anomaly: There is no specific determination made as to whether the substantial intrusion represented by informant coverage is justified 102

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by the government’s interest in obtaining information. There is nothing that requires that a determination be made of whether less intrusive means will adequately serve the government’s interest. There is also no requirement that the decisions of FBI officials to use informants be reviewed by anyone outside the Bureau. In short, intelligence informant coverage has not been subject to the standards which govern the use of other intrusive techniques such as wiretapping or other forms of electronic surveillance.15 At the time the only loosely enforced restrictions on intelligence informers were internal ones included in the FBI’s ‘Manual of Instructions’ that it did not publicize, added the Church Committee.16 Currently, the Canadian government requires its main intelligence agency, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), to get special political permission, including retroactively, if necessary, when informers are utilized against sensitive targets, such as university campuses and churches and mosques, but these uses still do not involve the obtaining of a warrant.17 Since 2000, the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) in the United Kingdom has governed the deployment of informers, or Covert Human Intelligence Source (CHIS) in MI5 parlance, in investigations, including who has authority to authorize their use, but there still is no requirement to obtain a warrant.18 An informer then is a type of state surveillance that does not require the same legal hoops to be jumped through as does surveillance through technology. Then there is the effectiveness that goes with informers. Informers represent a precise type of surveillance that in some ways is more difficult, although not, of course, impossible, to counteract as it can come in the form of a friend, colleague, or even family member. Some targets did and do attempt to employ methods to counter informers. Moving to smaller cells, with each having little knowledge of the activities of the others, is one such method. Questioning members about their backgrounds and political convictions is volu m e 5

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another. In the 1960s, it might involve having to partake in drugs as proof of one’s counterculture credentials.19 An additional technique is to require serious criminal activity as a test of the commitment to the group and out of the belief that an informer would not engage in such actions. Still, it is a style of information collecting that is active instead of passive as technological surveillance can be and which brings a precision often missing when technology is deployed. `R’ represents resources. Professional technological surveillance in whatever form it takes is expensive. There’s a reason that the American National Security Agency (NSA) and the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), the agencies that handle technological surveillance including satellites for the American government, combine together to represent approximately a third of the U.S. intelligence budget compared to roughly ten percent for the CIA, which specializes in human intelligence. In a direct comparison, the NSA’s budget is double that of the CIA’s and it has three times as many employees.20 Technology is costly and its use is complicated -- even in the present basic technological surveillance of a subject, which still on occasion involves physical access to the targeted group or individual’s property or body, can involve up to a dozen people performing a variety of tasks.21 All of these factors make this type of spying by the state in most democratic nations expensive, complicated and unwieldy and the incentive to use informers that much greater. Finally, `D’ is for destructiveness, which is the impact that informers and informing have. It is not a coincidence that most of the names applied to informers are negative and why those who employ them use neutral or positive terminology such as `source’ or `asset.’ 22 Some of this negativity emanates from the nature of informing which at its heart involves betrayal, potentially at a fundamental level. But it also relates to the active role that informers can take as agents provocateurs who, far from passively observing goings volu m e 5

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on, participate or even take a lead role in the activities that they are spying on.23 This is the most controversial aspect of all when it comes to this type of spying as it can lead to allegations of entrapment through manipulation of events by informers. This has particularly been the case in the United States where since the attacks of 11 September, informers have played a lead role in counter-terrorism investigations. Indeed, the number of informers on the FBI payroll has risen from 1500 in 1975 to over 15000 in 2011, the growth of which since 9-11 has been driven by terrorism investigations. With informers repeatedly playing key roles in plots or as witnesses in court cases, allegations of entrapment have abounded although they have yet to prevent convictions in counter-terrorism cases.24

One of the main grievances of Muslim communities against the police is the recruitment and use of informers. Whether during the Cold War or the War on Terror, the surveillance activities of domestic security agencies in democratic societies against real and imagined radicalism have proven to be controversial. The lack of transparency over the same period is equally problematic. While a case could be made that during the Cold War communism, backed by the military might of the Soviet Union, represented an essential threat to western democracies, this is clearly not the case in the present with the small number of individuals who choose to engage in terrorism. Informers are one aspect of the surveillance methods against this terrorist threat that are disproportionately experienced by marginalized communities in liberaldemocratic countries. Not surprisingly, these communities are not happy about being targets. Academic studies in both the United States and the United Kingdom arches quarterly

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have found that one of the main grievances of Muslim communities against the police is the recruitment and use of informers.25 In 2006, the president of Arab-Muslim American Federation, Wael Mousfar, lamented the impact of such spying: We feel that we’ve been violated and being spied on is not an easy thing. When you sit and pray, you’re not worried about only paying attention to a prayer, concentrating on your prayer, you’re worried about whether the person next to you is spying on you, is working for the Government, working for the FBI, whoever, and this is not an easy feeling-not only to take news or listen to what’s going on, but also to twist around what is said.26 There is a crucial need for greater cooperation between security agencies and Muslim communities in the pursuit of common counter-terrorism goals. However, Cold War surveillance through informing in democratic societies still lacks transparency and proper legal accountability which undermines trust and makes us all less safe. Steve Hewitt is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of American and Canadian Studies at the University of Birmingham. He has written extensively on matters related to security and intelligence. His publications include The British War on Terror: Terrorism and Counterterrorism on the Home Front since 9-11 (Continuum, 2008) and Snitch!: A History of the Modern Intelligence Informer (Continuum, 2010).

ENDNOTES 1. Buchanan, Tom (2011). ‘The secret history of Britain's Spanish civil war volunteers,’ Guardian, 28 June. 2. Donner, Frank (1990). Protectors of Privilege: Red Squads and Police Repression in Urban America (Berkeley: University of California), p.76. 3. For a study of counter-subversion efforts in the United States during the Cold War, see Theoharis, Athan (1978). Spying on Americans: Political Surveillance from Hoover to the Huston Plan (Philadelphia: Temple University Press). 4. Banoutsos, Andreas (2008). ‘The West and the Threat from Islamist Subversion,’ Research Instintte for European and American Studies, http://www.rieas.gr/research-areas/globalissues/islamic-studies/802.html 2 November (last accessed 18 November 2011). 5. Grace, Elizabeth & Leys, Colin (1989) ‘The Concept of Subversion and its Implications,’ in C.E.S. Franks, ed., Dissent and the State (Toronto), p.62. 6. `What is Terrorism?’ Terrorism Research, no date, http://www. terrorism-research.com/ (last accessed 30 November 2011). 7. Donner, Protectors of Privilege, 3. 8. Lewis, Paul (2010). `Birmingham stops camera surveillance in Muslim areas,’ Guardian, 17 June.

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9. Hewitt, Steve (2010). Snitch: A History of the Modern Intelligence Informer (London & New York: Continuum). 10. Rosen, Rush (2001). The World Split Open: How the Modern Women's Movement Changed America (New York: Penguin Books), pp.240-60. 11. Romney, Lee (2006). ‘The Trouble with Informants,’ Houston Chronicle, 12 August. 12. Johnston, Phillip (2005). ‘MI5 Seeks “Older, Wiser Women”,’ Daily Telegraph, 10 May; Evans, Michael (2006). ‘More Britons Are Turning to Terror, Says MI5 Director,’ Times, 10 November; Calman, Barney (2006). ‘Policing with Passion; Is the Met Police Still Prejudiced against Ethnic Minorities and Women?,’ Evening Standard, 10 July. 13. Risen, James & Lichtblau, Eric (2005). ‘Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts,’ New York Times, 16 December. 14. Civil liberties groups have campaigned for tighter rules. See, for example, a campaign by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU): ‘Unnecessary Evil: Blind Trust and Unchecked Abuse in America’s Informant System,’ American Civil Liberties Union, http://www.aclu.org/drugpolicy/search/informantabuse.html (accessed 23 April 2009). 15. Church Committee, ‘Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities,’ (Washington, D.C.: Congress, 1976), http://www.icdc.com/~paulwolf/cointelpro/churchfinalreportIIIj.htm (accessed 13 May 2009). 16. FBI ‘Manual of Instructions,’ as quoted in Church Committee, ‘Final Report.’ 17. Steve Hewitt, Spying 101: The RCMP’s Secret Activities at Canadian Universities, 1917-1997 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002), 208-11. 18. ‘Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000,’ Office of Public Sector Information, http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2000/ ukpga_20000023_en_5#pt2 (accessed 21 March 2009); `Covert Human Intelligence Sources,’ MI5, no date, https://www.mi5. gov.uk/output/covert-human-intelligence-sources.html (accessed 28 November 2011). 19. Grathwohl, Larry & Reagan, Frank (1976). Bringing Down America: An FBI Informer with the Weathermen (New Rochelle, New York: Arlington House Publishers), p.122. 20. Woodward, Bob (2004). Plan of Attack (New York: Simon and Shuster, 2004), p.213; Keefe, Patrick Radden (2005). Chatter: Dispatches from the Secret World of Global Eavesdropping (New York: Random House), p.xiv. 21. Sallot, Jeff (2006). ‘Canada Could Escape Attack, CSIS Says,’ Globe and Mail, 20 June; Hewitt, Spying 101, 32. 22. Donner,Frank J.(1980). The Age of Surveillance: The Aims and Methods of America’s Political Intelligence System (New York), p.464. 23. Nor is it just informers who can play this role. As recent media coverage in the UK has shown, undercover police officers can also play role of agents provocateurs. 24. Aaronson, Trevor (2011). `The Informants,’ Mother Jones, September/October 2011, http://motherjones.com/politics/2011/08/fbi-terrorist-informants (accessed 25 November 2011). 25. Spalek, Basia, El Awa, Salwa & McDonald, Laura Zahra (2009). `Police-Muslim Engagement and Partnerships for the Purposes of Counter-Terrorism: An Examination,’ 2009, http:// www.scribd.com/doc/26514450/Police-Muslim- Enld (accessed 1 February 2011); Schanzer, David, Kurzman, Charles & Moosa, Ebrahim (2010). `Anti-Terror Lessons of Muslim-Americans,’ 6 January, http://fds.duke.edu/db/attachment/1255 (accessed 1 December 2011). 26. Wael Mousfar, as quoted in ‘File on 4- U.S. Muslims,’ BBC Radio Transcript, 4 July 2006.

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BOOK PROMOTION

THE BRITISH WAR ON TERROR: TERRORISM AND COUNTERTERRORISM ON THE HOME FRONT SINCE 9-11 BY STEVE HEWITT I The British War on Terror, Steve Hewitt provides a concise but In ccomprehensive examination of over a hundred years of experience of ccounter terrorism in the UK. The author explains the workings of the British legal, political and intelligence strands of policy. Highlighting B the complexities of the terrorist threat and the challenges of t countering it, he argues that since 9/11, policy has been inadequate c and inconsistent. The British War on Terror is a balanced and informed examination of recent events, offering a historical and contemporary context to this new threat.

The British War on Terror: Terrorism and Counterterrorism on the Home Front since 9-11 by Steve Hewitt. Published in 2008 by Continuum International Publishing Group Ltd.

BOOK PROMOTION

S SNITCH!: A HISTORY OF THE MODERN INTELLIGENCE INFORMER BY STEVE HEWITT Snitch!: A History of the Modern Intelligence Informer is a very informative and engagingly written survey of source operations in intelligence and law enforcement. Author Steve Hewitt attempts to make the book relevant to 21st Century operations, by exploiting engaging case studies to highlight modern practices.

Snitch!: A History of the Modern Intelligence Informer by Steve Hewitt. Published in 2010 by Continuum International Publishing Group Ltd.

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Time for Change After 10 Years of Detention Without Trial PAUL DONOVAN

man known only as G1 has just marked the 10th anniversary of being detained without trial by the British state. “I’ve been here 10 years now, no trial, no charge, no evidence produced to challenge. Me, my wife and children don’t know how long it will take to attain justice and freedom,” said G. G and another man are the only two who remain of the 13 originally picked up in December 2001, following the passing into law of the Anti-terror Crime and Security Act (ATCSA). The men, mainly Algerian, were taken to Belmarsh Prison, where they were detained. “I was put together with the other detainees. We were kept a minimum of 22 hours in the cell and never saw the sky. I did not see my wife for six months,” recalled G. In 2004 there was the House of Lords ruling that the ATCSA was unlawful under the Human Rights Act. This resulted in the regime, known as control orders, being developed. Detainees were restricted to a house or flat, with stipulations about where they could move in the local geographical location and at what times. Access to phones and the internet were banned. They had to ring the tagging company regularly. People who visit have to be vetted. G recalled it taking three months to get a plummer in to fi x the family’s washing machine. The process that has kept G and others incarcerated over recent years has been overseen by the Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC). This body operates under immigration law, dealing with cases where national security is in question. It operates with special advocates representing the detainee. Lawyers for the detainees are not able to

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see all the material relating to why they are being held. The accused have never been told of what they are accused. The government has been prevented from deporting the individuals concerned due to the danger that they may face torture or worse in the countries from which they fled. Some, however, have returned due to the mental torture being imposed by indefinite detention in the UK. Two men, Benaissa Taleb and Rida Dendani, who agreed to return to Algeria voluntarily, believed they would not be detained for more than a few hours on arrival. The British diplomat who arranged their deportations had promised that there was no risk they would be held by the Algerian secret police. “They were both interrogated for 12 days, during which they were threatened and subjected to serious physical ill-treatment,” said solicitor Gareth Peirce. “They were then charged, tried, and, some months later convicted, on the basis of the “confessions forced from them during this time. Dendani was sentenced to eight years imprisonment; Taleb to three.” Another Algerian man, Mustafa Taleb, was originally one of eight people accused of involvement in what became known as the ricin trial, where no ricin was ever found. Arrested in 2003, the case came to court in 2005 when all eight accused were cleared. Then came the London bombings. A number of the acquitted men were picked up, including Mustafa Taleb, as well as G. They were served with deportation notices on the basis of being national security threats. Since that time these men have been held either in prison or under the house arrest style conditions. Mustafa Taleb now lives alone, allowed out at set times and only able to move volu m e 5

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within a restricted area. One person who has regularly visited him over recent years has been Bruce Kent, who has been appalled at what he has seen. “He has the marks on his body to this day from the torture and the British government want to send him back to the torturers,” said Mr Kent. “It is disgraceful and against British law to go on detaining people without knowing of what they are accused.” The government has been prevented from deporting the individuals concerned due to the danger that they may face torture or worse in the countries from which they fled. In order to get around this problem, the British government has sought Memorandums of Understanding (MOU) from those governments. These are written guarantees from the governments concerned regarding the safety of the individuals returning. Human rights organisations like Amnesty International argue that the very need to have such a guarantee makes any such document worthless. “Memoranda of understanding’ and ‘diplomatic assurances’ do not protect people from torture. They are legally unenforceable and monitoring by local organisations is not enough to ensure they are honoured. The countries that they are signed with are already defying international law by torturing people, so there’s no reason to believe they will honour a paper promise to the UK government,” said Tim Hancock, director of Campaigns at Amnesty International UK. “What’s more, these assurances undermine the global ban on returning people to countries where they could face torture.” The government has so far obtained MOUs from Libya, Jordan, Ethiopia and Lebanon. There was “an exchange of letters” between the governments of Algeria and the UK guaranteeing the safety of returning citizens.2 The weakness of the MOU, which the present government has continued to try to establish with other countries, was best demonstrated by the case of Libya. Back in 2005, a number of Libyans were picked up and detained. The cases of two volu m e 5

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men, known as AS and DD, came before the SIAC in 2007 with the government seeking to send them back to Libya on the basis of an MOU. The SIAC did not agree. This no doubt was partly due to the fact that the body allocated to monitor the safety of the individuals concerned was the Gaddafi Foundation, headed by the Colonel’s son Saif. Another factor pointed out by the men’s lawyer Gareth Peirce came from some of the expert evidence offered. “The deportations would almost certainly have been ordered on the basis of the MOU had not the government’s expert witness ventured one observation too many: when asked whether the men would enjoy a fair trial in Libya, the witness replied of course, Gaddafi would personally intervene to ensure that the judges delivered just that,” said Peirce, who has also suggested the reason behind the Libyans being picked up in the first place was to do with negotiations between the British and Libyan governments over oil. “In 2005 Libyan oilfields were made available for public auction. Might there have been a two-way accommodation? You give us oil, we give you your dissidents?” said Peirce.

Wherever there were dissidents that could be branded Islamist by the British government it was then the case that the British government joined in on the side of the oppressive state. More recently the British government played a leading role in the overthrow of the Gadaffi regime, claiming his brutality against his own people as one of the reasons for its actions in helping the rebels.3 Peirce believes the narrative that has been used to justify detention without trial, torture and war was established by Tony Blair’s arches quarterly

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government when it decided political Islam was the enemy. Wherever there were dissidents that could be branded Islamist by the British government it was then the case that the British government joined in on the side of the oppressive state. So this was seen with the British government siding with the Algerian, Russian, Egyptian and Libyan regimes against rebel groups. “Here we are 10 years on in a state of perpetual war, no concept of talking to each other, understanding each other,” said Peirce, who pointed out how the dissidents that the British helped oppress over the past decade in places like Tunisia and Libya now make up the government. Peirce described Britain as the land of the hunted, where the enemy within is sort out everywhere. “So our prisons are full of young men and women who don’t know why they are there,” said Peirce. The lawyer believes the Muslim men held in detention have been treated as guinea pigs by the British government to see how far it can push things. “The continuing experiment is dangerous and insidious in more than one way. It has become very clear that when one challenge is overcome the goalposts are moved and a new system comes in,” said Peirce. A look to the Troubles in the north of Ireland provides an important link, suggesting that the whole process of cutting rights at the behest of maintaining security under the aegis of anti-terror law has been a work in process for the past 40 years.

The plight of those individuals who remain detained without trial after ten years remains part of a work in progress. The Prevention of Terrorism Act was introduced in 1974 following the Birmingham pub bombings. Described as “draconian” by its author, then Home 108

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Secretary Roy Jenkins, the PTA brought in seven day detention without charge. This was renewed annually.Then as the peace process took hold at the close of the century and prior to 9/11, the Terrorism Act 2000 was introduced bringing in 14 day pre-charge detention. After 9/11, the ATCSA was brought in bringing about the regime of internment with few limits. Since then, this has been refined, with control orders and their successor the Terrorism, Prevention and Investigation Measures (Tpims). The level of pre-charge detention went up to 28 days in 2005 after the Labour Government was defeated over its efforts to get 90 days passed. So the plight of those individuals who remain detained without trial after ten years remains part of a work in progress. The last decade has simply been an extension of what went before in the Irish context, with the gradual extension of a security state that is accountable to no one. It has grown up in the shadows, and Mrs Peirce is right, those unfortunate individuals like G, Mustafa Taleb and others have become the guinea pigs for this process. And with the threat of civil unrest on the horizon, with the worsening economic situation, there can be little doubt that the security state will find more willing accomplices in government prepared to extend its powers still further. The big question for the rest of us is when will we say enough and insist that the rule of law is restored for all citizens of this country and that there will be no further detention without trial? Paul Donovan is a freelance journalist who has been writing on the issue of detention without trial for more than a decade. He has contributed pieces to the Guardian, Independent, New Statesman, Irish Post, Big Issue, Church Times and Universe on the subject.

ENDNOTES 1. G has been detained without trial by the British state, firstly, under the ACTSA when he was imprisoned in Belmarsh Prison, secondly following his release on receiving a control order. 2. Letter of 11 July 2006 Tony Blair to President of Algeria Abdelaziz Bouteflika – see: www.webarchive. nationalarchives.gov.uk/20091222080256

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TIME FOR CHANGE AFTER 10 YEARS OF DETENTION WITHOUT TRIAL 3. MPs voted on the following motion: “That this House welcomes United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1973; deplores the ongoing use of violence by the Libyan regime; acknowledges the demonstrable need, regional support and clear legal basis for urgent action to protect the people of Libya; accordingly supports Her Majesty’s Government, working with others, in the

taking of all necessary measures to protect civilians and civilian-populated areas under threat of attack in Libya and to enforce the No Fly Zone, including the use of UK armed forces and military assets in accordance with UNSC Resolution 1973; and offers its wholehearted support to the men and women of Her Majesty’s armed forces.” 557 MPs voted for the motion while only 13 voted against.

•

Everyone has the right to a fair trial under national and international law.

•

Secret evidence restricts that right and the proper functioning of our legal system.

•

The European Court of Human Rights recognised that this goes against the right to a fair trial and ruled against the British government.

The Coalition Against Secret Evidence (CASE) was set up in February 2009 and is made up of individuals and organisations working on the issue of the use of secret evidence in the UK courts. Secret evidence is an aﬀront to the rights and freedoms guaranteed by our legal system for more than 800 years. CASE campaigns for an end to the use of secret evidence in British courts, the restoration of everyone’s right to know the reason why they are detained and an end to a system based on secrecy and unfairness.

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Shifting Paradigms: De-Radicalisation AHMAD HASSAN

here remain many assumptions about the methods adopted by governments to tackle violent extremism. On the one hand, those that exist within the policy-world of State agencies are based on three key assumptions: firstly, that governments can tackle violent extremism through ‘community cohesion’ and ‘shared values’; secondly, communities want cohesion and shared values; and thirdly, if communities do not want these features, they ‘could’ be convinced of their value. On the other hand, the neurotic but nuanced reality of Western Muslim life houses its own assumptions. As a result of persistent denial and apologies, Western Muslim communities assumed they could avoid owning up to their role in resolving the problem of violent extremism. In part, this was due to the belief that the underlying rationale behind Counter Terrorism (CT) strategies of governments served intelligence gathering and spying. It was also derived from the conviction that foreign policy was the main driver behind acts of violence. Despite efforts to dispel these assumptions, these perceptions continue to cloud the overall CT Strategy, wherever it may be relevant. If the strategy is to continue or, more importantly, be effective, we can no longer ignore diametrically opposed perceptions of the policy by governments and communities. The purpose of this article is to weigh up the governmental expectations of CT aims against the reality. The points made aim to openly address, contextualise and clarify the issues of Takfiri belief and the plausibility of ‘de-radicalisation’ – topics that have long been avoided despite their centrality to CT Objectives. Before continuing, it is important to note that this paper is based on 5 years’ 110

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fieldwork, including over three years as an intervention provider, and 15 years of experience regarding Takfiri networks and their objectives. For the purpose of this paper, masculine pronouns will be used for gender-neutral or unidentified nouns.

PREVENTATIVE CT WORK We start at the true precipice of current debate within policy circles: should Preventative CT work remain? Based on the policy’s development and implementation over the past five years, it can be confidently argued that preventative strands were ‘over’ before they began for two key reasons: firstly, due to the controversy surrounding Preventative CT work’s primary focus being on Muslim communities; and secondly, owing to preventative work’s relationship with actual police led CT operations. The former has lived under the dark - somewhat cloak and dagger existence of the latter.1

VULNERABILITIES AND RADICALISATION If an individual journeys from ‘relative obscurity’ to ‘perfect clarity’ through what we have come to term ‘radicalisation’, it is crucial to recognise that this process is as lucid and dynamic as the secondary factors that propel the individual into the depths of vulnerability that worry government agencies. To this day in Prevent, we remain unclear about which of an individual’s vulnerabilities need tackling. At times, public sector bodies have assumed the need to support issues such as mental health or socio-economic milieus in order to reduce the risk of an individual’s potential criminality. Very quickly, this mainstream vulnerability approach gave way to the volu m e 5

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‘specialist’ intervention provider who more often than not would be attempting a theologically driven intervention to ‘safeguard’ the vulnerable individual. Examples of this would projects like the South London based ‘STREET’ and ‘SIRRAT’, both of whom rely on Saudi Salafism as the basis for reducing the extremist narrative from the individual. From here on in, the pursuit of effectiveness was underway. However, this objective and its aims have been a failure given that there are still no obvious metrics to measure if one intervention is any better than another and that the most recent refreshing of the Prevent strategy now appears to exclude ‘Salafist’ organisations as they do ‘share’ the same values as the government. This creates obvious doubt as to whether the policy is truly informed by best practice or best guessing.

The people most at risk of violent extremism are those on the Takfiri point of the Salafist spectrum. Contributing to this was the failure to involve those individuals who are most ‘at risk’ of violent extremism in targeted intervention support. Though the failure of this work has not affected national security, the threat from acts of Al-Qaeda inspired terrorism has gradually diminished since 2006, due to the changing nature of the threat combined with the success of Pursue (arrests), as opposed to Preventative efforts.

TAKFIRI BELIEF The people most at risk of violent extremism are those on the Takfiri point of the Salafist spectrum.2 Though other doctrines have proved to be as vulnerable if conditions favourable to radicalisation exist, Takfiri belief will always form the basis of violent action and its rationale. A classic error has been to label the threat of violent extremism as the Al Qaeda or Takfiri ideology rather than Takfiri belief. Ideologies are organised sets of ideas volu m e 5

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based on beliefs, views and perspectives. By contrast, Takfirism is based solely on one belief: takfir is the practice of declaring judgement (ex-communication) on other people or groups considered to be theologically inferior of misguided and thus kafir (non-believers in God). There are three key characteristics of Takfiri belief that have implications on Preventative intervention work.

Characteristic One The first characteristic of Takfiri belief is the unequivocal acceptance that the individual, regardless of his intellectual or scholarly standing, is capable of casting judgement on fellow Muslims. As such, Takfiris act on this belief, trying to ‘correct’ others’ deviance by convincing them to adopt Takfiri creed. For Takfiris this is essential, as if it is not possible to agree on creed, a Takfiri has no basis upon which to develop a relationship with another individual. Consequently, in line with the aims of preventative work, any attempt to intervene with a Takfiri or sway such fervent sentiment is met with unequivocal negativity. Essentially, a Takfiri will only listen to another Takfiri, as he perceives all others to be non-believers. The outcomes of the author’s work with Takfiris indicate that the resulting best case scenario of such an intervention is to successfully convince the Takfiri individual that the conditions of physical jihad are not yet at their zenith. Other interventions, be they focussed on doctrine, emotion, society or culture, will not be able to permeate the Takfiri mindset. Therefore at best, interventions may result in a ‘ceasefire’ (hudnah),3 or at worst, they may further radicalise the individual.

Characteristic Two The second characteristic of Takfiri belief is the acceptance that the world is definitively and decisively split in to two camps; the Abode of Islam/Peace (Dar al-Islam) and the Abode of War (Dar alHarb). The two sides are in perpetual conflict until one prevails over the other. arches quarterly

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If a Takfiri believes he is living in an abode of war, he is likely to claim that the conditions and restrictions applicable to times of peace are nullified. As such, a Takfiri may believe this allows him to act in any manner he deems appropriate. Hence, illegal activity becomes legal, actions contrary to Shari’a Law are permissible, and most importantly, the ends justify the means. Until the abode of war becomes the abode of Islam, the mission to spread the latter continues. In this context, as with the issue of defensive jihad, the key concept of takkiyah (subversion) is misused to protect the individual’s personal, collective and ideological interests. According to Takfiri history, the abode of war has been in effect since at least 1928. Although it is commonly believed that the threat of militant Islamic violence we currently face is Al-Qaeda inspired, they can only be credited with exploiting rather than conceiving - the concept of dar al-harb. This thus highlights the need to not only tackle Al-Qaeda inspired ideology but also its roots, Takfiri belief.

vulnerable individuals via a multi-agency panel including police, local government, social services and other statutory agencies or partners.

POLITICISATION

Although this journey is not linear, it is a process of deduction and falsification. An individual may start from a broad Salafist perspective, which restrains an individual’s right to wage physical jihad through a series of rules and stipulations relating to behaviour, action and authority. According to this approach, the authority to permit jihad lays within the hands of the state and its leaders - not individuals. This is the basis for both the Saudi and Yemeni de-radicalisation and the ‘STREET’ project form South London. If this doctrinal position cannot contain the mind of the individual, the next port of call is often the political version, commonly referred to as ‘Islamism’ but better defined as ‘political Salafism’. This perspective provides a pair of politically tainted glasses through which to view the Quran and hadith. Salafis are by no means the only ones vulnerable to this Characteristic Three The third characteristic is to apply political interpretation, but their literalist literalist meanings from the Quran and alignment renders them generally more Sunna (hadith) to current geo-political open to it. events as the barometers of any legal rulings. Takfiri beliefs state that the AUTONOMOUS INDIVIDUAL actions, as opposed to intentions, of states ACTION or their leaders constitute the basis for their However others, namely Takfiris, feel judgement. Takfiris cannot agree with this gradualist cultivation of theological these actions if they are not in line with crops to be a futile pursuit. Instead, they the true teachings of Takfiri Islam. As an favour a more direct, individual and violent extension of this, Takfiris class anyone they approach. In doing so, the individual starts perceive to be too closely allied to western to believe that his immediate action is governments as murtaddoon (apostates) essential to the global imposition of Islam. and a flag bearer of the taghut (liars). Subsequently, he realises that the ability Accordingly, if an intervention is led by to justify his actions through - a distorted a government-linked provider or from reading of - sacred text allows individual anything other than a Takfiri perspective, actions to contribute to a global struggle in the eyes of the targeted individual, it to impose Islam as the world’s dominant will be coming from a position of falseness. force. This illustrates the need to increase the Regardless of the modus operandi Muslim community’s role and leadership through which the individual arrives at in the Channel Project if it is to become this conclusion, the effects are potentially more credible. The Channel project is part very dangerous. If one believes he can of the Prevent strategy and aims to support act as an autonomous individual for 112

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the benefit of the global Muslim Umma majority of believers. (community) he is able to reason and rationalise anything he does - no matter Takfiris should be how extreme. Ultimately, the ‘Takfir’ has become a thorough process of irrational regarded as intentional theological consumerism. In essence, this actors, not the passive is akin to believing illegal activity from credit card fraud to mass murder pleases pawns of extremist God if it is in pursuit and context of dar clerics, manipulative al-harb (state of war). As long as the ‘state masterminds or of war’ exists in the Takfiri mind-set, then there is very little that is not ‘permissible’ social, economic and to pursue. psychological forces.

THE 73RD SAVED SECT - GROUP OF THE MAJORITY? As a Takfiri, one is taught how to recognise deviant thinking, both internally and externally. You are methodically trained in the differences between pure and impure theology. It is proved to you that forming part of a small group is actually fulfilling ancient prophecies of the tiny number of true believers left standing from among the hoards of ‘heretical’ and ‘misguided’ Muslims. Put simply, you are trained to spot those who may seek to challenge your beliefs. This feat has taken over thirty years to become entrenched into the community fabric. It is embedded to the extent that literalist groups hold great enmity towards each other due to differences in opinion regarding such issues as the state and direct action. Literalist groups are more wary of each other than other ‘non-believing’ Muslims. This is the result of self-extracting Ijtihad (ruling) and literalist doctrine’s provision for multiple ‘pure’ groups to coexist. The notion of plurality – and subsequent competition – derives from the Islamic understanding that there will be 73 sects, 72 of which are misguided. This means the 73rd sect will be the only saved one capable of achieving the ultimate form of salvation. What these fringe groups ignore however is that the complete narration of the Hadith (found in Trimidhi’s corpus of hadiths) states that the 73rd saved sect will be one of the majority (Ahlus-Sunnawal-Jama’a). The complete ‘hadith’ alludes to the ‘saved group’ being the party of the volu m e 5

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Particularly since 2005, hardcore Takfiri groups have tried to circumvent this fact by adopting the name ‘Ahle-Sunna Wal Jammah’, which has traditionally been applied to the mainstream Sunni Orthodox version of Islam, also known as Bharelvi’s. In doing this, Takfiri groups not only attempt to blend into communities and confuse Muslims but also try to justify their actions in light of the scripture.

INTENTIONAL ACTORS The theological discussion thus far has aimed to demonstrate one critical point; you become a Takfiri, you are not made into one. Takfiris should be regarded as intentional actors, not the passive pawns of extremist clerics, manipulative masterminds or social, economic and psychological forces. To be Takfiri you must actively accept that Takfirism is the true, undiluted Islam as practised by the Prophet Muhammad, and his companions. Regardless of whether you are born into or convert to Islam, the transition to Takfiri thinking is the final resting point of a journey to become a ‘pure Muslim’. By accepting this, you clearly state that all other forms of Islamic understanding are deviant and you are able only to agree with others who share the same literalist creed. In short, you cannot agree with others’ actions if they are not in line with the true teachings of Takfiri Islam. Therefore, a Takfiri can demonstrate some theological empathy with a Salafi, but will not yield to him. The Takfiri will not arches quarterly

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suddenly accept that Muslim leaders and Plurality is, and always has been, a lands need ‘schooling’ or ‘transforming’. characteristic of Islam. The individual sees the removal - by Accepting this plurality and freedom of force - of these ‘Western puppet’ or ‘kafir’ choice means you accept you have the same Muslim leaders as a natural response to right. their alleged hypocrisies. • Accepting that the killing of non-combatants is completely THEOLOGICAL REALIGNMENT forbidden. – DE-RADICALISATION VS. • The only form of physical jihad an SHIFTING PARADIGMS individual may wage is defensive, Is it possible to de-radicalise someone by namely, for the purpose of selfoffering him the same ‘status quo’ Islam defence in life-or-death situations. he consciously rejected in the first place? • Offensive jihad is the domain of Diamond cutters need specialist skills to the executive authority (state) in create well balanced or rounded stones. which the individual resides and its From the original stone, this type of performance is the responsibility of professional is able to form a new one. the state’s paid or conscripted army. We call this a paradigm shift. New • Accepting that the conditions of dar paradigms invariably replace older ones. In al-harb only come into effect if and the context of Prevent, we should be seeking when your immediate geographical the creation of not only new emotional surroundings are in a state of paradigms but new theological ones too. armed conflict that threatens your For without theological realignment, the life in a physical sense; that is, if emotional responses an individual may your neighbours (next door or a be subject to are potentially as hazardous neighbouring state) are trying to as the vulnerability that initially caused attack or kill you. concern and warranted the intervention. • Only a scholar granted ijaza This new paradigm requires a number (permission) from an Islamically of elements for it to constitute an effective recognised authority can make attempt at reducing vulnerability to violent legal rulings or judgements using extremism. It could include the following the available parameters according matters and contexts that have been to Shari’a law. collated from the primary data of over fifty • Muslims do not need to live under ‘interventions’ under the Prevent strand Shari’a rule to practice their faith. and based on their outcomes: • Muslims do not need to live under an Islamic state to perform their Plurality is, and always duties. has been, a characteristic • Citizenship or a visa from a certain state equate to a Muslim having of Islam. accepted a covenant of security with said state. • This covenant is binding upon the Accepting that highly conservative or individual as it is built on trust and literalist views are one part of a diverse the implication that he will honour spectrum that comprises Islamic thought its terms. in contemporary Muslim diasporas. • This equally applies to Muslim and Acknowledging that this spectrum is non-Muslim lands. based on the free will and choice of each • The individual may only express Muslim to practice his faith in a manner opposition to the state through appropriate to his personal understanding legal means. and context. • Accepting that if the individual 114

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opposes the above condition, he will be considered anti-state, also known as al-khawarij (rebels). If the land in which the individual lives becomes a threat to his daily life as a Muslim, he must consider migration. Non-Muslims have rights under Islamic law. Muslims living under non-Muslim rule must respect and obey the law of the land so long as it does not contravene a majority or consensus based view of the tenets of Islam.

and shifting paradigms and why we should pursue the latter. Such a shift would mean creating a paradigm of beliefs and ideological views that would still fall short of a ‘western values’ test or pro-democracy test, but would essentially and crucially house the extreme view within a non-violent context. Currently, the closest such policy is to ‘proscribe’ Takfiri groups and force them to go further underground, without any attempt to address the beliefs creating the potential vulnerability to violence or its glorification.

Each of these elements opposes Takfiri Ahmad Hassan has been involved in the Prevent belief in its original form. Moreover, they strategy since 2006, delivering and developing intervention based support for vulnerable individuals are difficult to impose given the adeptness across the UK. He is currently completing a Masters with which some Takfiris use Islamic degree in Terrorism Studies in London and provides training/ capacity building skills to community and concepts to conceal their true beliefs and statutory organisations of how to effectively engage hence evade suspicion or detection. The vulnerable individuals and the communities they reside in. theory that an individual can be funnelled into adopting a new perspective through what we call ‘de-radicalisation’ is flawed. To assume an intervention might be able ENDNOTES to reverse the adoption of Takfiri beliefs 1. The failure to separate the pre-criminal ‘Prevent’ strand the intelligence led CT ‘Pursue’ strand, within the and replace vulnerability with resilience from ‘CONTEST’ strategy, meant that British Muslim communities is denying a fundamental aspect of the applied the intelligence and police-led nature of Pursue human condition. People adopt and change to Prevent, resulting in suspicion and distrust of the latter their ideas based on their personal, social, policy. Takfir is the practice of declaring (ex-communicating) an moral and ethical realisations. Though we 2.individual or group, previously considered Muslim, to be may be able to demonstrate and explain non-believers in God (kafir(s)) due to supposed theological some of our ideas to the ‘vulnerable’ inferiority and misguidance. individual, this does not mean he will 3. ‘Ceasefire’ concept when used in the context of a Terrorist accept them. Moreover, de-radicalisation ideology merely replaces one ‘vulnerability’ with another. We can however, enter into a robust and challenging series of dialogues that may potentially provide the individual with a substantial foundation from which to transfer old or existing Takfiri belief into a new paradigm in line with the aforementioned ‘outcome based’ points. Trying to adapt rather than dismantle Takfiri beliefs serves three advantages: 1) it maximises the likelihood of the individual personally accepting ideological adjustment; 2) it allows the individual to be public; and 3) it enables the individual to maintain ideological stability. This is thecordobafoundation.com the difference between de-radicalisation

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Fundamentalists vs. Moderates: The War Within Judaism RABBI MARK L. WINER

he world’s most threatening “clash of civilisations” pits fundamentalists against moderates within every religion. Although political scientist Samuel Huntington1 coined the phrase “clash of civilisations” to stimulate debate about the pernicious divisions among world regions and cultures, my experience is that the most destructive division lies between fundamentalists and moderates in every religion, and between fundamentalists and moderates among humanity as a whole. Within the half of humanity which identifies with Judaism, Christianity and Islam – the Abrahamic religious family – what afflicts one sibling often infects the others, just as in a biological family. In accepting the challenge from Arches to write this article, I initially intended to do a comparative sociological study of fundamentalism and moderate responses to fundamentalism within all three of the Abrahamic faiths. As I am a born Jew and rabbi, I began my research within Judaism. I quickly realised that I could not, within the reasonable word limitations of this article, accomplish more than provide a review of this conflict within Judaism alone. My Muslim and Christian cousins within our Abrahamic family will find, I hope, in my analysis of the “clash of civilisations” within Judaism instructive parallels in their own traditions. The future of humanity may well depend on the ability of moderates within each religion to overcome their fundamentalist co-religionists. Even more, moderates across the religious boundaries need to join in “sacred coalition” against the scourge of fundamentalism which threatens humanity. As a sociologist, I have never believed in 116

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the possibility of “value-free” behavioural science. My analysis of the conflict between fundamentalists and moderates within Judaism should not be considered non-partisan. I am a congenital and unequivocal religious moderate. Indeed, I became a rabbi and later a sociologist to “heal the world” of its interfaith bigotry. Throughout my life as a Jew, throughout my career as a rabbi, I have combated Jewish fundamentalists and I have always rejoiced in my kinship with religious moderates of all traditions. We have studied together, and “exchanged notes”, in our common cause. Within every population, roughly 15-20% display deeply ingrained fundamentalist, authoritarian attitudes. Behavioural science studies find fundamentalists exhibiting prejudice and articulating stereotypes even for fictional groups, like Lilliputians. On the other end of the spectrum, a similar percentage of every population display moderate, liberal attitudes. Those between the poles of fundamentalism and moderation within every population, tend to conform to what they perceive as socially acceptable positions and mores. This tripartite division of every population explains the presence of fundamentalists within each group. It also helps us understand how social change can occur in positive as well as in negative directions. Moderation triumphs over fundamentalism, mutual respect over bigotry, when the moderates manage to persuade the “conformist” middle to give up their bigoted mores. Examples include the American South over the last half century, the unification of Europe, and the transformation of South Africa. So, despite widespread fundamentalism and prejudice, there is reason for hope among moderates. volu m e 5

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Fundamentalists possess an ability to attract media attention disproportionate to their numbers or percentage of any given population. Because they are so certain of the correctness of their cause, they both focus clearly and project an unequivocal vision. By virtue of their moderation, progressives see nuance and

When religious moderates, across religious boundaries, work together in interfaith coalitions against fundamentalists of all faiths, we labour to save humanity. are rarely certain of either their goals or of their programmes. Fundamentalists, precisely because they are so singleminded, easily “hijack” groups, nations, or entire populations. Within the Jewish world, the West Bank settler movement has never attracted more than a minority. But their single-mindedness and focus have enabled them to “hijack” Israeli society into acquiescing or at least tolerating their programme. Although cursory reading of popular media suggests that fundamentalists comprise a major segment among Jews, the fundamentalist fringe is less than 10% of worldwide Jewish population.2 Every religious and ethnic group has experienced similar kinds of “hijacking” by tiny fundamentalist minorities. The future of each of our faith traditions depends upon how the conflict between fundamentalists and moderates resolves. So when we confront our co-religionist fundamentalists, we do so to preserve what we view as the integrity of our own faith. When religious moderates, across religious boundaries, work together in interfaith coalitions against fundamentalists of all faiths, we labour to save humanity.3 Fundamentalism, it would appear, volu m e 5

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spawns interfaith bigotry and sanctions violence, war and terrorism. Within the Twentieth Century, more people died in the name of religion than in all of history before. I fear that the Twenty First Century may even eclipse the grisly record for interfaith bigotry and terrorism of the previous century. So much depends upon our understanding of the eternal conflict between fundamentalism and moderation, and upon the strategies we religious moderates devise together to combat our common scourge. There are four types of Jewish fundamentalism in our day:4 1. Some secular Zionists turn the state and people into transcendent objects. They rely mostly on the Hebrew Bible to justify their claims, ignoring rabbinic development.5 2. Extreme national chauvinism, most clearly represented by Meir Kahane and his followers, include racists who have the least precedence in Jewish tradition. Israel has outlawed them, and blocked their representation in the Knesset, the Israeli parliament. Despite their illegal status, the racist extreme national chauvinist element is a growing element in Israeli society. 3. Ultra-Orthodoxy projects itself as a quietist form of fundamentalism that believes it is necessary to do whatever it can to protect its way of life. Despite their outward displays of piety, Ultra-Orthodox elements often exhibit extreme violence. 4. Mystical messianism is an activist form of Zionism in which it is a sacred mission to bring the messiah into the world using utopianpolitical action. What unifies these diverse groups is a single truth model of the world in which a transcendent utopian response to modern circumstances expresses itself in a certainty that translates into intolerant forms of political action. Though they may be able to trace an unbroken line of transmission that emphasizes a tradition of exclusivity, arches quarterly

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they ignore a counter-tradition that refutes exclusivity and a single truth model of the world. In this article, some of the sociohistorical reasons and the textual justifications for Jewish fundamentalism will be presented. Then counter texts and traditions will be considered. However, it should be noted that fundamentalist antirationalism makes it impossible to alter the thinking of these individuals. Therefore other strategies need to be developed to address the problem of fundamentalism. Fundamentalism is defined as a response to modern secular society even though it may have roots in the past.6 In Judaism, there are two recent historical events that serve to shape Jewish fundamentalism: one is the Holocaust; the second one is the existence of the State of Israel. With respect to the Holocaust that led to the death of six million Jews, a substantial proportion came from the more orthodox communities, because the rabbis of many of these communities encouraged their congregants to stay in Europe until it was too late to escape.7 As a result of such choices, “going by the book” replaced “living on the street.”8 That is, customs and traditional practices that had existed before the Holocaust either ceased, or were no longer trusted. The traditional texts of Hebrew Bible, Talmud, and the literature of the code books became a more certain foundation for tradition, particularly in a dramatically changing world. Naturally those people who were best positioned to interpret these texts gained in power. In Orthodoxy, these individuals are the rabbis. Their increased power had its own historical roots in rabbinic authority, which could be either open-minded or intolerant.9 The intolerant forms based themselves on exclusivist texts, which exist in the Hebrew Bible, the Talmud, and the law codes. This is as true for all forms of fundamentalism today as it was in the past. Furthermore, there is historical evidence to suggest that the more isolated and autonomous a Jewish community was in the past, the more likely violence would be used against members of its own 118

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community.10 Hence a tradition of intrareligious intolerance has developed. Within the community, prohibitions against independent thinking were common in post-talmudic times.11 Maimonides (1135-1204), one of the greatest scholars of Judaism, writing in Hebrew, provided a clear foundation for these prohibitions in his Mishneh Torah.12 Writing in Arabic for a more acculturated audience, Maimonides in his Guide to the Perplexed, teaches a much more pluralistic and rationalist philosophy.13 However, the exclusivist trend can be seen as early as the Mishnah (circa 200 CE), a central text of Judaism used to generate law. The classic example appears in Mishnah Bava Qamma 4:3, in which one can see a double standard applied to the Jew and the non-Jew.14 Though the specific example is narrow, the application is broader. This exclusivist trend is even more pronounced in certain forms of mystical Judaism. In contrast to the Talmud where the “righteous of all nations have a share in the world to come,”15 Kabbalah, the texts for mystical Judaism, suggest that only Jews will merit salvation.16 As problematic as these exclusivist trends are for the quietist form of fundamentalism, they are even more problematic for activist forms of Jewish fundamentalism.17 Activist fundamentalism focuses on the size of the State of Israel and how to act towards the non-Jews who live on the land.18 The definition of what land is Jewish can be as expansive as Deuteronomy 11:24 which indicates that Israel goes from the Euphrates to the Western Sea (Mediterranean). Some activist fundamentalists use the Book of Joshua in the Hebrew Bible to justify their desire to conquer the land. As a result, fundamentalists use biblical texts about the seven Canaanite nations to govern their responses to the non-Jews who live in the land.19 Other biblical justifications for taking action against non-Jews who live in the land are based on their classification as Midianites (Numbers 25:1-18) and Amalek or his descendants (Deuteronomy 25:17 and 19).20 volu m e 5

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However, nationalist fundamentalists are equally dangerous to Jews who do not agree with them. Two talmudic laws are used as a justification for violence against fellow Jews. The first is the law of the pursuer (din rodef ) which permits one to kill or harm a Jew if that Jew is going to kill another Jew. The second is the law of the informer (din mosar), which permits one to kill or harm a Jew who provides information to non-Jews about Jewish affairs. In this case, granting Palestinian authority over any territory of Israel is considered informing. The Israeli fundamentalist Yigal Amir assassinated Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin specifically justifying himself by that fundamentalist interpretation. Messianic beliefs also are used as justification for activist fundamentalist actions. Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook (1865-1935), the first Ashkenazi Chief Rabbi of Palestine was a Zionist mystic who based his work on Lurianic Kabbalah. He proposed that the individual person of the messiah could be interpreted as a collective being.21 Everything that I have read leads me to believe that Kook would have been shocked and dismayed by what his son and others have done to his teachings -- teachings that allowed Orthodox Jews wiggle room to cooperate with the Zionist state. His followers became that collective being, and thereby took on messianic pretensions. One of his contemporary followers, Rabbi Shlomo Aviner, is reported to have said that Jews should “be holy, not moral, and the general principles of morality, customary for all mankind, do not bind the people of Israel, because it has been chosen to be above them.”22 This truly appalling statement not only demonstrates how dangerous Jewish fundamentalists are, but how corrupt their ideology can become. There is no doubt that there is no precedence to separate the holy from the moral in Judaism. The last time it happened it was considered heresy.23 However, both the mysticism and the messianism of Jewish fundamentalism do have precedence in the tradition. volu m e 5

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Within Judaism, there is just as long a tradition of universality and inclusiveness as there is of exclusivity. For this reason knowledge of countertexts and ideas becomes critically important. In fact, within Judaism, there is just as long a tradition of universality and inclusiveness as there is of exclusivity. In discussing the complexity of this issue in early rabbinic history, Steven Fraade has developed three categories that intersect and sometimes contradict each other based on a number of rabbinic sources: 1. Non-Jews have no legal status in the tradition 2. Non-Jewish claims must be acknowledged because of social and political realities. 3. Non-Jews are subjects of the same God, and therefore deserve to have some of the same benefits. 24 This last category is the most inclusive and has its own interpretive history. As Jews were included in the non-Jewish world, this inclusiveness increased. In Torah, all humans are made in God’s image, tselem elohim (Genesis 1:26). Through Abraham all the families of the earth are to be blessed (Genesis 12:3). God is the God of all flesh (Numbers 27:16). When we begin to explore the prophets, they too, recognise the universal nature of all humankind. Isaiah says (56:7), “For my house will be called a house of prayer for all people.” And Malachi asks (2:10), “Have we not all one father? Did not one God create us all?” The rabbis of the Talmud also generate a number of ideas to support the unity of all humankind. The Noahide laws proclaim that anyone can be righteous as long as they follow seven basic laws.25 The following legal concepts also promote peace and well-being. 1. Darkei shalom, “the ways of peace,” fosters peace and prevents arches quarterly

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controversy within and between different communities. Darkei noam, “the ways of pleasantness,” refers to the ways of Torah. When the intention of Jewish law is unclear, interpretation should not conflict with ways of pleasantness and peace. Rodef shalom, “pursuing peace,” encourages one to help an enemy even before one helps a friend. Pikuach Nefesh, “saving a soul,” means saving a life supersedes all other commands with the exception of prohibitions against murder, idolatry, and sexual immorality. Tikkun olam, “repair of the world,” was initially a very narrow way of repairing a judicial injustice. In Lurianic mystical Judaism, it refers to an individual’s capacity to repair the cosmos with his or her acts.

The significance of the inclusive, universal strand of rabbinic thought is not only a reflection of a counter-tradition in Judaism, but just as importantly, a reflection of the validity of pluralistic ideas. The importance placed on multiplicity has its own significant place in rabbinic history. The early rabbis were concerned about the survival of the Jewish people. This was particularly true once the Temple in Jerusalem was destroyed by the Romans in 70 CE, and it became clear that it was not going to be rebuilt any time soon. The Jewish way of life had been organized around the Temple. The question for the rabbis was could the Jewish people survive without a Temple or a land in which they could govern themselves? Their answer was to generate an halakhic (legal and social-religious) system that could be enacted anywhere. They were particularly fearful of the development of sectarian divisions, not only because there were so many such divisions when the rabbinic tradition started (before the destruction of the Temple), but also because Jews were such a small population that sectarianism would threaten the existence of the Jewish people altogether. 120

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A multiplicity of valid ideas became a way to reduce sectarianism and sustain their existence. In fact, the Babylonian Talmud is considered a rather unique set of books, because argumentation that is not resolved makes up so much of the text.26 Not only does argument help in the development of ideas, but multiplicity allows for contradictory ideas to remain a part of the tradition. This is famously summarized in a talmudic story about two famous rabbis, Hillel and Shammai. For three years there was a dispute between the School of Hillel and the School of Shammai, the former asserting, “The law is in agreement with our views,” and the latter contending, “The law is in agreement with our views.” Then a voice from heaven, announced, “These and those are the words of the Living God…” That both legal traditions are the word of God suggests that both have validity. This not only reflects the acknowledgement of multiple valid perspectives, but it acknowledges the validity of each rabbi’s reasoning process in developing their tradition. In fact, the resolution of the dispute between Hillel and Shammai does not concern a system of beliefs, but moral action.27 We follow the School of Hillel because they are kindly and modest, and teach their opponent’s views before their own. 28 This text suggests that morality is the ultimate determinate of Jewish law.29 In fact, other talmudic texts connect holiness and morality. One text blames the destruction of the Temple on immorality. Why was the First Temple destroyed? Because of three evils in it: idolatry, immorality, and bloodshed. But why was the Second Temple destroyed, seeing that during the time it stood people occupied themselves with Torah, with observance of precepts, and with the practice of charity: Because during the time it stood, hatred without rightful cause prevailed. This is to teach you that hatred without rightful cause is deemed as grave as all three sins of idolatry, immorality, and bloodshed together.30 volu m e 5

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Another text says that Jerusalem was destroyed because the people only acted according to the letter of the law, and did not go beyond the measure of the law to morality.31 Medieval commentators add their voice to this chorus. Nachmanides (1194-1256) was not only a noted commentator on the Hebrew Bible, and a rational debater with Christians about Judaism, but also a mystic. In one of his commentaries, he says one should do “the right and the good (Deuteronomy 6:18)” in every matter. This command occurs because one could technically fulfill all of the Torah’s rules and still lead an immoral life.32 Mysticism, too, connects the holy and the moral. Moses Cordovero (1522-1570) shows how mystical ideas can be used to promote morality.33 Lurianic Kabbalah also frames Jewish ritual as a way of repairing God and the cosmos, a repair that is certainly moral.34 The separation of morality from holiness that appears in Jewish fundamentalism is a modern phenomenon that occurs precisely because the secular world has separated religion from morality. The fact that Jewish fundamentalism does, only shows how much it is influenced by the very modernity that it rejects. In fact, the attempt of many Jewish fundamentalists to stop time and deny modernity and the interconnectedness of the world seems to be its own kind of idolatry. In Judaism, it is possible to turn the tradition, the land, or the people into an idol. In The Book of Exodus (3:14), God is reported to have said to Moses when Moses asks for God’s name: I will be that I will be. This is an answer that reflects action, future possibility, and ambiguity. To turn God into anything else is idolatry, and such idolatry is capable of destroying the religion. It is not easy to fight fundamentalism. It has a black and white view of the world that creates certainty in an uncertain world. That is part of its appeal. But the either/or world fundamentalisms inhabit is about the use of power. It contributes volu m e 5

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to the fundamentalist ability to determine the rules of the game. There are three basic tools that moderates can use: 1. Knowledge – we must be knowledgeable about our tradition. This includes knowledge of countertexts and commentaries to the ones fundamentalism uses. 2. Counter values – Our understanding of what is valuable is not the same. 3. Cooperation with moderates of all traditions. We are stronger together than individually.

Fundamentalism often triumphs because of the weakness of moderates, not because of the strength of fundamentalists. Across religious boundaries, religious moderates need to study texts with each other, learning together to push beyond literal meaning. A hallmark of fundamentalism is a worship of sacred text, as if the text is God. Responding to the modern world, religious moderates must search for the compelling moral and ethical insights revealed in sacred texts. Religious moderates tend to take text less seriously than fundamentalists. My undergraduate New Testament professor Krister Stendahl, in the most important lesson I learned in a year of New Testament textual study with him, stressed the necessity of religious moderates like me learning to study texts as seriously as fundamentalists do, if only to do battle with them. Fundamentalism often triumphs because of the weakness of moderates, not because of the strength of fundamentalists. I personally learned this insight forty years ago from a political science professor of mine, Juan Linz. In a course on “Crisis and Breakdown in Democracy,” Linz taught that the triumph arches quarterly

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of authoritarianism comes about more through the weakness of democrats than by the strength of authoritarians. From the Weimar Republic to Republican Spain and similar failed democracies, Linz buttressed this hypothesis through a fullyear course. Religious moderates similarly need to learn to make moderation robust and compelling, if we are to vanquish fundamentalism. The single most important focus for interfaith conferences should be the role and status of women in our religious traditions. The role and status of women in all religions – such as women’s access to education, including study of sacred texts - is the single most important barometric measure in the fundamentalist-moderate war within every religion. Listening and hearkening to the voices of women enhances every religious tradition in indispensible ways. Focussing on women’s issues, religious moderates confront the full range of issues in the conflict between moderates and fundamentalists within every tradition. The interfaith encounter is in and of itself an expression of modernity and moderation. Fundamentalists within every religion resist and oppose interfaith activity. It is the relative moderates who attend the interfaith dialogues and participate in interfaith partnerships. It is sometimes difficult to read the moderation in interfaith dialogue, since so often a measure of posturing takes place in the enunciation of positions. Nonetheless, all need to recognise the essential moderation of their partners in dialogue. Attending interfaith dialogue implies an acceptance of the possibility of the validity of more than one path to truth. We need these encounters, however awkward they appear sometimes, to nurture moderation in others, and cross-pollinate our interfaith endeavours. The eternal war between fundamentalists and moderates, within each religion and across religious boundaries, reflects the never-ending conflict in every civil society. Too often moderation, compromise, and peace-building become demonised. 122

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Religious moderates need to stand in the forefront of efforts to create a passion for peace within civil society and to elevate moderation to a civic virtue. It is often the lack of such passion, often a by-product of a society’s focusing on other “existential” matters, which allows fundamentalism to enlarge its influence. We must build a world where people of all different traditions can live together in peace. The best possibility we have of creating peace is to develop partnerships with others who also seek peace regardless of their religious traditions. Mutual respect and the celebration of difference should be the goals of our joint effort. Although influencing fundamentalists often seems a daunting task for religious moderates, we believe that it is a sacred task and one which unites large segments of humanity. Jewish tradition tells us that it is not incumbent upon us to complete the task, but we are not allowed to desist from it either.35 > Many contributed ideas and suggestions for this article. The author indebted for much of the research and insight in the article to Catherine Lasser, Ph.D., the Director of Research for FAITH.

Rabbi Dr Mark L. Winer is President of FAITH: the Foundation to Advance Interfaith Trust and Harmony, two sibling foundations of the same name in the UK and US, www.faithinterfaith.com. He is also Chairman of the International Interfaith Task Force of the World Union for Progressive Judaism and Senior Scholar at the West London Synagogue of British Jews, where he was Senior Rabbi between 1998-2010.

ENDNOTES 1. Huntington, Samuel. (1996). The Clash of Civilizations, New York, Simon and Schuster. 2. See footnote 15. 3. This language may seem extreme. However, fundamentalists adhere to a single truth model of the world (see below), which creates a black-and-white, either/or understanding of the world. Using this perspective, fundamentalists have created a win-lose zero sum game, which creates conflict and is oriented to power. Moderates, who are more oriented toward creating win-win, cooperative situations, will find themselves ‘losing’ in situations that fundamentalists have defined unless they recognize this dynamic. 4. Mittleman, Alan L. (1993). “Fundamentalism and Political Development,” in Jewish Fundamentalism in Comparative Perspective, NY: New York University Press. 5. Most scholars do not address this particular form of fundamentalism. 6. J. Silberstein, Laurence J. (1993). “Religion, Ideology, Moder-

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FUNDAMENTALISTS VS. MODERATES: THE WAR WITHIN JUDAISM nity: Theoretical Issues in the Study of Jewish Fundamentalism, in Jewish Fundamentalism in Comparative Perspective, NY, NY: New York University Press, pp. 3-26. 7. Heilman, Samuel C. (2005). “Orthodoxy in America after the Holocaust,” in Sliding to the Right, Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, pp.15-62. 8. Ibid, pp.127. 9. It is true that since the time of Saadia Gaon rabbinic authority has characterized Judaism. However, it is problematic to make the case that the only way to determine authentic Judaism is to rely on this characteristic. A 400 year tradition has been established in the United States that does not rely on rabbinic authority. Moderate Jews are more likely to accept the halakhic expertise of rabbis than their authority to determine an individual’s actions. As such the role of halakhah has changed. It can be a communal practice and/or a Jewish way to connect with God. Therefore it provides a way to develop one’s spiritual being. In addition, it is true that though Jews worry about assimilation and intermarriage, the strong use of rabbinic authority is not considered the only, or even the best solution. 10. Shahak, Israel & Mezvinsky, Norton. (1999). Jewish Fundamentalism in Israel, www.members.tripod.com/alabasters_archive/jewish_fundamentalism.html. 11. Ibid. 12. In his laws of idolatry (2.3) he says that it is forbidden to think about idolatry or anything that may cause a Jew to doubt one principle of Jewish religion. Further (2.5), he says that idolatrous Jews are to be treated like non-Jews. This particular point shows that not only were ideas a basis for expressing exclusivity, but exclusivity between Jews and non-Jews was a trend in Jewish thought as well. This Jew/non-Jew exclusivity is more clearly stated in Maimonides’ Laws of Murders and Preservation of Life (4.10-11) where he cites Leviticus 19:16 that says one should not stand by the blood of your fellow, and then goes on to say that the non-Jew is not your fellow. He further states that one is forbidden to cause the death of a non-Jew, but one is also forbidden to rescue a non-Jew. 13. Fox, Marvin. (1990). Interpreting Maimonides. University of Chicago Press. 14. The example concerns a double standard applied to the Jew and the non-Jew with reference to their culpability when an ox of one does damage to an ox of the other. 15. BT. Sanhedrin 105a. Other texts and ideas will be presented below. 16. Shahak and Mezvinsky, op.cit., Mysticism was a particularly important trend in Judaism from approximately 1550 when Luria democratized the elitism of Jewish mysticism to 1750 at the beginning of modernity when Jews began to be accepted into the broader non-Jewish society and rejected mysticism for rationality 17. In Israel they are more of a problem because they control how certain rituals are observed in Israel, and even define who is a Jew. 18. Hunter, James Davison. (1993). “Fundamentalism: Introduction to a General Theory,” in Jewish Fundamentalism in Comparative Perspective, NY, NY: New York University Press, pp. 27-41. 19. This is the case even though Rabbi Joshua ben Hananiah, a respected second century rabbi, has said that the seven nations that lived in ancient Canaan can no longer be identified. 20. These classifications are important because they define how one responds to inhabitants in the land. Specifically, the Talmud makes a distinction between obligatory wars and authorized wars. An obligatory war can occur for three

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reasons: against the seven (Canaanite) nations, against Amalek and to deliver Israel from an enemy who has attacked them. An authorized war is one to enlarge the borders of Israel and to increase greatness and prestige. Hence how one designates the inhabitants of the land is critical to what one is permitted to do and how one treats the combatants.See Michael J. Broyde, The Bounds of Wartime Military Conduct in Jewish Law, Flushing, NY: Center for Jewish Studies, 2006, for a more complete discussion. 21. Another interpretation was based on Zechariah 9:9 “your king will come to you, righteous and victorious is he, a humble man riding upon a donkey…” Secular Jews were the ‘donkey’ that messianic Zionism would use to fulfill their goals. Shahak and Mezvinsky, op.cit. 22. Hirst, David. (2003). The Guns and the Olive Branch: Roots of Violence in the Middle East, NY, NY: Avalon Publishing Group, Inc, p.84. 23. This refers to the Frankist heresy after Jacob Frank, an 18th century Jewish religious leader who proclaimed himself the messiah and believed in “purification through transgression.” 24. Fraade, Steven D. (1994). “Navigating the Anomalous: NonJews at the Intersection of Early Rabbinic Law and Narrative,” in Lawrence J. Silberstein and Robert L. Cohn, The Other in Jewish Thought and History, NY: New York University Press, pp.145-165. 25. BT Sanhedrin 56a-b. The laws are 1) having a judicial system, 2) no idolatry, 3) no blasphemy, 4) no murder, 5) no sexual immorality, 6) no theft, and 7) no eating a limb taken from a live animal. 26. Kraemer, David.(1990). Mind of the Talmud: An Intellectual History, NY: Oxford University Press. Lightstone, Jack. (1994). The Rhetoric of the Babylonian Talmud: It Sociological Meaning and Context, Waterloo, ON: Wilfred Laurier University Press. 27. What is even more fascinating is that this text is followed by a story in which it turns out that we follow the tradition of Shammai. Thus showing that the precedence given to Hillel is not an exclusive one. 28. BT Erubin 13b, “but the law is in agreement with the rulings of School of Hillel.” Since both are the words of the Living God,” what entitled [the members of ] the School of Hillel to have the law fixed according to their rulings? Because they were kindly and modest, they studied their own rulings and those of the School of Shammai, and were even so humble to mention the words of School of Shammai before their own. 29. In fact the Hebrew Bible makes little sense unless it can be comprehended that morality matters to God. 30. BT Yoma 9b. 31. BT Bava Metzia 30b. 32. See Wurzburger, Walter. (1994). Ethics of Responsibility: Pluralistic Approaches to Covenantal Ethics, Philadelphia, PA: Jewish Publications Society, p.32. 33. Cordovero, Moses. (1994). The Palm Tree of Devorah, Southfield, MI: Targum Press. 34. Luria lived from 1534-1572. His student Hayim Vital wrote down and transmitted his teachings. 35. Pirkei Avot 2:21.

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Counter-Terrorism Post 9/11 and the Erosion of Human Rights and Civil Liberties SAALIK HALEEM

iscussions surrounding human rights and civil liberties have accelerated considerably in the years since 9/11. The subsequent policies implemented by governments in the West to tackle terrorism have led to much debate about their effectiveness, and whether in fact these policies have been counterproductive leading to both an increase in the threat of terrorism and a subsequent decrease in civil liberties and human rights.

9/11 was an event of calamitous proportion. Few are under any illusion of its importance in the modern era. As millions around the world take to the streets demanding freedom, we watch from afar and admire the seriousness and bravery of those facing down dictatorship and oppression in the streets, without thinking of questioning our own state of freedom. This is the very freedom these people are fighting for, which we take for granted in our societies. However, there has been a steady erosion of civil liberties and freedoms in our own society and a lack of moral insight into many of the policies implemented to curb the so-called terrorist threat. This paper looks at human rights and civil liberties after 9/11 in the West, primarily the US and Britain, and will focus on the extent to which they have eroded due to counter terrorism policies, and what impact this has had on our freedoms.

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BUSH ADMINISTRATION RESPONSE TO 9/11, DECLARING A ‘WAR ON TERROR’ AND THE SUCCESSION BY OBAMA 9/11 was an event of calamitous proportion. Few are under any illusion of its importance in the modern era. It shook the world and ushered in a new era of international relations. It was an event which redefined how people looked at the world as a whole; a paradigm shift which gave rise to new schools of thought with regard to terrorism, non-state actors and new contours of a globalised world. As a response, the Bush Administration declared ‘War on Terrorism’ itself, not just on the specific aggressors. This has since been seen as an error because the word ‘war’ prepares us for mass mobilisation, casualties on a large scale, and also possible attacks on our political liberties.1 It also meant that a victory could not be declared until all terrorism was defeated, which was, and still is, impossible. In fact, by defining the attacks as an act of war on the US, instead of a crime,2 the Bush administration created “implications for the presidency as well as for the nation, opening up some policy avenues and foreclosing others”.3 It meant also that a number of powers, not previously available to the president alone, were handed over to him. This increased executive power momentously, making citizens open to almost continuous, and often unwarranted interference by the federal government, in the name of security. The latter legislation meant also that those questioning certain policies and their legality could be brushed aside as unpatriotic. The administration wanted a response that went beyond the specific attacks4 so that they could “respond with volu m e 5

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the full panoply of the US national security establishment.”5 Thereafter followed a swift centralization of power within the Oval Office, where presidents historically have been able to exercise greater authority in international rather than domestic matters, and also in wartime than peacetime.6 There needs to be fundamental checks on executive power, and by declaring a ‘War on Terror’, the administration increased its power exponentially, curtailing some of the checks and balances already in place. Dick Cheney, the Vice President at the time seemed to envision a larger executive role than ever before for the presidency and his office. For the American people who suffered a great shock at the tragic events of 9/11, a specific narrative was required; an explanation to cushion the shock of these events. Thus, the construction of a ‘War on Terror’ was a concept far easier to accept domestically than the notion that the US faced an ideologically motivated enemy with significant sympathy in many parts of the world.7 So instead of referring to a specific group or movement, the definition of the enemy was widened8 which led to the impossibility to declare victory of any sort, as ‘terrorism’ is not something that can be defeated in totality, thus making the task of the administration that much harder. In relation to specific policy, the Bush Administration embarked on a series of antiterrorism policies and legal initiatives designed to disrupt Al-Qaeda and to prevent future terror attacks against the homeland,9 employing “a combination of traditional law enforcement tools with a more muscular use of military force applied under the law of war.”10 While some applauded this seemingly no nonsense approach, critics argued that these policies were not well thought out, and that these reactionary policy moves were part of an ill planned short term response rather than part of a feasible long term strategy. The quagmire that resulted from the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq (despite recent pullout of combat troops from Iraq) are testimony to a lack of planning. Legal volu m e 5

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and ethical questions regarding treatment of prisoners of war have also been raised, and there have been numerous scandals regarding the employment of torture and so called ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’. The legal lines have been “pushed back” to a point where many can no longer discern what is still legal, and what is not. The two main pieces of legislation passed in the aftermath of 9/11 however, were the Patriot Act and the mandate for the creation of the Department of Homeland Security,11 which created thousands of jobs in the counter terrorism industry, and increased the financial value of it remarkably. Many stakeholders benefited greatly from it, and continue to do so even now. The Bush Administration perpetuated a notion that those who attacked the United States hated the freedoms that those in the US and other Western societies enjoyed, and that this hatred was a key motivating factor in the attacks. Of course at the time, this notion was labelled as simplistic and misguided by some, and has since been proved incorrect with the wave of pro-freedom uprisings across the Arab region. Such poor understanding of the motivations for the 9/11 attacks stem from a misunderstanding of some of the (often legitimate) grievances many have with certain policies of the US and other Western States, particularly with regard to the Muslim world. This in turn has led to ineffective and counterproductive policies in the arena of counter terrorism. Unfortunately, with the coming to power of President Obama and his administration, those hoping for a more pragmatic and ethical approach to counter terrorism policy were to be disappointed. There was no clear policy shift (except rhetorically) to replace the reactionary one of the Bush Administration. In reality, what has happened is that President Obama has retained many key Bush Administration policies,12 and occasionally has even gone further. The recent legislation that Obama has signed, the National Defence Authorization Act (NDAA), which is an indefinite detention bill, is a very worrying arches quarterly

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development, showing that Obama has not only continued but surpassed the motives of the Bush Administration. This, along with the increase in drone attacks, particularly in Afghanistan and Pakistan (repeatedly breaching their sovereignty), has shown that even with a President of seemingly opposing ideology, the counter terrorism industry, which we will explore further later, can appear to wield disproportional power in dictating counter terror policy. In summary, the Bush Administration’s reaction to 9/11 can be characterised as being focussed on direct use of military action against an enemy which was never clearly defined internationally, alongside an aggressive domestic program intended to disrupt terror networks, including increased surveillance on civilians and harsh interrogation techniques, both which have long since entered legal grey areas. The Obama administration has continued much of this policy, and the executive powers which were strengthened after 9/11 after the declaration of a general ‘War on Terror’ are detrimental to American liberty as they afford powers to the executive branch which should have more thorough checks and balances.

NATIONAL SECURITY VS CIVIL LIBERTY These two points, one of maintaining national security, the other maintaining civil liberties, do not seem necessarily at odds, but the line is thin and it is true that “when there is a significant increase in a threat to our life, most of us are prepared to sacrifice some liberty and property to counter this threat.”13 The question is, how much are we willing to sacrifice and who decides how much of our freedom can be eroded in the name of maintaining this security? Certainly, by declaring a ‘war’ on terror, the Bush Administration managed to create in the mind of the American populace, the national psyche, if you will, an idea of wartime freedoms being different to peacetime freedom. The fact that a ‘War on Terror’ is being waged means that, for the foreseeable future, there must be a level 126

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of freedom one is prepared to sacrifice. Of course, civil libertarians will not agree, as this goes against the core premise of a free society. Is it not the so-called enemy who are trying to disrupt our freedom? If so, then why are we doing it to ourselves? There is an intellectual dishonesty present when holding our so-called enemies to a different standard to ourselves, which means that we in fact do more damage to ourselves and erode our own freedoms.

As protectors of freedom, the defender of civil liberties must insist that no elected leader can have the authority to act as he or she wishes in the name of national security. In reality, it is because of the state’s preoccupation with terrorism that civil liberties have been facing their greatest challenge in the democratic era,14 and if people do not step up to challenge the erosion of these liberties, we may soon find ourselves in a restricted society, all under the guise of safety and security. It was noted that under Bush, the administration seemed to see civil liberties as security problems that require strong executive action,15 and this attempt to justify undue erosion of freedoms appeared typical of a government trying to increase executive power. As protectors of freedom, the defender of civil liberties must insist that no elected leader can have the authority to act as he or she wishes in the name of national security.16 Democratic legitimacy is not sufficient to warrant the seizure of such power.17 In fact, it is clear that judgements to ensure national survival must be shared with the legislature, and especially with the judicial branch.18 This conversation must be had across all sectors of a society. This would provide the required checks volu m e 5

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copies of the bill were available to members of Congress, naming the final bill the USA Patriot Act; the bill passed the Senate with only one dissenting vote”.22 Also, it was renewed after “Congress reviewed the Patriot Act in July 2005, under the threat of a Bush veto if they did not renew the entire act. Moreover, the Senate Intelligence Committee had proposed to add a number of new investigative tools to gain access to anyone’s financial, medical, employment, and even library records without the approval of a judge.23 The above is only a brief mention of some of the powers afforded by the passing of the Act and many of the privacy concerns triggered by the war against terrorism can be traced directly back to the Patriot Act.24 Added to that, issues with the implementation of Habeas Corpus and wiretapping have meant that civil libertarians were, and still are, in uproar over these huge invasions to individual privacy. Surely a benchmark of freedom and human rights should be that you apply the same standard to all citizens, non-citizens and prisoners. When the law is seemingly suspended in the light of a ‘war’ on terror, it is a damning indictment against a society’s application of justice, and this hypocrisy can be justifiably used against it. We do not need more counterproductive counter terrorism policies, which instead of decreasing the threat, increase the risk of terrorism. This, therefore, leads to acts which diminish our civil liberties and freedoms. Ironically, our policies, rather than addressing policy positions which cause grievances, seem to aggravate the sense of injustice and grievance PATRIOT ACT The most controversial policies of felt by many, emboldening rather than counter-terrorism legislation since the 9/11 minimising the peripheral elements of attacks has been under the Patriot Act. society hoping to cause harm to it. This act authorizes a collection of powers that the government had wanted for some ACTUAL THREAT VS time but was approved as a package only EXAGGERATED THREAT because of widespread anxiety about While there is little doubt that terrorism terrorism.21 It was passed without public is a real threat, we must also ask how much deliberation, where “the congressional of it is a real threat, and how much of what leadership cooperated by holding closed we are told is in fact exaggerated, and if hearings and scheduling a final vote before so, for what purpose? As we can see from

and balances to ensure that power is not abused. As a free society, we must have this debate. Our freedoms should not be put on hold just because a government can declare an endless ‘War on Terror’ with such vague parameters that it in fact gives the executive branch unequalled powers. The competing issues in the civil liberties vs. security trade-off are thus fundamental to the very idea of democracy19 and a free society. This means that so called enemies are treated by the same standards and values that we hold dear, otherwise, what claim do we have for moral legitimacy? Those who argue in favour of restrictions of some civil liberties and personal freedoms say that “the trade-off between civil liberties and personal security rests on the notion that the very openness of American society contributed to the planning and execution of the terrorist attacks, the desire to live in a peaceful and orderly society should favour greater acceptance of limitations on personal freedom and civil liberties.”20 Yet, at the same time, these measures are not even foolproof. One can see how this is a very slippery slope. When we start to restrict some freedoms and civil liberties in the name of security, where is the line? And who gets to decide this? No doubt those in government who do end up deciding are not impartial and it certainly is a cause of great concern. Let us now look at a few examples of how human rights and civil liberties have been eroded in the post 9/11 world, and how this has led to a decrease in our freedoms.

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our study above, the exaggeration of the threat and the consequent policies conflate the antiterrorism industry and lead to increased threat and increased erosion of freedom. John Mueller is somebody who speaks about the anti-terrorism industry and its financial worth, where millions of dollars are used to finance counter-terrorism policies and related activities. Mueller speaks from a structuralist perspective and describes how a climate of fear is often maintained to continue this funding and financing. Many defence companies and other varied stakeholders all benefit from the inflating of this industry. It is in their interests to keep the terror threat alive so to speak, and to continue to bankroll themselves from it. He notes that, “perhaps the most common reaction to terrorism is the costly stoking of fear and the often even more costly encouragement of overreaction by members of what we might call the “terrorism industry.”25 In his book, Mueller’s thesis is “that our reaction against terrorism has caused more harm than the threat warrants- not just to civil liberties, not just to the economy, but even to human lives. And our reaction has often helped the terrorists more than it has hurt them.”26 Thus the counterproductive policies have ironically emboldened those they have sought to defeat. Similarly, another notable thinker argues that, “by stoking these public fears and attracting vast political and economic resources in response to them, the War on Terror encourages, indeed virtually compels, every interest group in the country to advance its own agenda as crucial for winning the war. As a result, widening circles of Americans are drawn into spirals of exaggeration, waste, and fear.”27 Chris Sparks also discusses terrorism, and examines the strategic use of terror to produce a politics of fear through an exploration of current Western reactions to terrorism,28 and also feels that current counterterrorism measures are not merely ineffective, but rather they are intentionally 128

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counterproductive, and in fact may help further fuel radicalisation and in essence helps fuel the anti-terror industry. From the structuralist perspective, it again sees the complexity of interest groups involved and with a stake in the upkeep of the current order. Sparks believes that “chronic fear is a response to an enduring and persistent or growing threat,”29 and thus looks at a certain ‘necessity’ in exaggerating a threat or worry, to get actors to behave in a specific manner. When there is common agreement that there is indeed a threat, or belief in a perceived threat, there is much to be gained. This is particularly true for those in the counterterrorism industry, whose livelihoods depend on the growth of it. There are many stakeholders that benefit from the counterterrorism polices enacted. These thinkers are amongst many who believe a change is needed in policy. We can say that if civil liberties and human rights were returned to peace time levels, we would already see an increase in the moral authority of the US, and Britain, amongst others, as they will be seen to be practicing what they preach. A review of foreign policy will also help to fi x the reasons of discontent and many of the points for which terrorists and extremists find fodder for their narratives, and thus will help substantially reduce the threat of terrorism.

CONCLUSION There is an urgent need to increase engagement with community and religious leaders to help glean an authentic and orthodox scholarship regarding these issues, as to collectively gain better

The key to a successful change in counter terror policy is to develop effective policies which deal directly with and identify the root of the anger of those who are intent on causing havoc. volu m e 5

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understandings of various related issues which positively affect policy making. Indeed, it is a desire for security, which has motivated these antiterrorism policies, and some of these measures may in fact undermine the government’s ability to address the terrorist threat in the long run30 as they prove to often embolden the threat of terrorism. The key to a successful change in counter terror policy is to develop effective policies which deal directly with and identify the root of the anger of those who are intent on causing havoc on society, and to understand the legitimate grievances many have with aspects of Western (imperial) policy. This will help not only in understanding the causes of terrorism, but also in developing effective policies to foster more stable societies. It can also be the beginning of addressing the conflated and exaggerated threats we face and will allow us to reign in the counter terror industry, which is benefiting few at the expense of many, reducing collective welfare in society. We need a bold leadership which wishes to deal effectively with civil society and which must be adamant not to decrease civil liberties and human rights. This will help prevent the false importance of terrorists and extremists, which can exacerbate the problem. The human rights and civil liberties we cherish should be maintained and protected in all circumstances where legal maxims should be respected in times of peace, and more importantly, in times of war. Saalik Haleem is a research assistant at The Cordoba Foundation. He has recently completed his master’s degree from the University of Warwick, reading International Political Economy (IPE). This followed his undergraduate studies at Queen Mary, University of London. His areas of interest include Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism strategies in the UK/US, Islamic finance, as well as Political Islam and models of Islamic governance.

ENDNOTES 1. Gearty, C. (2007).“Rethinking Civil Liberties in a Counter-Terrorism World”. Field Day Review, Vol. 3, p.125, Field Day Publications 2. Baker, N. (2003).“National Security versus Civil Liberties”, Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol. 33, No. 3, The Permanent War, p.548,Center for the Study of the Presidency and Congress. 3. Baker, N. (2003).“National Security… op. cit. p.548

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4. Dunn (2005). “Bush, 11 September and the Conflicting Strategies of the ‘War on Terrorism”, Irish Studies in International Affairs, 16, p.14. 5. Ibid. p. 14. 6. Baker, N. (2003).“National Security…” op. cit. p.548 7. Dunn (2005). “Bush..” op. cit., p.18. 8. Ibid. p.18. 9. Addicott F, J, (2010), “Efficacy of the Obama Policies to Combat Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and Associated Forces--The First Year”, Pace Law Review, p.342. 10. Ibid. p.343. 11. Ibid. p.342. 12. Ibid.p.341. 13. Niskanen, W. (2006). “The Several Costs of Responding to the Threat of Terrorism” (Public Choice, Vol. 128, No. 1/2, The Political Economy of Terrorism, p.351: Springer). 14. Gearty, C. (2007).“Rethinking…” op. cit. p.135. 15. Baker, N. (2003).“National Security…” op. cit. p.563. 16. Ibid. p.130. 17. Gearty, C. (2007).“Rethinking…” op. cit. p.130. 18. Ibid. p.130. 19. Davis, D & Silver, B. (2004). “Civil Liberties vs. Security: Public Opinion in the Context of the Terrorist Attacks on America”, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 48, No. 1, p.29, Midwest Political Science Association. 20. Ibid. p.28. 21. Niskanen, W. (2006). “The Several Costs…” op. cit. p.353. 22. Ibid. p.353. 23. Ibid. p.353. 24. Baker, N. (2003).“National Security…” op. cit. p.560. 25. Mueller, J. (2006).“Overblown: How Politicians and the Terrorism Industry Inflate National Security Threats”, p.33, Free Press. 26. Ibid. p.2. 27. Lustick et al. (2006). “Are We Trapped in the War on Terror?“ (pg, ix, Middle East Policy Council). 28. Sparks, C (2003).“Liberalism, Terrorism and the Politics of Fear”, London Metropolitan University Politics, Vol 23, p.200. 29. Sparks, C, (2003)“Liberalism, Terrorism and the Politics of Fear” (London Metropolitan University Politics Vol 23, p204) 30. Baker, N. (2003).“National Security…” op. cit. p563.

Occasional Papers is a publication of The Cordoba Foundation that provides a medium for diverse opinions, presenting a comprehensive view of the myriad perspectives pertaining to dialogue and cross-cultural exchange. This is done by publishing important contributions by experts and world leaders.

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COUNTER-TERRORISM: COMMUNITY-BASED APPROACHES TO PREVENTING TERROR CRIME EEDITED BY DR BASIA SPALEK This new book examines community-based approaches to countertterrorism through an analysis of the notions of community, partnership, engagement, gender and religion in order to shed new p llight on the potential of, and drawbacks to these approaches. Spalek stresses the need for policy makers and practitioners to reflect on the effectiveness of the initiatives that they are engaged with, particularly in relation to how community-targeted or communityfocused they are.

Counter-Terrorism: Community-Based Approaches to Preventing Terror Crime, edited by Dr Basia Spalek. Published in 2012 by Palgrave Macmillan.

BOOK PROMOTION

FROM BEIRUT TO JERUSALEM BY DR SWEE CHAI ANG B This is a first person account of medical work in Beirut's camps by Dr Ang who has been described as "the unsung heroine of Beirut." Dr A Ang is an orthopaedic surgeon who was brought up in Singapore and came to England as a political refugee in 1977. In 1982 she went to Beirut to help civilian war victims. Almost by chance, she ended up working in a hospital run by the Palestinian Red Crescent, a hospital inside one of Beirut's refugee camps. She was the surgeon on duty during the Sabra-Shatila massacres and then went to Jerusalem to testify before the Karan commission of enquiry into the massacres. On her return to Britain, she organized Medical Aid for Palestinians, the charity which sent Pauline Cutting to Beirut and herself relieved Pauline after the siege was partially lifted. Since then she has repeatedly returned to Beirut to work in the refugee camps.

From Beirut to Jerusalem by Dr Swee Chai Ang. Published in 1989 by Grafton.

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‘From Beirut to Jerusalem’ 2009 - The Wounds of Gaza SWEE CHAI ANG

returned to Gaza in January 2009 when it sustained the worst attack since the Six Day War in 1967. The Christmas week of 2008 saw shocking scenes of Gaza being bombed by land, air and sea. In just three short weeks 1,400 Palestinians were killed, one-third of them children. In this tiny part of Occupied Palestine, there were 5,450 casualties severe enough to require operations; many remain in a critical state. The scale of the Israeli assault matched that meted out to the Lebanese in 1982, or indeed, in 2006, with similar ferocity and breaches of international law. My book, From Beirut to Jerusalem, was written during the six months I had to spend waiting for the Israelis to grant my first visa for Gaza during the First Intifada; I had volunteered as a surgeon to treat Palestinians. The wait was productive, enabling me to produce these memoirs and then head for the Gaza Strip when the visa finally came through in 1988. I spent six months as the only foreign orthopaedic surgeon in AlAhli Anglican Hospital in Gaza City. I first met Palestinians in 1982 when I responded to an international appeal for help following Israel’s invasion of Lebanon. I was warned by my Church that Palestinians were ‘terrorists’. In the refugee camps of Beirut, however, I found warm and generous people who kept telling me of a home their children had never seen; of a place called Palestine from which they were forced to flee in 1948; and of their determination to return one day. Their wish to exercise their right of return remained undimmed through the passing years; those in the diaspora were as one with those under Israel’s occupation. Akka Hospital in Shatilla refugee camp was named after the coastal city many came from. And Gaza Hospital in Sabra volu m e 5

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camp was named after the tiny strip of land in Palestine. In September 1982, thousands of unarmed men, women and children were massacred in Sabra and Shatilla. The massacre confirmed to me that Palestinians existed and their story of exile was true. I dedicate From Beirut to Jerusalem to all those who were killed and to all survivors who remained determined to return to Palestine. I was in Beirut in 1987 when news of the Intifada emerged. Palestinians rose up in civil disobedience against the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. The Israeli army responded brutally. Many of my friends in Lebanon were anxious for their families in Palestine but they were also proud that the uprising had finally happened after decades of occupation. The Intifada was a declaration to the whole world of the refusal of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza to live under Israeli occupation. TV coverage showed Palestinian children confronting Israeli tanks with stones. Women and old folk were not afraid any more. Occupied Palestine was saying, “We will die standing; we will not live on our knees”. The Israelis fired tear gas at unarmed demonstrators, into homes, schools and hospitals. ‘Plastic’ and ‘rubber’ bullets were fired at very close range, causing blindness and death. Israeli soldiers were filmed beating captured Palestinians to break their bones. The then Prime Minister boasted that when Israel was through with the Palestinians, they will be a nation of cripples. Because of the large numbers of casualties, the UN called for an orthopaedic surgeon. I volunteered but despite UN sponsorship, Israel took six months to allow me in. When I first heard about the Intifada arches quarterly

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I was on a routine morning round with ‘Mamma’ Rita, an 80 year-old retired German ambulance driver and paramedic volunteer with our charity Medical Aid for Palestinians. We provided milk, basic medical care and advice for the refugees in Beirut. The intervening years had given no respite to the suffering of the people of the camps who survived the 1982 massacre. Indeed, their conditions deteriorated and morale was at a new low. These were people who had little to look forward to. But that December morning, something was different. I saw a sparkle in their eyes as they spoke of the Intifada in broken English. Their smiles returned, along with their dignity. In the course of that first Intifada, hundreds of Palestinians died, thousands more were injured and tens of thousands were imprisoned. Al-Ahli was a small hospital founded in 1891 by Christian missionaries and was the only independent medical centre not under Israeli control at that time. In all the other hospitals, wounded Palestinians were subject to scrutiny and arrest. Doctors had to report stone throwers shot by the Israeli soldiers. Understandably, wounded demonstrators preferred Al-Ahli. As we refused the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) automatic access to our hospital, we were treated with hostility. When the IDF wished to arrest one of our patients, it would surround the hospital with armoured vehicles. Soldiers would take up positions on rooftops ready to snipe into the hospital. Commandos stormed the hospital, even while women were in labour. Once, I was finishing an operation on a patient who had been shot in the shoulder. Soldiers marched straight into my operating theatre – guns and all – and demanded that I surrender him for interrogation. I refused. They promised to return to take him. They had probably never faced aggressive Chinese women before! The soldiers did return that night but could not find the patient. Apart from the foreign doctors’ rooms, the whole 132

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hospital was searched to no avail. The man was hidden in the room of my foreign anaesthetist; he escaped. Undeterred by further IDF harassment, the staff ploughed on, treating and operating on more and more wounded. The entire Gaza Strip was regularly put under prolonged curfew, often lasting for weeks. Children were not even allowed to look out of the window; they risked being shot if they did. When Israel was celebrating its Foundation Day in May 1989 it placed the whole of Gaza under curfew. I was in Jerusalem to buy medical supplies and, as a UN official, was exempt. There was an atmosphere of gaiety in Israel but as I went back, my heart was heavy. Gaza was silent, like a ghost town. There was a curfew; no music was allowed, no one was allowed out. My ambulance was the only thing moving as I drove through Gaza City. It was eerie. Eidul Fitr, the day after the Muslim fasting month of Ramadan is a time for visiting and showering gifts on family and friends. As worshippers emerged from the mosques on Eidul Fitr, 6 May 1989, Israeli helicopters fired at them. Children and young men responded angrily by stoning Israeli ground troops. They shotback. Within minutes, 343 injured Palestinians were brought into our hospital; 6 died while awaiting treatment. We operated all day, throughout the night and into the next morning. As I emerged at dawn, I was told to go for a shower and something to eat. I had a distinct sense of déjà vu. At 7am, 18 September, 1982, I was ordered out of the basement operating theatre of Gaza Hospital in Beirut’s Shatilla camp. I walked into the bright sunlight and learnt the truth and scale of what happened over the previous three days. I was a witness and survivor of the Sabra-Shatilla massacre. But on that May morning in 1989, something was different. As I left the hospital operating theatre I saw that the tree in the hospital courtyard had beautiful pink blossoms. In my hospital quarters I volu m e 5

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‘FROM BEIRUT TO JERUSALEM’ 2009 - THE WOUNDS OF GAZA

knelt down and sobbed. Memories of the massacre in Beirut and the experience of the night before in Gaza overwhelmed me. The tear gas and the shootings, the humiliation, the cess-pools, the realities of life under occupation; “God, are you still there?” I asked. The tree in full blossom told me that He had not forgotten Gaza. When Israel withdrew its settlers from Gaza in 2005, it turned the territory into a large prison for the 1.5 million Palestinians there; Gaza was put under a military, economic and financial blockade. No one was allowed to enter or leave Gaza without Israel’s permission. Visitors to the Holy Land, especially those from the West, usually visit the West Bank, bypassing Gaza. Not only was it a logistical nightmare to get into Gaza in the first place, it was also very difficult to get out again. Many westerners also believed Gaza was poor, uninteresting and teeming with Islamic zealots and suicide bombers. This is untrue. When the assault on Gaza started in December 2008, Dr Ghassan Abu-Sita, a Palestinian colleague in London, was concerned about the destruction and the fate of his family. He was desperate to go there to assess the medical needs and plan for long-term medical help. We realised our role was not to perform operations – Gaza has superb local Palestinian surgeons. What they needed were medical supplies and training. We wanted to know how best to support them. Throughout the 22 day bombardment, Gaza was sealed-off by Israeli troops. We figured that we had a narrow window of opportunity to get into Gaza through Egypt although the Egyptians could not open the Rafah crossing without Israeli permission. Our hunch was correct; the Israelis declared a temporary ceasefire on the eve of President Obama’s inauguration. We flew to Egypt. It took more than five hours to reach Rafah from Cairo. Many trucks heading for Gaza were turned back; one was loaded with cement but building material was not allowed for Gaza. The bombedout hospitals, schools and homes had to volu m e 5

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remain rubble. The British Embassy in Cairo warned us that it was reckless to go to Gaza and that we were going against the advice of our government. Everyone was nervous as dozens of medical doctors had been turned away. However, three hours of frustration was ended and we were waved on to the bus taking us into Palestine. A Palestinian Ministry of Health liaison officer met us. We told him that we wanted to assess the medical needs of Gaza for a medical charity. That evening, Gaza radio announced that the first British medical team had arrived. Ghassan thought it very funny, what with him being a Palestinian from Gaza and I being Chinese. Fortunately, we were joined by Dr Sonia Robbins, a British plastic and hand surgeon, the next day. With her, we had a rainbow coalition. I had been on the road leading from Rafah to Gaza City many times during the first Intifada. I remember it being crowded with buildings and shops on either side. But this time, it was apparent that many buildings had been destroyed by Israeli military action. As Gaza is under siege, rebuilding was not possible, so these clear spaces have become fields again. Further north I saw evidence of the “Operation Cast Lead” destruction: bombed-out buildings, heaps of rubble, collapsed

I looked at northern Gaza where once there were citrus orchards, farms and houses with beautiful gardens. Now laid waste by Israeli explosives, northern Gaza 2009 resembled the nuclear devastation of Hiroshima after the Second World War. The entire area was obliterated. arches quarterly

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concrete, and mangled cables. This was very much like Beirut in 1982. I looked at northern Gaza where once there were citrus orchards, farms and houses with beautiful gardens. Now laid waste by Israeli explosives, northern Gaza 2009 resembled the nuclear devastation of Hiroshima after the Second World War. The entire area was obliterated. Ghassan’s father-in-law, Abdel Daim had picked us up at Rafah. “Look at our petrol stations!” he said, pointing to a man squatting on the roadside surrounded by several jerry cans filled with petrol. “From the tunnels”, remarked Daim. The tunnels under the border with Egypt had been described as Gaza’s “lifeline” during the years of the Israeli siege. Abdel Daim was defiant: “They pound us from the sea, shell us from their tanks, bomb us with F16s and helicopters; they have killed and wounded so many. But they have not recaptured one inch of our territory. Welcome to Free Gaza!” How could I forget such spirit? In the first Intifada, I spent six months with them and found the same steadfastness and courage. I had completed From Beirut to Jerusalem and wanted to share with them the story of their Palestinian relatives in Lebanon. I had brought along six copies but the nurses in the hospital spliced the book into sections and shared them out. While the Beirut hospitals were named after places in Palestine, those in Gaza, in turn, were named after places like Tel El-Za’ter and Shatilla, in honour of the refugee camps. There is no better example than this to illustrate that the Palestinian people are one;there is no distinction between those under occupation and those in exile. We turned off the main road past a cemetery. This is where young Muhammad Al-Dura, the 12 year-old shot by the Israelis at the beginning of the second Intifada in full view of the media, is buried. Abdel Daim’s land has not been spared by the Israelis. He pointed to a large field: “The Israelis came one night and destroyed all the olive and apricot trees on 15 acres of land. Most of those trees were over 50 years old and planted by my mother; she dug the 134

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first well here.” When we finally reached Abdel Daim’s home in Khan Younis, flanked by palm trees, bougainvillea flowers, hibiscus,

“Anything that moves could be shot at.” I needed no second telling. jasmine and honeysuckle, it was hard to believe that such beauty existed amidst such destruction. The house is a bungalow with a flat roof top. When I started to climb to the roof I was stopped by Ghassan’s fatherin-law; Israeli pilotless drones survey the area. “Anything that moves could be shot at.” I needed no second telling. Abdel Daim is tall and dignified, about 60 years old with silver-grey hair, a moustache and long eyebrows to match. Beneath the stern appearance, was a kind man with a great sense of humour. He had been arrested and imprisoned by the Israelis four times; although tortured, he never betrayed his friends. He comes from a Bedouin family in Beersheba renowned for strength and loyalty. The family was driven out and are refugees in Gaza. Aida, his wife, is a young-looking, attractive lady, who decorated their home with beautiful Palestinian embroidery. I first came across such embroidery in Beirut in 1982, in Shatilla camp. Each village has its distinct motif. Despite the demolition of their villages, memory and heritage lived on through these colourful silk threads sewn on black cloth. The beauty of the embroidery and the garden brought to life the beauty of Palestine. Diaspora Palestinians always told me that their land was beautiful. I used to dismiss this as sentimentality; not any more. Khan Younis has a dark history. In 1956 Israeli soldiers under the command of Ariel Sharon killed nearly all of the Palestinian men in the town. Their graves were dug by the women and children. Almost three hundred were killed. Every morning, before we went to the volu m e 5

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hospitals, we had Arabic coffee, home baked pastries, cheese and bread; in the evening, a cooked dinner. One day, we found that the family had killed some fowls for us. As if it were not enough, Abdel Daim bought us fresh fish. He could not allow us to leave Gaza, he said, without tasting their fish. It was extremely delicious, but Gaza’s fishermen are often shot at or even killed by gunboats if they stray beyond the Israeli-imposed three-mile limit. We visited all the hospitals in Gaza and saw the extent of damage to schools, clinics and UN buildings. We introduced ourselves as the ‘British’ medical team, speaking to the medical personnel and administrators who were extremely disciplined and dedicated. We wrote a quick report of our findings as Israeli bombs fell hard and fast in southern Gaza. We put the facts down and issued it immediately. It was our witness and was published in the medical journal, the Lancet Global Health Network. It attracted a great deal of attention. Excerpts read: “THE WOUNDS OF GAZA Over the period of 27 December 2008 to the ceasefire of 18 January 2009, it was estimated that a million and a half tons of explosives were dropped on the Gaza Strip. Gaza is 25 miles by 5 miles and home to 1.5 million people. Prior to this, Gaza had been completely blockaded and starved for 50 days. In fact, since the Palestinian election [in 2006], Gaza has been under total or partial blockade for several years... On the first day of the invasion, 250 people were killed. Every single police station in Gaza was bombed killing large numbers of police officers. Having wiped out the police force, attention was turned to nongovernment targets. A) Israeli weapons – In addition to conventional weapons and high explosives, four categories of volu m e 5

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unconventional weapons could be identified – i) White Phosphorus shells and bombs - eyewitnesses speak of bombs exploding at high altitude scattering a large canopy of white phosphorus bomblets which cover a large area. During the land invasion, eyewitnesses describe the tanks shelling homes first with a conventional shell [followed by] a phosphorus shellfired. Used in this manner the phosphorus explodes and burns the families and the homes. Many charred bodies were found among burning phosphorus particles. One area of concern is that the phosphorus seems to be in a special stabilising agent, resulting in the phosphorus not burning out completely. Residue still covers the fields, playground and compounds. It ignites when picked up by curious kids, or produce fumes when farmers return to water their fields. One returning family returning to water their field met with clouds of fumes producing epitasis. This makes the phosphorus an anti-personnel weapon. Surgeons from hospitals are also reporting cases where after primary laparotomy for relatively small wounds with minimal contamination find on second look laparotomy increasing areas of tissue necrosis at about 3 days. Patients then become gravely ill and by about 10 days those patients needing a third relook encounter massive liver necrosis. Th is may or may not be accompanied by generalised bleeding, kidney failure and heart failure and death. Although acidosis, liver necrosis and sudden cardiac arrest due to hypocalcaemia are known to be complications of white phosphorus it is not possible to attribute these complications as being due to phosphorus alone. arches quarterly

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There is an urgent need to analyse and identify the real nature of this modified phosphorus for its long term effect on the people of Gaza. There is also urgency in collecting and disposing of the phosphorus residues littering the entire Gaza Strip. As they give off toxic fumes when coming into contact with water, once the rain falls the whole area will be polluted with acid phosphorus fumes. Children should be warned not to handle and play with these phosphorus residues.

they were lined up they were fired upon and killed. Families have lost tens of their members through such executions. The deliberate targeting of unarmed children and women is well documented by human rights groups in the Gaza Strip over the past month.

ii) Heavy Bombs – the use of DIME (dense inert material explosives) was evident though it is unsure whether depleted uranium was used in the south. In the civilian areas, surviving patients were found to have limbs truncated by DIME, since the stumps apart from being characteristically cut off in guillotine fashion also fail to bleed. Bomb casing and shrapnel are extremely heavy.

D) Cluster Bombs – Dropped on the Rafah border crossing with Egypt. The first patients wounded by cluster bombs were brought into the Abu Yusef Najjar Hospital after the ceasefire. Since more than half the tunnels in the border with Egypt have been destroyed, Gaza has lost part of her life-line. These tunnels, contrary to popular belief, are not for weapons, though light weapons could have been smuggled through them. They are the mainstay of food and fuel for Gaza. Palestinians are beginning to tunnel again. However it became clear that cluster bombs were dropped on to the Rafah border and the first was accidentally set off by tunnelling. Five burn patients were brought in after setting off a booby trap kind of device.

iii) Fuel air explosives – Bunker busters and implosions bombs have been used. There are buildings, especially the 8 storey Science and Technology Building of the Islamic University of Gaza, which had been reduced to rubble no higher than 5-6 feet high. iv) Silent Bombs – People in Gaza described a silent bomb which is extremely destructive. The bomb arrives as a silent projectile at most with a whistling sound and creates a large area where all objects and living things are vaporised with minimal trace. We are unable to fit this into conventional weapons but the possibility of new particle weapons being tested should be suspected. B) Executions – Survivors describe Israeli tanks arriving in front of homes demanding that residents come out. Children, old people and women would come forward and as 136

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C) Targeting of ambulances – 13 ambulances have been fired upon, killing drivers and first aid personnel in the process of rescue and evacuation of the wounded.

E) Death toll – as of 25 January, 2009, it is estimated 1,350 were killed with the numbers increasing daily. This is due to the severely wounded continuing to die in hospitals. About 40 per cent killed were children. F) Severe Injuries - The severely injured numbered 5,450 with 40 per cent children. These are mainly large burns and poly-trauma patients. Single limb fractures and walking wounded are not included in these figures. Through our conversations with volu m e 5

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doctors and nurses the word holocaust and catastrophe were used repeatedly. The medical staff bears the psychological trauma of the past month living through the situation and dealing with mass casualties which swamped their department and operation rooms. Many patients died in the Accident and Emergency Department while awaiting treatment. In a district hospital, the orthopaedic surgeon carried out 13 external fi xations in less than a day. It is estimated that of the severely injured, 1,600 will suffer permanent disabilities. These include amputations, spinal cord injuries, head injuries, large burns with crippling contractures. There are 400 amputees of which 88 are bilateral. SPECIAL FACTORS TO CONSIDER- the high death and injury toll is due to several factors No escape - Gaza is sealed off by Israeli troops. No one can escape the bombardment and the land invasion. There is simply no escape. Even within the strip itself, movement from north to south is impossible as tanks have cut off both halves. By contrast, it was possible for people in Lebanon in 1982 and 2006 to escape from an area of heavy bombardment to an area of relative calm. Gaza does not have this option. Gaza is densely populated – The bombs used by Israel have been precision bombs, they have a hundred per cent hit rate on buildings which are crowded with people, such as the central market, police stations, schools, the UN compound used as a shelter from bombardment, mosques (40 of them destroyed) and the homes of families who thought they were safe as there were no combatants in them. In high rise flats, a single implosion volu m e 5

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bomb would destroy multiple families. The pattern of consistent targeting of civilians make one suspect that the military are but collateral damage, while civilians are the primary targets. Quantity and quality of the ammunition - as described above. Gaza’s lack of defence - against the modern weapons of Israel. Gaza has no tanks, no planes, no anti-aircraft missiles against an invading army. We experienced that first hand in a minor clash of Israeli tank shells versus Palestinians AK47 return fire. The forces were simply unmatched. Absence of well constructed bomb shelters for civilians – Unfortunately even if these were present they would be no match for bunker busters possessed by the Israeli army. CONCLUSION The next assault on Gaza would be just as disastrous. The people of Gaza are extremely vulnerable and defenceless in the event of another attack. If the international community is serious about preventing such a large scale of deaths and injuries in the future, it will have to develop some sort of defence force for Gaza. Otherwise many more vulnerable civilians will continue to die.” The report stayed on the Lancet Global Health Network for 28 days – from 2 February to 2 March 2009. It was taken off the website following a massive pro-Israel protest accusing it of factual inaccuracies. However, in those 28 days, it had found its way into many other publications and as of March 2009, has been translated into 10 languages. Dr Swee Chai Ang is a consultant trauma and orthopaedic. She is the author of From Beirut to Jerusalem, from which this abridged account is taken, and co-founder of British Charity Medical Aid for Palestinians.

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Terrorism: A Critical Introduction BY RICHARD JACKSON, LEE JARVIS, JEREON GUNNING & MARIE B. SMYTH This innovative text provides a much-needed critical introduction to terrorism. Cutting-edge research on contemporary issues is combined with new insights into Cu long-debated issues such as the definition of terrorism, the nature of the terrorist lo threat and counter-terrorism strategies. Showing that the methods we adopt as well th as the material we study are vital for a clear understanding of the subject, this text ggoes beyond traditional IR approaches to rethink popular beliefs and assumptions aabout terrorism. Taking a genuinely global and integrated approach, this book is aan ideal entry into the study of terrorism. The text is supported by International case studies from around the world; a detailed glossary introducing key actors, events and concepts relating to terrorism; and learning aids to stimulate critical thinking, including discussion questions, further readings and selected web resources.

Terrorism: A Critical Introduction By Richard Jackson, Lee Jarvis, Jereon Gunning & Marie B. Smyth Published in 2011 by Palgrave Macmillan. 138

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Youth De-Radicalisation: the Wolverhampton Experience REVD. MASON WEST

istory reveals that conflicts between societies rarely occur due solely because of ideological clashes. Ideology, philosophy and religion are usually the justification for the use of the most primitive and violent means to bring an enemy into submission. However, the true source of conflict is usually the scarcity of resources. Throughout history people of different cultures, ethnicities and religions have had periods of peaceful coexistence until the balance of economic resources was disrupted. Because of this disruption the urge and need to survive motivated one group to seek the elimination of another. Often this process of elimination was contrary to the morality of the group, so some principle was needed to justify what would otherwise have been considered homicidal or genocidal. This principle, whether religious or philosophical, served as a type of absolution for a groupâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s means of restoring social balance. The idea posited by the Nazis that they were a genetically superior race in comparison to the Jews whom they defined as subhuman served as their reason and justification for attempting to wipe an entire race of people off the face of the earth. The Darwinian survival of the fittest provided western nations with the justification for enslaving the people of Africa and looting the natural resources of the entire continent. The Hutu of Rwanda saw the Tutsi as no more than cockroaches, enabling them to slaughter one million people without much thought. These acts of terror along with the slaughter in Sudan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Laos and many other places throughout history are all examples of the use of ideology or religion to justify unimaginable acts of intolerance and genocide.

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Those who wish to eradicate such heinous acts against the innocent should concentrate their efforts on more than the tool used to justify them. The underlying cause that makes people vulnerable to accepting extremist ideas and engaging in acts of terror should be the focus. That cause is the unequal distribution of basic resources and the struggle for survival it creates. If scarcity can be dealt with before fear leads to a primitive survival instinct kicking-in and subsequent inhumanity, then ideology as a justification for heinous acts will lose its power. Hence, scarcity rather than ideology should be the issue. If societies can enable all of their members to have a purpose, have access and have the freedom to reach their full potential, then they will have fewer frustrated citizens seeking extremist and violent means to restore a semblance of balance. In the British city of Wolverhampton there is an organisation which seeks to engage young people and empower them with the ability to influence their government and participate in the local economy before they become victims of antisocial or extremist ideologies. It is the belief of the leadership of this organisation that if those who feel rejected by society can be given the tools to reconnect then it will not be possible for them to be radicalised or recruited into gangs or other groups which thrive on antisocial behaviour.

EYES The restoration of balance is the basis for the model being developed by Wolverhamptonâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Engage Youth Empowerment Services (EYES). The purpose of EYES is to empower youth to influence their peers, government and economy as agents of positive social change. arches quarterly

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EYES believes that if it can empower those who will one day serve as society’s leaders in a way that promotes balance in society, scarcity of resources will not force people into committing inhumane acts. Since 2004 EYES has helped hundreds of youth identify their talents and develop them into marketable skills to be celebrated by their community. Initially, the organisation targeted AfroCaribbean youth between the ages of 8 and 25 who were on the fringes of society as a result of exclusion from school, problems in the courts and a history of antisocial behaviour. Presently, EYES serves youth from a range of racial, religious, educational and economic backgrounds. It has become apparent that the need to discover purpose exists in all segments of society.

METHODOLOGY OF EYES EYES does not exist in a vacuum. It has participated in capacity building and collaboration with other organisations locally and nationally. Capacity building is the juxtaposition of divergent organizations’ strengths and weaknesses to maximize their ability to have an impact on society. Where EYES is weak in its ability to serve the interests of Wolverhampton’s youth the management seeks to partner with an organisation stronger in that particular area. The reverse is done with the organisation’s strengths. Collaboration is the strategic assignment of tasks to organisations working together to solve a specific societal problem. As far as capacity building is concerned, EYES partners with organisations which can provide training for qualifications it is unable to provide. In 2009 EYES received funding from the Tackling Knives Action Plan (TKAP) to engage youth on the fringes in Wolverhampton; it set up a partnership with the Trinity programme to help young men to secure their SIA qualification so that they could find work as security guards. EYES has also partnered with organisations like JML Training to provide apprenticeships for service users and Ground Works to secure volunteers to help carry out EYES programmes. 140

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EYES has targeted specific areas in Wolverhampton identified as hot spots for crime and unwelcome activities. In partnership with the police, EYES has targeted specific areas in Wolverhampton identified as hot spots for crime and unwelcome activities. Through funding initiatives like TKAP and Building Blocks the police service supports the application of the EYES model in the most difficult parts of the city. EYES has also received funding from the British government’s counter-terrorism Prevent strategy. This funding allowed the organisation to reach out to young Asian men and empower them to become advocates for their own communities. It also sought to dissuade them from becoming victims of extremist ideologies. The first phase of the EYES model is engagement; it developed the Street Team Strategy in 2008. This calls for specially trained mentors to meet young people where they are, rather than expecting them to come to the organisation for services. It is a fact that most young men surviving on the streets, participating in gangs or involved in some form of extremism do not approach youth service bodies for help. Many are so marginalised that they believe that the life they are leading is the only way for them to go. Hence, EYES street team members go out to them on the street or in their hangouts known as “cotch houses”. Once engaged, the young people are invited to a safe place like a local restaurant where street team members elicit what services they need to pull them out of a particular situation or lifestyle. After several of these meetings and research conducted by the street team, an engagement strategy is designed for that group and they begin to enter the second phase at the EYES building. The EYES model challenges participants to identify those abilities which seem to volu m e 5

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come naturally to them. These are defined as talents. Most people reached by the programme have never really engaged in meta-cognitive activities that result in self-definition or self-determination. The young people taking part often reveal that they have never really thought about what natural abilities they possess and usually engage in activities and lifestyles which their families, peers or the prevalent pop culture push them towards. Though it is a difficult process, programme participants are encouraged to think about themselves and their lives. This process not only helps them to begin the process of defining themselves, it also gives them a sense of purpose, a reason for being. This is a very important aspect of the EYES model because most of the young people with whom the programme engages join antisocial organizations to gain a sense of purpose and belonging. They are frequently so overcome by trauma in their lives that they first try to numb the psychological pain and then try to find a reason for it. The initial acceptance by gangs and extremist groups provides the pain relief these youth are seeking .When their pain is numbed by the stimulating activities of these groups, young minds become fertile ground for extremist dogma, which appears to provide the reason for their pain and the â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;enemyâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; responsible for it. EYES seeks to neutralise the attraction of such groups by empowering youth to define themselves by identifying their talents and then use that definition to begin the discovery of purpose in this world. Though difficult, this is only the second phase. The model also accommodates those who are quite familiar with their talents but do not know how to apply them in the societies in which they live. Many of the programme participants become involved in antisocial activities and groups because they believe that such involvement is the only way that they can support themselves and their families. They have developed prolific skills, but those skills are only volu m e 5

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useful in an illicit economy. The third phase of the EYES model empowers participants to transform their talents into marketable skills. A skill is defined as any ability or activity that is learned. It is occasionally hard for participants to distinguish skill from talent. Participants who are asked to identify their talents will often name a skill such as being good at football or cricket. Facilitators remind them that these are sports, with rules which they were taught. If they are allowed to regard a skill as a talent they will ultimately limit themselves. A person may be able to play football as well as rugby or cricket or volleyball. However, if they believe they only have the natural inclination to play one of the sports they become limited. The goal of this phase is to eradicate all limitations and help the participants visualise their full potential. Facilitators would, therefore, help such participants to identify their talent as athleticism and help them to realise that athleticism can have many applications. Participants will seek to uncover all the applications of just one talent. For example, a person with a talent for communication could find that this one talent can be applied to motivational speaking, teaching, preaching, speech writing, story-telling and many other skills that can be learned. Once the participants have identified the skills that can be developed from their talents, they are guided through the process of determining the marketability of each skill. Marketability refers to the demand a particular skill has in the local, regional and national economy. Participants are able to see not only how their talent can become a skill, but also how they can make a living with each of the skills. Jenny Taylor, the CEO of the programme, notes that many of the young people who join while they are engaged in antisocial behaviour donâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;t want to engage in illegal activities; they feel that they have no choice. They have been deceived into believing that the path they are on is the only option. Even though the path may have an undesirable end, they accept it and usually embrace it. This phase of the EYES arches quarterly

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model gives participants the opportunity to see that they do have a choice; that there is a different path. In fact, that there are many. It is at this point that participants experience a revelation and a new reality begins to take shape. Young people are encouraged to choose a skill that is not only valuable to them but also enables them to support themselves and their families. They are encouraged to choose a skill which gives them a sense of purpose, one for which they feel passion and one that can be defined by the market as their profession. The skill that will serve them best is the one that gives a strong sense of purpose, passion and profession. Once the participants have chosen their skill, they are ready for the fourth phase; training. EYES is divided into five departments: intervention, training, creative, marketing and administrative. The intervention department is where most of the organisationâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s participants enter, usually through the work of the street team. Others are referred to EYES by schools, the police service, the courts or concerned parents. In the training department, facilitators take the youth through the journey of self-discovery. Once the participants have decided what skill they will pursue they are assigned to a training programme designed by EYES. If EYES does not have a curriculum for a specific skill or qualified trainers, the participants are referred to another organisation which does. Many of the youth who come to EYES want to develop a creative skill in music, drama, fashion or writing. They complete a twelve-week training programme which helps them to become proficient in their chosen area. Those who want to be rappers are not only trained in the development of lyrical expressions structured in different configurations of rhyme and metre. They are also trained in the music studio as they create their own tracks and CDs, and then trained how to market their music and engage in advertising. Participants are taught not only the art of music, but also the business of music. 142

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This type of training is intentional because the EYES model calls for them to participate in the economy and influence it. They are trained to be creative, meaning they can bring something new to the world by force of their imagination. They are trained to be innovative, meaning they can find new applications for existing products. Ultimately, they are motivated to have an entrepreneurial spirit. Entrepreneurship is a key component because in a free market it is the one element that expands an economy. The basic elements of any economy are land (natural resources), labour (skilled workers), capital (produced goods used to make other goods) and entrepreneurship. Of these four basic resources entrepreneurship discovers new uses for land, applies capital properly to these new uses and creates new jobs as a result of creation and innovation for the labour force. Motivating the participants in EYES to be entrepreneurs creates a multiplier effect. If these youth become creative and innovative developing new products and services, they will in turn create a place for others to use their skills in a productive way.

One can only imagine the sense of achievement that a young person who was once a gang member or dealer on the street must feel after identifying a talent that gives him a sense of purpose. Most of the programming conducted by EYES is a direct result of the creativity and innovation of those youth who take part. This is the power of the fourth phase of the EYES model. Once youth have transformed their talents into marketable skills they are then challenged by the organisation to showcase those skills on the biggest stage that can be created. EYES volu m e 5

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is known in Wolverhampton for musical productions involving forty to sixty young people. All of these youth are service users who have developed their skills in EYES training workshops. They help write the plays; they compose the music; they market and advertise the play; they build the sets, design the costumes, plan the lighting and organise the rehearsals. One can only imagine the sense of achievement that a young person who was once a gang member or dealer on the street must feel after identifying a talent that gives him a sense of purpose, developing a skill he loves and then being celebrated for something new he brought to the world. However, this is not the last phase of the EYES model. The final phase is the multiplier effect. Those who have gone through the previous phases have the opportunity to become mentors, trainers and project leaders in the organisation. These youth are taken through a training programme that exposes them to leadership theory, civic engagement, economics and motivational and training methods. Once they have completed this training they are challenged to have an impact on the lives of other youths who are where they once were. One of the powerful aspects of the EYES programme is the fact that the only staff members over the age of thirty are the organisationâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s three founders and the programme coordinator. This is not down to a commitment to ageism, but because all of the directors of the five departments, the leaders of the 12 sections and other staff are young people who were once service users. They came through the EYES model and then helped to build the organisation through their own creativity and innovation. For the past eight years this model has been employed to reach youth on the fringes of Wolverhampton society. The programme has been amazingly successful as a grassroots initiative. Now the challenge for EYES is to join the mainstream as a professional organisation on a par with other youth service agencies which have the respect of private and public sector entities. volu m e 5

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WORKING IN PARTNERSHIP This grassroots approach worked and continues to work, but it is contrary to the mainstream approach of marketing oneâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s services widely and waiting for potential users to come to the organisation for help. The grassroots approach does not offer the chance to sit on boards, advisory committees and steering groups. Grassroots organisations are never really seen because their operations are deep in the eponymous grass. It is their impact that rises to be recognised. When the likes of the police service and local authority began to see changes in parts of Wolverhampton they started to ask questions about the cause. When riots took place in the city, and a cadre of young people led fearlessly by Jenny and Helen were in the midst of the chaos persuading their friends to go home, the city took note. Recently, the leadership of EYES was engaged by the British Counter-terrorism unit to develop a project for Asian youth in the city of Wolverhampton. When a group of Asian young men came together and announced a mission to encourage young Muslim men to find peaceful and productive means of advocating for their community, people took note. At first it seemed that this organisation, with a focus on Black youth, was out of its element. However, the founders of EYES insist that the issues facing Black youth who engage in antisocial behaviour are similar, if not identical, to the issues faced by the young people in other segments of society. Disenfranchised Black youth may be attracted to gangs which have a negative impact on society through drug dealing and gun crime. Disenfranchised White youth may be attracted to far-right organisations which have a negative impact on society through racist rhetoric and hate crimes. Disenfranchised Asian youth may be attracted to radicalised groups intent on making their mark on western society. These may be different outlets for their anger, frustration and pain, but those feelings usually have the same source: social and economic oppression. arches quarterly

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CONCLUSION Engage Youth Empowerment Services has now been invited into the mainstream. On 12 December, 2011 twenty members of the EYES organisation stood before the Wolverhampton City Council and told their story. Listening were the city’s Chief Executive Officer, the Director of Education, elected city councillors, managers from the city’s public health agency, the Director of Youth Services and others. Young people who were once on the street selling drugs, excluded from school, convicted of crime or on the verge of extremist behaviour stood before the most powerful people in the city. These young people were no longer on the fringes. Three were the designers and members of the street team; one is now the marketing department manager; another is the IT manager; yet another is the manager of the creative department. These young people were once service users who now help run the organisation. They are a powerful testimony to the history and work of EYES. No member of Wolverhampton City Council left the meeting unimpressed. This organisation started by two mothers seeking to save their children and a minister seeking to fulfil his purpose had

risen above the blades of grass from the roots. The question that lies before Wolverhampton now is this: “Can what thrived at the grassroots level thrive above the blades?” If you ask the leadership of EYES and the youth they serve they will tell you that the model has passed the test of reaching those whom others could not find and empowering them to discover their purpose, passion and profession. They will tell you that even above the grass, EYES will thrive as it empowers the youth of Wolverhampton, the youth of the United Kingdom and beyond to influence their peers, their governments and their economies.

Revd. Mason West III is the director of operations and one of the co-founders of Engage Youth Empowerment Services (EYES) in Wolverhampton, UK. He has a bachelor of arts degree in Theology; a masters degree in Urban and Regional Planning with a focus in community development and is currently completing a doctorate in Leadership and Learning from the University of Tennessee. West has worked with young people throughout the United States, the UK and Bermuda. His experience includes, but is not limited to, working with and developing strategic initiatives to decrease crime in communities; dissuading youth from participating in extremist and terrorist activities; and fostering creative youth leadership.

DELIVERING TAILORED MEDIA TRAINING TO THE COMMUNITY thecordobafoundation.com

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Why an European network? The increasing importance of matters of Religion and Belief in public life across Europe has been recognised in Article 17 of the Treaty of Lisbon: that the European Union: “Respects and does not prejudice the status under national law of churches and religious associations or communities in the Member States. Equally respects the status under national law of philosophical and non-confessional organisations. Recognising their identity and their specific contribution, the Union shall maintain an open, transparent and regular dialogue with these churches and organisations.” In addition, Article 19, especially through the implementation of the Religion and Belief strand of Equalities and Fundamental Rights, is leading to greater awareness across Europe of the need to take action to promote harmony and mutual understanding, and to combat discrimination and prejudice on issues of Religion and Belief across Europe. The European Network on Religion and Belief (ENORB) seeks to work with others to develop a long-term network, within the framework of EU policies on equalities and fundamental rights, to combat discrimination and promote mutual understanding in the field of Religion and Belief. ENORB will facilitate dialogue between Religion and Belief traditions of all kinds and support the development of similar networks in all member-states.

What we hope to be A European Network for mutual understanding and common action between religious and non-religious groups, based on the shared European values which bind diverse groups and communities together in a strong and sustainable Europe: social cohesion and inclusion, freedom of belief and discussion, respect for the rule of law, democracy, human rights, and equality of treatment for all, which seeks to: 1. 2. 3. 4.

Build on the common heritage and the modern diversity of Europe’s historical faiths: Christian – Catholic, Orthodox and Protestant – and Jewish and Muslim; Draw on the long European traditions of free thinking, secular humanism and nonreligious social action; Affirm Europe’s modern diversity: Buddhist, Hindu, Sikh, Jain and other religions from across the world; Define common ground and promote collaboration between secular institutions and religious and non-religious organisations.

v o l u m tel: e 5 0044 e d i t207 i o n359 9 7145 s p r i n| 00322 g 2 012374 7733 | info@enorb.eu a r| www.enorb.eu ches quarterly

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Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: Young People’s Perspectives HUSSAIN AL-JABIR

n the aftermath of the September 11 attacks in New York, and July 7 in London, a fresh wave of counterterrorism legislation was unleashed upon Europe and the US, starting with the USA PATRIOT Act and US Homeland Security Act. Both of these were introduced by the Bush administration as a direct response to mounting criticism of their handling of the attacks; the UK Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act; and the Prevention of Terrorism Act, which was catalysed by the detention of nine men whose grounds for imprisonment were based upon secret evidence which meant that they could not be prosecuted. In the wake of such legislation, our civil liberties appear to have changed irrevocably, as these legislation begin to infringe increasingly upon our rights as enshrined in the Human Rights Act (HRA), and European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). However, an unintended phenomenon has begun to emerge as a result; an increasing sense of threat among young people of terrorism, desire for greater discussion of terrorism and suspicion levied towards Islamic groups as well as student organisations.

METHODOLOGY This study examines the results of a study, undertaken during October 2011 which involved sixty-one respondents completed over a three-day period. Organised online by the author, the study was initiated in order to surmise the opinions of young people from a variety of ethnic backgrounds on terrorism, counterterrorism, and discussion within schools about such issues. The study presented both qualitative and quantitative research, with thirty-six questions asked in an online survey. Although the survey was open to 146

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any age group, as an effect of publicising this survey through a single student forum site1, only eight per cent of respondents identified themselves as being older than 23 years of age, with the majority aged between 17 to 19. However, the data is not necessarily representative of all types of student in the UK, and generally focuses on those more academically inclined. Additionally, being an anonymous online survey, some respondents chose not to answer in-depth questions, resulting in less comprehensive qualitative data. Generally, the survey was answered well, with evidence of reasoned thought into the answers that respondents gave, allowing for greater confidence in the results. A copy of the survey questions may be found in Appendix I.

HOW THREATENED DO YOUNG PEOPLE FEEL FROM TERRORISM? One of the more startling conclusions which can be drawn from the data is young people’s sense of threat from terrorism, in relation to themselves, their community and their country. Thirty-five per cent of the respondents felt their country was either ‘Most Threatened’ or ‘Threatened’ from terrorism. By comparison, only 8% felt the same when asked about the threat of terrorism to them, and even fewer felt so about their local community. This clear disparity between the sense of threat to the country and to the self highlights the influence of the media in shaping young people’s perceptions of terrorism. Azad Ali, chair of the Muslim Safety Forum, a key advisory body to the Metropolitan police on counter-terrorism policy remarked “the threat of terrorism… is quite high because the media has propagated it to that level.” The media, volu m e 5

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consisting of both traditional outlets such as press and television, as well as newer distribution methods such as the internet and social-media, has enough influence to change people’s perceptions of terrorism through both explicit and implicit methods. For instance, a report found that “that respondents who relied on television news experienced more positive and negative emotions toward the terrorist attacks. In contrast, newspaper use was not a significant factor in explaining people’s emotional responses to the attacks.”2 This, when taken in the context that 64% of young adults in the US were “non-users” of Newspapers3, gives rise to a clear discrepancy between public opinion and media reports. Television reports (which had the highest penetration among young adults) are far more emotionally charged than actual public opinion, yet, when faced with constant media reports exaggerating the emotional aspects, young people become more emotionally charged. These emotional feelings are often expressed in news reports covering terrorist acts such as September 11 and July 7, and are also reflected in reporting of foiled terrorist attempts or police counterterrorist arrests, and even coverage of wars in Afghanistan and, Iraq. Therefore, they begin to exhibit more emotional, and commensurately, more irrational response to the threat of terrorism. One report found that in the US, the probability of “simple acts of terror occurring” was only 0.07%.4 Consequently, although the actual risk of terrorist incidents occurring is infinitesimally small, the irrational perceived risk as a result of media influences is far higher, which explains the discrepancies that the survey sheds light on. If the perceived threat of terrorism to the country can be explained by media influences, accordingly the lack of a sense of threat to the self, exhibited by the respondents, can be explained by a lack of media influence in this area. Although this little concern can be explained by general idiocentric beliefs that such events volu m e 5

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will never happen to them (a phenomena known as ‘unrealistic optimism’5), a major constituent of this lack of concern is the prevailing of rational thinking over the irrational risks propagated by the media. This is because the media has influence over perceived risk to the self to a far smaller extent than perceived risk to the country as a whole.

Young people have a greater fear of terrorism in relation to their country as opposed to themselves, as a result of media influences which create emotionally charged responses to terrorism. A Swedish study produced an alternative explanation for the lower perceived personal risk as opposed to general risk, in that “ [personal risk] is seen as one over which the respondents have some degree of control and possibility of protection”.6 This would be a particularly acute problem with regard to young people, due to their inherent susceptibility to unrealistic optimism. Thus it is clear that young people have a greater fear of terrorism in relation to their country as opposed to themselves, as a result of media influences which create emotionally charged responses to terrorism. It can also be seen in the context of ‘unrealistic optimism’, where the media propagate irrational, emotional thinking over rational thought.

WHY DO YOUNG PEOPLE DESIRE GREATER DISCUSSION OF TERRORISM? A key finding from the study was the desire among young people for greater discussion of terrorism in their places of learning. When asked, 46% of respondents either ‘Agreed’ or ‘Strongly Agreed’ arches quarterly

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that they wanted greater discussion, with 54% responding that they either ‘Never’ or ‘Rarely’ discuss terrorism in their places of learning. This highlights inadequacies in the government’s policies with regard to education about terrorism, known as the Prevent strategy. Prevent, a key constituent of the government’s overarching CONTEST counterterrorism strategy, was launched in 2007 to “seek to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism,” 7 mainly through means of funding projects in key sectors such as “education, the internet, faith organisations and institutions, health, the criminal justice system and the charitable sector” to halt the development of extremist ideologies from the source. In 2008, 54% of the projects delivered in England as a result of funding from Prevent were classed as “Debates, discussions and forums”, such as “‘Safe space’ debates to discuss current affairs or grievances”.8 This would appear to be a wise investment, since greater discussion and thus, greater awareness of the issues surrounding terrorism allows for the dispelling of myths and conjecture in addition to encouraging potential extremists to listen to discussion of key issues from ‘both sides’. However, this investment has not had the impact that was desired. Indeed, as the survey pointed out, 54% of respondents said they ‘never’ or ‘rarely’ discussed terrorism in their place of learning, which is indicative of key failures in this policy. One study found that the Prevent strategy was vague and uninformative with regard to how schools can encourage free debate on terrorism, as well as how to implement this successfully in the curriculum.9 Additionally, disparities in how funding for Prevent is allocated to local councils gives rise to difficulties in providing the Prevent agenda. Quartermaine cites the example of Warwickshire, an area with low Prevent funding, that is only able to “engage with teachers through police initiatives such as a free website and training courses, so this region focuses on the criminality of terrorism rather than answering the questions that the pupils have about 148

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the topic, which restricts its usefulness to teachers and pupils.”10 This provides an explanation for the desire of greater discussion, because current government initiatives do not engage sufficiently with young people as a result of poor planning and advice on how schools can implement this into the curriculum. A secondary issue that arises from this is how education pertaining to extremism is broached by schools, and whether such education focuses upon the criminality of terrorism and relative legislation, or the extremist ideologies behind terrorism. The Prevent strategy as of present focuses on the latter, with specific regard to Islamist terrorism.11 This is in accordance with the survey results, showing that 27% of respondents did not know about any of the current terrorism legislation, with 73% recognising ‘Detention without Trial’12, yet numbers smaller than 40% recognising specific acts or more obscure areas of legislation (respondents may select more than one checkbox, therefore percentages add up to more than 100%). In addition, many respondents did not answer questions pertaining to counterterrorism policy, claiming “I don’t know”.13 This is a clear effect of the lack of education about the ideas of counter-terrorism; what it is, what the police are currently doing, and the relevant legislation. As a result, young people may feel alienated from the police, as they do not understand their rights and thus, do not understand police motives behind actions such as Section 44 Stop and Search. Ironically, this leads to a situation where extremism is being promoted as a means of protest against police actions. Therefore, in order to remedy this situation, a clear and distinct focus in the curriculum has to be attributed to why the police use certain powers for counter-terrorism, as well as a clear explanation of young people’s rights under the legislation. Th is would help to endear the police to young people, a crucial objective in order to gain their cooperation in counter-terrorist initiatives. Thus, it is clear that young people desire greater discussion of terrorism, due to the volu m e 5

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inadequacies of the current advice given to schools, and hence, the poor quality of education and discussion delivered to students as a result. Hence, in order to alleviate this concern, more structured and comprehensive strategies need to be deployed so that young people have opportunities to discuss terrorism in a ‘safe’ environment.

IS IT FAIR TO TARGET ISLAMIC GROUPS? A frequently debated aspect of government counter-terrorism policy is the greater emphasis on preventing Islamist terrorism, as opposed to far-right extremism or Irish nationalist terrorism. The government’s Prevent strategy outwardly explains that the “majority of our resources and efforts will… be devoted to preventing people from joining or supporting Al Qa’ida, its affiliates or related groups”, as they remain “the most serious… threat”.14 However, as the shootings in July 2011 on Utøya Island, by Anders Behring Breivik, a right-wing extremist and xenophobe have shown other forms of extremism exist and pose a threat to countries. When asked specifically about Islamic groups, 56% of respondents said they ‘Agree or ‘Strongly Agree’ that Islamic groups are being affected by counter-terrorism approaches. This is in accordance with earlier discussion of the Prevent strategy, as tackling Islamist ideologies are a key part of the government’s counter-terrorist plan. When asked for more details, respondents wrote: The current legislation allows them to be scrutinised far more than any other group; They are watched more carefully than other ethnic groups in Britain with [sic] relation to potential terrorist activities.” (respondent 15) and “Various charity groups have been told that they are on a terrorist databases [sic] – charities that support Muslim countries that are directly at conflict with US allies, constant sense of scrutiny”.15 The argument made by respondent 15 appears to be a misinterpretation of the volu m e 5

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counter-terrorism legislation currently in force. Of the current laws in force (Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001; Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005; Counter-Terrorism Act 2008), there is no mention of Islam or Islamist terrorism. The respondent however, was alluding to the Prevent strategy, discussed earlier, which has a pronounced focus on Islamist Terrorism. In fact, Prevent itself mentions that it relies upon both counter-terrorism legislation and other laws and executive orders. It deliberately shies away from further legislation as “research suggests that counter-terrorism legislation and wider policing powers can contribute to the radicalisation process.”16 Therefore, Prevent tries to work within a community model, by funding projects that aid the ‘counter-radicalisation’ process. The second response is more accurate than the former, arguing that Muslims are watched more closely than other community and ethnic groups. Again, the Prevent strategy corroborates this argument, through its focus on Islamist terrorism. One report that compared counter-terrorism strategies during ‘The Troubles’ of the 1970s and today’s counter-terrorism climate highlights a key grievance with the counter-terrorism policies in place at the moment, in that law-abiding Muslims are being victimised and becoming objects of suspicion, where only a small minority exhibit ‘radical’ behaviour. For example, it found that “Irish or Muslim spaces (mosques, Catholic churches, Irish pubs) were felt to be under surveillance… Muslim respondents recounted several instances of ‘stop and search’ including one case involving young children”. Additionally, it found that as a result “a state of fearfulness” was created, “which in turn resulted in behaviour such as lying low, keeping quiet, and avoiding certain places or areas of the city. This provoked diverging reactions ranging from feelings of alienation, with implications for sense of belonging and trust in institutions to various forms of politicisation”.17 Such a state of existence within the Muslim community would be calamitous, arches quarterly

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since it would catalyse further separation and isolation of different communities within the UK, which would promote both xenophobia and racist attacks. The authors cite these effects of counterterrorism policy to conclude that: The current government has stated that it seeks to separate the community cohesion agenda from the counter-terrorism agenda. This is useful but their location of the problem of political violence and the focus of counter-terrorism remains fixed on Muslim communities and a strategy of rooting out extreme ideas. This is a classic counterinsurgency strategy of the type that was unsuccessful in Northern Ireland. It is only likely to further reinforce the negative impacts on Muslims in Britain of counter-terrorism policies. It is also likely to further encourage the public at large, on this evidence, both to be more fearful (as it is rarely linked to any transparent assessment of risk) and therefore to treat Muslims as potential ‘suspects’ or legitimate objects of abuse.18

The survey highlighted a distinct lack of knowledge by today’s young people about the Muslim world, which could be a key contributing factor to the sense of threat from Islamist terrorism.

It can be concluded that counterterrorism measures which target Muslim communities and groups are inevitable on the part of the government, since the ‘pain’ felt by necessary surveillance should eventually result in increased safety from terrorist threats for the greater public. Nevertheless, care needs to be taken when using such measures, since alienation and in turn, isolation and separation can result in mistakes, such as when dealing with This conclusion indicates the failure to Irish nationalist threats in the 1970, are take into account former counter-terrorism repeated with the Muslim community. strategies when formulating newer ones, and hence the feeling of victimisation that DO YOUNG PEOPLE KNOW was experienced by the Irish and is now ENOUGH ABOUT THE MUSLIM being felt by Muslims today. Therefore, the WORLD? One particular response that arose from authors recommend that: Policies that foster the practices of the survey highlighted a distinct lack of multiculturalism based on less bounded knowledge by today’s young people about notions of communities may be more the Muslim world, which could be a key successful in promoting social cohesion contributing factor to the sense of threat within an increasingly ethnically, religiously from Islamist terrorism in particular. and culturally diverse society, than the Respondent 17 wrote: I know it’s the media portraying them focus on suspect communities as a source of and responsible for a solution to political as such, but you never hear of any other religious group or demographic committing violence.19 acts of terrorism. The world seems to be run This suggestion would certainly counter by the media nowadays and for most of us the feeling expressed by respondent 15, it’s our only insight into the Islamic world since greater emphasis should be placed and way of life - I wish I didn’t feel some on countering the political ideology, rather unease around Muslims (or even people who East), but I feel than the communities that it may originate appear to be from the Middle 20 from. However, it could be argued that as though I can’t help it. taking such a step would be ineffective, The respondent referred to three key since in an era of terrorist threat, it is unavoidable that whole swathes of the factors: 1) power of the media in influencing population must be put under surveillance. public opinion; 2) lack of knowledge by young people of the Muslim world; and 3) 150

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exploitation of this lack of knowledge by the media to further fears of terrorism. In relation to the former factor, as discussed earlier, the media has a disproportionate influence upon young people’s fears of terrorism. When in comparison with Irish Nationalist terrorism in the 1970s, it was found that there was “20% less coverage of Irish-related events, despite the far greater incidence of actual physical violence perpetrated by the IRA (approximately 500 attacks in Britain over the years)”.21 This provides further evidence in emphasising the media’s influence, as there is a marked difference in the sense of fear towards Islamist terrorism as opposed to Irish nationalist terrorism, caused by the greater media coverage. The second factor is far more noteworthy in the way that it affects perceptions of risk among young people. Islam and the Muslim world is not a great area of discussion within both the curriculum and in the wider media. Th is fact is clearly highlighted by the author not having been able to locate any reference to education pertaining to Islam in schools except for religious studies lessons, which are often optional and not covered by schools following age 14, an age range covered by the survey. One study found that many schools often abandon curriculum schemes, as “schools… look at what the local syllabus says and say ‘we don’t want that, thank you very much, we’ll go and do something else”.22 Hence, schools often do not cover or focus on Islam, leading to a lack of education and mention of the Muslim world except in conjunction with terrorism, which in turn leads to the situation that respondent 17 alluded to: a situation where the public feels obliged to suspect Muslims purely due to ignorance of the Islamic world and pressure from the media. The media often utilises this lack of knowledge pertaining to the Islamic world in order to further a sense of threat from terrorism. As discussed earlier, the media has the ability to polarise the public in relation to the threat of terrorism, by imparting emotionally charged responses volu m e 5

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to incidents. This, coupled with selective reporting of Islam and the Muslim world, creates a situation where the media are able to exploit ignorance of Islam to advance the sense of threat to the country (the fact that this threat has not affected personal sense of risk is commensurate with that which was discussed earlier). This could provide a situation where the media is capitalised upon for political communication,23 with relation to counter-terrorism policy.

CONCLUSIONS This survey, discussion and analysis presented in this study clearly highlighted an apparent interest among young people of terrorism, and its impacts upon their communities. It has been highlighted that the media have a disproportionate influence among the general public, as a result of both selective reporting, and the addition of emotionally charged news stories, shown by the effect of ‘unrealistic optimism’ among respondents. Young people desire greater discussion of terrorism, which has not been provided to them owing to ineffective government curriculum strategies and failures of the Prevent strategy in education pertaining to the actions the police are taking in the name of counter-terrorism (which, if implemented successfully, would go a way towards mitigating the sense of threat to the country). Moreover, Young people agree that Islamic groups are being affected by counter-terrorism approaches, which shows an understanding of the effects of counter-terrorism upon factions of society (though the limitations of the survey mean that their opinions cannot be deduced). Finally, the results of one respondent show a lack of knowledge relating to the Islamic world without the context of Islamist terrorism, which can be inferred to highlight the media’s selective reporting. From these findings, a series of recommendations can be obtained. Firstly, a limitation upon the media’s effect upon creating irrational and disproportionate fear of terrorist attacks should be implemented. This can be executed arches quarterly

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through either voluntary or legislative agreements upon the amount of opinion and emotionally charged responses contained in factual reports in both print and televised media. This may appear

A greater emphasis needs to be given to discussion of terrorism in schools, in a ‘safe’ environment. an impossible undertaking; however it can be achieved through a change in culture and society with relation to the media. Secondly, current government curricula need to be amended in order to provide clearer direction to schools on how to implement the provisions of the Prevent strategy, which should make it more comprehensive than at present. Additionally, a greater emphasis needs to be given to discussion of terrorism in schools, in a ‘safe’ environment. Finally, there needs to be greater education about Islam and the Muslim world, to mitigate the impact of ignorance in relation to perceived risk from terrorism, and in addition lessen impacts of xenophobia and racism towards the Muslim community. The views and grievances of young people are crucial to providing a more cohesive and unified society. If young people feel a certain way towards certain policies, then they are liable to thwart and question them. Young people have a distinct opinion upon counter-terrorism measures, and yet are not given safe opportunities to discuss them. This must be an utmost priority for the government, for as the August 2011 riots have shown, if continually sidelined, it is only a matter of time before young people take matters into their own hands.

Hussain Al-Jabir is a student, with a keen interest in politics and academic research. He works as an intern for The Cordoba Foundation, where he undertakes research into current and historic counter-terrorism policies in the UK. He has also attended various events and conferences, as well as working with other young people to ascertain their views on counter-terrorism approaches and policy.

ENDNOTES 1. www.thestudentroom.com 2. Cho, J., Boyle, M. P., Keum, H., Shevy, M. D., McLeod, D. M., Shah, D. V. and Pan, Z. (2003). ‘Media, Terrorism, and Emotionality: Emotional Differences in Media Content and Public Reactions to the September 11th Terrorist Attacks’, Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media, 47(3), 309-327. 3. Patterson, T. E. (2007). Young people and news. 4. Beitel, G., Gertman, D. and Plum, M. (2004). ‘Balanced scorecard method for predicting the probability of a terrorist attack’, Risk Analysis, 24(4), 12. 5. Sjoberg, L. (2003). ‘The Different Dynamics of Personal and General Risk’, Risk Manag (Bas), 5(3), 19-34. 6. Sjöberg, L. (2005). ‘The perceived risk of terrorism’, Risk Management, 43-61. 7. Great Britain. Home Office. (2011b) ‘The Prevent strategy’, [online]. 8. Great Britain. Home Office. (2011a) Prevent strategy, Cm, London: Stationery Office. 9. Quartermaine, A. (2010). ‘A Study of Pupil Understandings of ‘Terrorism’ in Pupil Conversations (aged 16-18) and Questionnaires from a Sample of Warwickshire Secondary Schools’, Discourse, 10(1), 101-130. 10. Ibid. 11. Great Britain. Home Office. (2011a) Prevent strategy, Cm, London: Stationery Office. 12. It is expected that many respondents would have awareness of detention without trial due to widespread media coverage from the passing of the Terrorism Act 2005 and henceforth. 13. Respondent 33 14. Ibid. 15. Respondent 21 16. Ibid. 17. Hickman, M., Thomas, L., Silvestri, S. and Nickels, H. (2011). ‘Suspect communities’?: Counter-terrorism policy, the press, and the impact on Irish and Muslim communities in Britain London: London Metropolitan University. 18. Ibid. 19. Ibid. 20. Respondent 17 21. Ibid. 22. Lundie, D. (2010). ‘‘Does RE work?’ An analysis of the aims, practices and models of effectiveness of religious education in the UK’, British Journal of Religious Education, 32(2), 163-170. 23. Op. cit. Cho, J. et. al. (2003).

Appendix I– Survey Questions A full set of survey results can be found here: http://bit.ly/tcf-survey-pdf

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A publication of The Cordoba Foundation that provides a medium for diverse opinions, presenting a comprehensive view of the myriad perspectives pertaining to dialogue and cross-cultural exchange. This is done by publishing important contributions by experts and world leaders

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Developing Community Partnerships - A Practical Solution for Peace, Prosperity & Justice NICK MAURICE

Together with my colleagues I believe that the nations of this world not only have to but are able to live in peace. We think that the task is to free mankind from oppression, from hunger and distress. New links must be developed which substantially increase the chances of achieving freedom, justice and solidarity for all. This is a great task for both the present generation and the next. The shaping of our common future is much too important to be left to Governments and experts alone. Therefore our appeal goes to youth, to women’s and labour movements; to political, intellectual and religious leaders; to scientists and educators; to technicians and managers; to members of the rural and business communities. May they all try to understand and to conduct their aff airs in the light of this new challenge! Willy Brandt, 20th December 1979

hus wrote the one time Chancellor of what was then West Germany and Nobel Peace Prize winner (1971) in his introduction to the Brandt Report “North South – A Programme for Survival”, a seminal document produced by a Commission of 18 political leaders of different persuasions, from the North and the South, chaired by the charismatic leader Willy Brandt. The document looked for the first time at the imbalance between the so-called rich North (the industrialised countries) and the so-called poor South (the developing countries) and the underlying causes of that imbalance. Fundamental to the report was the whole question of power and who holds it - a question as relevant today as it was 30 years ago. Why was it, at that time that on the one hand men were travelling to the moon from the US at inconceivable expense and people were simultaneously dying of starvation in 154

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Africa? Questions were raised not simply about the very strong moral arguments for addressing this imbalance, but just as importantly the argument of self interest. It was clear that we were moving into an era of globalisation. It was also clear that there was beginning to be a geo-political shift from the focus on East-West relations (with the final fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989) to North-South relations. There was the beginning of an understanding that if we were to allow the huge global disparity between the very rich and the very poor to continue, if the imbalance between those holding the power and those suffering as a result of political decisions made by the powerful were to continue we would be providing fertile ground for the development of extremism and ultimately conflict. As the one-time Deputy Secretary General of the UN Mark Malloch-Brown wrote: Democracy can only be built from the bottom up, by the patient building up of the tolerance and respect for minorities that are its prerequisites. It cannot be imposed or achieved overnight.

THE MARLBOROUGH BRANDT GROUP A group in the small market town of Marlborough in Wiltshire who had had international experience as returned VSO volunteers, as teachers, doctors, faith leaders and others who had worked in Africa and Asia, met together in 1981 provoked to action by the Brandt Report, and founded the Marlborough Brandt Group. We shared the idealism of the political theorist John Schaar “The future is not some place we are going to, but one we are creating. The paths are not to be found, but made. The making of those pathways changes both the maker and the volu m e 5

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destination”. Members of the group were struck by the sense of responsibility on all of us that the report conveyed, inspired by the Dalai Lama - “Responsibility does not only lie with the leaders of our countries … it lies with each of us individually”. However they were also struck by the common understanding they shared of the extraordinary benefits they had personally gained from living and working in totally different environments, with people of different faiths, cultures, living in different social and economic circumstances. They agreed that the experience had given them an opportunity to reflect on and in many cases question their own culture, practices and lifestyles and “disturb” their prejudices and assumptions. They agreed that the experience of living in a different culture had made a major contribution to their own personal and professional development. They felt that the experience had given them the self confidence to bring about change. The Marlborough Brandt Group was founded with four aims: 1) the group felt the need to educate themselves about the fundamental issues which keep people poor; 2) they wanted to bring those issues to a wider public through work with the media, a series of public lectures, work with teachers in schools etc; 3) they saw a role for the group in working with local, national and international politicians to understand that some of their constituents had real concerns about vast global inequalities (if you studied the manifestos of the main political parties in the 1980s, international development hardly featured); and 4) in order to be able to speak with authority based on current experience, to politicians, teachers and the wider public, they should form a partnership with a community in the Global South. A letter was sent to ten1 High Commissioners in London of African, Asian and Caribbean countries. It was clearly stated in the letter that the members of the group saw that in developing a partnership with a community in the High Commissioner’s country, the people of volu m e 5

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Marlborough would have as much to learn from people in that community as those people would have to learn from people in Marlborough. The High Commissioner for The Gambia, Abdoulai Bojang, replied to the letter with the greatest enthusiasm and suggested that Marlborough (population 7,000) should form a partnership with his home community of Gunjur, a Muslim fishing community of 12,500 inhabitants. And thus was born a relationship between two communities of hugely contrasting cultures (8 predominant tribal groups in Gunjur – an almost exclusively white, middle class population in Marlborough), faiths (95% Muslim in Gunjur, a recognised centre of Islam in West Africa – no Muslims but an active Christian population in Marlborough), material wealth (no access to clean water, electricity or public sanitation system in Gunjur – a comparatively wealthy community in Marlborough with a large 800 pupil, fee-paying school at one end of the town and a comprehensive school with a strong reputation at the other). Since its inception in 1981 some 1200 people have travelled between the two communities, living in each other’s homes, arguably a fundamental pre-requisite for understanding each other at a profound level. As the Zimbabwean politician Sithembiso Nyoni delared “Let us share who we are before we share what we have”. With the words of President Abdou Diouf of Senegal as a central policy platform “development will not be sustainable unless it originates from the concept of local development … and is based on the efforts of the local population who respect priorities that they themselves define”, partners in the Gambia in collaboration with the Marlborough Brandt Group have addressed problems facing people in that community; lack of access to clean water (capping and inserting hand pumps on the open wells); lack of early childhood education (3,000 children between the ages of three and seven have now received pre-school education); low levels of literacy amongst women (women say that arches quarterly

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they have been empowered by a literacy programme run by women for women in the eight kabilos (wards) in the town); few opportunities for income generation (business and skills training), and high infant mortality rates (a health education and malaria prevention programme). Inspired by the words of President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania,“take every penny you have set aside for aid for Tanzania and spend it in the UK explaining to people the facts and causes of poverty”, the Wiltshire Global Education Centre based at the Marlborough Brandt Group’s offices, has brought all the learning of the link with a Muslim fishing community in West Africa into the education of children in schools throughout the county. Since 1994 some 450 teachers and teacher trainees have been on study visits to Gunjur, living with families there and learning about the role of Islam, the strong sense of community and family, the impact of climate change, and the different teaching methods. As a result, 27 schools in Wiltshire now have partnerships with schools in Gambia, providing opportunities for young people to essentially understand the global context in which they are living and building relationships with young people of different cultures and faiths across the globe.

UKOWLA In the early 1980s this example of a community partnership link was only one of a growing movement of NorthSouth partnerships between communities of all kinds in the UK and in the Global South which first developed, in many cases, in response to the publication of the Brandt Report and the growing feeling of frustration amongst people that “the rich were getting richer and the poor poorer”. Here was a fundamental social injustice that must be addressed if we were to build a safer, more prosperous and just world and clearly it could not be left to politicians. The UK One World Linking Association (UKOWLA) was founded in 1985 following a meeting of new activists in the linking movement. Significantly the 156

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meeting took place in Hull whose MP William Wilberforce, had been the driving force behind the abolition of slavery in 1807 and the setting up of the free colony of Sierra Leone. Hull City Council is linked to Freetown in Sierra Leone. UKOWLA became the umbrella organisation for communities of all kinds, towns and villages, schools and hospitals, faith, youth and cultural groups that were beginning to form partnerships with counterparts in the South and perhaps its greatest achievement was to formulate an ethos behind these links based on many conversations with Southern partners. At a UKOWLA conference in Leamington Spa, linked to Bo in Sierra Leone entitled, “North South Links – A Southern Perspective”, participants from Africa and Asia set the agenda. They challenged participants vehemently: “first you came to us as missionaries, then you came as colonists and now you are coming to us as linkers! What’s this all about?” They went on to say “If you are interested in accompanying us on our road to development set to our agenda and provided you have the humility to understand that we might have a contribution to make to your development then let us link!” As Barbara Bond of Oxfam, one of the earliest pioneers of community linking declared “to give lower priority to education and action at home in preference to funding and organising work overseas would be to undermine one of the most important long term objectives of linking – changing attitudes, views and behaviour in the North”. UKOWLA led the way nationally in promoting and supporting linking until 2002 when an ambitious dream was formulated that “no one in the UK should escape life in the UK without at some point being touched by a partnership with a community in the Global South whether that be through their school, local authority, hospital, faith, youth, cultural, sports, women’s group …..whatever!” The dream was explored by representatives of leading INGOs, in UK, Africa, Asia, and Caribbean, politicians, volu m e 5

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representatives of the private sector and others at a two day meeting in Windsor Great Park. The outcome of that meeting was the birth of BUILD (Building Understanding through International Links for Development) a coalition of INGOs committed to the development of partnerships between communities of all kinds in the UK with counterparts in the South for Peace, Prosperity and Justice! While UKOWLA is the support agency for these communities, BUILD has worked since 2002 at a more strategic level, not least through the Westminster allparty parliamentary group “Connecting Communities” which has provided access to Secretaries of State, Ministers and civil servants and has contributed to an understanding of the role that these school, health care and community partnerships can play both in terms of raising awareness of development issues in the UK and building support for the Government’s international development agenda, but also in terms of the contribution that the links themselves can make to development in the South. As a result of discussions with Government, considerable funding and policy change in favour of community based partnerships has taken place to the extent that there are now some 4000 schools, 450 communities and 120 hospitals in the UK with partners in the Global South, in many cases supported financially through programmes initiated by the Department for International Development.

THE SPIRIT OF UBUNTU Archbishop Desmond Tutu who launched BUILD’s publication, “A Toolkit for Linking - Opportunities and Challenges” affirmed our mission by saying “You, BUILD, are saying that we are family. If we don’t learn that lesson pretty quickly we are destined for extinction!” He went on to talk about the African philosophy of Ubuntu. “I am because you are – the essence of being human. Ubuntu speaks particularly about the fact that you volu m e 5

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can't exist as a human being in isolation. It speaks about our interconnectedness. You can't be human all by yourself, and when you have this quality – Ubuntu – you are known for your generosity. We think of ourselves far too frequently as just individuals, separated from one another, whereas you are connected and what you do affects the whole World. When you do well, it spreads out; it is for the whole of humanity”. A person with Ubuntu is open and available to others, affirming of others, does not feel threatened that others are able and good, based from a proper self-assurance that comes from knowing that he or she belongs in a greater whole and is diminished when others are humiliated or diminished, when others are tortured or oppressed. Nelson Mandela explained Ubuntu as follows: A traveller through a country would stop at a village and he didn't have to ask for food or for water. Once he stops, the people give him food, entertain him. That is one aspect of Ubuntu, but it will have various aspects. Ubuntu does not mean that people should not enrich themselves. The question therefore is: Are you going to do so in order to enable the community around you to be able to improve?

LESSONS FOR THE UK Thus, just as importantly, has been the recognition of the role that partnerships with communities in the South can play in social cohesion across the diverse communities in UK. There are many levels at which this can happen. They can provide opportunities for personal development and the self confidence to recognise and relish difference. To have experienced and livedwith ‘difference’ in communities in other parts of the world encourages a confidence and an attitude of acceptance of and indeed enthusiasm for engaging with difference in one’s own society; an understanding of the faiths and cultures of communities in the UK through having lived in communities in the South where that faith and culture is practised. As was highlighted by an Asian colleague recently “Why do you want to arches quarterly

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link with an Indian community several thousand miles away, when you never say more than ‘A Guardian please’ to the Indian family who run the shop at the end of the road?”

LINKS FOR UNDERSTANDING ONE’S IDENTITY An important aspect of community links can be the opportunities they present for the introduction of young people in the UK to their countries and communities of heritage and giving them that personal identity that is essential for personal development. In 2008 the Bristol Legacy Commission supported a group of 88 young black British people to visit the Gambia on the basis that “You need to know your history before you know where you are going to”. People of African descent should be proud of who they are and their connections to Africa, a visit to Jeffery and James Island will enable young people to explore their heritage and how the enslavement of African people contributed to the wealth of Bristol” (Clive Smith 2009). The trip highlighted the need for young people and adults to learn about their history (not specifically taught in schools), be proud of who they are, where they’re from and realising their own cultural identity. Some young adults decided after the trip that they needed to make significant changes to their lives, and changes they could be proud of.

BUILDING ON UK DIASPORA INTERNATIONAL PARTNERSHIPS Recognising the close ties that representatives of the diaspora have with their communities of heritage and the opportunities that those ties present to broaden them out to engage with the wider community both here and in the countries of heritage, BUILD has embarked on a programme of consultation with diaspora groups in several centres in the UK, including Bristol, Edinburgh, Wolverhampton, Cardiff and Sheffield. The purpose of these consultations is to encourage the diaspora to recognise the opportunities that their links to home 158

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A Malawian nurse working in the NHS in Bristol or a Jamaican teacher working in Brixton, London could forge a link between their hospital or school here with counterparts in Lilongwe or Kingston, thus bringing a global understanding and a contribution to peace, prosperity and justice across the world. present for building partnerships with schools, hospitals and communities here in UK with counterparts in their communities of heritage. A Malawian nurse working in the NHS in Bristol or a Jamaican teacher working in Brixton, London could forge a link between their hospital or school here with counterparts in Lilongwe or Kingston, thus bringing a global understanding and a contribution to peace, prosperity and justice across the world. At an institutional level for example, the development of partnerships between hospitals in the UK and Africa, not only have been shown to provide opportunities for improving health services in the South but also bring important benefits to the hospital in the UK in terms of professional development of staff; greater team building and collaborative working between diverse disciplines and the many different ethnic cultures within the NHS, and reflections on wastage from having worked in a resource poor institution. Another example is the development of partnerships between the police in the UK and Pakistan around immigration issues which have brought opportunities for greater understanding and collaboration between the police and Pakistani communities in the UK. volu m e 5

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IMPACTS FOR THE PARTNERSHIPS But what is it about, these community links between people of different faiths, cultures and social circumstances that appears to be so personally enriching? There are at least four areas where the impact seems to be greatest.

Reflection By living together in each other’s communities and seeing difference in all its forms (clothes, climate, attitudes, social structures, relationships, flora, fauna, faith, food) one is forced to reflect, to hold a mirror to one’s own life and ask the question “have we got it right?” When Gambians from Gunjur come to Marlborough they are shocked by the treatment of the elderly. “How can you put elderly relatives in homes? Why do you not do as we do and look after them within the family?” When teachers from Wiltshire visit Gunjur, as they climb the steps of the aircraft to return home, they are often in tears. If asked what is causing the tears, it is clear that it is grief. Not simply grief at saying farewell to the friends made and with whom they have stayed in their compounds, but grief that our Western society has lost something that is clearly still present in Gunjur society. A common, maybe simplistic response to the first time spent in Gunjur by people from Marlborough is “they are so poor but seem so happy!” Is it the strong sense of community; the strong bonds within the extended family; the warmth of the human relationships as experienced through all the social intercourse taking place in the evenings and on the streets? Is it the opportunity for divesting oneself of all the trappings of class and the prejudices that surround one’s appearance and tone of voice – all quite meaningless in such a different society? You are taken for who you are and not for what you represent. As the Zimbabwean politician Sithembiso Nyoni states: There are some people who only look at poverty as material poverty. I think we need volu m e 5

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to look at poverty as a lack of any need that is essential to life. Today we have material and psychological poverty, spiritual poverty, social poverty and cultural poverty. I have been in communities in the North where people are so lonely. I wish they would come to our villages for us to embrace them.

Self-Confidence The opportunities that these community partnerships provide for the development of self confidence are boundless. “I have lived as one of you. I have benefited from seeing my own culture in the beam of a different light”. “I understand my identity better by reflecting on your identity”. “You have shown me the opportunities that exist for involvement in social justice programmes”. “As a woman in a traditional Muslim society you have given me the self confidence to question and challenge traditional practices and attitudes”.

Development The increasing self confidence has led to personal, professional and community development. Young volunteers from the UK who have spent time in Gunjur have used that experience to further their own development and many are now working in the field of international development. Many young people who have trained in the UK under the auspices of the Marlborough Brandt Group now hold senior positions in The Gambia and in other countries. But many problems facing the Gunjur community have been tackled as a result of the community confidence, resilience and solidarity that has developed with people in Marlborough. Childhood illness has fallen through the provision of clean water; wealth has been created through training and income generating programmes. Women have been empowered through literacy programmes. Children aged between 3 and 7 have been given a head start in education through a pre-school education programme. The incidence of malaria has dramatically reduced through health education, street cleaning and bednet programmes. arches quarterly

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The Role of Islam in the relationship. Until the link started, people in Marlborough would never have visited the Mosque in nearby Swindon, but because they have taken our Gunjur visitors to Friday prayers they now have a relationship with the Muslim population of Swindon. In Gunjur, Nabani Darboe stated “Until the link started I would never have eaten in a Christian compound in Gunjur” At a time in 1996 when people in Marlborough realised that there was, despite the exchanges of and close relationship between people, a high level of ignorance of the central role of Islam in the Gunjur community, it was decided that a booklet should be published “Exploring Islam in Gunjur”. With the chapter headings agreed “The History of Islam in Gunjur”; “What do Muslims Believe?”; “How is Islam practised in Gunjur?”; “Relationships”; “Festivals and Ceremonies”, and “How do Muslims see non Muslims?”, a small group of four from Marlborough spent two weeks working with Islamic scholars and others to produce the booklet. Each evening sitting by candlelight for two to three hours, a single chapter was discussed with one person interpreting from Mandinka into English and another taking notes on a typewriter. The following day the note taker distilled what he had recorded into a form that might make up that chapter. In the evening the group gathered together again and the chapter in its draft form was read out and interpreted from English back into Mandinka to interruptions of “No! we didn’t quite say that!” “You must rephrase the sentence this way” or “Yes! That is fine – it’s a good reflection of what we said”. At the end of ten days of discussions, argument, laughter, but never anger as the central importance of the task was understood, the final document was presented to the Imam of Gunjur for his affirmation and his imprimatur. He listened for four hours as the booklet was read to him and translated. At the end of that time he smiled and simply said “That is good!” 160

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Returning to Marlborough, the group presented the book in its draft form to the Imam of Swindon who not only agreed that it was good but then and there on the floor of the Mosque, got out his pen and paper and wrote in magnificent calligraphy the Shahada to be reproduced on the front cover of the booklet. This publication is given to all visitors to Gunjur so that they understand the quite complex but fundamental role that Islam plays in the lives of the people and the community. A telephone call to the Marlborough Brandt Group in 2001 from the Christian Bishop of Salisbury, in whose diocese Marlborough is situated, suggested that because the group had ‘one foot in the Muslim camp in Gambia and one foot in the Christian camp in Marlborough’, they should be bringing Christians and Muslims in Wiltshire together. This provoked a series of meetings with leaders of the Muslim community in Swindon and the Christian community in Marlborough. At an early meeting, Muslim friends suggested that while it was interesting spending time with Christians, from their point of view they would really like the opportunity to meet with the Directors of Education and Social Services and the Chief of Police to discuss the social issues that they were confronting in Wiltshire. This started a series of productive meetings which led to a number of issues involving exclusion of the minority Muslim population being addressed by civic leaders. And yet it was the relationship between a white market town in rural Wiltshire and a Muslim community 3500 miles away in West Africa that had led to this change!

CONCLUSION – THE MANGO TREE The Community Partnership relationship is not seen as being primarily based on the transfer of resources from “us the rich to them the poor”. Rather, the relationship is seen in terms of “sitting under a mango tree with partners” recognising that people in the North have strengths and weaknesses and our partners have strengths volu m e 5

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The mango tree has become the metaphor for community based partnerships across the world.

and introducing new visions); providing shelter and solidarity, for those sitting under the dense foliage of the mango tree, (what is the relationship if it is not providing that solidarity between people of different cultures and faiths); long-lasting, the mango tree will live for 200 years (what is the relationship if it is not to be sustained over a long period of time); an area in the shelter of the tree where children will play (what is the relationship if it is not FUN!) It has been that quite unique, and accidental (thanks to the response from High Commissioner Abdoulai Bojang) relationship between a predominantly Christian community, with a Muslim community in West Africa that has given the Marlborough-Gunjur link such an important dimension.

and weaknesses. Let’s listen, learn in humility, collaborate and contribute to the development of people at both ends. Development – etymology - French “Deenvelopper = “opening the envelope”, i.e. removing the constraints of poverty, ignorance, and enabling people to reach their full potential”. The mango tree has become the metaphor for community based partnerships across the world. Deeply rooted, the rain in many parts of Africa only falls for four months in the year (what is the relationship if it is not Nick Maurice is President of the Marlborough Brandt deeply rooted in the communities involved Group and Founder of BUILD (Building Understanding through International Links for Development). and inclusive of as many people within that community as possible); fruitful, and what fruit the mango tree produces ! (what is the relationship worth if it does not 1.ENDNOTE The 10 were chosen on the basis of their country’s bear fruit?); evergreen, shedding old leaves proximity to the UK and thus the cost of travel to that and producing new growth (what is the country, political stability in those countries, and whether relationship if it is not regularly assessing English was spoken. itself and shedding old ideas and practices

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The Muslim “Demand Curve” for U.S. Foreign Policy CHARLES KURZMAN

n the weeks after September 11, 2001, even before the rubble had been removed from Lower Manhattan, a debate emerged about whether U.S. foreign policy was responsible for the attacks. This debate was not limited to crackpots and conspiracy theorists, although there were plenty of them to be heard. No, this debate occupied the center of American politics, and the side that won was: Yes. American foreign policy had indeed contributed to the tragedy of 9/11. A survey conducted at the end of 2001 estimated that three quarters of Americans considered the U.S. partly responsible. Even the White House, led by President George W. Bush, agreed. At the same time, there was no agreement about how the U.S. was responsible, and what changes in foreign policy would prevent attacks in the future. President Bush insisted that the United States needed to adopt a stronger, more aggressive stance than it had in the past, so that Muslim terrorists would respect American power rather than view it as a vulnerable “paper tiger,” a phrase that the Bush administration used to characterize its opponents’ approach. The administration’s opponents, including almost every academic expert on Muslim societies, insisted that the United States needed to adopt more conciliatory and multilateral policies than it had in the past, so that Muslims would respect America as a fair broker, rather than an imperialist meddler in world affairs. Both sides in this debate were probably wrong. It turns out that Islamist revolutionaries are hardly affected at all by U.S. foreign policy. Whether the United States military bombs Muslim civilians or hands them emergency relief packages or stays in its bases -- over the past two decades, the U.S. has tried all of these 162

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approaches and many others as well, singly and in combination -- it does not make much difference.

While the threat of Islamist violence looms large in the Western consciousness, it remains fairly rare outside of a handful of dreadfully bloody civil war zones. Islamist revolutionaries -- militants who believe that it is their duty to establish an Islamic state, and their right to do so by force -- have never been very numerous, regardless of shifts in U.S. actions around the world. Of the world’s billion and a half Muslims, Islamist revolutionary movements have managed to recruit fewer than 1 in 10,000 over the past generation, and most of these recruits have been engaged in local causes with no strategic ambitions outside of their own territories. While the threat of Islamist violence looms large in the Western consciousness, it remains fairly rare outside of a handful of dreadfully bloody civil war zones -globally, Islamist terrorism accounts for less than 3 percent of the world’s fatal violence, according to data from the U.S. National Counterterrorism Center, and far less than 1 percent of murders in the West. In economic terms, the “demand” for U.S. foreign policy is “inelastic.” Elasticity refers to people’s willingness to change their behavior in response to a change in their surroundings -- if the price of Acme Widgets goes up, for example, elasticity means that people buy fewer Acme Widgets. If the price goes down, volu m e 5

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elasticity means that people buy more Acme Widgets. But if demand is inelastic, people keep on buying the same amount of Acme Widgets, no matter how high or low the price. Why would they do that? Well, instead of widgets, think of polio vaccines. Imagine that the price of polio vaccines doubled overnight, maybe because of some malfunction at the vaccine factory. Would you let your child go unvaccinated and risk being crippled or killed by polio, just because the price went up? Probably not. The demand for polio vaccine is relatively inelastic. Most people will pay whatever they can afford to keep their children healthy. That’s why the world’s governments strictly regulate the price of polio vaccines. Let’s examine attitudes toward government policies through the same lens as attitudes toward prices. When a policy shifts in one direction or another, how many people will change their views of the government? If demand is inelastic, very few people will change their views. That seems to be the case with Muslims’ views of U.S. foreign policy. That is, most Muslims’ views of the U.S. government are so entrenched that they do not change much in response to shifts in American policies. As a result, Islamist revolutionaries have not been able to capitalize as much as they expected on what they view as an American assault on Islam. In April 1994, an American ambassador approached the imam of a small Balkan mosque and proposed an illegal gunrunning scheme. At the time, Bosnian Muslims were being slaughtered by Serbian militias. Tens of thousands had perished, and Sarajevo, the capital of newly independent Bosnia and Herzegovina, had been under siege for two years, with nearly constant sniper fire and shelling into civilian neighborhoods from the surrounding hillsides. A United Nations arms embargo, which the Serbian forces were able to evade, prevented the Bosnians from defending themselves, and many Americans wanted to help. The United States government lobbied the Security Council to lift the embargo on the volu m e 5

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America’s surreptitious role in re-arming Bosnian Muslims became public knowledge almost immediately. Bosnian side, but the council’s European members vetoed the suggestion out of fear that their soldiers in the Balkans would become targets of Serbian forces. Unable to help the Bosnians legally, President Bill Clinton opted to help them surreptitiously. Flying back to the White House from the funeral of former President Richard Nixon, Clinton ordered the military not to enforce the embargo on the Bosnians. Plane-loads of weapons and supplies began to arrive in Bosnia the following week, under the watchful gaze of American military surveillance. America’s surreptitious role in rearming Bosnian Muslims became public knowledge almost immediately. The Washington Post and other newspapers reported on the arms pipeline one week after it started, and Bosnian Serbs protested loudly. Non-enforcement of the embargo became official U.S. policy in the fall of 1994, thanks to a Congressional resolution. And in 1995, the U.S. and its allies intervened openly on the side of the Muslims, bombing Serbian positions in Bosnia and helping to bring the Serbians to the negotiating table to end the civil war. Muslims around the world desperately sympathized with the Bosnians, whose plight was front-page news for more than four years in almost every Muslim community. Yet few Muslims gave the United States much credit for its support of the Muslims of Bosnia. Sure, the United States could have done much more to help the Bosnians -- if it had allowed them to acquire weapons two years earlier, thousands of lives might have been saved. But there is little evidence that the United States was in cahoots with Serbia to wage a genocidal war on Balkan Islam -- and that is the sort of accusation that was common at the time. “The West’s arches quarterly

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role as co-conspirators with the Serbian war criminals becomes clearer with every passing day,” wrote Crescent International, an Islamist magazine. Bin Ladin called this an example of America “killing the weaker men, women, and children in the Muslim world and elsewhere” through the “withholding of arms from the Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina, leaving them prey to the Christian Serbians who massacred and raped in a manner not seen in contemporary history.” This kind of anti-American sentiment was not limited to Islamists. In Turkey, surveys by the U.S. Information Agency found that favorable opinions of the United States dropped from 57 percent in 1991, before the civil war in Bosnia, to 31 percent in 1994, when the U.S. had begun to allow weapons for the Bosnians. It recovered partially the following year, to 48 percent favorable, after the U.S. and its allies stepped into the Bosnian conflict and forced the Serbs into truce negotiations. But Turkey has long been a “swing state” for U.S. foreign policy -- attitudes toward America shift dramatically in Turkey from year to year, depending on the issues of the day. In the years before 9/11, favorable opinion about America had climbed over 60 percent in Turkey -- and then dropped to 30 percent in 2002, after the U.S.led invasion of Afghanistan. It dropped further, as low as 9 percent favorable, after the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. Turkish views of the United States are deeply affected by what America does, not what America is -- a distinction made by political scientists Peter Katzenstein and Robert Keohane in their recent book on global anti-Americanism. A similar shift is visible in Indonesia, where favorable views of America plummeted from 75 percent in 2000 to 15 percent in 2003. This evaporation of support for the United States is, ironically, a promising sign for U.S. foreign policy. It suggests that Turkish and Indonesian attitudes toward America are influenced by changes in U.S. policies -- large portions of the populations in these countries may not have agreed with Bush administration policies, but a different 164

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set of policies might win them over. Very few Islamist terrorists come from these countries -- approximately one per million residents. In many Muslim societies, by contrast, anti-Americanism may be so entrenched that changes in U.S. foreign policy do not make much difference. In Pakistan, for example, only 23 percent of respondents expressed a favorable view of America in 2000. At this low level there wasn’t much room for decline during the Bush administration. So even though favorable responses dropped by more than half in 2002, this change only amounted to 13 percent of the sample -- a far smaller proportion than the 50 percent of Turks and 60 percent of Indonesians who changed their minds about the United States during the same period. It is difficult to know how many societies exhibited a pattern similar to Pakistan’s, because we don’t have comparable pre-9/11 public opinion data from many other Muslim societies -- authoritarian governments such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia only began to allow extensive survey research after 9/11. However, the consistently low levels of support for the United States that emerged in surveys of these and many Muslim societies since 9/11 suggests that this pattern is fairly widespread. A significant portion of the world’s Muslim population consistently opposes the United States, regardless of American foreign policy. A small portion consistently supports the U.S., regardless of American foreign policy. And only a small portion -- perhaps as little as 20 percent of the world’s Muslims -- is affected by shifts in American foreign policy. Anti-Americanism in Muslim societies is not associated with hatred of American freedoms, as President Bush used to claim. Surveys show that large majorities of Muslims support American freedoms such as democracy and free speech, and the mass movements of the “Arab Spring” confirmed the popularity of these ideals. Freedom of religion is a different matter. Many Muslims believe that apostasy should be illegal -- but only in their volu m e 5

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THE MUSLIM “DEMAND CURVE” FOR U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

own societies. Islamist revolutionaries, who consider democratic institutions to be an illegitimate usurpation of divine sovereignty, remain marginal on freedoms. They can only watch in frustration as Muslim public opinion cheers the advance of their rivals in the Islamist movement -- pro-democracy Islamists who seek to create an Islamic state through democratic elections, and who have made common cause with secular movements in order to topple autocracies and compete at the ballot box.

Many Muslims who like American cultural and political institutions oppose U.S. foreign policy. This combination of pro-Americanism and anti-Americanism may seem paradoxical to Americans, but it is common in Muslim societies, and it is persistent. In recent surveys of six Arab countries, political scientist Shibley Telhami asked respondents directly: “Would you say your attitudes toward the U.S. are based more on American values or American policy in the Middle East?” Three quarters picked policy. The bottom line is this: Many Muslims who like American cultural and political institutions oppose U.S. foreign policy. This combination of pro-Americanism and anti-Americanism may seem paradoxical to Americans, but it is common in Muslim societies, and it is persistent. Many millions of Muslims believe that the American war on terrorism, its promotion of democracy, its advocacy of human rights and civil liberties are little more than window dressing for imperialism, at best. At worst, this activity is part of a plot to destroy volu m e 5

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Islam. No amount of goodwill gestures or civilizational dialogue has changed these people’s minds – yet many of them still desire democratic institutions of the sort that America has promoted, and many of them are avid consumers of American movies and other cultural exports. Suspicion of U.S. foreign policy motives swamped the Bush administration’s “public diplomacy” project to convince Muslims that America is their friend. Islamists mocked these efforts as cover for the American “war on Islam.” Mainstream media in Muslim societies focused far more on Bush’s single unscripted remark that the United States was engaged in a “crusade” against terrorism than on his repeated insistence that the U.S. was not engaged in a religious war. Muslims are also well aware of the occasional derogatory comments about Islam made by other American officials and religious leaders, such as the prominent Christian evangelist, Franklin Graham, who called Islam “evil.” Fortunately, there was only fleeting media coverage of the outrageous suggestion by failed presidential candidate Tom Tancredo that the United States should deter terrorist attacks by threatening to bomb Mecca. Few Muslims thought Barack Obama’s election as president of the U.S. would shift the direction of American foreign policy -- approximately one third, according to surveys by Telhami and the Pew Global Attitudes Project. After Obama’s election, some Muslims expressed optimism, most notably in Saudi Arabia, where 79 percent of respondents said they viewed Obama positively and were hopeful about American foreign policy -- but favorable attitudes toward the United States throughout the Middle East rose by only 3 percent, within the survey’s margin of error. By 2010, Arab opinion of Obama had turned upsidedown, with positive ratings dropping by more than half, but favorable attitudes toward the United States dropped only by 6 percent. “Obama is a duplicate copy of Bush,” al-Qaida editorialized after the American presidential election. Many Muslims seem to agree. arches quarterly

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THE MUSLIM “DEMAND CURVE” FOR U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

Only a bold policy change might conceivably make a difference in Muslim opinion of the United States. According to Muslim survey respondents, one such step would be an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement -- but it is not politically feasible in American politics to pressure Israel into such an agreement. Indeed, the Obama administration has maintained many of the signature elements of the Bush administration’s Global War on Terror, even as it has abandoned the GWOT label and much of the blustery rhetoric. The Obama administration has continued to engage in drone attacks and Special Forces operations; it continues to detain “enemy combatants” and try them in military tribunals. The United States government stuck with its authoritarian allies in the Middle East even as the Arab Spring began to engulf them. In the absence of a major shift in American foreign policy, Muslim public opinion toward the United States will likely remain inelastic. Americans and their presidents can be impatient with foreign policy. We want

instant results, or at least measurable progress by the next election cycle. This mismatch in timing between the frenetic activity of the U.S. government and the suspicious, wait-and-see attitude of the rest of the world, can lead to frustration and misunderstandings. Americans tend to think that U.S. foreign policy matters a great deal in the battle for the hearts and minds of Muslim societies. Many Muslims, for their part, believe that American plots lie behind every development around the world. But some of the most important trends of recent history, from the challenge of Islamist revolutionaries to the drama of the Arab Spring, are not about America. They involve Muslims making their own history, regardless of the position of the United States government. That may take some getting used to.

Charles Kurzman is the author of The Missing Martyrs: Why There Are So Few Muslim Terrorists (Oxford University Press, 2011) and a Professor of Sociology at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

The Center for Understanding Islam seeks to present an enlightened understanding of Islam in America. Our focus is education. We emphasize the common humanity of people of all faiths, rather than taking sides on political issues. We urge everyone to distinguish h between the true teachings of Islam as a faith and the e diverse cultural traditions of Muslim societies. Actions of o a tiny minority of extremist Muslims cannot be used to define the faith tradition itself. Serious Muslims have an n obligation to take back their faith from those who tried ed to hijack it for their political purposes. CUI repudiates all hateful messages regardless of the source. WHAT WE DO • Organise leadership conferences, workshops and seminars on Islam and Muslims. • Publish discussion guides, articles, and books on FAQs • Build a research library. • Provide commentators for radio, TV, and the print media. • Marshal expertise of scholars on issues of conscience. • Retreats for Muslim and non-Muslim youth and community leaders. • Speakers Bureau on Islam.

WWW.CUII.ORG

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Behind Closed Doors - Ten Years of Secret Evidence and Human Suffering AISHA MANIAR & ADRIENNE BURROWS

ince 9/11, the UK government has enforced a regime of detention without charge or trial to impose restrictions on the lives of individuals it deems as terrorist suspects; it cannot prosecute these individuals for various legal reasons. In the case of foreign nationals, it is seeking to deport them to their countries of origin on the ground that they pose a threat to national security, or to exclude them on that basis, as in the cases we consider here.

Not only have several dozen individuals (and by extension their families, subject to this same regime of collective punishment) been subject to these measures but they have never been given a reason for their detention. For British nationals and individuals who cannot be deported, the government has instead preferred to use control orders, recently replaced (on 25 January 2012) by Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures (T-PIMs). Most strikingly, not only have several dozen individuals (and by extension their families, subject to this same regime of collective punishment) been subject to these measures but they have never been given a reason for their detention and consequently any viable means of challenging the restrictions to their liberty volu m e 5

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or the assessment of the “security risk” they pose. The government is now planning to expand the use of such secret evidence or “closed material procedures” in all civil court cases. We begin at the end of 2001, when the Kafkaesque journey started for eight men, subject to these measures, with no means of challenging it. For some, still subject to a form of house arrest ten years later, the journey has not ended; this is the case of G. In ZZ’s case, a few years later, secret evidence is used to exclude a father of eight from this country, separating him from his wife and children. They are just two examples of a far wider issue.

BACKGROUND TO MR G’S CASE The eight men detained under a new anti-terrorism law in 2001 were already in a vulnerable situation, having fled their countries of origin (Algeria, Libya, Jordan,) to seek sanctuary in the United Kingdom; several had suffered imprisonment and torture at home. They had all lived in the UK for many years, with resident status in many cases, becoming settled and establishing roots with families and friends in the community. These men were interned from December 2001 to March 2005 under the ATCSA (Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act) 2001. This enabled the British government to lock up foreign nationals who it deemed to be “terrorism” suspects without charge or trial and on the basis of largely secret evidence. The detentions were to be indefinite and potentially forever. The government accepted that the men could not be deported to their countries of origin due to the risk of torture or other inhuman treatment on their return there. None of the men were interviewed by the police about the claimed allegations against them arches quarterly

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as would be expected if they were truly believed to have been involved in unlawful activity. There were no prosecutions. Instead the men were ‘certified’ by the Home Secretary on the basis of ‘suspicion’ and incarcerated in high security prisons. Neither they nor their lawyers were allowed to see the evidence against them, so they were prevented from being able properly to defend themselves so as to assert their innocence. The effects of this indefinite detention have been catastrophic on their mental health. Four of the men had to be moved out of Belmarsh Prison after suffering mental breakdowns. Three were transferred to Broadmoor high security psychiatric hospital by agreement with psychiatrists instructed by the Home Secretary. A fourth, again on the recommendation of psychiatrists including two acting on the government’s instructions, had to be released and moved to a small one bedroom flat with his wife and child on the strict condition of total house arrest. Indefinite detention at Belmarsh caused his mental breakdown to become life-threatening. This man (Mr G.) and his wife, tell their story below. In December 2004 the Law Lords ruled that the indefinite detention of these men was unlawful. In March 2005 the highly restrictive regime of Control Orders ‘released’ the men to a form of house arrest within their own homes. This meant that their families were also living under severe restrictions. The fear and intrusion involved has caused great damage to the mental health of wives and children caught up in this new form of indefinite detention. More information about the damage done to the wives and children in families living under control orders can be found on-line in the Joint Committee on Human Rights 12th Report published 13th February 2006. Control Orders seemed to be a step in the right direction which could lead to freedom. But following the terrible 7/7 London bombings, ten of the men were re-arrested in violent dawn raids by armed police in their homes on 11th August 2005. The men were re-arrested as the Home 168

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Office had changed its mind and now claimed that they could be deported to the very countries – Jordan, Algeria, Libya – to which previously, until 10th August 2005, the British government had accepted that deportation was not possible because of the risks of torture and other serious illtreatment. But after 7/7 ‘tough action’ was called for – so the government picked on and used these vulnerable people who it is known were not involved, and against whom no allegations of involvement in such attacks have ever or could ever be made. In the years since then they have been fighting through the courts these attempts to deport them. Some remain in prison whilst others live under strict deportation bail, alone or with their families. Some have returned home where some of them have been imprisoned (for details of this imprisonment see: Gareth Peirce “Was it like this for the Irish” in Dispatches from the Dark Side). The politics continues and the waiting still seems endless.

Statement by Mr G. 19/12/2011 I am Mr G, 42 years old and disabled from childhood polio, a wheelchair user. I am Algerian, a father of three children: daughters of twelve and three years, a boy of five. I have been in this country for nearly sixteen years. I came to this country as an asylum seeker, running from the dictator’s regime which is Algeria, where I’d been imprisoned and tortured. I thought at that time I would find a good and peaceful life in Britain. I thought: ’I am in a country where they respect and believe in human rights and justice – and that you are innocent until found guilty.’ After September 11th 2001, the Government passed a law - the 2001 Antiterrorism Crime & Security Act, allowing the detention of foreigners without charge or trial indefinitely. The police came that time, the 19th December like today, ten years ago, to kidnap me from my house, from my wife and my children – going straight away to Belmarsh high security volu m e 5

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unit. I left my wife and child crying and screaming and frightened. I had no interview with the police – no-one tells me anything about what offence I’ve committed. I spent nearly four years thinking “I will spend the rest of my life in prison”. It was the most horrible and difficult time of my life. After this my mental and physical states deteriorated and I tried to end my life by hanging myself in my cell. The Judge granted me a very restricted bail – full house-arrest, twenty four hours in my flat. I was not allowed to talk to anyone, no-one could approach me, no phone was allowed, no visitors, not even the doctor, no Friday prayers, and I had to call the tagging company five times during the day and late at night. I spent nearly 9 months under these conditions. It was a nightmare. I remember when my wife was pregnant, she was in hospital for delivering and they did not allow me to visit her in the hospital. Instead they kept me at home with my daughter and we could not even find anyone to buy milk or bread at that time. I also remember, my daughter was in school and she was sick and because we had no phone the school could not contact us to tell us about her condition. We were lucky that the school gave her first aid and we just found out at the end of the day. Then the House of Lords withdrew the legislation and said it is inhuman and unjust to hold us with no trial, no charge and indefinitely. Then the Government put me under a restricted Control Order for nearly five months, where the police came many times at night, searching my flat, frightening me, my wife and our children and banning us from many basic things. I remember when fifteen policemen came early one morning, searching the flat, turning everything upside down and even searching the bedroom where we sleep and the drawers where we put our private clothes. It was very humiliating. I cannot forget when we applied for permission for a plumber to fi x our washing machine and they rejected our request for volu m e 5

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nearly three months. Then after 7/7 happened in London, the Government tried to show the public that they were doing something and they tried to play a political game at our expense by destroying our lives. Many policemen came again to arrest me. They handcuffed me and kidnapped me again, without me knowing any charge against me or even where they were taking me. I left again my wife and the children screaming “My dad! My dad! Leave my dad alone!” This time they took me to Long Lartin prison. This time they wanted to deport me to the brutal regime I had run from. I’d prefer to hang myself and finish my life here in Britain, rather than go there and face torture. Again my health deteriorated and prison staff took me to health-care because I could not cope with this situation, neither physically nor mentally. Once again I tried to finish my life. Then the judge granted me bail – 22 hours’ curfew with restricted conditions. That was in 2005. Since then I’ve been under bail – me and my family suffering together for no purpose or clear case. We are still frightened that the police will come any time, day or night, to arrest me again – because they’ve done it twice so who can stop them from doing it again and again. I am still fighting deportation to a brutal regime which commits massacres and has killed innocents for many years and where I could be imprisoned for ever, or killed like many others. So this time, the Government wants to separate me from my family and is risking my life for political desires. I am still suffering physically and mentally and I am still under treatment. I don’t know how long this drama will go on for – it is now ten years of suffering going from prison to control order and then to deportation bail. Until now both I and my solicitor, Ms Gareth Peirce, have not been allowed to see the evidence against me, or to challenge it in a proper court. Finally I would like to thank first Allah Ta’ala, The Highest, and then be very thankful to my solicitor and to my friends arches quarterly

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at Peace & Justice in East London and all the organisations and individuals who stand by our side. I would ask them from my deep heart, to carry on protesting for our freedom and for the freedom of the many people who are still behind bars after many, many years without charge or any trial. Thank you so much, Mr G.

Statement by Mrs G. Nineteenth December 2001 – the day that our life changed dramatically. My husband was snatched away from us for something unknown – and to this day we never saw any evidence against him, nor has there been any trial in a court. The first time he went to prison he stayed there for almost four years. It was so difficult because the Home Office locked him up indefinitely without trial. He was going to spend the rest of his life in prison and I was so devastated. My daughter at this time was only two years old. She witnessed when her dad was taken away and asked me “Why did they take daddy?” I didn’t know what to reply. Once when she was playing, she came to me putting her wrists pressed together and told me “they hurt daddy” (referring to the handcuffs). This broke my heart. I wished that this had been erased from her mind but it wasn’t. My husband missed the most important time of her childhood. She was asking when her dad will come back, crying every time we went to visit him and begging him to come back with us when the visit was finished. After almost four years he was released under very strict conditions. We were so happy he was back, but this didn’t last long as the conditions were so strict. It was the most stressful time of my life. My husband was not allowed to go out at all – he was locked up under home-arrest 24/7. He had to call the tagging company five times a day to let them know he was still in our flat. We were not allowed to have any visitors at home, including family 170

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members or doctors. No phone or internet. Once I went to hospital for four days because I wasn’t well. He wasn’t allowed to visit me, or bring my daughter to school, or go shopping. Thank God we had a close friend who could bring her to school and do shopping for them. We live in a one bedroom flat and the conditions were just too difficult for us, too much – the Home Office coming all the time and searching the house, coming at night and invading our life, it was too much. And the complete isolation totally destroyed my husband. After nine months of house arrest, the 2001 Act was withdrawn. My husband was put under a Control Order and was able to go out. We still had the restrictions about people visiting and other things, but it felt like complete freedom was coming. But this didn’t last for long. After the 7/7 bombings happened my husband was taken back to prison facing deportation to Algeria where he will be tortured or even killed because of the “terrorist stamp” the Home Office has given him. My husband was completely destroyed and couldn’t cope any more. He tried to end his life. He was then given bail and he is still facing deportation to Algeria. All this suffering is still going on. We still don’t know the evidence against him, nor has he had a trial. If at least we could have a trial one day, or know when this will end…. But no, we must stay like this. We are now marking the ten years, but the never ending suffering is still going on.

Aisha Maniar is a human rights activist who works with Coalition Against Secret Evidence (CASE), the London Guantanamo Campaign and others. Adrienne Burrows is a member of Peace & Justice in East London and Coalition Against Secret Evidence (CASE). Since 2005 Burrows has been Home Officevetted to visit some of the individuals and families held under house-arrest in their homes.

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Conviction of Thought: How Islamic Concepts are Ruled on in UK Courts ASIM QURESHI

hrough discussing the case of R v Faraz, I attempt to argue in this paper that the case has shaped, and may establish a precedent, in the discussion of Islamic concepts in British law courts. While the Faraz case is not alone in a new wave of terrorism trials, it highlights points relating to Islamic theology and jurisprudence that should be understood in greater depth by UK judges, before rulings are made.

The landscape of terrorism prosecutions has changed dramatically over the last two years, given the increasing emphasis on perceived ideologies of the defendants. Previously, convictions were related to actual terror plots. Thus, the outcomes of terrorism related trials in the UK, such as ‘Operation Crevice Trail’, the ‘Ricin Plot’, and ‘Old Trafford Plot’1, have been influenced by the amounts of evidence available. The landscape of terrorism prosecutions has changed dramatically over the last two years, given the increasing emphasis on perceived ideologies of the defendants. In response to the conviction of Ahmad Faraz on 12 December 2011, the Crown Prosecution Service expressed the following: This trial was not about censoring books but about the defendant’s role in the mass distribution of material, which had been added to and manipulated, in order to prime would-be terrorists to commit violent acts. volu m e 5

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They further add, Some of these publications have previously been cited by convicted terrorists as influencing their actions. Other items contained explicit instructions on how to make explosive devices and how to kidnap people.2 Within this case, prosecution was based in Faraz’s alleged involvement in activity related to terrorism. The main charges against him included the possession and dissemination of books and videos related to terrorism, regarded as an offence under section 58 of the Terrorism Act 2006. The Faraz case is not the first to have led to convictions where no evidence of an actual terrorist plot is presented. As part of the UK government’s Prevent strategy, it appears that the criminalisation of ideas has been prosecuted by the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) who are keen to test cases before the courts. In February 2011, Mohammed Gul, a 19 year old law student, was convicted of the dissemination of terrorism publications. In his judgment, Judge David Paget is recorded as saying; “I am in no doubt that you have become thoroughly radicalised.” Padget also went on to say that Gul was, “pouring petrol on the fire” for those who may be inclined towards terrorism. The reality of the Gul case is that there was no plot, nor was there was any evidence linking him directly to the actual or planned acts of terrorism. Gul created and uploaded videos to anti-imperialist websites. The case spoke more of the alienation of a conflicted young man. The five years sentence given to Gul, according to Kimberley Trapp, was completely disproportionate to his activities.3 A further case demonstrating attacks on ideologies, is that of Munir Farooqi. Farooqi was given four life sentences arches quarterly

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despite the fact that there was no evidence of a terrorist plot. The government admitted that Farooqi had not been planning to commit acts of terrorism, but rather he was expressing sentiments against the Western invasion of Afghanistan. At the conclusion of the trial, Detective Chief Superintendent Tony Porter, head of the North West Counter Terrorism Unit, commented on the case, This was an extremely challenging case, both to investigate and successfully prosecute at court, because we did not recover any blueprint, attack plan or endgame for these men. However, what we were able to prove was their ideology.4 The Farooqi case further causes concern, given the possibility of entrapment in the case. The undercover police in the case, were actively encouraging the Farooqis to help them join the jihad abroad. After months of investigation though, it was not due to any tangible plot that Munir Farooqi was convicted, but rather, it was due to his opinions in relation to foreign policy and conflicts abroad. In a similar vein prior to the Farooqi and Gul cases, in 2007, Faraz was arrested and detained by the police in connection with ‘Operation Gamble’5. He was released without charge, but at the time the police gathered evidence from the Maktabah bookshop. At the time, Detective Inspector Haddon of West Midlands Police claimed that while the material they had seized promoted anti-Western sentiments, it was not illegal. Part of the evidence that was only partially presented in the trial (due to the defence not actually presenting a case) proved that Faraz had gone to great efforts to speak with his team, lawyers and indeed the police about the content of the material the Maktabah bookshop sold. Emails and notes recovered by the police demonstrated that Faraz was particularly concerned with any legal liability that might arise from the publications. Thus the ambiguity of the 2006 Terrorism Act is apparent in the confusion surrounding legal responsibility. Faraz was also charged with a section 58 172

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offence of possession of terrorist material on his computer hard-drive, however it is important to understand the context under which the possession took place. The files in question were found on Faraz’s harddrive in a folder entitled “PhD”. For those Faraz, the prospect of a PhD following his Masters was a matter of when and not if. The prosecution had access to detailed communication between Faraz and his former Masters dissertation advisor, in relation to potential PhD projects. Faraz explained through his lawyers in court that the data in question had been collected as source material for a possible PhD level comparative study of Al-Qaeda and Hamas.

With little factual basis, the Faraz trial very much hinged on proving the ideology of the defendant. Faraz was also found to be in possession of an Al-Qaeda training manual. Similarly Rizwaan Sabir,was arrested (and held in solitary confinement) for having downloaded the training manual as part of his PhD. The manual was available for free download from a US Department of State website. Sabir was released after a week and was subsequently awarded £20,000 compensation for his mistreatment. With little factual basis, the Faraz trial very much hinged on proving the ideology of the defendant. The CPS was keen to rebut the arguments defence lawyers Karen Armstrong and Alistair Crooke. Their arguments were based on assessments of the case prior to the trial. In order to do so, the CPS requested Dr Matthew Tariq Wilkinson to provide expert testimony in order to understand the charges through an Islamic framework. Wilkinson suggests the following as key in the formation of his Islamic expertise: I memorised two juz (parts) of the Koran in the traditional way of sitting with a scholar, volu m e 5

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memorising it with a board, rubbing it off the a significant number of those who read it.8 board, learning the next section off by heart, through about 1/15th part of the Koran, Both the prosecution and the judge which is quite a lot in fact, and a number of claimed that the Faraz case was not other major chapters of the Koran... concerned with the banning of books, ideas or Islamic thought. I contend below Alongside that I studied some of the that the aforementioned concepts were traditional Tafsirs some of the commentaries being analysed and judged throughout of the Koran, which are needed to understand the case. My argument will be based on the context of the Koran. I also memorised Wilkinson’s testimony and the decision of and learned one of the most important the judge. After presenting a general overview of Hadith collections, one of the important collections of the sayings of the Prophet Islamic thought and belief, the prosecution Mohammed (peace be upon him), by a man took Wilkinson through the concept of called Imam an-Nawawi, I memorised jihad, in order to clarify the concept to the those in Arabic, and studied their meanings judge and jury. In Wilkinson’s opinion, in Arabic through memorisation of a poem there are only very strict conditions under called “Al-’Ajrumiyyah” by a man called which jihad, as an armed struggle, can be fought: Shaykh Al-’Ajrum.6 1. When jihad has been declared and fought, it is under recognised The majority of Wilkinson’s experience Muslim leadership, such as under has been acquired through working an Imam/Amir/Caliph. in Muslim schools, and subsequently 2. The armed conflict must be openly through his role as a member of a declared to the enemy, it cannot be a prominent organisation, representing cover in any way. As a precondition British Muslims. to jihad is to invite the enemy to What must be considered, in light of Islam first, or offering them to pay Wilkinson’s role in the trial is the reason a compulsory tax. why he had been commissioned by the 3. Once the conflict begins, nonCPS. His position was clarified early combatants may not be harmed. on by the prosecution QC, Mr Hill, 4. Agriculture and architecture may who explained, “we have asked for Mr not be harmed in any way.9 Wilkinson’s assistance as to the meaning of the religion. Therefore, we will come on to it, the context in which religiously and Wilkinson’s presentation of jihad is socially the indicted publications may be singularly literal, in the sense that it does understood.” 7 The response by the judge, not describe any of the efforts relating to Justice Calvert-Smith, was equally telling, varying circumstances and jurisprudence I was concerned, members of the jury, that over a 1400 year history. This formulation in learning a bit, those of us who don’t know is then used as the lens through which the much about the core tenets of Islam, we should prosecution and the judge then understood not forget that what we are actually dealing further arguments relating to conflict with the encouragement, or not, of criminal around the world. Further, when pressed about the word off ences. So that if a particular religion, think of another one altogether, had as one shaheed (witness/martyr), he claims, It is not a word that appears in the Koran, of its key tenets, the commission of criminal it is a word that appears in the early Hadeeth off ences, that would be no justification. Whatever the religion says, what we material, and the idea is that someone that are concerned about in the end is whether sacrifices their life to uphold properly the criminal off ences were being encouraged religion is somebody that most directly witnesses directly or indirectly by any of these to their faith; it is not a Koranic word.10 publications, and would be so understood by The above statement is incorrect as volu m e 5

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the word shaheed appears on numerous occasions in the Qur’an in various permutations and circumstances. The suggested lack of presence in the Qur’an implies a lack of religious significance. From a theological perspective, this becomes particularly important when juxtaposed to the discussions that took place immediately after, as Mr Hill attempted to clarify the concept of martyrdom in Islam during a conflict. Wilkinson reiterated: “That is not an Islamic concept.”11 Wilkinson’s testimony remains problematic, largely due to his lack of expertise in Islamic theory and jurisprudence, and conflict studies. An important part of his testimony focussed on his assessment of the modern day Islamic validity of conflicts around the world. Wilkinson discussed the conflicts in Afghanistan, Chechnya, Iraq, Bosnia, Palestine and Kashmir, with an oversimplified assessment of whether or not the conflicts had Islamic validity in terms of jihad. For the most part, he refused to accept any Islamic validity in the aforementioned cases. Using the above analysis of both the theology of the jihad, and its application on the modern circumstances of conflict in the Muslim world, Wilkinson set out his views on the publications that were distributed by Faraz. A major point of discussion for the prosecution was the role of the widely used book Milestones by Sayyid Qutb. Wilkinson sets out a view of the book and its author’s opinion: Sir, my contention is that this Milestones itself, in particular this edition, militate both against the spirit and the letter of the Koran and the Sunnah, the primary sources of Islam, and this is because in my opinion they establish a mindset in the reader, in the audience, that I have described in the following way: that is Manichean, in other words it sets up a vision of the world that is entirely divided into black and white, right or wrong, good and bad, true or false, without any shades of grey whatsoever, it is separatist, so it encourages the reader to split off into the Muslim group and away from any other sort of group, and into a very particular 174

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Muslim group in that, it is simplistic in that it provides a vision of the world that is broken down into -- has an absurdly simple analyst of the relationship, for example, between the Muslim world and the non-Muslim world, it is excessively political so it trots out the cliché which has actually been absorbed almost in the main stream of thinking that Islam is just a sort of political faith, that it can’t exist without its sort of politics, it is violent beyond what is authorised in the Koran and the Sunnah, that it is historically inaccurate, it uses analysis of history that is wrong in a number of quite simple ways, both Islamic history and non-Islamic history, that it is unrepresentative of an authentically Koranic world view...12 Wilkinson also commented on texts by Abdullah Azzam, amongst others, and he does not accept their views as being Islamically authentic. I would argue that the conclusions that Wilkinson reaches are based on his personal opinion. I am saying that the style of Milestones is what you might call in the style of the Khariji theology, because it specifically says that the sovereignty of a Muslim state resides with the Godhead, and not with the person deputising for it, which was the very typical Khariji theology.13 It is during the defence rebuttal of Wilkinson that much of his Islamic credibility is damaged. Defence QC Mr Joel Bennathan cross-examined Wilkinson on various comments, statements and arguments made during the course of his testimony. What Bennathan was able to prove, was that much of the Wilkinson evidence, was open to interpretation. Bennathan cited the example of Martyrs Square in Tripoli, used during the Libyan uprising in order to discuss the issue of martyrdom and how it was being understood by those fighting for their freedom. On pushing Wilkinson as to the status of the ‘martyrdom’ of those who had died fighting against Ghaddafi, the witness initially denied they could be called martyrs, but when pressed was forced to accept that he could not give a volu m e 5

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definitive answer. Bennathan went on to cite the example of the war in Afghanistan, explaining that there were a number of varying opinions about the conflict. Using the fatwa (religious edict) written by Abdullah Azzam and acquiesced by Shaykh Abdul Aziz bin Baz regarding the jihad in Afghanistan, the witness was forced to concede differences of opinion: BENNATHAN: Who was, or is indeed, Abdul Aziz ibn Baz? WILKINSON: He was the leading establishment Mufti of the Saudi regime. BENNATHAN: Mr Wilkinson, you are a learned man who has been 20 years in the religion, but you are not on the same page as him are you in terms of Islamic authority? WILKINSON: Here I express my opinion about this matter.

BENNATHAN: The only point I am making is on whether this was a Jihad, there is obviously a very significant division of opinion with people on both sides? WILKINSON: No, that is why I said, if you turned to my table, I ticked what I thought was a pretty consensual view I ticked both boxes. Although, I think strictly speaking it doesn’t fulfil all the conditions of an Islamic Jihad, nevertheless I think it is a just struggle. I would not argue with people that would call it a Jihad. BENNATHAN: That is a perfectly good point, most people tick the box, most people think it is a Jihad? WILKINSON: Yes. BENNATHAN: You are in a minority on that one? WILKINSON: Possibly.14

BENNATHAN: Forgive me, could you The arguments set forth by the defence answer the question first. You are not on underline the differing opinions in Islamic the same page as the Grand -jurisprudence. The defence team presented WILKINSON: What do you mean that a classical Maliki jurisprudential text I am not on the same page, I am not in which rebutted Wilkinson’s statements any way such an authoritive voice in the that jihad could never be Fard al-‘Ayn - an Muslim world, is that what you mean? obligation on the individual. By proving to the court that a town under attack must BENNATHAN: Yes. be defended without the requirement of authorisation, the defence was able to show WILKINSON: Yes, I would certainly that there was enough conflicting evidence agree with that, but nevertheless I think within classical Islamic interpretations. great authorities in the Islam have in Thus disproving the analyses set out by the last 50 at least years had to grapple Wilkinson. with very complicated problems. Often Despite the strength of the defence they have changed their minds rebuttal, the judge and jury were convinced about situations quite a lot. For example by the ideological analysis put forward by Yusuf al-Qaradawi, having initially Wilkinson. In the words of Justice Calvertsupported suicide bombing condemned Smith: it thoroughly. Even Sayyid Imam, who Milestones, described by the expert was initially a Jihadi ideologue of Matthew Wilkinson as Manichean, separatist quite some pedigree, recanted entirely and excessively violent. The original author of upon his ideology on a diff erent legal the book made the case that any regime which setting. Very respected Islamic figures does not apply Islam, should be removed by have, throughout the last 30 years, force, ties of family etc were unimportant, changed their mind on very important this is the view put forward by Qutb.15 matters. volu m e 5

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The starting point of the judge was to He is also the author of Rules of the Game: Detention, accept Wilkinson’s flawed analysis of Deportation, Disappearance published by Hurst and Columbia University Press. The work analyses Islamic theology and its jurisprudential global detention policies in the ‘War on Terror’ post implementation. Without using his 11th September 2001 and the impact on those most affected, the victims. testimony as a basis, the conviction and the resulting judgment would have been difficult to adduce. ENDNOTES The conflation made by Wilkinson 1. ‘The Operation Crevice Trial’ in 2006 resulted in the between traditional jurisprudence and conviction of 5 out of the 7 men alleged to have been

The reality is that precedents were being set in the way that Islam and Islamic jurisprudence is understood by the courts. modern conflict scenarios, presented a somewhat false understanding of the way in which Islamic argumentation has developed over a 1400 year history. While the prosecution and the judge claimed that this case was only about whether or not the dissemination of these materials could amount to an offence, the reality is that precedents were being set in the way that Islam and Islamic jurisprudence is understood by the courts. This is an extremely dangerous precedent, as it will only serve to restrict the space of legitimate and necessary Islamic discourse. While I may not disagree with everything that Wilkinson said, the very notion that a pseudo-expert on Islam could be relied on to secure convictions over areas of Islam which are highly contended, serves to have a negative impact on the manner in which Muslims engage with their religion and how they go about debating concepts. The criminalisation of certain types of Islamic thought will not make ideas disappear, rather it will force discussion on such matters underground.

involved in a plot to use ammonium nitrate fertilizer to blow up targets in London. Conversely, the ‘Ricin Plot’ in 2005 resulted in acquittals as it was revealed that there no plots to begin with. The ‘Old Trafford Plot’ in 2004 was dismissed early into the investigation as police admitted that there was no tangible evidence of such a plot. 2. BBC News, Bookseller Ahmed Faraz found guilty of terror offences, 12/12/2011 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/ukengland-16149299 3. Trapp K, R v Mohammed Gul: Are You a Terrorist if You Support the Syrian Insurgency?, Blog of the European Journal of International Law, 14/03/2012. 4. BBC News, Munir Farooqi given four life sentences for terror charges, 09/09/2011 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/ukengland-manchester-14851811 5. The Maktabah bookshop was raided on 31 January 2007 under section 41 of the Terrorism Act 2000 for the alleged association and involvement in a ‘plot’ to kidnap a soldier from the British army. The manager and a volunteer from the bookshop were amongst nine individuals arrested in ‘Operation Gamble’. After seven days, the men were released without charge. 6. R v Ahmed Faraz, Kingston Crown Court, 07/11/2011 http://www.cageprisoners.com/learn-more/legal-issues/ item/2922-r-v-faraz-testimony-of-matthew-tariq-wilkinsonfor-the-prosecution-day-1 7. Ibid. 8. Ibid. 9. Ibid. 10. Ibid. 11. Ibid. 12. Ibid. 13. R v Ahmed Faraz, Kingston Crown Court, 08/11/2011 http://www.cageprisoners.com/learn-more/legal-issues/ item/2923-r-v-faraz-testimony-of-matthew-tariq-wilkinsonfor-the-prosecution-day-2 14. Ibid. 15. Ibid.

Asim Qureshi is the Executive Director at CagePrisoners where he has led investigations into Pakistan, Bosnia, Kenya, Sudan, Sweden, USA and around the UK. With his team of researchers, he has written and published many reports exposing the use of unlawful detention, rendition, and torture in the ‘war on terror’.

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BOOK REVIEW

MUSLIMS IN POLAND AND EASTERN EUROPE: WIDENING THE EUROPEAN DISCOURSE ON ISLAM EDITED BY KATARZYNA GÓRAK-SOSNOWSKA, WARSAW: UNIVERSITY OF WARSAW FACULTY OF ORIENTAL STUDIES, 2011. BOOK REVIEW BY MAŁGORZATA WRÓBLEWSKA

slam has become a prominent topic in global media discourse since 9/11, and it has recently featured prominently on the political agenda in Europe too. However, little has been done to explain the complex topic which is Muslims in Europe. The book Muslims in Poland and Eastern Europe: Widening the European Discourse on Islam, edited by Katarzyna Górak-Sosnowska fills the gap in knowledge of Muslim communities and

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their experiences in Central and Eastern Europe. The book is unique because it deals u with a wide range of w strands of thought. s Not N only is the book useful for those who are u keen ke on the topic, but it is also an interesting read for the novices. The book is divided into two main parts: Muslims in Poland and Muslims in the t wider Central and Eastern Europe. Each part East contains several chapters cont which widely explore whic the issue. There is both historical background as histo well as modern points of views, views such as the history and culture of Polish Tatars, generational changes among young Polish Tatars and mosques in Poland. Also, past and present, formation of new Muslim communities in new member states: the case of Hungary. Among the contributors in the book are philosophers, sociologists, historians and orientalists. Whilst most of the authors originate from Poland, there are some researchers from abroad too. The

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book is written well, and contains rich information and points of views that helps to build a complete picture of the situation of Muslims in Poland and Eastern Europe. Literature, gender, gastronomy, religion, history, network, language, culture and behavior, are among some of the subjects covered in the book. Due to the vast nature of the topic the book fills the gap in academic literature on Islam and Muslims in Europe. Today, depending on sex, race, education, age, or even nationality people take a variety of approaches to Muslims. Unfortunately, the lack of even basic knowledge is visible. Such levels of unawareness raises a sharp contrast between Muslims and others as well as a stiff opposition “we – they?” Moreover, people are very often afraid of Islam because of the lack of information about this faith and its growing adherents. Recently there has been a hot debate about the building of a new mosque in Warsaw, the capital of Poland. This discussion has shown that this is a burning issue because a majority of Poles have little knowledge about Muslims. Poland has a long history and tradition of Muslim presence, dating back to the 14th century, which seems to have been forgotten today. What is interesting is that there is a significant Muslim minority, proportionally even larger than in France, in Bulgaria, according to this book. Muslims in Poland and Eastern Europe is written by a number of authors; however it was edited by the sociologist, Katarzyna Górak-Sosnowska. Like a good editor, she picked up a great deal about the concerns and problems that prompt research of the Islamic faith. The book is well-organised and includes convincing arguments, statistics, maps and a wide range of information. Among others there is a picture which shows a number of Muslims in European counties, a chart showing Arabic TV stations and a table with information about phases of relations between Islam and Europe. The first part of the book is extensive, while the latter is

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more general and briefly shows the picture of Muslims in countries like Lithuania, Hungary, Slovakia, Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia and last but not least, Serbia. There is clear evidence that the choice of these countries was not random because all of them have something in common -- a Communist past. In brief, Muslims in Poland and Eastern Europe fills the gap in knowledge of Muslim communities and their experiences in Central and Eastern Europe. This is the first book in the vast body of Polish academic literature that places Poland inside the realm of vivid discourse about Islam. Małgorzata Wróblewska has an M.A. in Iranian Studies from the University of Warsaw, Poland. She is currently completing a PhD at the University of Warsaw where she is researching Modern Iranian Women’s Prose. Her interests include post-modern theory and literary practice; feminism; Islam and social issues in contemporary Iran.

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