The Counter Terrorist Magazine Asia Pacific issue December-January 2017

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CAPTIVE IN EGYPT • SUICIDE/HOMICIDE BOMBER • CHILD KIDNAPPING • PSYCHOLOGY OF TERRORISM

Journal for Law Enforcement, Intelligence & Special Operations Professionals

DEC 2016/JAN 2017

VOLUME 9 • NUMBER 6

LONE WOLF MYTHS

ASIA PACIFIC

EDITION An SSI Publication ®

DECEMBER 2016/JANUARY 2017 USA/CANADA $5.99

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The Journal for Law Enforcement, Intelligence & Special Operations Professionals DECEMBER 2016/JANUARY 2017 VOLUME 9 • NUMBER 6

COVER STORY: 30

LONE WOLF MYTHS: WHAT THEY MEAN FOR SECURITY PROFESSIONALS by Mark Booher, JD, CPS

FEATURES:

CONTENTS

30

8

08

I WAS A CAPTIVE IN EGYPT by Leonard Wien

16

SUICIDE/HOMICIDE BOMBER: THE MYTH OF THE HEAD SHOT by Julio R. Pinera

46

CHILD KIDNAPPING PREVENTION by Orlando Wilson

52

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TERRORISM: PAST AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS by Dr. Jonathon and Dr. Kim Appel

DEPARTMENTS:

16

06

From the Editor

44

Book Review

68

The Best Cover is Superior fire Power Verbal Judo: The Gentle Art of Persuasion by George J. Thompson and Jerry B. Jenkins

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Cover Photo: Illustration by Scott Morrison

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FROM THE EDITOR:

The Best Cover is Superior fire by Garret Machine

O

Journal for Law Enforcement, Intelligence & Special Operations Professionals

VOLUME 9 • NUMBER 6

ftentimes when training for combat, we can be distracted by institutional practices that are perpetuated by the old guard or antiquated thinking. A common case in point is the use of cover VS concealment and the nuance of semantics. In some cases these practices or mantras prove inadequate to address the real life problem as soon we add the magical ingredient: reality. Stress and chaos will be your reality. The entire situation is an evolving, dynamic, and hopefully quick exchange that you will negotiate on autopilot, if properly trained. Cover versus concealment, what’s the difference? In general the first one is considered ballistic cover from incoming fire or explosion, while the second one means hidden from sight without protection. However, when considering these differences in real life we must ask ourselves the following questions. Do you know the physical makeup of the cover you’re behind? Do you know the caliber of the weapon being shot at you? “No” is most likely the answer to these questions. Therefore you will treat them the same. Meaning if my cover is an empty dumpster outside a building, and I am being shot at with .50 BMG, I will fare far worse then if I am behind said dumpster filled with bricks and sand, being shot at with .22 LR. The extreme example above should get you into the right mindset, which is a simple concept. “One would rather fight from behind a shield then from exposure.” While not all shields are equal, they are all temporary. Further analysis and exploration will take this one important step further. Our adversary will shoot at what they can see exposed as a target to site in on. Not the perceived location of our center mass behind the cover. To try this, ask a friend to stand twelve meters away from you in a room. Go outside the room and ask the friend to position his hands as if he were holding a weapon in it. Ask him to “shoot” at you as soon as he sees you present yourself as a target. Now pie your head and hands around the doorway as if holding a gun. Ask you friend what he is aiming at. This will confirm that your center mass behind the dry wall (or whatever material) is not the focus of his aim and your head/hands are. The bottom line is that a gunfight is not something you can game, nor is it the time for second-guessing your actions. Cover is a temporary location, in all cases, to better your position. Sometimes the best cover is aggressive fire and movement to contact.

Garret Machine Editor, The Counter Terrorist

DECEMBER 2016 /JANUARY 2017 Editor Garret Machine Director of Operations Carmen Arnaes Director of Advertizing Sol Bradman Administrative Ashley Villegas Contributing Editors Mark Booher Orlando Wilson Dr. Kim Appel Julio Pinera Jonathan Appel Leonard Wien ASIA PACIFIC EDITION Director of Operation Yaniv Peretz Graphic Design Morrison Creative Company Copy Editor Laura Town Advertising Sales Maria Efremova Maria@loringlobal.com +65 90266571 Publisher: Security Solutions International 13155 SW 134th St. • STE 103 Miami, Florida 33186 ISSN 1941-8639 The Counter Terrorist Magazine, Journal for Law Enforcement, Intelligence & Special Operations Professionals is published by Security Solutions International LLC, as a service to the nation’s First Responders and Homeland Security Professionals with the aim of deepening understanding of issues related to Terrorism. No part of the publication can be reproduced without permission from the publisher. The opinions expressed herein are the opinions of the authors represented and not necessarily the opinions of the publisher. Please direct all Editorial correspondence related to the magazine to: Security Solutions International SSI, 13155 SW 134th Street, Suite 103, Miami, Florida. 33186 or info@thecounterterroristmag.com The subscription price for 6 issues is $34.99 and the price of the magazine is $5.99. (1-866-573-3999) Fax: 1-786-573-2090. For article reprints, e-prints, posters and plaques please contact: Security Solutions International at villegas@homelandsecurityssi.com or call 786-573-3999 Please visit the magazine web site where you can also contact the editorial staff:

www.thecounterterrroristmag.com © 2017 Security Solutions International

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I WAS A CAPTIVE IN EGYPT

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by Leonard Wien

On March 1, 1974, some 42 years ago, I sat down in the King David Hotel in Jerusalem to write about a fateful trip to Israel. The trip was a logical conclusion to the build up to the October War in 1973 in Israel.

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had been very worried when Israel was attacked by Egypt and Syria in October of ‘73. I was one of one hundred people who gathered at the Greater Miami Jewish Federation during the war to help the State of Israel. I was amazed that the group of us gave six million dollars combined in that meeting. I gave my first gift to the Jewish community that night. Back then it was a tremendous amount of money. I resolved to head to Israel to see for myself exactly what had happened, and the trip changed my life. My family had been among the people who built most of the Jewish community in Miami back in the ‘50s. My grandfather was one of the founders

Israeli tanks on the Golan Heights during the Arab-Israeli War. Photo by: The Central Intelligence Agency

who built Mt. Sinai Hospital, the Jewish Museum of Florida, and many other community institutions in Miami. In those days, Miami was much quieter then it is now, way before the cocaine cowboy days of the ‘80s and the glamour that followed in the ‘90s. Today, still a Miami resident, I don’t even recognize it. The city is still beautiful, but now more corrupt and crime ridden then ever. My fact-finding trip ran from late February to somewhere about March 5th, 1974. It began some one hundred days after the end of the Yom Kippur War, which ran from October 5th to 25th, 1973. My first wife and I left Miami on a United Jewish Appeal Mission,

On the Yom Kippur of October 6, 1973 Egypt and Syria launched a coordinated surprise attack on Israel. The Yom Kippur War was launched on the holiest day on the Jewish calendar: The Day of Atonement. Pictured here is an IDF medical crew evacuating an injured soldier from the battle field. Photo by: Israel Defense Forces

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An Israeli pilot, Shimshon Rozen, climbing into a McDonnell Douglas F-4E Phantom II during the Yom Kippur War. Photo by: Ori.ravenna


Egyptian vehicles crossing the Suez Canal on October 7, 1973, during the Yom Kippur War. Photo by: Wikimedia Commons which took us on the course of a week all over Israel. We visited the border with Lebanon and went through the Golan Heights into areas of Syria that had been captured during the war. Our group consisted of about 47 people, mostly couples from all over the U.S. Half were active in their local communities, several much more than I had been. Tuesday, February 26th at 6:15 in the morning, the men, about 24 in number, boarded a small French transport aircraft, likely a Transall C-160, in which we flew from a small airfield near Tel Aviv to the Sinai. We landed in Bir Gifgafa, which is located about 25 miles from the Great Bitter Lake on the Suez Canal. We boarded an Egged Tour Bus, which drove us to the command post at Tasa, which was located about twelve miles further west on the road to Ismailia, which lies across the Suez Canal. We spoke to a number of soldiers at the

command post and got permission to head to the Suez Canal. To everyone’s surprise, our military guide and bus driver took the wrong road. We drove directly west until we reached a barbed wire barrier with a warning in Hebrew “Do not cross – border area.” The guide, foolishly thinking he knew where we were, removed the barrier. We drove about a mile to the UN outpost on that road. The guide misunderstood and failed to explain to the Peruvian UN troops what he had in mind. They didn’t realize that we were lost and let us pass through another barbed wire barrier into what we believed were the forward Israeli lines. They were in fact on the way to the middle of the Egyptian 2nd Army, which was encamped on the eastern side of the Suez Canal. Unbeknown to us, we had crossed the front lines into enemyheld territory.

We realized the mistake when six or seven Egyptian troops came running along the side of the road waving the bus to stop. Our driver tried to return to the UN position by backing up. Fortunately, he stopped before setting off one of the mines on the road shoulders. I personally saw mines that had not yet been buried along the road. They surrounded the bus and held us under armed guard while they asked for instructions. About one hour after our capture, which took place at 11:30 am, the UN observer drove up. He said that the Egyptians were out of their lines and should free us. The UN’s direction was later shown to be wrong, and they were partly responsible for our capture. We knew we were in serious trouble. When I was sitting on the bus, surrounded by armed Egyptians, I made my one and only promise to not stop trying to protect the Jewish people if I survived. I

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Israeli troops during the Arab-Israeli War. From the booklet “President Nixon and the Role of Intelligence in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War.� Photo by: The Central Intelligence Agency

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On the way to the floating bridges over the Suez Canal, the bus was heavily stoned, spit upon, and hit with clubs by Egyptian soldiers along the way. have never stopped in the 42 years since this experience. From our point of capture, we were blindfolded and bussed to the Egyptian headquarters in Ismailia. On the way to the floating bridges over the Suez Canal, the bus was heavily stoned, spit upon, and hit with clubs by Egyptian soldiers along the way. I felt completely powerless, not something I want to experience again. The Egyptians decided to drive us across the floating bridges to Ismailia for questioning. We later found out that we were taken to their high command headquarters, which was located in an abandoned high school. We were offered sodas and sandwiches upon our arrival. At that point we were separated from one another and individually sequestered. Our entire group was questioned as to why we had come to Sinai and what we had seen both in Israel and across the lines. We were questioned under armed guard and interrogator the whole time. The questioning was harder for some of our fellow travelers, who were beaten up during their interrogation. Those who they felt had information or whose belongings or answers were displeasing were severely beaten. In my own case, they asked what aircraft I had seen at the airfield at Bir Gafgafa. I told them as little as possible, playing as though I knew little about the airplanes on the field. In particular they were interested in the types or aircrafts and their capabilities. I distinctly remember telling

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them that I had seen bombers with heavy bombs. When asked how I knew that they were bombers, I told them because all bombers have two engines. At this point they saw me as a fool and lost interest in what I had to say. Nonsense turned out to be our best defense, although the Egyptians did have English-speaking interrogators. Others, the more proud men among us, had a much harder time. Fortunately for us, the Egyptians and Israelis had signed an agreement the day before to turn back people who had straggled across the lines within 24 hours. They did this in our case. Eight hours later, the interrogation was over and we were driven to the UN checkpoint at the land bridge the Israelis had built when they crossed the Suez Canal during the war. The UN turned us over to Israeli troops on the east side of the canal. We rode the same aircraft back to Tel Aviv, returning to our hotel at 2 am. This was a dangerous and unnecessary incident, an incident that I will never forget and changed me as a man. This incident happened to me while I was young and shaped who I later became. It was a surreal incident, in which one day I was in Miami learning about the war, the next day in Israel, and then suddenly a captive. It was dangerous enough so that I never wanted it to happen to others. I knew that I must make defense a major priority in my life. Today I am the chairman of an Israeli defense company, Ariel Photonics, Inc., and serve as the Treasurer of the Secure Community Network, which has provided training and support to communities across the U.S. I am also the Chairman of the Global Emergency Network. I hope my description of this incident will encourage others to not take Israel’s security or their own personal security for granted.

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SUICIDE/HOMICIDE BOMBER: THE MYTH OF THE HEAD SHOT

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by Julio R. Pinera

Head shot! This is the overwhelming response I get when I present the following question in my training classes to law enforcement officers in South Florida: “If you are confronted with a subject who you are certain is a suicide bomber with a vest or other explosive device on their body and who is prepared to detonate, what would you do?”

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he overwhelming and enthusiastic response is “head shot!” Is it really that simple? Is a head shot the best option? Are you likely to hit your target in the head if they are moving? What firearm do you carry on duty and off duty? What type of round is in the chamber? Will it do the job? Will a shot to the head immediately incapacitate a

person to the point where they will be “DRT” (“Dead Right There”) and cannot press a button or take some other action to initiate a device? What part of the head do you want your bullet to strike: the forehead, the temple, the eye, the back of the head, the medulla oblongata? These are my follow-up questions to the head shot answer. The officers then realize the

complexity of the matter considering that stress, duty equipment, training, and other variables are working against the easy “head shot!” Let’s explore these complexities in more detail. While several volumes of books can be filled with the best tactics, techniques, and procedures to address head shots, for the sake of brevity and focus, the

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Navy Petty Officer 3rd Class Benjamin Knauth (blue) and Petty Officer 2nd Class Dustin Koch a 26-year-old corpsmen with 3rd Battalion 3rd Marine Regiment place reassuring hands on the shoulder of an Afghan National Policeman while examining his injuries in the battalion aid station here following an attack by a suicide bomber in Helmand province’s Garmsir district April 19, 2012. Photo by: Cpl. Reece Lodder

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primary intended audience includes law enforcement officers and military personnel who serve as first responders. Generally speaking, first responders are armed with a handgun or small caliber police carbine. I will not touch upon the trade craft of snipers or other more highly trained and appropriately equipped (for making the head shot) personnel. The primary intended audience for this article includes law enforcement officers and military personnel who serve as first responders. We must begin to explore this question by first defining what is a suicide bomber and discussing under what conditions you might have the occasion to encounter one. The suicide bomber is an adversary armed with an explosive device, who is not just willing, but planning to die as part of the operation. Maybe the bombing is the mission in and of itself or maybe the bombing is the exclamation point after an armed attack such as Mumbai, Paris, or Orlando. As these type of attacks increase in frequency and escalate in violence, you may find yourself three to five meters from a suicide bomber having to make life-changing decisions for both you and any other potential victims. Most suicide bombers have the device strapped to them. However, a bomber may also be carrying the device for the purpose of placing or throwing it and becoming a suicide bomber when law enforcement interrupts the mission. They may even be driving the device to its intended target in the form of a VBIED (Vehicle Born Improvised Explosive Device) when a traffic infraction results in a traffic stop, which may escalate to anything but routine. With a recent trend in multiple attackers and multiple targets and the inclusion of IEDs in the mix, regardless of the method of delivery, if you encounter one, are you prepared for the headshot? Is it that simple? Will a head shot make a suicide bomber “DRT� (“Dead

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Right There?�)? During my service as a young police officer working some of the meanest streets of Miami, Florida, as well as my time spent as a SWAT team member with the same agency, with which I completed over 150 missions, I personally witnessed more than 50 head wounds from gunfire sustained by victims of crime, offenders and even one fellow officer. He survived. The calibers used ranged from the .22 Short to the infamous 7.62 x 39 AK-47 round. Most of the head wounds I encountered were caused by handgun rounds. I can attest to the fact that the human head can sustain gunshot wounds and continue to function, and in my estimation based on personal observation, unless the shot hits the right spot or literally causes catastrophic damage, a suicide bomber will not be precluded from activating a button to initiate the device. In fact,

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in some cases that I responded to, the person with the head injury was actually walking, talking, and pledging revenge as I arrived on the scene. In one instance where the SWAT team responded to a hostage situation, the hostage taker shot himself in the head with a Glock 17 (9mm) after killing the victim. As the team made entry, he was still reaching for the gun that he dropped, but he could not see it. He had shot himself from temple to temple and literally blew his eyeballs out, but was not completely incapacitated. He sits in prison, blind but alive. The head shot is not the simple answer that is blurted out in my classes, especially the head shot with a handgun or a small caliber carbine in a high stress dynamic encounter. In many circumstances, the head shot is survivable, giving the bomber the opportunity to carry out his or her carnage.

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Are you likely to hit your target? How good of a shot are you? How much do you train? Do you train for accurate head shots? You might be a great shooter engaging stationary paper targets, but can you hit a moving apricot that is encapsulated by soft tissue and bone? Can you hit it more than once? That moving apricot, as snipers refer to it, is the medulla oblongata, which serves to carry out all of a person’s involuntary reflexes, such as heartbeat and breathing. It also serves to connect the brain with the spinal cord and the rest of the body. If you cause catastrophic damage to the medulla, its owner will be “DRT” and incapable of activating any switches, or even squeezing a trigger. Or will they? The destruction of the medulla may cause flaccid paralysis. Acute flaccid paralysis is a condition where the muscles go limp or flaccid due to damage to the spinal cord. This is why the medulla is the primary target for snipers; however, there continues to be much debate about whether or not a subject can make a twitch if the medulla is hit. Two medical phenomenona come to mind: cadaveric spasms and the Lazarus reflex. More on these later. What firearm do you carry on duty and what round is in the chamber? The skull’s function is to protect the brain, and it does a pretty good job of it. On average, the frontal bone of the skull, a.k.a. forehead, averages 6.5 mm in thickness for men and 7.5 mm in thickness for women. Add to that the curvature of the skull, movement, and its ability to withstand impact due to the flexibility offered by the fissures where the different bones that make up the skull meet, and a round may be deflected or not penetrate the skull at all. I have witnessed instances where a victim was shot in the forehead and the bullet traveled under the skin around to the back of the head before

exiting. It never penetrated the skull. Most police officers are armed with a handgun as their primary duty weapon. Even on military bases, the military police carry side arms, currently 9 mm, and only perimeter security forces or entry control points are armed with long guns. The most common handgun duty ammo is the 9 mm, .40 and .45 cal. for handguns and the .223 or 5.56 mm for duty rifles. Some departments may still be carrying a police carbine in 9 mm. Terminal ballistics are important, and the FBI does its work on ballistic gel to offer a standard for duty ammunition. However, the reality is that you must know the capabilities of the specific gun you carry and the round in the chamber that will provide you with greater confidence during an armed confrontation. The question of which round is best for your duty weapon will not be addressed in this article since you are the best judge of that and ample material on the subject is readily available. Regardless of which round you chamber, remember that shot placement is the greatest factor in stopping power, and a shot well placed is the best round of all. Having access to a patrol rifle such as an AR-15 will greatly increase your chances of accurately engaging your target in a timely fashion when compared to a pistol. Is a head shot the best option? If not the head shot, then what? As a former Certified Bomb Technician, I spent a great deal of time learning about and training for the suicide bomber scenario. As previously mentioned, a suicide bomber may have the bomb attached to their body, they may be carrying it for the purpose of placing or throwing it, or they may be driving it to its intended target in the form of a VBIED. The discussion of where to shoot a suicide bomber, if not the head, raises a good question. Most officers are quick to point

Regardless of which round you chamber, remember that shot placement is the greatest factor in stopping power, and a shot well placed is the best round of all.

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Gas Turbine System Mechanic 3rd Class Alahnna Taylor, from Vancouver, Wash. roleplays as a suicide bomber during the Paulele Palulu 2009 anti-terrorism field training exercises. PAPA 2009, also known as “Reliant Shield”, is an annual Navy Region Hawaii exercise, focusing on the ashore and afloat unit’s capabilities to deter, detect, defend and mitigate acts of terrorism within the Pearl Harbor area. Photo by: Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Mark Logico

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If you take the shot, where should you aim? What part of the head do you want to cause catastrophic damage to?

out the danger of striking the bomb with a bullet, thereby causing an unintended detonation. What is the alternative? Do not shoot and let the bomber detonate? This is definitely a possibility; however, let’s take a closer look at this option. Most explosive devices designed for the purpose of self-detonation will be attached toward the front of the torso around the abdomen. Based on an informal open-source review of cases where the device was recovered due to malfunction, capture or surrender by the intended bomber, you will find that the device was often placed lower than the imaginary nipple line that runs across the chest. Empirical evidence in the form of intact upper torsos of bombers provides additional proof of this. Do some research on the topic for the purpose of sharing the findings with your team. So if the upper torso is

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not obstructed by the device, is that a better target? It certainly presents a larger target with vital organs, namely the heart and the major blood vessels such as the aorta, and of course there is always the possibility of striking the head. Inflicting non-survivable wounds to the upper torso may not make a suicide bomber “DRT,” but it will more than likely eliminate or significantly reduce the bomber’s capacity and mobility. Stopping a bomber from moving closer to victims may be a huge victory if detonation occurs, even remotely by a spotter. If you take the shot, where should you aim? What part of the head do you want to cause catastrophic damage to? The best answer according to most is to hit the medulla, but aiming for it is a difficult task at best. The goal in targeting the medulla is to cause catastrophic damage resulting in immediate acute flaccid paralysis. Flaccid paralysis is a phenomenon where the body goes immediately limp—no movement, no twitching. Now we can talk about cadaveric spasm and Lazarus reflex. Unfortunately, these are two conditions that will result in postmortem movement or twitching. Cadaveric spasm is also known as instantaneous rigor, which is a rare form of muscular stiffening that occurs at the immediate moment of death and is usually associated with violent death that happen during hyperemotional circumstances. I would say that a suicide bomber looking down your duty weapon as he or she ponders next steps is emotionally intense for the engaged parties—you and them. Additionally, another more common postmortem occurrence is known as the Lazarus reflex, a condition that occurs in almost 40% of brain dead patients. It can occur at the time of death all the way to 72 hours of death and involves movement or jerking of different body parts.


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A training exercise designed to simulate a suicide bomb attack. Photo by: Sgt. David Bolton, Kentucky National Guard Public Affairs Office


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So what do you do when confronting a possible suicide bomber?

So what do you do when confronting a possible suicide bomber? This piece is not intended to provide you with specific answers because there are too many variables to cover; however, my intention is to spark thought and debate in examining the complexities of this question. My discussions with subject matter experts, including two emergency room doctors who have treated gunshot wounds to the head, suggest that there is no “magic bullet” that will end the threat of a suicide bomber in a manner so absolute as to eliminate the possibility of detonation. Taking that into consideration, my hope is that you continue to research this

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problem and train, train, and then train some more. Training should consist of realistic dynamic scenarios and include simunition if possible. It’s a matter of time before law enforcement has to confront this problem in the U.S. and the consequences of your preparation will be a matter of life or death.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR Julio R. Pinera has 26 years of combined military and law enforcement experience. During his 22 years at the Miami Police Department, he served in several investigative and tactical units. He was assigned to work with the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force for several years, focusing investigative efforts on international and domestic terrorism investigations. Additionally, he was trained as a Certified Bomb Technician and served in that capacity for ten years.

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LONE WOLF MYTHS WHAT THEY MEAN FOR SECURITY PROFESSIONALS

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by Mark Booher, JD, CPS Hawai‘i Pacific University

Attacks by Islamic terrorists are increasing in frequency and lethality. Particularly in the West, attacks in France, Belgium, Germany, and America have happened so fast it’s hard to keep up with the details.

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ftentimes, these attackers are pegged as lone wolves, that is, self-radicalized individuals who appear out of nowhere to commit random attacks of carnage. But is this accurate? The image of the lone wolf is particularly shrouded in myth, largely described as someone who acts alone,

planning and conducting attacks without assistance or direction from any outside group. Until recently, very little research has been done on the lone wolf terrorist, but that is changing. In a 2014 issue of the Journal of Forensic Science, researcher Paul Gil published an insightful article entitled, “Bombing Alone: Tracing the

Antecedent Behavior of Lone-Actor Terrorists.” Gil surveyed 119 cases of lone wolf attacks in the United States and Europe. Analysis of subsequent attacks in the West confirms his findings. With this as our backdrop, we expose five widely-held misconceptions about lone wolf terrorists.

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MYTH #1: LONE WOLF TERRORISTS ARE SILENT AND UNKNOWN Run an Internet search of lone wolf attacks within the last five years and you’ll find a mantra repeated ad nauseum by security experts and news commentators alike that lone wolves are particularly hard to detect because they are isolated and disconnected from society, while planning to strike without warning. It’s a chilling thought, and in most cases, inaccurate.

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In 82.4% of cases Gil surveyed, others were aware of the attacker’s grievances before the attack actually occurred, while in 79 percent in cases; others were aware of the terrorist’s ideology. In 64% of cases, friends and family were aware of the terrorist’s intent to commit violence. And 58.8% of lone wolves made public declarations and statements concerning their intents of violence With few exceptions, these terrorists were neither silent nor unknown. Rather than referring to them as lone wolves, a more accurate term to describe these attackers would be, as national security and terrorism expert Patrick Poole puts it, “known wolves.” In a majority of cases, not only were these terrorists’ grievances, ideology, and intentions known to family, friends, and co-workers, but these terrorists had appeared on law enforcement’s radar as well. The FBI received warnings twice from Russian Intelligence about the Tsarnaev brothers, who conducted the Boston Marathon bombing in 2013. The FBI said that it interviewed and couldn’t find any connection to radicalism. However, the brothers were known by the FBI to have attended the Islamic Society of Boston, a mosque with ties to al-Qaeda and which had previously turned out other convicted jihadists like Tarek Mehanna and Aafia Siddiqui. Tarek Mehanna was convicted in 2012 and sentenced to 17 years in federal prison on charges of conspiracy to provide material support to al-Qaeda, conspiracy to commit murder in a foreign country, two counts of making false statements, and other charges. Aafia Siddiqui was convicted and sentenced to 86 years on two counts of attempted


Dzhokhar Tsarnaev. Photo by: Security camera of federal courthouse/United States Marshals Service murder of U.S. nationals, officers, and employees, assault with a deadly weapon, and other federal charges. Other examples of assailants deemed “lone wolves� by either media or government analysts abound: Carlos Bledsoe, the jihadist from Tennessee who became Abdul Mohammed and travelled to Yemen in an attempt to link up with al-Qaeda operatives on the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). He was later deported back to

the United States and interviewed by the FBI before his release. Tragically and frustratingly, Bledsoe later attacked a U.S. Army recruiting station in Little Rock, Arkansas, in 2009. Ahmad Rouleau and M. ZehafBibeau, jihadists who conducted separate attacks in Canada were known to authorities there. Both men had their passports taken. The Koachi brothers, who executed the Charlie Hebdo attacks in 2015,

Composite picture of Aafia Siddiqui from her wanted poster. Photo by: F.BI.

The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2016/January 2017 33


were known to U.S., U.K., and French authorities. Even back to 9/11, we see these individuals were known to law enforcement, yet sufficient action wasn’t taken to prevent them from killing citizens. Thus, the prevailing contention that the majority of attackers are silent, unknown radicals waiting to strike without warning is simply a myth.

MYTH #2: LONE WOLVES ARE “ALONE” It’s a popular narrative that lone wolves are social outcasts in search of Saïd and Chérif Kouachi. Photo by: Photo Booth

French soldiers guarding a Jewish site in the aftermath of the Charlie Hebdo attack, Rue de Pali-Kao, Paris. Photo by: Herman Pijpers

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meaning and belonging. Rejected by society, these loners gravitate to extremist groups, usually online, where they can find a sense of purpose and belonging. In the privacy of their apartments or dark basements, they radicalize with the Internet’s anonymity. They plot alone, waiting to strike out of the darkness. It sounds good, but again the narrative is unsupported by facts. The lone wolf as typified in most media reports doesn’t exist. Far from being anti-social rejects, these terrorists are deeply embedded in larger social networks. The reason for this is simple. Terrorism is typically a group activity. The social network provides meaning necessary to justify the purpose and object of the violence, as well as the personal risk involved. In one-third of the cases surveyed, Gil found these terrorists were members of extremist groups or had joined contentious organizations. 48% of them interacted face-to-face with other organization members, and 59% tried to recruit or had assistance in planning or carrying out the attack. Only 35% interacted with groups online—again, a significant factor, but by no means the majority. These lone wolves are not truly “alone.” That means investigators and security professionals must understand the ideological drivers behind the attacks.

MYTH #3: LONE WOLVES STRIKE SUDDENLY, ATTACKING TARGETS AT RANDOM Because the public is largely unaware of a terrorist’s presence, even when the terrorist is under surveillance by authorities, it’s understandable that the public is shocked and surprised when

NOT TRULY

“ALONE”

59%

RECRUIT OR ASSISTANCE

48%

FACE-TO-FACE

35%

GROUPS ONLINE

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Fort Hood shooting: First responders use a table as a stretcher to transport a wounded US Soldier to an awaiting ambulance at Fort Hood, Texas, Nov. 5. Photo by: Sgt. Jason R. Krawczyk 36 The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2016/January 2017


SWAT team members approach a building with a gunman inside. Thirteen people were killed and 30 more wounded in an attack by a lone gunman at Fort Hood, Texas, November 5, 2009. Photo by: Sgt. Jason R. Krawczyk these attacks occur. To a family strolling through Nice on Bastille Day or friends socializing at an Orlando nightclub, the attacks come suddenly and without warning. But with few exceptions, authorities find the targets and the executions are carefully planned. Part of planning a successful attack involves “tooling up,” or acquiring the skills, knowledge, and equipment to pull off the operation. In 46% of the cases surveyed, terrorists acquired their training and instruction from the Internet. In 21% of cases, they received hands-on training. Almost one-third (29%), rehearsed “actions on the objective,” or practiced dry runs of the attack. These statistics indicate that these attacks are planned and do not occur at random. That’s good news for law enforcement and security professionals because it means that during this phase of the planning, the terrorist must expose himself. This is the best and earliest point for professionals to prevent or intercept the attack, though this is not necessarily an easy task. On January 31, 2006, a group of men who were later convicted of the 2007 Fort

Part of planning a successful attack involves “tooling up,” or acquiring the skills, knowledge, and equipment to pull off the operation.

Dix attack plot took a videotape of their training sessions to a Circuit City location in New Jersey to convert the tape to DVD. The tape showed them shooting semiautomatic weapons with vitriolic shouts of “Allahu Akbar.” A store employee grew suspicious and alerted authorities, who launched an investigation and subsequent arrest and conviction of the group on federal charges. Leading up to his attack at Fort Hood in 2009, Nidal Hasan purchased

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a FN-5.7 Herstal pistol. He bought a membership to a local gun range, took training classes to increase his tactical proficiency, and practiced regularly at the range. The simple act of target practice doesn’t indicate terrorist activity per se, but in Hasan’s case, evidence of his hostilities were well known and documented. Hasan’s “anti-American propaganda” and opposition to the Afghan and Iraq Wars prompted complaints from fellow officers and classmates at the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences, where he attended his master’s program. According to interviews of his classmates, Hasan was quite open about his belief that Sharia law transcended the United States Constitution and that

suicide bombers were justified in their actions. Hasan carried business cards that bore the jihadi SoA, or “Soldier for Allah” inscription, rather than his United States military rank. The FBI knew of multiple email exchanges between Hassan and al-Qaeda cleric “Anwar al-Awlaki” where he asked questions about jihad and suicide bombings, but no action was taken. Given the information, it’s inaccurate to say the Ft. Hood attack came out of nowhere.

MYTH #4: LONE WOLVES ARE MENTALLY DISTURBED INDIVIDUALS It’s popular for experts and commentators to portray the lone wolf as a deranged individual sharing sympathies and views with larger

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radical groups. While there are certainly examples of such individuals, they are not the majority. According to Gil, in only 31.9% of the cases surveyed were terrorists confirmed to have a mental illness or disorder, so roughly 1/3. Said another way, in about 70% of the cases surveyed, the terrorist was not diagnosed with a mental illness. (I’m sure many are mentally ill, walking around without diagnosis or treatment, so saying definitely that they are not “suffering from” doesn’t work unless you can show stats that they were forensically examined shortly after the attacks.) It would be easier if terrorists were insane. If most “lone wolf ” terrorists were insane, we wouldn’t have to explore issues like motive, ideology, or connections

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to subversive networks. Nor would we have to confront the reality of what such an inquiry would find. But the fact is, a majority of these terrorists function with the same level of mental clarity that we do. Many are educated. They attend classes on college campuses, serve in the government, security and other fields. They live and walk among us. The reality is that mental illness or disorder is a significant factor, but does not appear in a majority of terrorist attacks.

MYTH #5: LONE WOLVES CANNOT BE STOPPED There’s an attitude that seems to be gaining popularity among politicians and certain counter terrorism “experts” that not much can be done to stop lone wolf attacks. The most recent examples of this would be French Prime Minister Manuel Valls, who said after the Nice attack that “France [was] going to have to live with terrorism.” Does any country have to lie down and live with terrorism? There were virtually no jihadist-inspired attacks in France in the 1960s or 1970s, so what’s changed? Why not investigate, find its cause and eradicate it? If the majority of lone wolf terrorists were truly alone, social outcasts who kept to themselves, and struck without warning at random targets selected by voices inside their heads, then yes, it would be almost impossible to stop these attacks. Fortunately, that isn’t the case. As it turns out, law enforcement and security professionals do intercept and prevent these attacks regularly, sometimes through undercover sting operations, as was the case of Amine El Khalifi, who was arrested in 2012 for plotting to carry

out a suicide bombing on the United States Capitol. El Khalifi, a Moroccan man who overstayed on a visitor’s visa and had been under federal surveillance since 2011, believed he was working with al-Qaeda operatives, who were in fact, undercover FBI agents. He pled guilty and was sentenced to 30 years in prison. A similar but more recent case involved Christopher Cornell, aka Raheel Mahrus Ubaydah, a 20-year-old Muslim convert from Ohio. Cornell also wanted to attack the United States Capitol building, and he sought assistance. In Cornell’s case, the individual he recruited to help him “wage jihad” was a FBI confidential informant. On January 14, 2015, Cornell was arrested with two semi-automatic rifles and 600 rounds of ammunition. He later

ID photograph of Mohamed LahouaiejBouhlel, perpretrator of the July 14, 2016 Attack in Nice, France. Photo by: Rama

Memorial of July 14th, 2016 in Nice. Photo by: Jesmar

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pled guilty to four counts of attempted murder of U.S. officials and employees. In addition to undercover operations, routine traffic stops and good oldfashioned police work have thwarted a number of terror plots. On August 4, 2007, two men of Middle Eastern descent were pulled over for speeding near Goose Creek, SC. As the deputy approached the vehicle, he noticed one of the occupants quickly close a laptop computer and attempt to hide it. His suspicions raised,

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the deputy obtained consent to search the vehicle and discovered safety fuses, piping containing a potassium nitrate explosive mixture, and containers filled with gasoline. The FBI later searched the laptop of one occupant named Ahmed Mohamed and found several file folders containing information on manufacturing bombs, rockets, and other explosives. They even found a video he placed on YouTube demonstrating how to use a remote control detonator for an


explosive device to be used against U.S. troops. He was convicted of providing material support to terrorists. One of the most notable instances of routine police work uncovering a terrorist plot is the case of Ahmed Ressam, the Millennium Bomber. Ressam, an Algerian national with ties to al-Qaeda, illegally immigrated to Canada in 1994, seeking asylum using forged documents. After receiving instruction at an alQaeda terrorist training in Afghanistan in 1998, Ressam decided to conduct a bomb attack at Los Angeles International Airport (LAX). On December 14, 1999, Ressam took a ferry from Victoria, British Columbia to Port Angeles, WA in a rental car packed with over 100 pounds of explosives. Although Ressam drew the suspicion of ferry officials in Victoria, he was sent through after a vehicle search came up empty. Custom officials in Port Angeles also became suspicious after Ressam’s cover story began to unravel. They questioned Ressam, who showed increasing nervousness. Another vehicle search revealed explosives.

PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER As security professionals, it’s our job to raise our awareness and understand the nature of the threat. That includes testing our own biases and long held assumptions, and having moral courage to speak out and correct misconceptions our leaders and the public may be operating under. Although we recognize that mental health is a significant factor in lone wolf terrorism, it is not the majority cause. The majority of actors are driven by ideological motivations and beliefs that drive target selection,

The majority of actors are driven by ideological motivations and beliefs that drive target selection, operational planning, and operations.

operational planning, and operations. Understanding ideology not only helps explain what has happened in the past, but also how we can be more proactive when dealing with potential suspects in the future. Most so-called lone wolves are not silent and unknown. They are talking to people—co-workers, friends, and family members—about their grievances, ideologies, and even intent to commit violence. They are posting comments on social media and elsewhere. Law enforcement and security personnel must be proactive in reaching out to the suspect’s family members and social networks for information and clues. Of course, some of these contacts will lie or mislead investigators to shield the suspect, but not all. In several cases, friends and family members have cooperated with authorities to avert disaster.

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We have to dispel this idea that lone wolves are phantoms that strike without warning and cannot be stopped. This mindset is a non-starter and does nothing to help us protect our communities. The truth is, these terrorists are goal-driven and want their operations to succeed. Terrorists must acquire the tools, knowledge and expertise to execute the attack. During training and “tooling up,” the terrorist is most exposed and vulnerable to detection. But police and security professionals must be trained and know what to look for. Of course, just because a terrorist leaves behind some clues doesn’t mean the authorities will discover them in time. But that’s true of all intelligence and police work. It’s much like trying to solve a puzzle with some of the pieces missing. The difference is, the pieces are out there. They do exist. And it’s up to us to find them and piece it all together. Our lives and the lives of those we protect depend on it.

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR Mark Booher, JD, CPS, is the Senior Instructor for Rubicon Training Group, a provider of security and intelligence training solutions for the military, law enforcement, and the private sector. Mark is a veteran of the United States Army, where he spent five years in the intelligence and security field. He is also a Certified Executive Protection Specialist and has traveled to Israel to train in the Israeli counter terrorism and security methods. Following his military service, Mark studied law at the University of Arkansas and spent six years as a deputy prosecuting attorney. He is an experienced litigator with numerous jury trials in cases including murder and robbery; drug crimes; and violent assaults. He now devotes his time to teaching and has trained hundreds of military, law enforcement, and private personnel on matters of intelligence and security operations. info@rubicontraininggroup.com

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The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2016/January 2017 43


BOOK REVIEW

Verbal Judo: The Gentle Art of Persuasion by George J. Thompson and Jerry B. Jenkins

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his book was structured and formatted in a similar way to another book I liked entitled Surviving, which was also written in part by a policeman. Sun Tzu professes that it is a higher skill to subdue one’s adversary without fighting than to be victorious in one hundred battles. This book teaches just the concepts and techniques to that end. The majority of what the book teaches comes from the perspective of U.S. law enforcement, which is appropriate for this audience. One of my primary takeaways from the book was: “The way we are seen by others is vital, because we have a lot to say about determining that. If you consider yourself a professional, you will exude professionalism.” To me, this means that if you are in a high-stress situation and believe that you are handling the situation in the best way possible and the other party believes you to be incompetent, who is right? Perception is reality, and what may be just another day for you may be a life-altering experience for the other party involved. The author professes three types of people one might have to negotiate with: the wimp, the nice guy, and the difficult. The wimp is a personality type that puts up a front that they are in compliance

Reviewed by Jacob Ingram

Perception is reality, and what may be just another day for you may be a life-altering experience for the other party involved. but really hates authority and wishes they had the power to challenge it. The nice guy truly wants to comply and is generally easy going. The difficult person is up-front about their discontent with the status quo. These people are quick to challenge and ask, “Why?” But at least their intentions are clear. The book advocates taking your adversary’s energy and momentum and redirecting it to a common goal. Much like in real judo, the principle is redirecting energy to your ends. The key to verbal judo is to empathize with the other party, thereby reducing tension and conflict intensity. A great way to show someone that you empathize with them is to repeat back to them exactly what they said so they see that you understand. L.E.A.P.S. is an acronym used in the U.S. military during leadership courses. This means Listen, Empathize, Ask questions, Paraphrase their statements,

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and Summarize their situation. The book also elaborates on this process. One of the most valuable things I learned in the book was to say: “What can I do or say to make this situation right by you?” Meaning, the way a situation is framed can often predict its outcome. When dealing with others, one should strive to protect the dignity and self respect of the other party, so long as it is within reason and totality of circumstances. I would highly recommend this book to new LEOs and freshly minted E5, as I was able to read it in just one plane flight and absorb the material as the author intended.


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CHILD KIDNAPPING PREVENTION

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by Orlando Wilson

Over the past couple of decades, kidnapping and hostage-taking have become a booming multimillion-dollar business. Unlike in the movies, you do not need to be high profile or a high roller to be kidnapped.

I

t can happen to virtually anyone for a multitude of reasons. In the emerging markets of the Middle East, Latin America, and Africa, business owners within the middle classes are often the targets for criminal gangs. Children are especially vulnerable to kidnapping, as their natural inquisitiveness can be exploited. Most nannies or drivers are not security trained, and many kindergartens

and schools have very low standards of security. Most people think of kidnap for ransom situations when we discuss kidnapping, but another type of domestic kidnapping is where an estranged parent takes a child they do not have legal custody over. These situations can become very complicated if the child is in another country, as the

local laws usually take precedence. The Hague Child Abduction Convention is the international law that tends to be used for child custody disputes, but how this is interpreted at local levels is another thing. A single parent may have custody of their child in U.S. or Western Europe, but if their ex-partner is a citizen of say an Asian or Middle Eastern country and manages to get the child

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there, the local courts will most probably give them custody. I have been asked quite a few times if I could go to various countries to recover children who have been taken by estranged parents. I am happy to provide advice and highlight the fact that if the parent I am talking to has legal custody in U.S., this might not apply in the country the child is in. Also, if the child was snatched back, those doing so would have committed the crime of kidnapping, which in most places has a lengthy prison term attached. Combine the risk of being arrested and the child being harmed during the snatch, and things are better left to embassy staff and trusted local attorneys. Kidnapping situations are nasty situations to be involved in and best avoided at all costs, period. If the kidnappers are professionals, there is a good chance that a hostage will be released when the ransom demands are met. On the other side of the coin, if the ransom demands are not met, it would be a good business practice to execute the hostage, to encourage future payments. The professionalism of kidnappers varies greatly from those that are highly skilled to Neanderthals; all, however, are capable of extreme violence. The express kidnappers, for example, are generally not what could be classed as high-end criminals. This means they tend to be more violent and unpredictable than groups that target higher-profile victims for large ransoms. As always, if ransoms are paid in express kidnappings, there is no guarantee the victim will be released, especially if the victims can identify the criminals or have been sexually assaulted, which can be expected in most cases. We have been approached several times by the families of kidnapping victims wanting to know if we provide hostage rescue services. Of course, our answer is

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always no we do not. People that claim to provide such services tend to live in their own little fantasy worlds. There are those claiming to provide such services in Mexico. Well, if you follow the news, then you will see that a few times every year Americans are arrested for crossing the Mexican border with a firearm. These people go to a Mexican jail and in a few cases after a lot of government pressure they may be released, but most are not. So, you think the Mexican police, military and the drug cartels will turn a blind eye to a private SWAT team waltzing across the border to save a damsel in distress? I am also sure if they made it back, the FBI would be having a chat and ATF would be interested in the weapons crossing the border, etc., etc. Also, from a business point of view, consider how much would you charge to go into Mexico to perform a completely illegal operation, face a slow imaginative death, life in a Mexican prison, and don’t forget the repercussions to you and your family if the cartels found out you messed with them? As I said, some tend to live in a movie. We can’t overemphasize the degree to which kidnapping situations should be avoided and where a threat is identified, precautions need to be taken, especially when children are involved. In most cases children are a lot more vulnerable, easier to take than an adult, and yet the threat to them is taken lightly or ignored! Here I am going to list some basic considerations to help prevent child kidnappings. Compile a threat assessment. This is the most basic and often overlooked element to any security program. You need to consider all the potential threats to the child and get the opinions of others; forget the “it will never happen” attitude. Arrogance is the greatest weakness in all security and military operations. Ask opinions from a wide


Combine the risk of being arrested and the child being harmed during the snatch, and things are better left to embassy staff and trusted local attorneys.

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Think with a criminal’s mindset, where the rule of law means as little as the life of someone who got in your way!

variety of people. Advice from security professionals can be helpful, but in a lot of instances their opinions are textbook and one-dimensional. Criminals don’t have textbooks, so also ask those who you think can give you some unique perspectives. How would you kidnap the child? Think like the kidnappers. Think with a criminal’s mindset, where the rule of law means as little as the life of someone who got in your way! Once you have answered this question and have the threat assessment compiled, then you can start to consider what security measures to put in place to counter the potential threats.

RESIDENTIAL SECURITY It’s a sad fact that a lot of kidnappings take place at the victim’s residence or when they are entering or exiting. The

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security of the residence, the grounds, and the surrounding area need to be assessed. Contingency plans need to be put into place for potential threat situations and active kidnapping attempts.

PRETEXT TESTS Consider testing the security of the residence and alertness of the staff by sending someone to try and gain entry to the house or grounds or to deliver an unsolicited gift of a toy or sweets for the child. Remember, when selecting someone for the pretext, that people are usually suspicions of young men, but not so of young girls and women with children. Could the child be drugged? This can be from unsolicited gifts delivered to the house or given while the child is in the garden for an outing. If the child has


taken ill, the parents’ and staff’s main concern will be the child’s wellbeing, and security precautions can be disregarded. The ploy of poisoning the child can be used to get them out of a secure residence for a street kidnapping or to a hospital where a low level of security may exist as a visual deterrent but nothing more.

HOUSE STAFF Have all house staff be vetted and briefed on security awareness and procedures. Criminals will look to recruit or blackmail employees to give them itineraries and sensitive information, which is why you must ensure that all employees are vetted out and supervised and all sensitive information is kept on a need-to-know basis.

NANNIES The child’s nanny will need to be trusted at a far greater level than the other house staff and understand any potential threats the other staff may not have been made aware of. The nanny will need to know how to spot any potential threats and how to respond to any emergency situations.

DRIVERS Full time drivers should be trained to identify and react to potential threats and hostile situations. Contract drivers should not be trusted and not be given the details of any trips until the last minute.

SECURITY PERSONNEL Will they fight, run, or are they working with the kidnappers? Just because someone has a gun it does not mean it works, they can use it, or would use it if they had to. Yes, I am very cynical about those in the security industry, and with good reason! Make sure you’re not wasting your money! Visitors to the residence. Ensure visitors are known, contractors have

appointments, and are not left unattended.

SCHOOL SECURITY Most schools have minimal security in place: they may have cameras and employ a few guards, but not have anything that could prevent a kidnapping attempt from a determined semi-professional criminal gang. The issue with armed school security is how they would react to a hostile incident and whether they are properly trained. You don’t want them shooting a child “by accident” as they try to prevent a kidnapping.

SCHOOL STAFF Are school staff security-aware and trained to deal with emergency situations? Penetration tests. Consider sending someone to test the school’s security. Can they get in, walk around unchallenged, talk to children, etc.? Being picked up from school. What are the procedures for the children when being picked from school? What chances are there for the child to be picked up by an unauthorized person? Test it! The child’s friends. What threats could the child’s friends be under that could lead to your child being threatened? If your child is visiting friends, what are the other families’ security precautions like? Consider pretexting or a penetration test! We are talking about a child’s security, so don’t worry about hurting the other parents’ feelings. Better that than dealing with a kidnapping, right? The child. When the child is old enough, basic security procedures should be taught to the child. Be mindful not to scare them, but to educate them. This needs to be an ongoing process, and as they grow they need to be made aware of the potential threats they could encounter, both criminal and social!

Hopefully you can see from this article that there is a lot more to a security program than hiring a big guy with a gun, and we have not touched on such things as local laws, budget, environment and cultural issues, etc. Where a potential kidnapping threat is identified, everything must be done to minimalize it. That’s a far better state of affairs than to have to pick up the pieces from the aftermath of a kidnapping situation.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR Orlando Wilson has over twenty-five years experience within the international security industry. His experience in the risk management business began in 1988 at the age of 17, when he enlisted in the British army and volunteered for a 22-month front-line, operational tour in Northern Ireland in an infantry unit. This tour of duty gave him an excellent grounding in personal security and anti-terrorist operations. He then joined his unit’s Reconnaissance Platoon, with which he undertook intensive training in small-unit tactics and asymmetrical warfare. Since leaving the British army in 1993, he has worked and coordinated projects in the U.K., South & West Africa, Western and Eastern Europe, the U.S., Latin America, the Middle East, and the Caribbean. His experience has included providing close protection for Middle Eastern royal families and varied corporate clients, asset protection, embassy security, crisis management, corporate intelligence, asset recovery, and paramilitary training for private corporations and government agencies. He has become accustomed to working with minimal support, the problems of organized crime, and the types of complications that can occur when dealing with international law enforcement agencies.

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THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TERRORISM: PAST AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS

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by Dr. Jonathan Appel and Dr. Kim Appel

Abstract—This paper will provide a review of key scientific and professional literature analyzing theories and findings on the “psychology of terrorism.” The paper will also identify, describe, and evaluate what contribution psychological theory and research have made to understanding terrorists and terrorism and its impacts on the victims. Typologies and group differences in terrorism are explored. Current and future research directions in studying terrorism and counterterrorism are offered.

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I. INTRODUCTION

errorism is often over-simplified as a religious, fundamental, or irrational act. Terrorism is best seen as a dynamic and ever-changing phenomenon—but one that is best

organized through a multi-dimensional lens.1 It stands to reason that without a proper and accurate understanding of terrorism and the radicalization process, the response will be less than optimal and lack firm ethical and legal moorings. It

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is the “wide lens” view of terrorism and radicalization that will offer the best hope of organizing an appropriate and effective response for homeland security and counter terrorism efforts. Radicalization is multi-dimensional, with political, psychological, social, and religious aspects. This multi-dimensional process exists on an individual, group, and at a country and state level. It involves groups of people forming associations, defining social realities, and taking actions based on the psychological meanings given to those realities. Terrorism consequently has become the new reality for the world (a reality many were unprepared for). Unlike many other social processes and realities, terrorism is violent and is conducted in situations where violence is not expected. The motivation for terrorism and an effective response cannot be considered apart from psychological dynamics.

Ideologue. These individuals were hypothesized to come from severely dysfunctional families where they likely had suffered severe abuse or maltreatment, leading them to have hostile feelings toward their parents. Their extremist ideology was a displacement of their rebellion and hostility onto the “state” authority. That is, they acted out hostility by rebelling against the “state” of their parents.

A. Profiling Terrorist Psychology has tried to profile terrorists with limited success, as they constantly change over time. But some past scholarly terrorism typologies include Post’s Model, Hacker’s Typology, and Hamden’s Four Types.2

Hacker’s early typology includes terrorist typology that includes the idea of terrorists as “crusaders, criminals or crazies.” Hacker defines these as follows: • CRUSADERS (idealistically inspired and acting in service of a higher cause); • CRIMINALS (who simply use terrorism for personal gain); and • CRAZIES (often motivated by false beliefs and perceptions arising from their mental illness). Hacker notes immediately (and correctly) “of course, the pure type is rarely encountered.”5

II. POST’S MODEL Former CIA psychiatrist Jerrold Post built on the earlier models that sought to explain terrorism as a form of psychopathology or personality defect. This view was based on the psychodynamic view, which was initially popular in a psychological view of terrorism. Post argued that two different forms of dysfunction produced two different patterns in terrorist behavior. These types were called (1) Anarchic-Ideologue, and (2) Nationalist-Secessionist.3 A. Anarchic-Ideologue The first type was the Anarchic-

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B. Nationalist-Secessionist In contrast, the second type, the Nationalist-Secessionist, was not hostile, but loyal to his parents, and his extremism was motivated to retaliate or avenge the wrongs done to his parents by the state. In essence, they rebelled against external society out of loyalty to their parents.4

III. HACKER’S TYPOLOGY

IV. HAMDEN’S FOUR TYPES (1) The Psychopathic Terrorist. These individuals are narcissistic and unconcerned with the welfare of others. They are interested in their own personal benefits only. They can be hired to do “the job” with little or no interest in the


cause, and they can kill with no remorse. To kill a hostage is of little concern, unless it directly affects him or her, the psychopathic terrorist. The Ethnogeographic Terrorist has two sub-types: (2) Religious. (3) Political. These two types run the same or very similar dynamics but for different causes. This definition can be applied to political as well as religious fundamentalism. (4) The Retributional Terrorist. These are individuals who had no medical or psychological history of psychopathology. They may not have belonged to or favored any particular religious or political group or groups. Furthermore, they may not have desired any notion of joining such. Yet, their home, community, family members, or all of these were destroyed by deliberately planned war, crisis, or terror on innocent and civilian locations. The individual who survives an atrocity will seek revenge (punishment or injury inflicted in return for what one has suffered), through retaliation (to repay in kind or to make a counter-attack) and revolt (to rise in rebellion; to be in a mood of protest or defiance).6

V. CAN YOU “PROFILE” A TERRORIST? There have been opinions on both sides of the argument of whether you can profile a terrorist. It has been pointed out consistently that using merely using personality or pathology is problematic. And “the idea of terrorism as the product of mental disorder or psychopathy has been discredited.”7 The earliest study by Russell and Miller8 found that people with the following qualities tend to join terrorist organizations:

• 22–25 years of age • 80% male, with women in support roles • 75–80% single • 66% middle or upper-class background • 66% some college or graduate work • 42% previous participation in working class advocacy groups • 17% unemployed • 18% strong religious beliefs This basic profile has appeared to have held up over time, but there is considerable debate on other characteristics (e.g. trauma or prior jailed experiences).

VI. TRANSPERSONAL ROOTS OF “MALIGNANT DESTRUCTIVENESS” AND TERRORISM Religious and spiritual traditions across cultures and epochs have traditionally focused on the transpersonal aspects of living, but as psychological science evolves, there may be a recognition and the need to study this transpersonal level of self [9]. The Transpersonal domain represents the need for an “expansive” identity beyond the personal ego and the desire to experience “transrational” stages of consciousness (see Walsh & Vaughan).10 A. “Malignant Destructiveness” It is at the transpersonal sphere of influence that one can be driven towards aggressive acts. It is from this level one can express what Grof calls “malignant destructiveness.”11 Grof indicates the need to distinguish “defensive” or “benign aggression,” which is in service of the (perceived) survival of the individual or the species, from “malignant destructiveness,” a form of aggression that can be done even without any biological

The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2016/January 2017 55


or economic reasons. “Malignant destructiveness” is born out a lack of an integrated transpersonal perspective (e.g. experiencing a discontinuity among living organisms) as well as in a striving for transcendence in the context of desiring death-rebirth. A transpersonal search can be worked through in a constructive moral and ethical system, or it can be abandoned in despair and/or existential crisis. This innate desire for purpose, meaning, and transcendence beyond a finite material life can also be perverted or hijacked by spiritual or religious systems that advocate self or other destruction.

VII. BAND OF BROTHERS AND EVOLUTIONARY THEORIES OF RELIGION

“I WOULD LAY DOWN MY LIFE FOR TWO BROTHERS OR EIGHT COUSINS.” —J.B.S. HALDANE.12

Kin Selection: “I would lay down my life for two brothers or eight cousins.” —J.B.S. Haldane.12 Human behavior is often driven by individual and group evolutionary life forces, with the basic functions of safety, self-survival, and threat assessment— against hostile environments of the environment. This is the base objective of life, or Richard Dawkins’ “selfish gene” directive of replication and survival or our genetic material (“Kin Selection”).13 If this family bond does not exist in actual biology, it can be and is replicated through building a “psychological family,” which is the basis of most training for most military organizations. Our evolutionary perceptual systems and deep biological functioning and adaptation have been organized around two functions: (1) determine which environmental stimuli pose a threat to our existence—who is “safe” or “like us” and who is “the different one” (in group vs. out group)—and (2) replicate our genetic material. These are the realms of

56 The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2016/January 2017

the lower and mid-brain regions with its biological and emotional processes, programmed through evolutionary and genetic forces to aid our physical survival and propagation. Our very biology and behavior mapped from DNA carry the desire to stay alive and protect the self-system. Our neuropersonal level also includes the evolution of our paleo-mammal brain (as the origin of consciousness) and is built upon the unique properties of the mammalian neocortex. But even in our developed brain functions is the inherent tendency of limbic and amygdala activation (fear and aggression), which still often take precedence to the more recent frontal cortical emergence in human evolution. Psychology has shown that deep inherent (and unconscious) processes provide the tendency towards cultural and racial prejudice, even among the most “enlightened” among us. Terrorism, in part, is a product of human evolutionary pressures, but the usefulness of this adaptation is now obsolete. About a quarter of all terrorist groups and about half of the most dangerous ones on Earth are primarily motivated by religious concerns.14 Roy points out, “This is not, then, the radicalization of Islam, but the Islamization of radicalism” in that the radicals of each age glom onto whatever is anti-establishment or whatever philosophy fixes what the young adult saw lacking in their parents or close society. This void lasts for a couple of generations but eventually whatever they are fighting for loses its appeal, or perhaps begins to compromise, and young radicals of the next generation look for something else to attach themselves to for meaning.15 This lack of meaning in their life or lack of a deep commitment to some group in society was discussed by Marc Sageman, who, speaking specifically


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FIG. 1 DEVELOPMENT OF TERRORIST THINKING

about jihadists, said they tended to come from marginally devout families, were separated from their families for work or school, made friends with other people in the same situation, and together this small “group of guys” starts moving towards the more “pure,” in their eyes, form of Islam.16 Since the last part of the twentieth century, terrorism has often become embedded in a religious process that is hard to separate from other contexts. Islamic terrorism is still only one of countless forms of terrorism today, including revolutionary, political, nationalist, cause-based, environmental, criminal, religious, enforcement, maverick, splinter, and even psychotic or lone-wolf terrorism. To simplify terrorism as only being due to religious extremism is missing the mark and any painting with “broad brushes” is a disservice to getting

to the real root (and multi-dimensional) aspects in the etiology of terrorism.

VIII. THE DEVELOPMENTAL APPROACH Horgan and Taylor have noted: “What we know of actual terrorists suggests that there is rarely a conscious decision made to become a terrorist. Most involvement in terrorism results from the gradual exposure and socialization towards extreme behavior.”17 The “Developmental” approach has been advanced, in various forms, by a wide range of commentators. Terrorism, in this view, is not the product of a single decision but the end result of a dialectical process that gradually pushes an individual toward a commitment to violence over time. The process takes place within a larger political environment involving the state, the

THE PROCESS OF IDEOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT IT'S NOT RIGHT SOCIAL & ECONOMIC DEPRIVATION

CONTEXT

IT'S NOT FAIR INEQUALITY & RESENTMENT

COMPARISON

IT'S NOT FAULT BLAME/ ATTRIBUTION

ATTRIBUTION

YOUR'E EVIL GENERALIZING/ STEREOTYPING DEHUMANIZING/ DEMONIZING THE ENEMY (CAUSE) REACTION From Borym, 2003

58 The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2016/January 2017


terrorist group, and the group’s selfdesignated political constituency. The interaction of these variables in a group setting is used to explain why individuals turn to violence and can eventually justify terrorist actions. Three factors—injustice, identity, and need for belonging—often been found to co-occur in terrorists and to strongly influence decisions to enter terrorist organizations and to engage in terrorist activity (see Figure 1).

IX. TERRORISM FEEDS ON IRRATIONAL FEAR It is suggested that fear of terrorism in low-risk areas is irrational and not supported by data. Following 9/11, the threat of terrorists and terrorism has sent the American public and the American government into a chronic state of fear of continued mass disasters, car bombs, and suicide bombers. More Americans have died in the last year from gun violence than in the last 40 years from terror attacks. But perhaps most importantly, we should refuse to be terrorized. Terrorism isn’t really a crime against people or property; it’s a crime against our minds. If we are terrorized, then the terrorists win even if their plots fail. If we refuse to be terrorized, then the terrorists lose even if their plots succeed. This is not to suggest one should not think or try to prevent terrorist attacks. This indicates one must use a rational cost/risk approach. John Mueller, Professor and Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies at the Mershon Center for International Security Studies and Department of Political Science, Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio, writes: We find that, in order for the $75 billion in enhanced expenditures on homeland security to be deemed costeffective under our approach—which

substantially biases the consideration toward finding them effective—they would have to deter, prevent, foil or protect each year against 1,667 otherwise successful attacks of something like the one attempted in Times Square in 2010. In other words, we’d have to foil more than four major attacks every day to justify the spending. We are not arguing that much of homeland security spending is wasteful because we believe there will be no more terrorist attacks. Like crime and vandalism, terrorism will always be a feature of life, and a condition of zero vulnerability is impossible to achieve. However, the frequency and severity of terrorist attacks are generally very low, which makes the benefits of enhanced counterterrorism expenditures of a trillion dollars since 9/11 challenging, to say the least, to justify by any rational and accepted standard of costbenefit analysis.18

Like crime and vandalism, terrorism will always be a feature of life, and a condition of zero vulnerability is impossible to achieve.

X. FUTURE DIRECTIONS A. U.S. Department of Homeland Security The U.S. Department of Homeland Security is involved in many human factors/behavioral research projects now and into the future. The most used human factors method is the Screening of Passengers through Observation Techniques (SPOT) behavioral detection program, which deploys trained TSA agents to search for characteristic signs of stress and deception among passengers. There has been a call for the United States to move even further in adopting the “Israeli model” of behavioral intensive profiling. While SPOT has not be associated with any terrorist prevention to date, it is credited with thousand arrests for various offenses.19 There are also efforts to develop a prototype screening facility containing real-time, non-invasive sensor technologies to detect cues indicative

The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2016/January 2017 59


of the intent or desire to cause harm (rapidly, reliably, and remotely). The system hopes to measure both physiological and behavioral signals to make probabilistic assessments of mal-intent based on sensor outputs and advanced fusion algorithms and measure indicators using culturally neutral and non-invasive sensors.20 B. Overall Psychological Strategies for the Defense against Terrorism Based on research and thinking in the field of the behavioral sciences, one can generalize the direction the field can offer: • Apply human factors and ergonomics principles to reduce vulnerabilities • Enlist the aid of the populace in identifying vulnerabilities • Improve detection performance of counter terrorism personnel • Enhance team function of counter terrorism personnel • Enhance capabilities of first responders to terrorist incidents • Treat victims effectively C. Psychology in Disservice to Terrorism Prevention? Some experts affirmed the consensus view that torture is incontrovertibly bad, but might be justifiable as a lesser evil in the service of public safety and national security.21, 22 These arguments hinge on the presumption that torture actually works. Many top officials continue to debate whether it is the government’s prerogative to continue using coercive interrogation tactics directly or to render prisoners to states that torture, and there are many who disappear into CIA “black sites.” It is often defended that these practices are necessary to defend against terrorism. Psychologists James Mitchell and Bruce Jessen created (and made millions doing it) the CIA torture program, and these

60 The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2016/January 2017

two men were essentially the architects of the CIA’s ten-step interrogation plan that culminated in waterboarding. But it turns out neither Mitchell nor Jessen had any experience in conducting actual interrogations before the CIA hired them. They also had no research experience or expertise in this area. The CIA later came to learn that the two psychologists’ waterboarding “expertise” was probably “misrepresented” and thus there was no reason to believe it was “medically safe” or even effective. And most experts in the efficacy of interrogation conclude that torture does not work.23 In light of the above facts, the American Psychological Association voted to ban its members from taking part in interrogations at the prison at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and other military detention sites where it believes international law is being violated. APA unsuccessfully moved toward ethical complaints against Mitchell and Jessen.24 D. The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) (http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/) is an open-source database including information on terrorist events around the world from 1970 through 2010 (with annual updates planned for the future). Unlike many other event databases, the GTD includes systematic data on domestic as well as international terrorist incidents that have occurred during this time period and now includes more than 98,000 cases.25 The GTD can offer assistance to the behavioral and nonbehavioral researcher alike. E. Psychology as a Field in Response to Terrorism Psychology can aid the prevention and understanding of terrorism by a focus on the following: • Specialties IO/Social/Neuro/


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Counseling—all addressing research and practice areas in prevention as well as response to terrorist attacks. • Cross-disciplinary and cross training—between criminal justice, political, and behavioral sciences. • Development of a global psychology framework—more international models and collaboration within psychology and related fields. • Science-based government and criminal justice systems—based on rational and ethical decision making.

XI. CONCLUSION Psychology has tried to develop a theory of terrorism or to “profile” terrorists, with limited success, as terrorism constantly changes over time. Experts note that the idea of terrorism as merely the product of mental disorder or psychopathy is unlikely to be accurate, as a psychology of terrorism cannot be considered apart from political, historical, familial, group dynamic, organic, ideological, and even purely coincidental factors. Terrorism (and counter terrorism) is still a psychological process that can aid counter terrorism efforts. Individuals take actions either alone or with groups

62 The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2016/January 2017

in reaction to interpretations of reality. Terrorism is often over-simplified as a religious, fundamental, political, or irrational act. Terrorism is best viewed as a dynamic and ever-changing phenomenon—but one that is bestorganized trough a multi-dimensional panorama. It is the “wide lens” view of terrorism and radicalization that will offer the best hope of organizing an appropriate, ethical, and efficient responses for homeland security and counter terrorism efforts. Radicalization is multi-dimensional with political, psychological, social, and religious aspects. The current counter terrorism efforts may be insufficient due to its lack of vision and a narrow and isolated academic or solely practitioner approach. We must replace the fragmented view of terrorism as a single issue (e.g. religious) or disciplinary view (political science and/or military science) and examine the phenomena from an expansive lens. This lens should include psychology as well as other disciplinary fields. We must also link the researchers with the actual practitioners. Research and practice working together will be required for an effective response to terrorism now and

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The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2016/January 2017 63


into the future.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR Dr. Jonathan Appel received his bachelor’s degree in psychology from Kent State University, a master’s degree in community/clinical counseling from Kent State University, a second Master of Science in criminal justice/homeland security (Tiffin University), and a Ph.D. in counseling (sub-specializing both in family therapy and organizational psychology) from The University of Akron. He also has received a Graduate |Certificate degree from the Institute of Transpersonal Psychology. He has worked in the field of behavioral health for almost three decades. He has worked with individuals, groups, families, and organizations as a counselor, psychotherapist, clinical supervisor, Director of Behavioral Health Services, consultant, researcher, Department Chair, IRB Director, and educator. He is currently a Full Professor in the Department of Behavioral and Social Sciences, within the School of Criminal Justice and Social Sciences at Tiffin University. Dr. Appel is a Diplomate in Psychotherapy and is a Clinically Certified Forensic Counselor, a National Certified Counselor, a Certified Clinical Mental Health Counselor, a Certified Career Counselor, an Approved Clinical Supervisor, as well as an Internationally Certified Alcohol and Drug Abuse Professional. He has also received training as a Certified Red Cross Mental Health Disaster Worker and a Behavioral Health Disaster Responder to state disaster, emergency and terrorist events. He is certified in the psychology of terrorists by the American Psychotherapy Association. Dr. Appel is currently licensed as an Independent Marriage and Family Therapist, an Independent Chemical

Dependency Counselor, and a Supervising Professional Clinical Counselor. Dr. Kim-Appel was born and raised in Seoul, South Korea, where she got her undergraduate degree in art from Seoul Women's University. She came to the United States in 1991. She then obtained two master’s degrees (one in art therapy and one in family counseling). Her doctorate was then earned in counseling with an emphasis in family therapy and a cognate in gerontology She has worked with a diverse population of clients across the spectrum of emotional and substance-related issues, including youth, individuals, couples, and families. She currently is an Associate Professor of Counseling and Art Therapy at Ursuline College, and she has taught at both the undergraduate and graduate levels. She enjoys international research and travel. Her current research has focused on mindfulness and Bowenian theory as well as creativity and mental health. Dr. Kim-Appel is also involved in a number of international initiatives. Dr. Kim-Appel is a certified mediator (general/divorce), a licensed professional clinical counselor (LPCC-S), a licensed independent chemical dependency counselor (LICDC), a registered art therapist (ATR), and an independently licensed marriage and family therapist (with supervisor status) (LIMFT-S). Dr. Kim-Appel is also a clinical member of the American Association for Marriage and Family Therapy (AAMFT) and an AAMFT-approved supervisor. She has worked with a diverse population of clients across the spectrum of emotional and substance related issues, including youth, individuals, couples, and families.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT The authors would like to acknowledge their parents for instilling in them the curiosity and love of knowledge and

64 The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2016/January 2017

providing an ethical compass in trying to do good things in the world.

REFERENCES R. Borum. Psychology of Terrorism. Tampa: University of South Florida, 2003. 2 Ibid. 3 J.M. Post. “Notes on a Psychodynamic Theory of Terrorist Behavior.” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 2 (1984): 241256. 4 Ibid. 5 F.J. Hacker. Crusaders, Criminals, Crazies: Terror and Terrorism in Our Time. New York: Norton, 1976. 6 R.H. Hamden. Psychology of Terrorists: 4 Types. Washington, D.C.: The Foundation for International Human Relations, 2007. 7 M. Crenshaw. “Current Research on Terrorism: The Academic Perspective.” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 15 (1992): 2. 8 C. A. Russell and B.H. Miller. “Profile of a Terrorist.” In Perspectives on Terrorism, edited by L.Z. Freedman and Y. Alexander, 33-41. Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources, 1977. 9 J.K. Appel, J. K. and D. Kim-Appel. “The Multipath Approach to Personality: Towards a Unified Model of Self.” Psychology 1 (2010): 273-281. 10 R. Walsh and F. Vaughan. “On Transpersonal Definitions.” Journal of Transpersonal Psychology 25 (1993): 125-182. 11 S. Grof. Beyond the Brain: Birth, Death and Transcendence in Psychotherapy. New York: State University of New York, 1985. 12 J.B.S. Haldane. “Population Genetics.” New Biology 18 (1955): 34–51. 13 R. Dawkins. The Selfish Gene. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976. 1


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B. Hoffman. “The Mind of the Terrorist: Perspectives from Social Psychology.” Psychiatric Annals 29 (1999): 337-340. 14

O. Roy. “International Terrorism: How Can Prevention and Repression Keep Pace?” In BKA Autumn Conference (2015): 18-19. 15

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M. Sageman. “The Stagnation in Terrorism Research.” Terrorism and Political Violence 26, no. 4 (2014): 565580. 17 J. Horgan and M. Taylor. “The Making of a Terrorist.” Intelligence Review 13, no. 12 (2001): 16-18. 18 J. E. Mueller. Overblown: How Politicians and the Terrorism Industry Inflate National Security Threats, and Why We Believe Them. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2015. 19 T.C. Ormerod and C J. Dando. “Finding A Needle In A Haystack: Toward A Psychologically Informed Method For Aviation Security Screening.” Journal of Experimental Psychology 144, no. 1 (2015): 76. 20 J. Kraus and T. Verner. “Using Sensor Network for Passengers Prescreening In Air Transport.” Journal of Transportation Security (2016): 1-8. 21 M. Ignatieff. The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013. 22 S. Levinson. “Slavery and the Phenomenology of Torture.” Social Research: An International Quarterly 74, no. 1 (2007): 149-168. 23 R. Swenson. Educing Information: Interrogation: Science and Art, Intelligence Science Board, Phase 1 Report. Washington DC National Defense Intelligence College, 2006. 24 D.H. Hoffman, et al. Report to the Special Committee of the Board of Directors of the American Psychological Association: Independent Review Relating to APA Ethics Guidelines, National Security Interrogations, and Torture. Chicago: Sidley Austin LLP, 2015. 25 G. LaFree and L. Dugan. “Introducing the Global Terrorism Database.” Terrorism and Political Violence 19, no. 2: 181-204, 2007. 16


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waistline dead center. The knife stayed there when I surfed, slept, drove, and went on hikes. Most importantly, I used that knife every day for opening coconuts to drink and eat. After you drink coconut water and eat coconut for three days, you get terrible bowel issues, but then it goes away and you are fine with it. The knife dulled by then and was now relying on power of the swing, so I found a large stick to hammer the back of the knife through stuff. Like coconut husk and fuel for our campfires, we even used it once for vehicle repair. By the end of the trip, the edge was almost rounded and would not cut skin. As soon as I got stateside I sent the knife off to a place called Pioneer Valley Knife and Tool. They sharpened the knife for me for only five dollars plus shipping. It came back as good as new. I got robbed in Costa Rica three times. Yes, three. Once was in my sleep. They broke into my rental car on the beach. Man, it was desolate out there. Days would pass and we would see no one at all, but they saw us. The second time they stole one of our surfboards while we were out in the water. We left one board back and it was taken off the top of the truck. We saw it happen, but we were so far out at sea that by the time we swam back, the culprit was long gone. Third time’s the charm: this time the guy tried to steal our camera out of our bag after we gave him a ride. We caught him later that night in a small town nearby and the knife was used as a tool of intimidation. No violence, no words. Both thieves ran and dropped the camera. Costa was fun. Back in Israel not long after, by now I had a custom Kydex sheath made for the knife and was not carrying it on my vest front any more. I mounted it horizontally at the base of my vest in the rear. It sat in between my ruck and vest that I would wear in the field. I could grab it by reaching behind my back under my ruck and it could come right out. I made this decision because I was in a house arresting a terrorist with my team. To say the least, the terrorist resisted just when the flex cuffs where going on. We had a short but intense fight and he was subdued and handcuffed by us. I quickly realized I didn’t want a weapon easy for both of us to get to. The Kydex was zip tied to a molle-like mount on the back of the vest. It stayed there the rest of my time in combat service. In the IDF I saw many knives: KA-Bar, Spyderco, Emerson, and SOG Pentagon daggers. Ernest Emerson made and donated several knives to my army unit with the Emerson opening wave feature. These knives were specifically used as backup weapons and were actually not allowed to be used for utility. They were strictly weapons of defense to be used when needed. They were typically carried on the support side of the body in such a way that they could be deployed by the support hand and free the soldier from close contact so he could get to his sidearm with his dominant side. These Kerambit-style knives were carried by overt and covert forces on and off duty. These knives had a ring at the top and a bull nose-style blade. When deployed, they would open immediately and provide an underhand grip. They had a very aggressive short blade for fending off an adversary so you can get to your firearm. They were excellent tools. In my civilian life, I need something more discreet and easy to conceal. I have one knife I carry on my person now: a Spyderco

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THE GEN1 PATRIOT COLLECTION Made for Frogmen. Founded in 2009, RESCO Instruments set out to build a sleek, simple and rugged timepiece. This vision was realized with the production of the Gen1 Patriot model which now graces the wrists of over 100 active duty US Navy SEALs. Our watches are built and tested in Coronado California. The Patriot line is the only watch that has been field tested through every phase of NSW training by actual operators providing feedback and design input. The result is one very rugged timepiece worn by more actual SEALs than any other watch claiming to be the “Official Watch.” While there is no official watch of the U.S. Navy SEALs, if there ever were one, the RESCO Gen1 Patriot would be it. This is the re-edition of the original RESCO Gen1 Patriot, the watch that put us on the map and became a favorite of SEALs of both coasts. Built to Frogman specification and ready for anything, the Gen1 is back in the RESCO lineup. rescoinstruments.com


MODEL 98B Carved from years of hard-earned insight, the Model 98B is entirely in a league of its own. This revolutionary precision rifle offers sub MOA long-range performance that others can only dream about. Its straight-line design allows for faster, more accurate follow-up shots. Available in .338 Lapua Magnum, .300 Win Mag, .308 Win, .260 Rem, 6.5 Creed and 7mm Rem Mag, this rifle was developed to be a completely unique, purpose-built platform for precise long-range shooting. The Model 98B rifle’s aluminum upper receiver boasts an M1913 optics rail, offering plenty of space to mount substantial optics as well as a night vision device or other accessories. The forward receiver is drilled and tapped for accessory rails to be mounted at the 3, 6 and 9 o’clock positions using KeyMod. From its shooter-adaptable design to its unprecedented performance, the 98B is ingenuity in action. barrett.net

The Counter The Counter Terrorist Terrorist ~ December ~ August/September 2016/January 2016 2017 71


Counter

ADVERTISER INDEX

The

DECEMBER 2016/JANUARY 2017 VOLUME 9 • NUMBER 6

Journal for Law Enforcement, Intelligence & Special Operations Professionals To request detailed product information, visit our website http://thecounterterroristmag.com/readerservicecard.php or scan this code. Select the appropriate Reader Service Number (RSN) on the web-form and submit your contact information. Individual advertiser’s websites are also provided below for your convenience.”

Page

Ad/Company • website and/or email......................................................................................................................................................................... RSN Number

24

10th Annual Military Radar Summit • www.MilitaryRadarSummit.com...........................................................................................115

29

12th Annul Homeland Security Professionals Conference • www.thecounterterroristmag.com/conference.............................. 177

28

2017 K9 Vendor Conference and Show • www.policek9magazine.com........................................................................................279

57

Advanced Homeland Security Workshop in Tel Avia • ww.homelandsecurityssi.com................................................................. 215

25

American Public University • www.AMUonline.com/Counter-Terrorist.............................................................................................25

2

Barrett Firearms Manufacturing • www.barrett.net........................................................................................................................ 121

63

Counter Terror Expo - London • www.sctx.co.uk/counter-terrorist.................................................................................................. 221

15

DeSantis Holster & Leathergoods • www.desantisholster.com........................................................................................................ 241

27

Elevated Tactics training by SSI • www.homelandsecurityssi.com.................................................................................................... 313

3

Fairleigh Dickinson University • www.fdu.edu/mas..........................................................................................................................10

38

HighCom • www.highcomsecurity.com.....................................................................................................................................................8

42

J & N Tactical • www.jntactical.com..................................................................................................................................................... 155

59

MACTAC • www.homelandsecurityssi.com............................................................................................................................................228

67

Metro Dade K9 • www.metrodadek9.com......................................................................................................................................... 303

24

Operational Energy Summit • www.OperationalEnergySummit.com................................................................................................113

7

Patriot3 • www.patriot3.com...............................................................................................................................................................301

76

Phantom Lights • www.phantomlights.com........................................................................................................................................ 209

66

PLEA - Police Law Enforcement Associatio • www.PLEA.net............................................................................................................93

65

Police Canine Magazine • www.policecanine.com............................................................................................................................277

20

Resco Instruments • www.RescoInstruments.com..................................................................................................................................20

62

Southern Police Equipment • www.southernpoliceequipment.com....................................................................................................343

43

SSI Pull Kit • bradman@homelandsecurityssi.com................................................................................................................................ 179

75

SSI PVBs • www.SSIPVB.com................................................................................................................................................................226

4

Surveilance One • www.survone.com................................................................................................................................................. 319

73

The Counter terrorist Asia • sales@thecounterterroristmag.com........................................................................................................255

72 The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2016/January 2017


Counter The

Asia Pacific Edition The Counter Terrorist Magazine Asia Pacific Edition is finally available for the Asia Pacific region counter-terrorism and homeland security practitioners. The Asia Pacific Edition not only gives the readers a worldwide counterterrorism perspective but also in-depth information about counter terrorism activities in Asia. The Asia Pacific Edition provides an excellent platform for counter-terrorism and homeland solutions providers to access and penetrate the Asia Pacific market.

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Counter Terrorist ~ December 2016/January 2017 73


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New and improved

( portable vehicle barrier ) When Law Enforcement in Dallas wanted a product to protect the greatest sporting event in the US they chose SSI’s PVB. The reason the PVB is used by agencies and militaries across the globe is that it transfers the momentum of the threatening vehicle upwards and stops it in its tracks. Two adults can deploy the barrier in minutes, and there is no need for electricity whatsoever. The Portable Vehicle Barrier comes with several customized configurations: • You can put wheels on it so that it acts as a swing barrier and easily opens a road • You can toughen the line by adding anchoring cables or place the PVB’s in one single row or even three rows to stop anything • Additional safety features can be added PVBs can be folded down quickly –moved and stored with ease – the PVB is reusable and durable. Best of all NO maintenance is required. Made in the USA means jobs in the USA and supporting our national economy. Ordering is quick and easy allowing us to make the PVB available to your agencies immediately. Besides being the most cost effective barrier in the business today, the PVB is a VBIED killer. CALL NOW.

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