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to specialist support services, their right to legal aid and representation, and the role of the victim in the criminal justice process. Available procedural protections for victims of sexual crimes include the right to deliver evidence through a live television link, give a victim-impact statement at a sentencing hearing, and receive state-funded legal advice once charges have been brought against the accused. While a right to independent legal counsel for complainants throughout trial may be constitutionally suspect and practically infeasible in this jurisdiction, our narrowly tailored model of legal representation can certainly be improved upon, without compromising the procedural equality of a criminal trial. The Criminal Law (Rape) Act 1981 could be amended to allow a barrister who represents a complainant at a hearing for an application to adduce sexual history evidence to continue to represent that complainant throughout any related questioning or cross-examination. The provision of separate legal representation which currently only applies to cases of rape and aggravated sexual assault, could also be extended to victims of all sexual assault offences. While we cannot tilt the balance of the criminal trial in favour of the prosecution, we can certainly ensure that our criminal processes are victim-orientated and committed to protecting the dignity, privacy and bodily integrity of all witnesses.
A Convenient Marriage Ellen Hyland JS Law and Political Science Editor’s Note: This article contains references to human trafficking, which may be distressing for some readers. Jane Austen’s Pride and Prejudice transcends the cultural outlook of marriage at its time through the main character Elizabeth Bennet, who marries for love instead of wealth or status. Fortunately for women, this particular social norm has changed significantly over the past centuries, and people are not forced into loveless and potentially abusive marriages because of a fear of destitution. Austen’s characters are painted with a sympathetic brush: they are not seen as conning their prospective spouses, nor are they viewed as a burden on society for their decision to marry for a better quality of life rather than for love. Furthermore, the government does not involve itself in the affairs of the wedded couple, nor does it remove the benefits gained by the more impoverished spouse because of their intentions. Whilst not a perfect parallel with the current status of those entered into “green card” marriages, coined marriages of convenience in Ireland, it is interesting to note how differently immigrants are interpreted through the same contemporary lens that sees the Bennet sisters as unlucky and desperate. In 2015, due to the Free Movement Directive passed by the European Parliament, the Minister for Justice and Equality was given the power to declare marriages which do not adhere to certain criteria as “marriages of convenience.” This is defined in the regulations as a marriage entered into for the sole purpose of “obtaining an entitlement” regarding the status of entry and residency for foreign nationals. The regulations themselves are not outwardly ominous: the sole power that the Minister has after declaring a marriage of convenience is to “disregard” said marriage as a factor for the renewal of a residency card. Put simply, the regulations do not intend to interfere with the marriage itself, but with the benefits gained by the marriage. This all changed in 2018 when a judgement by Justice Humphreys against a Pakistani man, S, found that a determination by the Minister of a marriage of convenience under the 2015 regulations rendered the marriage a nullity at law, or that it never legally existed at all. This gave the Minister the power to essentially throw the baby out with the bathwater - he could not only revoke the benefits to the marriage but could actually dissolve the marriage itself under the guise of immigration policy. An appeal was partially allowed in 2020 where Supreme Court Judge McKechnie overruled this position in the case of M.K.F.S. (Pakistan) and A.F. and N.F.J. (an infant suing by and through his mother and next friend A.F.) v The Minister for Justice and Equality (2020). The judge stated that while the Minister for Justice and Equality clearly was not given the power in the regulations to render a marriage of convenience void, he left open the possibility for a
