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Russian Reliance on Wagner: An Assessment of Prigozhin’s Secretive ‘Sellswords’ and their Role in Ukraine.

by Daniel Shields-Huemer, SS Law and Political Science

Editor's Note: This article discusses military violence, which some readers may find distressing

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Introduction

When Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, the infantry on the Russian side was not constituted solely of Russian soldiers. Mystery men dressed in green without insignia were reported to be fighting on the Russian side not long after the onset of the war. These combatants were soon recognised as members of the Wagner PMC (Private Military Company), who had also been stationed in Ukraine during Putin’s 2014 annexation of Crimea The definition of this group and its legality as a combatant group is an emerging issue within international law This is particularly relevant due to the Wagner Groups’s favourable status within the Kremlin, and its ongoing use as infantry in the current war in Ukraine.

Prigozhin and Wagner’s Emergence

Yevgeny Prigozhin is often referred to as Putin’s “chef” - a nickname stemming from his spell as a high-end restaurateur in the 1990s, when he frequently catered to Russian elites, Putin amongst them Not long after, Prigozhin found himself managing lucrative government catering contracts, further ingratiating himself in Putin’s inner circle. It was the Kremlin’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and increasing military presence in Eastern Ukraine which presented Prigozhin with the opportunity for a new business venture, as Putin sought plausibility for his outright denial that Russian forces were not involved in Ukraine Thus, the Wagner Group was born. Despite long denying his involvement, Prigozhin admitted in 2022 to having owned and funded Wagner from the outside, alongside the more public figurehead Dmitri Utkin, a nationalist veteran of the Russian military intelligence service, whose far-right tendencies are believed to have led him to name the group after Hitler’s favourite composer. Since then, the Wagner group has also served Russian interests around the African continent, largely providing security services to state regimes and by extension furthering business ventures of the Russian oligarchy - in Sudan and the Central African Republic, Prigozhin has gained mining concessions in exchange for training state security services. Wagner has also fought extensively for the Assad regime in Syria alongside Russian forces there, often in direct conflict with US forces.

Human Rights Concerns

Wagner has earned a brutal reputation for its cruel treatment of its enemies, as well as its own members Numerous videos have circulated on the internet showing torturous and degrading punishment within Wagner, as those no longer wishing to fight are often violently executed. Such practices appear to be tolerated and even encouraged from above, exemplified by Prigozhin’s reported response to a video of a defector in Ukraine being murdered with a sledgehammer: “a dog’s death for a dog.” This suggests Prigozhin is savouring the newfound notoriety attached to his role as Putin’s top warlord. The Wagner group has not only been implicated in the Bucha massacre in the Ukraine war, but also in similar atrocities in Mali and Syria. Its combatants appear to act with a level of brutality not usually seen regularly with official state forces. Of course, tactical state use of PMCs with abhorrent human rights records is not unique to Russia. Wagner lends itself to comparison with the US “Blackwater” group, which was heavily employed in Iraq by the Bush administration Much like Wagner, they faced regular outcry for their grave human rights violations, most notably the Nisour Square massacre in Baghdad in 2007. However, the number of Wagner operatives active in Ukraine today sets Russian use of PMCs apart – Wagner troops in Ukraine have been reported by Western intelligence to have reached 50,000 men. This is following evidence of widespread prison recruitment drives to sustain the Russian war machine in Ukraine Prigozhin, who himself spent most of his twenties in prison, has been filmed promising Russian inmates pardons if they survive a 6-month stint with Wagner in Ukraine Worryingly, Wagner has been accused of using such troops as cannon fodder on the front line, with one former commander suggesting the group had deteriorated from “a band of brothers to a group of combat serfs.”

Difficulty of Definition

Despite the media’s common labelling of the Wagner group as “mercenaries,” the group does not lend itself to clear definition under existing international law The definition of mercenary under the 1989 International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries specifies that a combatant must be “neither a national of a party to the conflict nor a resident of territory controlled by a party to the conflict” to fall within the scope of the definition. This certainly excludes Wagner’s operations in Ukraine from the scope of the Convention Even its operations in Syria, it has been observed, are likely outside the Convention’s scope, as Russia unambiguously supported the regime with its own troops and weaponry

Wagner’s open involvement in Ukraine has put an end to its once secretive status. There has been much speculation regarding the reasons why the Kremlin is willing to bend its own laws for Prigozhin’s group.

Legal Grey Area - a Tactical Shirking of Responsibility?

The Wagner group’s legal status, evidently unclear under international law, is equally murky under domestic Russian law. Notwithstanding the registration of “PMC Wagner Center” in January of this year as a joint stock company in St Petersburg and the construction of a flashy new Wagner HQ there, PMCs remain illegal under Article 359 of Russia’s Criminal Code In its registration, the company states its interests as comprising business and management consulting, publishing, media, scientific development, and the leasing of ships and airplanes. However, Wagner’s open involvement in Ukraine has put an end to its once secretive status.

There has been much speculation regarding the reasons why the Kremlin is willing to bend its own laws for Prigozhin’s group The “plausible deniability” motive is one explanation – that Russia allows Wagner to do their dirty work for them, and then can shirk responsibility for their heinous acts. This appears convincing in the context of the group’s early involvement in Eastern Ukraine in 2014, where Putin sought to surreptitiously stir up pro-Kremlin sentiment in the region while avoiding outright Russian military involvement However, regarding the war in Ukraine, in which Russia is by now the clear aggressor, this argument is less convincing. Another factor may be the greater perceived expendability of PMC troops – public outcry is sadly but inevitably lessened by the fact that many of the Russian fatalities are contracted combatants rather than conscripted civilians. Indeed, Prigozhin has justified his prison recruitment campaign by callously suggesting “either mercenaries and inmates [fight], or your children do”

Conclusion

There is little denying that the extent of Wagner deployment in Ukraine presents a novel dilemma from a humanitarian perspective, but also the perspective of the law of armed conflict, as the Wagner group evades convenient definition. The sheer number of Wagner troops involved in Ukraine sets the situation apart from otherwise comparable examples like Blackwater Reliance on legally dubious PMCs to the extent seen in Ukraine is far more typical of weak authoritarian regimes than of a global powerhouse like Russia, and is thus quite surprising. Whether Prigozhin’s status as “warlord” will continue to reap military results for Russia may depend on whether he can maintain popularity with Putin. Recent tensions suggest Prigozhin’s burgeoning power and increasing criticism of Russian forces has birthed scepticism within the Kremlin. Regardless of its future, however, the Wagner group has exemplified a unique and troubling phenomenon in modern-day warfare: the large-scale use of brutal PMCs in a full-scale invasion of a neighbouring state

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