Disclosures Act 2014, in which whistle-blowers are ensured protection from reprisal. Applying this to the human trafficking context, the victims should be ensured a safe place for them to stay, with their anonymity protected, and measures taken to help them obtain new employment and residency. Victims have been viewed not as victims of trafficking but as potential witnesses in the eyes of the Irish criminal justice system. In a truly distasteful application of justice, human trafficking victims are required to co-operate in the criminal investigations if they wish to obtain support services, such as residency. GRETA strongly advises Irish authorities guarantee that identification of victims is dissociated from the suspected victim’s co- operation with the investigation. This grave injustice echoes the requirement that a sexual assault victim be a witness in their case, causing considerable trauma for the victims involved and impinging on their due process rights. It is strongly suggested that Ireland mirrors the Italian model, a pioneer among other member states. It provides victims with a right of residence not contingent on their co-operation with the investigative or criminal proceedings against traffickers, embodying a true victim-centred approach with a clear goal of vindicating human rights. Previously, Ireland’s only approach to human trafficking was founded in criminal legislation. Today, there is a greater understanding that human trafficking is a double-sided coin and the criminal aspect is not the only element that needs to be addressed. The recent case P v Chief Superintendent of the Garda National Immigration Bureau, highlighted the inadequacy of Ireland’s administrative scheme and how it fell short of its obligations under the Convention. This is further evidence of the inefficacious positive obligations founded in Article 4. The margin of appreciation doctrine is respected and acknowledges the ancillary nature of the Convention, however at times and particularly in relation to this issue, it appears to be a tool the European Court of Human Rights uses to evade coherently regulating an issue and maintaining a neutral position. It is at times like this, that I question if the European Court of Human Rights is a sword to be used in the battle of vindicating human rights or a political device to appease Member states.
10 · The Eagle Gazette Volume 5 Issue 2
The apparent bias of the Spanish Supreme Court in favour of financial institutions DARA NEYLON JF LAW AND POLITICS
Last November, the Spanish Supreme Court fell under public scrutiny due to a series of contradictory decisions. On the sixteenth of October the Supreme Court held that it was the responsibility of the banks to pay a particular tax on mortgages. However, this decision was soon overturned, causing the general public to feel as if they had been betrayed for the sake of financial interests. This is not the first time that people have doubted the transparency of the Spanish Supreme Court. In July of 2015, Luis Diez Picazo was appointed President of the third chamber, which was met with discontent from other Supreme Court members and politicians alike, due to being appointed through “merits” rather than through the common system. To do so, he had to be supported by the conservative members of the Court who are affiliated with the political party in power at the time. Not only was this method questionable, but the chamber that he was chosen to preside over was one in charge of decisions that may affect government legislation, making it seem even more possible that his appointment was politically motivated. This is not the only controversy that the Court has faced recently. Many of their latest rulings have ended up before, and been overruled by, European Courts. For example in 2015, the European Court of Human Rights held that Arnaldo Otegi, a pro-independence Basque politician, underwent an unfair trial. The tax on “Actos Juridicos Documentados” (Judicial Documents), is a governmental source of revenue that the bank’s clients who acquired a mortgage traditionally had to pay. However, on the sixteenth of October, the Spanish Supreme Court decided to depart radically from what had been the norm since the tax was created in 1993. The tax on mortgages is regulated by “Ley del Impuesto sobre Transmisiones Patrimoniales y Actos Jurídicos Documentados” (“Patrimonial Transmission and Judicial Document Tax Act”). It was enforced through executive order but was then maintained through legislation. This legislation deems that the one responsible to pay the tax is “whoever [the mortgage] may benefit”. Since
