The Changing Dynamic of Unconventional Warfare: The U.S. Special Forces in Vietnam and Their Impact on Modern War
Cole Manaster John Near Scholar
Ms. Zink, Mentor 16 April 2012
“’The Green Beret’ is again becoming a symbol of excellence, a badge of courage, a mark of distinction in the fight for freedom. I know the United States Army will live up to its reputation for imagination, resourcefulness, and spirit as we meet this challenge.”
– President John F. Kennedy in a letter to the U.S. Army regarding Army Special Warfare 4/11/62
1
The United States Army Special Forces are America’s elite soldiers, the unique warriors who fight in nearly unimaginable ways and conditions. Since their post‐World War II inception, the covert group has been involved around the world and has resolved conflicts using methods once deemed impossible. Although their journey to become world‐class warriors was an arduous one, their evolution during and since the Vietnam War has contributed to the revolutionary transformation of special warfare. By aiding the indigenous groups of Vietnam in resisting the Viet Cong, the U.S. Special Forces introduced a new chapter of unconventional warfare and added a new strategy that significantly altered the prosecution of the war.
The Birth of a New Fighting Breed
“Defined [today] as a broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, unconventional warfare [operations] are normally of long duration, predominantly conducted through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces that are organized, trained, equipped, supported and directed by an external source.”2 The general idea of unconventional warfare can be traced as far back as ancient Asia. The Ninja of feudal Japan were among the first covert soldiers, and the great Chinese general Sun Tzu devotes an entire chapter to the use of spies in his famous treatise The Art of War.3 To say
the fundamental concept of special operations is novel would therefore be a gross overstatement. But apart from references to espionage in works like Sun Tzu’s and subsequent treatises, the Special Forces idea as it stands today was not widely popularized.
In fact, this strategic notion of using tactical strike forces remained a mostly dormant minority view, and not the status quo of military operations, while conventional troops bore the brunt of action until the twentieth century.
U.S. Special Forces owe much of their existence to the work of agents in the Office of Strategic Services during World War II. The OSS, created by President Roosevelt in the early 1940’s, acted as a central command for espionage‐related activities that occurred behind enemy lines.4 The predecessor of the Central Intelligence Agency, the OSS also forged the path for a new, official military unit.5 During the war, the intelligence agency was responsible for overseeing the missions of covert operatives infiltrating Nazi Germany.
Beyond its purely espionage‐oriented objectives, the OSS was also involved in other operations, conducting sabotage and guerilla warfare as well as assisting German anti‐Nazi resistance groups. One of these clandestine missions, codenamed Operation Jedburgh, gave rise to a number of the original leaders of the Special Forces. This operation was a joint project between the OSS, the British Special Operations Executives, and the Free French Units, and their work included sabotaging Nazi operations in Belgium, Holland, and France6. In terms of its long lasting impact, the actions conducted through Operation Jedburgh established the foundation for the Green Berets’ emphasis on global involvement through international cooperation.7 One of the men who served as an OSS operative in Operation Jedburgh was Colonel Aaron Bank.
Col. Bank recognized from his experience in the OSS the need for a group to carry on the tactics that had seen success in the European Theatre. Along with other members of the OSS (including Captain Herb Brucker, the man who designed the famous green beret itself), he was “convinced that the Army should have a permanent unit whose mission would be to conduct unconventional operations."8 After much deliberation, the Army authorized the creation of such a unit, whose primary mission would be to conduct the same type of unconventional warfare that the OSS practiced in WWII. The 10th Special Forces Group (named to confuse enemies as to the number of active units) was officially commissioned as the first Special Forces unit on June 20, 1952 at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.9
But the Special Forces did not grow solely from the OSS; they were a blend of various units. Another military department responsible for the formation of this new unit was the U.S. Army’s Psychological Warfare Division. This coordinated Anglo‐American effort, which acted in a similar manner as the OSS, distributed propaganda leaflets, with both political and military messages, to attack the Germans. One of the most prominent leaders of the Psychological Warfare Division was Major General Robert McClure, referred to as the “forgotten father of U.S. Army special warfare”, who advocated the need for a PsyOps‐like unit after his experiences in World War II.10 With Maj. Gen. McClure’s background so similar to Col. Bank’s, the momentum for a permanent, unconventional force grew exponentially. Together, the two men helped develop their new unit, each using his personal expertise to form the most elite force they could. Col. Bank, with his fighting experience, looked for unique men who could parachute in and work behind enemy lines11 while Maj. Gen. McClure sought out officers with adequate guerilla warfare experience to help run the new group, such as Brigadier General Russell W. Volckmann12
After the first Special Forces Group was established, the next major achievement of its creators was the formation of a training center in the early 1950’s for their unique brand of soldiers. Maj. Gen. McClure deserves much of the credit for creating this center, as he “assumed a leading role in ‘selling’ the need for an unconventional warfare capability to the senior [Army] leadership” and was the main proponent of what became the Special Warfare Center and School at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.13 While McClure was the primary founder of the school, its development is owed to Lieutenant General William P.
Yarborough. Beginning in 1961, the “father of the modern Green Berets” assumed the duty of commander/commandant at the school (later named the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School) and began to truly shape the Special Forces groups.14 With the combined wisdom of so many experienced soldiers and strategists, the Special Forces have been from their beginning a multi‐faceted unit. It is from this diversified background that they count themselves among the most versatile, adaptable troops in the world. Though they started with a solid foundation upon which to grow, the Green Berets found themselves thrust into battle just a few short years after their establishment. In the Vietnam conflict, U.S. Special Forces met their proving ground and not only rose to the challenge but also simultaneously revolutionized their new style of warfare.
The Use of Special Forces in Vietnam As soon as the United States involved itself in war‐torn Vietnam, the vast differences in fighting style began to emerge. No longer were there the trenches of World War I or the open battlefields of World War II; they were replaced by the muddy jungle. Another new difficulty faced by American troops was the use of small guerilla forces by the enemy. The
Viet Cong, the violent communist organization that supported the North Vietnamese cause,
relied heavily on its more mobile, irregular forces (the guerilla troops) to infiltrate and attack the South. Its multi‐pronged barrages were extremely difficult to cope with, and fear spread that the large, unwieldy U.S. forces could not adequately handle these swift widespread guerilla attacks. Faced with this concern, the Special Forces found their niche as a solution to the irregular assaults.
The training developed by the founders at Fort Bragg prepared these troops to deal with precisely this type of diffuse adversary. Reflecting on their missions and effectiveness in the war, former Green Beret officer Bob Seals remarked, “The war in Southeast Asia was tailor made for the newest and most controversial force in the U.S. Army, the Special Forces".15 His retrospection captures much of the rationale that went into the decision to test this young unit. The Special Forces were designed to continue the trend begun in WWII in which problems that couldn’t be addressed by conventional methods were instead handled with unusual, innovative strategies.
Though the war had been raging for a few years already, Special Forces first began their work in Vietnam in 1957.16 Initially, they worked in an advisory capacity, similar to other American specialists that had been sent to the region. They were to assist where needed, but because of fears of a “loose cannon” or unrestrained unit emerging, they were not to interfere too much or overstep the chain of command.17 As the years progressed, their role was transformed, growing concurrently with both the American and Vietnamese governments’ understanding of the dynamic of the war.
When the forces were first formed earlier in the decade, they “were capable of waging unconventional war under conventional war conditions.”18 Upper level officials
soon came to realize that this war was unique because it was in no way a conventional war.
The enemy guerillas rooted themselves so deeply in the Vietnamese countryside, a place that was completely foreign to U.S. troops, that by early 1964, the Special Forces found themselves combating guerilla tactics more than implementing them themselves. While the troops were still determining their role in the overarching military hierarchy and structure, their ability to adapt so quickly to such unforeseen circumstances and completely alter their function in Vietnam exemplifies the versatility and responsiveness that has marked these men as such extraordinary soldiers.
Soon after the forces gained their bearings in the war zone, their duties began to expand rapidly. Some of their missions involved reconnaissance into the inner workings of the North Vietnamese forces. These operations often led the Green Berets to cross international lines and work covertly in surrounding countries such as Laos and Cambodia in order to expand and protect their defenses within Vietnam.19 An example of the unit’s combined intelligence gathering and clandestine border crossing capabilities, the 5th Special Forces Group participated in Project GAMMA, a covert infiltration of Viet Cong base camps stationed in and supported by Cambodia.20
Another important objective, which drew on their guerilla‐style, clandestine abilities, was search and rescue duty. Special Forces teams frequently recovered and extracted prisoners of war being held in North Vietnamese camps 21 The truly remarkable aspect of this objective, magnified by the heightened Cold War political tensions, was the troops’ determination to aid any prisoner regardless of nationality. Although the unit performed a wide variety of notable duties, the mission regarded as their primary objective
and most significant contribution to the war effort was the Civilian Irregular Defense Group, first implemented in November 1961.22
The Civilian Irregular Defense Group, or CIDG for short, has been called one of the most successful civilian‐based military strategies in history because of its unprecedented efficacy in using the resources and human capital of the region to the military campaign’s advantage. It is undeniably the chief work of Special Forces in Vietnam.23 The enemy’s guerilla nature and its deep penetration into “friendly” territory greatly differentiated this war from all previous ones. To combat this problem that had never been met before on such a grand scale, the Special Forces created a new way of interacting with the local population and using them to benefit the American and South Vietnamese cause. The plan, which developed in tandem with its implementation, was to train the indigenous Vietnamese people, called the Degar or Montagnard (a French term for “mountain people”), to resist the Viet Cong. Working alongside the Vietnamese Special Forces (which were established around the same time as their U.S. counterparts), the Green Berets created camps to train the Montagnard people and teach them important fighting skills.24
Through this program, the United States hoped to use the natives as small armies that could both attack the Viet Cong and defend their villages without the need for U.S. soldiers to be present when they were desperately needed elsewhere in the war zone. The Special Forces operatives would train a village, essentially leaving a defensive force and widely expanding their guardable region. While producing these vanguards was the most obvious purpose, the CIDG’s general mission, as defined in a post‐Vietnam retrospection done by the U.S. Army, was to:
train strike forces and village defenders; bring the local populace under the influence of the South Vietnam government; employ paramilitary forces in combat operations to reinforce organized hamlets, carry out interdiction activities, and conduct joint operations with Vietnamese Army units when such operations furthered the CIDG effort; conduct psychological operations to develop popular support for the government; establish an area intelligence system including, but not limited to, reconnaissance patrols, observation posts, and agent informant networks; conduct a civic action program; and, where appropriate, establish a border screen in sectors along the Republic of Vietnam international border.25
Although the program appeared to encompass an extensive list of responsibilities, many of these duties overlapped and thus could be attained simultaneously. For example, by providing the Montagnards with equipment and training, the United States built up a strong rapport with the natives, thus further strengthening the bond they were trying to build. Because of this, the Army felt even more comfortable entrusting these people with armaments and, what was arguably more dangerous, the strategy and tactics of the talented Special Forces. This acceptance of this relationship is evidenced by the support the Montagnard people gave the Special Forces in learning how to protect themselves; the program’s effectiveness ultimately depended on the cooperation of the villagers.26
The numerous goals of the CIDG did not in fact arise all at once. Instead, they too grew and adapted to meet the evolving needs of the war. At first, the primary driving motivation behind the program was the fear that the Viet Cong would manipulate the Montagnards, recruiting them to their cause and gaining access to their strategically
located territories spread across the Vietnamese Central Highlands.27 The irony is rather
striking that to impede the recruitment and manipulation of the natives by the Viet Cong, the Americans decided to recruit the people themselves and convert them to the American cause first.
To accomplish this task and earn their trust, the troops running the program emphasized the urgency of protecting the natives’ homes and communities, and this twist of intention may appear manipulative and malevolent; the Americans did provide the people with essential tools and training for both protecting their villages and resisting the Viet Cong. This assistance was especially important considering the tumultuous history of events that had transpired between the Vietnamese and the Montagnards. Similar to many other indigenous minority groups around the world, the Montagnard felt exploited by the Vietnamese, especially in regards to land ownership.28 Also, the Montagnards had at times pushed for greater political representation and even independence.
Once the Montagnards had accepted the Special Forces into their communities and training had begun, the mission was officially under way. The camps that were set up, called Area Development Centers, transformed into the arenas in which Special Forces began to shine. The Green Berets took the responsibility of actually teaching the Montagnards how to defend themselves. They taught the native people everything from rifle training to lessons in tactical strategy. One aspect that accounts for some of the remarkable success of the program was the rapid growth of the defense‐ready forces. Enabled by the structure of the CIDG, villages that had been trained by Special Forces could be left on their own and could then act as teachers to another village while the Green Berets moved on to train another tribe in a completely different region.29 Thus, the system
expanded at a phenomenal rate, growing from thirty‐four camps in 1962 to over three hundred by 1971, and the number of “soldiers” flourished exponentially.30
Once a sufficient number of villages had been “pacified,” as the Special Forces liked to call their trained hamlets, “there was a shift in emphasis from expanding village defense systems to the primary use of area development camps or centers (CIDG camps) as bases for offensive strike force operations”.31 This change signaled the activation of the newly trained troops by moving their objective away from merely protecting their own village and instead actively targeting Viet Cong soldiers, at least close to their home. Using the Montagnards in this offensive capacity was most effective in impeding the Ho Chi Minh trail, one of the Viet Cong’s major supply lines from the North, whose importance grew as the war dragged on.
After this shift, the CIDG became relatively steady. CIDG camps had been established around the country by 1968, and the program itself has been deemed one of the most useful products of the war, as evidenced by its implementation in subsequent conflicts.32 In the last few months of 1969 and the first few of 1970, control of the CIDG was officially transferred over to the Vietnamese Army. This task was the last act in Vietnam of the 5th Special Forces Group, one of the many new ones that had been created over the course of the war.33 But new Special Forces Groups were not actually the only Special Forces related units that came to be and that saw action during the conflict.
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam – Studies and Observations Group, or MACV‐SOG, was one of the most covert teams involved in Vietnam. It was comprised of highly qualified soldiers of all grades.34 Because of the extremely covert nature of the unit, much still remains obscure about the team’s activities, but the accolades MACV‐SOG has received
speak to its astounding accomplishments. A subtle signal of this unit’s remarkable
clandestine abilities can be seen in the high percentage of Medal of Honor recipients who served in the elite unit.35 Out of approximately 150 Medals awarded for action in the Vietnam War, eleven men, including the highly decorated Colonel Robert L. Howard, had served in MACV‐SOG.36 The work of both Special Forces and MACV‐SOG contributed significantly to the war effort. Unfortunately, they were not enough to change the ultimate outcome.
Although the Vietnam War was not considered a military victory for the United States, it gave Special Forces the opportunity to experiment and perfect their techniques.
Even though the war itself was not a success, the lessons gained from the experience were invaluable and provided even greater results in subsequent conflicts.
The Evolution of Unconventional Tactics The question often brought up by people, primarily conventional warfare proponents, who are skeptical of Special Forces tactics is: if what transpired in Vietnam didn’t win the war, why would anyone expect those same techniques to help in other conflicts today? The answer lies in both the evolution of unconventional warfare and in the changing face of war as a whole. Before the Green Berets existed and especially before their involvement in Southeast Asia, the notion of unconventional warfare was just a minor component in the grand scheme of military strategy.37 But just as the Vietnam War produced a new style of enemy to confront, the enemies the United States has faced since and continues to face today are similarly a transforming breed. The versatility of the Special Forces and related units enables them to readily adapt to these new challenges.
Since their first appearance in Vietnam, the Green Berets have been active around the world, acting as soldiers, advisors, and everything in between. No matter where they work, however, their roles more often than not reflect both their origins and their development in Vietnam. The soldiers to this day pay their respects to their founding fathers, honoring Col. Aaron Bank’s “vision and initiative [, which] allowed the Army to create Special Forces as we know them today.”38 His insight, along with that of his colleagues, established a powerful foundation that prepared his soldiers to fight in a wide range of situations and conditions.
More than just the Green Berets’ action in the world today is the impact they have had on the techniques and strategies applied by other units that have begun to implement their unconventional methods. In just the half‐century since the Vietnam War, numerous other units have sprung up with similar objectives. They have all been consolidated under the control of Special Operations Forces (SOF) and, above that, Special Operations Command (SOCOM). Nearly all of the groups now working as SOF, including the Navy SEALS, the CIA’s Special Activities Division, Delta Force, and the Navy Special Warfare Development Group (DEVGRU, colloquially SEAL Team Six), have learned from the lessons of the Special Forces. With such a rapid explosion of new forces, it is undeniable that
“Special Operations Forces have transitioned from a marginalized force structure to a prominent part of U.S. military strategy.”39
For a long time, conventional and unconventional forces were at odds with each other. The regular military was uncomfortable with the seemingly reckless, less cautious nature of Special Forces. Amazingly, it took until the 1995 SOF operations in the Balkans for there to be significant progress in the integration of the two types of soldiers at the
tactical level.40 Before those missions, however, SOF personnel were involved in operations around the globe. During the military operations that occurred in Grenada in 1983 and in Panama in 1989, SOF operators were on the ground and heavily involved.41
The Long Journey
Unconventional warfare has expanded and grown from the dense jungles of
Vietnam to the urban streets of Afghanistan. From its covert beginnings in World War II, special operations grew from the minds of talented tacticians like Col. Aaron Bank and have
markedly altered the face of modern warfare today. None of the techniques used today would exist had they not been tested in the heat of the Vietnam War, where the Green Berets proved themselves as elite warriors prepared to take on the toughest challenges. With the remarkable innovation of the Civilian Irregular Defense Program, the
Green Berets successfully adapted to try and handle an unforeseen enemy strategy. Though their efforts were ultimately in vain, the work they did accomplish established the Special
Forces as a new powerhouse in the military arena. Their presence on the battlefield ushered in a new era of military strategy that has only grown since their debut in the
Vietnam War.
Notes
1 John F. Kennedy to United States Army, April 11, 1962, accessed February 20, 2012, http://www.groups.sfahq.com/sf_heraldry/beret/pres_kennedy_to_us_army.htm
2 Bob Seals, "The 'Green Beret Affair': A Brief Introduction," Military History Online, November 24, 207, accessed February 5, 2012, http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/20thCentury/articles/greenberets.aspx#. 3 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Lionel Giles (1994), 105, http://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/132/pg132.html.
4 Alfred H. Paddock Jr., U.S. Army Special Warfare: Its Origins (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1982), 33, accessed February 5, 2012, http://www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA118758&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf 7
5 Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare: Its Origins 69 6 Colin Beavan, Operation Jedburgh: D‐Day and America's First Shadow War (New York: Viking Penguin, 2007), 30.
7 Beavan, Operation Jedburgh: D‐Day and America's First Shadow War 293
8 Dennis McLellan, "Aaron Bank, 101; OSS Officer Became 'Father of the Green Berets,'" Los Angeles Times, April 2, 2004, accessed February 5, 2012, http://articles.latimes.com/2004/apr/02/local/me‐bank2.
9 Department of the Army, Vietnam Studies: U.S. Army Special Forces 1961‐1971 (1973; repr., Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1989), 4 accessed February 5, 2012, http://www.history.army.mil/books/Vietnam/90‐23/90‐23C.htm.
10 Alfred H Paddock Jr., "Major General Robert Alexis McClure: Forgotten Father of US Army Special Warfare," PsyOps and Military Links, accessed February 5, 2012, http://www.psywarrior.com/mcclure.html.
11 McLellan, “Aaron Bank, 101”
12 Paddock Jr., “Major General Robert Alexis McClure”
13 Paddock Jr., “Major General Robert Alexis McClure”
14 U.S. Army Pacific, "Biography of Lt. Gen. William P. Yarborough," U.S. Army Pacific, accessed April 15, 2012, http://www.usarpac.army.mil/history2/dcgYarborough.asp.
15 Seals, “The ‘Green Beret Affair’: A Brief Introduction”
16 Department of the Army, Vietnam Studies 4
17 Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare: Its Origins 156
18 Department of the Army, Vietnam Studies 10
19 Department of the Army, Vietnam Studies 154
20 Seals “The ‘Green Beret Affair’: A Brief Introduction”
21 Department of the Army, Vietnam Studies 148
22 Department of the Army, Vietnam Studies 24
23 Department of the Army, Vietnam Studies 7
24 Department of the Army, Vietnam Studies 24
25 Department of the Army, Vietnam Studies 35
26 Department of the Army, Vietnam Studies 26
27 Department of the Army, Vietnam Studies 19
28 Department of the Army, Vietnam Studies 19
29 Department of the Army, Vietnam Studies 97
30 Department of the Army, Vietnam Studies 184‐193
31 Department of the Army, Vietnam Studies 34
32 Department of the Army, Vietnam Studies 151
33 Department of the Army, Vietnam Studies 151
34 J.H. Crerar, "MACV SOG: New Books Reveal Vietnam's 'Secret War,'" Special Warfare 13, no. 2 (Spring 2000) accessed February 14, 2012, http://puffin.harker.org:2079/ps/ i.do?id=GALE%7CA67163342&v=2.1&u=harker&it=r&p =ITOF&sw=w.
35 Congressional Medal of Honor Society, "Vietnam War Recipients," Congressional Medal of Honor Society, accessed April 9, 2012, last modified 2012, http://www.cmohs.org/ search_results.php?q=&x=55&y=4&rank=&organization=&division=&company=&conflict= Vietnam+War.
36 Crerar, "MACV SOG: New Books Reveal Vietnam's 'Secret War,'"
37 Matthew Johnson, "The Growing Relevance of Special Operations Forces in U.S. Military Strategy," Comparative Strategy 25, no. 4 (October 2006): 273, accessed February 14, 2012, doi:10.1080/01495930601028622. 273
38 McLellan, “Aaron Bank, 101”
39 Johnson, “The Growing Relevance of Special Operations Forces in U.S. Military Strategy,” 273
40 Johnson, “The Growing Relevance of Special Operations Forces in U.S. Military Strategy," 283
41 Johnson, “The Growing Relevance of Special Operations Forces in U.S. Military Strategy," 280
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