Israel: A Light Among Nations • Spring 2013 • Volume VII: Number 1 by Jewish Policy Center

inFocus Vol. 7 Issue 1 | SPRING 2013

Quarterly

Oded Eran on U.S.-Israeli Military Relations | Yoram Ettinger on Israel’s Economy | Yossi Kuperwasser on Israel’s Future Stategic Challenges | David Goldman on Israel’s Demographic Miracle | Rep. Peter Roskam on Sustaining the U.S.-Israeli Partnership | One-on-One with Ambassador Michael Oren | David Wurmser on Israeli Natural Gas | Nicholas Saidel on Engaging with the UN Human Rights Council | Cameron Brown and Owen Alterman on America’s Changing Demographics | Avi Mayer on How Israel is a Force for Good | Shoshana Bryen reviews Saturday People, Sunday People

inFOCUS examines israel: a light among nations

letter from the Publisher

Contributors

t a time when the fragile gains for civil liberties in the Middle East appear to be unraveling and Israel remains under political attack and looming physical threat, there is a tendency to take a magnifying glass to the immediate crisis. But Israel is not the sum of the 24hour news cycle. Twenty-first Century Israel is a triumph of human spirit and intellect under pressure. Like every country, it grapples with economic, social and moral issues and some political pushing and shoving as well. Yet unlike many other countries, Israel’s vibrant democracy gives voice to its citizens, and its government listens. The Jewish Policy Center is pleased to offer this spring edition of inFOCUS Quarterly as an antidote to tunnel vision. Israel is focused on its future and we are too. Major natural gas finds will make Israel an energy exporter, and David Wurmser of Delphi Global Analysis Group addresses the impact on Israel’s relations with Europe, Asia, and Russia. Avi Mayer, Direc-

tor of New Media at The Jewish Agency, describes Israel’s contributions to international health and welfare, and Ambassador Yoram Ettinger discusses the impact of Israel’s strong economy and technology revolution. And, because security remains on the table Yossi Kuperwasser, Director General of the Ministry of Strategic Affairs, looks at Israel’s strategic challenges. Don’t miss our one-on-one interview with Israel’s ambassador to the United States, Michael Oren. He discusses the U.S.-Israel relationship, how Israel’s security calculus has changed since the two years of Middle East upheaval, and he explains what is necessary to forge ahead in peace process. If you appreciate our work, please consider making a generous donation to the JPC. You may do so securely at www. jewishpolicycenter.org/contribute.php. Sincerely,

inFOCUS

Volume 7 | Issue 1

Publisher: Matthew Brooks Editor: Matthew RJ Brodsky Deputy Editor: Samara Greenberg Managing Editor: Shari Hillman Contributing Editor: Shoshana Bryen Copy Editor: Karen McCormick Art Director: Andrea Cohen

inFOCUS is published by the Jewish Policy Center, 50 F Street, N.W., Suite 100, Washington, DC 20001. (202) 638-2411 The opinions expressed in inFOCUS do not necessarily reflect those of the Jewish Policy Center, its board, or its officers. To receive your copy of inFocus, please contact the Jewish Policy Center. © 2013 Jewish Policy Center

WRITERS’ GUIDELINES Essays must be 1,600 to 2,000 words in length. Email submissions to info@ jewishpolicycenter.org. Check our website to ensure your topic works with scheduled themes of future issues before submitting.

www.JewishPolicyCenter.org Matthew Brooks, Executive Director

Oded Eran is a Senior Researcher at the Institute for National Security Studies, Tel Aviv. (page 3)

Brig. Gen. (res.) Yossi Kuperwasser is Director General of Israel’s Ministry of Strategic Affairs. (page 16)

Rep. Peter J. Roskam represents the Sixth District of Illinois. He serves as Chief Deputy Majority Whip and co-chair of the House Republican Israel Caucus. (page 5)

Nicholas Saidel is Associate Director of the Institute for Strategic Threat Analysis & Response (ISTAR) at the University of Pennsylvania. (page 19)

David P. Goldman is the author of How Civilizations Die (and Why Islam is Dying, Too), a PJ Media columnist, and a former essayist at Asia Times Online. (page 8)

Cameron S. Brown is a Neubauer research fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS). Owen Alterman is a research fellow at INSS. (page 22)

Yoram Ettinger, a former ambassador, is a consultant to Israel’s Cabinet members, legislators, and the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee. (page 11)

David Wurmser is the founder of the Delphi Global Analysis Group. (page 26)

Michael B. Oren is the Israeli Ambassador to the United States. (page 14)

Avi Mayer is Director of New Media at The Jewish Agency for Israel. (page 29) Shoshana Bryen is Senior Director of the Jewish Policy Center. (page 32)

U.S.-Israel Military Relations: An Israeli Perspective by Oded Eran

he United States defense establishment is a major partner in Israel’s strategic balance and a pillar of its defensive shield. And Israel has contributed to American tactics and weapons systems. At the same time, no American soldier has ever fought in a battle in which Israel was fighting with its Arab neighbors, nor is that expected to happen in the future. The statement that the U.S. is committed to Israel’s security has been repeatedly made by the U.S. President and key U.S. political and military leaders. America’s commitment to Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge (QME) has been reiterated and enhanced by presidents and congresses of both political parties, even as the United States replaced the Soviet Union as the source of much of the Arab world’s weaponry. During the first twenty years of its existence as a state, however, Israel relied on European military hardware and security cooperation. In 1956 and 1967, Israel went to battle equipped mostly with French arms. The Israeli military’s overwhelming success in 1967 was a watershed in terms of Israel’s overall relation with the United States.

z The Legacy of 1967

The 1967 Six Day War has been properly understood as a defeat for the Soviet Union, with which Syria and Egypt had aligned themselves. The armies of these two Israeli neighbors were heavily armed with Russian-made weapons at the height of the Soviet-American Cold War, which had a significant impact on U.S. strategy in the Middle East and the Mediterranean. The political and military out-

comes of the war therefore transformed Israel into a central player in the context of the bi-polar competition. The resulting emergence of an intensive geo-strategic dialogue between Jerusalem and Washington translated into closer and stronger military relations. The arms embargo that France imposed in 1967, followed by the one imposed by Great Britain in 1973 only accelerated Israel’s shift to a U.S. weapons-based army. Following the 1973 Yom Kippur War, a U.S. military delegation that included General Donn Starry, later Commanding General of the U.S. Readiness Command, studied Israeli battle tactics, particularly in the Sinai Desert. The resulting reports and observations were instrumental in creating the U.S. Air Land Battle Doctrine that proved exceptionally successful in the 1991 Gulf War. The span of the U.S.-Israel strategic relationship, in which the military-tomilitary relations are just one piece of a larger puzzle, is difficult to describe. The United States-Israel Enhanced Security Cooperation Act (P.L. 112-150) that President Obama signed into law on 27 July 2012 provides a glimpse. It is a short but impressive list of initiatives to enhance political, military and intelligence cooperation activities between the two partners. Military-to-military relations between the U.S. and Israel have benefitted from a unique set of circumstances in which the two find themselves. They use the same hardware and their armies and soldiers are continually involved in battle. In some cases, they find themselves operating in similar physical and climatic

circumstances. The level of research and development both in the area of hardware and training, as well as in drawing lessons-learned from active combat, allows the two armies to mutually benefit from these experiences and to increase interoperability between the two armies.

z Cooperation in Rocket and Missile Defense

Joint military cooperation in the area of rocket and missile defense serves as the most well known, and most recent example. The success of the Iron Dome missile defense system was the result of a joint effort in development, backed by critical U.S. military assistance that amounted to $275 million for the system in FY2012. Iron Dome is only part of the joint research and development of missile defense systems, which also includes the long-range Arrow anti-missile defense system and the short-range David’s Sling system. The U.S. stands to benefit immensely from Israel’s rocket defense R&D efforts. Both the Iron Dome (operational) and David’s Sling (soon to become operational) systems offer capabilities that no other country in the world has. The Israeli firm Rafael developed the Iron Dome system, and has since partnered with Raytheon to produce it for U.S. allies, and perhaps for the U.S. military. Given Iron Dome’s successful track record to date, there have been requests on the U.S. side for co-production or technology sharing. Similarly, Raytheon and Rafael have collaborated in the development of David’s Sling in order to meet U.S. and Israeli operational requirements and it may also be

Spring 2013 | inFocus Examines Israel: A Light Among Nations

procured by the U.S. military. Looking forward, U.S.-Israel rocket and missile defense cooperation is likely to deepen further through continued U.S. support and engagement in the development of the Arrow III system. U.S. funding of the Arrow III exo-atmospheric interceptor, to be fielded in 2015, will provide Washington with key insights into the development of a system that, according to senior U.S. Missile Defense Agency (MDA) officials, “will be more capable than anything the United States has

Contingency Response Group conducted joint training exercises in Israel.

z …And By Sea

The presence of the U.S. Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean enables close cooperation between the two states’ naval and other forces. The two forces regularly conduct joint exercises. Reliant Mermaid, which took place in August 2012, was a search and rescue exercise that included the use of live ammunition. The U.S. deployed its most advanced vessels during

The U.S. stands to benefit immensely from Israel’s rocket defense R&D efforts. Both the Iron Dome and David’s Sling systems offer capabilities that no other country in the world has. on the drawing board,” as reported in the Eisenstadt and Pollock study, Asset Test: How the U.S. Benefits from its Alliance with Israel. While this sort of cooperation relates to joint development and production, the U.S. and Israel have additionally held joint missile defense exercises. The largest and most recent, Austere Challenge 12, was held in October-November 2012, involving 3,500 U.S. and 1,000 Israeli personnel.

z By Air…

Air Force cooperation has been one of the most advanced areas of cooperation due to the Israeli Air Force’s total reliance on U.S. hardware and the Israeli contributions to the different systems and joint training and exercises. Recent talks between the heads of the U.S. Department of Defense and the Israeli Ministry of Defense centered on Israel’s share of the production of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter and on the modifications to be made to adjust the system to Israeli requests. Most recently, in January of this year, the U.S. 86th Airlift Wing and 435th

the exercise, such as the Aegis-class destroyers.

z Military Intelligence Sharing

U.S.-Israel military intelligence cooperation is part of a wider exchange between the two states and is based on the sharing of instruments and informationgathering resources employed by the two in the Middle East region. The close proximity of Israel, the ongoing confrontation with regional terror groups with links to terror organizations from outside the region, together with the importation of weapons systems from sources hostile to both Israel and the United States, makes this intelligence sharing essential for success. Military intelligence cooperation is, and will be, the basis for the intense dialogue that the two states hold concerning the Iranian nuclear effort and nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. The Arab upheaval and its implications reach beyond the military realm, but the uncertainty and instability it created have military implications nonetheless. Here again, the intelligence-gathering and sharing will be essential for the

inFocus Examines Israel: A Light Among Nations | Spring 2013

understanding of the events and processes, and for the calibration of the partners’ respective responses. Cooperation in this domain, therefore, has wider significance than just the military.

z A Strong Web of Relations

Developing and using the same military hardware systems, sharing lessons learned from previous combat experience, and developing novel concepts and joint exercises, create a wide web of military-to-military relationships between the U.S. and Israel. The thousands of Israeli and American soldiers who come together at military schools, training facilities, joint exercises, and military industrial plants, create a human bridge. They translate into reality—on a daily basis—the concept of the strategic alliance and the commitment that comes from a statement or a Bill passed by Congress. It is an invaluable contribution to Israel’s long-term security. Military-to-military cooperation is an important layer in Israel’s defensive shield, beyond whatever news items about certain joint exercises may communicate. These relations reduce the heavy burden entailed in defending Israel. The recent military confrontations in Lebanon 2006, and in Gaza 2008-2009 and 2012 are reminders of the changing nature of the warfare in which Israel finds itself. Instead of facing conventional armies, Israel is now confronted by a combination of terror and rocketry capabilities of sub-state adversaries, which can be almost instantly resupplied. The Iranian threat of both conventional and potentially non-conventional weapons adds a new dimension. Israel’s strategic cooperation with the U.S., and particularly its military-to-military relations, are therefore a vital part of Israel’s defense. Oded Eran is a Senior Researcher at the Institute for National Security Studies, Tel Aviv, and he served twice at the Embassy of Israel in Washington, DC.

Sustaining the Pillars of the U.S.-Israel Relationship by Rep. Peter J. Roskam

n May 2011, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu delivered a most moving and memorable speech in the House chamber. One passage in particular resonated with me: “Israel has no better friend than America. And America has no better friend than Israel. We stand together to defend democracy. We stand together to advance peace. We stand together to fight terrorism.” This may be the case today, but there is no guarantee it will be true tomorrow. If there comes a day when the United States no longer views Israel as a strategic partner, the relationship may fall apart. My fear is not that Israel will abandon the United States, but that the United States will abandon Israel. The U.S.-Israel relationship has been strained at times. President Eisenhower threatened to cut $100 million in foreign aid if Israel failed to fully comply with a U.N. resolution to withdraw completely from the Sinai. The Johnson Administration denied Israel’s request to aid its preemptive strike on Egypt in June 1967 and remained neutral in the Six Day War. And recent feuding between the Obama Administration and the Israeli government over the peace process and Iran’s nuclear program has been unhealthy to say the least. While the alliance is strong today, some Americans view the relationship as a one-way street rather than a mutually beneficial partnership. Israel is not just a cause worth defending, but a partnership we must fight to preserve. To be sure, Israel has benefited immensely from its relationship with the United States. American economic, military, and diplomatic support has been essential to Israel’s pros-

perity and security. But America has also benefited. Military and intelligence cooperation, Israel’s commitment to nuclear non-proliferation, and strong economic ties have paid immeasurable dividends for the United States. Pro-Israel Americans must continue to highlight Israel’s role as a strategic asset to the United States, or risk the erosion of the U.S.-Israel relationship.

z Military & Intelligence Cooperation

U.S.-Israel military and intelligence cooperation has been the cornerstone of America’s foreign policy in the Middle East for decades. Joint U.S.-Israel security collaboration dates back to the Cold War, in which Israeli intelligence on the Soviet Union was critical to America’s ability to combat the spread of communism. The United States and Israel have worked together ever since to pursue mutual national security interests in the region. Foreign aid is the most tangible and critical component of U.S. support for Israel—it is also the most commonly misunderstood. A 2011 Gallup poll showed that 59 percent of Americans support making budget cuts to foreign aid to balance the budget. A separate poll shows that the average American believes foreign aid comprises 25 percent of the annual federal budget and thinks 10 percent would be an appropriate percentage. But this perception is far from reality. Total foreign aid spending comprises approximately 1 percent of the federal government’s annual budget. A fraction of this 1 percent is allocated to Israel, 75 percent of which is required to be spent purchasing U.S. military equipment. Nearly all of

the remaining funds are used to purchase Israeli-made military goods. Israel’s security concerns are unparalleled. Israel faces Hezbollah to the north, Hamas to the southwest, Iran to the east, Syria to the northeast, and the Muslim Brotherhood to the south—all of whom desire Israel’s destruction. These security concerns are very real and defending them very costly. A Central Bureau of Statistics report revealed that defense spending comprised nearly a fifth of Israel’s budget in 2009. At 6.5 percent, Israel’s defense spending to gross domestic product ratio ranks amongst the highest in the industrialized world. Our foreign aid is not a gift, but an investment that enables Israel to maintain a military more advanced and capable than its enemies—known as a qualitative military edge (QME). And in turn, Israel’s QME serves the direct national security interest of the United States. As the world’s de facto counterinsurgency expert, Israel is an essential resource for U.S. counterterrorism efforts not only in the Middle East, but North Africa, Asia, and as close to home as Mexico. Regular joint military exercises integrate U.S.-Israel defense capabilities, and U.S. and Israeli troops frequently train side-by-side to learn each other’s battlefield techniques. A three-week drill this past October, which included 4,500 combined troops, marked the largest joint exercise to date between the two militaries. Last summer, the New York Police Department (NYPD) opened a branch in Israel’s Sharon District Police headquarters in Kfar Saba to enhance its counterterrorist operations. This working partnership has been

Spring 2013 | inFocus Examines Israel: A Light Among Nations

critical in combating common enemies. Iranian proxies Hezbollah and Hamas have murdered hundreds of Americans and are designated terrorist organizations by the United States and Israel. For example, Hezbollah killed 241 U.S. personnel in the 1983 bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut and 19 servicemembers in the 1996 Khobar Tower bombings. While Hamas suicide bombings within Israel have killed dozens of American citizens, Hezbollah has increased its activities beyond its Lebanese base, including coordinating with some of the most dangerous Mexican cartels. And Hezbollah was recently found guilty of killing dozens of Israeli terrorists in a bus bombing in Bulgaria—renewing the need to urge the European Union (EU) to finally designate Hezbollah as a terrorist organization. The days in which our enemies wear uniforms clearly identifying their affiliation are long gone. But Israel is on the front lines, and its intelligence is invaluable to the United States. Imagine sitting at your desk at work or school when a siren sounds. You have 15 seconds to find shelter before a rocket strikes. Most of us cannot even fathom such a scenario. Nobody should have to live under these circumstances. Yet this is the reality I encountered while visiting families living in Sderot along the Gaza border, which has endured thousands of Hamas rockets over the years. But now the people of Sderot can sleep a little easier every night thanks to the anti-missile defense system Iron Dome. Iron Dome was transformed from an idea to an operational, life-saving device in just five years. This is testament to close U.S.-Israeli military cooperation and U.S. financing. Arrow 3 and David’s Sling, similar systems designed to intercept medium and long-range rockets, are expected to be deployed within a matter of years. Iron Dome has intercepted hundreds of Hamas’ rockets from Gaza with an estimated 90 percent success rate since its deployment in 2011. It has rendered Hamas’ weapon of choice—deadly shortrange rockets—nearly obsolete. And the

Israeli government will match our development dollar-for-dollar once the United States begins co-producing the system. Three of the last American casualties from the Iraq War were troops killed by a rocket from a Hezbollah-affiliate. If they had been protected by Iron Dome they would still be alive today. This joint venture offers an unprecedented return on investment—one only possible with Israel.

z Nuclear Non-Proliferation

No country has a greater stake in preventing a nuclearized Middle East than Israel. For years, Israel has stood as a pillar of prevention against malicious nuclear programs in the Middle East. In 1981, the Israeli Air Force conducted a successful, preemptive strike on Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor. One can only imagine a world in which Saddam Hussein possessed nuclear weapons. Israel’s bold actions spared countless lives and prevented U.S. troops from facing a nuclear-armed Iraq in the 1991 Persian Gulf War and recent Iraq War. In just the last two years, the Syrian Civil War has resulted in 70,000 deaths and millions of refugees. Like its puppeteer Iran, President Bashar al-Assad’s regime funds and supplies proxies Hezbollah, Hamas, and other terrorist cells. And while there is grave concern over Syria’s chemical weapons stockpile—one of the world’s largest—Syria does not have a nuclear weapon thanks to Israel. Israel did the world a profound favor in bombing Syria’s North Korea-backed al-Kibar nuclear reactor in 2007. Few in the international community believed Syria had a nuclear reactor, but Israel was confident in its intelligence. When the United States refused to act, Israel took unilateral action and spared the world a nuclear Syria. Iran’s race for nuclear weapons must be stopped at all costs. Israel and the United States must face this threat head on and in lockstep with one another. A nuclear Iran would trigger a nuclear arms race in the Middle East, as countries including Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt would in time pursue nuclear weapons

inFocus Examines Israel: A Light Among Nations | Spring 2013

of their own. Iranian long-range ballistic missiles can reach India, North Africa, western China and parts of Eastern Europe. Dozens of facilities and thousands of American troops and civilians would be in danger. Experts say that it could be less than a decade before Iran’s missiles can reach the East Coast of the United States. And there is always the threat that nuclear weapons could also end up in the hands of Hezbollah, Hamas or other Iranian terrorist proxies. Hezbollah’s missile arsenal is estimated at 70,000 rockets—including long-range missiles. Hamas also has a deadly stockpile of at least 10,000 rockets, including powerful Iranian Fajr-5 missiles. But my concern remains a nuclear Trojan Horse delivery system. These are cheaper to develop, easier to deploy, and harder to detect. A nuclear device arriving in Baltimore Harbor by container ship or in a briefcase would make the devastation of 9/11 pale in comparison. Iran is not a rational actor. We cannot afford to risk the endless terror that would come with a nuclear-armed Iran.

z Economic Cooperation

Israel may represent the best return on investment of U.S. foreign aid dollars we’ve spent as a nation. Our first Free Trade Agreement was established with

The Jewish Policy Center Board

moreIsrael’s helpfulrole once office. ashea left high-volume trade Lula’s influence with Argentina’s partner with the United States comes asleftno wing president was key surprise. Israel isCristina a worldKirchner leader in highto the UDI effort. Argentina home to tech startups, scientific researchisand develLatin America’s largest Jewish biomedcommuopment (R&D), green technology, nity, making it a challenge for the ical engineering, and agriculture to lobbyname effort. But a simultaneous diplomatic aing few. Apple opened its first R&D facility effort byofWalid Muaqqat, a veteran Palesoutside California in Herzliya, Israel last tinian diplomat the region, convinced year and has sinceinadded two more develthe Argentine government to announce opment centers—in Haifa and Ra’anana. its endorsement of a Palestinian state,Dell, also Google, Intel, Microsoft, IBM, HP, in December 2010. AT&T, Motorola, Yahoo, and other highThe Washington Posthubs reported in Febtech companies also have in Israel. ruary that this “was a strategy Palestinian Drip irrigation, USB flash drives, diplomats repeated acrossthetherevolutioncontinent AOL Instant Messenger, last year, taking advantage of the region’s ary Multiple Sclerosis drug Copaxone, growing ties to thePillCam Arab world and the economic industry standard for and eagerness to demonstrate its indeintestinal visualization were all developed pendence from Israel’s powerful flock ally, the in Israel. American companies to United States. ” The Argentina endorseIsrael to take advantage of its highly edument,and coupled with that of Brazil, cated productive society, whichstarted many a “me too” cascade, with countries like deem the next Silicon Valley. Chile, a strong ally of the U.S. and headed a right-wing government, zbyMaintaining a Strongquickly U.S.- announcing their endorsement of statehood Israel Relationship as well. Support for a strong U.S.-Israel relaThe should Washington Post articleWhile also tionship be commonsense. quoted Nabil Shaath, the Commissioner of the partnership is strong today, the future International for Fatah, saying, of the historicRelations alliance hangs in the bal“Our next target is Western Europe. I think ance. We have a moral responsibility and

Chairman: Richard Fox Honorary Chairman: Sheldon B. Kamins Vice Chairmen: Marshall J. Breger Michael David Epstein General Counsel: Jeffrey P. Altman

is a lot of readiness in Western Euathere practical necessity to maintain it. Iran’s rope to recognize an independent Palestinpursuit of nuclear weapons, the fate of ian state. ” Indeed,weapons the PA next set its sights Syria’s chemical stockpile, new on the EU, interested in building upon unstable governments, and the prevalence its Islamic success extremism in Latin America convince of will puttoAmerica’s enough members to also support the partnership with Israel to the test. WeUDI. can-

not be complacent. We cannot be apathetz Soft Subversion at Play ic. We cannot take anything for granted. Thewevote forremain Palestinian statehood at So must vigilant at a time the UN is largely symbolic and designed when foreign aid is widely misunderstood to create to an cut international for a pressure spending impetus is immense. boycott and divestment campaign to presThose who care about the alliance must sure Israel acceptinuntenable borders in be vocal andtoactive their support. Israel any final agreement. But the passage is not a “client” that needs protection; it of is the aUDI will on upend decades of diplomatic not “drain” American resources. Israwork by the United States and Europe el has been a reliable—indeed indispensto forge an agreement that first requires able—partner in providing intelligence, recognition of Israel’s right to exist, and tactics, equipment, and understanding might actually stand a chance of creatthat enhance the security of the West. ing a sustainable peace ofdeal. The speed Maintaining the viability the longstandat which both the and way Israeltoadapt to ing partnership is U.S. the best ensure counter these soft subversion tactics will that America will always have no better determine there is any chance for friend thanwhether Israel, and that Israel will alpeace, or whether misguided diplomacy, ways have no better friend than America. once again, will lead to war. Congressman Peter J. Roskam JON B.represents PERDUEthe is the director of of Latin (R-IL) Sixth District IlAmerica programs at the Fund for Amerilinois. He serves as Chief Deputy Majority can Studies, and is the author of the forthWhip and co-chair of the House Republicoming book, The War of All the People. can Israel Caucus.

Jon Perdue: Soft Subversion andthePalestinian Statehood Rep.B.Peter J. Roskam: Sustaining Pillars of the U.S.-Israel Relationship

lomatinwas alsowhich quoted saying Lula’s Israel 1985, fueled thethat explosive Middle East freelancing was “transpargrowth of U.S. exports to Israel from $2.5 ent” and only to designed gain in support billion in 1985 over $14tobillion 2011. for a spot on the Security Council. Total U.S.-Israel bilateral trade has skyrocketed over 350 percent over the past z Supporting the UDIin 2011, maktwenty years to $37 billion Brazil under Lula became the of first to ing Israel the 24th largest importer U.S. unilaterally endorse a Palestinian state (ingoods in the world. With a population of sideunder Israel’seight pre-1967 borders) in Decemjust million people—or 3 perber 2010, which at the time undermined cent of the Middle East’s population—IsU.S.comprises negotiations between Israel and the rael a quarter of U.S. exports to Palestinians. He was also responsible the region. And in 2009, Israel provided for billion convincing the presidents of Argen$7 in direct investments in the tina and Uruguay to endorse a Palestinian United States. Very few recipients of U.S. state, and to sponsor foreign aidprompted have beenUruguay able to turn around two summits in support of the proposal. and invest in our economy. As a result, The Palestinians’ quiet able campaign in the United States has been to phase Uruguay has since come under greater scruout nearly all economic aid to Israel. tiny In after Iran’smuch chargeofd’affaires, Hojjatollah 1950, Israel’s population Soltani, denied the Holocaust in public had fled persecution in post-war aEurope speech at the Uruguay-Sweden or the Arab States. They arrived onCultural Israel’s Center in Montevideo. “They (the shores with little more than they Nazis) could killed perhaps fewmore thousand but that carry. A waveaof than Jews, one million number of millions ... is lie,” Soltani immigrants arrived in thea 1990s from told the those gatheredUSSR. at the event. post-collapse In 2013, the country Lula was also the progenitor immiof the developed by those impoverished first Summit of South American-Arab grants is expected to raise more than $600 Countries (ASPAcapital by its funding Portuguese and million in venture through Spanish initials) in over 2005, assome 70 firms. And 120where Israelihe comsured Abbas that he would become even panies trade on U.S. stock exchanges.

Board of Fellows: Richard Baehr, William J. Bennett, Mona Charen, Midge Decter, David Frum, Rabbi Joshua Haberman, David Horowitz, Rabbi Daniel Lapin, Michael A. Ledeen, Michael Medved, Larry Miller, David Novak, Daniel Pipes, John Podhoretz, Norman Podhoretz, Dennis Prager, Tevi Troy, Ruth Wisse

Board of Trustees: Diana Epstein, Cheryl Halpern, Joel Hoppenstein, Eliot Lauer, Mark L. Lezell, Herman Obermayer, J. Philip Rosen, Walter Stern

FallExamines 2011 | inFocus: A Palestinian State? Spring 2013 | inFocus Israel: A Light Among Nations

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Israel’s Demographic Miracle by David P. Goldman

‘T

he word ‘miracle’ in Hebrew does not possess the connotation of the supernatural,” Rabbi J. B. Soloveitchik once wrote. “Miracle describes only an outstanding event which causes amazement.” Whether the term applies to Israel’s demographics is a question for higher authority, but the Jewish State’s population characteristics stand out as unique in the developed world. Israel’s fertility rate of three children per Jewish woman is higher than that of any other country in the developed world, and the only fertility rate substantially above replacement. Only the United States among the world’s industrial nations has a fertility rate around the replacement level of 2.1; Europe and East Asia are headed for eventual population decline with fertility of just 1.5 children per woman. Israeli women, by contrast, have three children on average; non-Haredi Jewish women have an average of 2.6. Just as remarkable is that fertility in most of the Muslim world has fallen below Israel’s, while the fertility of Israeli Arabs and Arabs in Judea and Samaria has converged on the Jewish fertility rate in Israel. At present fertility rates there is no risk that a non-Jewish majority will emerge between the Mediterranean and the Jordan River. Not only has the socalled population time bomb disappeared in Israel; in large parts of the Muslim world, fertility has fallen below the Jewish fertility rate in Israel. Whether the proportion of Arabs in Judea and Samaria as well as in Israel itself is growing may be the most politicized demographic question in the world. The late Yasser Arafat can take credit for the worst demographic forecast of the twentieth century. “The womb of the Arab woman,” the late Palestinian strongman averred, “is my strongest weapon.”

By this he meant that the Arabs of Israel and the occupied territories would outbreed and overwhelm the Jews. A generation of Israeli politicians believed him, fearing that a “ticking demographic time bomb” threatened the integrity of the Jewish state. In 2001, for example, The Christian Science Monitor noted a report to the Knesset, Israel’s parliament, which said: In the whole area west of the Jordan—including Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza—Jews last year represented 50.5 percent of the population; the Arabs, 49.5 percent. Testifying before the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, Prof. Arnon Sofer of Haifa University projected that with their higher birthrate, Arabs would constitute 58 percent of this population by the year 2020 and Jews, 42 percent. Without final borders and a clear separation between states, he said Israel faces an existential crisis. The supposed demographic threat loomed behind the late Yitzhak Rabin’s celebrated Rose Garden handshake with Arafat in 1994. It motivated then-Prime Minister Ehud Olmert to offer the Palestinians half of Jerusalem and almost all of the West Bank in return for a peace agreement in 2007. In October of that year Olmert warned the Knesset of “a demographic battle, drowned in blood and tears,” if Israel did not achieve peace through concessions of land. A month later Olmert predicted “the end of the State of Israel” by demographic exhaustion. “Mr. Olmert,” reported the BBC in November, “said it was not the first time he had articulated his fears about the demographic threat to Israel as a Jewish state from a faster growing Palestinian population. He made similar comments in 2003 to justify the failed strategy of unilateral withdrawals from Israeli-occu-

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pied land which holds large Palestinian populations.” Israeli concessions in the first decade of the twenty-first century were motivated by fear that Arab fecundity would swamp Israel’s Jewish population. Yet the Israeli Jewish fertility rate has risen to three children per female while the Arab fertility rate has fallen to the point where the two trend lines have converged and perhaps even crossed. A 2006 study by the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies claims that the West Bank and Gaza population in 2004 was only 2.5 million, rather than the 3.8 million claimed by the Palestinian authorities. Presumably the numbers were inflated to increase foreign aid and exaggerate the importance of the Palestinian population. Most of the phantom population, the report argues, comes from births that never occurred: [The Palestine Central Bureau of Statistics] projected that the number of births in the Territories would total almost 908,000 for the seven-year period from 1997 to 2003. Yet, the actual number of births documented by the PA Ministry of Health for the same period was significantly lower at 699,000, or 238,000 fewer births than had been forecast by the PCBS. … The size of the discrepancy accelerated over time. Whereas the PCBS predicted there would be over 143,000 births in 2003, the PA Ministry of Health reported only 102,000 births, which pointed to a PCBS forecast 40% beyond actual results. Palestinian fertility on the West Bank has already fallen to the Israeli fertility rate of three children per woman, if we believe the Palestine Ministry of Health numbers rather than the highly suspect Central Bureau of Statistics data. In 1963, Israeli Arab women had eight or nine children; today they have three, about the

David P. Goldman: Israel’s Demographic Miracle

same as Israeli Jews. Education explains most of the fertility decline among Arabs, and it is likely that Arab fertility behind the Green Line as well as in Judea and Samaria will continue to fall. More recent data also show that the Israeli Jewish birth rate has risen faster than predicted. Jewish births rose from 96,000 in the year 2000 to 125,000 in 2010, while Arab births fell slightly over the same period—from about 40,781 to 40,750, according to a new study by Yaakov Faitelson at the Institute for Zionist Strategies. The proportion of Jewish pupils in Israel’s elementary schools is increasing, Faitelson reports: The percentage of students in the Arab educational system out of all Israel’s total first grade student body will decrease from 29.1% in 2007 to only 24.3% in 2016 and 22.5% in 2020. At the same time the percentage of students in the Jewish educational system out of the total first grade student body will reach 75.7% by 2016 and 77.5% by 2020. While Israel’s ultra-Orthodox mi-

nority contributes disproportionately to Jewish population growth, most of the increase in Jewish births comes from the secular and non-Orthodox religious categories, which average 2.6 children per woman. Faitelson notes that the ultraOrthodox fertility rate fell over the past decade, while the fertility of the general Jewish population rose. An Israeli fertility rate of nearly 3 births per woman exceeds the industrial nations’ norm by such a wide margin that

Israel—assuming that fertility remains unchanged—will have a larger population than Poland by 2085. Poland’s median age, moreover, will be 57, an outcome impossible for the Polish state to manage (because the majority of Poles in that case would be elderly dependents), while Israel’s median age will be only 32. Even more remarkable is that Israel will have more young people than Italy or Spain and as many as Germany by the end of the century if fertility remains unchanged. A

Spring 2013 | inFocus Examines Israel: A Light Among Nations

century and a half after the Holocaust, that is, the Jewish State will have more military-age men, and will be able to field a larger land army, than Germany. Secular sociologist Eric Kaufmann complains of the “Haredization” of Jewish life—a shift towards ultra-Orthodoxy— but the numbers tell a different story. In Israel, the so-called secular (a designation that in actuality covers a wide spectrum of religious belief and practice) account for Israel’s uniquely high fertility rate. In fact, the line between “secular” and “religious” is blurred in the Jewish state. Fifty-six percent of Israelis light Sabbath candles every Friday evening (and a further 22 percent light them sometimes), according to Daniel J. Elazar at the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs in the most comprehensive survey of Israel’s religious practice. Fifty-five percent believe that Moses received the Torah at Mount Sinai. And 69 percent observe Jewish dietary laws at home. Synagogue attendance is low, at only 22%, but the comparison between synagogue attendance in Israel and Church attendance in the U.S. may be misleading. About half of the three-hour Saturday morning service is devoted to reading and study of the Pentateuch and some extracts from the prophets, providing a lesson both in Bible and Hebrew language lesson for the Jewish people in exile. Israeli schoolchildren use the language of the Bible on the playground, and take mandatory Bible study throughout primary and secondary school. Elazar observes: Israel’s Jews are not divided into two groups but into four: ultra-orthodox, religious Zionists, traditional Jews, and secular. Some 8 percent are ultra-Orthodox. These are the strangely (to Western eyes) garbed, black hatted Jews who are featured in all the pictures, despite the fact that they represent only 8 percent of Israel’s Jewish population. Another 17 percent are religious Zionists who normally are lost to view in the studies and the statistics because they are generally lumped with everyone else. The religious Zionists are similar to the modern or centrist Orthodox

Israel’s fertility rate of three children per Jewish woman is higher than that of any other country in the developed world, and the only fertility rate substantially above replacement. Jews in the diaspora, partaking of most or all aspects of modern civilization, except that they maintain Orthodox observance of Jewish religious law and tradition. The third group consists of the vast majority of Israeli Jews, some 55 percent, who define themselves as “traditional.” …They cover the whole range of belief and observance from people of fundamentalist belief and looser practice to people who have interpreted Judaism in the most modern manner but retain some of its customs and ceremonies. It might be added that inhabiting the Promised Land is one of Judaism’s central commandments. There was a deep religious sensibility among the secular Zionists who set out to rebuild the Land of Israel. David Ben-Gurion, the country’s first prime minister, rejected all religious beliefs, yet he personally gave Bible lessons to Israeli students and fought to secure a central role for the Bible in the school curriculum. Devotion to the State of Israel distinguishes nominally secular Israelis from really secular American Jews, whose fertility divides by denomination quite as clearly, as can be seen in the following statistics from Anthony Gordon and Richard Horowitz in the 2000 National Jewish Population Survey.

American Jewish Fertility by Religious Current Average No. Religious of Children per Sect Woman Ultra-Orthodox 6.72 Modern Orthodox 3.39 Conservative 1.74 Reform 1.36 Secular 1.29

inFocus Examines Israel: A Light Among Nations | Spring 2013

That Israel’s exceptional fertility stems from religious commitment rather than ethnicity is suggested by the enormous contrast between orthodox and secular Jewish birth rates in the United States. Nowhere is the fertility gap between religious and non-religious more extreme than among American Jews. As a group, American Jews show the lowest fertility of any ethnic group in the country. That is a matter of great anguish for Jewish community leaders. According to sociologist Steven Cohen, “We are now in the midst of a nonOrthodox Jewish population meltdown… Among Jews in their 50s, for every 100 Orthodox adults, we have 192 Orthodox children. And for the non-Orthodox, for every 100 adults, we have merely 55 such children.” Reform and secular Jews average one child per family; the Modern (university-educated) Orthodox typically raise three to four children, and the ultraOrthodox seven or eight.” The American data suggest an explanation of fertility similar to what is encountered in Israel: the stronger the Jewish commitment, the more likely Jews are to have children. Living in Eretz Yisrael is one of the strongest manifestations of Jewish commitment, such that Israeli Jews within a broad spectrum of religious observance have as many children as the most religiously engaged American Jews. As unique as the Jews are among the world’s people, their fertility in the State of Israel is also unique among the nations, and cause for optimism about the future of Am Yisrael. David P. Goldman is the author of How Civilizations Die (and Why Islam is Dying, Too) (Regnery 2011), a PJ Media columnist, and a former essayist at Asia Times Online.

Israel’s Economy Has the Power to Astound by Ambassador (ret.) Yoram Ettinger

uring 2012, the three leading global credit rating companies, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) commended Israel’s economic performance and expressed confidence in its long-term viability. Standard and Poor’s (S&P) reaffirmed Israel’s A+ credit rating in September at a time when it lowered the credit rating of an increasing number of Western countries. According to S&P, “The Israeli economy continues to generate solid economic growth… Major security risks will be contained… There is sufficient political will to prevent a sizable increase in the government’s debt burden… We forecast that by the middle of the decade domestic natural gas production should contribute to improved external and fiscal balances.” That news came just weeks after Moody’s sustained Israel’s A1 credit rating: “Israel’s stable outlook is underpinned by the country’s high economic, institutional and government financial strength… supported by its relatively high GDP per capita [US$32,000] and its economic resilience… The country’s specialized-export sector is well positioned to rebound quickly should the global environment normalize… Moody’s judges Israel’s susceptibility to event risk as moderate based on the political risks facing the country, both domestic and external… Israel’s own gas production will increase substantially between 2013 and 2016.” Fitch Ratings maintained Israel’s long term foreign exchange and local currency credit rating at A and A+ respectively, despite the ongoing war on Palestinian terrorism, the Iranian nuclear threat and the raging Arab Street. In April, Fitch cited

“Israel’s strong institutions and solid recent macroeconomic performance, rich, diversified economy and strong external balance sheet against a high level of government debt and longstanding geopolitical concerns.” The International Monetary Fund (IMF) published its annual report on Israel’s economy in April as well, noting, “Israel’s economy remains strong… led by robust private consumption and buoyant investment… Israel’s fundamen-

by an economic meltdown, Israel demonstrates fiscal responsibility, sustained economic growth, and a conservative, well-regulated banking system with no banking or real estate bubble. For example, from a 450% galloping inflation in 1984, Israel managed to hold inflation in check at 1.6% in 2012. Israel’s budget deficit and unemployment were 4.2% and 6.9% respectively in 2012, significantly lower than the OECD average of 7% and 8%.

While most of the world is afflicted by an economic meltdown, Israel demonstrates fiscal responsibility, sustained economic growth, and a conservative, well-regulated banking system with no banking or real estate bubble. tals are strong: inflation and inflation expectations are squarely within the 1-3 percent target range; unemployment is at historic lows; the net international investment position is a surplus; and public debt has fallen steadily to below 75 percent of GDP… The Israeli financial system currently appears to be generally robust… The current combination of external threats and the relative stability of the domestic system are propitious for strengthening the crisis management framework…” The IMF report added that the recent discoveries of natural gas fields may transform Israel to a net energy exporter in coming years.

z Economic Indicators

While most of the world is afflicted

During the 2009-2012 global economic crisis—without a stimulus package and in spite of the stoppage of the natural gas supply from Egypt, which increased energy costs—Israel experienced a 14.7% growth of gross domestic product (GDP), the highest among OECD countries. Israel led Australia (10.7%), Canada (4.8%), the United States (3.2%), Germany (2.7%), France (0.3%) and the Euro Bloc (which suffered a 1.5% decline in GDP). Israel’s 2012 GDP growth (3.3%) leads the OECD, which averaged 1.4%, is higher than the U.S. (2.2%) and Canada (2%), but lower than India (4.5%) and China (7.5%). Israel’s GDP of $250 billion in 2012 catapulted 120 times since 1948. From $1,132 (1962) and $19,836 (2000) GDP

Spring 2013 | inFocus Examines Israel: A Light Among Nations

per capita, Israel surged to $32,000 GDP per capita in 2012. While the debt/GDP ratio—a key indicator for the rating companies—is the Achilles’ heel of most countries, Israel has managed to reduce it rapidly. From about 100% in 2002, it was compressed to 75% in 2012, compared with the OECD average of 78%. The Bank of Israel foreign exchange reserves—which are critical to sustain global confidence in Israel’s economy and Israel’s capabilities during emergencies—soared

Israel, purchasing 80% of the Israeli company Iscar for $4 billion. The New York Sun reported that in his annual letter to Berkshire Hathaway’s stockholders, Buffett defined the Iscar investment as “the highlight of the year,” adding that “at Iscar, as throughout Israel, brains and energy are ubiquitous.” Eric Schmidt, Google’s Executive Chairman, has been a frequent investor in Israel’s high-tech sector via his own private venture capital fund, Innova-

The Bank of Israel foreign exchange reserves soared from $25 billion in 2004 to $75 billion in 2012, 26th in the world and one of the top per capita countries. from $25 billion in 2004 to $75 billion in 2012, 26th in the world and one of the top per capita countries. The Swiss-based Institute for Management Development (IMD) ranks the Bank of Israel (Israel’s “Federal Reserve”) among the top five Central Banks in its 2012 World Competitiveness Yearbook for the third year in a row. Recognizing Israel’s promising economic indicators, Kasper Villiger, Chairman of the United Bank of Switzerland (UBS) indicated that China, Hong Kong, Brazil, Russia, and Israel are the future growth engines for UBS. Deloitte & Touche, one of the top four global CPA firms opined that Israel is the fourth most attractive site for overseas investors, trailing the U.S., Brazil, and China, but ahead of India, Canada, Singapore, Taiwan, Australia, England, Germany, and Japan.

z The High-tech Country

According to Warren Buffet, one of the most successful and conservative investors in the world, “If you’re going to the Middle East to look for oil, you can skip Israel. However, if you’re looking for brains, look no further. [Israel] has a disproportionate amount of brains and energy.” In 2006, Berkshire Hathaway, Buffett’s investment company, made its first acquisition outside the United States, in

tion Endeavors. He considers Israel “the most important high-tech center in the world after the U.S.,” which will have an oversized impact on the evolution of the next stage of technology. In fact, Google established a large engineering and sales operation in Israel, whose achievements are definitely world-class. Intel has led the pack of some 400 global high-tech giants that operate in Israel. Intel features four research and development centers, two manufacturing plants and investments in 64 Israeli start-ups. Intel’s President and CEO, Paul Otellini, revealed that “we are the largest private employer in Israel (8,200 employees), and most of those employees have technological know-how. Some of our most sophisticated engineering efforts are carried out in Israel…. We have been in Israel for 40 years and we have done many things. We’re here for the long term...” A Wall Street Journal book review of Dan Senor and Saul Singer’s book, Startup Nation: The Story of Israel’s Economic Miracle, reported, “Steve Ballmer [Microsoft’s CEO] calls Microsoft as much an Israeli company as an American company, because of the importance of its Israeli technologies. Google, Cisco, Intel, Microsoft, eBay… live and die by the work of [their] Israeli teams… Israel, a tiny nation

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of immigrants torn by war, has managed to become the first technology nation…” Highlighting Israel’s emergence as a high-tech superpower and a unique ally of the U.S., George Gilder, author of The Israel Test and a high-tech guru, wrote in the Wall Street Journal: Israel cruised through the recent global slump with no deficit or stimulus package… It is the global master of microchip design, network algorithms and medical instruments… water recycling and desalinization… missile defense, robotic warfare, and UAVs… [supplying] Intel with many of its microprocessors (Pentium, Sandbridge, Atom, Centrino)… Cisco with new core router designs and real-time programmable network processors… [supplying] Apple with miniaturized memory systems for its iPhones, iPods and iPads, and Microsoft with user interface designs for the OS7 product line and the Kinect gaming motion-sensor interface… U.S. defense and prosperity increasingly depend on the evergrowing economic and technological power of Israel. If we stand together we can deter or defeat any foe… We need Israel as much as it needs us. The high-tech giants don’t just talk the Israel talk; they walk the Israel walk. Cisco just made its 11th Israeli acquisition, acquiring IntuCell for $475 million; IBM acquired WorkLight for $60 million, its 11th Israeli acquisition; Sequoia Capital, one of the world leading venture capital funds, introduced its 5th Israeli-dedicated $200 million fund; Hong Kong’s Sir Li Ka-Shing, considered the 9th wealthiest person in the world (net worth $22.5 billion), made his 7th Israeli investment; ChemChina acquired 60% of Agan for $1.44 billion; Siemens acquired solar energy Solel ($418 million) and 40% of Arava Power ($15 million); Apple made its first Israeli acquisition—its first research and development center outside the United States—acquiring Anobit for $400 million; the Dallas-based DG acquired MediaMind $517 million; and there is more.

z Israel’s Competitive edge

Israel attracts the elite of global high-

tech due to its competitive edge, offering a unique high-tech environment. For instance, the Shanghai Jiaotong University’s Academic Ranking of World Universities—one of three most influential rankings—includes four Israeli universities among the top thirty computer science universities in the world. Twenty universities are from the United States, four from Israel, two each from Canada and the UK, and one each from Switzerland and Hong Kong. Israel leads the world in its research and development manpower per capita: 140 Israelis (per 10,000) and 85 Americans (per 10,000) are ahead of the rest of the world. Israel’s qualitative workforce benefits from the annual Aliya (immigration of Jews) of skilled persons from the former USSR, Europe, the U.S., Latin America and Australia, who join Israeli graduates from Israeli institutions of higher learning. In addition, Israel’s hightech sector absorbs veterans of the elite high-tech units of Israel Defense Forces. Israel’s unique security and economic challenges have produced unique, innovative and cutting edge solutions, tech-

Israel is the fourth most attractive site for overseas investors, trailing the U.S., Brazil, and China, but ahead of India, Canada, Singapore, Taiwan, Australia, England, Germany, and Japan. nologies and production lines. Israel’s informal society has also nurtured ongoing interaction between the academic, research, military, and industrial sectors. Moreover, Israel’s robust demography— which leads the Free World with three births per Jewish woman—provides a tailwind for Israel’s economy. In order to sustain its competitive high-tech edge, Israel dedicates 4.5% of its GDP to research and development, the highest proportion in the world, ahead of the OECD (2.3%), Sweden (3.8%), Finland (3.5%), South Korea (3.4%), Japan (3.3%), the U.S. (2.8%), Germany (2.7%) and Canada (1.7%). In advance of Israel’s 64th anniversary, Nicky Blackburn wrote at Israel 21c, “With the most startups per capita worldwide, and the third highest number of patents per head, Israel has become one of

Ambassador (ret.) Yoram Ettinger: Israel’s Economy Has the Power to Astound

Tel Aviv is the economic center of Israel.

the leading players in the world of hightech innovation, attracting international giants to its shores. From health breakthroughs to technology, agriculture, the environment and the arts, the country’s innovations are transforming and enriching lives everywhere. Israel today is playing a significant role in some of the most important challenges facing our planet.” In hindsight, the ongoing wars and terrorism, since Israel’s establishment in 1948, have been just bumps on the way to unprecedented economic and technological growth. Ambassador (ret.) Yoram Ettinger is a consultant to Israel’s Cabinet members, legislators, and the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee on U.S.-Israel bilateral projects, U.S. policy, and Middle East politics.

Spring 2013 | inFocus Examines Israel: A Light Among Nations

The Enduring Israeli-U.S. Partnership An inFOCUS Interview with Ambassador Michael Oren On February 21, inFOCUS editor Matthew RJ Brodsky interviewed Ambassador Michael Oren. Born and raised in New Jersey before attending Princeton and Columbia universities, Dr. Oren became an officer in the IDF serving multiple tours, and was a liaison to the U.S. Sixth Fleet during the Gulf War. The Ambassador is also the author of two New York Times best-sellers, Power, Faith, and Fantasy: America in the Middle East from 1776 to the Present and Six Days of War. The Jerusalem Post named Dr. Oren as one of the world’s ten most influential Jews.

iF: The relationship between Israel and Greece and Cyprus has been elevated tremendously over the past three or four years, generally because of a common interest in energy exploration and extraction. In what other ways have Israel and Greece strengthened their political and military relations? MO: Jews and Greeks share a 3,000-year history. Anywhere you go in the State of Israel you’ll find evidence of how Jews and Greeks lived and flourished together in antiquity. For the last 20 years, Greece and Israel have enjoyed excellent relations. Now, that relationship has truly blossomed into the fields of energy, agriculture, trade, military cooperation, and tourism. This year alone, some 400,000 Israelis visited Greece, and we expect even more next year. Our friendship finds expression here, in the United States, in the bi-partisan Congressional Hellenic-Israel Alliance that was recently announced, chaired by Reps. Ted Deutch and Gus M. Bilirakus.

We look forward to continuing to foster this relationship and expand our cooperation.

iF: How have Israeli-American relations, both political and military-to-military relations, changed in the past five years? What do you hope to accomplish with President Obama during his second term?

tures, unbelievable humanitarian projects, intelligence sharing, and security coordination. I would say in the past five years, these bonds have only become stronger and grown wider. We will work closely with President Obama to further strengthen this unshakable alliance, and his visit to Israel in the spring will be a great start.

iF: How would you characterize the working relationship

I think the land for peace formula is still relevant today and we hope President Abbas will take us up on our offer to restart peace negotiations immediately, without delay, and without preconditions, in Jerusalem, in Ramallah, in Washington, DC, wherever. MO: When I came to this job four years ago, I knew the alliance was strong, but I had no idea just how vast and dynamic it is. Our ties are not restricted to the political and military, but rather they extend to broad commercial and agricultural ven-

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between the PA security services and the IDF in the West Bank? Is the “land for peace” formula still relevant today? MO: The IDF works closely with the PA

interview with Ambassador Michael Oren

security services in the West Bank. The fact that there is even a working relationship is an incredible achievement, one that was unthinkable ten years ago. It’s also a testament to Israel’s willingness to negotiate a two-state solution based on mutual recognition and security. Supporting the PA security forces was a major risk on our part, but it’s the type of risk that Israel is willing to take for peace. I think the land for peace formula is still relevant today and we hope President Abbas will take us up on our offer to restart peace negotiations immediately, without delay and without preconditions, in Jerusalem, in Ramallah, in Washington, DC, wherever. We are prepared to put all the issues on the table and to take risks for peace.

iF: How has Israel’s security situation changed as a result of two years of Arab upheaval? MO: Though the developments in the past two years have certainly made us al-

We hope that Europe will heed the Obama administration’s call to label Hezbollah a terrorist organization. ter some of our defenses, Israel remains prepared and able to defend itself. In the south, we are building a border fence in record time, and in the north our soldiers are monitoring the situation in Syria carefully. With generous support from the United States, which we truly appreciate, we have also mobilized our Iron Dome anti-missile system, which saves lives and gives more time for diplomacy, as we saw during Operation Pillar of Defense. Though it is not a game-ender, Iron Dome is certainly a security game-changer.

iF: Media reports have noticed recently the deployment of more Iron Dome batteries in northern Israel. What is the situation between Israel and Lebanon these days and what

explains the higher threat level? MO: The deployment of Iron Dome in different parts of Israel is merely part of our standard operational rotation. We are monitoring the situation in Lebanon closely. Of course we need to keep our eye on Hezbollah, which Bulgaria recently found to be guilty in the Burgas bus bombing last summer. It has amassed tens of thousands of missiles and armaments from Iran and strives to murder Israelis and Americans all over the world. We hope that Europe will heed the Obama administration’s calls to label Hezbollah a terrorist organization.

iF: Thank you for your time, ambassador.

Spring 2013 | inFocus Examines Israel: A Light Among Nations

Israel’s Strategic Challenges: The Next Five Years by Yossi Kuperwasser

srael will face a complicated and challenging strategic landscape in the years to come. This, of course, could have been said at any point since 1948. Ever since the Zionist idea took the shape of a political movement, there have been several times at which the situation was even more dire than it is today. Yet the combination of recent developments in the region, in the broader international arena, and within Israel and the Jewish people, suggests that another demanding period lies ahead. And these challenges will make it more difficult for Israel to secure the nation state of the Jewish people and build peaceful relations with its neighbors.

z The Threat from Iran

The most demanding challenge is the progress of Iran’s military nuclear project, aimed at equipping the fanatical messianic regime in Tehran with an arsenal of atomic bombs that is intended to enable it to be a regional hegemon and a world power, and to threaten Israel’s security attempting, ultimately, to wipe it off the map. At this stage, the Iranians have accumulated uranium enriched at a level that is 40-50 percent of the full enrichment process needed for military grade uranium, enough for the production of at least six bombs. It should be noted that most experts, including the IAEA, refer to this level as 3.5-5 percent enrichment. They refer to the amount of the enriched component in the material produced instead of emphasizing the degree of progress toward military grade enriched uranium that it represents. The Iranians are also carefully and consistently enriching uranium to the point that is 70-75 percent of the work

needed to enrich uranium to military grade, commonly referred to as 20 percent enriched uranium and they have accumulated about two-thirds of the amount needed for the first bomb after further enrichment. They have installed thousands of centrifuges in well-protected facilities, declar-

forces. He is following the international community, and in his view, it will not have the guts and will definitely not have a consensus to take the necessary steps to stop Iran. Based on the timid approach of the West and its regional allies thus far, he believes Western society is weak and

Regional upheaval and instability, the rising influence of radical groups, and the development of “less than governed” areas along Israel’s borders and elsewhere in the region all mean that the coming years will be characterized by more uncertainty, animosity, and hostility toward Israel. ing and following through on their intention to install more efficient ones. Once they start operating them, the time they will have to spend closing the enrichment gap to military grade will be much shorter than it is today. It is not totally clear to the international community how much progress they have made on preparation for turning the enriched uranium into a weapon, but their insistence on denying IAEA access to the facility at Parchin is one of many indicators that makes everyone suspect they have a lot to hide. Economic sanctions are finally increasing the pain and difficulty of Iran’s progress toward an atomic arsenal, but Ayatollah Khamenei is determined to continue the march. From his perspective, giving up at this late stage of the project wouldn’t make sense. He believes the regime’s stability has been ensured by the ruthless and effective suppression of the Iranian population by his security

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hollow. If the Ayatollahs manage to buy more time and establish Iran as a military nuclear arsenal threshold state, Iran may start to change the regional order in the Persian Gulf area. It is already working intensively to embarrass the U.S. in the region and the global arena, and then may swiftly move toward producing the weapons, thus promoting its goals and at the same time starting a regional arms race.

z The Rise of Non-State Actors

An Israeli air force jet fighter plane takes off from Tel Nof air force base for a mission over the Gaza Strip on November 19, 2012. denial of the legitimacy of Israel’s existence in any form, and specifically existence as the nation state of the Jewish people. There are also the problems of the aging of the current leadership and radicalization of political discourse in the region as well as inside the Palestinian community. The current misperceptions of many European governments about the conflict offer no incentive for the Palestinians to drop their intransigence toward real, positive peace based on accepting Israel as the nation state of the Jewish people. Palestinian policies bolstered by Western governments may well lead to increased violence and terror, though the Palestinians are reluctant to experience another “intifada”

z The International Arena

The international arena presents broader developments and concerns for Israel. Most worrisome is the regional perception that the United States—Israel’s main ally, whose support is a cornerstone of Israeli national security—is a weakening superpower. People in the region believe the U.S. is hesitant about its mission and vision, unwilling and to some extent unable to make the necessary psycho-

logical, political, military, and financial investments to maintain the role it has managed for decades. On many regional issues, Europe seems more determined to act even though the economic crisis and demographic changes in Europe have made the “Old World” less capable of contending with the radicalization of the Arab world, and more likely to witness growing anti-Israel, and sometimes anti-Semitic, feelings. This goes hand-in-hand with Palestinian-led efforts to deny the legitimacy of the existence of Israel as the nation state of the Jewish people, its right to defend itself, and its right to have its opinion heard. These efforts receive active support from academics, journalists, and NGOs pretending to care about human rights and peace, while actually using their epistemological authority to bash Israel and erode it’s legitimacy. It frames the discourse in a misleading way, portraying Israel as the problem and the victimizer in its conflict with the Palestinians. These individuals and groups work to isolate and limit Israel’s ability to defend itself properly in the military and diplomatic arenas. They hope to enable Palestinians

Spring 2013 | inFocus Examines Israel: A Light Among Nations

Yossi Kuperwasser: Israel’s Strategic Challenges: The Next Five Years

becomes less relevant, and effective accountable addresses become harder to find. The rise to power of Islamic parties seems to be a lasting phenomenon that will make the chance of promoting new peace agreements between Israel and its neighbors minimal at best. The fact that Islamic parties may become well-entrenched does not mean they will be entirely popular at home. There will be resentment by considerable components of the population who do not want a religious lifestyle and who fear that the democratic moment that finally emerged is being crushed. Economic and demographic challenges may be exacerbated, contributing to increased instability, and leading to greater difficulties for relatively weak central regimes in governing their own peripheries. Non-Arab regional powers—including Iran and Turkey—may try to exploit those weaknesses, as will global jihad organizations. The rise of non-state actors and the fluidity of borders has increased the terror threat to Israel’s civilian population—today there are tens of thousands of rockets and missiles pointed at Israel’s rear, eliminating the distinction between the “front” and the “home front.” Iran’s efforts, Russia’s irresponsible policies, and the abundance of uncontrolled stateof-the-art weaponry following the fall of Gadhafi’s regime in Libya (and the possible fall of the Assad regime in Syria) may lead to advanced weapons in the hands of radical terror groups including Hezbollah, Global Jihad, and Palestinian terror organizations. A major concern is the possibility of chemical weapons ending up in the hands of Hezbollah or Global Jihad organizations in Syria. The complexity of these challenges will be enhanced by other changes in the nature of the battlefield as cyber warfare becomes more developed. Israel’s relations with the Palestinians will continue to be complicated because of Palestinian insistence on operating unilaterally, and their ongoing incitement to hatred and violence. Chief among the difficulties is the Palestinian organizations’

to achieve their goals without having to accept the legitimacy and permanence of Israel in the region as the nation state of the Jewish people and without addressing Israel’s legitimate security concerns.

z The Internal Dimension

Not all of Israel’s challenges live in the non-Jewish world or outside its borders. Internally there are the tensions among factions of Israeli society. There is also a growing need to address what seems to be erosion in the way Jews outside of Israel relate to the Jewish state and to the importance many Israelis attribute to security concerns. Israelis, like other people, can be misled by misconceptions about the conflict with the Palestinians and by the promotion of imaginary threats that play on peoples’ sense of morality and/or insecurity. For example, it is often said that if Israel does not succumb to Palestinian demands, Israel will become “one state for two peoples” (instead of the presumed “two states” Israel and Palestine, for “two peoples”). The threat that Israel will cease to be a Jewish state, or become an “apartheid state,” is often accompanied by a call on the West to pressure Israel; to “rescue” it from its own “destructive policies and leadership.” All of these baseless presumptions delegitimize the Israeli democratic system—the only truly democratic system in the region. It cannot be denied, however, that these misconceptions have become unquestioned truths in many political and social circles, despite the fact that their purpose is to single out Israel as the only “obstacle to peace” and distract from the real stumbling block that prevents progress on the issue—the Palestinian refusal to accept Israel as the nation state of the Jewish people and thus as a legitimate and permanent state in the area.

z Relying on Israel’s Strengths

Experience tells us that Israel can contend successfully with great dangers and threats. It managed to overcome much bigger armies and convince its neighbors to give up the conventional

The current misperceptions of many European governments about the conflict offer no incentive for the Palestinians to drop their intransigence toward real, positive peace based on accepting Israel as the nation state of the Jewish people. military option. Israel succeeded against all odds to win several wars against terror, the most demanding of which was the terror war of 2000-2006, and it has developed capabilities to provide its citizens with protection against incoming rockets. Israel has also managed to prevent its rivals from producing nuclear weapons. In coping with the challenges ahead, Israel will rely first and foremost on itself and its people. Israel has a unique and diverse social fabric, but the people share broad common social and political denominators. The vast majority of the population is committed to doing what is necessary to defend the State. The resilience of the home front is strong, as evidenced by its response to the 2006 Lebanon War in the north and the rocket barrages by Hamas in the south. The Israeli public relies on its high moral standards; outstanding military and intelligence services; sound economic policies; scientific and technological capabilities; creative and innovative nature; and ability to learn rapidly and well, making the required adjustments to new threats and challenges. It has also been able to rely on Jewish communities outside of Israel—particularly in the United States—but the future will require the development of a better infrastructure for dialogue and joint action plans. Israel can also rely on its special relations with other liberal democracies, especially the United States, which not only identify with Israel and are committed to its security, but which understand Israel’s strategic value and see it standing on the front line in confronting threats to their own security, values, and interests. In light of regional and international developments, Israel continually seeks to strengthen its cooperation with the U.S.

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and other friends, including NATO, and look for new friends as in fact it has common interests with many of the regional players despite their formal negative approach toward the Jewish State. Building on fundamentally sound positions, Israel has to strengthen its capacity to prevent emerging threats from fully materializing. First and foremost is to help form an effective coalition of liberal democracies determined to stop the Iranian military nuclear project, and develop the ability to carry out a preventive mission, if necessary. Israel is convinced that sanctions backed by a credible military threat will convince the Iranian regime to give up what it sees as a strategically important and politically prestigious project. Israel will also continue to develop its military and intelligence capabilities, and the internal and international consensus regarding the conditions under which it can be used. This enhances Israel’s deterrent capability by affecting its adversaries’ perception that Israel can and will cause damage they would prefer to avoid. And finally, parallel to securing the existing peace agreements and arrangements with its neibours, Israel will continue its efforts to change the framework by which its conflict with the Palestinians is understood. The road to real peace lies in convincing the Palestinian leadership that Israel, the nation state of the Jewish people, is a legitimate and permanent part of the region. Brig. Gen. (res.) Yossi Kuperwasser is Director General of Israel’s Ministry of Strategic Affairs. He was formerly head of the Research and Analysis and Production Division of the IDF Directorate of Israeli Military Intelligence.

Engaging the UN Human Rights Council by Nicholas Saidel

srael began to disengage from the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) in March 2012 when the council voted 36-1 to appoint a fact-finding commission to investigate the implications of Israeli settlements on Palestinian human rights. At the time, then-Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman declared Israel’s policy toward the fact-finding mission would be one of non-cooperation. In January 2013, Israel declined to appear before the UNHRC’s Universal Periodic Review (UPR), a human rights assessment mechanism in which all 193 member states had previously participated.

z Disengaging from Multilateral Institutions

By boycotting the UNHRC, Israel is employing a variation of a tactic employed by the United States during the Bush Administration. The UNHRC was created in March 2006 to replace the Human Rights Commission, a UN body that was the target of much criticism due to the numerous states with abysmal human rights records (e.g. Sudan and Libya) that comprised its membership and because of its disproportionate focus on Israel. The United States government under President George W. Bush refused to join the UNHRC, convinced the new body would not behave differently than its predecessor. The rationale of the United States was to render the UNHRC irrelevant and illegitimate. As U.S. Ambassador to the UN John Bolton said at the time, the United States would have more “leverage in terms of the performance of the new council” by not participating in it and thus signaling a

rejection of “business as usual.” The doubts of the Bush administration were, to a large extent, justified. The UNHRC has reduced its credibility deficit by naming human rights rapporteurs for Iran and Sudan, by speaking out against Syria, and by making progress on issues such as gay rights, free speech, and gender equality. However, it is still a body whose membership is riddled with nondemocratic and repressive regimes that are frequently fiercely anti-Israel. The prescience of the Bush administration notwithstanding, the Obama administration reversed the boycott policy in 2009, and now the United States holds a seat on the UNHRC. Obama’s policy of reengagement hinges on the notion that, while the UNHRC is a flawed institution, improvement can better be effectuated from within the system than from without.

z A History of Inequity

If Israel does not share Obama’s thinking as it pertains to the UNHRC, it is for good reason. Both special rapporteurs on Palestine, first John Dugard and now Richard Falk, have been vehemently one-sided in their appraisal of human rights infractions in the Palestinian territories. During his appointment, Dugard not only conveniently ignored Palestinian terrorism as beyond his mandate, but excused it as an inevitable consequence of Israeli “apartheid” practices. Falk has been even worse. He likens Israel to Nazi Germany and talks of a Palestinian “genocide.” He may also be an anti-Semite. In 2011, Falk posted a cartoon to his blog page depicting a dog with a Jewish head-

covering and a sweater with the letters “USA” urinating on Lady Justice while devouring bloody human bones. The record of the UNHRC since its creation in 2006 is replete with evidence of an unjustifiable obsession with Israel. Israel has been censured more than any other state. In fact, more than half of the resolutions passed by the UNHRC since its inception have focused on Israel. In addition, the UNHRC adopted Agenda Item 7, which makes Israel the only country that is a permanent subject of debate. It also invited a senior official of Hamas, Ismael al-Ashqar, to speak at its headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland (an invitation later rescinded after Israel filed an official complaint with UN officials) and allowed Hamas-affiliated organizations, such as the Palestine Return Centre, to hold meetings under its banner. While these facts influenced Israel’s decision to boycott the UNHRC, it was certainly the result of two UN investigations that weighed the heaviest. The first is known as the Goldstone Commission, a UN fact-finding mission appointed by the UNHRC to probe possible war crimes committed by Israel and Hamas during the Gaza War of 2008-2009 (Operation Cast Lead). The Goldstone Commission, with which Israel did not cooperate, concluded that Israel intentionally targeted Palestinian civilians. The second is the Palmer Commission, created under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General to investigate the circumstances of the Turkish Mavi Marmara flotilla incident that took place off the coast of Gaza in May 2010. Israel did cooperate with that investigation. In

Spring 2013 | inFocus Examines Israel: A Light Among Nations

its final report, the Palmer commission called Israel’s use of force “excessive and unreasonable,” but also upheld the legality of the Israeli-Egyptian blockade of Gaza and saved its most severe criticism for the Government of Turkey.

z The Shift toward Reticence

Given the UNHRC’s overall record, the Israeli government refused to cooperate with the council’s fact-finding mission on the impact of Israeli settlements on Palestinian human rights. The factfinding mission published its report on January 31, 2013, unsurprisingly finding Israel’s settlement policy to be an illegal “creeping annexation” of the West Bank and East Jerusalem that violates the human rights of the Palestinian people. It further called for Israel to immediately

for this focus, only leads to the contempt and degradation of the important cause of universal human rights. Palmor added that Israel’s decision to cut ties with the UNHRC should be considered a wake-up call to democratic countries as to the UNHRC’s corrupt nature. Cementing its position further with the recent boycott of the UPR, Israel is making a clear statement to the world that that it views the UNHRC as illegitimate—at a time when it has the backing of Israel’s main ally, the United States.

z The Opportunity Cost of a Principled Decision

Building on the experience of its cooperation with the Palmer commission on the Gaza flotilla, Israel might consider revisiting its policy of non-cooperation

In effect, the UN now endorses private sanctions against Israel, a legitimizing boon to the Palestinian Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions movement (BDS) that has already been gaining traction in other fora. begin withdrawing all of its citizens from those areas and recommended that private companies consider “terminating their business interests in the settlements.” Israel’s non-cooperation meant UNHRC investigators were barred access to the West Bank. Foreign Ministry spokesman Yigal Palmor, speaking in Jerusalem in February, summarized the Israeli government’s position toward the fact-finding mission: Its existence embodies the inherent distortion that typifies the UNHRC treatment of Israel and the hijacking of the important human rights agenda by nondemocratic countries... Israel was left with no other choice than to make this decision, after it became apparent that putting the disproportionate focus on Israel while ignoring massive human rights violations in the very countries who bear responsibility

to allow for flexibility and participation when gains can be achieved. For example, with the message entirely controlled by the Palestinians, Israel likely exacerbated the degree of derision leveled against it in the UNHRC’s report on Israeli building activity in the West Bank. The report did not discuss at any length the security threats to Israel that give rise to some of the perceived or actual infringements of Palestinian rights that do take place in the West Bank. No context was provided and no explanation was given as to why the security fence, checkpoints, or temporary road or area closures are necessary to maintain peace and order. Instead, the report relies solely upon “information from more than 50 people affected by the settlements and/ or working in the OPT and Israel.” These people included “victims of human rights violations, Jordanian Foreign Ministry of-

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ficials, Palestinian Authority officials, international organizations, NGOs and UN agencies.” Reading the findings, it appears Israel could have benefited from producing facts to counter some of the assertions made and to provide perspective to what the UNHRC determined are arbitrary and punitive restrictions on Palestinian life. For example, the report contains uncorroborated and un-cited statements such as the following, which compares legal recourse for victims of settler and Palestinian violence: The Mission has been informed that when acts of violence are committed by Palestinians against settlers, these are appropriately addressed, indicating that the lack of law enforcement experienced by the Palestinians is largely a matter of political will. Between 90 to 95 percent of cases against Palestinians are investigated and go to court. With testimony coming solely from aggrieved Palestinians and no Israeli response, the UNHRC report was fated to be weighed dramatically in the Palestinian’s favor. But while historically there has been reluctance by Israel to arrest and prosecute settlers committing “price tag” attacks (usually in the form of intimidating language written in graffiti and other defacement of property) or acts of violence against Palestinians, the situation has become much more equitable. In December 2012, Israeli police arrested three Jewish settlers whom they suspect of arson and other attacks on Palestinian property in the West Bank. And in January 2013, an Israeli court found a U.S.born Jewish settler guilty of murdering two Palestinians and convicted him on two counts of attempted murder; he received a sentence of two life terms plus 70 years.

z War by Other Means

While the UN oftentimes seems like an abstraction with no real impact or authority, there are potential real life consequences at stake here. Palestinians and Israelis have been engaged in not only

Boycotting the UNHRC mission on settlements and Palestinian human rights was a principled decision, but it was one that played into the hands of Israel’s foes. tine may lead to accountability for gross violations of human rights law and serious violations of international humanitarian law and justice for victims. The report is also a lawfare victory for Palestinians in that it recommends that private companies boycott products made in the settlements. In effect, the UN now endorses private sanctions against Israel, a legitimizing boon to the Palestinian Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions Movement (BDS) that has already been gaining traction in other fora.

z Israel Cast as a Pariah State

Allowing Palestinians to control the narrative of hot-button issues in a global forum such as the UN is bad for Israel’s image. Silence toward an inquiring body, especially one convened to investigate potential human rights abuses, looks like an admission of guilt and gives a bad impression from the start. Even people of good

will are likely to ask: What is Israel hiding? Second, by failing to cooperate with the UNHRC, Israel is feeding the perception that it considers itself above international law, and perhaps more importantly, that it is receding from the community of nations and heading toward a path of isolation. This is not the image Israel wants or needs. Israel’s silence in this regard stands in stark contrast to the public relations successes of Operation Pillar of Defense, where it shaped global public opinion of the 2012 military operation in Gaza through clever use of social media outlets. Boycotting the UNHRC mission on settlements and Palestinian human rights was a principled decision, but it was one that played into the hands of Israel’s foes.

Nicholas Saidel: Engaging the UN Human Rights Council

warfare, but also “lawfare.” Lawfare can be loosely defined as the utilization of international laws and institutions to weaken one’s enemy, or “the use of law as a weapon of war.” Palestinian leadership in the West Bank, having foregone traditional military and terrorist strategies against Israel, has been quite successful on the lawfare front. Through intense lobbying by Palestinians and their sympathizers, universal jurisdiction statutes have been enacted in Europe, making it possible to arrest and convict Israeli officials of “war crimes.” A more well-known lawfare victory for the Palestinians was their recent successful non-member statehood bid at the UN. This UNHRC report is yet another lawfare victory in that helps build the case for Israeli officials to be brought before the International Criminal Court. The report purposefully declares: The Rome Statute establishes the International Criminal Court’s jurisdiction over the deportation or transfer, directly or indirectly, by the occupying power of parts of its own population into the territory it occupies, or the deportation or transfer of all or parts of the population of the occupied territory within or outside this territory... Ratification of the statute by Pales-

Nicholas Saidel is Associate Director of the Institute for Strategic Threat Analysis & Response (ISTAR) at the University of Pennsylvania.

monitoring events in the gaza strip Visit us online for the latest updates, JewishPolicyCenter.org

GazaWatch Spring 2013 | inFocus Examines Israel: A Light Among Nations

Changing Demographics: Implications for Israel by Cameron S. Brown and Owen Alterman

hifting demographics are reshaping American politics, and supporters of Israel must understand how these trends stand to reshape U.S. public opinion toward Israel. Analyzing President Obama’s re-election last November, pundits of all political stripes pointed to shifting demographics as having made the critical difference. Most frequently mentioned has been the rise of Latino voters, whose numbers at the polls (12.5 million ballots cast in 2012) nearly tripled from only two decades ago. Pundits also frequently pointed to a generation gap, whereby younger voters solidly support Democrats and older Americans vote Republican. Finally, attention is increasingly paid to dramatic changes in religious affiliation in American life, or more precisely, the growing number of Americans who lack any affiliation. According to the Pew Center, in 1972, 7 percent of Americans said they had no religious affiliation. That figure grew to 15 percent by 2007, and today stands at nearly 20 percent. Such demographic and social trends are not only set to reshape the future of American partisan politics, they will also present substantial challenges for the longstanding, solid, bipartisan support for Israel in U.S. public opinion—a critical pillar of the U.S.-Israel relationship. This article identifies several such trends—the partisan gap and the generational gap in support for Israel, the decline in religiosity, and the rise of Latinos—and assesses how each is affecting U.S. public opinion toward Israel. While the first three look set to chip away at support for Israel in the years to come, the

growth in numbers of Latinos could work to strengthen support.

z The Partisan Gap in Support for Israel

Once, an American’s party affiliation said little about his attitude toward Israel, but times have changed. In a poll conducted during Israel’s November 2012 Operation Pillar of Defense, 80 percent of Republicans voiced support for Israel, as opposed to only 51 percent of Democrats. When the sample is divided into conservatives and liberals, the difference is even

Democratic are even less supportive of Israel than are self-identified Democrats. Democratic-leaning independents were almost 23 percent less likely to support Israel than Republicans (and 15 percent less than the average American). As above, even when respondent age, income, education, race, and religion were taken into account, these Democratic-leaning independents were still 20 percent less likely to support Israel than Republicans (and approximately 12 percent less than the average American). Nearly identical results emerged from an analysis of those who

Religiosity in America is declining at a substantial rate, impacting on American public support for Israel.

sharper. Some 77 percent of conservatives supported Israel, with only 6 percent opposed. For self-identified liberals, 37 percent supported Israel and 27 percent opposed. An analysis of Pew survey data reveals that those who identify with the Democratic Party were 14 percent less likely to approve of current levels of U.S. support for Israel than Republicans, and 12 percent more likely to say the U.S. supports Israel “too much.” Regardless of a respondent’s age, income, education, race, religion, and attendance at religious services (and whether controlling for these factors independently or concomitantly), this partisan gap remains unchanged. Moreover, self-identified “independents” who lean (and thus usually vote)

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thought the U.S. supported Israel “too much” (Figure 1). This partisan gap in support for Israel has not escaped attention. Observers have credited a variety of theories, from growing liberal wariness toward the use of force (and connecting that to Israeli use of force) to the more fundamental trend of widening polarization in U.S. politics. Whatever the underlying cause, the basic result is clear: the partisan gap is real, and it has grown.

z The Generational Gap

A second, highly pronounced trend is the generational gap: so-called “Millennials” (18-30 year-olds) are substantially more likely to be critical of Israel than older generations, particularly “Baby

z The Decline in Religiosity

America is often thought of as a religious country, at least in comparison to a supposedly “godless” Europe. The American reality, though, is more complex. Religiosity in America is declining at a

Cameron S. Brown and Owen Alterman: Changing Demographics: Implications for Israel

Boomers” (born 1946-1964) and the “Silent Generation” (born 1925-1945), though this is generally the case for Generation X (between the Baby Boomers and the Millenials) as well. As shown in Figure 2, this gap largely holds across political affiliation. As in the analysis of the partisanship above, controlling for a host of other factors did not change this gap at all. Republican Millennials, for example, are less supportive of Israel than Republican Baby Boomers. When examining religious affiliation, this generational shift is found to be particularly strong among self-identified Protestants. This said, support among self-identified “born again” Christians has been less affected (Figure 3). Two alternate explanations could account for the data: either a shift in public opinion is actually taking place, or younger generations are usually less supportive of Israel and become more supportive as they age. The answer emerges in comparing the findings to two joint nationwide CBS/New York Times polls from October 1977 and April 1978 (Figure 4). Interestingly, the generational gap then was the opposite of the generational gap today: retirees (65 and older) were least supportive of Israel, with 18-29 year-olds the most supportive. Again, this pattern was substantial and statistically significant regardless of other factors (i.e., race, religion, party affiliation, ideology, and education). This suggests that the first explanation is correct: generations seem to develop views toward Israel that guide their opinions throughout their lifetimes. If so, the relatively less pro-Israel positions held by today’s Millennials are unlikely to fade over time, just as their elders have maintained robust support for Israel over the past 35 years.

substantial rate, impacting on American public support for Israel. White Protestants, for centuries the social and demographic backbone of America, have declined from 39 percent of the US population in 2007 to 34 percent in 2012. During the same period, the percentage of so-called “Nones”—those who have no religious affiliation—rose sharply, from 15.3 percent to 19.6 percent. This category of “Nones” includes atheists and agnostics, though most are those who simply respond that they have no religious affiliation. Largely, the trend is not one of individual Americans abandoning religion; rather, “generational replacement” is responsible for the change, with older, more religious Americans being replaced

with younger, less affiliated individuals. Indeed, looking at data from polling respondents, “Nones” are by far the youngest of all religious groups; consequently, this trend may well accelerate in the generation to come (Figure 5). This stark demographic shift is a cause for concern for Israel, or at least a potential cause for change in an Israeli outreach strategy that has prioritized Evangelicals in recent decades. American Protestants are more likely to be pro-Israel than the average American, with “born again” Christians particularly supportive. On the other hand, in statistical analysis of the polling data (see Figure 6), compared to Protestants, “Nones” are 23 percent less likely to support Israel and 19.5 percent more likely to

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say the U.S. is “too supportive” of Israel. Among this group, atheists show particularly weak support (42 percent more likely respond “too supportive”), followed by agnostics (25 percent more likely), and those who identify as “nothing” (15 percent more likely). Demographic movement away from Protestantism and toward those with no religious affiliation could lead to a weakening of support for Israel over time. Given that “Nones” are the fastest-growing religious cohort in America, and that they account for more than a quarter of Democrats (27 percent), Israel and its supporters must learn how to engage them.

z The Rise of Latinos

Of the emerging demographic trends in the United States, none has received more attention than the rise of Latinos. An estimated 52 million Latinos live in the U.S., of which, nearly half were born abroad. With an estimated 800,000 Latino children reaching voting age every year, this sector is expected to account for 40 percent of the growth in the number of eligible voters by 2030. Despite relatively low rates of voting—50 percent versus approximately 65 percent for whites or blacks—the sheer overall growth of Latinos will continue to impact greatly on U.S. elections. At first blush, American Latinos appear almost identical to the average American in their support of Israel. Yet, Latinos are on average younger and more Democratic-leaning than the average American. In other words, given Latinos’ other demographic characteristics, one would expect them to be less supportive of Israel than average. In fact, when taking into account the three factors discussed previously, Latinos are actually 7 percent more likely to support of Israel than the average American; and the figure rises to nearly 9 percent when taking into account income, education, and church attendance. The growing presence and electoral power of Latinos, then, is likely a positive trend for Israel, especially as they are

now identifying or leaning Democratic by large margins. Consequently, this group could become a new component of the future pro-Israel coalition among the Democratic base. Many pro-Israel organizations have already begun outreach efforts for Latinos, but efforts to solidify support must be expanded as this community gets its footing and begins to take a greater interest in foreign affairs.

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z A Targeted Approach

Overall polling numbers on U.S. proIsrael sentiment—with their near-record high of 63 percent support (according to Gallup)—could induce a false sense of security. Looking behind the numbers, the composite of the social and demographic trends paints a starker picture. Importantly, the three main trends working against Israel (partisan, generational, and religious) are not simply describing

include stepping up engagement with segments of the population that are on the rise. Continued focus on university campuses seems justified as a key tool for closing the generation gap. With Latinos, engagement efforts are well underway, especially by American Jewish organizations. Far more challenging will be the engagement of “Nones.” The rising disaffiliation from religion may be part of a growing disaffiliation from social institutions writ large, a trend made famous by scholar Robert Putnam’s Bowling Alone. “Nones,” therefore, might not only be unreachable through churches, they might be less af-

Cameron S. Brown and Owen Alterman: Changing Demographics: Implications for Israel

the same people. Each factor has an impact (~13-17 percentage points) almost entirely independent of the others. So, for example, an older (Silent Generation), Protestant Republican would most likely (79 percent) say he or she supports the U.S. stance on Israel. However, a Millennial, Democratic “None” would be unlikely (33 percent) to support the present U.S. stance on Israel. If Israel and its supporters must take American demographics as they find them, how can these challenges be met? In particular, how can Israel and its supporters maintain grassroots support among Democrats? Part of this effort will

filiated with all manner of community groups as well. If so, pro-Israel forces must allocate more resources toward improving their understanding regarding where this cohort gets its information and, most importantly, from whom it takes its political cues. Perhaps, for instance, this sector might best be engaged by shifting part of pro-Israel groups’ efforts from mass media to niche media, reaching a smaller target audience but with more precision and effect. While outreach efforts toward Latinos seem better developed, strategies for reaching “Nones” are perhaps even more important—and more challenging. Winning the support of liberals and “Nones” will require working with and through organizations that are ideologically inclined to the left, and indeed, many American Jews have argued that a single organization can no longer speak for all supporters of Israel. In an era of increased polarization and social fragmentation in American society, no single organization can effectively influence opinion in all segments of the American public. While this may disconcert Jewish community leaders who prize solidarity, the trend may in fact prove a blessing. Over the course of the next several decades, American public opinion regarding Israel will likely become more divided. Israel’s policymakers should consider the strategic implications. The challenge is to maximize U.S. public support, where much can be done, and then to identify other political and geopolitical strategies to compensate for any incremental decline in public support. A targeted approach that focuses on these growing demographic segments in American society is the best path forward. Cameron S. Brown is a Neubauer research fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS). Owen Alterman is a research fellow at INSS. The authors thank Rachel Beerman and Tamar Levkovich for their research assistance. A more detailed version of this article was published in Strategic Assessment: www. inss.org.il/upload/(FILE)1361104876.pdf

Spring 2013 | inFocus Examines Israel: A Light Among Nations

The Strategic Impact of Israel’s Export of Natural Gas by David Wurmser

n January 17, 2009, a team led by the Texas firm, Noble Energy Inc., discovered methane in a field (Tamar) now estimated to contain 275 billion cubic meters (9.7 trillion cubic feet) of natural gas—about half of what Europe consumes annually. A year later, the same team announced the discovery of monster gas field to the west of Tamar (Leviathan), which alone contains about as much gas as Europe consumes annually. There have been several other finds of smaller, but nevertheless substantial fields. In neighboring Cyprus, another field (Aphrodite) comparable to Tamar was discovered by Noble Energy, abutting and even slightly spilling into Israel’s waters. In short, Israel and its neighbor now sit atop roughly two years’ worth of European consumption.

z The Geostrategic Impact of Gas Supply

Israel’s newfound energy abundance will dramatically affect its economy and resource realities, representing a major strategic change. The amount of gas discovered exceeds projected Israeli demand for at least a half century. As such, Israel will become a net exporter of gas. While the currently known amount of commercially producible hydrocarbons does not itself make Israel an energy supermajor or strategic powerhouse, Israel may have an opportunity to leverage its supply of marginally critical amounts of gas to either Europe or Asia. Unlike oil, gas neither flows to spot markets nor is sold en route to a consumer. There is no global market price like Brent Sweet Crude for oil. Gas is priced unique to each deal, na-

tion or region. It is not globally traded as a commodity. The infrastructure to transmit gas—either via pipelines or liquefaction— is so complex, demanding, and expensive that marketing agreements and supply patterns are locked in for the long term, indeed years before the molecules even flow. Even liquefied natural gas (LNG) shipped from port to port is essentially a “locked” structure much like train lines. The countries supplying and receiving the gas, therefore, tether their critical energy policies to the expectation of a particular supply chain, and to a particular diplomatic relationship. Since the severing of a particular source of gas is not easily replaced in an ad hoc fashion by oversupply from elsewhere, it is strategically important for a nation, even when it only represents a relatively small portion of its overall supply. Thus, even modest amounts of Israeli gas exports can carry significant strategic leverage. The short-term inflexibility of gas trade and the difficulty of replacing disrupted supply also imply that energy prices for consumers and revenues for suppliers can be easily manipulated by marginal increases or decreases. This price sensitivity makes the question of gas supply strategically vulnerable to the geopolitical interests and machinations of third parties. Two factors—the strategic context of gas transmission structures and third-party strategic ambitions—are often as important to understanding the overall strategic significance of a specific gas supply relationship as the two dimensional question of supply and consumption for the two nations involved in the trade themselves.

inFocus Examines Israel: A Light Among Nations | Spring 2013

z Exporting to Europe

There are five existing or proposed pipelines supplying gas to Europe from north Africa: the Trans-med pipeline (carrying 30.2 bcm/yr via Tunisia and Sicily), the Maghreb-Europe Gas Pipeline (carrying 12 bcm/yr via Gibraltar), the Medgaz pipeline (from Algeria to Almeria, Spain carrying 8 bcm, but only now about to come on-line), Greenstream (through Western Libya to Sicily had carried 11 bcm/yr but is now cut off), and finally the GALSI pipeline (which is still being planned and will run under the Mediterranean from far-eastern Algeria). All these pipeline structures originate in the Hassi al-Riml field in Algeria. In short, three pipelines carrying almost 50 bcm/yr into Europe all originate at one point. Moreover, while the EU sought to diversify its supply of gas by building the Trans-Saharan pipeline, which would carry Nigerian gas north, even that pipe passes through to Hassi al-Riml, where it hooks up with the other three currently operating pipelines. This makes roughly 18 percent of Europe’s gas supply extremely vulnerable. European experts—especially those energy companies along the southern littoral—are currently rethinking their dependence and diversification strategy. Europe’s grim reality could represent a unique window of opportunity for Israel to nail down long-term agreements and align export policy with a broader effort to reset Israeli-European relations.

z The Lure of Asia

Despite the strategic benefit Europe represents, Asia may yet emerge as Is-

The Sedco Express drilling rig above the Tamar gas field in the Mediterranean. Europe or Asia must first be examined, since these latter factors may dictate the shape of the former.

z Export Transmission Structures via Cyprus

Early discussions after Leviathan’s discovery focused on building a pipeline from Israeli fields, through Cyprus, to Greece. But the tide has shifted in the last two years. Tensions over Cyprus, the growing role Gazprom and Russia appear to be playing there, and the overall instability and potential corruption which appears to be plaguing Cypriot politics and business, reminded many how problematic it can be to place critical infrastructure there. Moreover, the attractiveness of Cyprus diminished within the context of change in Egypt and the entry of Woodside as an equal partner in the Leviathan field. Any eastward-directed export infrastructure anchored to Cyprus would tend to rely on the Suez Canal, in essence locking what will emerge as Israel’s most vital industry into a trade route that passes through an Egypt politically dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood, which remains ideologically opposed to provisions in the 1979 peace treaty allowing Israeli passage through the Canal. Finally, although Cyprus has enjoyed a record of stability since the mid-1970s, several key trends indicate that instability

will likely rise on Cyprus: • Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan’s desire to reestablish a neo-Ottoman imperial empire under a rehabilitated “Caliphate” has driven Turkey to regard the Greek islands, the Balkans, and Cyprus to the north, as well as Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Israel to the south as “lost territories.” • While never having surrendered its claims in Cyprus, Turkey’s attempt to enter the European state system has been linked to the island’s apparent stability since the mid-1970s. The more Turkey reorients and aspires to assert its Middle Eastern and Islamic credentials, the more its claims in Cyprus assume importance and intensity.

David Wurmser: The Strategic Impact of Israel’s Export of Natural Gas

rael’s preferred export destination. While the prices the Leviathan partners could demand by trading to Asia are higher, price is only partially the reason Asia will likely emerge as the most attractive export destination. Any Israeli gas trade with Europe would implicitly impact Russia’s domination of Europe’s gas supply. Not only would Israeli gas offer a backstop to any Russian threat to cut off supply as blackmail, but also a marginal addition of Israeli supply can create oversupply. Even light oversupply can cause prices to drop sharply in the European region—which whittles down the bottom line of Russian gas companies integrally linked to Russia’s ruling elite. In short, unless Russia manages to gain controlling interests in Israel’s gas sector, Russia will fear Israeli exports will tread on its sacred interests— a strategic challenge which Moscow will answer in ways which could give both Israel and Europe pause before proceeding. Additionally, Europe may be vulnerable, but its current demand is largely met. Asia, on the other hand, has major gaps approaching between its anticipated demand and supply. While Europe may eventually realize its vulnerability can be addressed by buying Israeli gas, Asia already realizes it. That explains why the two most serious contenders to attempt or successfully buy into Leviathan have been Asian companies (CNOOC and Woodside). Finally, the Leviathan partners have signed an initial agreement with the Australian firm, Woodside, to acquire about a third of the rights to the field in order to tap into its liquefaction experience, marketing structure, and capital. But Woodside is oriented toward marketing gas in Asia, and has structured the initial agreement to a schedule for building a liquefaction plant generally assumed to service trade to Asia. In short, the shape of the partnership will have a significant impact on whether the gas flows east or west. While the export destination of Israel’s gas is strategically important, the context and geostrategic circumstances of how gas might be transmitted to either

z The Turkish Dilemma

Most recently, the Levant Basin Energy Report posited the idea that Israel could build an export pipeline from the Leviathan field to Turkey, and from Turkey to Europe. At the end of January 2013, Director General of Israel’s Ministry of Energy and Water Resources Shaul Tzemach indicated that Turkey could be an anchor customer for Israeli gas, and that the option of gas exports to Turkey was practical, despite the current reigning political tensions. As reported in Globes, Tzemach said of cooperating with Turkey, “There are quite a few geopolitical barriers, but if we know how to

Spring 2013 | inFocus Examines Israel: A Light Among Nations

create the right conditions, it is possible. Gas should be used as a stabilizing factor which leads to cooperation between countries and includes multinationals and international parties with an interest in regional stability.” Officials from Turkey, however, appear less eager. Almost the same day Tzemach was quoted, Turkey’s Deputy Energy Minister told the Turkish daily Hurriyet that even if Israel 1) fulfilled Turkish demands for an open apology for the Mavi Marmara incident, 2) compensated families of the victims and 3) ended the blockade on Gaza—all dubious in and of themselves—Israel’s resource cooperation with Greek Cyprus would preclude any energy cooperation with Turkey. And even if such a pipeline were built, it would be subject to: • Geopolitical blackmail on Ankara’s part. • Sabotage: Pipelines to Turkey are bombed regularly. Indeed, it is precisely the tenuousness of pipeline supply to Turkey that led to the Turkish government’s interest in the Israeli pipeline, which it will be no more able to secure than its other pipelines. • Geostrategic opposition from Moscow: Israeli gas poses a competitive pressure on Russia’s supply to the Turkish and European markets. It may be possible (but unlikely) to address this specific concern by bringing Gazprom into the deal in a controlling position, but bringing in Gazprom would only multiply the geopolitical vulnerability to blackmail and expose the pipeline system to Turkish-Russian and Russian-Israeli vagaries in addition to those between Turkey and Israel. But perhaps even more important than the mercantile problem this poses to Russia, Moscow now sees itself threatened by the rise of a resurgent Ottoman Sunni empire to its south and is seeking every way possible to cut Ankara’s ambitions to size. Being on the wrong side of Russia and Iran on the issue of a facility or structure in Turkey that cannot effectively be protected from terror is a risky endeavor. And both Tehran and Moscow would be tempted towards sabotage.

z The Jordanian Option

Some in the Israeli government and political spectrum view the anchoring of an export structure to a liquefaction terminal in Aqaba on the Red Sea as an important strategic objective. Moreover, there is a powerful constituency, reinforced by international diplomatic preferences, to advance the option of lashing Israel and Jordan tightly through natural gas structures as a way to advance the stalled peace process. Still, it is highly unlikely that this option will ultimately prevail. Israel’s recent experience with Egypt, where half of Israel’s natural gas supply was permanently severed because of the destruction of the Egyptian-Israeli gas pipeline following the collapse of the Mubarak regime, suggests Israel will view with apprehension any scheme to anchor its critical infrastructure and an emerging major portion of its GDP to a potentially unstable Jordanian regime. Even assuming the Jordanian government does survive, political conflict in the Middle East in the age of the “Arab Spring” is increasingly expressing itself through attacks on energy infrastructure, particularly pipelines. Since Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah already have defined Israel’s gas industry as a strategic target, Israel’s government expects them to attempt to strike Israel’s export structure at any point of vulnerability. Moreover, Iran and Turkey—which have had some role in attacks on each others’ pipelines in Iraq, Syria, and Turkey—both view the successful emergence of Aqaba as a major energy transfer hub with tremendous strategic apprehension. In order to vie for control and undermine the viability of an emerging Kurdish state, both want all northern Iraqi gas and oil to either remain undeveloped or flow through their respective territories and are likely to sabotage any alternative, such as Aqaba. Israel’s Defense Forces (IDF) and the broader security establishment will almost certainly adopt the view that they cannot guarantee the protection of this critical infrastructure— which they are tasked to do—unless it is accompanied by the IDF’s direct presence.

inFocus Examines Israel: A Light Among Nations | Spring 2013

z Liquefying the Gas at Home

It is likely that the gas will be liquefied on Israeli territory and exported from there. Indeed, not only did the Tzemach Committee—tasked by the Israeli government to recommend overall natural gas policy, which the government may enact as law—expressed a “strong preference” for any export facility to be located on Israeli territory. Globes reported that officials from Israel’s Ministry of Energy and Water Resources have said the terminal would be built in Israel despite the bureaucratic difficulties, since “no sensible government is prepared to have its gas export installations in another country, however friendly it may be.” Israel’s government may also seek to leverage and align gas export policy to broader foreign policy objectives by favoring a flexible export strategy that exploits the country’s geographic position to service both Asia and Europe, allowing it to contemplate a dual-continent approach. Such a plan could potentially involve the construction of LNG terminals anchored at either end to the Eilat-Ashqelon Pipeline Corp. (EAPC) structure, depending on the volumes of resource discovered in the Levant Basin. Indeed, many Israeli officials view the importance of gas export in the context of Egypt’s deterioration—not only in terms of hostility to Israel, but in terms of anti-Western tendencies and chaos, all of which raise questions about the viability of the Suez Canal as a major EuropeanAsian transit route. These officials see a cross-Israel natural gas pipeline as an additional anchor for transforming Israel into a major trans-ocean passageway connecting the Mediterranean and Red Seas. This would reassert Israel as a major trade and transportation route as an alternative to the Suez, and by developing the Eilat area and by extension, as Europe’s portal to Asia. The result would be to enhance Israel’s strategic value to the West. David Wurmser is the founder of the Delphi Global Analysis Group.

Another Side of Israel: The Impact of Tikkun Olam by Avi Mayer

n a chilly day in the middle of February, seven young Syrian men appeared near the border fence separating the Syrian and Israeli sides of the wind-swept Golan Heights. Suffering from gunshot wounds, their bodies riddled with shrapnel, they called out to the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) soldiers guarding their side of the fence and asked for permission to draw near. When the IDF soldiers saw the Syrians’ condition, they immediately permitted them entry, provided them with first aid, and transported them in military ambulances to Ziv Hospital in the northern Israeli town of Safed for further treatment.

proud status as the Start-up Nation, as Dan Senor and Saul Singer put it so aptly in their book. With more companies on the NASDAQ than Europe, China, and Japan combined, and more high-tech start-ups per capita than any other nation, Israel is a veritable wellspring of innovation. Google, Microsoft, and Intel have long had a robust presence in Israel; Apple is reportedly planning to open a third R&D center in the country. Advances in a vast range of fields—from medicine to agriculture, and from alternative energy to nanotechnology—have emerged from this tiny strip of the Mediterranean coast.

Seven Syrian men who staggered toward their country’s border with Israel in February knew that their supposed enemy to the southwest would come to their aid when they needed it most. “This is not the first time in the hospital’s history that we have received wounded individuals from the other side of the border,” hospital director Dr. Oscar Embon later said. “It is always a humanitarian activity and we concentrate on the wounded as we would on any other wounded person, focusing solely on the medical issue without going into other matters. We treat every wounded person as he is, and it does not matter where the person comes from.”

z A Wellspring of Innovation

Much has been written about Israel’s

But not as much is known about Israel’s commitment to humanitarianism and international development, a principle that has accompanied the country throughout its existence and is enshrined in a document no less essential than its 1948 Declaration of Independence.

z Commitment to Humanitarianism

“We extend our hand to all neighboring states and their peoples in an offer of peace and good neighborliness,” the Declaration reads, “and appeal to them to establish bonds of cooperation and mu-

tual help with the sovereign Jewish people settled in its own land. The State of Israel is prepared to do its share in a common effort for the advancement of the entire Middle East.” This vision of international cooperation had, in fact, been laid out 52 years earlier, in the foundational text of the modern Zionist movement. In closing his seminal book, Der Judenstaat (The State of the Jews), in 1896, Theodor Herzl wrote the following: “Whatever we attempt [in the state of the Jews] for our own benefit will redound mightily and beneficially to the good of all mankind.” It may be argued that Israel’s commitment to humanitarianism is rooted even deeper, in what the Declaration of Independence calls “the eternal Book of Books.” The traditional Jewish commitment to tikkun olam (“Repairing the World”) has long served as an inspiration for social action, from Rabbi Abraham Joshua Heschel’s participation in the 1965 Selma Civil Rights March alongside Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. to more recent activism aimed at bringing an end to the genocide in Darfur. It would seem only natural that the reconstituted Jewish State would seek to embody such a cardinal tenet of the Jewish ethical code. Dr. Arye Oded, a former Israeli ambassador to several African countries, traces the genesis of Israel’s overseas development activities to a diplomat named David Hacohen. Writing in Jewish Political Studies Review, Oded notes that Hacohen, serving as Israel’s first ambassador to Burma in 1953, arranged for Israeli experts in a variety of fields

Spring 2013 | inFocus Examines Israel: A Light Among Nations

to visit the Southeast Asian country and for their Burmese counterparts to travel to Israel for training. “Hacohen’s work became a model for Israeli aid,” Oded writes. Later, Elyashiv Ben-Horin, a foreign ministry official, formally proposed the establishment of “a fund to provide technical assistance to Asian and African countries. Professionally speaking, our… experience can easily compete with [that of] other countries.” Teddy Kollek, then Director General of Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion’s office and later mayor of Jerusalem, was also active in promoting aid programs for developing countries. It is important to note that Israel, a nascent country less than a decade, was at the time contending with immense challenges, including a wave of immigration that had more than doubled the country’s population, high unemployment, an austerity regime, and the constant threat of armed conflict with its neighbors. The country was still engaged in the process of building its own national institutions— Israel’s first currency, the lira, only went into circulation in 1952 and the Bank of Israel, the Central Bank, was founded in 1954—and tens of thousands of immigrants still lived in tent cities known as Ma’abarot.

z The Legacy of International Development

Yet the commitment to international development ran deep among the country’s early leaders. As Dr. Aliza BelmanInbal, a former MASHAV official who is currently a fellow at Tel-Aviv University, and Shachar Zahavi, director of the humanitarian nonprofit IsraAID, wrote in a 2009 report on Israel’s development activities: “As Zionists, they aspired to establish Israel as a model amongst emerging states, leading the way forward for others to develop as Israel had. This deep sense of mission informed the commitment to development, in post-colonial Africa and elsewhere, of former Prime Ministers David Ben-Gurion and Golda

Meir.” As it happened, Meir—then Israel’s foreign minister—accepted Ben-Horin’s recommendation and in 1957 MASHAV (a Hebrew acronym for “The Center for International Cooperation and Aid,” but more commonly translated as “The Agency for International Development Cooperation”) was born. During its first decade, MASHAV trained more than 10,000 individuals from more than 90 countries and dispatched more than 4,000 Israeli experts across the globe. A 1960 MASHAVsponsored conference on “the advancement of new states” drew 120 delegates from 40 countries, including President Joseph Kasa-Vubu of the Republic of the Congo, who arrived in Israel a mere five days after his own country was formed. A 1962 article about MASHAV in the British newspaper, The Guardian, noted: “Israel’s policy toward Sub-Saharan Africa should perhaps be seen in wider terms, and should be recognized to be not just part of its defense line against the Arab world, but also of a genuine desire to help. Africans respond because they recognize this.” Consider the following statement by Belman-Inbal and Zahavi: “During the 1960s and 1970s, when Israel was itself still a developing country, it had a bilateral aid program comparable, relative to the size of its economy, to that of the major, developed-country donors of the time.” By the late 1960s and early 1970s, MASHAV’s international development activities were among the most extensive of national aid agencies. Belman-Inbal and Zahavi note that a 1975 report by the UN Development Program named Israel as the largest single contributor of expertise per capita of any nation in the world. Since then, MASHAV’s activities have only grown. In the fifty-five years since its establishment, the center has undertaken training and development projects in more than 130 countries. Some 270,000 individuals have participated in MASHAV courses, both in Israel

inFocus Examines Israel: A Light Among Nations | Spring 2013

and abroad. Today, MASHAV’s activities focus on the mitigation of poverty, provision of food security, empowerment of women, and enhancement of basic health and education. “MASHAV’s philosophy is to encourage professionals from the developing world to find their own solutions to development issues and to adapt them to the reality of their countries’ specific needs and potential,” Ambassador Daniel Carmon, MASHAV’s current director, said in 2012. “Israel, through MASHAV, is sharing its know-how in agriculture, health, energy, education, the empowerment of women, and so many other fields where the Israeli experience can make a difference.” But while Israel’s aid activities in the realms of food security and agricultural innovation have improved countless lives over time, the country’s lifesaving expertise is more immediately sought in times of crisis. Having endured seven wars and thousands of terror attacks over the course of its sixty-five-years, Israel has developed emergency know-how and crisis protocols that are readily shared in times of need. According to the Israel Defense Forces, no fewer than sixteen IDF emergency aid missions have been dispatched across the globe over the past twentyeight years. From Mexico to Kenya and from Turkey to Japan, thousands of people have been provided with medical care, and hundreds have been saved from certain death. When a devastating earthquake struck Haiti on January 12, 2010, a 220-person IDF aid mission was one of the first dispatched to the island nation. Upon the delegation’s arrival, it split into two teams: the first, comprised of search and rescue specialists, immediately went to work sifting through the rubble in search of survivors; the second, a medical delegation, set up a field hospital in a Port-au-Prince soccer stadium. During the IDF mission’s time in Haiti, the medical team treated 1,100 patients, performed more than

ligated to every person in need—whether he’s Israeli or not. Our commitment to people in need is not a national one, but a universal one.

z Neighborly Assistance

Closer to home, Israel has often extended humanitarian assistance to its neighbors, despite ongoing tensions. According to the Office of the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT), the Defense Ministry department responsible for implementing government policy vis-à-vis the West Bank and Gaza Strip, 210,469 Pales-

During the IDF mission’s time in Haiti, the medical team treated 1,100 patients, performed more than 300 lifesaving surgeries, and delivered 16 babies—one of whom, a little girl, was named Israel by her grateful mother. ane Sawyer, in a segment featuring the network’s medical editor, Dr. Richard Besser. “The Israelis arrived here Friday night; by Saturday morning they had set up a field hospital,” Besser said. “As you walk through this campus, it has military precision. You see a pediatric ward, you see a maternity ward, a newborn intensive care unit.” Israeli nonprofit organizations remain in Haiti, continuing humanitarian work to this day in cooperation with MASHAV. In August 2012, the IDF Spokesperson’s Unit published an interview with Lt. Col. A., commander of the Israel Air Force squadron responsible for flying the aid missions around the world. He said: As I see it, [the aid missions are] part of the Jewish identity that obliges each and every one of us to aid people in time of need, anywhere in the world. I have no doubt that whenever and wherever help will be needed, we will arrive. As an Israeli citizen and an IDF soldier, I see myself ob-

tinians in need of medical care were admitted into Israel to receive treatment in Israeli hospitals in 2012. A report by the World Health Organization found that 91.5% of applications to enter Israel for medical purposes were approved in 2012, while a further 7.2% were awaiting approval, pending security clearance. Israeli nongovernmental organizations play an important role as well. One NGO, Save a Child’s Heart (SACH), works with Israeli government agencies and medical centers to provide lifesaving medical treatment to children from 44 developing countries, including some that do not maintain diplomatic relations with Israel. Approximately half of the 3,000 children treated through the program have been Palestinians, 70% of whom have come from the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip. Though Iraq has been at a state of war with Israel since 1948, dozens of Iraqi children have received medical care in the Jewish state. SACH is the largest organization of its kind in the

world and all medical staff involved in the program work voluntarily. These activities continue even during hostilities. Writing in The Jewish Week one week after the November 2012 clashes between Hamas and Israel, Lt. Nira Lee described her work as a COGAT liaison officer on the Gaza-Israel border: Had you told me four years ago that there were IDF officers who stayed up all night under a hail of rockets, brainstorming ways to import medical supplies and food to the people of Gaza, I am not sure I would have believed you. But I can tell you it is true because I did it every night. What amazed me the most was the singular sense of purpose that drove everyone from the base commander to the lowest ranking soldier. We were all focused completely on our mission: to help our forces accomplish their goals without causing unnecessary harm to civilian lives or infrastructure. Maybe stories such as these make for less exciting headlines, but if they received more attention there would perhaps be more moral clarity, and thus more peace in the Middle East.

Avi Mayer: Another Side of Israel: The Impact of Tikkun Olam

300 lifesaving surgeries, and delivered 16 babies—one of whom, a little girl, was named Israel by her grateful mother. Observers marveled at what Israel was able to achieve. “I’m just amazed. I’m just amazed at what’s here,” said CNN medical correspondent Elizabeth Cohen as she walked past a large Star of David placed on the soccer field in a segment that aired in the earthquake’s aftermath. “This is—this is like another world compared to the other hospital.” “One unit has become legendary: the Israeli medical unit,” said ABC’s Di-

z A Light Among Nations

The seven Syrian men who staggered toward their country’s border with Israel in February knew that their supposed enemy to the southwest would come to their aid when they needed it most. Indeed, Israel’s commitment to helping those in need is embedded in the country’s national DNA. It has manifested itself throughout Israel’s existence and continues to do so in a myriad of ways, both close to home and at the furthest reaches of the globe. Perhaps, as Lt. Lee notes, if Israel’s national dedication to tikkun olam were better known among both its friends and its foes, we might be one step further toward repairing our fractured world. Avi Mayer is the Director of New Media at The Jewish Agency for Israel, the largest Jewish nonprofit organization in the world. He tweets at @avimayer.

Spring 2013 | inFocus Examines Israel: A Light Among Nations

Two Books and an Agenda review by Shoshana Bryen

Saturday People, Sunday People: Israel Through the Eyes of a Christian Sojourner by Lela Gilbert Encounter Books 2012 $25.99

he Western temptation to view the Middle East and North Africa as part of the “Muslim World,” of which the “Arab World” is a subset, makes politics simpler but does a disservice to what has historically been a multicultural, religious, and ethnic region. It also provides cover for the systematic assault on minority communities by the dominant Arab and Muslim cultures. If the West doesn’t know minorities are there, it won’t notice when they disappear. And they are disappearing. Iraq, for example, is both Arab and Muslim—but there are non-Arab Kurds, Assyrians and Turkmen, and smaller groups of Azeris, Georgians, Armenians, Roma, Chechens, Circassians, Mhallami, and Persians. There are non-Muslim Christians, Mandeans, Yazidis, Yarsan, Shabak, Zoroastrians, and Bahais. The Jewish community dated from before the Common Era. But in 2011, Wikileaks published the names of what were reported to be the last seven, in hiding while they planned to leave. Iran is considered Persian, but nearly 40% of the Iranian population consists of Azeris, Kurds, Arabs, Lurs, Baloch and Turkmen, Kazakhs and Qashqai. The percentage of ethnic Persians is actually rising slightly as others leave. The percentage of non-Muslim people is declining precipitously—as many as half of Iraq’s 1.5 million Christians have left the country since the 2003 overthrow of Saddam. The Persian Jewish community, dating from the time of the Bible, continues to shrink from 100-150,000 in 1948 to 80,000 in 1979, to 8,756 today according to a 2012 census. The lack of official and unofficial tol-

inFocus Examines Israel: A Light Among Nations | Spring 2013

erance for “the other” is part of the reason the “Arab Spring” soured so quickly. Western ignorance or complacency remains a contributing factor. Lela Gilbert, an adjunct fellow at the Hudson Institute and a free-lance writer, brings the systematic decimation of Christian communities in the Middle East to the attention of the West in her new book, Saturday People, Sunday People: Israel Through the Eyes of a Christian Sojourner. It is actually two books and an agenda. The first book is about Gilbert’s much-longer-than-planned visit to Jerusalem and her exploration of Israel. The second is about the decimation of Arab Christian communities, the follow-on to the expulsion of Jewish communities in the 20th Century. This explains her choice of the title, borrowed from radical Muslims who have long used the phrase, “First the Saturday people; then the Sunday people.” Gilbert examines both tragedies with great respect. The agenda is to use the Jewish history in Arab lands as a cautionary tale to sound the alarm about the increasingly monolithic Muslim Middle East, and to create a Christian-Jewish alliance to face Muslim violence against minorities.

z The First Book

Gilbert came to Israel during the 2006 Lebanon war and learned that much of what she thought she knew about Israel wasn’t so. She stayed longer than planned, visiting Christian and Jewish holy sites in Jerusalem and in the North, visiting Sderot under Hamas rocket fire, Bethlehem and a “settlement.” She met and interviewed Israelis of all stripes. Her

review by Shoshana Bryen: Saturday People, Sunday People

blunt and outspoken belief in the political rightness and essential humanity of Israel is refreshing and her wide-eyed astonishment with the media’s unfairness is almost shocking. A cynic might say it is rose-colored glasses—after all, Jerusalem does that to people—but it will come as a relief to those who have been talking about media and political bias for years. It is refreshing to have someone look at Israel with new eyes and see what many others have seen and write about it with such elegance. She captures sights, smells, and insights about the Jewish calendar, Jewish holidays, and her Jewish and Arab neighbors with appreciation and respect. Aware of the persecution of European Jews, Gilbert discovers the Jewish refugees from Arab countries by accident: “So why hadn’t I heard about this ‘forgotten exodus’ before? I’d been in Israel for a few years by then. I’d read half a dozen lengthy histories of Israel or histories of the Jewish people, yet they had barely mentioned such a monstrous event. Why had nearly a million refugees fallen off the radar screen?” She turns her attention to them and their progeny in a series of vignettes about Sephardic Jews, contrasting the relative obscurity of their stories with the exposure of Palestinian refugees and their descendants. “Hardly a day passes when the subject of the millions of Palestin-

in fact probably about Jews in general. We never look back. We always look forward. I’m not going to go back and claim a house, which used to be mine 40 or 50 years ago. I really couldn’t care less. I live for the future. The European Jews were the same way after the Holocaust. If you

If the West doesn’t know minorities are there, it won’t notice when they disappear. And they are disappearing. ians refugees seeking a ‘right of return’ to their lost properties—or compensation for them—isn’t discussed in relation to Middle East peace negotiations… the story of their losses and their controversial politicization is a familiar subject… Meanwhile, a different refugee story… is far less familiar.” One Iraqi-born Israeli explains why: “I’ll tell you something about Iraqi Jews—

look back, you never go forward.” The stories of Muslim persecution of Jews in Morocco, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, and Syria segue seamlessly into tales of Muslim persecution of Christians in the same places.

z The Second Book

The stories in the second book are ugly. Described in detail is the almost un-

reported 2010 massacre in the Assyrian Catholic Church of Our Lady of Salvation in Baghdad, in which 57 people including two priests and many children were killed during Mass. There is the 2012 incident in Mosul in which, “motorcycle-riding killers struck a Catholic priest’s family, breaking into the residence through a back entrance. They murdered Fr. Mazin Eshoo’s father and his two brothers, and raped his mother and his sister.” She describes the 2011 rampage in Cairo’s Maspero District in which at least 27 Copts were killed, and the harassment of converts in Morocco. The quiet decimation of the Bethlehem Christian community through intimidation by the PA government, Hamas, and assorted Muslim gangs gets a chapter of its own. As she did with Jewish refugees, Gilbert provides historical background and then lets individual stories speak for themselves, either through persecuted individuals or through surviving family members. It was not necessary to juxta-

Spring 2013 | inFocus Examines Israel: A Light Among Nations

pose their tribulations against the horrific massacre of the Fogel parents and three of their six children 2011 in Itamar, but that is the segue to the third, and most uncomfortable, part of the book.

z The Agenda

The last chapter, “Natural Allies in a Dangerous World,” postulates that Jews and Christians, as minorities, have to stand together to defend Israel and defend the remaining Christian communities of the Middle East. It is hard to argue against the proposition. Gilbert has a sharp tongue for Muslim radicals and the politics of the Catho-

But she engages in a bit of disingenuousness herself when she discovers that Bethlehem’s Christians have anti-Jewish attitudes no different from those of radical Muslims, and place blame on Israel no differently than does the Catholic Church. She lets them duck: “As the leaders of the Arab Christian churches place the blame for the dangers facing Arab Christians squarely on the shoulders of Israel, they never hint that the radical religious jihadis or ‘Islamic Mafia’…are extorting, threatening, falsely accusing and sometimes murdering Christian Arabs.” Gilbert appears not to consider that the Catholic Church may blame Israel

Jews and Christians, as minorities, have to stand together to defend Israel and defend the remaining Christian communities of the Middle East.

lic Church. But she slides a little too lightly over the history of Christian-Jewish relations. “Muslim hatred of Jews,” she writes, “is linked to hatred of Christians.” Radical Islamists, “demonstrate that, in their view, human life is of less value than the Islamic religion itself. Human beings—and their God-given breath of life—are found wanting in comparison to the sanctity of Islam’s holy book, the Quran. And the revered reputation of its prophet Mohammed. And calls to jihad—holy war—from radical leaders against non-Muslims.” She calls out the Catholic Church’s political bias against Israel: “The Vatican’s Special Assembly for the Middle East of the Synod of Bishops… chose to focus on the ‘Israeli occupation’ of Palestinian territories rather than naming the actual perpetrators of ongoing violence against Christians; radical Islamic terrorists,” adding, “The Vatican’s focus on Israel, rather than on radical Islam, as the root cause of abuses against Christians, is both disingenuous and destructive.”

precisely because it fears that Islamic violence against local Christians might be exacerbated by taking Israel’s side. Nor does she consider that Arab Christians may really share Arab Muslim anti-Jewish attitudes. It can’t go all one way for the Catholic Church and all the other way for the Arab Christians.

z Selective Lessons from History

Of Christian persecution of Jews she writes, “It has been true that Jews and Christians have hotly disputed religious disparities… A number of our differences cannot and should not be compromised for the sake of mutual understanding, and we will continue to agree to disagree.” What she posits as mutual antagonism historically led to Jewish—not Christian—persecution. The Spanish Inquisition, for example. “[I]t cannot be overlooked that the bloodshed suffered by Jews at the hands of so-called Christians over many centuries is a matter of historical record.” So, even where Gilbert acknowledges who

inFocus Examines Israel: A Light Among Nations | Spring 2013

was on which end of the persecution, she won’t call the bad guys Christians; they are only “so-called.” That dodge— her apparent belief that “real” Christians wouldn’t kill Jews for theological reasons, but “real” Muslims would—is actually the reason that “bitter mistrust continues to this day.” It would have been better to say outright that the Christian ecclesiastical hierarchy and many practitioners treated Jews and Muslims precisely the way the Muslim ecclesiastical hierarchy and many practitioners treat Jews and Christians today—as people minimally in need of conversion and maximally doomed to die. If that sounds churlish, it is only because Gilbert doesn’t then acknowledge the great efforts by various strong Church leaders over time who worked prodigiously to come to terms with and overcome the history of Christian persecution of Jews. Christians did not always appreciate them, but it is on the foundation of their work that Gilbert’s appreciation of Israel and the Jewish people stands.

z A Natural Alliance

Saturday People, Sunday People is elegantly written, historically important, and politically relevant. Gilbert is correct that there is an immediate and deadly problem for Christian communities of the Middle East and that most of the world is ignorant of or unmoved by their plight. Jews should be calling for the protection of minorities in the Middle East. Not because Jews were victims first, but because it is morally right, and because the growing intolerance of modern Muslims majorities will make it harder, if not impossible, for Arab and Muslim countries to find political openness and consensual government in the 21st century. The natural alliance is among people, individuals or groups of any religion or no religion, who understand that exclusionary and reactionary governments bode ill for their majorities and minorities alike. Shoshana Bryen is Senior Director of the Jewish Policy Center.

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The Success of Israel’s Iron Dome News services Israeli officials hailed the Iron Dome missile defense system as a major success following Operation Pillar of Defense in Gaza. During the campaign, the Iron Dome intercepted more than 400 incoming mortars and missiles at a success rate of 85%. The system works by quickly identifying each incoming projectile and then launching an interceptor if populated areas are at risk. Its deployment did not just save Israeli lives. Many believe that low Israeli casualties from Palestinian rockets prevented a political backlash. Such a backlash could have pressured the government to send ground troops into Gaza to stop the rocket fire, which would have caused more civilian Palestinian casualtises. Such valuable technology does not come cheap, as some project that each Iron Dome

interceptor will cost upwards of $90,000. The U.S. also saw value in Israel’s missile defense systems. While visiting Washington in May 2012, Defense Minister Ehud Barak accepted $680 million from the U.S. government to help further its development. Israel’s defense establishment created a multi-tiered defense shield with Iron Dome providing protection against short-range threats. David’s Sling, expected to come online in 2014, would protect Israel from medium-range attacks coming from countries such as Syria or Lebanon. Arrow 3 targets long range ballistic missiles, such as the Iranian Shahab with a range of more than 1,200 miles. Tested this February, Arrow 3 should be able to hit targets above the earth’s atmosphere and is expected to be deployed in 2016.