Volume II - The Starling Undergraduate Journal of Philosophy by The Starling Undergraduate Journal of Philosophy

VOLUME II | JULY 1, 2015

TABLE OF CONTENTS Preface. ............................................................................................................................... 3

Heidegger Never Got Pregnant: A Discussion of the Possibility of Pregnancy ............ 4

EVANGELIAN COLLINGS, Queen's University

Why Conceivability Does Not Entail Metaphysical Possibility...................................... 12

ADRIAN YEE, University of British Columbia

Natural Laws and the Contraceptive Mandate: The Catholic Objection to the Affordable Care Act ......................................................................................................... 33

THEODORE DRAKE, Villanova University

How Urbanization Has Affected the Living Arrangements of the Elderly in Africa .... 42

PAMELA METANI, Wellesley College

Economic Inequality and Civil Disobedience ................................................................. 48

HANNAH OSWALD, University of Illinois

A Defense of the Institutional Theory of Art .................................................................. 55

SNOW ZHANG, Wellesley College

Postlude ............................................................................................................................ 59

PREFACE

Dear Reader, I am very pleased to present to you the second volume of The Starling Undergraduate Journal of Philosophy. It is with great excitement that I share this volume with you, a volume for which submissions have come from many undergraduate institutions, in different countries. The Starling thanks all of its contributors for so readily sending us your wonderful submissions, and congratulates those authors whose work is published in this volume. True to its vision of becoming the most inclusive space possible for philosophical thought at the undergraduate level, this volume includes submissions from various areas of philosophy. The Starling hopes to challenge the common form to which philosophical works are compared to, and we welcome submissions ranging in degree of formal presentation and creativity, keeping only one variable constant among the works: their philosophical focus. All of the works published in this volume have undergone a multi-step, blind-review process. Volume II of The Starling Undergraduate Journal of Philosophy would not have been possible without the following people who helped further increase the quality of works featured herein: Austin Kibsey (York University, Canada), for his contribution to editorial work, and Gemma Adams (Western University, Canada), for her contribution to editorial work, and countless supporting members from the Wellesley College community. As you embark on the enlightening adventure that we hope reading this volume of The Starling will provide, I hope that you enjoy reading the featured submissions as much as we, at The Starling, enjoyed reviewing them!

- Pamela Metani President & Founder | The Starling Undergraduate Journal of Philosophy

Heidegger Never Got Pregnant: A Discussion of the Possibility of Pregnancy EVANGELIAN COLLINGS, Queen's University

In Being and Time, Heidegger makes a careful phenomenological characterization of Dasein1, or the human being. His study of Dasein is of primary importance to answering his main question of ‘what is Being?’, since all phenomenological study is directed from a particular point of view. In our case, this is the point of view of Dasein. One essential aspect of Dasein is that it is a being-ahead-of-itself. That is, Dasein projects itself into the future as a fundamental mode of Being. It adopts projects that greatly affect its actions and experiences, and intends actions to help realize its goals. Dasein as a being-ahead-of-itself imagines and invests interest in itself and the things it cares about, as they will be in the future. As a woman reading Heidegger, I wonder what attention might have been given to pregnancy had Heidegger been a female. From puberty to menopause, the possibility of becoming pregnant is a constant presence in a woman’s2 life. As a being-ahead-ofherself, a female Dasein is aware that what she might be in the future includes a woman 1

Dasein means ‘that it is’ or ‘existence’ and is loosely used to mean human being. It is sometimes translated Dasein ‘there being’, emphasizing Heidegger’s idea that people are in the midst of the world, not apart from it (see Martin Heidegger, “Being and time: Introduction,” in Basic Writings, ed. David Farrell Krell (New York: HarperCollins, 1993), 41-87, footnote p.48). In keeping with a Heideggerian conception of the human being, I will also use the term Dasein in this paper. 2 In this essay, I mean ‘biologically female person’ whenever I say ‘woman’ or ‘female’, unless otherwise noted.

in a state of pregnancy. It affects how she makes her decisions and what plans she has for the future. I would like to say that the female case of Dasein in this stage of her life is a being-towards-pregnancy. The state of being pregnant itself also seems to be a special case of being-ahead-of-oneself, as there are many associated and previously unavailable possibilities that come with being pregnant. A better understanding of Being was central to Heidegger’s philosophy, and necessary to understand any other question that might be pursued. Perhaps starting with a concept of what pregnancy is for those who have the possibility of being pregnant is a good way to approach some of the debates surrounding procreation. The ability to become pregnant is the ability to create new human life, and the moral considerations surrounding the decision to use this ability have been taken up in many bioethical debates. While a phenomenological approach is not a means to develop an ethics, a prior consideration of what pregnancy is would be a valuable starting point to understand more about what is involved in these decisions. Being-towards-pregnancy Although I am reluctant to compare the state of being pregnant to the state of being dead, Heidegger provides a detailed discussion of the state of death and does not discuss the state of being pregnant at all. There are some aspects of his discussion of death that translate well to considerations for pregnancy from the perspective of one who has never experienced it. Heidegger names being-towards-death as another one of the essential aspects of Dasein’s Being, in addition to being-ahead-of-itself. He takes care to investigate how the universal ‘possibility’ of impending death colours Dasein’s experience. Death is something that is fundamentally a part of Dasein; it does not ‘find out’ that death is coming in the same way that it discovers that there is a storm coming upon turning on the weather channel. It is not necessary or possible to characterize what the experience of actually being dead is like, as Dasein is no longer Dasein when this occurs. However, the fact that Dasein will be no more at some point in the future affects Dasein’s experience. Heidegger emphasizes four characteristics of death that Dasein must appreciate in its being-towards-death. Dasein does not always do this, since the anxiety that arises from its awareness of death causes it to ‘turn away’ and inauthentically view it as something that may, in empirical fact, happen to it one day, just not yet. However, an authentic being-toward-death recognizes death as “Dasein’s ownmost possibility—non-relational, certain and as such indefinite, not to be outstripped.3” Death is indefinite in that Dasein does not know when or how it will die. Death is possible at any moment. Although death is indeterminate with respect to the particulars, it is certain: it is an a priori part of Dasein that one day it will cease to exist. It is insuperable, which means that this fundamental part of Dasein cannot be avoided, outstripped, or done away with no matter how much 3

Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. Macquarrie and Robinson (New York: Harper, 1962), 52:259

Dasein would prefer not to die. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it is nonrelational, or ‘Dasein’s ownmost’. Nobody can partake in someone else’s death, and Dasein’s death applies only to itself; it belongs to the core of each Dasein. Obviously, the four characteristics of death that must be apprehended for an authentic being-towards-death cannot apply to a being-towards-pregnancy considering the characteristics of pregnancy. Pregnancy is not certain, as not all women become pregnant. It is not insuperable in the sense that nothing can be done to avoid or terminate pregnancy, but it is insuperable in the sense that once pregnant it is not a fact that can be simply ignored. It demands that Dasein take some kind of stand towards her state. It is non-relational, in that one’s pregnancy is their own. One might argue that a pregnancy is not only the woman’s. It is true that someone needs to provide sperm. Also, if the pregnancy results in a live birth there will be a brand new Dasein, with its own set of future projects and possibilities. In this way there are other people involved, however, neither the biological father nor the child is pregnant. The pregnancy is a part of the woman, and it is her own; she is the only person who is in a state of beingpregnant. Pregnancy is also indefinite: you don’t know when (or if) your attempts to become pregnant will be successful, and you don’t know when (or if) your methods to avoid becoming pregnant will fail. What characterizes pregnancy? It is a state of possibility. There is a possibility that there a miscarriage will occur, and Dasein also has the possibility of acting to end its pregnancy. If the pregnancy is completed, the woman can take on the role and project of parenthood. Alternatively, she can arrange an adoption while pregnant, or plan to put the child up for adoption on delivery. She can allow the male Dasein who provided the catalyzing sperm to take on the role and project of parenthood, or she can move away and find a different parental figure or raise the child on her own. All of these possibilities are present in any pregnancy, although the tradeoffs that may be required to realize them vary depending on the situation the woman happens to be in. For example, in a society where abortion is illegal, acting to end one’s pregnancy is still possible, but it carries with it a higher risk of harming oneself or death. In a society where women are considered the property of men, leaving to raise a child on one’s own would be a very difficult thing to achieve -- but still conceivably possible. Heidegger provides a nice formulation of how to be an authentic being-toward-death. One must look at death at “the possibility of the impossibility of any existence at all.4” Death is a lot less more messy than pregnancy, in that once this possibility has been realized, as it must, the possibilities simply end. In an analogous form but with an opposite result, an authentic being-toward-pregnancy should see pregnancy as the possibility of a multitude of new possibilities. That is, if pregnancy is a state of many previously unavailable possibilities, the female Dasein who is not currently pregnant should see it as the possibility of this. An authentic being-towards-pregnancy needs to take ownership of the responsibility for choosing from the possibilities that arise with pregnancy. As Sartre has taught us, the 4

Ibid., 53:262

extent to which we are responsible for our actions and decisions is equal to the extent to which we are free to make these actions and decisions. Our absolute responsibility is “the logical requirement of the consequences of our freedom5”, and our freedom is far more comprehensive than we typically realize. In every case, even when a joint decision has been made to pursue pregnancy between a woman and, for example, a man who she has sex with, a disproportionate responsibility for the existence of the child still lies with the woman6. She is the one who every day freely decides to continue the pregnancy. One project in particular strongly influences the quality of being-towards-pregnancy if the woman has or has not decided to pursue it. This is the project of becoming a parent. There may be other reasons to purposely attempt to become pregnant (e.g. surrogate mothers), however I take a desire to be a parent to be the most common reason to pursue pregnancy. While pregnancy is not the only way to become a parent, it is one of the ways that many women choose to pursue that project. Dasein is particularly strongly aware of her being-towards-pregnancy when she thinks she might already be pregnant, but isn’t sure yet. Awareness of this possibility is an experience of anxiety; the indeterminacy is palpable and the possible changes will require attention. Heidegger characterizes the fundamental mode of being-towarddeath as emerging from anxiety, but anxiety is also experienced more generally: Anxiety makes manifest in Dasein its Being towards its ownmost potentiality-forBeing— that is its Being-free for the freedom of choosing itself and taking 7 hold of itself. The quality of an anxious feeling in the face of possible pregnancy entirely depends on Dasein’s projects. If becoming a parent is one of her projects, it is a hopeful state of anxiety. If becoming a parent is consistent with her other projects, or could be accommodated somehow, it is more complicated. She may be considering whether or not she wants to add parenthood to her projects, and very much could be at stake. She could also see pregnancy as inconsistent with her other projects, in which case the anxiety may be rather dreadful, especially if safe abortions are not available. In calling women beings-toward-pregnancy, I make the claim that women do not consider their potential for pregnancy as they would some type of object in the world. It is not, as Heidegger would say, either something that is present-at-hand or ready-tohand. That is, it is not experienced as some kind of tool or problem that needs to be solved that exists apart from her. It is also not a form of being-alongside. She does not consider her possibility of becoming pregnant in the same way that she would consider someone else’s ability to be pregnant. The knowledge that accompanies being-towards5

Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, trans. Barnes (New York: Philosophical library, 1956), p.554 Question for further study: how do new technologies and policies related to pregnancy embrace this freedom or put pressure on this freedom? Case study: the announcement that Apple and Facebook now include egg freezing in their employee benefits. 7 Heidegger, 40:188 (original emphasis) 6

pregnancy is available to her in a more fundamental sense than empirical knowledge; realizing the possibility of pregnancy affects Dasein in a way that is distinct from learning about the possibility of a new party being elected. The changes would be to Dasein herself, and the possibilities that come with it belong only to her. A woman’s capacity for pregnancy should not be construed as applying to anyone but herself; it is her own non-relational possibility. Pregnancy and Parenthood. The possibility of becoming pregnant is related to pregnancy and parenthood, both of which are important words in the vocabulary of discussing procreation. However, important distinctions must be made between being-towards-pregnancy, pregnancy, and parenthood. While many people who have a desire to become a parent pursue this through pregnancy, pregnancy is not the only way to become a parent. Parenthood is not a state of being, like pregnancy or death. It is a role that may be pursued similarly by members of either gender8. Parenthood is open to people regardless of their sex, as any woman can decide to be a mother to a child through adoption, just as men can adopt and become fathers. As previously mentioned, parenthood does not necessarily follow from pregnancy. Parenthood is a role that one can choose to assume and in light of which one modifies their actions. Pregnancy is a situation that provides an opportunity to make the choice to pursue this role. While the choice to pursue parenthood is freely available, a state of pregnancy is not always under an individual’s direct control. Plenty of people who desire to be pregnant fail to attain it, and plenty more attempt to avoid it and become pregnant regardless. Pregnancy is also distinct from being-towards-pregnancy. The analogy between beingtowards-pregnancy and being-towards-death breaks down when we discuss the actual state of pregnancy. Being-towards-pregnancy is importantly different from beingtowards-death because Dasein can exist and be pregnant, whereas attaining a state of being dead negates the possibility of Dasein’s experience of it. That is, unlike death, pregnancy is something that can be experienced both as a future possibility and as a present state. Thus, pregnancy is a real concern for Dasein and is a state that can be experienced.

One may make the observation that it is a lot easier to pursue the project of being a mother than it is to be a father to one’s biological children, seeing as a pregnant person has the possible choice of leaving. In order to be a father to one’s biological offspring, one must cooperate with a woman for an extended period of time, or perhaps try to control her. Even where women are no longer considered property, social inventions such as ‘bastard’ and ‘slut’ provide a disincentive to pregnant people realizing some of their possibilities. ‘Bastard’ leads her to believe that her child will be shunned, and pressures her not to leave the biological father. ‘Slut’ attempts to control situations in which claims to biological fatherhood are not perfectly clear.

However, pregnancy itself is a less interesting subject for the scope of this essay, since each pregnancy is always a particular case of pregnancy. I make no universal claims as to how pregnancy is experienced for the individual. Dasein might experience pregnancy as being-alongside and behaving in a certain way towards a separate yet-toexist Dasein, or she might see her pregnancy as an object ready-to-hand or present-athand, or she might not see it as being ‘at arm’s length’ from herself at all9. Some version of each of these may characterize the experience at different times and to varying degrees in each pregnancy. It does not seem likely that a universal characterization of how pregnancy itself is experienced will be successful. As discussed earlier, the quality of the experience of Being a being-towards-pregnancy has to do with whether or not one plans to actually become pregnant. In the developed world, women have a historically unprecedented ability to consciously encourage or inhibit a state of pregnancy, and have the opportunity to give careful thought about whether or not it is the right thing to do. The decisions made around pregnancy are related to the projects that a woman freely chooses to pursue.

Project selection and ethics The actions taken in the pursuit of projects related to procreation profoundly affect others’ lives. Many factors can influence how one determines the best course of action in circumstances related to parenthood and pregnancy, but the importance of the effects on those who procreate and their future children warrants some careful consideration. What types of ethical arguments can be raised with regards to selecting the project of becoming a parent? If one desires to be a parent, is the best way to do this through pursuing pregnancy? We may take completing a pregnancy to be equivalent to creating a new human life. All successful pregnancies end as such, and no human lives are created without a pregnant woman’s involvement. The moral implications of creating a human life have been taken up in bioethical debates by men and women alike. These debates center on whether or not procreation is the right thing to do in terms of the child’s interests. The fact that the issues at hand deal with future people who do not yet exist complicates the matter. There is no way to ask the child for consent to create him or her, and typical comparative definitions of harm do not seem to apply: how can the act of creating a child make them worse off than they were before? One particularly evocative and convincing example of an analysis of the morality of procreation is given by Seana Shiffrin. She begins her investigation10 by offering an alternative definition of harm to the comparative model, arguing that an investigation of 9

Question for further study: does the medicalization of pregnancy encourage a woman to view her pregnancy as some type of problem apart from herself, i.e. something present-at-hand? Is this a bad thing? Would there be some cause to consider such an appraisal inauthentic? 10 Seana Shiffrin, “Wrongful life, procreative responsibility, and the significance of harm,” Legal Theory 5, (1999): 117-148

an individual’s previous state is not required to ascertain whether or not an action has harmed her. She also establishes a difference in how we should assign moral value to harms and ‘pure benefits’, that is, benefits that do not alleviate a dire situation, but simply improve the situation of the recipient. Pure benefits should not be weighted as heavily as the harms that we cause. She gives the example of Wealthy and Unlucky 11 in which Unlucky is overall better off after Wealthy’s actions of bestowing a pure benefit in the form of a gold brick that was dropped near Unlucky from a height. However, Unlucky has also been harmed, because the gold brick broke his arm when it fell. Shiffrin includes additional details that allow the example of Wealthy and Unlucky to be compared to a case of procreation, in which Unlucky is the child and Wealthy is the parent. Wealthy has good intentions, but knows his actions carry some risk. He is unable to consult Unlucky to determine whether or not he would consent to receiving the gold brick, considering the risk that his arm may be broken in the process. Shiffrin entertains various defenses of Wealthy’s actions, but finds that none of them are sufficient. Prospective parents act, as Wealthy does, with the hopes that the harms caused by their actions are not too severe. However, sometimes the resulting harms caused by creating a new life are unavoidable and represent a great burden to the child, especially in cases of genetic or other diseases, depression, etc. She concludes that we should take an “equivocal stance toward procreation, one that recognizes that parents subject their future children to harm and substantial risk by bringing them into existence.12” In light of the characterization of pregnancy as a fundamental possibility for a woman, these considerations seem fairly strange. Surely Wealthy is not exactly the same as a pregnant woman, and owning a stack of gold bricks is not the same as living with the possibility of becoming pregnant. It may not be accurate to suppose that a woman facing the possibility of becoming pregnant primarily considers herself to be appraising her ability to bestow a gift upon another being. As discussed earlier, one does not regard their possibility of becoming pregnant as they would a problem that has to be solved, a tool to achieve an end, or as a form of being-alongside. Pregnancy is much closer to the woman than that: it is the manifestation of one of her fundamental possibilities. Is the state of being pregnant available for the moral recommendations of others? Perhaps Shiffrin is exactly right in concluding that moral evaluations of procreation ought to be equivocal. Ethical discussions of procreation that ignore pregnancy seem strange, and it is difficult to support attempts to dictate the way in which women choose to approach their ability to be pregnant. However, this should not indicate that the morality of reproductive decisions cannot be examined. We certainly should be concerned with the ways that our actions affect others, including the children that we may bring into the world. We have seen that one of the reasons a woman may decide to pursue pregnancy is because she wishes to be a parent. Perhaps a good reason to become pregnant is 11 12

Ibid., p.127 Ibid., p.148

because one wants to be a good parent. Of course, it is a big job to define exactly what it means to be a good parent, and I do not attempt to provide such a definition. However, perhaps it is a better on-the-ground yardstick that can capture why we think that people go wrong in certain cases regarding procreation. If a woman decides to conceive while taking a medication that will cause an ailment in her future child, is she making a good decision? Is it acceptable to select a disabled in vitro embryo over a healthy one to implant and carry to term? If we ask whether the primary motivating desire behind these cases of bringing a child into existence is to be a good parent, perhaps we can find preliminary answers to these questions. A woman who becomes pregnant and gives birth to a child is responsible for the existence of that child. This responsibility is tied to a womanâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s freedom to select among the possibilities that her pregnancy presents her with. Awareness of oneâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s freedom results in an individual being made fully aware of their correspondingly profound responsibility. An authentic being-towards-pregnancy is one who is aware of the weight and availability of her decisions. With this consciousness, hopefully she will make the right choices for her particular case.

Why Conceivability Does Metaphysical Possibility

Not

Entail

ADRIAN YEE, University of British Columbia

Abstract I argue against the notion that the conceivability of any given state of affairs by some agent entails that that state of affairs is metaphysically possible. I argue against this notion by demonstrating cases in which an agent conceives of some state of affairs but that it would not follow that that state of affairs is metaphysically possible. I also distinguish between imagination and conceivability as well as logical, metaphysical, and physical possibility to clear up many of the confusions surrounding debates on this topic. I critique a range of variations on the concept of conceivability and focus my argument specifically on the case of what I take to be the most plausible form of conceivability and show that this does not entail metaphysical possibility.

The Prevalence of Conceivability Reasoning Modal reasoning abounds in philosophical discussion and everyday life. It is often one hears modal talk such as: ``there was nothing anyone could do about it, it had to occur that way", ``super-luminal travel is physically impossible," or ``it is possible I could have done otherwise." Modal reasoning also occurs in human judgements concerning the properties everyday objects have. Gilbert Ryle writes in `The Concept of Mind' of how humans regularly employ dispositional reasoning â&#x20AC;&#x201C; a certain species of modal reasoning. Ryle's example is how glass is considered fragile because given certain 12

possible situations involving glass, it is more likely than not amongst these class of situations to have it be the case that the glass breaks rather than it remain intact. 13 Other examples include how modal reasoning can help to aid emotional reconciliation ("There was nothing I could have done to save her life; I must move on with my life now"), to justify atrocities during war ("If we hadn't bombed Hiroshima, the Japanese would not have surrendered."), and to motivate conclusions reached in other personal and political matters in the private and public sphere. It is clear then that modal reasoning is ubiquitous. While modal reasoning has been variously informed by the imaginative capacities of a person's mind, one's metaphysical beliefs, and even emotion-based rhetoric, the modus operandi of such reasoning, particularly in academic philosophy, is often taken be via a unique faculty of the mind: the faculty of conceivability. Conceivability is here being understood as a kind of mental state wherein an agent considers some state of affairs along with some set of conditions for whether that state of affairs obtains or fails to obtain. Indeed, it is common for analytic philosophers to employ a premise in an argument which rests on the ability of one to conceive of some state of affairs and draw as a conclusion that that state of affairs is metaphysically possible. One could then say many philosophers adhere to something like the following thesis: (CEP) := If an agent S conceives of a state of affairs p obtaining then p is metaphysically possible. There is also a stronger variant of (CEP) which has been claimed is employed by laypersons. Hawthorne and Gendler claim that this is ``a pervasive feature of our mental life â&#x20AC;&#x201C; in both day-to-day decision making and in philosophical reasoning."14 This particular variant can be stated as:

(CEP)* := An agent S conceives of a state of affairs p obtaining if and only if p is metaphysically possible. Variants of the (CEP) and (CEP)* theses have played a substantive role in arguments for metaphysical positions in Western philosophy at least as far back as Aristotle's Òrganon' and figured prominently in Aristotle's discussion of modal propositions: ``The negation of à man walks' is not à not-man walks' but à man does not walk'; for there is no difference between saying that a man walks and saying that a man is walking. So then, if this holds good everywhere, the negation of `possible to be' is `possible not to be', and not `not possible to be'. Yet it seems that for the same thing it is possible both to be and not to be. For everything capable of being cut or of walking is capable also of not walking or of not being cut...The negation of `possible to be', therefore, is `not possible to be.'"15 [emphasis added]

13 Ryle, p.31. 14 For simplicity, I refer to Hawthorne and Gendler as joint-authors. See Hawthorne/Gendler, p.2. 15 Aristotle, Categories and De Interpretatione. Chapter 12. p. 60.

In this passage, Aristotle takes his mental state of seeming something to be the case to be not a mere guide to the modal status of some state of affairs but as providing positive evidence in favor of the claim: ``the negation of `possible to be'... is `not possible to be." Similar conceivability-based reasoning has appeared throughout the writings of philosophers who sought to ground non-trivial truths including: St. Anselm's ontological argument for the necessary existence of God16, Descartes' argument that what is conceived clearly, by a mind, is true (and therefore metaphysically possible) 17, and Chalmers' argument against the reducibility of the mental to the physical 18. While both Quine and Putnam are famous for being scientific pragmatists, where even the logical law of excluded middle may be revised, both have nonetheless used conceivability-based reasoning to argue that classical-logic is in some sense transcendental in that no mind could conceive of a world in which the law of noncontradiction or excluded-middle would fail and therefore that classical-logic is the only true, correct logic.19 So conceivability-based reasoning has been employed not merely in matters of metaphysics but in epistemological and even logical contexts as well. Given the prevalence of (CEP) reasoning in philosophy, David Hume went as far as to remark in `A Treatise On Human Nature': an established maxim in metaphysics [is] ... whatever the mind clearly conceives, includes the idea of possible existence, in other words, that nothing we imagine is absolutely impossible.20 While Van Inwagen has gone so far as to retort: ``philosophers who are convinced that they can hold...the concept of transparent iron before their minds and determine whether transparent iron is possible by some sort of intellectual insight are fooling themselves,"21 very few philosophers have seen difficulties with (CEP) and its variants to the point that we should be sceptical of (CEP) as a method of obtaining modal knowledge. This is particularly the case concerning metaphysical possibility as 16 ``Thus even the fool is convinced that something than which nothing greater can be conceived is in the understanding, since when he hears this, he understands it; and whatever is understood is in the understanding. For if it is even in the understanding alone, it can be conceived to exist in reality also, which is greater." [emphasis added] – Mann, p. 260. 17 ``Having noticed that there is nothing at all in this 'I think, therefore I am' that assures me that I am speaking the truth, except that I see very clearly that, in order to think, it is necessary to exist, I judged that I could take as a general rule that the things we conceive very clearly and very distinctly are all true, but that there is merely some difficulty in properly discerning which are those that we distinctly conceive" [emphasis added] – Descartes, p. 19. 18 ``We can think about what is conceivable, in order to argue directly for the logical possibility of a situation in which the physical facts are the same but the facts about experience are different...And we can appeal directly to the concept of consciousness, arguing that there is no analysis of the concept that could ground an entailment from the physical to the phenomenal." [emphasis added] – Chalmers, PhD Thesis, Chapter 3 - Section 1. p.83 19 While certainly the Quine of `Two Dogmas of Empiricism' had held that experiments from quantum mechanics render the distribution laws for conjunction and disjunction revisable, I am referring in particular to Quine's text `Philosophy of Logic' as well as Putnam's text of the same name – `Philosophy of Logic'. Sections toward the end of each book have passages which express this logical-monism. 20 Hume, 1968, p. 32. 21 Van Inwagen, p. 71.

contrasted with physical or logical possibility. As Yablo, Chalmers, and the majority of philosophers' writings in Hawthorne/Gendler's anthology on the topic suggest, Hume may very well be right in observing that (CEP) and its variants is established orthodoxy in metaphysical reasoning. The purpose of this paper is to argue that (CEP) and its variants are false. I argue that modal reasoning that uses (CEP) as either a premise or a central component of its apparatus is epistemically tenuous and should be abandoned where possible. I consider only the entailment from the mental state of a subject conceiving of some state of affairs to that of the metaphysical possibility of that state of affairs. While the analysis of the epistemic structure of beliefs in general must play a role, I will not discuss the issue concerning the epistemic foundation that beliefs themselves rest upon. Instead, I will provide a variety of scenarios in which one would clearly conceive that some state of affairs p held though p is metaphysically impossible and thereby demonstrate that (CEP) is a poor method of obtaining modal knowledge. Distinguishing Conceivability from Neighboring Phenomena The term `conceivability' has etymological and semantic roots with the word `concept' and is traceable to the Latin verb concipere which had often meant `ènvisage, envision, fancy, fantasize, image, imagine, picture, see, and think."22 Due to these various definitions, philosophers in the debate have often conflated multiple meanings of the notion of `conceive' to much confusion. It is common to hear people say ``well, it's conceivable that God could exist" and say this use of `conceivable' is synonymous with ìmagine': ``well, I can imagine in my mind that God exists." Another common equivalence to is to equate `conceivability' with `plausibility': `Ìt is plausible that one could have gone down 22nd street instead of 23rd street and thereby have avoided the traffice jam." I provide at this point a definition of conceivability so as to distinguish it from other definitions in the literature to make clear the target of my criticism. I define `plausible conceivability' (PC) by an agent S as: (PC) := An agent S conceives that some state of affairs p obtains if and only if S has critically evaluated the finite set of conditions under which p could obtain, concludes that C with the conjunction of p is consistent,23 and concludes that p is consistent with one's other background beliefs. I take this action of `concluding' to be a sufficient description of the mental state of conceivability as contrasted with `knowing'. I say ``concludes that..." since it would be unreasonable for anyone to ask of someone to make sure that they know that a premise is consistent with a set of conditions or one's other background beliefs. This is due to the computationally intractable problem of determining whether some finite set of beliefs is consistent or not. To see this issue, it would require checking that p is consistent with 22 Hawthorne/Gendler, p.1. 23 One concern may be that this is already assumed in that one is already ``critically evaluated the finite set of conditions." I wish only to make clear that I take the condition of consistency to be very important when considering the mental state of conceivability and that the agent who is conceiving has concluded that the conditions are consistent.

every subset of C which means checking the consistency of 2 to the power of the cardinality of C subsets. Given that the average human likely has at least over 100 distinct beliefs about various things, this would require checking 2^{100} subsets. For a simple reason why this is a reasonable lower bound, the belief that 0<1<2<3<....<99<100 and take each consecutive inequality as a single belief. If we are being generous and assume that checking each subset's consistency with p takes one second per subset, it will take more than 1.2 x 10^{30} seconds which is much longer than the amount of time since the big-bang was hypothesized to occur. The point of mentioning this computational difficulty is this difficulty's relation to the notion of ideal conceivability, which I will soon argue is employed frequently by philosophers but is a poor concept to work with. So concluding that something is the case is not necessarily being able to know for sure that something is the case. And to conceive that p is not the same as to know that p. It is in this sense that I take concluding to be an essential feature of a plausible notion of conceivability. Further, as the name suggests, I want to claim that competing notions of conceivability to (PC) are either too vague or too liberal to capture what is intended when one is said to `conceive' in modal reasoning. In the next section, I illustrate how (PC) improves upon definitions offered by Chalmers, Yablo, and Hawthorne/Gendler. Competing Notions of Conceivability Chalmers distinguishes between prima facie conceivability and ideal conceivability: ``S is prima facie conceivable for a subject when S is conceivable for that subject on first appearances...after some consideration, the subject finds that S passes the tests that are criterial for conceivability...S is ideally conceivable when S is conceivable on ideal rational reflection."24 In distinguishing between prima facie conceivability and ideal conceivability, Chalmers conflates the evidence given from imagination (``first appears") with that of conceivability in the sense of ``think" and mere `concluding' in the sense of (PC). Another passage where Chalmers conflates imagination and conceivability is when he says: ``Cases of prima facie conceivability without ideal positive conceivability...might include...imagining an impossible object and imagining a situation in which mathematicians annouce that M (for some false M)."25 Here, Chalmers seems to mean `imagine' as in considering some conditions under which a mathematical proposition could be true or false, which is closer to the sense of conceivability as outlined in (PC). However on one view, to imagine that some state of affairs is the case can be described as a very mild form of sense-experience that some state of affairs obtains.26 It follows that, to conceive that 2 + 2 = 4, in the sense of ``think", is not to necessarily sense24 See Chalmers' essay `Does Conceivability Entail Possibility' in Hawthorne & Gendler, p. 147. 25 Ibid., p. 154. 26 I follow cognitive scientist Douglas Hofstadter's notion of imagination where to imagine some state of affairs is to have a very mild sense-impression of that state of affairs. Under this view, imagining the taste of cherry is to have an actual, mild taste of cherry which the brain creates. See Hofstadter, p. 364-365.

experientially see the number 2 or 4 and in some sense ``sense" their some addition. Rather, it is to understand the conditions and rules of arithmetic which make 2 + 2 = 4 true. Imagination is quite a different notion since to understand rules and conditions is not necessarily to be able to picture them in one's mind. To picture in one's mind is more a case of imagination than it is a case of conceiving of state of affairs and it is the notion of conceiving qua thinking that concerns my overall case against (CEP)'s plausibility. So while I grant that imagination may indeed be a reliable guide to metaphysical possibility, it is not the target of my criticism. The notion of `thinking' is much closer to conceivability than is ìmagining' for one can conceive of many states of affairs that are not imaginable. In mathematics, it is rarely ever the case that one can conceive, in the sense of ìmagine' a vector-space whose dimensions exceed 3 (what does a 4dimensional object actually look like?). Nonetheless, using elementary linear algebra techniques, one can easily reason about these spaces by constructing a set of basisvectors and considering their span without having to picture in one's mind what that vector space actually looks like. All of this conceiving is done while reflecting upon certain mathematical definitions and axioms in accordance with (PC). So these vector spaces need not be imaginable though they are in a sense conceivable in the sense of `thinkable'. Contra Chalmers, (PC) imposes a finite upper-bound on the number of conditions under which p could obtain or fail to obtain rather than the much more epistemically tenuous notion of ideal-reasoning.27 For under Chalmers view, ideally rational conceivability is on the one hand too vague to be of use as there is no clear, universally agreed upon notion of ideal conceivability. As mentioned before, it is already difficult enough for one to make sure that one is conceiving properly under the definition of (PC) I have given due to practical computational issues alone. Or worse yet, what is ideal for humans now may not be ideal for humans and other thinking-beings in the future. Perhaps future humans will have evolved to a significantly greater degree such that they can reason more `ìdeally" then we could have imagined it to be the case in the present times. (PC) also imposes the much more realistic assumption that conceiving beings are going to be finite beings who will have a finite set of beliefs. If my arguments are sound, ideal conceivability ends up being a useless concept to work with since no philosopher or any mind for that matter can actually be ideal conceivers. As concerns Chalmers' notion of prima facie conceivability, this is tantamount to basing one's modal reasoning from the contents of snap-judgments and cognitive reflexes which, while perhaps useful as a survival tool, are epistemically useless in considerations of metaphysics.28 One would be hard-pressed to find someone who would be persuaded that talking donkeys are metaphysically possible merely due to an argument whose premises rested on the notion of either an ideally rational conceiver or 27 One mainstream proposal of ideal reasoning has been the Church-Turing Thesis which states that the notion of the vague notion of ìdeal reasoning' qua calculability is made synonymous with `computable by a Turing-machine'. However, it is ubquitous to find in mathematics textbooks the remark that it is intended as a vague notion and is therefore not a proof that human computational capacities can be entirely captured by the expressive and computational powers of a Turing-machine. See Boolos, p. 88 for further discussion. 28 See Cummins' paper `Reflections on Reflective Equilibrium' for an argument similar to my own.

intuition-based, snap-judgments.29 Philosophers are generally careful people and when they formulate conceivability-based arguments for metaphysical possibilities I take it that they are not merely making snap-judgments about what is possible or not. That is a conceivability-argument is an argument believed by someone who has critically reflected upon the argument. So I take defenders of (CEP) to be avoiding prima facie conceivability where possible and so this Chalmers' notion of prima facie conceivability is not of concern for my argument. As concerns conflating different senses of the word `conceive' with neighboring words, throughout Yablo's paper on the topic, he has at times taken the notion of conceivability to mean a kind of ``believability." For example, he says: ``Take the example of our finding it conceivable, in the sense of believable, that Goldbach's conjecture holds." 30 This is not the sense of conceivability for which I want to criticize nor is it the kind I take to be what is often defended by adherents of (CEP) and its variants. I take it that for a proposition p to be rationally believable, it does not follow that it must be conceivable. For example, one may rationally believe in the existence of God. This belief in God's existence may be due to some sequence of extremely improbable events of good fortune where that person had, previous to the events' occurrence, prayed for God to bring them fortune. Nonetheless, arguably God's existence cannot be conceived for, by a standard argument, he would have to be an inconsistent entity; for if he was truly omnipotent then he could lift a boulder defined in such a way that it was a boulder so heavy even he couldn't lift it (or insert your favorite analogous argument). I take it that one cannot conceive of psuedo-entities such as inconsistent entities or incoherent ideas though of course such people often do not realize their inconsistency or incoherency. Further, one may conceive of a light-year long wooden table without having to believe in the existence of a mile-long table, let alone even be commited to its metaphysical possibility. So conceivability qua believability is neither a plausible understanding of what is intended by (CEP) adherents nor is it a constural of what conceivability amounts to as my counter-examples have shown. Hawthorne/Gendler propose four separate definitions of conceivability: 31 (a) Understanding the proposition that P. (b) Entertaining (that) P. (c) Mentally simulating P's obtaining. (d) Engaging in off-line processing concerning P. (a) is the closest to (PC) in that it involves the notion of understanding. Arguably, to understand a proposition one must first be in a position to conceive of that proposition. I will return to a related point concerning `entailment' in a later section.

29 I wish to clarify here that my criticism is not toward the idea that intuitions simpliciter cannot be a source of evidence for philosophical theories. I wish only to criticize the notion of intuitions in the sense of snap-judgments in the sense that Chalmers intends this. See Cappelen, p.3 30 Yablo, p. 10. 31 Hawthorne/Gendler, p. 8.

(b) does not describe the idea within the notion of conceivability that there be a set of conditions that govern the content of one's conceiving. So entertaining has the connotation that some state of affairs is merely being considered rather than scrutinized carefully. A further difference is that to entertain a decision is to place some state of affairs into one's mind to possibly act upon something wheras conceivability need not necessarily entail acting upon some state of affairs. I have in mind here something of the form ``Laura entertained the possibility that Jim was flirting with her as an explanation for his behavior" as opposed to ``Laura conceived the possibility that Jim was flirting with her" for conceivability need not entail entertaining. (c) is not quite right either since it conflates ìmagination' with `conceivability' and, as I had argued for earlier, this won't do. Lastly, if (d) is to be understood in such a way that off-line processing is synonymous with subconscious processing then it is no good for conceivability is really about bringing something to one's attention and cannot really be executed via subconscious processing (though it may arise as a result of subconscious brain processing). If my judgements are sound, we can safely rule out these notions of conceivability from our discussion since they are implausible notions of conceivability and therefore do not concern us when considering (CEP)'s plausibility. Contrary to these opposing definitions of conceivability, the target of my critique will be the notion of conceivability as defined by (PC). I have argued that this to the most plausible form of conceivability, relative to the aforementioned alternatives, that (CEP) adherents really adhere to as a thesis. However, as I will try to show, even the notion of conceivability as (PC), coupled with the (CEP) thesis, will fail to entail metaphysical possibility. Before I can demonstrate this to be the case, I must first describe in detail what I mean by metaphysical possibility. Three Flavors of Possibility As I have shown, the notion of conceivability has be confused with other concepts such as ìmagination', `thought', and ùnderstanding'. Similarly, the concept of `possbility' and other modal notions have been not only been confused with other notions but conflated by various authors. I wish here not to provide the ``proper" account of what metaphysical possibility amounts to but only to show what I mean by metaphysical possibility so as to argue against (CEP). We can distinguish between three different types of possibility, only one of which will concern us:32 physical possibility, metaphysical possibility, and logical possibility. I follow Hawthorne / Gendler's definitions as outlined below. I take physical possibility (PP) to be: a state of affairs p is physically possible if p is consistent with the laws of physics. What exactly the laws of physics are is highly 32 Hawthorne/Gendler, p. 4.

controversial but I take it that the reader will forgive me for taking it for granted that he/she understands roughly what is meant by `the laws of physics' for the purposes of my argument. In any case, this definition will suffice for now as I only need this definition to distinguish it from metaphysical possibility. I take metaphysical possibility (MP) to be: a state of affairs p is metaphysically possible iff p is consistent with the metaphysical structure of the universe. This structure can include the properties and relations of entities (intrinsic and extrinsic) as well as the modal status of such properties. I take logical possibility (LP) to be: a state of affairs p is logically possible iff p is not inconsistent.33 The picture I wish to focus on is one wherein the following ordering relation on the set of all logically, metaphysically, and physically possible states of affairs holds: (PP) is a subset of (MP) which is a subset of (LP). Under this view, everything that is physically possible is metaphysically possible, and everything that is metaphysically possible is logically possible. By transitivity, we have it that everything that is physically possible is logically possible as well. The purpose of the picture I illustrate here is to grant freedom to adherents to (CEP) for I take it that my construal of the relation between physical, metaphysial, and logical possibility is more liberal than others have offered and I hope to show that even this liberal account of modality is problematic for (CEP), let alone more restricted accounts. I focus my discusion only on conceivability and its relation with what is metaphysically possible. To clarify the differences between (MP) and (PP), some examples of alleged metaphysical possibilities include: the existence of God, the existence of talking donkeys,34 the existence of unicorns, the existence of philosophical zombies, and even inconsistent events.35 What is unique about these examples is that few of these are considered to be physical possibilities in that they could be said to be inconsistent with the laws of physics. So metaphysical possibility is a more liberal notion than physical possibility and can allow for dragons, angels, and ghosts if the universe happens to have a metaphysical structure that can sustain such entities. When I say ``the universe" I do not mean what is typically called `the actual world' in possible-worlds talk but instead I mean the set of all `possible worlds'. So a state of affairs is metaphysically possible if its occurrence is consistent with the true ontological picture of the universe. As to what the true ontological picture of the universe actually is I will not go into. I only wish to draw a distinction between metaphysical and physical possibility for the purposes of my argument against (CEP). The picture of modality I have presented has not been without its problems. Van Inwagen for instance rejects the coherence of the concept of `logical possibility' and

33 Due to lack of space and at the risk of being overly tangential, I restrict my analysis to classical and relevant logic systems keeping in mind that paraconsistent and intuitionistic systems may very well have coherent frameworks for reasoning about modalities. I set aside these worries for now. 34 See Lewis's `On the Plurality of Worlds' for a defense of this view. 35 See Priest, p. 160 for how Priest thinks events in time can have non-trivially inconsistent properties.

therefore questions its impact on physical and metaphysical possibility. 36 While Van Inwagen accepts the claim that some kinds of impossibilities follow from the logical impossibility (i.e. - contradictory properties) of some state of affairs, it does not follow in his mind that what is not proved to be logically impossible is logically possible. The point he is making is that if some state of affairs cannot be proved to be impossible, then it does not follow that it is possible and that absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. Van Inwagen's concern here is that logical possibility should be understood on the basis of proof and evidence which is largely ignored in the context of modal epistemology and conceivability reasoning. In a later section, I will mention an objection to (CEP) which is related to Van Inwagen's concern about evidence and its relation to logic. There is also another concern that the structural differences which I have described need not be so. Kit Fine has argued that there are three distinct types of necessity, each of which is independent of one another, similar to the way that a set of basis-vectors for a vector space are orthogonal to one another. Under this view, none of these types of necessity entail anything about the other. These three kinds of necessity are physical, metaphysical, and normative necessity (the last of which we ignore for the purposes of this paper) and that physical necessity cannot generally be subsumed under the metaphysical (contra the subset relationship I have described). For Fine, what is physically necessary entails nothing about the modal status of the metaphysical aspects of some state of affairs (and vice-versa). Fine thinks that metaphysical necessity is properly about the identity of `things' broadly construed wherein the intrinsic properties to an object â&#x20AC;&#x201C; say, that an electrons have negative charge â&#x20AC;&#x201C; are taken to be metaphysically necessary.37 Physical necessity on the other hand is taken to be what is necessitated by the laws of physics: that no object can travel faster than the speed of light, that water = H20, that Avogadro's number is 6.02214129 x 10^{23} mol^{-1}, and so on. Under this view, the physical laws need not constrain which properties objects have necessarily nor does it dictate the impossibility of certain objects possessing certain properties either. Fine's distinction is certainly more nuanced than my own. Nonetheless, whether or not the concepts of physical, metaphysical, and normative necessity are orthogonal to one another is a more restricted \ view than my own. That is, Fine criticizes the notion that (PP) subset of (MP) subset (LP) and instead wants to rule out the possibility that these sets could be equal. So he favours a picture more like: (PP) proper-subset (MP) propersubset (LP). Or under one more extreme interpretation of Fine, it might be that there cannot exist an ordering of (PP), (MP), and (LP) for they are alleged to be completely independent categories and so one cannot say that one is a subset of any other. However, Fine's construal of the relationship between different notions of possibility need not undermine my overall case against (CEP). If the account of physical, metaphysical, and logical modality that I have provided above is sound, and if (CEP) cannot adequately face the more generous picture which I have provided, then 36 Van Inwagen, p.71. 37 See Fine's essay `The Varieties of Necessity'. Hawthorne/Gendler, p. 257.

adherents to (CEP) coupled with the sense of metaphysical possibility which Fine argues for will not survive my criticism either. That is, those who agree with both Fine's picture and (CEP) will not survive my criticism if my more general picture, the one in which I have outlined above, does not permit (CEP)'s plausibility. In other words, if I am correct in having shown Fine's system to be in some sense a more restricted system than my own then (CEP) is implausible under the notion of metaphysical possibility that Fine has described if the system which I proposed implies issues for (CEP). At this point, it is worth noting the distinction between the notion of metaphysical possibility from that of epistemic possibility. Hawthorne/Gendler themselves distinguish between a permissive and strict account of epistemic possibility38. Under the permissive view (PEP), some state of affairs ``p is epistemically possible for a subject S just in case S does not know that ~p. Under the strict view (SEP), some state of affairs ``p is epistemically possible for S just in case p is consistent (metaphysically compossible) with all that S knows."39 As construed by Hawthorne/Gendler, neither can be understood to be related to (PC). Instead, both definitions are related to a certain distinctly epistemic state rather than a mental state. While conceiving of some state of affairs is in a sense being in a position to possibly know that p, for a subject to not know that p is false (PEP) is not so much to be in a state of conceiving that p so much as it is a sense of being in a position of epistemic justification. For example, one can defend their belief in p's truth by saying ``for all I know, p was not false." While many philosophers do similarly defend their belief in p's metaphysical possibility by saying ``well, I conceived that p" knowing that p is not false is different than merely conceiving that p for conceivability need not ascribe any truth-value judgement upon p whereas (PEP) does. Conceivablity is merely conceiving of something without ascribing any particular judgment to it beyond concluding that certain conditions that govern the state of affairs being conceived hold or not. So I take (PEP) and (SEP) to be employed in very different kinds of epistemic cases than cases of mere conceivability. So (CEP) is ultimately not about epistemic possibility but is about metaphysical possibility.

Conceivability Without Possibility Having explained the targets of my criticism, I now claim that each of (CEP) and (CEP)* fail for the following reasons. While my focus is to argue against (CEP), (CEP)*'s close similarity to (CEP) bears mention. I first begin with (CEP)* and provide a brief criticism of (CEP)*'s plausibility. Recall that (CEP)* states that (CEP) and its converse are both either true or both false and are therefore logically equivalent. That is, an agent S can conceive of a state of affairs p obtaining if and only if p is metaphysically possible. It is important here to note the significance of the condition ``if and only if" especially in the case of the entailment that if p is metaphysically possible then an agent S can conceive of p obtaining. I take this to be not only false but inconsistent with other epistemic norms for the following 38 Hawthorne and Gendler, p. 3. 39 Ibid.

reasons. (CEP)* has the unique consequence that what is metaphysically possible is always conceivable. This is a bold thesis for it states that all (including extremely-complex) metaphysically possible scenarios are conceivable. Take for example the alleged metaphysical possibility that the United States is a conscious entity. 40 Arguably, it is very difficult to conceive qua (PC) what the United States being conscious is actually like (let alone even possibly like). Despite Ned Block's easier to conceive example of the people of China using walkie-talkies to simulate neural connections,41 very few philosophers have provided a precise set of criteria for what it means for a macroscopic entity the size of a country to be conscious. So while one may think that they are conceiving of the United States being conscious, it does not follow that they actually are conceiving of the US being conscious for such a state of affairs is very complex. Analogously, if it is metaphysically possible that electrons could be conscious,42 it does not follow that we could conceive of what it would actually be like to be an electron. Arguably, we fail to possess the relevant mental concepts that would be similar enough to that of an electron were it to be metaphysically capable of experiences. In each of these cases, we have metaphysical possibility without conceivability and thereby count as evidence against (CEP)*. As for (CEP) itself, I take it that first order modal beliefs require as a base-set of beliefs some 1st-order beliefs which are themselves non-modal. This is not the same as saying that the truth of modal propositions relies on the truth of non-modal, 1st-order propositions for this is certainly not true. For nothing about the falsity of p entails anything about the status of the possibility of p. Indeed, if it it is false that humans are currently unable to colonize Mars, it does not follow from this alone that it is metaphysically possible nor metaphysically impossible. As an example of how the truth of some proposition p may entail the possibility of p, one is led to believe that there possibly exist wooden tables if they believe there are actually wooden tables. Similarly, for one to believe that it is impossible for there to be unicorns is for it to be believed that it is always false that unicorns exist. It follows then that if 1st-order beliefs are epistemically suspect with regards to their ability to track truth, then 1st-order modal beliefs are similarly suspect with regards to their ability to determine whether some metaphysical scenario obtains. One argument along these lines is one from evolutionary theory. While evolutionary theory can be understood to imply difficulties for epistemological theories of all kinds, I take it to be even more problematic for the case of conceivability-based reasoning. Following Sharon Street's argument43 that ethical judgements are suspect with respect to truth-tracking, since these judgments are the result of millions of years of evolutionary processes conditioning human psychology, there is similarly no guarantee that any of our propositional beliefs accurately track truth either. Evolution need not in any sense track truth; it need only track survival. That is, conscious creatures have evolved and 40 Schwitzgebel, `If Materialism is True, the United States is Probably Conscious'. URL: http://www.faculty.ucr.edu/~eschwitz/SchwitzPapers/USAconscious-140130a.pdf. 41 Block, p. 279. 42 See Galen Strawson's paper `Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism.' 43 Street, p.109.

survived to have the beliefs they do only because it allowed them to survive â&#x20AC;&#x201C; not because it allowed them to somehow obtain the objective truth better. And if it's true that modal beliefs have as their basis judgments concerning 1st-order beliefs, then since 1st-order beliefs are epistemically suspect then modal beliefs are themselves also suspect. Here, one is reminded of Gilbert Ryle's example of how one cannot see (with one's own eyes) the fragility of glass but instead judges that glass is fragile by believing that the majority of counterfactual scenarios involving glass end up with glass breaking rather than failing to. So modal beliefs are susceptible to even greater fallibility than perceptual beliefs for modal beliefs involve dispositional properties that we abscribe to our sense-experiences though we cannot experience these dispositional properties. When glass breaks, we of course are perceiving at that time the breaking of glass, however attaching the property of fragility to glass prior to glass actually breaking is to assign a property to a non-actual state of affairs (since the glass has not yet broken though we judge it to likely break given a set of counterfactual scenarios). Therefore, since assigning properties to non-actual affairs is more epistemically tenuous than assigning properties to immediate sense-experiences, there is reason to be concerned about (CEP) and its entailment relation's ability to preserve truth from conceivability to metaphysically possibility. Following an objection which Yablo himself raises, there appears to be no independent evidence to suggest that conceivability is evidence of metaphysical possibility, let alone a guide.44 Nonetheless, Yablo thinks this is no issue since ordinary perception is in a similar quandary.45 Similarly, Van Inwagen remarks in a paper on how the philosopher Richard Gale takes laypersons' ordinary modal beliefs to be in some sense selfevidently truth-tracking, with the implication that normal people are justified in drawing modal conclusions based off of a combination of intuition, imagination, and conceivability: ``Gale does not bother to argue for the conclusion that he is able to make philosophically interesting modal judgments about concerns remote from everyday life. Rather, he takes this to be self-evidently true...[Gale] has said that if my own capacity to make modal judgments is really as limited as I say it is, I must be regarded as modally challenged, as someone who â&#x20AC;&#x153;cannot modalize like normal people do.â&#x20AC;?"46 I think this is not the way one should reason about this. It is certainly no Moorean fact that conceivability entails metaphysical possibility in the same sense that it is a Moorean fact that one's own hands exists. So it is simply not true to say that it is equally epistemically absurd to deny (CEP) and its variants as it is to deny the existence of one's own hands or some other basic perceptual belief. If anything, Yablo's reasoning should make us even more sceptical of the veracity of our modal beliefs for if ordinary perception falls victim to the defficiencies of evolution and sceptical objections, modal beliefs about metaphysical propositions should be suspect too for there exists no remotely plausible human cognitive capacity which can determinately pick out modal 44 Yablo, p. 3. 45 Ibid. 46 Van Inwagen, pp.72-73.

truths in the way that humans can pick out basic truths with sense-experiences. However, even the evidence of human senses is often insufficient to ground the truth of perceptual judgments as is common when, for example, one judges that the person across the street is their friend when it is merely someone else who resembles one's friend. Similarly, Gale cannot appeal to the laypersons' complacency with making modal judgments as evidence that modal judgments are sound. This is especially problematic in the case of conceivability-based reasoning for I take it that philosophers are no better at conceiving than laypersons are. And I am by no means alone in this view. The new movement of `Experimental Philosophy' has made it a central tenet of their research program to undermine armchair philosophy's reliance on conceivability-based reasoning due to the fact, so they claim, that philosophers are subject to the same cognitive biases and epistemological deficiencies as laypersons.47 These biases can include the socalled `Knobe Effect' wherein the ethical intentions of characters in thought-experiments are judged to be malicious given the order in which the thought-experiment is played out48 and the Wason selection task where subjects typically fail to implement modus tollens reasoning.49 Philosophers need to demonstrate that they are somehow immune from the psychological deficiencies of laypersons and that they more accurately control their reasoning processes and conclusions drawn. Until this project of philosophers demonstrating their superiority to laypersons has been completed, there is no guarantee that conceivability is adequately capable of tracking metaphysical possibility. Consider also examples from mathematics. I take mathematics to be providing, in some sense, the limits of the metaphysical structure of reality; this is a view for which I am by no means alone in holding.50 If this view is right then counter-examples in mathematics (that is, cases where the conceivability of some mathematical state of affairs would not entail its metaphysical possibility) would be suitably relevant as counter-examples to (CEP) for, under this view, mathematical impossibilities represent metaphysical impossibilities as well. As a one popular example, it is conceivable that the set of all natural numbers would be the same cardinality as the powerset of the set of natural numbers for if two sets are truly of infinite size (so the thought goes) then it is conceivable that there be a set of conditions in which they turn out to be the same size. However it is surely metaphysically impossible for the set of naturals to be of the same cardinality as the

47 48 49 50

Nicols and Knobe, pp. 8-9. See Knobe's `Intentional Action and Side Effects in Ordinary Language'. See Wason' `Reasoning About A Rule'. Numerous philosophers and scientists have argued for a view like this. Pythagoras thought everything was ultimately number (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pythagoras/\#WasPytMatCos), computer scientist Stephen Wolfram has argued in `A New Kind of Science' that the universe is fundamentally mathematical in a metaphysical sense, and Putnam has argued in `Philosophy of Logic' that: ``The restrictions of nominalism are as devastating for empirical science as they are for formal science; it is not just "mathematics" but physics as well that we would have to give up" â&#x20AC;&#x201C; p.35. â&#x20AC;&#x201C; where the line between physics and metaphysics is taken by Putnam to be a continuous one.

power-set of naturals given diagonalization arguments.51 While it is certainly mainstream orthodoxy to proclaim those few dissenters to Cantor's infamous proof to be either irrational or as not having understood his proof, logician Toby Meadows has argued our naive conception of infinity in some sense justifies the conceivability of the naturals and the power-set of naturals being equinumerous. For the ``naive notion" proclaims that a set which is truly infinite in cardinality could not properly be said to smaller in cardinality than any other set.52 While I do not have the space to discuss Meadows' arguments, if Meadows' arguments are sound, we have a case of conceivability with metaphysical impossibility. Also, it is certainly conceivable that every continuous function is differentiable for, following (PC), there are a finite number of conditions that define a function to be continuous and it is clear when a given function is continuous given some background set of mathematical axioms. However, infamously, the Weierstrass function is continuous for all real-number values but differentiable nowhere.53 Following the definition of (CEP), any undergraduate mathematics student having taken an analysis course is able to conceive of what it means for a function to be continuous and separately for a function to be differentiable. And, naively, as one reflects upon the definition of continuity, one is plausibly led to believe (and therefore concludes) that all continuous functions must be differentiable. Indeed, until Weierstrass plublished his proof in 1875, many mathematicians believed that all continuous functions were differentiable. Yet, there exists at least one demonstrably non-differentiable continuous function. So again we have conceivability without metaphysical possibility. Kripke on Unicorns One may complain that these examples from evolution, experimental philosophy, and mathematics are not the kinds of defeaters to (CEP) that concern philosophers. Philosophers typically argue for conceivability arguments that are much more distinctly philosophical and somehow this is supposed to be different than the attempted counterexamples I have given. So while an interlocutor may grant that my argument while perhaps successful so far has been focused on outliers rather than mainstream conceivability arguments and so is not really a substantive argument against (CEP). Examples in philosophy of counter-examples to (CEP) include the idea that it is conceivable that Hesperus is not Phosphorus (though it is metaphysical impossibility) and that it is conceivable that water is not equal to H20 (which, following Kripke, is metaphysically impossible). Indeed both were considered perfectly conceivable though

51 A simple proof is the following: define f(x) = {x} from the natural numbers into the natural numbers. By extensionality, this function is injective so |N| < |P(N)|. To show that there exists no surjection from N to P(N), consider the set S = {x| x not a member of f(x)}. Then if there were some natural number n such that f(n) = S, then n is a member of S if and only if n is not a member of f(n) (which equals S). Contradiction. Therefore, |N| < |P(N)|. 52 Meadows, p. 6 and pp. 15 - 16. 53 Tao, pp. 463-464.

they are now understood to be metaphysically impossible as we know that Hesperus = Phosphorus and water = H2O. As another mainstream example, I take it that Kripke can be interpreted as explicitly rejecting (CEP). This is particularly evident in his argument for origin necessity. The argument rests on a premise that while it may appear that we can conceive of a table in which it would come from a different block of wood, conceivability is no reliable guide to metaphysical possibility for he claims it would not be the same table one is thinking of when considering that different block of wood.54 As one more famous example, I consider now the details of Kripke's argument that there are no unicorns and couldn't possibly have been unicorns.55 I will summarize Kripke's argument and provide a brief defense concluding that it provides a counter-example to (CEP). Kripke believes that: ``no counterfactual situation is properly describable as one in which there would have been unicorns"56 and concludes that unicorns are therefore metaphysically impossible. He thinks that while we can certainly conceive of unicorns (as we have an idea what it means to be a unicorn given the myth and there are only a finite number of conditions that govern unicorns' existence), it is nonetheless impossible for unicorns to exist in reality even in counterfactual situations. So the claim is that we have conceivability without metaphysical possibility. Kripke's argument runs as follows: (i) What is most important to the identity of a species of animals is its internal structure and not its exterior structure.57 (ii) The myth of the unicorn provides insufficient information about unicorns and therefore there it is indeterminate whether we could even identify unicorns rather than some other possible closely-related species. (iii) Even if there were to be archaeological evidence that purported to show the existence of an animal which possessed the external appearance of a unicorn, this would not be sufficient evidence of its existence by (i). (iv) Since there is no current evidence of unicorns' existence, and since there couldn't be archaeological evidence which would conclusively demonstrate the existence of unicorns, there could not have possibly existed unicorns. Kripke's argument is not merely to demonstrate that unicorns could not metaphysically exist but that the case of the myth of the unicorn is one in which (CEP) is false: it is conceivable that there exist unicorns (in the sense of (PC)) however it is metaphysically impossible. 54 55 56 57

Kripke, p. 114. Kripke, pp. 156 â&#x20AC;&#x201C; 158. Kripke, p. 156 Ibid.

Kripke's argument is certainly valid. As to its soundness, one could object that his argument is too strong since it generalizes beyond unicorns and applies to any creature which is seldom seen and therefore has an underdetermination of reference and external features. Yet, so the objection goes, this is absurd since if a long long time ago one were to speak of a poisonous monotreme one would, by Kripke's argument, have it that this apparently ``mythical entity" can't possibly exist. Yet it does: the Australian platypus is precisely such a (very bizarre) creature. I would argue that Kripke's argument can be saved in light of this apparent counterexample. The difference between the case of the platypus and the unicorn is that someone actually saw a platypus. This person had sensory-experience of the platypus and therefore had knowledge by acquintance and not merely knowledge by description as is the case with fictional and mythical entities such as the unicorn. In the case of the unicorn, few have claimed that they have actually seen unicorns. Therefore, there is more epistemic support in the case of the person who claimed to have seen a platypus, especially considering their verbal report is extremely specific and therefore adds rigorous falsifiability conditions. Indeed, there are only five known types of monotremes in the world (the platypus and four species of echidnas) so premise (ii) of Kripke's argument doesn't hold for the case of platypuses since there are very specific conditions that could determine whether or not something was a platypus (i.e. - whether or it was a poisonous monotreme, which is an extremely rare combination of traits). So if Kripke's argument is sound, then Kripke has an argument that (CEP), and therefore (CEP)* as well, is false. Troubles for Entailment So far I have provided an account of what `conceivability' qua (PC) and `metaphysical possibility' amount to and have argued that (CEP) is false given my account. At this point it is instructive to mention an even deeper issue with (CEP) which I claim rests on the notion of entailment. I claim that even under a variety of differing notions of entailment, none of them secures a grounding of metaphysical possibility from that of an agent's conceiving of that state of affairs. That is, no plausible account of entailment secures the entailment of (CEP) and its variants. Since classical-logic is the reigning logic in analytic philosophy58 philosophers could be understood to intend the notion of entailment to be captured by the material conditional. This is quite unlikely what Descartes and Chalmers intend for consider the case where the antecedent of (CEP) is false. Then, by the truth-table for the classical materialconditional, (CEP) would entail that either every state of affairs is metaphysically possible or that every state of affairs is metaphysically impossible. The point here is that it doesn't matter which scenario is true given the falsity of the antecedent since either scenario is consistently entailed. However, it should matter for one understanding of what it means for the material conditional to be true, either scenario is entailed or both 58 See Chalmers and Bourget, `What Do Philosophers Believe?'

are! This would mean that even inconsistent propositions are possibly true. To make this concrete, say that all agents lose agential capacities (e.g. â&#x20AC;&#x201C; say all conscious entities such as humans and animals die). Then it would follow that every state of affairs is metaphysically possible! But surely philosophers such as Descartes and Chalmers deny that everything is metaphysically possible since Descartes uses reductio ad absurdum arguments to ground his views on the nature of God and Chalmers says explicitly: ``The notion of a male vixen is contradictory, so a male vixen is logically impossible"59 suggesting that contradictions are impossible to accept and therefore metaphysically impossible. So both Descartes and Chalmers think that there are at least some metaphysical impossibilities. But according to classical-logic, every state of affairs whatsoever would be metaphysically possible given that the antecedent of (CEP) is false. Therefore, either there is no reasonable sense in which conceivability could entail metaphysical possibility or material-implication is not what is meant by entailment when philosophers such as Descartes and Chalmers talk about conceivability entailing possibility. Even if we are being charitable to (CEP) adherents, and assume that they instead mean something different altogether, then the difficulty here then is what could be meant by entailment? Adherents of (CEP) often do not provide an account of what is meant by entailment. In any case, entailment is notoriously challenging to express formally, let alone define. Dating back to C.I. Lewis' work on propositional modal logic, the paradoxes of material implication for classical propositional-logic suggest that classicallogic is inadequate to provide a formal system of entailment. For in classical-logic, it is always true that a contradiction entails any proposition whatsoever and that any tautology is entailed by any proposition whatsoever. As mentioned previously, if for example it is raining and not raining (an impossibility) then it follows in classical-logic that Richard Nixon was always an egg (he was in disguise) and that if it is true that Kripke was an alien from Mars (which is false), it follows in classical-logic that either all natural numbers are even or odd (a truth). And both of these inferences are nonsense due to the irrelevance between the antecedent and the consequent yet follow in classical-logic just as much as modus ponens does. So classical-entailment can't be a secure grounding for the notion of entailment that adherents of (CEP) mean entailment to be.60 Another objection to my view might be that it must be true that if some state of affairs is truly metaphysically impossible, it must also follow that the state of affairs is inconceivable. And it seems that this is a plausible mode of reasoning for if some proposition expresses a true metaphysical impossibility then it $surely \ must$ be inconceivable. However, this is precisely the contrapositive of (CEP) and therefore is logically equivalent. There is a difficulty with arguments from logical equivalence. I take it that the logical equivalence equivalence of two propositions need not necessarily entail rationalequivalence â&#x20AC;&#x201C; that is, that a person need not believe two propositions with equal weight despite their logical equivalence. The difficulty with the contrapositive case of (CEP) is 59 Chalmers, PhD Thesis, p. 32. 60 See Yee, pp. 14 - 17 for further detailed discussion.

that it draws an analogy to Hempel's `Raven Paradox'. In Hempel's example, 61 the belief that all ravens are black is strengthened both by having seen more ravens which are black as well as, paradoxically, seeing more non-black objects that are not ravens. However, this is counter-intuitive since in what sense could one be said to have more evidence in favor of something due to an absence of negative evidence? This relates back to Van Inwagen's concern about logical possibility earlier. We can extend this idea to the cause of modal reasoning. Is it a plausible epistemic principle to accept contrapositive reasoning in modal affairs? I think not. For if one takes it that for a proposition to be understood it must be conceived then being able to understand the antecedent of the contrapositive of (CEP) would in fact require having to conceive of an impossible state of affairs. I take it to be the case that understanding really does entail conceivability. That is, if a person truly understands what a proposition means then surely they must be capable of conceiving the contents of that proposition. This is plausible for people often reason that they can't conceive of an inconsistent state of affairs such as ``it is raining and it is not raining" and they thereby conclude that this state of affairs is incoherent and therefore not understandable. Similarly, one understands it to be the case that 2 + 2 = 4 only if they can conceive of 2 plus 2 equalling 4. So one cannot really understand the contraposedantecedent for this represents a logically impossible state of affairs which, if I have argued persuasively, is not conceivable (and therefore not understandable). So while the contrapositive of (CEP) is certainly logically-equivalent to (CEP) itself, it is not rationally-equivalent insofar as belief in the contrapositive of (CEP) does not entail having to believe (CEP) itself. There is an even simpler problem for these issues. There is the simpler problem for the thesis that logically equivalent beliefs need be rationally believable when one considers problems of monotonicity. In classical-logic, which sociological evidence dictates is the reigning logic,62 if it is true that some proposition p entails a proposition q then it also follows that p & r (for some arbitrary proposition r) entails q as well. Indeed, p & r & s & x & y & z & â&#x20AC;Ś all entail q given that p alone is true. So adding any arbitrary number of conjunctive beliefs to one's set of beliefs also classically-entails the truth of q. But this is absurd for say each of the new conjunctive premises contains defeasible evidence â&#x20AC;&#x201C; that is, evidence in favour of q's falsity. From the stand-point of classical-logic, this does not weaken the inference to q's truth in any manner whatsoever. So while classical-logic may be adequate at preserving truth, it is not rational to use classical-logic as a model for normal everyday beliefs including conceivability-based reasoning. For in classicallogic, it would follow that if it is conceivable that Kripke could have had a son, and that that it is also conceivable that Kripke was impotent (defeasible evidence), then it is metaphysically possible for Kripke to have a son and this is absurd. So perhaps entailment should be understood as a much looser term. Perhaps entailment is just ``p entails q if q is in some sense a consequence of p." The difficulty here is that is vague and does little to help provide an account of how conceivability 61 See Hempel, Studies in the Logic of Confirmation. 62 Chalmers and Bourget claim 51.6\% of respondents think classical-logic is the right logic. See p. 15.

could have as its consequence metaphysical possibility. What exactly is a consequence and not a consequence? Consequence itself is a highly contested topic in the philosophy of logic63 and so adherents to (CEP) had either better describe in great detail what is meant by entailment or they should be wary of reasoning from conceivability to metaphysical possibility.

Conclusion I conclude that philosophers have wanted more meat than they can properly chew. Following Van Inwagen, I take it that philosophers have been much too comfortable reasoning via conceivability arguments largely due to the sociological fact that there is ``an environment composed of philosophers who unthinkingly make all sorts of fanciful modal judgments because theyâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;ve always been surrounded by philosophers who unthinkingly make the same sorts of fanciful modal judgments...[One] is as unaware of his immersion in this environment as a fish is of its immersion in water." 64 While conceivability-based reasoning may initially have plausible justification, if my reasoning is sound, there are strong reasons to believe that the conceivability of any given state of affairs does not always entail its metaphysical possibility. I conclude then that (CEP) is either a poor method of obtaining modal knowledge or is simply false. One might object that if my criticisms are true, how then is one to formulate any modal beliefs at all? Indeed, it would appear that my arguments, if successful, entail a kind of modal-agonisticism wherein one cannot have conclusive evidence of the modal status of some state of affairs. For if conceivability is no evidence of metaphysical possibility what method could philosophers possibly use to attain modal knowledge? I argue that while lay-persons and philosophers do reason and speak of their modal beliefs all the time, it is not clear that modal reasoning based off of (CEP) is as sound as it is made out to be. This is not to say that some state of affairs p can't ever be possible if some agent conceives of it. I only argue that it cannot be conclusive evidence of its metaphysical possibility to the degree that philosophers such as Descartes and Chalmers want it to be. If philosophy is really about seeking knowledge and truth, philosophers should seek for a better means of arguing for their conclusions than mere conceivability arguments. One cannot merely rely on one's ability to conceive of some state of affairs to ground metaphysically possibilities. For one person's ability to conceive of something may not be another person's ability to do so, and vice-versa. Indeed, until there comes a time where philosophers can have some humanindependent method of assessing modal claims65 I do believe we must be compelled to avoid reasoning via conceivability. So I do not take this to be a reductio of my view but only a lamentable conclusion. How then are we to secure a grounding for the notions of possibility and necessity? Are we doomed to only be able to assess mere de dicto modality as opposed to de re 63 See Yee's `In Defense of Logical Pluralism' for a detailed discussion. 64 Van Inwagen, p.73. 65 See Cummins' `Reflections on Reflective Equilibrium' for further discussion along these lines.

modality? Or worse yet, are we truly left in a position of complete modal agnosticism wherein we cannot know the modal status of propositions and their contents? The aim of my paper was only to argue against (CEP) as so discussed. I leave these other questions for further work in modal epistemology.

Natural Laws and the Contraceptive Mandate: The Catholic Objection to the Affordable Care Act THEODORE DRAKE, Villanova University

Abstract

In 2010, President Barack Obama signed into law the Affordable Care Act, known colloquially as Obamacare. Included in the law was the mandate that large employers would have to provide fundamental health care coverage, including coverage for contraceptives, or they would have to pay a fine.66 Many religious employers received an exception to this mandate, by claiming that abiding by it would involve betraying their religious beliefs.67 The morality of the mandate rests on the question of what treatments and practices constitute fundamental health care, and is contraceptive coverage one of those treatments. If so, then can the government mandate that employers provide fundamental health care coverage that violates religious beliefs? Religious employers should be granted an exemption to the contraceptive mandate because only fundamental health care coverage is a positive right, and contraceptive coverage is not an element of fundamental health care. Additionally, Robertson’s understanding of procreative liberty, Aquinas’ goods and principle of double effect, and Locke’s

Health Resources and Services Administration, “Women’s Preventative Services Guidelines”, http://www.hrsa.gov/womensguidelines/. 67 Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, “Women’s Preventative Services Coverage and NonProfit Religious Organizations”, http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Fact-Sheets-and-FAQs/womenspreven-02012013.html.

fundamental rights defend the idea that a business owner can object to choosing an employee health plan that has coverage for contraceptives. II. The Objection to the Contraceptive Mandate The Affordable Care Act was passed with the goal of insuring more Americans, by way of a mandate to employers. The law requires an employer with fifty or more employees to provide “minimum essential” health insurance coverage that is comprehensive and affordable, otherwise the employer is subject to a fine.68 Accordingly to the law, uncooperative employers have to pay fines of $100 per day, per employee. 69 The annual sum of these fines can be almost the entire annual salary of an employee (in lower-paying jobs). The requirement greatly increases coverage for employees without cost sharing. Cost sharing refers to the employer having to pay co-pays, deductibles, or other fees (but not premiums) for health insurance for that employee. In other words, the employer subsidizes health insurance coverage for a certain employee. Typically an employer pays almost all of the premiums for health insurance for an employee and pays a smaller percentage for the care of that employee’s dependents.70 Requirements for coverage without cost sharing under the Act include: screening for diabetes, screening for HIV, breastfeeding support, contraceptive methods, and several others. 71 The backers of the law see comprehensive health care as an objective good, instituting legislation accordingly. They see the right to contraception as a positive right or an entitlement. A central force of the objections to the Affordable Care Act’s mandates has come from religious groups. The premiums, co-pays, or deductibles that the religious employer would pay go to the insurance company, who pays the pharmaceutical or consumer products company that manufactures the contraceptive. This causal flow only happens if the employer has the employee enrolled in health insurance with contraceptive coverage. If they refuse to provide this contraceptive coverage then they must pay a fine, according to the law. In this way they are being forced to betray conservative religious views, with the consequence of financial penalties. Christian Scientists, for example, object to certain forms of medical

Brooklyn L. Rev. 953, “A First Amendment Objection to the Affordable Care Act's Individual Mandate” LexisNexus. Date Accessed: 2014/12/07 69 Mears, “Court set to rule on Obamacare Contraception Mandate”, http://www.cnn.com/2014/06/29/politics/scotus-obamacare-contraception/, June 30, 2014. 70 "2014 Employer Health Benefits Survey." The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation.http://kff.org/privateinsurance/report/2014-employer-health-benefits-survey/ 71 Health Resources and Services Administration, “Women’s Preventative Services Guidelines”, http://www.hrsa.gov/womensguidelines/.

care and must pay a fine under the Affordable Care Act’s mandate. 72 A main segment of the exceptions have come from Catholics. The religious objection to the contraceptive mandate under the Affordable Care Act has come largely from Catholics, since the use of contraceptive measures is sinful in Catholicism. Additionally, Catholics believe that life begins at the moment of fertilization, so any measure to prevent a fertilized egg from implanting in the uterus (as many forms of contraception do) is considered as abortion and gravely sinful.73 For conservative Catholics, sexual intercourse should only be within a marital union and in the absence of contraception. The recent story concerning Hobby Lobby, a retail arts and crafts chain headquartered in Oklahoma, is a prominent example of religious objection. For this employer, mandating contraceptive coverage for its employees not only violated the owner’s Catholic beliefs but also violated their right to freedom of religion in the First Amendment, their right to be free from religious discrimination outlined the First and Fifth Amendments, and the rights stipulated in the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.74 In addition to the arts and crafts chain, thousands of other employers have filed exemptions to the Affordable Care Act’s contraceptive coverage mandate.75 The Supreme Court’s decision to rule in favor of Hobby Lobby was the first case in which a closely held, for-profit company can exercise a religious belief. Lori Windham, Senior Counsel for The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty and counsel for Hobby Lobby, said “The Supreme Court recognized that Americans do not lose their religious freedom when they run a family business.”76 Many religious employers (including Villanova University) have been granted exemptions to the mandate.77

O’Brien, Kathleen, “Obamacare religious exception hard to get”, Religious News Service, http://www.religionnews.com/2014/04/28/obamacare-religious-exemption-hard-get/. 73 Brooklyn L. Rev. 953, “A First Amendment Objection to the Affordable Care Act's Individual Mandate”. 74 Brooklyn L. Rev. 953, “A First Amendment Objection to the Affordable Care Act's Individual Mandate” LexisNexus. 75 “Religious Refusals under the Affordable Care Act: Contraception as Essential Health Care”, Depaul University, JSTOR. 76 “Burwell vs Hobby Lobby”, http://www.hobbylobbycase.com/the-case/the-decision/. 77 I was able to contact the Villanova health center and they said they do not offer contraceptive coverage to students. The Catholic University also does not offer it as part of their employee health insurance plan, according to an administrator that I talked to in November 2014.

III.

Contraceptive Mandate, Rights, and Natural Laws

Negative Right to Contraception

Religious employers should not have to provide contraceptive coverage to employees, because the right to contraception is a negative right not a positive one. An employee’s right to health care does not always constitute an obligation to provide the coverage the employer. In this case, one’s supposed right to contraception care would contradict with one’s right to freedom of religion. The right-duty relationship can be compared to the right to procreative liberty. In his article about procreative liberty, John Robertson believes that procreative liberty is a negative right, meaning that others have an obligation not to interfere with that choice. He understands that “the negative right to procreate or not does not imply the duty of others to provide the resources or services necessary to exercise one’s procreative liberty…”78 Rather, the right to procreative liberty and religion are negative rights, meaning that they ensure freedom from interference. In this instance, Robertson means that one does not have to provide access to the means to control procreation, but one must not outlaw the access to those means. A religious employer does not have to provide access to contraceptive measures, but it must not interfere with an employee’s ability to obtain the measures outside of employer-sponsored health insurance. This is the nature of procreative liberty being a negative right, within Robertson’s intellectual framework. Hypothetically, a positive right would be an entitlement and a right to contraceptive measures. Robertson continues by saying “a closely related reason for protecting reproductive choice is to avoid the highly intrusive measures that governmental control of reproduction usually entails.”79 Similarly, religious liberty is a negative right against state control of religion. If the government were to create a positive contraceptive right it would go against Catholic beliefs because the rationale is that contraceptives are objectively good and should therefore be considered as an entitlement. Historically, governmental reversals of the negative right to procreative liberty have brought about despair. Robertson notes communist Romania in which contraceptive measures were absolutely forbidden. The result was women who “…sought illegal abortions and died, leaving their children orphaned and subject to sale to Westerners…”80 Governments should be conscious to not restrict the liberties and remove negative rights, as history has shown that people will act outside of the law to maintain their freedoms. B.

Thomas Aquinas and Natural Laws

An analysis of the contraceptive mandate and religious freedom issue within a natural laws framework yields a result in favor of religious freedom. In his understanding of natural laws (the basis of which underlines contemporary Catholic thinking), Thomas Aquinas wrote that the five goods that we have a natural inclination to desire are: human life, the union of a male and a female, care of one’s children, a well-ordered

John Robertson “Procreative Liberty” page 600. Ibid, page 601. 80 Ibid. 79

society, and knowledge, especially knowledge of God.81 In his view human action should continuously strive to preserve these five goods. Aquinas’ arguments have great applicability within the context of religious objections to the government paternalism. One may object if the mandate attempts to destroy any of the five basic goods. Within this argument, Catholics may object to the mandate as they see that it destroys human life and morally bankrupts the male and female union (as the union can be created simply as a means to obtain sexual pleasure). Extensive contraceptive usage can propagate the present a promiscuous culture, which does not lead to human flourishing in Aquinas’ and the Catholic view. For Catholics, having a moral life that is consistent with a view of God entails not condoning the use of contraceptives. Again, having knowledge of God is one of the five goods that people have a natural inclination to desire. The preservation of these goods leads to a society functioning according to Nature. Catholics may object to the contraceptive mandate because they intend to defend these morally salient goods. The contraceptive mandate is unjust within the context of the common good and the hierarchy of goods. Pleasure is not among these five chief goods, rather it is always a derivative or secondary good attached to some more basic good. 82 Thus the pursuit of sexual pleasure (in the presence of protection) at the expense of human life would be wrong, as it chooses a secondary good over a first-order one. As often happens, the pursuit of secondary goods (such as pleasure or wealth) can lead to disorder and the destruction of human flourishing.83 Requiring religious employers to provide coverage for contraception encourages this false pursuit of inferior goods. Furthermore, practical wisdom, which is guided by a perception of the basic goods, leads men to act in accordance with the common good.84 The common good is of paramount importance and is fueled by the pursuit of the five major goods. Self-preservation and self-interests are of lesser importance when they do not promote the common good and do not help mankind live according to nature. Nature refers to the full development of rational faculties, instead of the pursuit of simple, biological drives. 85 Thus a government that mandates contraceptive coverage would not promote the common good in a society that exists according to nature. Maintaining such a hedonistic society would go against the common good and be incompatible with the hierarchy of goods. Additionally, Thomas Aquinas’ theories produce a principle of double-effect that can be used to defend the religious objection to the contraceptive mandate. He understands that the destruction of another life in order to defend one’s own is morally legitimate if one only intends the protection of one’s life, and if the destruction of the other life is proportional to the good that is to be protected.86 This analysis underlines the principle of double effect. Catholics do not intend the potentially negative consequences (the 81

Verlasquez, “Western Religious Approaches to Business Ethics”. Business Ethics Quarterly, Vol.7, No.2, (Mar., 1997), pp. 87. 82 Wolfe, “Understanding Natural Law”, The Good Society, Vol. 12, No. 3, Symposium: Natural Law and Secular Society (2003), pp. 39. 83 Ibid. 84 Ibid. 85 Ibid. 86 Verlasquez, “Western Religious Approaches to Business Ethics”. Business Ethics Quarterly, Vol.7, No.2, (Mar., 1997), pp. 87.

spread of sexually transmitted diseases, greater difficulty for women to plan careers, more obtrusive menstrual cycles, etc.) that may arise in the absence of contraceptives. They merely intend to avoid the harm of the destruction of life. Accordingly, they would be in favor of adoption or other ways of mitigating the harms of unwanted pregnancies. They would also be in favor of medicines that provide the additional benefits that contraceptives provide without the contraceptive function. For example, Catholics would not object to medicines that control acne or manage menstruation (like the birth control pill), but without the intended contraceptive aspect of the pill. Aquinas’ second stipulation steps outside of a natural laws perspective, by weighing the consequences of the action in a double effect situation (in a utilitarian calculus). The two parties in this debate would disagree about which option creates the greatest utility, particularly since only a subjective comparison is possible. One would have to somehow weigh the benefits contraceptive use (as voiced by pragmatic and secular individuals) versus the sanctity of life and moral importance of sex for procreation (as understood by religious groups). C.

John Locke’s Rights

An analysis of rights as understood by John Locke defends the religious objection to the contraceptive mandate. For Locke there are three central rights: right to freedom, property and life.87 Any form of business is an economic entity that is the property of its shareholders. Thus, he would be in favor of owners creating health plans for their employees according to their own beliefs, as it is simply an exercise of their freedom and right to property.88 The employee, accordingly, participates in the enterprise of the economic entity and is compensated according to the agreement between the parties. The employee’s control of the organization is dependent upon the corresponding level of seniority and stock ownership. Locke means that no matter how good is the cause, just and powerful is a government, or pious is a church none can morally restrict the freedom of the people or confiscate their property.89 Within the context of the mandate, Catholicism cannot force a member to restrict the health insurance plan, but that person can freely choose what to do with one’s property. This is not to say that individuals can universally use their rights to property even if it brings about significant harm. Locke is simply establishing the importance of freedoms and property rights that must endure in the face of government restrictions and stipulations. Within a framework of John Locke’s thinking, a legislative body cannot restrict an individual’s right to operate a business according to that person’s religious beliefs, with regards to the contraceptive mandate. Locke writes “the legislative…cannot be absolutely arbitrary over the lives and fortunes of the people.”90 The government cannot universally govern the actions constituents and the employment of their property. According to Locke, “A man… cannot subject himself to the absolute arbitrary power of another…and having, in the state of Nature, no arbitrary power of over the life, liberty, or

Barilan and Brusa, Journal of Medical Ethics, Vol. 34, No. 5 (May,2008), pp. 379. Ibid. 89 Ibid. 90 John Locke, Natural Rights and Society, pg. 47 88

possession of another…”91 One cannot expect the right to contraceptive to be a positive one that would allow an individual to require coverage from the corresponding employer. Locke also believes that the legislative’s power is “…limited to the public good of the society”.92 Within a Locke perspective, the good of the society depends on the right to property. Several expensive contraceptives and prescription contraceptives work by destroying life (after fertilization) or interfering with the normal functioning of the female reproductive system. There is nothing according to Nature, the laws of property, or the common good that requires an employer to pay for coverage for these methods. Many physical contraceptives (condoms, most generally) are available over the counter and are less expensive. A legislative body should not restrict an individual’s right to private property in this instance, as doing so is not consistent with Nature. IV. A.

Objections and Responses People Need Contraception

The central religious objection to the contraceptive coverage mandate understands that religious employers need to subsidize the coverage because there is a great need for it, particularly among women. In a recent statement Nancy Pelosi stated “Allowing employers and CEOs to limit health care available to employees is a gross violation of their worker’s religious rights. Women should not have to jump through extra hoops to secure fundamental health care they need.”93 More than 99% of American women aged fifteen to forty-four who have had sexual intercourse have used some form of contraception.94 So, while there is a small relative amount of employers that are religiously opposed to contraception, a huge majority of American working women use or have used some form of family planning. The President for Planned Parenthood America, Cecile Richards, was concerned that “millions of women, especially young women, struggle every day to afford prescription birth control.”95 A prominent case of this trend is the Georgetown University Law student who claimed that she would not be able to afford contraception in the absence of the proper insurance, which Georgetown Law does not supply to students (but does supply to employees).96 It is worth noting that all three female Supreme Court Justices voted against Hobby Lobby, believing that the arts and crafts chain should have to pay for health insurance coverage that violates their beliefs.

Ibid. Ibid. 93 Fox, “Supreme Court on Birth Control: What Hobby Lobby Ruling Means”, http://www.nbcnews.com/health/health-care/supreme-court-birth-control-what-hobby-lobby-ruling-meansn144526, June 30, 2014. 94 “Religious Refusals under the Affordable Care Act: Contraception as Essential Health Care”, Depaul University, JSTOR. 95 Park, “Birth control should be fully covered under health plans, reports says”, http://www.cnn.com/2011/HEALTH/07/19/birth.control.iom/index.html, July 19, 2011. 96 For more about this particular incident explore: http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/2012/02/23/147299323/law-student-makes-case-for-contraceptivecoverage and http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/2011/12/02/143022996/catholic-groups-fight-contraceptiverule-but-many-already-offer-coverage 92

An individual’s right to contraceptive measures does not impose an obligation onto an employer to provide coverage that betrays the employer’s religious beliefs. The fact that an employer does not subsidize the insurance costs of a contraceptive does not absolutely restrict their employees’ access to it. The employee is entitled to work for a secular employer whose health plan does cover the cost of contraceptives. It is certainly not a violation of their worker’s religious rights as no religion exhorts the idea that an individual has a right to contraceptive health care coverage through an employer. Certainly there exists a need for contraceptives, but this need must be balanced with the potential burden imposed on employers who choose to operate their businesses according to their religious principles. Does one’s level of financial distress give rise to an obligation of their religious employer to betray their beliefs? This is certainly not the case, as religious employers would object to providing the care regardless of the financial situation of their employees. The Supreme Court first recognized a right to contraception in 1965.97 However, for over 200 years the United States Government has recognized a freedom of exercising religion as part of the First Amendment. The religious exemption to the employer contraceptive mandate in the ACA shows that someone’s right to contraception does not impose an obligation on another party to violate one’s religion. B.

Agreement to all Religious Beliefs

The established precedent of the religious exemption to the contraceptive mandate could lead to religious abstentions to various other forms of health care. This argument usually cites the fact that Jehovah’s witnesses refuse blood transfusions, as they see it against their religion.98 Under my argument, a Jehovah’s Witness employer would not have to pay for coverage for blood transfusions (because they can object on religious grounds). These employers that practice a particular and conservative religion often employ individuals who share those beliefs.99 Dissenting individuals have the right to work elsewhere. The view of health care for these employers may be different than the majority view, but they have a right to their own property. They also have a right to live and work according to their view and knowledge of God.100 C.

Society full of Religious Employers

Consider the possibility that all employers choose health insurance plans for their employees according to some acceptable religious belief. In other words, all employers are religious. Would there have to be different versions of Obamacare for each 97

“Religious Refusals under the Affordable Care Act: Contraception as Essential Health Care”, DePaul University, JSTOR. 98 “Why Don’t Jehovah’s Witnesses Accept Blood Transfusions?”, Jehovah’s Witness.Org, http://www.jw.org/en/jehovahs-witnesses/faq/jehovahs-witnesses-why-no-blood-transfusions/. 99 For a related case please visit: http://www.natlawreview.com/article/jehovah-s-witness-s-claimshighlight-employer-need-to-manage-workplace-religion-issu 100 Much of the focus of this paper was on the Catholic objection. A more thorough discussion of the Jehovah’s Witness objection, the Christian Science objection, etc is part of a larger discussion and goes beyond the scope of this paper. For more about Jehovah’s Witnesses and Federal Mandate please read the following Journal of Religion Article that is published by the University of Chicago: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1200768.

employer? What would happen to employees who do not share those beliefs? The IRS only recognizes religions that were formed before 1950, so one could not invent a religion so as to avoid both health insurance costs and governmental fines.101 I support this restriction as it legitimizes the religious objection. Different forms of Obamacare would not be necessary, as religious employers would be granted exemptions where appropriate. In this hypothetical scenario the employee would indeed be at the mercy of his or her religious employer that would likely have a restrictive, modest health insurance plan. An employee would likely have to cover much of his or her health insurance costs without employer help. The employee does, however, have the right to choose which employer to work for, likely choosing the best among the various health insurance plans. Religious employees would naturally choose to work for employers who share similar views and offer acceptable health plans. Conservative employers with overly restrictive health plans would likely lose out on employee talent. Secular employees can also form their own secular companies and win employee talent by offering more comprehensive health insurance coverage. As a result, these secular companies could quickly outcompete their religious competitors. Even in this unlikely scenario, the two goods at stake (freedom of religion and comprehensive health insurance) are not necessarily incompatible. V.

Conclusion

This paper analyzed the religious objection to the contraceptive mandate in the Affordable Care Act from several philosophical perspectives. The argument gave rise to a relationship between religion, science, health care, and the government. Some of the undesirable implications of this argument were addressed and countered in this paper, yet many more potential problems exist and many questions remain unresolved. What type of businesses can voice a religious objection to the mandate (corporations, partnerships, for profit versus non-profit)? If the right to contraceptive coverage is not a positive right then what, in a just society, is a positive right, and why? At what threshold of ownership does an employer become religious? These questions are important for further deliberation, but are outside the scope of this paper. The United States government should continue to uphold the religious objection to the mandate. There are other ways to help women gain access to contraceptives without violating religious beliefs. The government has approved the allocation of public funds to help low-income individuals gain access to family planning methods. The morality of these practices (since religious groups pay taxes to fund these enterprises) is a question beyond this paper. Title X, for example, is a government-sponsored health program that provides family planning methods, particularly to low-income individuals.102 Hopefully the government can continue to help women who want contraceptives in ways that do not violate religious beliefs according to these philosophies.

101

Presently, only religions formed before 1950 are qualified to be exempted according to IRS, who collects those fines. For more on this visit: http://www.nj.com/healthfit/index.ssf/2014/04/religions_care_for_soul_but_few_exempt_from_obamacare _for_body.html. 102 For more on this please visit: http://www.hhs.gov/opa/title-x-family-planning/

How Urbanization Has Affected the Living Arrangements of the Elderly in Africa PAMELA METANI, Wellesley College

When your elders take care of you while you cut your teeth, you must in turn take care of them while they are losing theirs - Ghanaian proverb * After many of today’s prominent African countries gained their independence around the 1960’s, great changes arose on the continent of Africa. These changes provide the canvas for rich philosophical debates, and enquiries regarding the continent’s future, spreading across topics such as the continent’s economy and political state, and extending to topics which appear more auxiliary from a Western perspective, but are indeed nuclear to the African psyche, such as the effects of urbanization. The present paper will focus on the effects that urbanization has had on family structure in Africa, particularly as it pertains to the living arrangements of the elderly, who “paid their dues when they were young but, because of social change, their time for the pay-off was begrudged” 103. The most rapid growth in the elderly population in Africa is currently observed in Western and Northern Africa, where urbanization has uprooted young generations to the city in search of better education, better jobs, and higher living standards, and in return has weakened family ties with the elders. Of those elders left behind, it is not uncommon to observe that some are left to eke out a living for themselves in rural and agricultural settings, while not having the tools or the resilience to face such tasks. 103

Araba Nana, United Nations Population Publications. 1999.

Africa has the greatest percentage of elders who are forced by economic and family circumstances to work well beyond the age of 65, and while these elders were once the keystone to African philosophy, serving as religious intermediaries, caregivers, and wise people of the tribe, through the Western views which are sculpting the continent, they are being devalued and labeled as “useless consumers of scarce resources”104. Current living arrangements of the elderly in Africa show that an integral component of African philosophy, that of Ubuntu, a community-oriented philosophy, is transitioning to one more focused on the individual’s prosperity. Through guarding our philosophical scope, this paper will highlight how what is happening to elders in present day Africa is part of a bigger picture that encompasses social and economic changes, a transformed family structure, and a rapid shift in personal values. * The social and economic changes which have led to the current pauperized living conditions of many elders in Africa demonstrate a clear shift in the philosophical evaluation of elders in society. Whereas during pre-colonialism, due to their knowledge, wisdom, and experience, elders in certain communities were ranked in importance after God, deities, and ancestral spirits, in the contemporary Westernization of Africa, elders are viewed as idle individuals who lack the ability for economic contribution105. While one may argue that one of the reasons that elders were respected a lot more, one or two centuries ago, is because there were higher rates of mortality and people did not live as long, this would serve merely as a basal evaluation of the reality at hand, and is not critical enough of a theory to be prioritized. Whereas elders were typically trusted with the administrative, property and monetary responsibilities of the tribe, one sees less and less consultation taking place between the youth and elders, regarding these issues. The United Nations reports that “when elderly Nigerians were asked what sort of things give the most status today, the general agreement was that money, character and education (in that order) were most important”106. Interesting to note from these elders’ responses is that the foundations of a good status which they themselves where raised with, such as children, which serve to preserve one’s name and history, and family, seldom surfaced in their responses. Perhaps this is a sign that the elders have begun to adapt their views with the changes that urbanization has brought forth. Here, the question arises of whether the elders simply feel obliged to accept the truths of urbanization. In today’s urbanized African society where money equals social status, if the elders would try to adapt to the current cash economy that has engulfed Africa, would they prosper enough to be fully valued by their children and ensure their self-sufficient survival in a big city and furthermore, contribute to the financial wellbeing of their families? There seems to be no evidence to support this view. In addition, it must be noted that elderly women face far greater economic hardships than elderly men, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, for, although men may sometimes seek another 104

Ibid, Nana. John S. Mbiti. African Religions and Philosophy. Harlow: Pearson Education Limited. 1969. Print. 106 Jay Sokolovsky. United Nations Population Publication. 1999. 105

spouse, or may have been greatly valued as leaders in society prior to becoming a widower, the same truth does not usually hold for women, who are left at the hand of mercy, while their children pursue better economic circumstances in the city. Urbanization is causing high rates of unemployment and huge financial strains on the younger generations, factors which have a ripple effect, and in turn deprive elders of the economic support which they would otherwise have had from their children, had they stayed at home. What further augments the income insecurity of elders in rural settings, such as is the case with Ghana, is that the “majority of older Ghanaians are small-scale farmers and artisans and have no benefits to rely on when they retire from active work”, and with no children nearby to continue to harvest the farms, no source of income is left for the elders, and their children, who went to the city in hopes of economic pursuits, face incredible challenges of their own, which limit the financial resources that they can send back to their parents107. As a result of urbanization, “services extended to the elderly within the traditional households” are insufficient and sporadic, as the “elderly people become geographically separated from kin”108. In reflecting on the paragraphs above, it is necessary to ask ourselves what the elders themselves prioritize. Is it more important for them to live with their children and try to aid them in establishing new beginnings in an urban setting, or would they rather remain on the same land where they were born, and preserve the name of their family on that land? * Another effect of urbanization in Africa has been the transformation of the family structure. The United Nations reports that “migration, urbanization, education and wage labor” are the main factors affecting elderly support from the family structure 109. The introduction of Western ideals of receiving a strong education so that one may earn a higher wage and have a better life often leads individuals to abandon their rural roots, and travel away from their families and home areas, in order to pursue aspirations of a better, more competitive standard of living. This geographical separation weakens family ties, however, and often times the separation also becomes internalized as the different education and job opportunities that one is exposed to in the city might alter one’s perspectives and further alienate them from their families, making it more difficult for both elders and the younger generation to relate to each other . Whereas dominance and significance of the elders may have been felt when, prior to urbanization, African society presented an extended family structure, urbanization has transformed that structure into a nuclear one, comprised of small families with fewer children110. The result is one which has long been felt in the Western world, whereby one’s nuclear family becomes the center of family structure, and elders, as in grandparents, and one’s parents, are seen as appendages to the family, and not 107

Ibid, Nana. Ibid, Nana. 109 Ibid, Nana. 110 Ibid, Mbiti. 108

key components of it. On the other hand, while urbanization may have brought forth negative changes in the lives of elders, it is also important to reflect on how the younger generations are torn between the responsibility of caring for their parents, while also balancing the responsibility of caring for their own nuclear family under the pressures of city living. While pre-urbanization, family structure was crafted in such a way that children would work hard to maintain the structure which preserved the integrity of elders in society, this situation is changing, and the children who would have worked to ensure the quality of life for their parents are now struggling to simply establish a quality of life for themselves in the cities. This makes elders financial burdens for their children, as opposed to pre-urbanization, when they were viewed as invaluable community resources. The corrosion of family values is being accepted by the new generations, and, sadly, by the elders themselves who are observing the trends arising from urbanization. The U.N. reports that “rapid urbanization and migration for reasons of work have significantly altered family relations, especially where changing living conditions and lack of income stretch family capacities to provide for the elderly,” and the biggest problem that comes with this transformed family structure is that the elderly are left to survive on their own, in a rural setting111. The fact that transformations in the family structure have worsened living arrangements for the elderly is not only observed from a philosophical and statistical perspective, but the elders that are left behind as the victims of urbanization are well aware of the fact that they are not as valued in an urban society. The viewpoint that “your family is attached to you as long as you can earn. With frail body and no income, no one in the house will care for you,” is not uncommon amongst the elders which have come to realize the bitter truth which faces them112. It is important to acknowledge that the effects of urbanization on elders are not felt only by those elders that are left behind, in a rural setting. As evidenced below in a study conducted by the United Nations, the following statement from an elderly woman in Kenya helps to highlight, that even for those children that bring their elderly parents with them, negative imbalances can arise in the lives of the elders113: “When I was at home, I had a field and managed to do all I wanted, but here in town, I am hardly able to take a walk because I am old and, besides, in town there is a danger of cars. I always tell my son that I want to go home to live the life I am used to. I am, however, too old and sick and no one is prepared to come with me. I have no future but to wait for death.” One wonders how understanding the elders are of their children moving away, and what would make them feel better about the changes taking place. Solutions to the present-life scenarios of lack of support and proper arrangements for the elderly are easy to come by, and difficult to be implemented on such a large, continental scale. 111

Ibid, Nana. Ibid, Sokolovsky. 113 Ibid, Nana. 112

Most of Africa is being touched by urbanization, and we see the same patterns emerging on every corner of the continent, whereby the ageing population presents a major challenge for policy makers. The United Nations estimates that between 1980 and 2025, the population aged 75 and over will have increased by 434 per cent in Eastern Africa, 385 per cent in Middle Africa, 427 per cent in Northern Africa and 526 per cent in Western Africa. In Western Africa, Nigeria will be among the countries in Africa that will experience the largest increases in this age group114. * Another factor affecting the living arrangements of elders is the shift in personal values, which stems from the new socio-economic ambitions which have dominated the continent. Prior to urbanization, ancestors and the elderly were two of the groups most valued by individuals within a community, however, in current Africa the Western influence is greatly felt, and financial prosperity is now one of the most valued traits. Prior to colonization, which has been followed by urbanization, in the ontological scheme of African communities ancestors and the elderly were near the top of the hierarchy of beings, however, in todayâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s time, respect for ideals of the past is quickly decreasing â&#x20AC;&#x153;as the African, like the rest of the world, joins the industrial and technological age and adopts the scientific spirit which underlies its progressâ&#x20AC;?115. An important ingredient in transforming personal values in Africa has been the cultural shift which has given great significance to the Western cultural make-up. The definition of success has changed greatly in the last 100 years in African society, and if one wants to succeed today, it is believed that they must move to the city in hope of better work and education prospectives. In many African countries, such as Ghana, it is estimated that at least 50 per cent of the children of the elderly migrate to distant places, carving the way for the weakened interactions with the elderly, as were described above116. We can attribute the shift in personal values not only to a cultural change in African society, but also to a religious one, whereby Christianity and Islam are bringing forth a new set of personal values, rather different from the traditional African religions which placed great significance of the respect of the nameless dead, the living dead, and the elderly. Whereas one of the greatest bases for honor and respect in a tribe could have been placed on treatment of elders, amongst other intermediaries, current religions are bringing forth the perspective that one can be considered religious so long as they go to church on a Sunday, and are not rooted as deeply in personal values as the traditional African religions may have been. Prior to the booms of Christianity and Islam that have come with urbanization, one needed to be on good terms with their elders, who served as intermediaries with the spirits, if they wanted to approach the Deities, or God, in asking for favors, blessings, etc., however, through canonical religions, such as Christianity and Islam, one is able to pray directly to their God, and 114

Ibid, Nana. Chukwudum Barnabas Okolo. Urbanization and Traditional African Values. 2010. 116 Ibid, Nana. 115

can be considered to be on good terms with their religion so long as they believe in the book of their religion117. * Regarding solutions to improve the current living arrangements of elders, leaders must come together to craft implementable social integration and social welfare programs for the elderly of Africa, so that those who sacrificed their youth for the wellbeing of their children are not sacrificed again, on behalf of their childrenâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s prosperity in urban city centers. Not surprisingly, the elderly of Africa are concentrated in rural settings, and so whatever initiatives arise must aim to make these elders self-sufficient, for the new generations do not seem likely to drop their current ambitions for the nobler objective of taking care of their sick grandmother in the village. On a philosophical level, the modern African, who finds themselves in an urban setting while their elders are left behind, must ask themselves not what it takes to be a successful person, but what it takes to be a good person. One must be able to reason with themselves if the progress they have made in certain areas is worth the losses suffered in other arenas of life. If what has happened to the Western world is any indication, urbanization is a can of worms which, when opened, will never be put back on the shelf, and todayâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s African generation, which is transitioning from a rural to urban landscape, will give birth to an entirely urban generation. The strong morals and values which once characterized African societies will be corroded, in return for consumerism, modernism, and capitalism, which plague us Westerners on this side of the world. At this point, one must wonder if it is fair to refer to urbanization as a choice, or is it simply a matter of survival which causes individuals to flock to city centers? If the latter is true, then what can countries which have already experienced the growing pains of urbanization do to help the countries currently undergoing the process in Africa? As this paper has aimed to prove, current living arrangements of the elderly in Africa indicate that the African philosophy is transitioning from a family and communityoriented philosophy, to one more focused on an individualâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s prosperity. Unfortunately, for the present-day elders in Africa, it appears that suffering when they were young in hopes for later payoff was not enough, and that they were destined to sacrifice once more in old age as the social and economic changes, shift in personal values, and transformations in family structure, caused by urbanization have rather unfavorably affected their living arrangements. * The one who does most to avoid suffering is, in the end, the one who suffers most. - Thomas Merton

117

Ibid, Mbiti.

Economic Inequality and Civil Disobedience HANNAH OSWALD, University of Illinois

Civil disobedience plays an important function in any society. It allows citizens to address egregious injustices that might otherwise never change. However, there is a fine line between admirable civil disobedience and unproductive, disruptive behavior. In order to differentiate the two, it is necessary for a society to have a comprehensive theory or guideline that determines what constitutes justified civil disobedience. In his paper Civil Disobedience and Conscientious Refusal, John Rawls provides one account for determining the justification of civil disobedience in a reasonably just society. For the most part, Rawls’s theory is admirable and relatively successful at providing a comprehensive scheme; however, I am going to argue that Rawls’s theory has one major flaw. In his discussion, Rawls refers to the two principles in his theory of justice. Part of the second principle is known as the difference principle and is essentially concerned with determining the acceptable amount of inequality that can exist between individuals of a society. Under Rawls’s account, it is not permissible to engage in civil disobedience over issues that violate the difference principle. In this essay, I am going to argue that this is a serious flaw to deny citizens the option of engaging in civil disobedience over economic inequality, and that it is in fact compatible with the rest of his theory to incorporate the difference principle as justified grounds for civil disobedience. Firstly, it is important to understand the basics of Rawls’s theory. He argues that civil disobedience is meant to give citizens the ability to address societal injustice in a conscientious and political manner. However, his theory only applies to societies that are reasonably just to begin with. By reasonably just, Rawls is referring to a society that 48

is mostly well-ordered, but still experiences occasional serious violations of justice. Rawls also makes the assumption that in order for a society to be reasonably just, it must be a democracy. Essentially, this means that the purpose of his theory is to determine the role of civil disobedience exclusively in a society with a functioning democracy.118 This is an important foundation for his theory because it commits him to maintaining the virtuous aspects of democracy, and he consequently thinks that civil disobedience should only target an aspect of society rather than the system as a whole. He argues that in a just society, citizens have an obligation to follow all laws, even unjust ones, because they have a duty to uphold just institutions. The best way to do that is to respect the principle of majority rule. He also claims that we have an obligation to follow our society’s laws because of the principle of fairness. You agree to partake in a society because you gain benefits from it. He argues that because you agree to be in the society and you benefit from it, you must accept when the laws constrain you. 119 So Rawls argues that given our duty of fidelity to law, civil disobedience, or the act of breaking the law, is only justified when there are substantive violations of justice. Rawls refers to his theory of justice to determine exactly when these violations occur. Rawls’s theory of justice is made up of two principles. The first principle states that each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty that is compatible with the liberties that others have. These liberties include things such as freedom of speech, liberty of conscience and the right to vote. So civil disobedience is justified when there is a law or aspect of society that breaks the first principle of justice. This could occur in instances of discrimination or unjust censoring. Rawls’s second principle has to do with the amount of inequality that is acceptable in a just society. Rawls recognizes that there will inevitably be differences between individuals over wealth and social status. Rather than try to argue that all differences or inequalities are bad, Rawls instead argues that inequality is acceptable as long as it meets two criteria. The first is that if inequalities exist, offices and positions must be open to all under conditions of equal opportunity. The other criterion is that if inequalities are going to exist they must be to the advantage of the least well off in society. Meaning, it is acceptable for you to have more wealth than me so long as I am better off than I would be if there was total equality. This is commonly known as the difference principle. Unfortunately, this is an inconsequential point for Rawls’s theory of civil disobedience because he does not think violations of the second principle are an adequate justification for civil disobedience. Rawls discounts violations of the second principle as a justification for civil disobedience for multiple reasons. The first reason he rejects it is because of an epistemological concern of our ability to know the truth of the matter. The difference principle is complicated and it is difficult for us to draw the line and definitively say that an action or system violates the principle.120 With the first principle, it is relatively easy to make claims about violations because there is a somewhat obvious truth of the matter: either you have a specific right or you do not. For example, either all people are legally 118

John Rawls, “Definition and Justification of Civil Disobedience” in Civil Disobedience in Focus, ed. Hugo Adam Bedau (London: Routledge, 1991), 103 119 John Rawls, “Civil Disobedience and Conscientious Refusal” in Classic Readings and Cases in the Philosophy of Law, ed. Susan Dimock (New York: Pearson Education, 2007), 319-321 120 Rawls, 324

protected against bodily harm or they are not. In contrast, it is much harder to determine exactly at what point inequality becomes unacceptable and harms the least advantaged. He thinks that there will always be conflicting yet rational opinions over these issues, and ultimately each person will be heavily swayed by their own self-interest.121 This could be problematic for two reasons. One is that if we are making decisions based on our prejudice, then we are no longer focused on what justice requires and what is best for our community. The second reason is that even if we could potentially overcome our self-interest, we would have a very hard time convincing the public of our sincerity or making good faith negotiations. Rawls’s view point is fundamentally about convincing the public to change their minds and one of the conditions he sets out is that you must exhaust good faith negotiations before you engage in illegal action. However, he thinks that these efforts would be futile in instances that violate the second principles, such as questions of income inequality, and are therefore best left to be determined by the normal political processes. I think all of Rawls’s arguments against including the second principle of justice are flawed. Not only is it possible to incorporate the second principle with the rest of Rawls theory, but to not include it would be a serious mistake. In today’s society, questions of income inequality are arguably one of the most serious issues that we face. For example, in 2007 1% of the population claimed 30% of the country’s wealth, while the entire bottom half of the population owned a minuscule 2.5%.122 There are many reasons why we should be concerned about such a dramatic gap in income. In a CNN article, Jared Bernstein articulates one potential concern: in the United States we pride ourselves on the ideal that anyone with talent and dedication can achieve the “American Dream” and create a good life for themselves. Bernstein argues that economic disparity seriously threatens this ideal because it eliminates opportunities for the lower classes to elevate themselves.123 This demonstrates just one possible danger of living in a society where the difference principle is violated. Because it is so detrimental to society, it is important that citizens have the ability to address the problem. Let me make an important clarification: I am not necessarily arguing that our current status quo does in fact violate the second principle. Rather, my argument is that if we ever do find ourselves in a situation where we have serious reasons to believe that the difference principle is violated, civil disobedience is a necessary tool for citizens to use to address the issue. In essence, I do not think it is appropriate to leave the problem to normal political processes as Rawls suggests. One positive aspect of the second principle is that Rawls requires all positions be available on the basis of equal opportunity. Although Rawls was right to include this stipulation, it is important to recognize that there is a significant difference between having an equality of opportunity to take on a position in politics and having an equality of opportunity to influence politics. For example it is the difference between having the ability to run for office and having the ability to be an influential political lobbyist. To 121

Rawls, 324 Gus Lubin, “23 Mind-Blowing Facts About Income Inequality in America”, Business Insider, Nov. 7 2011, http://www.businessinsider.com/new-charts-about-inequality-2011-11?op=1 123 Jared Bernstein, “Opinion: Why growing income inequality matters”, CNN Money, January 21 2014, http://money.cnn.com/2014/01/21/news/economy/growing-income-inequality/ 122

have an equality of opportunity to become a politician might include having the same opportunities to go to college and hire political campaign managers. In contrast, being an influential political lobbyist almost always requires having access to a lot of capital. It is a sad fact that politics is very wrapped up in money. Some of the most powerful groups gain their power by donating large sums of money to politicians. For example, the Washington Post reported that Sheldon Adelson personally spent at least $93 million in the 2012 election. However, the $93 million only counts donations made to groups that are required to disclose the name of their donors. The article speculates that his actual donations far exceed this number.124 To give another frightening example, five prominent and powerful senators are being investigated by the Senate Ethics Committee for having a potential conflict of interest. The five senators received nearly $1.4 million in donations from Charles Keating, and they are being accused of wrongfully protecting Keating’s company from federal regulators. Estimates are showing that because the senators prevented intervention, that it will cost American taxpayers an extra $1.3 billion to bail out Keating’s company. 125 This is a particularly alarming example because it demonstrates how wealthy citizens have the power to seriously influence politics in a selfish way that is detrimental to the lower economic classes. If money equals power, how can the lower classes ever compete over issues of not having enough money? Furthermore, another major problem that prevents citizens in lower economic classes from impacting change is that not only do campaigns cost money, but they also require a significant amount of time and effort. A main reason why many think that the income gap is problematic has to do with the fact that citizens are struggling to survive on minimum wage. Many people have to take on multiple jobs to make ends meet. In which case, they would not have the time necessary to campaign and raise awareness. Some might argue that unions can address this problem; I do not think this is necessarily the case. Although unions certainly have the potential to aid disadvantaged citizens, there are many factors that can prevent unions from adequately representing citizens and giving them a powerful voice in politics. One such concern has to do with the fact that even with the aid of unions citizens still do not have a hope of competing with corporations. According to the Huffington Post, business groups donated over $9.5 billion during the 2012 election in cycle. Labor unions spent $600 million, which is a mere 6% of what business groups donated. Clearly unions are no match for corporation’s spending power.126 Furthermore, even if unions could somehow find a way to compete financially, there is always the possibility that unions will not adequately represent the interests of the public as a whole. As of 2013, only 11.3% of workers belonged to a union.127 This leaves a large portion of the working class without 124

Chris Cillizza, “Sheldon Adelson spent $93 million on the 2012 election. Here’s how.”, Washington Post, March 25, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2014/03/25/sheldon-adelson-spent-93million-on-the-2012-election-heres-how/ 125 “The Power of Money: The Ethics of Campaign Finance Reform”, Santa Clara University, 2014, http://www.scu.edu/ethics/publications/iie/v3n2/money.html 126 Paul Blumenthal and Dave Jamieson, “Koch Brothers Are Outspent by Labor Force Millions Of Times Their Size, But…”, Huffington Post, March 15 2014, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/03/15/kochsbrothers-labor_n_4966883.html 127 Eric Liu, “Viewpoint: The Decline of Unions is Your Problem Too”, Time, Jan 29 2013, http://ideas.time.com/2013/01/29/viewpoint-why-the-decline-of-unions-is-your-problem-too/

a way to impact politics. Unions obviously also do not necessarily represent the interests of unemployed citizens, and as the worst off in society, unemployed citizens deserve just as much opportunity to impact their community. Therefore, it is important that citizens have other options besides unions to make their voices heard. So without time, money, or a powerful agency to represent them, how could citizens possibly hope to compete against the interests of multi-million dollar companies? A democracy cannot adequately function if a large portion of citizens are powerless and marginalized. The impossibility of impacting change through normal political processes makes civil disobedience a necessary tool for citizens to utilize when there are substantive economic injustices. If Rawls’s account for Civil Disobedience cannot justify disobedience over violations of the difference principle, then it is a flawed theory and should be rejected. Fortunately for Rawls, it actually is possible to incorporate the difference principle without sacrificing any of the theory’s other commitments. Rawls arguments over the difficulty of knowing the truth of the matter with the difference principle and the worries about prejudice and self-interest are not as serious as they first appear. It is important to note that although the goal of Rawls’s theory is to convince society, the justification for disobedience is in no way contingent on society actually agreeing. As long as an act of civil disobedience is non-violent, public, does not inspire widespread chaos, and is based upon an argument that abstains from personal belief over why a substantive justice exists, then according to Rawls, it is justified.128 So this means that Martin Luther King would still have been justified in engaging in civil disobedience even if society had never come to agree with him or accept his protests. Society could have entirely rejected him and everything he stood for, but he still would have been justified in his actions. This is an important distinction to make because it suggests that even with the first principle, it is not always obvious when there are violations of justice; there is always room for debate. If violations of justice were obvious, then it would make more sense to require societal acceptance to justify disobedience; the fact that it is not required shows Rawls accepts disobedience based on opinion, and opinions are always subject to being wrong. Therefore, Rawls’s epistemological concern is not as serious as it seems. Let me clarify with an example. Consider the ongoing debate over Ferguson. There have been peaceful protestors engaging in civil disobedience because they think the basic liberties of African Americans are being wrongfully violated. The peaceful acts of disobedience are justified according to Rawls’s theory. However, society has yet to agree with the protestors. Many think that there has been no violation of liberty. There is a credible chance that society will ultimately come to reject the protestor’s arguments. Society’s rejection does not change the fact that Rawls’s theory still justifies the Ferguson protestors. Remember, Rawls’s theory only applies to a society that is reasonably just. The United States is certainly reasonably just in the sense that we have a well-ordered society and a legitimate, functioning democracy that respects the freedom of the people. If the majority of a reasonably just society rejects Ferguson and decides that there has not 128

Rawls, 321-325

been an infraction of injustice, then there is credible reason to doubt that injustice has actually occurred. Assuming there is a truth of the matter, which Rawls does take to be the case, then allowing society to reject civil disobedience implies that either the society is mistaken, or the protestors are. Therefore, it is possible to have justified disobedience over mistaken arguments of a violation of justice. In which case, there is no reason to deny disobedience over the difference principle just because it is difficult to know the truth of the matter. In reality, regardless of the issue, it is always hard to know the truth of the matter when it comes to civil disobedience in a society that is already reasonably just. If it was really that obvious, then it would not be an issue in the first place. Rawlsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s next argument against including the difference principle had to do with prejudice and self-interest. One of the requirements for Rawlsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s theory is that the argument for civil disobedience must appeal to a widespread sense of injustice. He excludes issues over economic inequality because he thinks they are too caught up in self-interest. This is also a bad argument to make. When you consider what civil disobedience is and the purpose it serves, it seems as if prejudice and self-interest will inherently be tied to any act of civil disobedience, regardless of its subject matter. As I just argued, it is not always obvious when there are injustices in society. Therefore, you will not notice them unless they affect your life in some way, and it is hard to conceive anyone acting against them unless they were seriously and directly affected by the injustices. Thus it seems that most, if not all, civil disobedience is inherently based on a citizen acting in a self-interested way. For example, consider when Susan B. Anthony used civil disobedience to protest the fact that women could not vote. Given the fact that Anthony was a woman, it seems implausible to say that she was not acting in a selfinterested manner. What is important to note here is that self-interested actions are not inherently wrong. It is possible to both be self-interested and to appeal to a wide-spread sense of injustice. So when considering protests over economic injustices, as long as protestors are primarily focused on correcting a substantive injustice that is felt by many in the society, it should not matter whether or not they personally benefit. To be fair, Rawls is right to point out that when it comes to money issues it is much harder to separate your own self-interest from the needs of your society. What makes economic inequality different from inequality of liberties is that correcting economic problems often entails taking resources away from one group and giving it to the disadvantaged; in contrast, correcting problems of liberties rarely diminishes the liberties of others. Since both parties have a vested interest in economic concerns, it is reasonable to assume that good faith negotiations would be much harder over issues of income inequality than they would be for questions of civil liberties. However, the fact that it is more difficult to accomplish does not automatically prove that it cannot be done or that it should not be done. Rawls assumes too much when he makes claims about the difficulty involved with issues over the difference principle. Rather than making a concrete argument for why the difference principle should be rejected, he has simply shown why there should perhaps be extra consideration or conditions that should be met before civil disobedience can be justified on these grounds. Overall, Rawls has not provided any compelling reasons for why the difference principle is incompatible with the rest of his theory. It is entirely arbitrary to accept violations of the first principle of justice, but not the second principle. Protests over the difference principle are 53

completely capable of achieving the goals Rawls lays out for civil disobedience, and therefore should be justified grounds to engage in disobedience. In conclusion, the purpose of this paper was twofold. First, it is important to recognize why we need to have the option of engaging in civil disobedience over economic concerns. Given the power of money in politics, it seems paradoxical to think that citizens without money could ever hope to win political issues concerning money through normal political processes. If citizens in a society ever have sincere reasons to believe that there are in fact substantive violations of Rawlsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s difference principle, then their only credible option in addressing the problem is to engage in civil disobedience. Given this necessity, a theory of civil disobedience cannot be justified if it excludes citizens this option. Therefore, the second goal of this paper was to show that Rawls was essentially too hasty in rejecting the difference principle as grounds for civil disobedience. A closer analysis of his arguments reveals that there is nothing fundamentally incompatible about the difference principle, and that it is possible to incorporate the principle as justification for civil disobedience without sacrificing any other aspects of Rawlsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s theory.

A Defense of the Institutional Theory of Art SNOW ZHANG, Wellesley College

The institutional theory posits that an artifact is art if and only if it is recognized as such by the social institution of the artworld (Dickie, 431). One main objection against this definition is that it is ‘viciously circular’: by appealing to the antecedent concept of the artworld in its definition, the theory is tautological if not logically fallacious (Dickie, 434). In this paper I argue that the institutional theory is tenable and informative insofar as it is interested in providing an account for an abstract concept of art, as opposed to art as a conception or an honorific status of a particular object. To this extent the objection has failed by misinterpreting the purpose and subject of the institutional project. The institutional theory appears particularly appealing because its predictions seem to align neatly with our empirical data of prima facie artworks. The predecessors of institutional theory - theories of imitation, representation, expression or aesthetic - are all deficient to the extent that they are unable to account for all works that we recognize as art. Both expression and aesthetic theories exclude avant-garde art like conceptual art and ready-mades (Carroll, Beauty, 38; Expression, 68), whereas the representation theory seems to leave no room for purely decorative works (Carroll, Representation, 32). Part of their problem, according to Dickie, is that they are exclusively concentrated on generalizing one unique and universal feature exhibited by all artworks (Dickie, 427). As a result, they all face two seemingly irresolvable paradoxes: 1) the theory aims to extrapolate a universally shared feature of the perceived subject or received effect of the artworks, yet the ‘raw data’ - our experiences with artworks - seem to be essentially idiosyncratic and henceforth defy any attempt of universalization; 2) as a result of its 55

attempt to universalize, the theory necessarily stipulates a transcendental feature that ought to be instantiated by all artworks, which subsequently renders the theory incapable of accounting for historical cases or deliberate attempts by artists to challenge the theory’s tenability. In contrast, the institutional theory proposes that X is a work of art if and only if 1) X is conferred artifactuality and 2) X is conferred the status of candidacy for appreciation by at least one member of the artworld (Dickie, 431) The theory thereby alleviates the tension between universalization and percipientdependence in the first paradox by defining the universal feature of artworks (i.e. being taken as art) in terms of the act of their percipients (i.e. taking them as art). In virtue of doing so, the theory also resolves the second paradox by shifting the burden of judgment to the artworld with respect to what ought to be counted as art. However, upon scrutiny, the institutional theory seems to have resolved the paradoxes at the cost of creating another dilemma for itself. For while the theory defines art in terms of the artworld, it leaves unclear whether the term ‘artworld’ itself is well-defined or not. If the ‘artworld’ is undefined, then the proposed definition of art is at best problematically vague and uninformative; If the ‘artworld’ is well-defined, it is then difficult to see how such definition could be articulated, and in particular how the boundary and composition of the social institution could be properly identified, without invoking some prior notion of ‘what art is’. For example, the only thing that appears to distinguish an art historian from a historian specializing in international relations is, ceteris paribus, the differences of their areas of expertise, i.e. art vis-a-vis international relations, which would not have made sense if the notion of art were not already welldefined. Therefore, insofar as the definition of ‘artworld’ involves and depends on a primitive intuition about ‘what art is’, a conditional that Dickie himself seems to concede as plausible (Dickie, 434), the institutional theorist’s definition of ‘art’ is tautological and thereby ‘viciously circular’. In defense, Dickie argues that the institutional definition of art is circular but ‘not viciously so’ because it is ‘embedded in an account that contains a great deal of information about the artworld’. Dickie points out that the apparent circularity is perhaps inevitable by the fact that the concept of art is ‘institutional’ (Dickie, 434). Here it warrants explication that Dickie seems to be using the word ‘art’ in three different ways: 1) Art as a concept in abstraction (e.g.’theories of art’); 2) Art as an conception for an individual or a community with specific content (e.g. ’X is art’129), 3) Art as a social status and ascribed to a particular object. 129

Here the word ‘art’ seems to refer to a particular set of properties even if the properties themselves may not be explicable or communicable

An analogy could be made with the word ‘wise’, which seems to have different meanings in: 1) The concept of wiseness, 2) X is wise (which may imply that X is clever, sophisticated, has rich life experiences, etc), and 3) X is the wise man of the village (which may entail certain kind of authority or privileges)130 Therefore the institutional definition of art is in fact a meta-theory of our concept of art the ‘art’ that is instantiated in the individual’s art-related behaviors and judgments, including expressions of artistic ideals, conferment of art status, etc. The account of the artworld therefore explains the concept’s ‘institutionality’ by showcasing how the artworld institutes and influences our particular idea of art and subsequently our criteria for conferment of the status of art. In other words, the definition should not be evaluated with respect to ‘what the artworld is’, but in the context of ‘what the artworld does’, and to this extent the definition is informative about what art is on the abstract, metatheoretic level. However, one may disagree with this conclusion by questioning whether the information of ‘what the artworld does’ sheds light on the definition of art even in its abstract terms. Here the institutional theorist may be guilty of making a genetic fallacy by equating a) what is causally responsible for X to be conferred the particular status of art, and b) what constitutes the essence of becoming and being an artwork. To use one of Dickie’s own examples, a university conferring a PhD degree to a graduate student may be the direct cause of her becoming a PhD (Dickie, 431), but this fact alone seems insufficient if not irrelevant to what a PhD actually is. On the other hand, the conferred degree could be invalidated retroactively if later she is found out to have committed plagiarism in her dissertation. It seems henceforth that the conferment is contingent on and consequent of a prior judgment that ‘the student qualifies as and deserves to be a PhD’. The critical information here is therefore not the genealogical explanation for how the status is acquired, but why or what motivates and justifies the status to be conferred in the first place.131 Admittedly, Dickie recognizes the significance of the ‘why’ question over the ‘how’ question, but nevertheless rejects the idea that answering the ‘why’ question is part or all of what the theory of art ought to do. Instead, he posits that the assertion ‘X is art’ is an act appropriate for moral scrutiny as opposed to a constative statement that admits of truth evaluation. Mistakes in the artworld, he argues, cannot be made ‘in conferring the status of art’ but only ‘by conferring it’ (Dickie, 436). For it is not an epistemic failure like errors in arithmetic computations or scientific measurements; rather, it constitutes a 130

One way to differentiate among 1, 2, 3 is to note the compatibility of the following sentences: X and I disagree on the definition of wiseness. X is called the wise man of the village, but actually he is pretty stupid (and hence not wise). 131 One could also argue that the conferment of a status A is not even the cause of A but only an epiphenomenon of A (i.e. there exists an external cause B that is responsible for A and its conferment), in which case the relation between the conferment and the nature of A would be further undermined.

wrongdoing that has responsibilities.132

undesirable

consequences

and

warrants

attribution

Therefore, institutional theory conceptualizes the purpose and nature of its project very differently from its predecessors. For previous analyses, theorization of art is not only to construct a universally applicable formula that could effectively identifies art from the non-art, but more importantly this formula must to some extent reinforce, justify or at least be consistent with the underlying idea that art is antecedently and intrinsically valuable - it must answer the ‘why’ question in addition to the ‘how’ question. As a result, their definitions of art are invariably action-guiding principles, which implicitly prescribes that only objects with the kind of features stipulated in their formulae ought to be conceived, created and celebrated as art, an ambition essentially responsible for the two seemingly irresolvable paradoxes. On the other hand, the institutional theorist acutely recognizes that both the honorific status of art and our own idea of art are instituted by the artworld, and it is this interactive dynamism that characterizes the essence of the concept of art. Hence, the institutional project views the philosophy of art as an ethical rather than epistemological or metaphysical query, to the extent that what we ought to do to art, for art and with art precede and supersede the question of what art is and ought to be. Instead of providing a scripture that seeks to educate one particular idea of art at the expense of the others, the theory thereby calls for selfconscious, autonomous and responsible behaviors by members of the artworld. 133

Acknowledgement: I would like to express sincere thanks to Professor Matthes and Claudia Yao for their invaluable input and critical feedbacks.

132

One may conceptualize the distinction by observing the difference of our evaluative attitudes in saying that a) ‘’you made an algebraic mistake here’ vs. b) ‘you mistook a doodle sketch for an artwork. 133 Arguably the merit of institutional theory lies more in its perspective than its actual content, for even if we conceive of the theorization of art as an ethical project, it is still unclear how we ought to deliberate in the artworld without a prior knowledge or general consensus of what art is and ought to be. This then brings us back to the classic Platonic problem of whether it is necessary to know ‘what justice is’ in order to be just, and I can think of two potential solutions for future research: 1) it may be plausible for us to ‘rightly’ create, discern and appreciate art in particular instances even if we do not have a formal and exhaustive account of what art is; 2) we may analyze and evaluate actions in the artworld from a contractarian perspective, in which each member (presumably autonomous agent) is bound by a particular social contract.

POSTLUDE We hope that you have enjoyed reading Volume II, of The Starling Undergraduate Journal of Philosophy. If you have any questions or comments regarding any of the work featured in this volume, please feel free to email us at starlingujp@hotmail.com. Further, if you are interested in submitting your own piece for the consideration of The Starling, please review our website for submission guidelines at http://starlingjournal.wordpress.com/, and send us your wonderful work, by 15 December, 2015, at starlingujp@hotmail.com . Wishing you happy philosophizing!