Combatting Offshore Tax Evasion After Brexit EmilDuvessa SondajBandeen, Han Juliette Bowen, Mark O’Brien, Will Melling and Zeki Dolen Emil Sondaj Hansen,
citizens in these jurisdictions. This issue will be discussed further both in assessing the domestic steps the UK has taken to tackle international tax evasion and in evaluating the success of the OECD’s efforts to make the automatic exchange of information the global standard. This tension is unavoidable and runs throughout many of the discussions below. An effective remedy to illegal tax evasion is better information and, in an increasingly globalised economy, that information must be shared between governments if any progress is to be made. However, sharing such information carries risk. As will be discussed below, several scholars have recently raised concerns about whether the efforts to tackle illegal tax evasion are losing sight of what constitutes effective information sharing, and instead are becoming excessive.2 This paper therefore recognises the need for greater transparency; however, it will be advocating that this greater transparency must be coupled with the principle of proportionality. It is a general feature of individual legal rights that there are exceptions – for instance, the right to free speech and demonstration is always set within the boundary of public order and safety. However, these exceptions are fair and proper. There must be sufficiently good justifications to interfere with the private rights of citizens; sharing information should be encouraged but not without good reason. The excesses of transparency will be critiqued below where they are perceived to be disproportionately overstepping the demarcated boundaries enshrined in the right to privacy (such as has been the case with the 5th EU Anti-Money Laundering Directive – see section IV.
I.I DEFINING TAX EVASION AND AVOIDANCE In the UK, there is no statutory definition of tax avoidance.3 Despite this, any instance of behaviour to reduce tax liabilities which is strictly illegal constitutes tax evasion. This tautological distinction is of little use, however, in delineating the scope of tax reducing behaviours tackled by this paper.
2
For instance, see: Lynne Oats and Penelope Tuck, ‘Corporate tax avoidance: is tax transparency the solution?’ (2019) Accounting and Business Research, 49:5; or Filippo Noseda, ‘CRS and Benfifical Ownership Registers: A Call to Action’ (2017) 23(5) Trusts and Trustees 496 3 House of Commons Library (Antony Seely), Tax Avoidance and Tax Evasion, House of Commons Library (Briefing Paper, Cm 7948, 18th April 2020).
The Wilberforce Society Cambridge, UK
www.thewilberforcesociety.co.uk
10
February 2021
