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“Hong-Kong Style Cultural Revolution” — Weaponization of the Cultural Revolution in the 2019 Hong Kong Protests Yat I Fung1 Yale University
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Abstract The pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong started in June 2019 received international attention as clashes prolonged. A peculiar phenomenon has been observed in the textual space of both the pro-democracy camp and the pro-government camp, which is a shared set of terms surrounding the Chinese Cultural Revolution amid the camps’ antagonism. This essay thus investigates the comparisons between either the pro-democracy protests or the pro-government movement, with the Cultural Revolution, made by Hong Kong writers who position differently in the political spectrum. This essay aims to analyze the use of the Cultural Revolution as an idiomatic weapon to attack the opposing camp to draw insights to both Hong Kong’s perception of the Cultural Revolution and the characteristics of the current protests. The border goal of the essay is to show how the Cultural Revolution’s impact is still echoing. the Cultural Revolution to draw direct analogies to the on-go-
I.
ing situation, the general social ambiance, as well as particular The on-going pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong
actions of individuals and parties. This shared application of
have lasted for half a year by now and show no sign of termina-
vocabulary not only poses a peculiar case due to the polariza-
tion. In June 2019, the protests were sparked by the opposition
tion of the language in the current protests, but also due to the
to the extradition bill, which would have permitted extradition
sensitive nature of the Cultural Revolution, which has been a
to mainland China, leading to worries that Hong Kong’s au-
taboo for the Communist Party of China (CPC).
tonomy would be undermined by exposing the locals to the le-
Comparisons between the pro-democracy protests or
gal system of mainland China. While the protesters claim their
the pro-government counter-protests, with the Cultural Revo-
rights in defending the democratic system of the city against the
lution, made by Hong Kong writers who position differently in
Chinese authority, their opponents denounce their ideals and
the political spectrum, thus worth our investigation. This essay
their actions for damaging the city’s socio-economic stability.
aims to analyze the use of the Cultural Revolution as a rhetor-
The antagonism between the pro-democracy camp
ical device by Hong Kong people in online media platforms to
and the pro-government camp constructs two completely dif-
draw insights on locals’ perception of the Cultural Revolution.
ferent sets of vocabulary adopted by the media of the opposing
This essay suggests that the use of the Cultural Revolution as
camps. However, a set of terms can be found in the textual
an idiomatic weapon to attack the opposing camp reveals Hong
space of both camps — the Cultural Revolution. The Cultural
Kong people’s multilayer conceptions of the Cultural Revolu-
Revolution, a socio-political movement initiated by Mao Ze-
tion, which continues to play a role in the current society.
dong in China from 1966 to 1976, resulted in a “severe setback
II.
of China culture and social development”1. Both camps in the current Hong Kong society employ terms specifically tied to
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During the Cultural Revolution, Mao mobilized the
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STEM | Astronomy SOCIAL SCIENCES | East Asian Studies
VOL. VOL.1.1 1.1| |Nov. Nov.2020 2020
mass to consolidate his leadership in the party and revive
the self-perceived image of Hong Kongers that has been edu-
the revolutionary spirit by struggling against party enemies,
cated and sensible, which has been consolidated by the unpop-
overthrowing local authorities, and destroying traditional rel-
ularity of the 1967 riot. There have been copious attempts to
ics. Factory productions halted and schools were closed amid
draw similarities between the Cultural Revolution and political
a stateless and lawless society. Student organizations known
movement in Hong Kong in this decade, like the 2014 Um-
as the Red Guards were mobilized by Mao to catalyze terror
brella Movement and the 2016 Mongkok Riot. This essay thus
by going on a rampage, destroying state property and beating
extends the academic conversation on the longlasting effect of
up people. Local fractions divided by political differences and
the Cultural Revolution as a serious part of the local anti-Bei-
personal vendetta had large-scale militant clashes. It resulted in
jing and anti-China sentiments in nowadays.
millions of death, socio-political chaos, and permanent loss of
III.
historical artifacts2. The Cultural Revolution spilled over the Shenzhen
The term “Cultural Revolution” appearing in articles
border to Hong Kong, which had been under British colonial
about the recent protests of both pro-democracy and pro-gov-
rule since 1841. While many Mainlanders escaped to Hong
ernment camps. The term is unanimously perceived negatively,
Kong from the chaos and gained residency from the loose im-
which is peculiar itself given the “multiplicity of standpoints
migration policy, communists and their supporters in the crown
on historical events.” While it may be understandable for the
colony rallied and put up “big-character posters” to stand in
anti-Beijing camp to use the radical Revolution to embarrass
solidarity with their Mainland counterparts. In May 1967, riots
the authority, the same action is surprising for the pro-gov-
broke out as a result of the heightened political climate and so-
ernment camp. The CPC has adopted a policy of evasion and
cial tension, and was put down by the royal police force. Most
treated it as a sensitive issue. The Hong Kong pro-government
pro-Communists organizations were outlawed by the govern-
camp’s, as well as the pro-democracy camp’s, high-profile de-
ment and marginalized by the public .
nunciation of the Revolution, may be explained by their effort
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The 1967 Riot has been well-studied, but scholars’
in weaponizing the Cultural Revolution as a silver bullet.
analysis of the ramifications of the Cultural Revolution to the
The weaponization works on the foundation that most
city usually ends here. However, the ripples of the Revolution
of the Hong Kong people know about the Cultural Revolution
can still felt as strong evidence of the failure and brutality of
and have an aligned negative view on it. Articles of both camps
the CPC leadership. Locals weaponize the incident by mak-
refer to the situation roiled by the protests now in Hong Kong
ing analogies between a certain aspect of the Culture Revolu-
as “Hong-Kong style Cultural Revolution,” or “Cultural Rev-
tion and that of their opponents, so as to highlight and attack
olution 2.0.”6 Titles that asserts the Cultural Revolution with
each other’s wrongdoings. This process of weaponization, in
“gory,” “wail” and “losing people’s heart” display explicit
which an idea, concept, or object is translated into an effective
negative connotation7. This negativity is well developed in the
propaganda message and used as a rhetorical assault, operates
articles when writers parallel it with the damaging phenomena
on several levels politically, socially and culturally . Weapon-
of the current protests.
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ization can be used to legitimize one’s cause and attack the
The term “Cultural Revolution” is used more than as a
enemies, empowered by the virality of verbal and visual com-
buzzword in the titles but is employed to describe the destruc-
munication. It creates a battlefield where enemies competed
tion and violence occurred in the current movement by writers
for justification, favors, and influence5. In this case, most Hong
of both sides. The anti-protesters camp stresses the physical
Kong people have believed that Mainlanders in the Cultural
assaults made by young students during the strikes. For exam-
Revolution were uncivilized and irrational, in comparison to
ple, in his opinion piece that advocates the need to terminate
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the youngsters’ violence, Yu Pinghai condemns the university
the rich people and property owners in Hong Kong.”12 She is
students, just like the Red Guards in the Cultural Revolution,
mainly referring to the government and its official media’s ac-
in destroying stores, beating up opponents, and throwing pet-
cusation against the wealthiest merchant in Hong Kong, Lee
rol bombs and claims such actions recreated the lawlessness
Kashing. Her sentence ends with a prophecy of a soon occur-
society in the Cultural Revolution . On the other side of the
rence of a “Cultural Revolution 2.0” in Hong Kong. Siding
coin, Luo Xiaoran denounces police sieges in universities ssnd
with Qu and the protests, Guan Jianwen scorns at Fang’s label
condemns the destruction of the grave of Principal Cai Yuan-
of the Cultural Revolution on the protesters when he literally
pei in Hong Kong . He labels the renowned Chinese educa-
highlights in his blog post the mob attack in Yuen Long on 21
tor-politician Cai as the leading figure in pursuing academic
July against the supporters of the protests13. Like many critics
freedom in China, thus labels the destruction of the grave as an
of the police force and the government, he identifies the mob
act of demolishing freedom. Luo compares this act to “ destroy
as criminal gangs. He implies that the anti-protester crimes
the Four Olds” during the Cultural Revolution in which his-
group’s struggle against ordinary citizens is the prelude to soon
torical monuments were eradicated. The Cultural Revolution
reappearance in Hong Kong of bloody struggle sessions in the
becomes a symbol of political violence and the writer’s weap-
Cultural Revolution.
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on depends on their denunciation of the Cultural Revolution
The struggling campaigns mentioned by the writers
— the more violent they can make the Cultural Revolution
shed light on their denunciation on extreme identity politics.
appear, the more uncivilized their current opponents are.
In the Cultural Revolution, the PRC government used “label-
Aside from smashing properties, writers also ap-
ing” to create two camps – the “Reds” and the “Blacks.” The
ply the historical metaphor to the struggling campaigns now.
“Blacks” were portrayed as villains from rich families who con-
“Struggling session” was a public collective plot in the Mao-
stantly plan to revolt against the regime14. Similarly, “political
ist era to attack the Party’s enemies with verbal humiliations
labeling” was used in the police force in Hong Kong and polit-
and physical assaults . It created unbearable harm to the body
ical hatred was fostered against the “new black five categories”
and mentality of victims, who ranged from top party leaders to
– students, layers, journalists, medical personnel and social
local landowners and teachers. In the current discourse, for in-
workers. In the same vein, protestors point their swords to ev-
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stance, Fang in his article highlights the “wind of struggling.”
ery policeman and pro-government citizens regardless of their
He denounces radical protesters who struggled against every-
actual behavior and speech. In these articles, the rhetoric of em-
one who had different political opinions with them, even when
ploying the term “struggle” to substitute every personal assault
they were their closest teachers, colleagues, and parents. The
made by the opposing camp was not only to raise the level of
struggles against the university principal and staff, as well as
harm created but accuse the opposing camp in their political im-
government officials, which include spreading hate speech and
morality and incorrectness. The struggling campaigns not only
online vigilantism, also are the targets of Fang’s condemna-
polarize society, but also questioned the morals like respecting
tion. “Struggle,” (批鬥 pidou) a term Fang uses repeatedly, is a
elders since many victims of the “struggling campaigns” in both
specific vocabulary that is contextualized with socio-political
eras have been close family members and teachers.
movements in the early PRC era and popularized in the Cul-
IV.
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tural Revolution. Meanwhile, the pro-democracy camp also alleges their opposing camp of performing “struggling.” Qu Weilin’s article, which brings the severity of the current government oppression of citizens to light, asserts Beijing’s “struggles against
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The weaponization of the Cultural Revolution is based on a consensus that the majority of Hong Kong people have similar knowledge of the Cultural Revolution. The quotation of slogans and borrowing of vocabulary in the Cultural Revo-
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STEM | Astronomy SOCIAL SCIENCES | East Asian Studies lution shows a higher level of learning of the revolution. This historical knowledge, and the unanimous negative resonance based on history, should not be taken for granted when the education of the sensitive political events in China, and allegedly starting in Hong Kong, had been tightly controlled, and they were not taught or euphuistically spoken of in the education of Chinese history. On top of the education of the event, Hong Kong people’s perception of the Cultural Revolution is also based on personal or collective memory and ties. As Brickers and Yip acknowledge in the testimonies of the witnesses of the 1967 Riots in Hong Kong, first-person accounts “reminds us an important dimension of history: an awareness of the past that is personally felt.”15 Most of the refugees who escaped to Hong Kong, as victims of the Revolution, resented the Cultural Revolution. The sentiment was shared by most Hong Kong locals who were horrified to see dead bodies floating on the harbors from the Shenzhen River16. The Cultural Revolution leaves enduring legacy in Hong Kong based on collective knowledge and memory. It continues to polarize society by strengthening the arguments between pro-Communist camp and their opponents. Meanwhile, it also acts as a tool of “othering” between locals and Mainlanders. This process of othering, as proposed Elaine Chan, is no longer initiated by the government as she suggested, but became a botton-up movement17. The characteristics of Hong Kong mentioned in the articles, including the rule of law, the democratic system, and freedom of speech, which both camps accused the other of destroying, are indicators that Hong Kong is different from China and constitute the pride in Hong Kong identity. The collective memory of the Cultural Revolution has provided Hong Kong people a group identity through the construction of narrative, which was built on victimization. The Red Guards and generally Mainlanders in that era were portrayed as aggressors and killers. Hong Kong media still employs this generalization to distinguish the locals and their mainland counterparts. The weaponization of the Cultural Revolution thus displays long-lasting impact of this incident.
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VI. The current protests in Hong Kong constitute a defining moment in the city’s history. While Hong Kong’s future is unclear to us, the weaponization of the Cultural Revolution is the discourse surrounding the protests offered us some insights. The vocabulary of the Cultural Revolution is the media to channel denunciation, if not hatred, in multidimensions towards their opponents. Their opponents’ notorious behavior is advertised through the terms in the Cultural Revolution, thus making those acts even more sinister. This reveals that the ultimate goals of the effective weaponization are not only to attack the opposing camp, but also to mobilize or demobilize their readers. This is both the cause and the result of the polarization of Hong Kong society, which will possibly extend beyond protests. More than 40 years after the Revolution ended, it is still shaping the relations between the supporters and opponents of Beijing. Scholars should view the Cultural Revolution as still having an ongoing impact, while the Hong Kong locals should prevent the Cultural Revolution from truly reappearing.
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