11 minute read
Too much, too late
WHATEVER HAPPENED TO // THE BELL ARHWHATEVER HAPPENED TO // THE BELL ARH TOO MUCH, TOO MUCH, TOO LATE
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Despite several attempts, the US Army never fi elded a direct replacement for the Bell OH-58 Kiowa Warrior. David Willis looks at the armed reconnaissance helicopter, which became a victim of spiraling costs and delays
he cancellation of the overly
Tambitious Boeing/Sikorsky RAH-66 Comanche program in February 2004 left the US Army with an urgent need to fi nd a replacement for its fl eet of OH-58Ds. The Kiowa’s ability to provide armed escort for ground units was much in demand at the time to support operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq. On December 9, 2004, the Army issued a request for proposals for an Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter (ARH) – a relatively inexpensive off -the-shelf design to be equipped with existing mission systems.
The light, single-turbine aircraft was to carry a third-generation sensor, have a glass cockpit, self-protection systems and be able to ‘link in’ to the Army’s communications network. Two would be carried by a Lockheed Martin C-130J Super Hercules and able to fl y within 15 minutes of being unloaded. A total of 368 ARHs would be procured for $2.36bn.
Bell Helicopter put forward the Model 445, based on the Model 407, powered by the Honeywell HTS900 turboshaft. Lockheed Martin was chosen as Bell’s system integrator for the mission equipment package (MEP). Its primary sensor was based on the FLIR Systems BriteStar II, which would be mounted on the nose, with forward-looking infra-red (FLIR), color TV, laser rangefi nder and laser designator/spot tracker modes.
The cockpit suite would be the Common Avionics Architecture System created for the US Army by Rockwell Collins. Armament options included AGM-114 Hellfi re air-to-surface missiles, GAU-19/A Gatling gun pods, Hydra 70 rockets and seven-shot 2¾in guided or unguided rocket pods.
The basic airframe would be built at Mirabel in Montréal, Canada, with the transmission, main and tail rotor systems, and all fl ight dynamics built in Texas,
MUCH,
where system integration would take place – stated at the Paris Air Show at Le Bourget in June 2005 as planned for Bell’s Military Assembly and Integration Center in Amarillo. However, in March 2006, the company identifi ed Alliance Airport in Fort Worth as the site for fi nal work on the ARH. FlightSafety International joined the team with responsibility for training.
To promote its ARH solution, Bell modifi ed a Model 407 (N91796, c/n 53343) to test the MEP. The helicopter was fl own following modifi cation on June 3, 2005, and went on to play an important role in the ARH program. It was re-engined to test the HTS900-2 engine in April 2006.
Rival bids
Boeing off ered a variant of the AH/MH-6 Little Bird, with a Rolls-Royce engine and six-blade main rotor, equipped with a Raytheon AN/ZSQ-2 targeting sensor. Its team members included BAE Systems and the simulator provider CAE.
Both Bell and Boeing submitted their ARH submissions in February 2005, expecting the contract award to occur in June. But this was delayed slightly, and both companies resubmitted revised proposals on May 5. On July 29, Bell was awarded a $210.7m contract for a three-year system development and demonstration (SDD) phase for ARH.
It was envisaged that the initial four production helicopters would be procured in Fiscal Year (FY) 2008, with an additional 34, 35, 81, 90, 90 and 34 each year through to FY 2014. This plan changed as the program progressed. Bell planned to complete military qualifi cation of the Model 445 with a combined Army and contractor test team. At the same time, it would seek Federal Aviation Administration type certifi cation of a civilian version, the 417 (originally announced as the 407X). Work on the Bell 417 was cancelled in March 2007.
The pre-production ARHs were allocated the mission design series (MDS) YRH-70A on February 21, 2006. While Bell frequently used ARH-70A – including for the pre-production aircraft – it has not been confi rmed that this would have been the
Main Image: The fi rst Bell 445 to fl y was N44548, the second pre-production aircraft. The airframe was derived from the civil Bell 407, which was created by mating the rotor system of the military 406 (OH-58D) with the airframe of the 206L Bell Helicopter
Top: Bell used a Model 407 as a testbed for the mission equipment and the Honeywell HTS900 engine for the ARH. After the program had been terminated, the helicopter was used as the unmanned Fire-X demonstrator Bell Helicopter
designation of the production aircraft. The company referred to the Model 445 as the Bell ARH in its press statements prior to the allocation of the MDS for the pre-production aircraft; it is possible that it coined ‘ARH-70A’ as a combination of the program name and MDS numeral. A more logical MDS for the production examples would have been RH-70A. Similarly, the name Arapaho (Native Americans of Colorado and Wyoming) was used by the Army, but appears not to have been offi cially assigned to the helicopter.
Six airframes were allocated to the development program, including two (c/n 53901 and 53902) for ground tests, plus the original Model 407 demonstrator. The initial pair of fl ight-worthy airframes were delivered to Bell’s XworX at Arlington Municipal Airport near Dallas, Texas, to fl y in early 2006, but this was delayed. Bell test pilot Jim McCollough and co-pilot Chief Warrant Offi cer 5 Alan Davis of the US Army made the type’s maiden fl ight in the second aircraft (N44548, c/n 53904) from Arlington on July 20. A second sortie was completed later the same day. Two other pre-production aircraft (N44515, c/n 53903 and N445AR, c/n 53905) followed. One was dedicated to expanding the envelope and the others to avionics and weapons testing.
Crashing out
The fourth (N445SR, c/n 53906) made its fi rst – and only – fl ight on February 21, 2007. An emergency autorotation landing was attempted after it lost power 30 minutes into the fl ight, coming down on the Walnut Creek Country Club golf course in Mansfi eld, south of Fort Worth, Texas. The helicopter clipped trees and came to rest on its side. While the two pilots were uninjured, the aircraft had considerable damage and was written off . Bell suspended all YRH-70A fl ights until the cause of the accident was traced. It was found a plastic pipe cap had been left in the fuel tank, which cut off the supply to the engine.
The program was already in trouble before the accident. SDD costs had increased by 50%, while the original September 2008 date to equip the fi rst unit had already slipped to December 2009. On March 22, 2007, the US Army ordered work to stop. Bell was given 30 days to outline how it would put the project back on course, submitting its recovery plan on April 20. Changes to Bell’s management, additional manpower to catch up on lost time and clarifi cation of the Army’s needs all helped convince the service to stick with the program. In addition, Bell agreed to begin fabrication of the fi rst production ARH (N445LN, c/n 81001) and, using its own funds, start work on an additional aircraft each month, to prove that it could deliver on the revised schedule. An Army Systems Acquisition Review Council recommended continuing the program on May 18. It was agreed that SDD would be extended out to 2008, to be followed by a decision on low-rate initial production.
By October 2007, the three surviving YRH-70As had accumulated more than 860 fl ight hours, but costs continued to grow, with unit price increasing from $10.3m to $12.3m. Part of the increase was down to a decision to reduce the number to be purchased through to 2013 to 250, which was announced on November 30. Additional aircraft would be procured after 2013, stretching out the program and thus increasing costs, while the total buy increased to 512, for a program cost of $5.4bn.
An audit released in July 2008 revealed the program had overruns of 40%, caused by higher than projected costs for the SDD aircraft and contractor labor costs increasing quicker than originally forecast. On July 8, the Army sent a letter to Congress confi rming that the program had crossed the Nunn-McCurdy threshold (a cost growth of 25% or more above the original estimate), requiring the defense department to recertify the program as necessary for national security to continue. The department declined to do so. On October 16, 2008, it notifi ed Congress and Bell it would not recertify the program and the contract was terminated.
By then, the YRH-70As had accumulated more than 1,400 hours in the air, but development costs had nearly tripled, unit cost had grown to $14.48m and the in-service date was 2013 – four years behind schedule.
The following month, the Army started the process again, releasing a request for information for potential ARH candidates for what became the Armed Aerial Scout program. In the meantime, plans were made to refurbish and update the Kiowa, resulting in the OH-58F.
Above: The fi rst preproduction Bell 445 carrying seven-shot rocket pods. Unlike the OH-58D, the ARH carried its primary sensor under the nose Bell Helicopter
Below: The Bell 445 was equipped with AN/ALR-39B radar and AN/AAR-47 missile warning systems, with sensors on the nose and rear of the pod. This aircraft, the third pre-production example, has a wire-cutter at the top of the windscreen US Army